(5) 282

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME 1

Adams, John C. . . . . The Italian Labor Movement

Aspaturian, Vernon V. . . . . The Challenge of Soviet Foreign Policy and the Defense of the Status Quo

Backstrom, Charles H. . . . . The Social Scientist as Policy Adviser

Baker, Donald G. . . . . Literature and the Political Scientist: A Methodological Note

Belknap, George M. . . . . Motivational Research in the 1960 Presidential Campaign

Blanksten, George I. . . . . Fidel Castro and Latin America

Braunthal, Gerard . . . . . Federalism and the Party System in Germany: The Broadcasting Controversy

Cattell, David T. . . . . Changes and variations in Soviet Policies Toward the Underdeveloped Areas

Clark, Peter B. . . . . The Business Corporation as a Political Order

Cotter, Cornelius P. . . . . Technical Specialists and the 1960 Republican Campaign

Diamant, Alfred . . . . . The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed

Dorsey, John T. Jr. . . . . The Information-Energy Model

Duggar, George S. . . . . The Politics of Urban Renewal: Suggestions for a Conceptual Scheme

Epstein, Leon D. . . . . British Class Consciousness and the Labor Party

Etzioni, Amitai . . . . . The Decline of Neo-Feudalism: The Case of Israel

Eulau, Heinz . . . . . The Party as a Reference Group in the Process of Legislative Consent

Falk, Richard A.	Revolutionary Nations and the Pattern of International Legal Order
Fenno, Richard F. Jr.	The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration
Ferkiss, Victor C.	The Role of the Public Services in Nigeria and Ghana
Fesler, James W.	Comparative Perspectives of the Areal Organization of Administration
Fitzgibbon, Russell H.	Federalism and the Party System in Brazil
Galloway, Eilene	Political Science and Space Exploration
Gil, Frederico G.	Genesis and Modernization of Political Parties in Chile
Gray, Robert K.	Some Eisenhower Impacts on the Presidential Office
Gilpin, Robert	Civil-Science Relations in the United States: The Example of the President's Science Advisory Committee
Haas, Ernst B.	Dynamic Environment and Static System: Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations
Hacker, Andrew	The Corporation and Campaign Politics: Power and Legitimacy
Halpern, A. M.	Communist China's Demands on the World
Heady, Ferrel	Development and Status of the Study of Comparative Administration
Hoselitz, Bert F. Willner, Ann R.	Economic Development, Political Strategies and American Aid
Ike, Nobutaka	The Universal vs. Parochial in Japan's Political Tradition
Jacob, Herbert	Why Men Seek Political Office
Jaffa, Harry V.	Theory and Practice in American Politics

Joyner, Conrad ..... The Governor's Staff: Its Role in Image Projection

Kaplan, Harold ..... Urban Renewal in Newark, New Jersey

Kahn, Herman ..... The Arms Race and World Order

Kariel, Henry S. ..... The Challenge of Psychology to Political Thought

Kelley, Stanley Jr. ..... The Changing Uses of Television in Political Campaigns

Kennedy, Van D. ..... Trade Unions and Politics in India

Koenig, Louis W. ..... Eisenhower's Interpretation of the Presidential Office

VOLUME 2

Kroeger, Louis J. ..... The Value Assumptions Underlying Contemporary Municipal Personnel Systems

Laing, Lionel H. ..... The Diffusion of Political Ideas and Structures in the Commonwealth

Laird, Roy D. ..... Political and Administrative Implications of the Post-Stalin Changes in Soviet Agriculture

Latham, Earl ..... Two Cheers for Arthur Bentley

Lehmann, Shirley J. ..... The Crisis in Western Socialist Theory: A Continental View

Mansfield, Harvey ..... Toward a Definition of Editoral Policy for the APSA Review

Maslow, Will ..... The Legal Defense of Religious Liberty -- The Strategy and Tactics of the American Jewish Congress

Masters, Nicholas A. ..... Organized Labor as a Base of Support for the Democratic Party

Milburn, Josephine F.	Trade Unions in Politics Within the British Commonwealth, with Emphasis Upon Australia and New Zealand
Miller, Lambert H.	Economic Groups and the Judicial Process
Miller, W. E.	Policy Preferences of Congressional Candidates and Constituents
Minar, David W.	Political Theory and National Development in England and America
Montgomery, John D.	Induced Elite Change: An Examination of Western Techniques of Artificial Revolution in the Twentieth Century
Muller, Steven	Federalism and the Party System in Canada
North, Robert C.	Recruiting Policies of the Chinese Communist Parties
Ogden, Daniel M. Jr.	Trends in Democratic State Party Organization
Pfaff, Richard H.	Turkey & Iran: Political Development and the Problem of Disengagement from Traditionalism
Prendergast, William B.	Aspects of the Development of Republican State Organization
Press, Charles	Concepts of Access and Representation in Metropolitan Area Studies
Rapoport, David C.	The Soldier and the Civilian: Neo-Classical Themes
Richter, Melvin	T. H. Green and the Introduction of Philosophical Idealism at Oxford
Riggs, Fred W.	An Ecological Approach -- The 'Sala' Model
Robinson, James A.	Congressional Influence and Intitiative in Foreign Policy Making
Roche, John P.	The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action
Rosenau, James N.	Consensus-Building in the American National Community: Some Hypotheses and Some Supporting Data

Rubin, Louis D. Jr.	Politics and the Novel
Salant, Richard S.	The Changing Use of Television in Campaign Politics
Schoenwald, Richard L.	Freud as a Political Thinker
Sharp, Samuel L.	The Diffusion of Political Ideas and Structures in the Soviet Orbit
Shulman, Marshall D.	The Implications of Changes in Soviet Policy Toward the West, 1949-1952
Siffin, William J.	The Thai Bureaucracy
Silvert, K. H.	Political Leadership and Institutional Weakness in Argentina
Spiro, Herbert J.	The Contribution of German Universities to Political Theory
Stokes, Donald E.	1960 and the Problems of Deviating Elections
Swearer, Howard R.	Recent Trends and Developments at the Lower Levels of the Soviet Governmental and Party Apparatuses
Tyler, Gus	Organized Labor and Politics
Waelder, Robert	The Movements of Protest and Revolution Against Western Societies
Waltz, Kenneth N.	Kant, Liberalism, and War
Watkins, Frederick M.	The English Pluralists Reconsidered
Watts, Rowland	The Role of the American Civil Liberties Union -- In the Courts Thereafter
Webb, James E.	International Relations and Space
Weidner, Edward W.	Development Administration: A New Focus for Research
Wright, Benjamin F.	The Supreme Court Cannot be Neutral
Zawodny, J. K.	Guerrilla Warfare and Subversion as a Means of Political Change

THE ITALIAN LABOR MOVEMENT
Progress Report 1961

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No aspect of Italian public life appears to have gained more attention from American scholars than has the labor movement.[1]

[1] The student is referred to Maurice F. Neufeld, Italy, School for Awakening Countries, Ithaca, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1961; Joseph Lapalombara, The Italian Labor Movement, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1957; Humbert L. Gualtieri, The Labor Movement in Italy, New York, S. F. Vanni, 1946; John Clarke Adams, Italy, in Walter Galenson, ed., Comparative Labor Movements, New York, Prentice Hall, 1951; and John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile, The Government of Republican Italy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961, Chap. 11.

The present writer wishes to express his gratitude to these scholars who have so greatly simplified his task and particularly to this panel's chairman, whose excellent history of the Italian labor movement, published earlier this year, renders superfluous on this occasion the presentation of much material that otherwise it would have been necessary to include. I shall rely on Professor Neufeld and his book as a shield against many of the omissions in this paper and shall limit myself today to an interpretation and an evaluation of the Italian labor movement and a very provisional prognosis of its future.

American concern with the Italian labor movement has not been limited to Professor Neufeld and the other American scholars who have written in this field. Others of our compatriots have taken an intimate and active interest in Italian labor; the influence of Italo-Americans in vast sections of the American labor movement has led to the active participation of American labor in the organizatoon and the financing of the Italian unions. Interest in Italian affairs was particularly strong among the older generation of Italo-American labor leaders and it was they who were generally the intermediaries. Two "grand old men" of the American labor movement, Augusto Bellanca and Luigi Antonini (who have little else in common except the right to that epithet) epitomized this influence and in the immediate post-war years devoted what appears to have been the major part of their time and energy to observing, advising and in some cases presumably directing Italian labor.

Shortly before the conclusion of World War II the United States government officially recognized the importance of foreign labor movements and its interest in them by the institution of labor attachés at the major Embassies. The first attachés were primarily specialized political observers who reported to Washington but kept out of labor politics both in their host countries and at home. Later, as the cold war increased in intensity, some of our attachés discarded their ivory tower neutrality and entered into the labor politics of their host countries to aid and abet anti-Communist elements. The governments of such host countries as Italy overlooked this intervention in internal affairs since it was against a common enemy. This non-academic interest in Italian labor was not limited to Americans. The British unions are thought to have done their share of meddling and it is safe to say that Communist sources offered help. Big business in Italy is said to have contributed substantial but apparently sporadic assistance, particularly to the smaller federations, and obviously the mass parties have been in labor politics up to their necks.

The various attempts of external forces, foreign and domestic, to put the Italian labor movement on its feet (and incidentally to control it) have met with little success. I suggest that, given the peculiar nature of labor unions,

this outcome was virtually inevitable and that the labor movement of liberal democratic country, like its system of political parties, is not only sui generis but is in a state of flux, where the actual seats of power and chains of command are provisional and only momentarily reflected in the institutional patterns represented in charters or statutes or in the organizational charts discovered by investigators. Certain types of institutions, the TVA, for example, can spring, like Pallas Athena from the head of Zeus, almost full grown from the brain of an innovator. The formation of labor movements appears to me to be a vastly different process. Here there is a spontaneous growth that cannot be contained by an externally imposed structure or directives. Like political parties, labor unions are essentially extra-legal bodies, belonging more to the extemporaneous natural order than to the institutionalized juridical order.[2] Their structure is fluid and depends on the manner in which

[2] See John Clarke Adams, "Diritto e società nell'ordine naturale e nell'ordine giuridico," in Scritti giuridici in memoria di Piero Calamandrei, Padova, CEDAM, Vol. I, pp. 41-56.

they operate successfully at a given moment.[3]

[3] See, for example, Frank J. Sorauf, "Extra-legal Political Parties in Wisconsin", American Political Science Review, XLVIII (1954), pp. 692-704.

The Italian labor movement grew in a revolutionary environment as an adjunct to the Socialist party. Although many Italian Socialist leaders, such as Filippo Turati, Claudio Treves, and Camillo Prampolini, abhorred bloodshed or violence, Italian Socialism was essentially a movement of outcasts who neither accepted the state or the society in which they lived, nor were accepted by them. Political action of a revolutionary but not necessarily violent nature was their chosen means and according to their beliefs the only efficacious means to the realization of their goals. While certain economic and social gains were made by scattered unions, usually at the local level, the passionate interest and the panacea or organized labor was the essentially political ideal of Socialism. To attach great importance to such subsidiary matters as the economic advancement of one's own limited category of workers smacked of selfishness in the face of the major task of creating the classless society.

The revolutionary and political imprint that Socialism gave the Italian labor movement was strengthened by two other left wing philosophies, anarcho-syndicalism, primarily before World War I; and Communism after it. Both consider labor unions as tools for the propagation of an essentially revolutionary ideal; neither favors the organization of labor primarily for the improvement of the conditions of the working class within the framework of capitalist bourgeois society.

The superordination of the political to the economic in Italian labor practice also had its roots in the poverty of the Italian workers and of their unions. Even after World War I when finally something close to universal suffrage was granted and the Socialist party became notably less revolutionary, it was still on the political level, through labor legislation, that the workers' condition was improved rather than through collective bargaining or threats of economic warfare. The strikes that there were were sometimes violent and often unsuccessful; when successful they usually affected a limited number of organized workers. Political action was normally peaceful and benefitted large categories of the population.

John Clarke Adams

THE ITALIAN LABOR MOVEMENT

The advent of Fascism and the subsequent establishment of the corporate system intensified the politicization of the labor movement. Economic warfare, including strikes, lockouts, boycotts, sabotage, was outlawed, and democratically organized and financially independent unions were suppressed. On the other hand, the Fascists fostered labor legislation particularly in the interest of the white collar workers and in the field of social security. Although the economic advantages derived by the workers were often meager both in absolute figures and in the percentage of contributions reimbursed, much of this legislation, including that establishing the state social security system, remains today the organizational basis on which much of the new labor legislation depends.

After the fall of Fascism and Italy's defeat in World War II, the Italian labor movement, which had been split four ways in the aftermath of World War I, was united in an anti-Fascist democratic front. (It should be remembered that at that time, the word democratic was used to refer indiscriminately to Communist democracy and the liberal democracy of the western allies but to exclude the obviously popular totalitarian dictatorships of Hitler and (to a lesser degree) of Mussolini.) The Italian Socialist parties in exile had united to form the PSIUP (Partito socialista italiano di unità proletaria) and had joined with the Communists, the Catholic Democrazia cristiana, the Action party, the Republican party, the Liberal party, and the Democratic Labor party in a common anti-Fascist front. All of these parties except the latter two, which were not mass parties, created a single national labor federation, the CGIL (Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro), which until popular elections could be held was to be administered by a triumvirate composed of a Communist, a Socialist and a Catholic secretary, and with representatives on the executive committee of the Action and Republican parties. The union was thus an accomplished fact before a membership drive was gotten under way, while the war was still going on, and while the great bulk of Italy's easily organizable labor was still behind enemy lines in the north.

The purely political unionism of the CGIL functioned reasonably smoothly and effectively as long as the parties involved shared government responsibility. At this time, owing to the lack of grass roots organization and to the continued poverty of the local unions, little could be accomplished on the economic level.

In 1947, when the cold war affected Italy and the Communists were forced from the Government to their present position of opposition, it became obvious that labor unity through a politically dominated union would soon be an impossibility. In the following years, after various scissions, many recriminations and considerable interference, a weakened labor movement emerged, divided into three competing federations. The most important faction was the Communist-dominated CGIL, with an estimated 1961 membership of over two million; the second largest was the Catholic-dominated CISL (Confederazione italiana sindacati lavoratori), with an estimated membership of slightly under two million. Running a poor third was the Democratic Socialist and Republican UIL (Unione italiana del lavoro) with perhaps 300,000 members. Among the smaller federations two have local importance: the SILLD (Sindacato italiano lavoratori liberi democratici), a dissident Catholic movement in Torino, of which more later, and CISNAL (Confederazione italiana sincacati nazionali lavoratori), an organization with monarchist, Fascist, and corporative sympathies with local significance in parts of the south.

It is worthy of note that during this period the French labor movement evolved in the same direction, with, however, this distinction: that the French made a meaningful division into Communist, Socialist and Catholic workers, while each of the Italian federations has an equivocal nature. Thus the CGT (Confédération générale du travail) is a Communist union, while the CGIL is both Communist and Socialist. Members of Italy's major Socialist party, the PSI (Partito socialista italiano) are required to join the CGIL if they join a union. On the other hand, the federation is affiliated with the Communist

WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions). The Socialist Force ouvrière is supported by the SFIO (Section française de l'internationale ouvrière) while the UIL is virtually without Socialist political support as the PSI supports the CGIL, and the Democratic Socialists (Partito socialista democratico italiano) take a neutral stand and have members on the executive committees of all the major unions. The only solid political support for the UIL comes from the small Republican party. The CFTC (Confédération française du travail chrétien) is an openly Catholic organization affiliated with the IFCT (International Federation of Christian Trade Unions), while the CISL pretends to be aconfessional and like the FO and the UIL is affiliated with the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions).

The split (or more accurately, its causes) has necessarily had serious consequences for the political activity of the unions. The Italian working class is divided irreconcilably between Communists and Catholics. Off to one side is a considerably smaller and perhaps more sophisticated group of anti-clerical anti-Communists whose attitude toward the bigger groups is that of "a plague on both your houses". Since anti-clericalism in Italy, unlike in France, is primarily middle class, this group remains small, but it is difficult to imagine its members being absorbed by either of the larger groups. As a result political unionism in Italy has reached an impasse, and if the labor movement is to function efficiently it must change its traditional orientation.

Given these circumstances it is unfortunate that the political orientation of trade unionism in Italy has been so dominant. During the last decade almost all the few remaining unions with headquarters in the industrial north have transferred their head offices to Rome. The national secretaries of the major federations, the CGIL and CISL, are still regularly elected to parliament, and although the UIL leaders have not been so honored, the reason is one of votes, not of principle. Enzo Dalla Chiesa, for example, one of the founders of the UIL, was an unsuccessful candidate for parliament in 1958.

The labor background of these leaders is on the whole meager. From the American or British point of view, only that of the Socialist Fernando Santi is adequate. Santi, secretary of the CGIL, inherited his socialism from his railway worker father and was an active party worker in the pre-Fascist period. During Fascism he was a traveling salesman in perfume. Vittorio Foa, the number two Socialist in the CGIL, is an upper class intellectual jailed for anti-Fascism who has spent his life in public service. Agostino Novella, the Communist secretary of the CGIL, is an agreeable old-time Communist with limited labor background. The founder of the CISL, Giulio Pastore, was a writer and organizer for the Catholic Action and for the ACLI, a Catholic workers' organization. His successor in the CISL, Bruno Storti, is an elegant man-about-town with a very elegant wife. He appears to be an able politician but is just about everything else a labor leader should not be, with respect to class, social position, professional background, and apparent interests and aspirations. Whatever reservations we may have with respect to these men's labor experience, their political position is of the first water. All five are deputies to parliament. Novella and Pastore were members of the Constituent Assembly and all three republican parliaments; Santi has been a member of the last three parliaments, Foa of the last two, and the younger Storti of the present parliament.

The split in the labor front has tended to make the worker lose interest in and identity with the labor movement. The politically uncommitted worker is not attracted to the CGIL, which in the popular mind is Moscow-dominated nor to the CISL, which appears American- or Vatican-dominated. The UIL is too weak to appeal to many who are not already committed to its anti-clerical anti-Communist policy. The CGIL was also weakened by the death of Giuseppe Di Vittorio in 1957, the outstanding man in the post-war labor movement in Italy,

and the Communists have not succeeded in filling the void left by his passing. When ministerial duties took Pastore from immediate participation in the labor movement, labor suffered another loss.

To the degree that the unions operate on the economic level the split of the Italian labor movement into three major factions plus a few splinter groups altered the substance of Italian unionism less than it at first might seem. Behind the facade of labor unity in the immediate post-war years the same three tendencies, clerical, democratic Socialist, and Communist, were at odds. Now the differences between these factions are more obvious but scarcely more real. In their day-to-day activity on the labor front the unions still collaborate, as they must. Collective agreements are normally negotiated and signed by the three major confederations together. If there is a divergency, the point of view of the CGIL is generally the most extreme, but the other unions dare not stay far behind.

It is submitted that the future of the Italian labor movement lies in its ability to replace its faltering political unionism with a strengthened economic unionism.

There are indications that significant changes in this direction are on the way, made possible by the increasing prosperity of the workers. In many sections of industry today there are virtually no employable unemployed and for the first time in their lives hundreds of thousands of Italian workers no longer suffer the fear of involuntary idleness, of not being able, however willing, to support themselves and their families.

As a result the industrial workers are for the first time economically and psychologically in a strong position to bargain for economic benefits at the plant level. The workers' need for security, coupled with the weakness and insecurity of the politically oriented union leaders in Rome, creates the necessary atmosphere for the rise of new union leaders at the plant level, men little concerned with national politics or political philosophy, who owe their position not to their obedience to Rome but simply to their ability to get material benefits for the workers who elect them.

The changes are of two kinds. One is a weakening of the political influence and activity of labor; the other is an increase both on the local and the national level of labor activity in the economic field, in its negotiations with representatives of management.

It would be misleading to suggest that great strides have been taken along this line. We are still at the stage of signs and portents. So far the most spectacular inroads have been made in the CISL ranks at the Fiat works, where Edoardo Arrighi broke with Pastore, a man of ability himself, but notoriously intolerant of ability in his subordinates. When threatened with expulsion from the CISL, Arrighi founded his own union, the SILLD, and took with him over 50 per cent of the former CISL vote at the various Fiat plants.

There are circumstances attendant on the creation of the SILLD that make its rise at least superficially peculiar. The godfather of the movement was Pastore's passionate enemy, Giuseppe Rapelli, the former Catholic secretary of the CGIL (preceding Pastore in that post) and one of the most intelligent and experienced labor leaders in Italy. He gave Arrighi the benefit of his prestige and influence and was probably responsible for directing it toward its openly confessional position and its ties with the IFCTU. Professor Neufeld suggests that the wily Fiat management has probably had its finger in the pie and that the SILLD is to some degree a company union.[4] Such charges

4 Neufeld, op. cit., p. 490.

are regularly made in Italy against the smaller unions, such as the CISNAL,

and Olivetti's Comunità union, up to and including the UIL. They are doubtless true in many instances, but union leaders don't always stay bought and even company unions must deliver economic benefits to the workers, and in any case they are a far cry from the once dominant political unionism.

The CISL is not alone in experiencing the insubordination of the plant representatives. The CGIL is quite aware of the same phenomenon, but so far it has been able to bend with the wind and contain its would-be rebels within its ranks by granting them the initiative they demand. Until such time as the Communist party again seeks to impose its political line on the CGIL, this federation is in a good position to absorb new leadership of an essentially apolitical nature at the local level. In fact, as the old Communists and Socialists die off or retire, there is room for these new leaders rising from the rank and file of labor. It is doubtful that the Communist party is itself very happy about this tendency, as it must realize that these new men will be more difficult to discipline and control than were the old devoted anti-Fascist comrades who were Communists first and only incidentally labor leaders.

Other indications of a shift in emphasis in the labor movement include a renewed interest in and insistence on strike funds. Politically oriented Communist labor leaders have opposed strike funds because they have preferred political intervention to negotiation and threats of economic warfare. Communists are normally interested only in political strikes, when the workers are paraded as a symbol and portent of political pressure. The young labor leaders at the plant level have a different outlook, and as they become more responsible to their rank and file and less to Rome, the balance of power in Italian labor will shift from the political capital to the periphera.

On the national level there is also a tendency to prefer direct negotiation with management over the traditional resort to legislation. Two recent examples are the preliminary accord on equal pay for women in industry,[5] and the granting of the 11½ day fortnight to commercial workers.[6] The first accord

5 La stampa, July 20, 1961, p.6.
6 La stampa, July 23, 1961, p. 14.

carries out a provision of the Republican constitution of 1948, which according to the traditional Italian mentality would be most fittingly implemented by legislation. The unions and management, however, chose negotiation with government participation as the preferable way of settling the matter.

This change of emphasis from legislation to negotiation on the national level reflects not only the increasing difficulties encountered in seeking coordinated political action from Catholic and Communist deputies. It has been made possible by two other factors, (1) the increasing technical competence in negotiation of the labor federations and (2) the recent law making collective agreements under certain conditions legally enforceable erga omnes (i.e., against the whole category of workers and plants involved).

It is seldom wise to predict the future without hedging. Material blessings are also ephemeral and Italy's new prosperity may not last the decade out, nor even the year. With it would go all immediate expectations for the development of economic unionism in Italy, for the worker's new freedom from the fear of unemployment would vanish along with management's increased desire to placate the workers. The development of the Common Market, however, appears to encourage a steady economic growth of western Europe that should last over a considerable space of time.

A more insidious danger to the labor movement may come from the political reactionaries. The advent of another neo-Fascist Tambroni government could so charge the atmosphere with political animosities as to redirect union activities primarily to the political plane. A series of ill-advised strikes of the kind that hurt the consumers more than management (e.g., the recent railway strikes) could also stir up tensions and animosities disastrous to the cause of labor. Were this or a similar calamity to occur, the present trend in Italian labor would be reversed.

If the trend continues, however, Italy may well develop a labor movement on the lines of British and American unionism. This, as we know, is not an unmitigated blessing, but it will bring about the modernization of one of the aspects of Italian public life that in the past has reflected more the traditional static Mediterranean than the dynamic European influence in Italian culture.

THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUS QUO

by

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I

It is customary to the point of triteness to speak of the multiple revolutions of our age -- the Communist, the colonial and the technological, but what has in the meantime become obscured by the fog of platitudes is that the Soviet Union has maneuvered itself as the main reservoir of revolutionary power in each case, threatening to channel them into a single overpowering torrential surge which will wash out the old social order in favor of a new social system ordained by Soviet iedological norms.

The most imposing challenge of Soviet foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century is that it has established a monopoly on revolutionary change. The supreme tragedy for the Western World and the United States is, not that they have been boxed into becoming the most formidable bulwarks against the revolutionary tide, but rather than neither Western statesmen nor the vast Western public are consciously aware of this fact which is as real as it is unpalatable.

This is particularly true of the United States, where revolutionary verbalism and conservative action have co-existed for so long that a supreme and heroic gesture would be required to leap out of an ever-deepening quagmire of self-deception, which continually subverts the effectiveness of Western responses to the Soviet challenge.

In a world seething with revolutionary ferment and convulsion, the United States emerges as the main reservoir of opposition, without always being conscious of that fact, and indeed often imagining itself in the vanguard of the very revolutionary surge, which its policies are simultaneously endeavoring to thwart. While the image of the United States in most of the world, whether it be Moscow and Peking, New Dehli or Cairo, Accra or Havana, becomes increasingly impressed as the mainstay of the <u>status quo</u>, there has been a corresponding self-image of a revitalized and resurgent America leading the forces of freedom and reform against the Communist legions of slavery and reaction. This wide and seemingly incompatible discrepancy between the self-image of the United States as a revolutionary force and that in the revolutionary world as a conservative, sometimes reactionary, force requires critical investigation. The usual official American response is to call for a "better

selling job," or an increase in the appropriations for the "voice of America," whereas what is in fact required is not a review of our policies and propaganda, which are simply reflections of more profound factors, but a serious re-examination of the fundamental constellation of interests in American political and economic life these policies are designed to promote or defend.

The so-called "great debates" on American foreign policy have never clearly presented the issues in terms of revolution versus status quo; the American public has not been asked whether the national interest requires a defense of the status quo, or indeed what the status quo is that is to be defended. Yet this emerges as the de facto policy of the United States. Neither a re-examination of national goals, values nor interests are necessary, since there exist now sufficient platitudes to serve any policy and hence in this realm no debate or examination need take place. What is needed is a critical re-examination of the analytical scheme with which our statesmen view the world and the way they present the issues to the public. In short, to enquire whether our image of the fundamental forces and issues confronting the world today is a tolerable approximation of international social and political realities, or whether it is increasingly an image whose analytical categories are irrelevant, superficial or calculatedly spurious, designed to conceal rather than reveal. For if we have lost touch with international realities, for whatever reason, we can look forward to an unending series of disasters which will result in catastrophe for the Western World.

At this critical juncture of history, the unparalleled successes of Soviet foreign policy during the past four decades challenges the Western World to delineate more sharply the direction in which the world is moving, the forces which impel it, the positions which are to be defended or modified, and finally to demarcate and shape as precisely as possible the social, economic and political contours of the new world which is being molded in the crucibles of the present.

II

The main burden of my presentation is that since the Soviet Union has effectively, and it must be recognized virtually irrevocably, established itself as the paramount revolutionary force in the twentieth century, the Western World and the United States are ineluctably confronted with no alternative but the defense of the status quo. The main task of the West is to devise an effective general framework and strategy for the defense of the status quo. This, in turn, requires a rigorous ideological definition of the status quo to be defended as opposed to a purely physical and temporal definition. It requires, furthermore, a careful calculation of the social forces which will defend the status quo, those which can be induced to support it, and finally, those forces which are irrevocably dedicated to its annihilation.

Whereas the traditional concept of the status quo defined in physical or temporal terms is essentially static in conception, an ideological definition of the status quo is dynamic in character and at first blush would appear to be a contradiction in terms, but in reality is not. One of the great ironies of the current conflict between the forces of revolution and those of the status quo is that the latter have been incapable of demarcating what is being defended. Various rubrics such as abstract "freedom," "the free world," "democracy," "free institutions," "capitalism," etc. have served to designate the status quo, irrespective of the fact that in both theory and practice, these norms are often incompatible, inapplicable or purely declaratory and platitudinous. Neither the defense of "freedom," "the free world," "democracy," "capitalism," individually or collectively can possibly embrace the heterogeneous array of systems, ideologies and interests which they are designed to describe. The same is true of the negative spectrum of objectives, "anti-communism," opposition to Soviet "despotism," "slavery" or "totalitarianism," as the case may be. Admittedly, in a purely negative sense, "anti-Soviet Communism" is perhaps the most accurate description of current Western and American policy, although it neither an inspiring nor a precise objective. Reduced to its operational level, the shopworn clichés of "freedom" and "free world" obviously refer to "freedom from Soviet Communism" and to that part of the world outside the Soviet orbit, irrespective of any other conception of freedom. Similarly, the pejorative terms "tyranny," "despotism" and "slavery" have operational relevance

only with respect to the Soviet orbit. Otherwise, how can one explain the intimate association and support which the United States generously provides to regimes and systems far more venal, tyrannical and despotic than those found in the Soviet orbit and with none of the indisputably redeeming features of cultural, economic and technological progress which characterize the Soviet system.

The current status quo policy pursued by the West in the face of the Soviet revolutionay challenge is ineffective and doomed because its definition of the status quo is defective, being based on purely physically and temporal terms -- that is, the defense and preservation of the status quo as of any given moment in history. Such a policy is neither morally, militarily nor psychologically defensible. An intelligent and effective policy of defending the status quo can only be founded upon an ideological conception, which is at once and the same time internally consistent and dynamic in character.

Before I proceed any further, perhaps I should provide a sharper definition of what I mean by a "revolutionary" foreign policy as contrasted with a foreign policy of the ideological status quo. A revolutionary policy is not simply a policy whose objective is to effect a re-distribution of the balance of power (which can be properly termed a policy of revisionism), but one whose objective, internally as well as externally, transcends the dominant ideo-social order, seeking to overturn it in favor of a radical re-distribution of social and economic power, not only among states and individuals, but among classes, élites and castes, whether within a single country or universally.

Soviet foreign policy is thus an authentic revolutionary policy, since its objectives are not simply territorial expansion or self-defense, nor the simple propagation of an ideology or, a faith, but the destruction of the hitherto dominant ideo-social system, which it terms the "capitalist-imperialist" order, and the residual pre-capitalist social orders which are dependent upon it. In its place, it seeks to install a new universal ideo-social system modelled upon itself and the Soviet orbit as a whole. Wherever Soviet power has intruded, it has always been followed with profound socio-economic changes, the transfer of power from one class to another, the destruction of the economic foundation of power enjoyed by the former governing classes through expropriation and

nationalization. Whether these surgical operations add up to socialism or communism is irrelevant and purely semantic, but the revolutionary character of the new ideo-social system is indisputable.

A policy of defending the ideological status quo on the other hand seeks to preserve the dominant ideo-social order and its existing distribution of social, economic and political power and the culture or civilization which it has evolved into. In the present context, the ideological status quo is defined as a social and international order in which the middle class constitutes the pivotal social, political and economic group. A status quo policy would thus be not only the policy of preserving middle class systems where they are already in existence, but to bring the middle classes to power where they do not govern and stabilize their rule as the most effective and reliable instrument of social progress. A realistic status quo policy is not simply a policy of opposing all change as a matter of principle. This is only one variation of a status quo policy and historically the most ineffective. Such a policy is incapable of execution and dooms those who subscribe to it to failure and extinction. This distinction must be made since many existing social orders in the underdeveloped world are pre-capitalist and neo-feudal in character and Western policy has been, both by choice and default, placed in the unenviable position of supporting their perpetuation.

Any given ideo-social system allows a considerable latitude for variation in institutions, processes and social equilibrium. As a general rule, the more mature the system, the more variegated the internal mutations and permutations become; the newer the system, the more rigid and uniform it tends to be. In mature ideo-social system, whose dominance has been long unchallenged, these internal variations and differences are exaggerated and appear to be fundamentally incompatible until confronted with the challenge of a totally new ideo-social system.

Concepts like "democracy," "freedom," "authoritarian," etc. have relevance only when they relate to a given ideo-social system, which inevitably provides their substantive definition and operational character. It is for this reason that authoritarian and democratic systems within a common ideo-social order are more congenial to another than their counterparts

in another ideo-social framework. It is for this reason that dichotomies between "dictatorships" and "democracies," "free systems" and "slave orders" are superficial and deceptive. The current struggle between East and West is neither a struggle between "democracy" and "despotism," nor "freedom" against "slavery," but a more profound struggle between ideo-social systems, whose substantive definitions of common platitudes like "justice," "freedom," "democracy," "peace" and "justice" are intrinsically incompatible, because their reference points are two conflicting social equilibriums.

III

The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of an ideo-social system is to be found in the nature of the equilibrium of power which has been established among the various social classes which are found within the order. The distribution of power among these classes can vary considerably, from the extreme of the Marxist-Leninist image of a "ruling class," which remains a valid approximation of social reality in many of the underdeveloped countries, to an informal graduated structure of power in which different classes share in the distribution of power, not necessarily in equal propositions, but usually in a structural hierarchy, which is not rigid but mobile and dynamic to a greater or lesser degree.

A given ideo-social system is defined in terms of the social class which constitutes the social center of gravity in the system, whether as a "ruling class," the most powerful class, the most numerous, or as the social class which acts as a common bond between the social groups above and below it. Within this context, the ideological status quo which the West is committed to defend is the middle-class social order, which is the dominant, but not universalized, social system outside the Soviet orbit. A middle class social system is not necessarily coterminous with a capitalist economic order, which is simply one variation (the predominant form until recently) of the middle class order, but includes as well "socialist" states like the Nordic countries, Great Britain and elsewhere. These are countries in which public ownership of economic enterprises was implemented by middle classes, who continue to provide the main social and political leadership in their countries. These countries are usually described as "democratic socialist" systems, but they could more properly be called "middle class socialist" systems as opposed to proletarian socialist systems in the Soviet orbit. While, it is true, the former are democratic while the latter are authoritarian, the "socialist" systems emerging in the underdeveloped countries are also "middle class" in character, but non-democratic. It is important to get these distinctions straight and to keep sight of the most fundamental factor which is the class character of the system rather than the political or economic forms which the dominant class chooses to exercise its power and radiate its influence.

In the revolutionary transfer of power from one class to another, the new ruling class may perpetuate itself as a direct ruling class or it might create conditions in which class rule is in fact transformed into a distinct culture and way of life in which its social and ethical values are diffused and imparted to all classes in society. This enables a class civilization to assume political forms ranging from democracy to despotism and economic orders ranging from "rugged individualism" to a wide measure of public ownership. It is neither the political nor the economic system which imparts to a system its distinctive flavor, but rather the class origin of its way of life. Soviet society represents a proletarian culture not because the proletariat rules, but because its values and goals have been universalized as those of society as a whole.

An effective status quo policy consequently must just depend upon a clear definition of the status quo, of which an ideological definition appears to be most unambiguous and the most defensible morally as well as militarily and psychologically. Furthermore, such a definition imparts both consistency and uniformity over a wide range possibilities. A policy of the status quo defined in this manner would aim to preserve middle class rule wherever it exists and to support its rise to power in the residual feudal communities where it does not and to aid in its stabilization, with the realization that each middle class must select the political and economic system which it considers most appropriate for the stabilization of its authority.

Since in most of the residual feudal countries of the world, the indigenous middle class has already come to power or is spontaneously being catapulted in that direction, the question of outside imposition is not involved. The West is not foisting middle class rule upon the emerging countries; this is taking place spontaneously. Indeed, the greatest danger is that the West will intervene to thwart middle class revolutions and support the preferred position of the land-owning classes. This policy, instead of supporting the ideological status quo in fact subverts it. The most reliable instrument for supporting a middle class ideo-social order is the middle class itself. Unfortunately, this elementary point has been obscured, since in many parts of the underdeveloped world, notably in Latin America, American policy finds itself supporting a decrepit and socially reactionary land-owning class against

middle class revolution. Instead of relying upon a rising revolutionary middle class, which is bound to come to power, and which would contribute to the stabilization of a middle class international system, American policy undermines the status quo by thwarting the aspirations of middle classes and forcing their orientation towards the main reservoir of social revolution, the Soviet Union, whose leaders see in the revolutionary upsurge of the middle class an instrument for stimulating a continuous upheaval over which they hope to establish control as a consequence of Western opposition, and to eventually convert into a communist revolution.

IV

Contemporary middle-class revolutions in underdeveloped countries fall roughly into two classifications: (1) Revolutions directed against indigenous neo-feudal land-owning classes. (2) Revolutions directed against foreign domination, that is, movements whose immediate objective is independence. In some areas, where both foreign domination and a native land-owning class exist, the middle class revolution is directed against both forces. Revolutions directed against colonial rule have been most conspicuous in Southeast Asia and Africa. Allowing for individual variations, it can be generally stated that in most dependent or ex-dependent underdeveloped countries, native land-owning classes either do not exist or their collaboration with the colonial powers so compromised their internal position that the achievement of independence automatically results in their elimination as a significant social or power force. In many parts of Africa, native land-owning classes hardly existed at all in any event. Consequently, in dependent areas, the ouster of colonial rule automatically results in catapulting the indigenous revolutionary middle class to power.

In underdeveloped countries which were never subordinated to colonial rule, two major variations exist: (1) countries not possessing natural resources which could be profitably exploited by foreign investments; and (2) countries, whose natural riches attracted foreign investments and which possess foreign owned industrial or extractive enterprises. Thailand and Afghanistan fall into the first category, while Iran, most of Latin America, Saudi Arabia, etc. fall into the second. In countries of the first category, a revolutionary middle class is virtually non-existent and whatever impetus for change exists originates in the ruling feudal class itself and manifests itself as a "revolution from above." It is in the second type in which the revolutionary middle class becomes a significant force, which is directed against both the native land-owning ruling aristocracy and foreign economic interests.

It is this alliance forged between foreign economic interests and the land-owning classes of the middle east and Latin American which threatens to divert the middle-class revolutions leftward into the arms of the Soviet Union and which the Soviet leaders are prepared to exploit in accordance with theoretical formulations which have been renovated and refined

for more than four decades. Thus, in 1920, Lenin laid down the principal lines of analysis for exploiting revolutionary movements in underdeveloped countries, which have been, of course, since then modified, renovated, refined and adapted to various areas under a variety of circumstances. The important point is that the Soviet leaders have had at their disposal a systematically articulated theoretical framework for analyzing and exploiting underdevelopment for more than forty years. "The characteristic feature of imperialism," Lenin observed in 1920,

> is that the whole world, as we see, is at present divided into a large number of oppressed nations and an insignificant number of oppressing nations possessing colossal wealth and powerful military forces. The overwhelming majority of the population of the world...about 70 per cent of the population of the world belongs to the oppressed nations, which are either in a state of direct colonial dependence or belong to the outlying colonial states such as Persia, Turkey and China, or else, after being conquered by the armies of a big imperialist power, have been forced into dependence upon it by treaties.... We argued about whether it would be correct, in principle and in theory, to declare that the Communist International and the Communist Parties should support the bourgeois-democratic movement in backward countries. As a result...we unanimously decided to speak of the national revolutionary movement instead of the 'bourgeois-democratic' movement. There is not the slightest doubt that every nationalist movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement.... It would be utopian to think that proletarian parties, if indeed they can arise in such countries, could pursue Communist tactics and a Communist policy in these countries without having definite relations with the peasant movement and without effectively supporting it. But it was argued that if we speak about the bourgeois-democractic movement all distinction between reformist and revolutionary movements will be obliterated; whereas in recent times this distinction has been fully and clearly revealed in the backward and colonial countries, for the imperialist bourgeoisié is trying with all its

> might to implant the reformist movement also among the oppressed nations. A certain rapprochement has been brought about between the bourgeoisie of the exploiting countries and those of the colonial countries, so that very often, even in the majority of cases, perhaps, where the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries does support the national movement, it simultaneously works in harmony with the nationalist bourgeoisie, i.e., it joins the latter in fighting against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes.... We came to the conclusion that the only correct thing to do was to take this distinction into consideration and nearly everywhere to substitute the term 'national-revolutionary' for the term 'bourgeois-democratic.' The meaning of this change is that we Communists should, and will, support bourgeois liberation movements in the colonial countries only when these movements are really revolutionary, when the representatives of these movements do not hinder us in training and organizing the peasants and broad masses of the exploited in a revolutionary spirit. Even if these conditions do not exist, the Communists in these countries must fight against the reformist bourgeosie, among whom we include the heroes of the Second International. Reformist parties already exist in colonial countries, and sometimes their representatives call themselves Social-Democrats and Socialists.... There can be no argument about the fact that the proletariat ofa the advanced countries can and must assist the backward toiling masses, and that the development of the backward countries can emerge from its present stage when the victorious proletariat of the Soviet republics stretches out a helping hand to these masses.

The middle class revolutions imminent in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa as well as those already consummated or in the process of transition and stabilization are essentially a resumption of the great revolution flood unleashed by the American and French Revolutions, but these revolutions were arrested in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America by the intrusion of colonialism and the unholy

alliance forged between Western capitalism and the local feudal classes in Latin America and Asia, whereas in Africa south of the Sahara, most of which was tribal and even pre-feudal in character, feudalism was arrested and a native land-owning class did not take shape at all. The colonial authority moved in and where European settlement was possible, white colonists became a surrogate for a land-owning aristocracy leading to the development of a caste rather than class social order. This development reached its consumate evolution in the Union of South Africa. In Central America and Caribbean area, large foreign owned latifundia enterprises further complicated the socio-economic system. In general a symbiotic relationship was established between foreign investors and the local land-owning classes, which persists today. Both groups had a common interest in frustrating the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class, the land-owners because a powerful capitalist class would threaten their dominant power position while foreign economic interests feared local competition.

As a consequence, the development of the middle class was first arrested and then reshaped within the socio-economic mold created by the alliance between the local landowners and foreign economic interests. It emerged as a new type of middle class -- a class, whose social locus of power was not material wealth or ownership of factories, but the possession of special skills and the performance of certain functions.

V

The most striking common characteristic of the emergent revolutionary middle class in the underdeveloped countries is that it is non-entrepreneurial in character. It is a distorted, almost misshapen, in the socio-historical sense, middle class since its center of gravity is not the capitalist component, which is largely non-existent, but the bureaucratic-intelligentsia component: professional military officers (field and company grade), civil servants, teachers, professors, lawyers, engineers, and various white collar groups. It is a post-capitalist middle class molded in a non-capitalist setting. The absence of the entrepreneurial element is explained by the fact that investment functions in underdeveloped countries, with rare exceptions, whether in dependent or independent countries, were pre-empted and largely monopolized by foreign investors. The revolutionary middle class, however, possesses virtually a monopoly over native technical, professional and organizational talent, but feels that its power, influence and rewards in the communisty are not commensurate with its skills and services. It is this combination of skills and social resentment and frustration which impels the revolutionary middle class to power.

The revolutionary middle class is the best organized, the most determined and politically articulate social group in most underdeveloped countries. Where it has not yet come to power, it seeks power, whether by overthrowing the native land-owning classes or terminating colonial rule; where it has come to power, it seeks to solidify its control against the former ruling groups and to expand its power through modernization and industrialization. In pursuit of the first objective, it expropriates the land-owners and nationalizes foreign enterprises to simultaneously destroy the social and economic fundations of the old order and to cultivate the goodwill of the peasantry and working class, upon which it will rely as the main stabilizing ballast of the new status quo. In pursuit of the second objective, it will chance the national power of the state, which in turn enhance its own power and prestige, by quick modernization and industrialization, mainly through public owndership and centrally directed planning. Since the middle class controls the state, the expansion of state-owned enterprises automatically extends its power as a class.

Thus, the immediate objective of the revolutionary middle class in power is to entrench itself permanently by adjusting the socio-economic order to its advantage. It also endeavors to demonstrate to the working class and peasantry that it merits the right to rule as the most progressive and socially responsible class; that its goals, values and aspirations are worthy of emulation and universalization as those of the nation or society as a whole. This was perceptively recognized by the aging Stalin during one of his shrewdest and most enigmatic moments, when at the 19th Party Congress he anticipated that the middle class would fail in this endeavor by maintaining that it had already done so:

> Formerly, the bourgeoisie permitted itself to be 'liberal' and defended democratic freedoms, thus creating popularity for itself among the people. Now no trace remains of liberalism. There is no so-called 'personal freedom'.... The principle of equality among peoples and nation's has been crushed and has been replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and no rights at all for the exploited majority of citizens. The banner of bourgeois democratic rights has been thrown overboard. I think that this banner must be raised by you, the representatives of the Communist and democratic parties, and must be carried forward by you if you want to rally around you the majority of the people. There is no one else to raise it.... Formerly the bourgeoisie was considered the head of a nation. It defended the rights and independence of a nation and placed them above everything. Now the brougeoisie sells the rights and independence of the nation for dollars. The banner of national independence and of national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. There is no doubt that this banner will have to be raised by you, representative of Communist and democratic parties, and carried forward if you want to become the leading force of the nation. There is no one else to raise it.

The revolutionary middle class in underdeveloped countries when it comes to power is extremely shaky because it possesses no material economic foundation to give it permanence. This results in its social instability and imparts to it an

ideological ambivalence. This new class is capable of either establishing a new social status quo, or, in the interests of preserving itself as a ruling group, to abdicate its middle class outlook and undergo unilateral communization and continue the revolution in more radical directions. In the latter instance, it automatically subverts its own character as a middle class and transforms itself into a bureaucratic ruling class, willing to serve whatever ideo-social system that will ensure its permanence as a collection of ruling individuals rather than as a social class. This is precisely what current Soviet thinking about the future of the "national bourgeoisie" contemplates. It is a departure from the orthodox Leninist-Stalinist position on the inherent treachery of the "national bourgeoisie," which is still subscribed to by Mao Tse-Tung. The Cuban Revolution opens up new possibilities, because it illustrates an unforeseen metamorphosis of a bourgeois-democratic revolution being transformed from the top into a proletarian revolution by a national bourgeoisie, not as a group of individuals who have become leaders of the proletariat, but as a social class. In this transformation, the Cuban Communist Party has played an entirely peripheral and insignificant role. Since the Cuban Revolution has yet to reveal its complete exploitation, no conclusive generalizations can yet be extracted from it -- only possibilities.

Thus, the ambivalent nature of the revolutionary middle classes in underdeveloped countries simultaneously poses a threat to the status quo and an opportunity to preserve it. These revolutionary middle classes have the capability and the determination to come to power; they will come to power with the West, without the West or against the West. The direction they take will depend upon how skillfully the situation is analyzed by Soviet and Western leaders and how effectively the various forces working for or against the ideological status quo are calculated and manipulated.

VI

In analyzing Soviet intentions and behavior in international politics, it is not sufficient merely to dissect, catalogue and scrutinize Soviet ideological goals or the various strategies and tactics which have been devised to implement Soviet policies, but rather this must be executed within the context of the world balance of power as a dynamic and constantly shifting force. But the contemporary balance of power must be viewed in a dimension which makes itself felt only during great revolutionary moments in history, when not simply the fate of this or that state is involved, but the destiny of entire ideo-social or civilization systems. The entire structure of the Soviet image of reality and international politics, the Soviet understanding of power, its manipulation and deterrence, rests upon an awareness of this fundamental truth. The Soviet dialectical system of analysis, furthermore, furnishes Soviet decision-makers not only with analytical categories, but creates for them a unique ordering of events, relating them to one another, no matter how widely dispersed in time and space, and coordinates the effects of the various and sundry conflicting forces within individual countries as well as the world as a whole. Through dialectical analysis, Soviet leaders see events and forces in constant motion and interrelation, not statically and in isolation; are able to measure their direction and tempo, and above all are able to mobilize the energies of a world in ferment and conflict, transmuting them into political power, subject to the manipulation of Soviet policy. Marxism-Leninism emerges as a framework for the analysis, mobilization and manipulation of social and political power under a variety of conditions and circumstances, individually and collectively, separately or simultaneously.

Soviet ideology has neither invented nor discovered "contradictions" or conflicts in international politics, and we can dispense with the spurious and largely irrelevant claim to "scientific" pretensions, but what distinguishes the Soviet method of exploiting conflicts of interests to advantage is that these conflicts are seen in qualitatively different dimensions and as being in constant flux, inevitably moving to a foreordained climax, rather than being chance or fortuitous occurrences. The Soviet approach to international politics slices deeper than simply the exploitation of state and national interests in conflict (which it recognizes and exploits in any event),

searching for the more profound, passionate and explosive animosities and resentments of social classes in conflict and submerged races and nationalities held in bondage, within individual countries, continents, or the world as a whole. The Soviet analytical system provides a scheme for ordering these contradictions and conflicts, establishing priorities, differentiating them into discrete social and power equations, which can be added, substracted, multiplied and divided, as the occasion may demand or the opportunity presents itself.

It is a mistake, however, to conclude that Soviet ideology is little more than a manipulative instrument designed to obscure what is in fact an opportunistic exploitation of essentially fortuitous situations and events. It is a systematic opportunism executed within a calculated framework of analysis and action, in which fixed ideological ends are always related to means, irrespective of how erratic, contradictory and bewildering they may appear to the Western eye, in accordance with Lenin's admonition "to master the tactics of maneuver, while remaining loyal to the end to principles in the struggle for socialism."

The Soviet claim that Marxism-Leninism is a science is so obviously spurious that it has seduced Western scholars and publicists into wasting inordinate energy and time in refutations, in the naive belief that if the scientific pretensions of Soviet ideology can be disproven, the entire Soviet ideological edifice will come crumbling down and the regime with it. But the Soviet criteria of "proof" and "science" are qualitatively different from the Western; as long as Soviet foreign policy continues to reap successes, the validity of their ideological analysis is confirmed in so far as Soviet leaders are concerned. They are not likely to pay much attention to repeated Western observations that the successes of Soviet foreign policy are due, not to the Soviet system of analysis, but in spite of it.

Marxism-Leninism may not be a "science," but it is a theory of social reality, and hence a theory of power, its origins, manifestations, forms, calculation, deterrence and manipulation -- and a very effective theory. Its effectiveness as a guide to action and policy is not absolute, but relative, and in this context the only valid assessment is to measure its effectiveness against the effectiveness of corresponding analytical systems employed by Western decision-makers. A true measure of its validity is contingent upon its comparison, not with the great

profusion of theories, models, systems, processes and games devised by Western scholars, but with comparable theories of reality and analysis employed by Western statesmen as a basis for policy and action, whether they be implicit or explicit, ecclectic or synthetic, ad hoc or systematic, pragmatic or dogmatic, empirical or a priori in charcter.

Soviet ideology is not simply a conglomeration of abstract norms, whose concrete fulfillment relies upon "faith, hope and charity," but is an ideology cemented to state power. The pertinent question is not, as is often posed, "Is Marxism-Leninism a science?" Rather it is: "How effective is Soviet ideology in providing Soviet leaders with a map of international reality, enabling them to see their way through the complicated and bewildering maze of events to their objectives, as compared with the effectiveness of the maps of reality, implicitly employed by their Western counterparts?" Furthermore, in assessing the past forty years, have the expectations of Soviet leaders in world affairs, based upon the insights gained from their ideological prism, been more or less accurately fulfilled than those of their enemies? As of this moment, for example, is the Soviet expectation of imminent social upheaval in Latin America and Iran a more accurate assessment of reality than the "prayerful" expressions of the Eisenhower administration and the "hopeful" anticipation of the present Kennedy administration that social renovation will come from above? Whether the Kremlin or the administration is relatively more accurate in its estimates will play a decisive role in the reactions and r esponses of both countries to future events in Latin America and the Middle East.

Too frequently in our examination of Soviet foreign policy, past and present, we are eager to catalogue all of its errors and mistakes, fumblings and bumblings, miscalculations and misreadings, losing sight of the fact that only very rarely do Soviet leaders make the same mistake twice, that they are quick to recover and retreat, and often turn miscalculations to advantage. Rarely do we compare the Soviet record of failures and successes with those of the West, yet when all the mistakes and successes on both sides during the past four decades are added and substracted, the balance in favor of Soviet successes is both extraordinary and alarming. Too often, however, we are content to attribute the record of Soviet successes to good luck cunning, cupidity, accident, personalities, Providence, treachery,

perfidy, subversion, and Western stupidity -- all of which, to be sure, played their part, but within the given framework of Soviet analysis.

Again, it should be emphasized, the record of Soviet foreign policy and the effectiveness of Marxism-Leninism as a system of analysis cannot be profitably or validly examined in its absolute intellectual dimension, but in terms of its relative effectiveness as compared with that of Western policy and analysis.

VII

In responding to the Soviet challenge, one of the obvious questions requiring our attention is the relative validity and effectiveness of the Western system of analysis. Does the West have an accurate image of social and political realities in a revolutionary world, or is this image distorted by factors which have not received sufficient attention from scholars? Is the Soviet class analysis of forces and events in the underdeveloped world more accurate or less accurate -- again not in the absolute sense, but in relative terms -- appraisal than the Western, which sedulously avoids any semblance of class analysis. Yet, even in underdeveloped countries, leaders and intellectuals constantly analyze social and political events in class terms, and indeed, the social and political realities in the underdeveloped world can be better understood when analyzed within class categories rather than within the context of impersonal forces like "poverty," "disease," "misery," "hunger," or developed within platitudinous confrontations like "freedom and slavery," "democracy and dictatorship," "law and violence," etc. Do approximations, in varying degrees, of the Marxist conception of a "ruling class" exist in Middle Eastern countries and many Latin American states or is this simply a figment of the Soviet imagination? Is "class conflict" real or imaginary in many of the underdeveloped countries? Certainly a more critical re-exmination of Western tools of social analysis is long overdue.

In the past few decades, class categories as tools of social and political analysis have fallen into disrepute, first in American official circles, and then in the intellectual community. This was undoubtedly due more to ideological and political considerations than to any other single reason. A vast vacuum was created in the sphere of social analysis which in recent years has been partially filled by intellectual euphemisms like "interest groups," "elites," etc., which are valuable analytical instruments, but which are even more valuable when developed within the broader framework of social classes, of which they are subgroups. Standing by themselves, too many fundamental problems are left either unexplained or unsatisfactorily developed.

One of the great advantages of the Soviet analytical system is that it has been allowed to establish a virtual monopoly over class analysis. Yet, neither classes, nor class conflict,

nor class analysis were invented, discovered or contrived, by Lenin or Marx, but rather they have an ancient vintage whose credentials reach as far back as Aristotle. Before the advent of Marxism, it was eminently respectable to speak of classes, class rule, class conflict, etc. and this continued into the 20th century. One can only mention Gaetano Mosca and Max Weber, in passing, as obvious and illustrious non-Marxian class analysts. In our own constitutional and political history, references to classes, ruling and otherwise, to class conflict, etc., are profuse and varied.

What has happened in effect is that Marxists and Communists rather effectively united a valid and reputable system of social analysis with a disreputable and feared prognosis and as a result of guilt by association the respectability of class analysis was ideologically tarnished and was eschewed.

Yet, it should be obvious that a class analysis can serve to stabilize and preserve the status quo as well as to disrupt and upset it, a point which was recognized by both Marx and Lenin. Instead, the Marxist view that a class analysis inevitably supported a revolutionary upheaval was implicitly accepted and consequently it became informally but no less effectively proscribed, and in its stead grew up the view that classes, class conflict and class revolutions were nasty Communist inventions and that their existence should be de-emphasized, or, at any rate, their political relevance should be denied. What has happened, in effect, is that we have become unwittingly victimized by a disease often ascribed to the Soviet leaders, namely "false consciousness" or institutionalized self-deception, whereby we automatically deny the existence of the realities which revolt us and affirm myths as real simply because it would be most congenial if they were true. David Lawrence's obstinate refusal to believe that either Yuri Gagarin or Gherman Titov were placed into orbit is an advanced sympton of a disease which has infected much of the United States at various stages.

However, if the West is to effectively meet and rebut the Soviet challenge, it can no longer enjoy the luxury of denying what in fact exists in many underdeveloped countries: a fierce class conflict and the existence of systems, like those in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and in some Latin American countries, in which exist virtual caricatures of the Marxist image of a "ruling class." During the past year both Look and Life

magazines have finally discovered that class conflict exists in Latin America and that the land-owning ruling classes must reform or perish.

It should be noted, however, that a class analysis of the political situation in much of Africa south of the Sahara is only of peripheral significance, since Africa was essentially in a pre-class phase of development before its subordination to European rule, whereas it can be very useful in Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, taking individual variations into consideration.

VIII

In looking at the underdeveloped countries of Latin America and Asia, a realistic appraisal of class relationships in each country is an indispensable foundation for an effective policy in defense of the ideological status quo. The West can pursue a limited number of status quo policies as a consequence of a class analysis:

(1) It can continue its symbiotic relationship with the land-owning classes and support them against internal upheaval or external attack. This has been the preferred response of the West to the Soviet challenge almost universally up to only recently, although it continues to remain the de facto policy, pending a possible change. The primary support for this policy in the West derives from powerful economic interests who are reluctant to permit any tampering with the existing orders in these areas for fear that their interests will be adversely affected. In areas of substantial European settlement, pressures from this source also militate against any alteration in the existing pattern. In some countries, like Yemen and Saudi Arabia, where revolutionary ferment has not yet developed, the existing symbiotic relationships can be left virtually intact, although it must be recognized that sooner or later, a revolutionary middle class will emerge in these countries as well. Such a policy can be only temporary in any event, but the preservation of the symbiotic relationship in most parts of the Middle East and Latin America are likely fail as status quo policies.

(2) The second alternative, which appears to be emerging as the new policy of defending the status quo, is to encourage the present land-owning classes, or the most intelligent and perceptive sections, to execute "revolutions from above," by taking the initiative in introducing the absolutely indispensable minimum changes which will shift the internal balance of forces in favor of the resultant status quo. Historically, the most reliable and effective status quo policy has been the "revolution from above," whereby the existing ruling elements upon their own initiative introduce changes outside the existing social framework from above and thus avoid the violent transfer of power from one class to another. A genuine "revolution from above," of which there have been few, should be distinguished from coups d'etats and palace revolutions, where personalities and

cliques from within the existing governing class, displace one another, but the basic economic and social sub-structure of power remains untouched, whether the existing constitution and institutions are scrapped or not. True "Revolutions from above" result in a re-distribution of social and economic power among classes and leads eventually to a sharing of power by the old ruling class with the emergent classes and their eventual fusion rather than collision and displacement.

The most significant of these "revolutions from above" were those wrought by Bismarck in Germany and by the Japanese feudal barons a short time later. In both cases, the existing feudal aristocracy upon its own initiative created the opportunity for the middle classes to share power with the feudal nobility and thus was born the marriage between feudalism and capitalism in both Germany and Japan. No violent transfer of power from class to another was ever consummated.

The most successful continuous "revolution from above" has been the British, where the ruling classes have been the most revolutionary and progressive social groups in British society always introducing the necessary changes to divert revolutionary upheaval.

Successful "revolutions from above," however, can be executed only if several prior conditions exist or can be created:

(a) The ruling class, or a significant section of it, must be intelligent and perceptive; it must be prepared psychologically to share power and rewards with the rising and challenging class from below and be prepared to accept the social, political and economic consequences of this redistribution of power. It must also calculate unerringly the social forces, external and internal, for both revolution and the preservation of the status quo and introduce changes at any given moment just sufficient to shift the balance in favor of the status quo. Miscalculations on the side of either too little change or too much is sufficient to result in failure. In countries where foreign investments are substantial, external interests must also agree to share in the distribution of whatever power they command. A "revolution from above" is likely to be a dynamic and protracted affair. Its great virtue is that it rarely results in violence or general disruption, but on the contrary creates new opportunities for progress. Instead of resulting in the violent displacement of one class for another as the

dominant group, it brings about a fusion of the old aristocracy with the rising middle class and the stabilization of society as a whole. Successful "revolutions from above" are rare, the most dramatic being those of Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan in the latter half of the 19th century, while the most successful being the one still-continuing "revolution from above" which started in England in 1215 A.D., and was interrupted only very briefly by a King who momentarily lost his head, figuratively, and permanently in the physical sense.

While the new "Alliance for Progress" program is essentially an approach to "revolution from above," its success will in all likelihood be restricted to a few countries, since Latin American ruling classes have never been noted for either exceptional intelligence or perception. It will most certainly fail in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East, because of the utter venality and stupidity of their ruling classes.

(3) The third alternative is to either encourage or permit the revolutionary middle class to come to power and instead of complicating its problems, to aid in its stabilization. While this policy is likely to be the most effective in the long run, it is undoubtedly the most costly in psychological and material terms in the immediate sense. Because of the social and psychological instability of the revolutionary middle class, it will almost inevitably expropriate the land-owners and destroy them as a social class although not necessarily physically, and distribute their land to the peasants. In many cases, depending upon the individual situation in each country, there will be substantial nationalization of foreign owned enterprises, but with compensation. In countries where capitalism is not in complete disrepute because of its identification with foreign domination, instead of nationalization of foreign owned enterprises, localization may take place instead whereby local capitalists are aided in buying up foreign owned enterprises. Substantial public ownership in all countries where the revolutionary middle class comes to power is a foregone conclusion. But the "socialist" and "welfare states" which will emerge will be middle class in character, not Soviet or proletarian. This means that neither collectivization of agriculture, nor the nationalization of small business will take place, unlike the Communist or proletarian versions where the state owns virtually everything. Some countries, depending upon local factors, will emerge as parliamentary and democratic states, which is of course to be preferred; others will be authoritarian in character in varying degrees.

Since American policy normally operates empirically and pragmatically, only when the second alternative fails to work, will there be a shift to the last alternative, if in the meantime the Soviet Union is asleep at the switch. A policy in defense of the status quo based either upon encouraging and assisting real revolutions from above or supporting the rise of the revolutionary middle class is defensible both morally and historically, but which of the two methods to rely upon in individual cases at any given moment in the future requires experienced and audacious statescraft as well as a favorable shift in the world balance of power.

Current Soviet policy expects the balance of power to continue its shift in favor of the Soviet orbit. If this continues, the revolutionary middle classes in underdeveloped countries may lose their patience with the West and continue their revolutions in a Soviet direction, transforming themselves into a bureaucratic ruling class on the Soviet model rather than stabilizing the middle class revolution. Thus, in the new Draft Program of the Communist Party, Khrushchev reveals both his expectations and apprehensions concerning the revolutionary role of the middle class in underdeveloped countries:

> The world is experiencing a period of stormy national-liberation revolutions.... Young sovereign states have arisen, or are arising, in one-time colonies or semi-colonies. There peoples have entered a new period of development.... But the struggle is not yet over.... Many of them, having established national states, are striving for economic sovereignty and durable political independence. The peoples of these formally independent countries that in reality depend on foreign monopolies politically and economically are rising to fight against imperialism and reactionary pro-imperialist regimes.... The extent to which the national bourgeoisie [roughly the revolutionary middle class] will take part in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle will depend in considerable measure on the solidity of the working class and peasantry.... The national bourgeoisie is dual in character. In modern conditions the national bourgeoisie in those colonial, one-time colonial and dependent countries where it is not connected with the imperialist circles is objectively

> interested in accomplishing the basic tasks of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. Its progressive role and its ability to participate in the solution of pressing national problems are, therefore, not yet spent. But as the contradictions between the working people and the propertied classes grow and the class struggle inside the country becomes more aggravated, the national bourgeoisie shows an increasing inclination to compromise with imperialism and domestic reaction.

In areas where the revolutionary middle class meets resistance to its objectives from the West, it can utilize the implicit protection of Soviet power to transform itself into a bureaucratic ruling class ready to execute a Communist-type revolution from above -- as in Cuba -- which in the Draft Program is called a National Democracy:

> In view of the present balance of world forces and the actual feasibility of powerful support on the part of the world Socialist system, the peoples of the former colonies can decide to take... the non-capitalist road of development.... This road will require concessions from the bourgeoisie but those will be concessions on behalf of the nation.... Establishing and developing national democracies opens vast prospects for the peoples of the underdeveloped countries. The political basis of a national democracy is a bloc of all the progressive, patriotic forces fighting to win complete national independence and broad democracy, and to consummate the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution.

Whether the middle class revolutions in the underdeveloped countries establish "national democracies" as temporary way stations on the road to Communism, or whether they will establish authentic middle class regimes which will "Compromise with imperialism and domestic reation," to use the quaint phaseology of the Draft Program, in large measure depends upon the reception they receive from the United State in the pursuit of their objectives. And American reaction will in turn largely depend upon how we perceive the situation and identify

the real forces and aspirations involved in their comparative strength.

To summarize, a successful defense of the status quo will re require (1) a conscious recognition that the United States has become the bulwark of the status quo; (2) that the status quo be more sharply, systematically and ideologically defined; (3) re-examine the analytical categories and clichés which we have been using to create our image of the world in general and the underdeveloped world in particular; (4) estimate realistically the correlation of forces for revolutionary change as opposed to those who support or might be induced to support the status quo; (5) on this basis to calculate the absolutely indispensible modifications which must be executed in order to shift the balance of forces in favor of the status quo; (6) be prepared to accept the material and psychological costs which an effective status quo policy requires; and finally (7) to reverse as rapidly as possible the present direction in which the world balance of power is moving.

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THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST AS POLICY ADVISER

or

The Astigmatic Leading the Blind and Vice Versa

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Prepared for delivery at the 1961 Annual Meeting of
The American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri,
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 6-9, 1961.[1]

Why Advise?

Pressures to join social science and policymaking come from both the social scientists and the policymakers.

a. The political scientist's reasons.

The scientist, whose vocation is finding knowledge, may disdain technology--the application of knowledge. But he cannot be completely uninterested in whether other people will accept and use what he finds. Almost everyone seeks a purpose in his vocation above the joy of acquiring knowledge.

Perhaps social scientists are frustrated by a feeling of impotence in society--being able only to observe and train others. Teaching and research are, after all, rather long range in outcome. In the case of teaching, the impact of a single designer seldom can be traced in the end product. A desire to have a part in some immediate event may explain some of the attraction to social scientists of policy advising positions.

In the case of a political scientist especially, his concern as a student of power can become a fascination that leads to attempts to get a closer look at power, its nature, and uses. Seeing at real life distance those who wield power, he may develop the confidence or compulsion to try to wield it himself.

An advisership obviously is a position of power.[2] The adviser's influence on the decision maker comes through his possession of knowledge. Because advisership is

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[1]A note on method: For this paper I have deliberately turned away from erudition evidenced by quoting library sources. Instead, I am simply reporting on the intellectual and practical struggles with this problem I already have experienced countless times in a brief career in and around government. Unknowingly, a student in a field work course in campaigns gave me courage to do this. He wrote in a course evaluation that this was the "only college class where the paper was drawn from original experience rather than research. EXCELLENT." (!) Comparing notes with friends who have served in other advisory capacities in government has helped to widen the application of the conclusions.

[2]Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, 1950), p. 91.

a form of power position, we can expect people to compete to fill the position. Decision makers will turn to someone for advice. Social scientists might prefer the advice to come from themselves rather than from someone else whose knowledge by definition may be less.

Not that the political scientists' wish to influence policy is a new phenomenon. From the beginning our trade has drifted into policy advising with more or less unsatisfactory results: Plato dabbled as adviser to the tyrant of Syracuse, without the resulting state becoming the promised land. Aristotle noted the dichotomy between those who theorized about government and those with practical experience, but he had little luck advising Alexander. Machiavelli and Hobbes may have designed their works to be valuable policy advice to people who did not esteem it to be such. So there are grounds for political scientists to continue to seek the ideal relationship of a marriage of knowledge about society to the decisions of government.

b. The Politicians' reasons

The pressure from the other side, from government, to use social science is also not absent. Policymakers, legislative and administrative, in the faith that every problem can and should be solved (they have seen it happen in the physical world), turn to social scientists and ask for similar results on social problems. Even before the New Deal enlisted academic men, some politicians began to realize the inadequacy of intuitive decisions about complicated and portentions matters beyond their own experience or ability to foresee consequences. In our time, social scientists increasingly are being called to supply advice in such affairs.

There has been, goodness knows, lip service aplenty to the need for discovery of social knowledge and its application to society. Part of this comes from a plea by physical scientists themselves. Man, they tell us, needs to learn to control himself, now that they have equipped him with unlimited extension of his will and unlimited consequences of his errors.

The spectacle of mass-staffing the national executive branch with university professors (some even from west of Cambridge), must seem to some social scientists to be the millenium, even as it must seem calamitous to others who share former Secretary Weeks' attitude that all Ph.D.'s should be cleaned out of government. This recognition should please the status-deprived among us, who have long grumbled because government deciders and foundation providers discriminated against us and employed our colleagues of the physical, natural, and medical sciences. Surely if social scientists want status and recognition they are fast getting it. Now remain only the proof that social scientists merit this newfound confidence, and the successful channeling of their contributions into the policy machine.

On both scores, something is lacking.

Limits of Social Science

Before a very junior member of our profession points to its weaknesses of content or method, he ought to examine both his evidence and his motives. His more experienced colleagues may properly think that he has merely failed to appreciate the difficulty of finding out anything at all. They may correctly argue that rather than cavil, he ought to rejoice at how much is in fact known. They may discover that he has been too swift in projecting the weaknesses of his own specialties upon

the whole discipline. Finally, they may justly comment that he is the kind of man who finds it intellectually easier to criticize than to add to the field of knowledge. I must risk your displeasure, trusting that you will see my intention to be honest, my comments to be directed at improvement, and my criticism applied to myself as well as others of our profession.

Despite the new entrée accorded social scientists, we do not seem yet to have established ourselves throughout government as the firm possessors of special knowledge that is eminently worth seeking, or at least if sought that is sufficiently reliable to act upon.[3] This means in boldest form that we often do not know enough to tell policymakers what they want to know. At least we find that they don't think we do.

The social scientist, as such, seeks knowledge presumably of causal chains. The policymaker seeks to create events. The social scientist is useful to him insofar as his knowledge of causal factors can create or modify events. But the state of the best social knowledge is still so tentative that we can predict only in terms of probable outcomes of ideas. The policymaker wants help in creating events--how to do something, or what to do, given several alternatives of things that could be done.

Differences between political and other science

The format of this panel requires a distinction between social and other scientists. No doubt similarities and differences in their fulfilling roles as policy advisers will become apparent through this discussion. Wisconsin's James McCamy, in a delightful book reprinting his Alabama lectures, considers all scientists and technologists together for his general statements about science and public administration.[4]

Yet surely there are distinctions.

Physical scientists, or so it seems from the outside, are not handicapped by lack of acceptance. Two years on and about Capitol Hill made me believe that government officials seem to abandon themselves joyfully or resignedly into the hands of these scientists and uncritically to accept their opinions as the factual framework into which policy must somehow be fitted. Only occasionally, when scientists with reputations disagree publicly, do policymakers voice doubts about having to rely so heavily on advisers. I sensed some drop in confidence when

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[3]The sociological differences between the roles of the physical and social scientist as policy advisers has been attributed in large degree to the indeterminacy of their findings by Robert K. Merton. He comments specifically: "When the social scientist is virtually certain of the validity of his advice, he is, very often, dealing with picayune affairs. When he deals with the larger issues, his relevant knowledge may not be as great as that acquired by the policymaker through years of firsthand experience." "The Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy," Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 1957), p. 211.

[4]James L. McCamy, Science and Public Administration (University, Ala., 1960).

Dr. Edward Teller and Dr. Linus Pauling disagreed by showing the weakness of each other's methods and drew differing conclusions from selected facts.

Actually, true scientists in whatever field (as contrasted with mere bottle-washers) are ready to admit that their knowledge is inexact. The objects of their study appear ever more complex and less controlled than they had once hoped, and they recognize more emotional involvement in their work than they once admitted.[5]

Yet there are special problems in social science. One of these is the occurrence of events that can upset the soundest prediction of effects from causes. While it may be of little satisfaction to policymaker, his adviser can alibi, "But had it not been for that event intervening, my analysis and recommendation would have held up."[6]

My relatively limited observation suggested that other social sciences may get slightly different reception from government. Economists are among the most respected scientists of human behavior. Their association with the largely successful stabilization of the national economy makes them beneficiaries of "the general feeling that economists are experts rather than charlatans, and that there is something they really know."[7] This acceptance is a distinct gain from tne New Deal period when economists had to masquerade as statisticians in the Department of Agriculture to avoid identification and presumable Congressional excommunication from appropriations. Yet even today officials are wary of over-reliance on economists, observing how Arthur Burns, Walter Heller, and John Galbraith (not to cite extremes) can differ in their estimates of what is happening.

Psychologists (if they are social rather than natural scientists) in my scale of goverrmental acceptance, rank relatively high. I have heard criticism of their availability for purchase by both sides of criminal trials which made some policymakers skeptical. In addition, their popularly acknowledged omniscience in working with human minds makes right-wing fundamentalists shudder at their potential for left-wing conspiracies.

Sociologists have acquired new status, of differing degrees in various sections of the country, after being cited by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Topeka. But, I must confess that my narrow professional morale rose when I heard a conference of reputable social experts--academic and practitioner--conclude that they knew too little about juvenile delinquency to propose any program of government action beyond backing "promising" research and paying for training (of whom and for what they were also unsure).

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[5]Cf. McCamy, pp. 32-33.

[6]Cf. Merton, op. cit. Also Nicholas S. Timasheff, "Order, Causality, Conjuncture," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston, 1959), p. 159.

[7]William Letwin, "Pigs, Politics, and Economics," The Reporter XX (Feb. 19, 1959), p. 44.

Historians are in competitive demand in government to preserve the account of some leader or campaign. Somehow the idea has got around that historians can write up an essentially uninteresting series of events into a lucid and exciting justification of what was done.

I confess that my limited governmental assignments have taken me into no agencies that use anthropologists and other types of social scientists. Thus I remain with political science to be on safer or possibly, since you are standing on it also, more dangerous ground. Our status in government policy-makers' eyes leaves much to be desired. Observe the testimony of the National Science Foundation, surfeited with money even during lean Eisenhower budget years. The Foundation supports research and education in all of the social sciences except political science, which is too controversial, the National Science Foundation believes. Our discipline is still omitted from the Foundation's list of fellowships.

Even within the discipline of political science there are differences, of course. For example, Professor McCamy has a list of six rules of organization, with which he says any beginning public administration student can become a competent management adviser.[8] Also, area studies specialists are in demand nowadays. (But my friends on Capitol Hill complain that it is easier to get Latin American scholars to talk about what <u>should have been done</u> than to guarantee success for anything we might do now.)

The Use of Political Science to Policymakers

The rest of us are less fortunate. Let me document this from my own experience of discouragement and disillusion. As a Congressional Fellow of this Association, I tramped the halls of the House Office Building, offering my services as a political scientist--free, mind you. A score of offices rejected me. In each office my stumbling block was the question, "Yes, I know you are a political scientist, but what can you <u>do</u>?" Was I an agricultural expert? an economist? a journalist? a lawyer? The last two were in exceptional demand. Congressmen feel that these skills count. Students of the legislative process, or the electoral process, apparently had no useful skills. In desperation, I finally passed myself off as an educational expert (hadn't I taught school?) and won a desk.

I began to fear that the profound difficulty of political science is just this--a lack of knowledge to offer. The political scientist, unlike other social scientists does not deal with the content of specific programs, except as they are grist for the political mill. The millers are looking primarily for grain to grind into meal, and many of the mill hands feel no need for outside advice on how to run the mill.

a. Weakness of Political Science

As I was ready to admit earlier, there is some justification for the policy-maker's suspicion that outsiders have little basis for offering advice to government officials. We political scientists certainly have not adequately understood how our system operates. Most of us know a good deal about a particular topic, but we lack similar knowledge of broad areas. We have read each other's books and recited each other's clichés, and we have avoided asking

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[8]McCamy, pp. 80-81.

penetrating questions and searching out better answers. One does not have to dig far to identify a factual fallacy that we persist in perpetuating, be it the importance of seniority in congressional committee assignments or the nature of the independent voter.

What sorts of knowledge do government officials want from political science, and how well prepared are we to give the answers? Here are just a few questions from my own field of local government which I have been asked to answer the last year:

How big geographically should a local unit of government be?
How is basic governmental reform achieved?
How can the effects of narrow political boundaries be overcome to mount an effective attack on metropolitan-wide problems?
How can adequate (whatever this is) revenues, of what kind, be raised in an equitable manner (whatever that is) to finance essential (whatever they are) government programs?
How can a substantial increase in local school budget be made acceptable?
What kinds of campaigning yield the maximum benefit at minimum cost?
Which is the best form of government for a city of a given size and complexion?

I am aware that answers to these questions are attempted in every textbook in local government. But how usable are the answers, when much of what passes for knowledge in this field has never been verified even by careful descriptive observation, let alone more sophisticated methodology? When called upon to advise local governments, how do we offer more then the prescriptive solutions of crusading reformers of years gone by?

In the field of the legislative process, work with Congress makes me believe that most political scientists, even those who specialize in this area, possess less knowledge about actual procedures in Congress than a Congressman who has served long enough to be worth advising. I fear that most students of pressure groups do no know enough about the inside workings of the principal groups to qualify themselves to advise a legislator how to use them or fight them effectively.

If we are to supply useful knowledge to policymakers, it must be empirically correct and timely. It must, in short, rest upon insightful research and sound learning. This coincides with our scholarly objectives.

b. Defense of Political Science

What I have said does not imply that we should blame ourselves for inability to answer all questions. We merit censure only when our knowledge is inadequate because we have not assiduously sought to learn. We are not culpable and need not quail if, in spite of all we can do, our knowledge remains tentative. Our advice to policymakers need not be more accurate than that of other scientists. The area of the assumed certainty of scientific knowledge has passed even in the "hard" sciences, and we should not seek it for our own. "At last," Heinz Eulau believes, "political inquiry has been freed from the quest for certainty, and we are willing to settle for what is hypothetical, or at most, probable."[9] If we

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9"Political Science," in Bert Hoselitz, ed., A Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences (Glencoe, 1959), p. 89.

accept this condition, we may go into policy advising positions armed only with the best facts and hypotheses we can muster, always warning the policymaker that what we say is not the final truth, that we hope for more definitive answers later. It is better, this view must suppose, for policymakers to act on the basis of partial, tentative knowledge, than on complete misinformation. If we can improve the probability that he will make realistic decisions by even a few points, our efforts are well worthwhile. If we sought to over-represent ourselves as infallibile, we should soon be rejected entirely as facts changed out from under our hypotheses, even the ones that were credible at the time of their utterance. While we should not carry modesty to the point of debilitation, then, we should never lose it, for we have much to be modest about.

How Advice Comes to be Used

If the social scientist wishes to insure an improved quality of decision-making based on the best evidence, he will thrust himself forward to offer advice. Of all the misconceptions held by some social scientists, it has shocked me more to uncover the assumption that our institutions operate somehow automatically to translate specialized knowledge into public policy. Because social scientists possess knowledge applicable to current problems they seem somehow to assume that knowledge trickles down (or up) to policymakers. But there is a frightful lag.[10]

True, policymakers in their own interest should and do seek knowledge. But the crush of everyday crises in Congress, a Mayor's office, or a campaign headquarters, especially since first priority is always claimed by details and ceremonials, precludes much time for thought on major decisions.

"Every political leader worth his salt [a sage writer notes] knows that the successful conduct of public affairs depends upon maintaining contact with reality, but the determination of what is real is often beyond him. Absorbed all day long in the management of details, he usually lacks the time, even when he has the intellectual endowment, to go behind appearances and find reality. He should be relieved of the necessity. Scholars . . . should do it for him."[11]

Legislative bodies have increasingly recognized how badly decision-makers need staff assistance, but in my estimation the provision has never been entirely adequate. I have heard policymakers at the national, state, and local levels of government complain that the supply of competent advisers is never excessive. This suggests that people with knowledge may generate policy action by volunteering ideas. An influential Congressman once told me how more than one public program was belated in adoption because people who knew about serious problems delayed bringing their proposals to men who had the power to shape public policy.

We social scientists are ready to be used, then, for what we are worth. What kind of place is there for us to fit into?

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[10]Cf. Henry M. Wriston, "Humanists and Generalists," in American Civilization and its Leadership Needs, The Annals CCCXXV (Sept. 1959), p. 12.

[11]Gerald W. Johnson, Congressional Record, (daily ed.) July 2, 1958, p. 11789.

Types of Advisers

Before going farther, we should try to distinguish among various types of policy influencing by social scientists. Distinctions can be made initially on the basis of how much responsibility is taken or acknowledged to be wielded by the social scientist, and how obliged the official is to accept it.

Officeholder. Here the social scientist is elected or appointed to a public office which could be held by others. In either case he takes on a new role that bears its own responsibilities and has its own expectations apart from academic or scholarly ones. Social science training may help officeholders to do a more competent job. Senators Humphrey, Douglas, and Fulbright's scholarly backgrounds appear to have served them well. But the training does not automatically produce policymaking skill. Scientists of whatever stripe, as McCamy points out, should certainly not be kept out of office if in addition to their specialized knowledge that makesthem scientists they have the "generalist" view required of good officials. Presumably since not enough of these composite types are available, the officeholder is going to have to seek scientific advice from advisers.[12]

Not all advisers who somehow get "promoted" will make the grade as policymakers. We have all seen an eminently successful Number Two fail as Number One. As an adviser his recommendations were highly successful. As a policymaker he may display an incredible capacity to choose wrong alternatives. As adviser he easily recognized political realities, but as officeholder he may quake at grasping the nettle that is the exercise of power.

Full-time official adviser. Here social scientists are required to come up publicly with analyses and recommendations for government action. For example, members of the Council of Economic Advisers are appointed by the President, yet have specific responsibilities to others.

Part-time official commissions. Here the participants are considered civilians, but make public official recommendations to government officials. For example, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

Advisory councils. These groups are usually established by a statute authorizing some new program or sometimes are enlisted by an agency head to broaden his political support. Such committees often consist of representatives of groups likely to be affected by the program. Sometimes members are even specifically named from interest groups, or at least so distributed that organizational representation is well understood. Executive agencies may not want advisory committees to possess actual power to make decisions, but interest groups backing certain programs sometimes induce Congress to endow advisory councils with actual decision-making authority. For example, the National Advisory Committee on Education set up by the National Defense Education Act of 1958, consisting of a majority of non-educationists, advises the Commissioner of Education on the operation of the Act.

Consultants. These are one-time or continuing workers, used for a specific agency project. Or they may be municipal counselors, being available in various ways to advise to to local units.

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[12]McCamy, p. 172.

Personal assistants. Here is a staff position differing from the official adviser in that the occupant is anonymous. He differs from the consultant in working full time, and from the advisory council in having no admitted outside groups for whom he speaks. His commitment to the policymaker is the greatest of any of these positions. Examples include aides to Congressmen, the White House office staff, and confidential assistants to department heads. The personal assistant is likely to be a general adviser, perhaps the only social scientist in the establishment. Whereas the advisory council is usually a large number of related specialists whose attention is trained on a small area of policy, the personal assistant is likely to advise on a broad array of problems. He is called upon either to have an unusually broad grasp of the social sciences, or to be able to locate a particular specialist in person or in the library and pair him up with the policymaker on a specific problem.

Textbook writer. I cannot resist adding this category of adviser. For the largest number of policymakers, the only systematic social science advice they will ever receive is what they carry around in their heads as a result of a single exposure to a particular discipline through a college textbook. This suggests our responsibility as advisers to unknown policymakers to reexamine regularly what we report to be facts when we write or assign textbooks.

Distinguishing these categories of advisers is necessary because the role of the adviser, his access to power, and consequently his problems differ. Generalizations that follow may not apply equally to others than the personal assistant type, which is the one I have mainly kept in mind.

Successful Advising

If the social scientist is to be a useful policy adviser, what will he do?

1. First, the social scientist will be accurate. That is, he will not be wrong where the state of knowledge would permit him to be right. Further discussion of this point would be improper.

2. The social scientist will improve his knowledge about government through direct participation. Field experience can teach the political scientist at least as much about the objects of his study as the participants know. It can help him relate his advice to the political context in which the decisions are to be made so that it is more understandable and acceptable to the policymaker. Participation is the only way a social scientist can discover the depth of feelings about policy subjects. By revealing the informal power structure at a given place and time, participation bring yields understanding of the manner in which compromises and adjustments are made in policy. While direct participation is an inefficient process through which to gain knowledge, in terms of time invested, certain kinds of knowledge can be discovered in no other way.

3. The social scientist will need to be a loyal staff man. In order to be listened to, the adviser has to gain the confidence of the policymaker. After the election, President Kennedy was reported to be appointing officials without having met them, on the apparent basis of their Harvard ties alone. Generally, however,advisers have not been given such automatic access. An official goes out on a limb of his adviser's choosing when he acts on advice. Even though he asks questions and pushes his adviser to the wall on conclusions, he ultimately relies in part on the adviser— if the policymaker had independent knowledge, he would

need no adviser. Confidence springs first from some other characteristic than the quality of the advice, because this quality cannot be judged until it has been followed. Speaking without data on this interpersonal relationship, I would guess confidence originates in personal characteristics such as energy, or skills like vocabulary, and in mutual group membership. Here is where party affiliation may play a large role. Before a policymaker even dares to seek advice, he wants to assure himself of a minimal measure of the adviser's loyalty to him. He cannot risk an honest exposure of his lack of knowledge to someone unscrupulous enough to use it against him. He dares not explore radical alternatives that may eventually be discarded unless he knows that only the final decision will leave the room. He hesitates to explore strategy except with someone who will gain from his victory. Those who are cynical about the relevance of party in government could never have observed the effects of the feeling of identification it produces between "us" as opposed to "them." Having the same party affiliation provides the basic minimum confidence in the adviser. Recommendation of intimate personal friend or other group ties may accelerate the development of trust between adviser and policymaker.

A personal example again: While looking for a Congressional office in which to serve, I tried several Republican members. Sponsors of the Fellowship feared that the lack of balance between Republican and Democratic fellows might prejudice the program. But, before long in each interview I received a question about my party affiliation. I said I was independent, but this always disqualified me. One staff man dismissed me by saying, "We don't need any independent help."

Commitment to the policymaker involves a sacrifice by the social scientist in respecting the confidential nature of the relationship that develops. He gives up the opportunity to tell everything about what is going on to the academic world.[13] A friend of mine who served as top assistant to a governor found that while this experience eminently qualified him to write a textbook on state government, he dared not print much of what he found out. It would have jeopardized the ongoing administration and cut off his future access entirely.

4. The social scientist will be prepared to recommend as well as study. Policymakers simply are not going to let their advisers rest when the advisers have analyzed the alternatives. They expect experts in the field to move beyond statements of what causes what else to happen and to suggest also what needs to be done. We recognize the second step to be applying value judgments to factual analysis of empirical data. While often indistinct, this step is professionally a crucial one. Policymakers may recognize a fact-value distinction but be unwilling to acknowledge it publicly.[14] Any scientist who purposely or carelessly blurs the step violates both an ethic of responsibility and an ethic of science. The social scientist can explain to the policymaker that they have reached the point where experts disagree. This is the point, because it does involve values, at which people outside of his field are also competent to speak.

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[13]Don K. Price, Government and Science (New York, 1954), p. 133.

[14]Price, p. 103.

The scientist is not expected to give up his right as a citizen to make commitments and to express his views and preferences from whatever biases he may have. But, he can be expected to separate these in his own mind from his scientific fact-finding, and to make his assumptions entirely clear to the policymaker he is advising.

5. The social scientist will fight for his conclusions. The idea that somehow an adviser can submit his facts to his superior and expect them to be accepted is, I believe, delusion. The social scientist especially is going to have to be prepared to argue for his conclusions and even for his facts. I cannot say how universal to science this requirement is. At least in the social sciences defense of facts is required because of the well-known tendency of laymen to generalize from limited experience and biases. This makes everyone who has been to school an expert on parenthood, everyone who has met a payroll an expert administrator, and everyone who has run for office an expert politician.

In the face of such certain "knowledge," the social scientist cannot just put his facts or his conclusions in the nature of advice on the stump and expect them to be picked up. He must explain, defend, argue, and insist. A personal example: With several others I was retained (or whatever the word is for someone who gets no retainer) by the aldermen of my political persuasion to analyze an opposition redistricting plan for the wards of our city. Despite the use of a detailed study of election returns in the city that had just proved its strategic usefulness in two hard-fought election campaigns, most of the aldermen were unprepared to accept the results as meaningful in redistricting. Their own impressions, based on faulty memories built up from years of incomplete newspaper reading and lackadasical campaigning stood in the way. The political scientists needed the most vigorous attack and hard-boiled confrontation by evidence to persuade the aldermen that they were being gerrymandered. One of the bitter participants in the study called the encounter a "battle of the egg-heads against the knotheads."

Yet the social scientist cannot demand that his advice be accepted as the condition upon which he will serve the decision-maker. The adviser must understand that incompatible values must be balanced off, the readiness of publics at the time to accept certain programs or of elected representatives to stake their futures on those programs must be thought out. Policy advisers must be humble enough to recognize that their kind of fact is only one kind. Political, ethical, and personal facts also go into a decision.[15] In the redistricting example cited, the social scientists were not trying to dictate the policy of the aldermen, rather to insure that the aldermen decided on the basis of knowledge that was available and its implications for their goals.

6. The social scientist will beware of being used for non-scientific purposes. Sometimes policymakers desire to use the public image of the social scientist--an impartial, non-partisan, expert--to buttress predetermined stands. This is not necessarily dishonest. A politician is, after all, in the business of building support. He often knows in advance what he wants to do. If

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[15]McCamy, p. 178.

a scientific study will help him enact a program he favors, why should he not use it? The major concern of the social scientist here is that violence not be done to his work or to the reputation of science by its misuse. His first protection is to be cautious about whom he advises. After that he will wish to draw a line beyond which he will not step in the day-to-day exercise of his job. If called upon to cross the line, he will warn the policymaker of the gravity of the request. If forced, he may wish to terminate the relationship.

Not every decision will be this clear. If the issue is to use or not use data, the question becomes whether the social scientist compromises his discipline by participating in some less-than complete revelation of the truth. How long can one "advise" like this without "selling out?" To what degree can one operate in such a relationship without prejudicing his roles as observer and explainer, and perhaps as critic of policymakers and policymaking?

My experience assisting a liberal Southern Congressman exemplifies this kind of conflict. I was asked to prepare his testimony against pending civil rights legislation. He had to appear or risk defeat by a Dixiecrat opponent. He wanted an analysis of how presently operating programs for human betterment would be jeopardized by making them serve the cause of enforced integration. The Congressmen thought it would be an invaluable learning experience for me to stand in the position of a Southerner. Assisting him in this delicate matter held promise of even greater access to the workings of his mind and of Congress.

I venture that all of us at some time in our professional lives have made a compromise in order to gain or maintain a position from which to achieve larger goals. Is the aim to achieve a sounder policy in a larger area? Is the aim to gain greater access to improve the scientist's knowledge and thereby the quality of his future advice? What is the price, and is it worth paying? In the vocation of politics, Max Weber pointed out, man treads a narrow path between responsible uses of power and sins of its misuse. He must look sharp to avoid being swallowed by the ethical paradoxes politics poses.[16]

7. The social scientist will be cautious of success as an adviser. Although initial confidence in an adviser may arise from personal and partisan bases, the policymaker's experience in following advice becomes the adviser's functional test. News reports indicate that President Kennedy in dismay has had to begin weeding out the advisers who predicted poorly. This is what happens if the adviser fails. If he at first succeeds, another danger arises, the danger that the policymaker may commit himself too completely to the hands of his adviser. The frustration of not having advice heeded can be surpassed only by the frightening weight of responsibility when it is followed uncritically.

In the local voting behavior study I mentioned earlier, my colleagues and I had done exhaustive statistical research. But when strategy was based on our data, we became haunted by the apprehension that our hypotheses might be wrong and that the whole enterprise might be disastrous because it followed our suggestions. When our work proved reliable twice in a row, we found our principal discomfort became requests to undertake more difficult responsibilities of a related nature which had decreasing chances of success. We were soon over our heads.

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[16]Max Weber, "Politics As A Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York, 1958), pp. 115 ff.

Conclusion

Social scientists do advise policymakers now. Not always, however, are we as influential as we might be, and not always is our advice as useful as it might be. We have the obligation to strive to become better social scientists. As we improve our knowledge and as we learn to offer advice in a manner that facilitates its use, I believe we will merit a larger role in enlightening public policy. Then our knowledge will be more often sought by policymakers. Or, if officials do not ask for our advice, we can ourselves insure that we are heard before social decisions are made.

LITERATURE AND THE POLITICAL SCIENTIST: A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

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I

The mounting interest of the political scientist in literature, reflected in numerous articles and the APSA panels on "The Political Novel" in 1960 and 1961, necessitates an appraisal of the present and future directions of research in this realm. From an assessment of the merits and limitations of previous studies,[1] most of which have appeared since 1955, insights might be derived about subsequent analyses which would be of value.

It appears that the impetus for political studies of literature was generated by Joseph Blotner's essay, The Political Novel, in 1955, which called for systematic studies of political literature. These, he claimed, would provide the investigator with

> a vivid record of past events, an insight into the nature of political beings, or a prediction of what lies ahead . . . . As an art form and an analytical instrument the political novel, now as never before, offers the reader a means for understanding important aspects of the complex society in which he lives, as well as a record of how it evolved.[1]

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[1] These studies are of diverse types. They generally discuss the political milieu per se, trace the influence of the political milieu on the writer, analyze an individual writer's view of politics, trace some aspect of political life discussed in literature, suggest political aspects of literature which merit exploration, or pose techniques for pursuing such studies. The following represent a cross-section of these approaches: Joseph Blotner, The Political Novel (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955); Irving Howe, Politics and the Novel (New York: Meridian Books, 1957); Morton Kroll, "Politics in Literature," PROD, III (January, 1960); Rowland Egger, "The Administrative Novel," APSR, LIII (June, 1959); John P. Roche, "Political Science and Science Fiction," APSR, LII (December, 1958); Henry V. Jaffa, "The Limits of Politics: An Interpretation of King Lear, Act I, scene I," APSR, LI (June, 1957); Allan D. Bloom, "Cosmopolitan Man and the Political Community: An Interpretation of Othello," APSR, LIV (June, 1960); Andrew Hacker, "Dostoevsky's Disciples: Man and Sheep in Political Theory," Journal of Politics, XVII (November, 1955); and Martin Kessler, "Power and the Perfect State: A Study in Disillusionment as Reflected in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Huxley's Brave New World," Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (November, 1955). See also the four papers presented on "The Political Novel" panel at the 1960 APSA convention. These included: James F. Davidson, "Political Science and Political Fiction"; Duane Lockard, "The Political Novel as a source of Popular Misinformation"; Merle Kling, "C.P. Snow's Image of Political Process: THE MASTERS"; and Donn V. Hart, "Overseas Americans in Southeast Asia: Fact in Fiction," subsequently published in Far Eastern Survey, XXX (January, 1961).

[1] Blotner, p. 1. Blotner's study appeared in 1955. Much earlier in its origins, Morris Speare's The Political Novel: Its Development in England and America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) suggested avenues of possible exploration, but it apparently fell on uninterested ears.

Blotner, like most subsequent investigators, limited his scope of analysis to those novels in which political figures occupy major roles. Hence, "the prime material is the politician at work: legislating, compaigning, mending political fences, building up his career."[2] Novels, to be classified as political by Blotner, must include the "portrayal of political acts, so many of them that they form the novels' main themes or, in some cases, a major theme."[3] The implications of Irving Howe's definition in Politics and the Novel are somewhat broader: there the political novel is that work in which "political ideas play a dominant role or in which the political milieu is the dominant setting."[4] In one of the few articles that examines the wider meaning and value of literature to the political scientist, Morton Kroll indirectly concedes that the novel must include a political figure or setting. For the political analyst, such literature is conducive to "understanding a political group or personality" or for "grasping the complexities of a political decision."[5]

Politcal studies of literature are generally of three major types: (1) case studies, (2) comparative analyses, or (3) those that trace the manner in which the political environment influences the writer. In case studies, the investigator analyzes the political values of a specific literary figure or traces the treatment of one political concept by various writers. The political views of numerous individuals are compared and contrasted in the comparative studies, while in political milieu studies the factors contributing to changes in political attitudes and values of literary figures are examined. These approaches are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.

The value of these studies to political science is readily perceptible. However, there are specifice predispositions of contemporary political science that have restricted the maximum use of literature. Three of these, which are explored more fully in Appendix B, include (1) specialization and the partitioning of knowledge, (2) overemphasis of natural science methodology, and (3) a predisposition for case studies. Political science is not alone in having fallen prey to one or more of these limiting influences. To a varying degree, similar proclivities are evident in other disciplines in social sciences, humanities, and science. Continually impelled toward greater specialization in his own discipline, the political scientist has, as a consequence, been isolated from other fields, including literature. Consequently, his nonacquaintanceship with literary materials has concealed its political limitations from him. Secondly, the reliance on natural science methodology, including the emphasis on empiricism, predisposes the political scientist to reject literary data on the assumption that it is non-quantifiable. Thirdly, thepredilection for case studies of usually well-defined and comparatively restricted dimensions has led the political scientist to reject outrightly broader literary studies or led him to accept narrowly-focused studies that miss the full implications of the data analyzed.

Studies of literature have been of value, but there is a need for less restricted analyses. Freed of those bindings that have impaired his study of literature, the political scientist, by using alternative methods of analysis, can expand his intellectual horizons. Various methods for achieving this are possible, and the one suggested below is neither conclusive nor final.

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2 Blotner, pp. 1-2.

3 Ibid., p. 2.

4 Howe, p. 17. Speare, p. 27, states that the political novel "leans rather to 'ideas' than to 'emotions.'" But here, too, Speare concedes the need for the presence of a political figure.

5 Kroll, PROD, III, pp. 5-6.

II

Initially, in the political analysis of literature, wider dimensions should be utilized. Those discussed here are suggestive, exploratory and heuristic rather than conclusive or final, in their nature. Thus, a broader definition of politics is essential, The exclusion of novels in which no political figures appear hampers the very nature of any study. Politics, as the Greeks clearly understood, is the "master science," and the arfairs of the polis include all questions and issues pertaining to education, religion, social standards, modes of conduct, and the future of society. Of necessity, these issues must be resolved by the body politic, either through the formal political structures or the "non-political" institutions of society.[6] Thus construed, the study of politics in literature acquires new dimensions, and the politician per se represents but a single facet of such analyses. Political figures, systems, processes, and ideologies; discussions of political topics by literary figures; and analyses of the role and influence of the political milieu in shaping values, attitudes, and perceptions of the writer--all warrant consideration in the political study of literature.

Questions or issues, essentially of a hortative nature, structure to some extent the focus of the political scientist 's interest. These include:

(1) The extent to which writer and society are shaped and influenced by the political milieu;
(2) the extent to which the subject politics is included in diverse types of literature;
(3) views of politics that may be discerned;
(4) patterns or changes that occur in such views;
(5) factors which account for such variations; and
(6) the role and relationship of the literary figure to his society

These questions are suggestive, not mutually inclusive. Others, of comparable importance, emerge from sociological studies on literature and society, and with these the political scientist must acquaint himself. A few comments on these studies illustrates their significance and, indirectly, provides the political analyst with additional dimensions of analysis.

In her assessment of the relationship of fiction to society, Ruth Inglis concluded that there are two basic views pertaining to the role and function of literature. These she termed the "reflection theory" and the "social control theory." "The reflection theory holds that literature reflects society; the control theory, that it shapes society."[7] Milton C. Albrecht, in two more recent articles, has qualified this. In addition to "reflecting" or "shaping" society, literature occupies another role, namely, "to maintain and stabilize, if not to justify and sanctify the social order." It is this which Albrecht terms the "social control theory."[8] In his estimation, it is evident that "literature reflects predominantly the significan values and mores of a culture."[9]

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[6] On the contemporary scene, these non-political institutions would include the Parent-Teachers Association, the board of education, the labor union, the local club or organization, or any ad hoc body organized for or in some way determined to influence political bodies or the community in pursuing particular policies.

[7] Ruth A. Inglis, "An Objective Approach to the Relationship Between Fiction and Society," American Sociological Review, III(August, 1938), p. 526.

[8] Albrecht, "The Relationship of Literature and Society," American Journal of Sociology, LIX(March, 1954), p. 426; cf., Albrecht, "Does Literatrue Reflect Common Values?" American Sociological Review, XXI(December, 1956).

[9] Albrecht, American Journal of Sociology, LIX, p. 426.

Hugh Duncan, in Language and Literature in Society, distinguishes four basic functions of literature, namely: (1) as great art, (2) as magical art, (3) as make-believe, and (4) as a social institution.[10] Literature, as great art, is the "creation of forms through which we consciously explore means and ends of action."[11] Here the writer explores the question of what is the "good life" and the course of action and conduct society and the individual must pursue. Magical art serves to "inspire us to practical actions held desirable within institutions controlling a society."[12] In the totalitarian society, Duncan suggests, the author is enlisted to project the ideals of that system in his writings. This, consequently, is classified as magical art.[13] Make-believe literature, on the other hand, often serves as a cathartic agent. Here are found expresseions or feelings of hostility and antipathy which, because of the fear of possible recriminations, neither writer nor reader wish to express openly.[14] As a social institution, literature fills an educative function in bringing readers into contact with views expressed by fictional characters who are much like themselves. This point is developed more fully in the studies of Inglis and Albrecht.

Clearly, these approaches have political implications. If literature "reflects" societal values, it is evident that it must reflect the political values of that society. Similarly, if literature "shapes" societal values, the shaping of political values is implicit in this. As Albrecht has noted, literature also has a social control function, and the political aspects of this should be explored. Likewise, Duncan's analysis projects functional aspects of literature that are politically significant.

Herbert Bloch, in a suggestive article, has argued that a distinction must be made between the "social significance" and the "sociological significance" of literary data. The social significance of literature is determined by the extent to which that material faithfully reproduces problems as they exist in society. In analyses of the sociological significance of literature, questions of a more fundamental nature must be answered. These include:

> (1) why the work came to be written or created at all, (2) what relationship it has to other works of art in the same field and to works in other fields of artistic expression, (3) why it has come to be accepted or rejected at a given period of historical development, (4) what basic values in the culture it expresses other than the problem-aspect, and (5) which is very important, why it has come to be cast in the particular form used by the creative artist.[15]

Set in a political context, such questions open new vistas of exploration, and the answers to these will provide insights into "the values which the culture is expressing or towards which it is heading."[16]

However, it is clear that if the political climate is to be analyzed, even broader dimensions and methodological approaches are necessary. Karl Mannheim, in the conceptual framework he has devised for exploring the weltanschauung of

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10 Duncan, Language and Literature in Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). In the order they are cited, see pp. 3-9, 20-41, 42-57, and 58-74.

11 Ibid., p. 20.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., pp. 20-21.

14 Ibid., p. 42.

15 Bloch, "Towards the Development of a Sociology of Literary and Art Forms," American Sociological Review, VIII (June, 1943), p. 314.

16 Ibid., p. 315.

a period, merits greater attention from the political scientist.[17] Of central concern to Mannheim is how the investigator can determine the "global outlook" or weltanschauung of an epoch, and, in the process, emerge with an interpretation that is both comprehensive and plausible.[18] A major difficulty, Mannheim notes, is that specialization, and particularly the demand that all materials be quantified, has distorted or rendered impossible cultural or "human studies." To analyze cultural phenomena, which "differ essentially from the natural sciences,"[19] it is necessary to "emancipate oneself from the methodological principles of natural science."[20]

Weltanschauung, as Mannheim explains, lies outside the province of theory. It is "a-theoretical," and the effort to superimpose a theoretical framework or structure on society at the wrong moment results in "entire vast provinces of cultural life" being made "inaccessible to historical synthesis."[21] Thus:

> The paradoxical nature of theoretical thought, distinguishing it from other forms, consists in this, that it seeks to superimpose a logical, theorectical pattern upon experiences already patterned under other--for example aesthetic or religious--categories.[22]

To comprehend the weltanschauung of a period, it is first necessary to grasp the original meaning of phenomena. This demands a "phenomenological analysis" of these phenomena as "cultural objects."[23] Following this procedure, it is often possible to transpose a-theoretical aspects of the weltanschauung into "theorectical, scientific terms."[24]

Mannheim questions, then concludes in the affirmative, that a weltanschauung is a cultural object which can be analyzed. Cultural objects are classified as "immediate" or "mediate."[25] An immediate object is itself present, and its meaning is directly derived from it. However, if the object is given mediately (e.g., the global outlook or weltanschauung), then other objects are present in its stead and fulfill diverse "mediator roles." Thus, in mediate presentation, an object that is "apprehended as being there in its own right can, and indeed must, also be conceived as standing for something else....."[26]

Cultural phenomena display three distinct levels of meaning: (a) an "objective meaning," (b) an "expressive meaning," and (c) a "documentary or evidential meaning."[27] Natural science methodology holds that an object must be percieved as a "thing in itself," and that its meaning is derived wholly from it. This is the objective meaning (culturally defined) of the object or phenomena. Thus, a novel may be analyzed and its objective meaning determined. However, this ignores its broader meanings--its expressive and documentary meanings--which also merit consideration.

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17 His essay, "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung," in Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 33-83, is utilized for this analysis.

18 Ibid., p. 33.
19 Ibid., p. 35.
20 Ibid., p. 37.
21 Ibid., p. 38.
22 Ibid., p. 39.
23 Ibid., p. 42.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 43.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 44.

To distinguish the characteristics of objective, expressive, and documentary meanings, Mannheim suggests the example of a man who stops on the street to give alms to a beggar. Clearly, this is an act of "assistance"--the objective meaning of the act(or cultural object), and the "distinguishing mark of such a meaning is that it can be fully grasped without knowing anything" more about the act itself, the giver, or the beggar.[28] There are other levels of meaning to the act. The intent of the giver in rendering assistance may have been to evoke a feeling of sympathy from onlookers or the beggar. Thus, the act is also "the vehicle of an entirely new kind of meaning", an expressive meaning, which, in this instance, can be designated as mercy, kindness, or compassion.[29] Still another level of meaning is discernible here. The investigator, upon further reflection and analysis of the giver, discovers that the motivation underlying the assumed act was, in fact, one of hypocrisy. This is the evidential or documentary meaning of the act, and neither the act itself nor what the giver "wanted" or "meant" the act to convey to others is of great significance except as indicative of his hypocrisy.[30] In understanding the evidential meaning (i.e., hypocrisy), the investigator is close to comprehending the global outlook of this individual and how it directs his life.

As Mannheim indicates, it is necessary for the cultural analyst to utilize such techniques of analysis. All, and especially the last type of interpretation, exemplify "an indispensable more of understanding" the cultural world.[31] Thus, it is clear that the investigator who is content with objective meaning of cultural objects and who attempts to drew inferences from a number of such analyses of the objective meanings of phenomena either ignores or distorts the expressive and evidential meanings.

Literary data may be analyzed within this framework. The artist is almost fully cognizant of the objective and expressive meanings of his work, for they are often the direct result of his conscious efforts. The documentary meaning, however, is both unintentional and unconscious on his part; this, it might be claimed, is the "'ethos' of the subject which manifests itself in artistic creation."[32] Through close and systematic analysis, the investigator can determine the evidential meaning of a writer's works. Sometimes, a segment, at other times, the entire body of a writer's works needs to be analyzed for this purpose.

Within limitations, it is possible to treat the evidential meaning of cultural objects (such as a weltanschauung) in a scientific manner. This is achieved by extracting or "detaching certain elements or units"[33] of the object and "fusing them into validly ascertainable objects of higher generality by using appropriate categories and conceptualizations."[34] There are limitations to this, however, as Mannheim warns:

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28 Ibid., p. 45.
29 Ibid., p. 46.
30 Ibid., p. 47.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 55.
33 Ibid., p. 73.
34 Ibid.

> . . . those who accept the degree of precision attained in exact natural science as their standard . . . will not admit that we have "knowledge" of anything unless this condition is satisfied. . . . . But we should be compelled to disclaim the possibility of knowledge in vast areas of exploration, if we took such a rigid standard literally, instead of calling to mind that each area, as it were, lays down the requirements, the limits, and the nature of possible theoretical analysis, so that criteria of exactness cannot be transferred from one field into another. There are data which can be treated mathematically; others may be described in terms of different but still uniform regularities; still others are uniquely individual but nevertheless display an inner law of their unique structure, an inner consistency which can be described conceptually; and finally, there are some in respect of which all theory must limit itself to an "indication," "approximation," or "profiling" of certain correspondences . . . .[35]

Thus, there remain relatively unexplored--and oftentimes not clearly perceived--facets of literature. Methods of political analysis presently utilized are not fully adequate in the treatment of these materials. However, the dimen- of possible analysis suggested by such individuals as Albrecht, Inglis, Duncan, Bloch, and Mannheim provide, at least for the present, a substantial set of dimensions for explorations of the political implications and significance of literature.

III

An investigation, presently in progress, "Political Values in Twentieth Century Popular Fiction," follows closely the suggestions developed above; and the preliminary findings of this yet uncompleted study illustrate the value of such analyses. Initially, the methodology, approach, and dimensions utilized warrant explanation. The purpose of the study is to explore political values found in those novels that have been most popular during this century. The ten most popular novels for each year, or more than 600 books for the 1900-1960 period, are analyzed.[36] Presently, the analysis for the period 1919-1959 has been completed, and it is on this material that the present commentary is based. In all, 413 novels have been analyzed.[37]

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35 Ibid., p. 71.

36 The tem most popular novels--the best sellers for eaan year--are compiled annually in Publishers' Weekly magazine. Alice Payne Hackett, in 60 Years of Best-Sellers: 1895-1955 (New York: Bowker, 1956), has taken these annual lists for the period noted and compiled them. There are reservations to the use of such a criterion of popularity (i.e., those novels which had the highest retail sales in any given year), but this remains the most objective and systematic criterion available for determining popularity. See the discussion of this in Donald G. Baker, "Political Values in Popular Fiction: 1919-1959" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Doctor of Social Science program, Syracuse University, 1961).

37 There are 413 novels rather than 410 because, in three years (1922, 1926, and 1935), two books tied for tenth place, and both were included in the analysis.

Basically, there are three purposes to the study: (1) to determine the impact of the political milieu on the writer and, indirectly, on the readers of popular fiction; (2) to assess, in a broad sense, the views of politics held by popular novelists; and (3) to discern factors that account for trends or variations in the political views and values of these novelists. The types of answers demanded and the volume of materials analyzed necessitated the formulation of approaches and techniques that would assure the maximum use of such data. Consequently, what might be termed quantitative, topical, and conceptual methods of assessment were utilized. These are not mutually exclusive but often overlap. Nevertheless, this does not impair their utility. A few brief comments on each should suffice in suggesting their functions.

Quantitative method. Intuitive impressions of changes, whether of a political nature or otherwise, may be concretely ascertained through quantitative assessments. As indicated elsewhere, not all materials are amenable to strict quantitative analysis. Large bodies of data, such as fiction, are too disparate for minute statistical analysis. However, when broader categories or classifications are utilized, the major trends or patterns emerge. Thus, the investigator may trace these. For instance, the major orientations of popular fiction (e.g., whether they are middle class, historical, agrarian, adventure, or religious) may be classified, and the degree to which these types appear at particular periods enables the investigator to draw inferences about the impact of the political milieu in shaping the values of the novelist.

Secondly, the degree to which such subjects as war and politics are found in popular fiction can be roughly measured. Thus, if the general topic of politics is broken down into such categories as (1) politics in general, (2) the political process, (3) the politician, and (4) political systems, the extent to which these appear may be classified in terms of such dimensions as (a) not included, (b) briefly mentioned, (c) occupies a major or minor role or theme, and (d) occupies a major role or theme. When analyzed in these terms, the patterns, clusters, or variations that occur over a chronological period are assessable. War, as a general topic, may be analyzed with similar dimenstions.

Thus, it is possible, through rough approximations such as these, to define or isolate patterns and trends and compare them with characteristics of the political environment.

Topical method. Specific topics, particularly of a political nature or having political implications, may be explored in some depth. The quantitative methods discussed above contribute to an understanding of such topics. Three in particular have been traced in this study: (1) political history, (2) war, and (3) politics. Novelists' views of the nation's political history are illuminating in what they reveal about the political environment of that period in which the novelist was living. Thus, the manner in which twentieth century novelists have treated such topics as (a) the nation's Revolution and Founding period, (b) the Civil War era, and (c) the period of national expansion(from the Civil War to World War I) divulges characteristics of the political milieu which shaped the writer.

An added dimension of analysis is available in the exploration of such topics as war and politics. This is the comparative dimension. Many non-American writers(usually Europeans) have a large following in the United States, and often their novels are among the most popular. Hence, it is possible to compare the treatment of war and politics by American and non-American writers.[38]

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38 Of the 413 novels analyzed in the 1919-1959 period, over one-fourth (120) were by foreign writers.

Conceptual method. Values are a motivational force for the individual. By utilizing specific concepts, it is possible to analyze those values which are factors in the determination of political behavior. Four concepts (or working assumptions) were utilized in this study: namely, writers' views of (1) human nature, (2) man's ability to govern himself in a democracy, (3) the role of specific groups in society, and (4) America's ideals and goals. Writers' views, analyzed in terms of these dimensions, clearly emerge. Although not all novelists address themselves directly to these points, more do than one might initially suspect. Together, these dimensions provide an insight into the political values of popular novelists.

Through the use of such methods of analysis as these, the political scientist can ascertain, in Mannheim's terms, the documentory or evidential meaning of these materials. Popular fiction, it should be noted, is essentially middle class literature.[39] It reflects middle class political values and a middle class weltanschauung. Consequently, the patterns of values discerned in popular fiction tend to characterize middle class political values during the period being analyzed.

No final conclusions from this uncompleted study are possible, but a number of points have clearly emerged which deserve a commentary. In addition to suggesting the types of insights that can be derived from such analyses, these points also question many perviously-held assumptions about popular fiction and middle class political values. Briefly, eight of the major points or issues that have emerged from this study are listed and commented upon.

1. Religious and historical novels. Often disregarded and dismissed as basically "escapist" literature, these novels do have political implications. The previous assumption has been that these novels generally appear in periods of crisis, such as wars or depressions. This is somewhat misleading. Fewer religious novels appeared during the depression years than in the relatively stable period of the twenties. During World War II, the number of religious novels did sharply increase. In the late forties, this percentage declined, only to be arrested momnetarily by the Korean conflict. Since 1955, the percentage of religious novels has again decreased.

Upon closer inspection, it is clear that the religious novels of the twenties were not escapist. Most of them questioned the direction and goals of American society. They criticized the industrialism and materialism of the era and pleaded for the re-establishment of a society based on spiritual foundations. Much of this criticism is missing from the religious novels that have appeared since 1940, and it is granted that most of these can be classifield as escapist.[40]

It is in the depression yearz and subsequently in the 1945-1949 period that the major cluster of historical novels are found. In this latter period, historinovels represent 46 per cent of all the popular novels. Depresseion novels which were historical generally focused on the Founding period of the nation or on the Civil War era. Writers often acknowledged that, in their turning to the formative years of the nation, they were seeking solutions to contemporary problems. They hoped to find these answers in the ideals of the founders and early leaders of the nation. Other novels of the depression period, and especially those by Southerners, implicitly rejected an industrial society and romanticized the antebellum Southern plantation society.

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39 This is discussed in Baker, chaps. ii,viii, and ix.

40 Taylor Caldwell's Dear and Glorious Physician(1959) is one of the few that reflects this earlier characteristic, for in it Miss Caldwell indirectly criticizes contemporary materialistic society--even though the book is about the life of St. Luke.

Historical novels of the war and postwar periods do not reveal such political characteristics, for they are essentially romantic and escapist in their orientation. However, it does appear from this assessmant that religious and historical novels cannot be dismissed so lightly, for the varying characteristics of them at designated periods certainly suggests the influence of the political milieu on the perceptions and values of the novelists.

2. Agrarian-oriented novels. Most of the agrarian novels appeared in the 1919-1924 and 1930-1939 periods. In both instances they constituted well over one-fourth of all the popular fiction of the period. The agrarian novels criticized the industrialism and materialism of American society and romanticized the ideals of agrarian life. Basic to these was the thesis that, if not agrarianism, then at least the values perceived as deriving from agrarianism(namely, integrity, individualism, and idealism) should be adhered to in American life.

Only two novels that have appeared since 1940 can be classified as agrarian: Caldwell's This Side of Innocence(1946) and Lockridge's Raintree County(1948). Miss Caldwell acknowledged that industrialism was inevitable, but she pleaded for the continuation of those basic values which she perceived as basic to agrarianism. In Raintree County, a poetic eulogy for an idyllic agrarianism, the major character, John Shawnessy (and the aurthor) concluded that agrarianism has been destroyed by industrialism--and that with its destruction had gone the ideals of America.

3. Treatment of war. Sharp contrasts are evident in the treatment accorded war by American and non-American novelists. In the 1919-1939 period, war served as the major theme in twice as many non-American as American novels. Characteristics of non-American writers in this period (mostly English and European) was a tone of disillusionment, bitterness, and futility. American writers, to the contrary, consistently regarded World War I as a religious crusade, as the victory of good over evil. Most of the American writers who served in the war and whose views closely paralleled those of non-American novelists(e.g., Hemingway, Dos Passos, Cummings, and others) were not popular writers but were largely ignored by American readers. A possible explanation for this is that American readers, deeply influenced by the nation's pervasive and optimistic atmosphere, willingly perceived Europeans as disillusioned, but they refused to accept the possibility that American novelists might be similarly disillusioned. The popular war novels--those by Americans, that is--were written primarily by women, and most of them are quite sentimental or religious in their tone and mood.

War is discussed to almost the same extent by American and non-American writers in the 1940-1959 period. Another basic difference is that in this period it is more often the American novelist's tone that reflects disillusionment and bitterness. Possibly, the non-American writers, less idealistic than the Americans about the war, emerged from it and the contemporary cold war less embittered. Similarly, the greater degree to which war became a topic in American novels in this latter period may reflect the more total involvement of the nation in World War II than in the previous conflict.

4. Political thought and ideas. Implicit, though quite pervasive, in American life is a set of political values that might be termed the "American Dream." Fundamental to this dream are (a) a belief in the dignity and worth of the individual, (b) a belief in man's ability, through reason and education, to make decisions and govern himself in a democratic society, and (c) a belief in equality of opportunity. Implicit in such beliefs is the assumption that progress and the betterment of society are possible; for man, once cognizant of his mistakes, will correct them. Underlying these beliefs is the realization that pluralism and diversity are inevitable in a free society. It is from this that the Jeffersonian ideal of freedom of conscience and opinion is derived.

As previously noted, popular fiction reflects middle class beliefs in American society. Hence, it is possible to trace the middle class attitude towards the American Dream during specific periods. Fairly clear-cut patterns emerge. In the twenties, for instance, the emergence of the middle class as a politically articulate group is quite evident. The American Dream, the middle class argued, applied specifically to it; and it was not interested in seeing the benefits of the dream extended to minority groups. Disturbed by the materialism and industrialism that was transforming the shape of American society and endangering its class status, the middle class demanded that political leadership be placed in its hands. Only through middle class leadership, it was claimed, could the ideals and goals of American society be achieved. Clearly, this view of the middle class as deeply concerned with the nation's future is somewhat in contrast with the generally held assumption that this group ignored the community and concerned itself only with the accumulation of material goods.

The indecision and confusion of the middle class in the depression years is apparent in popular novels. Materialism and industrialism were critized; suggestions were offered for a return to Jeffersonian ideals or agrarianism; but few concrete proposals were made for helping the nation out of the depression. The most perisitent trait of the period was the criticism of the extremes, of the economic entrepreneurs who exploited society and of the communists and facists who wished to change the political system. Capitalism was upheld, and the impression conveyed was that moderate, rather than drastic, measures would solve the problems of America.

The apotheosis of the American Dream occurred during the war years when it was accorded universal application. The hope for the world, the middle class concluded, was to be found in the dream. All Americans, including minority groups, were to partake of the benefits of the dream. This is the theme of Smith's Strange Fruit, Lewis's Kingsblood Royal, Graham's Earth and High Heaven, and Hobson's Gentleman's Agreement. The belief that the dream should be extended to the whole world was symbolized in Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" and characterized in such popular novels as Steinbeck's The Moon Is Down, Ullman's The White Tower, and Hersey's A Bell for Adano.

A sharp break in views occurs in 1948, and such popular novels of that year as Mailer's The Naked and the Dead and Shaw's The Young Lions reflect this. In the postwar era, from 1948 to the present day, various segments of the middle class have come to question or reject outright the values of the American Dream. Man is regarded as irrational and stupid, corrupt and malevolent; democracy and self-government are considered ruinous or impossible of achievement; and eauality of opportunity is discredited or reputed. Man is seen as a pawn in the hands of fate, and his destiny is considered beyond his cohtrol. Bitterness and disillusionment, or what might be termed the "politics of futility" characterize the postwar era, and the novels of O'Hara, Ruark, Marquand, Thompson, and others typify this.

5. Politics in popular fiction. American wiiters, in contrast to non-American novelists, tend to stereotype the politician as corrupt, bungling, and stupid. With but a few exceptions (e.g., Drury, O'Hara, and O'Connor), these writers show little understanding of American politics. Speculative thinking about political systems is non-existent, and the American writer tends to equate emotional platitudes and slogans with political theory.

Numerous changes have occured in the postwar era. The most basic of these is in the view held of human nature. Whereas the politician was previously regarded as stupid and bungling (which accounted for his proneness to corruption), politicians in the postwar era are seen as basically venal, sadistic, and malevolent. Even though such writers as O'Hara and Drury thoroughly understand the political process, their tendency to characterize the politician as noted (possibly the result of their concomitant view that the American political system is such that it leads to corruption and venality) seriously distorts their discussions of politics. Also in the postwar era, man, who was once regarded as capable of reason and of governing himself, is regarded with skepticism, and the inference that may be drawn from many novels is that man is incapable of governing himself and needs some form of elitist leadership.

6. Political behavior. Emile Durkheim's concept anomie, which may be defined as a state of "valuelessness" or "normlessness", is invaluable in analyzing the political behavior of the nation. Sebastian De Grazia, in The Political Community,[41] distinquishes between simple and acute anomie, and the characteristics of these concepts, when evaluated in popular literature, clearly suggest the various periods of simple and acute anomie through which the nation has passed since 1919.

It is quite evident, for instance, that the characteristics of acute anomie are quite widespread in the contemporary era. The emergence of anti-democratic and reactionary movements tends to characterize periods of acute anomie, and it is perhaps in these terms that recent movements in this direction in the United States can be partially explained.

7. Political psychology. The analysis of politics in popular fiction reveals a syndrome of traits which include: irrationalism, emotionalism, intolerance, hostility and aggression towards specific groups, a persistency in dichotomizing ideas and actions as either "American" or "un-American", and, of more recent date, a tendency to view the world as malevolent and man as controlled by fate. This syndrome, as Milton Rokeach suggests in The Open and Closed Mind, typifies the individual with a dogmatic or closed mind. Psychologically, individuals with such traits cannot be open-minded or democratic. There is a psychological need for absolute authority, obedience and submission, and an inability to tolerate ambiguity. Such individuals perceive the world and its problems in absolutes, dichotomies of black-white, good-evil.

So pervasive is this syndrome that, in Mannheim's terms, it represents the documentary or evidential meaning of popular fiction and, within limitations, of the middle class. Hence, there is a basis for claiming that the middle class weltanschauung is basically anit-democratic. At the objective or expressive level of meaning this tendency is not so apparent, but these are only superficial appearances. The implications of this for the political scientist are so clear that they need not be discussed here.

8. Frustration and aggression. This study lends credence to the view of psychologists that aggression is predominantly the product of frustration. A few briedf examples will suffice. Writers of the twenties (and the middle class) were disturbed by the far-reaching changes in American society (economic, political, and social). Politically powerless for years, this group directed its frustrations, in the form of aggression and hostility, towards these groups it assumed were

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41 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

responsible for these transformations. Thus, economic entreprenueurs and the unions were attacked; and the middle class demanded political control to assure protection of its status in society. Likewise, minority groups, including Negroes, Orientals, and especially recent southern European immigrants, were attacked, the middle class fearing that such individuals would corrupt what they percieved as "the American way of life."

This hostility is less apparent in the depression years, possibly the result of a belief that the government would restrict the actions of these groups. During the war years hostility was directed towards the enemy.

In the postwar era, however, hostility reappeared, but in this period it was directed against the political liberals in American society. Right wing movements and groups, frustrated in their efforts to gain influence or power since 1932, turned against the liberals in a subtle but concerted attack. The liberals, in power during the thirties and forties, two decades which wrought major economic and political dhanges in the world, have served as ideal scapegoats for these attacks. Thus, Drury's criticism of liberals in Advise and Consent is not unique, for similar attacks on liberals, sometimes in more subtle form, can be found in the novels of Any Rand, Frederic Wakeman, John Marquand, Taylor Caldwell, Norman Mailer, Irwin Shaw, Thomas Costain, Herman Wouk, and others. Thus, it is hard to accept the unsubstantiated claims of those contemporary political commentators who conclude that the nation is in the midst of a new era of liberalism, especially when so many factors point to the opposite conclusion.

IV

In conclusion, it appears, at least in the estimation of this individual, that the political scientist has the opportunity to chart his own pathways in such relatively unexplored domains or provinces as literature, political psychology, and others. The manner in which the political scientist exercises this option will be a significant variable in determining the value of such studies. If, for instance, in the domain of literature, his endeavors are essentially of a replicative nature, it is clear that our understanding of political phenomena will not be expanded greatly. However, by utilizing new methods of analysis, it is feasible that literature might become one of the "new frontiers" in political science research.

APPENDIX A

A brief descussion of published materials and papers presented at the 1960 APSA panel on "The Political Novel" illustrates the three major orientations of literary analyses: case studies, comparative studies, and studies of the political milieu.

1. Case studies. The political scientist's predisposition towards case studies is emplitifed in numerous articles published on the political views of Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, Orwell, Huxley, and others. Similarly, at least two of the four papers presented at the 1960 APSA panel--those on Drury and Snow--were case studies. A third paper, "Political Science and Political Fiction," although not a case study in the strictest sense of the term, deserves special commentary in this section because it reflects the major characteristics of political science research.

As noted previously (and discussed in greater detail in Appendix B), the political scientist's affinity for specialization, natural science methodology, and case studies is influential in establishing the boundaries and methods of analysis utilized. Thus, when exploring new fields, the political scientist first (a) determines whether he is qualified and has the right to explore this new field, (b) determines whether his methodology is suitable or adaptable, and (c) if the previous two questions are answered positively, proceeds, primarily through the accumulation of case studies, to draw together materials from which he hopes to derive meaningful generalizations.

It is interesting to note that the paper on "Political Science and Political Fiction" faithfully addressed itself to points (a) and (b) immediately above. It (a) decided that the political scientist is qualified to analyze literature, and (b) concluded that, even though there are reservations to the use of empiricism, the methodology of the political scientist is suitable. In this sense, the paper provided a rationale for subsequent studies of literature.

In the case study of Drury's Advise and Consent, the investigator concluded that the novel was a "source of popular misinformation" because it presented a "distorted picture of the legislative process." However, if the novel is viewed from a broader perspective, that which the investigator claimed was a distorted picture of the legislative process is, in fact, something entirely different: namely, Drury's conception of human nature as corrupt and the nation's political institutions inviting, if not compelling, the corruption of the individual. Similarly, as sketched in Section III,8 of this paper, Drury's antipathy for liberalism is simply one manifestation of a contemporary trend in popular fiction. Such facets as these remain hidden from the investigator who limits his study to one book or one writer.

The analysis of C.P. Snow's political views is a scholarly and sophisticated treatment of that topic, and while it clearly sets forth Snow's ideas, it suffers the limitation with which most case studies are burdened: specifically, the need for developing studies of this type within a broader, conceptual framework which enhances their value to the political scientist in his understanding of political phenomena.

2. Comparative studies. Blotner's essay and the APSA panel paper on "Overseas Americans in Southeast Asia: Fact in Fiction" are excellent examples of the comparative approach. Blotner argued that significant findings were possible only through comparative analyses of the literature of different countries. Investigators, he concluded, should (a) analyze novels as "political instruments," i.e., as means for initiating political changes, (b) assess novelists as accurate political historians, (c) compare national characters as determined by political novels of various countries, and (d) judge novelists as analysts of individual and group political behavior. In the APSA paper, personality factors of American overseas personnel as treated in novels were compared with factual analysis of these characteristics as reported in the study, The Overseas Americans.[1] In this matter the investigator was able to provide documentary evidence of the novelists' accuracy as historians and analysts of individual and group political behavior.

Future political studies of a comparative nature are definitely needed, but it is not necessary that these be cross-cultural in content. Comparative studies of American writers are invaluable in understanding the American political scene, for instance.

3. Studies of the political milieu. As a motivational force, the political environment influences the writer's perceptions, values, and behavior. This is clearly traced in Howe's Politics and the Novel. Various approaches to the analysis of the political milieu are feasible. For instance, Howe's study is psychologically-oriented; Leo Lowenthal's Literature and the Image of Man,[2] socialogically-oriented. In like matter, either or both the manifest and latent characteristics of literature may be traced. From these studies it is possible to draw inferences about the overt and covert aspects of the politcal milieu which influence the writer.

There are recognized limitations to this approach as well as in the others. In ditermining how the political environment influences or shapes literary figures, the investigator is given considerable freedom in the interpretation of data. This is less true of empirical data, although it is possible through the misuse of statistical techniques to misconstrue the nature of the data analyzed. Secondly, even where the analyst has correctly interpreted such non-quantitative materials, this does not preclude the possibility of drawing incorrect conclusions from his analysis. It should be noted, however, that misinterpretation at this level is also possible in empirically-oriented studies. In addition to these factors, there is the problem of replication or validation of such studies. Validation is almost impossible without the expenditure of considerable effort and time; and unless he is acquainted with the materials, the reader has little basis for disputing the investigator's findings.

* * *

All these approaches--case studies, comparative studies, and analyses of the political milieu--have their limitations. While these studies are invaluable, it does appear that other methods of analysis are needed if the political scientist is to make full use of literary data.

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[1] Harlan Cleveland, Gerard S. Mangone, and John C. Adams, The Overseas Americans (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

[2] (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

APPENDIX B

Three of the pervasive tendencies that characterize American political science are: (1) specialization and the partitioning of knowledge; (2) a comparatively rigid adherence to natural science methodology, with its concomitant emphasis upon empiricism; and (3) a dedication to the case study approach. It should be noted that these are not mutually exlusive, and the lines of demarcation are not always clear-cut. These tendencies have contributed to the development of the discipline of political science. Nevertheless, each has, to some extent, restricted the political scientist in his explorations. It is the restrictive qualities which are discussed below.

1. Speicalization. Man's vision--and particularly his comprehension and understanding--of the world has been narrowed and distorted somewhat by specialization and the partitioning of knowledge. The knowledge man has of himself, society, and the universe is vast, but he is unable to perceive its full implications. Speicialization, as C.P. Snow has suggested in The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, has driven a wedge between the scientist and non-scientist. The ramifications of this specialization are even more pervasive, for it has led to the development of disparate concepts, methodologies, and vocabularies in all brances of science, social science, and the humanities. Not only do sharp cleavages separate these areas; specialization has also precipitated the erection of barriers between disciplines within the same are (e.g., in the social sciences). The impact of this specialization does not terminate there. Animosities, misunderstandings, and rifts have evolved within specific disciplines, and it is not unusual for individuals within the same field (e.g., a political theorist and a political behaviorist) to discover that specialization has developed language barriers between them.[1]

Speicialization, as C. Wright Mills argues, has retarted the development of social scientists in the "classic tradition" who, through their analyses, are able to provide invaluable insights into the behavior of society.[2] In a similar vein, Karl Mannheim has concluded that the result of specialization is "methodological asceticism."[3] To this factor is partly attributable the inability of the political scientist to fully grasp the implications for politics of such newly emerging areas of analysis as political psychology and literature.

2. Natural science methodology. The application of natural science methodology and empiricism to the study of politics, while it has been invaluable to political science, has been to some extent restrictive.

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1 It is political science that is of particular concern here, but the commentary is applicable to other areas of science, social science, and the humanities.

2 Mills, Images of Man: The Classic Tradition in Sociological Thinking(New York: Braziller, 1960), pp. 1-6. Mills considers Marx and Engles, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, Mosca, Michels, Pareto, classic tradition. In The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), Mills is quite critical of this specialization and partitioning of knowledge.

3 Karl Mannheim, Review of Methods in Social Science, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, American Journal of Sociology, XXXVIII(September, 1932), p. 276.

Two factors merit consideration at this point. Because of the totally disparate types of materials analyzed, it is impossible for the social scientist to achieve the same degree of exactitude or precision as that of the natural scientist. Chance, plus human factors, limits the range of predictability in human situations; and efforts to posit causality in a historical context, as Karl Mannheim has noted, leades not to "causal explanations" but to the "elucidation" of situations. Likewise, higher order, cultural phenomena cannto be explained by genetic, monadic, or reductionist theories or methods. Secondly, the social scientist misconstrues the methodology of the natural sciences, especially when he concludes that the empirical method and reason can explain every phenomena or event in the world.[4] There is in science both a strategy of proof and a strategy of discovery. It is in the former context that the empirical method is most applicable, and even there individual facts, in science, are subsumed into logically interrelated systems. Facts and systems are both important in the strategy of discovery, but the natural scientist, like the social scientist, must also rely on "hunches", "educated guesses", and what has been termed "verstehen" in the process that leads to new discoveries. This is clearly depicted in Arthur Koestler's perceptive study, The Sleepwalkers. Hence, it is somewhat misleading for the social scientist to conclude that science is based wholly on the empirical method.

Another factor deserves consideration. Not all phenomena in their original state are amenable to analysis, and the scientist must often restructure it or adapt it in such a manner that it is usable. This is even more true of cultural phenomena. In its original form, such phenomena may have little immediate empirical value. Thus, a methodology that dogmatically excludes empirically non-testable statements must reject vast bodies of cultural phenomena, and such abrupt dismissal of data on this basis is foolish. Utilized properly, empirical analysis is of great value; utilized unwisely, it may impede or distort studies of society.[5]

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4 It is misleading for the social scientist to conclude that there are no limits to the use of reason in the natural sciences. Reason, it is surmised, can answer all questions and solve all problems of the physical universe. But this is a misconception of the natural sciences, which recognize human finitude and the ineluctable boundaries of reason. Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy suggests that there are limitations to the prediction of physical states of affairs; and, in another sense, Bohr's Principle of Complementarity recognizes that an electron must be regarded as both a wave and a particle, depending upon the particular circumstances surrounding it. Thus, the very perspective of analysis of the scientist limits the types of observation possible in this instance.

5 Milton Rokeach provides a good example of this in The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960). The tendency to view modes of thought in a symmetrical manner has often distorted research and analysis. Conceived in an a-symmetrical manner, the mind is amenable to new types of analysis. Similarly, the tendency to perceive thought or action in a dualistic manner distorts analysis. It is not necessary that an individual's behavior be construed as rational or irrational, logical or illogical. There is the possibility of non-rational or non-logical behavior. This proclivity for dichotomization is also found in the assumption that an individual has a belief system and disbelief system. Rokeach illustrates that individuals have many disbelief systems.

Various commentators have criticized the American social scientist's predisposition for natural science methodology. Even three decades ago, Karl Mannheim warned of this "fascination of natural science" which he recognized critically as "the ideal exactness toward which most [American] scholars are striving."[6] More recently, Barringtom Moore, Jr., has criticized the "scientist of politics" in this manner:

> The view is fairly widespread that the only problems that can be studied in a disciplined, scientific fashion are those that can be made to yield quantitative and measurable results. Its adherents therefore seek to break all problems into units for which quantification is--or at least superficially seems--appropriate.[7]

Bernard Crick, a foreign observer of the state of political science in America, is similarly critical of the pervasive influence of this cult of natural science methodologists. His commentary readily reflects this:

> I think it is clear that what the modern proponents of a "science of politics" have sought for, above all, . . . has been an exclusion of of empirically non-testable statements.[8]
>
> Clearly, to believe in a broad similarity in the criteria of truth between the natural and social sciences is . . . to limit arbitrarily the range of meaningful discourse in politics.[9]
>
> There is only a small doubt that such a philosophy [as the natural sciences] can provide us with an adequate epistemology for scientific truths; but there seems every reason for doubt that it can help us in framing social theories and evaluating social truths.[10]

Thus, overemphasis on natural science methodology (i.e., with that aspect which, in science, is most applicable to the strategy of proof), although providing a basis for replicable studies, seriously limits the dimensions and scope of cultural studies. Simultaneously, this tendency suggests an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the American social scientist to conceptualize in broader terms.[11] Part of this, as noted elsewhere, is attributable to what might be termed "factfetishism."

3. Case studies. C. Wright Mills has complained that case studies, heavily weighted by empiricism, have become "the standard for all social inquiry" in the United States.[12] What critics have viewed as the "drying-up of the sources of scientific inspiration and investion"[13] in the United States is attributable to the "bias toward scattered studies"[14] and the "pseudo-certainty about figures that

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6 Mannheim, American Journal of Sociology, XXXXVIII, p. 278.

7 Moore, "The New Scholasticism and the Study of Politics," World Politics, VI (October, 1953), p. 124; cf., H. Stuart Hughes, "The Historian and the Social Scientist," American Historical Review, XLVI(October, 1960), p. 34.

8 Crick, The American Science of Politics(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 220.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., p. 221.

11 There is a possible relationship between this and a deficiency often noted in college students: namely, their inability to conceptualize or think in connotative as well as denotative terms.

12 Mills, Images of Man, pp. 5,6.

13 Mannheim, American Journal of Sociology, XXXVIII, p. 278.

14 Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 85.

exercise a dangerous fascination for Americans."[15] As Moore has warned, it is naive to believe that case studies and analyses of "small problems" will provide us with a "conclusive answer to the big problems."[16] Mills, in a more caustic vein, suggests that the predominance of such studies is attributable to a "tacit conspiracy of the mediocre" who are unable to conceptualize or work with broader dimensions of analysis.[17]

The training of contemporary social scientests reflects the emphasis placed on specialization, and numerous graduates in these fields tend to be highly trained technicians in speicific methodologies. This, Crick contends, has narrowed their understanding of society. Thus, in political science,

> For all the textbooks with introductory chapters about "the American way of life," there has yet to come from an American political scientist a general understanding of American politics that can equal the work of certain foreigners, except perhaps the now badly dated Congressional Government of Woodrow Wilson and more recently the huge enterprise of Max Lerner's America as a Civilization.[18]

Specialization, natural science methodology, and case studies have had a restrictive effect to some extent. Because the American social scientist "lacks a certain courage of outlining broad theories," as Mannheim has contended, his "studies start from questions in no wise connected with those problems which arouse our passion in everyday political and social struggle."[19] "Problems are treated in isolation," and the "totality of social problems remains neglected."[20] Hence, the political scientist, while acknowledging the usefulness of the methods he has employed, should recognize their limitations.

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15 Moore, World Politics, VI, p. 125.
16 Ibid., p. 124.
17 Mills, Images of Man, p. 5.
18 Crick, p. 229.
19 Mannheim, American Journal of Sociology, XXXVIII, p. 279.
20 Ibid., p. 276. This reluctance to conceptualize or explore broader meanings and ideas appears to be a pervasive characteristic of American culture. Lerner, in America as a Civilization(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p.717, notes this "aversion to intellectual system-building" in American life and thought.

MOTIVATIONAL RESEARCH IN THE 1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

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Political scientists had been giving technical assistance to the Democratic party long before the 1960 campaign. When I joined the staff of the Democratic National Committee in July, 1959 it was apparent that political science as a profession was highly regarded by Democratic leaders. Academic knowledge was being used in two major ways. First, there was the practice of drawing on the subject-matter knowledge of professors in the fields of foreign policy, natural resources, taxation and agricultural policy. Second, there was recognition of the contributions that political scientists can make with respect to party organization. During the years when the GOP held the Presidency and Paul Butler was trying to build a national Democratic party, he was in frequent communication with academic specialists in party organization. When the 1960 Presidential Convention was being planned extensive use was made of the writings of Paul David and his associates. And the Citizenship Clearing House fellows, who served on the Democratic National Committee staff, worked closely with party leaders.

The technical assistance in 1960 that was unique was the attempt to bring motivational and behavioral research into the workings of the party at the national level. It was thought by a number of behavioral scientists that research in this area had, over the years, yielded results that could be very useful to the party; furthermore they believed that the party sould engage in motivational research in preparing for and during the 1960 campaign.

Groundwork for the experiment was done by a distinguished group of political and social scientists including: Morris Janowitz, Robert Lane, Heinz Eulau, Samuel Eldersveld and Peter Rossi. They explained behavioral science to Democratic officials and fund raisers and convinced them of the need to have a behavioral scientist on the staff of the Democratic National Committee. In 1959 the office of Director of Voter Analysis was set up in Washington, D.C. It operated throughout the campaign. I held the post and was the focal point of the experiment attempting to bring motivational research findings into strategic areas of the Democratic Party at the national level.

This paper will try to describe some of the incidents and some of the lessons learned during the 1960 campaign as an experiment in applied motivational research.

The most striking reaction of Democratic leaders to the idea of using motivational research in the campaign was a restrained repugnance. Even though there was grudging approval consistent apprehension was also expressed. There was the ethical apprehension of liberals who instinctively oppose any ideas of manipulation, hidden persuasion or brain

washing. There was also the fear of unfavorable public reaction. In the 1950s the Democrats had made quite a thing over the Republican party being the party of Madison Avenue; had needled the Republicans over their concern about their image; and more than once, had sneered at the GOP's happy association with the large public relations firm of BBD&O. At the same time the poor but honest Democratic party had had trouble getting even a small public relations firm to handle its account; therefore it would not be appropriate for the party to dabble in the hidden persuasion business.

Problems also developed at the outset because of the nature of the "client." We were engaged in applied research, and for it to be applied effectively, we had to find the points of application. A political party is not the same as an administrative agency or a business firm with respect to its top management.

It will come as no news to students of American political parties that the out-of-power party, at the national level, is not really an organization. When a party does not hold the Presidency there is more chaos than organization. The textbooks speak of a party as a "truncated pyramid"; motivational research was to be applied in the truncated area. The chaotic nature of an out party had been taken for granted, we had followed the maxim that most organizations are organizations only to people seeing them from a distance. The closer one gets to an organization (expecially a political one) the more apparent it is that its symmetry, cohesion and rationality are predominantly a mirage.

We needed action points. We found them in the National Chairman, Paul Butler; some of the stronger state leaders and in the camps of potential Presidential candidates. These people had considerable influence in shaping what Democratic policy there was at the national level, and they were the points to which our research was applied before the Presidential Convention.

Another early problem was to sell motivational research both in terms of using what was already known and as a way of solving campaign questions. To do this it had to be distinguished from other kinds of research and its special value explained.

Orthodox research had been and still is practiced at the Democratic National Committee. There is a Director of Research and a Division of Research. But it is essentially a fact finding unit, a library or morgue for information the politician wants at his fingertips: voting records of opposition politicians, population statistics, old voting statistics, and so on. The Research Director is expected to keep elaborate files of the opposition's public statements so that they can be quoted, viewed with alarm and rebutted.

Motivational research is different from the standard research politicians are accustomed to use. It, by its very nature, is operations research[1] and is valuable only if applied to the basic assumptions and

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[1] One exception was "prestige polls." Polling data existed showing a drop in America's prestige abrcad during the 1950s. Senator Kennedy used these data as ammunition for his campaign speeches.

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strategies of the politician. And here, of course, is just where he is least likely to accept the new brand of research. It's one thing to make

available information to strengthen an argument already selected by the political leader. It's another thing to ask that motivational research be part of the thinking that goes into the selection of appeals and strategies.

Resistance to motivational research as part of political strategy is not simply a rejection of hidden persuasion in favor of campaign appeals and strategies the politician really believes in; it is resistance to doing systematically what the politician does intuitively. It is not surprising that the politician is reluctant to surrender to specialists the very functions on which his wizardry as a politician depends. To be a good politician means to know how to get votes and this in turn means knowing a great deal about voters and what makes them tick. Political psychology to a politician is a redundancy. Politics without psychology wouldn't be politics. We wanted to add a new intelligence function to the practices politicians use to gauge voter motivations and public opinions. All political strategy involves some kind of intelligence function. No matter how idealistic a politician is, no matter how much he speaks about his ideals he is also, almost certainly, estimating public opinion. He is continually, consciously or unconsciously, assessing the prevailing values of the electorate; he is operating on certain assumptions about levels of understanding that lead him to use one kind of language rather than another. What are the methods politicians use to gauge a mass electorate? We felt that by studying the standard methods we would find a way to incorporate the new intelligence device; motivational research.

First, of course, we found the most primitive form of political intelligence, conversations with taxi drivers, barbers and so on. This procedure calls for little comment because, no matter how extensively it is practised, it is not easily defended, especially in Washington where taxi drivers become atuned to the role and are delighted to be considered political informants. Then there is the practice of reading one's mail. Politicians see this as an important link to their constituents and pay a great deal of attention to it. They feel the same about the intelligence they acquire at political meetings and rallies. These are to politicians, rich sources of information about the thinking and feelings of the electorate. And because of the important psychological link these sources seem to provide, between politicians and their constituents, it is difficult to persuade the politicians not to overestimate the political intelligence thus acquired. In both the above situations the politician is addressing himself to very special and misleading populations as far as general public opinion is concerned. They are even more misleading with respect to the swing or independent voter, who we know to be at the opposite end of this activity scale. The swing voter is the least likely to attend meetings or write letters. He is the most indifferent element in the electorate and therfore the most likely to have striking variances with people who write letters to congressmen and go to political meetings.

Another primitive form of intelligence gathering is the one politicians engage in between themselves. It is sometimes known as the "How I won by using bumper stickers" method and brings us to the great myths in American politics. In Washington most politicians are successful politicians. They are men who have generally won at least one election and it is standard for them to have theories about why they won and someone

else lost. Success becomes a badge of political wisdom and they are not only free but encouraged to divulge what factors they consider influence the outcome of an election. The phenomenon of the bumper sticker, the attractive wife who was put on the platform, outdoor advertising, particular issues stressed in campaign speeches are some of the more frequently cited factors. And however unrealistic these factors seem, the politician's success gives them a certain currency in political discourse. It is in this kind of situation that statistical trends are overlooked. In the case of a congressman, one of thirty, brought into office by a regional or national trend, he naturally wants to attribute his success to some specific thing he did and so attaches superfluous importance to bumper stickers and other gimmicks.

A classical myth among Democrats is about Harry Truman's 1948 reelection. Here, the story goes, President Truman was the underdog but the man who refused to give up, this image supposedly "got through" to the voters. He was the kind of underdog Americans like, the one who becomes an overdog. Inevitably in accounting for the surprise victory Truman's personal qualities are emphasized. The more accurate interpretation of 1948, according to post-election studies, is that President Truman won because he reinstated and reinforced the values Franklin D. Roosevelt had brought into the imagery of the Democratic party in the 1930s and early 1940s. Truman pounded away on the characteristics of the Democratic party, the fact that it was the party of the underdog, the consumer, the minority groups, the trade union member. He contrasted this with the Republican party's position as the party of privilege, the party of big business. Truman successfully sold Democratic symbolism on an economic class base, a very different thing from selling Harry Truman the man!

This may not seem like a big difference but as an analogy in campaigning it is tremendously significant. The mythological interpretation of 1948, emphasizing Truman's personal characteristics, could influence a politician to try to sell his personal characteristics instead of party symbolism as called for by the scientific analysis.

These examples of political intelligence have probably been in use, in one form or another, since politics began. In recent years the only real innovation in intelligence gathering on voter motivations has been the growing use of public opinion polls. Although motivational research, as a technology was a relatively unexplored area for Democratic politicians, polling had lately become part of their thinking. And because of the influence this was having on their actions it was abvious that our job would have on the one hand to show that the single, gallup-type public opinion poll is not the extent of motivational research; and on the other hand to point out some of the weaknesses and limitations of polls as sources of political intelligence.

In our first talks with political leaders we found that poll results were being misused in several ways. Most serious was the tendency to overvalue the results of polls taken months before an election. Polls taken early in a campaign give misleading evidence on the relative popularity of candidates and on the level of the public's interest in politics. Poeple seem to prefer candidate X to candidate Y and to favor or oppose a political issue. But these are artificial situations for voters who have not yet become interested in the campaign. And the poll results are largely artifices of polling procedure...the person polled chooses one or another candidate or issue to please or get rid of the interviewer.

Because politicians now study published polls and also conduct private polls for their own use there is often an abundance of dubious, (dubious because they are taken before the voter has been exposed to campaign stimuli) polling data long before the campaign gets underway. These data can then be used to influence a serious political decision: whether or not a candidate should run for office. As the findings of these early polls give questionable estimates of how a candidate will fare after an extensive campaign, it sometimes happens that a potentially strong candidate will withdraw and a weak candidate ends up on the ticket. What these polls actually measure in the very early months of a campaign is "exposure" not vote getting ability.

The confusing of exposure with potential power on election day has resulted in increasing the attention given to polls in political strategy. The newspaper polls, trying to provide interesting reading in the first months of a Presidential campaign match candidate against candidate in horse race polls. The published results are almost entirely a measure of how well-known the candidates are; but they are interpreted to mean that the candidate chosen by the largest number of people is the stronger candidate. This may be true. But no warning is given the reader that at this stage of the campaign the poll is probably measuring exposure and not the more complicated thing, drawing power at the end of a political campaign. This is not to say exposure is an insignificant factor in the potential drawing power of a candidate, but it is a different phenomenon from vote getting power and this is glossed over by early polls.

Equating exposure with vote getting potential is not always a misreading of polls. Sometimes it is a deliberate part of political strategy. The strategists pushing the fortunes of a relatively well-known politician can and do use poll results to "show" that their man is the strongest candidate. The reverse strategy is also used. An early poll can help create an underdog impression so that when the results of a subsequent poll are compared to those of the early poll, they show that the candidate "did better than expected"; therefore his popularity is growing.

We set out to "unsell" our Democratic politicians about much of polling. We tried to convince them that too much attention can be paid to polling results, especially to small statistical differences which are usually meaningless. Polls are useful instruments only if used with conservatism, both with respect to what they claim to measure and how accurately they measure. An exception is where results of the published newspaper polls and the private contract polls are used in campaigning for direct propaganda objectives. Objections to them as sources of truth do not apply here.

If American public opinion is thought of as consisting of a few highly stable components and many sporadic and transient attitudes, polling takes on a different meaning than it usually has for political strategists. The spot poll is useful for current readings on a basic attitude or value, or it may tap reactions to a minor stimulus. Polling results taken over a period of time and over a large range of issues begin to describe ideologies; eventually they add up to maps of public knowledge and ignorance. In studying poll results on both temporal and subject matter dimensions the level of the sophistication of public thought can be charted and from that the class of stimulus or political appeal which will leave a dent can be estimated. There are also social science findings other than poll results that can be applied to public

opinion problems. For example, psychological studies of learning although not usually dealing with political thinking can throw light on it.

Professor V. O. Key has stressed the fact that there have been only two great watersheds, in modern American history, determining basic political allegiances over long periods of time: the Civil War and the Great Depression. The central idea of this theme is that only major crises are sufficient to establish any long range, long run allegiances by people to one or another party and that when these crises do polarize the two parties the results tend to go on for a long time. Related to this is the idea that most political allegiances and most voting are habitual; the way a person votes is determined more than anything else by his family's basic attitude toward the two major parties.

The values and attitudes associated with the Great Depression, along with patriotic values continually being instilled in the citizenry, are the fundamental facts of life for anyone trying to understand voter motivation.

The nature of the attitudes generated by the Depression and by the politics of the 1930's have been revealed in hundreds of polls. The Democratic party is the party of the "little man", of the consumer, of the "have not." The Republican party is the party of "big business," of privilege, of the overdog. For many many Americans who reached political maturity during the 1930s these are the dominant (and often the only) political thoughts. The families of those affected by the policies of the 1930s transmitted these ideas far beyond the events of the New Deal since no watershed comparable to the Depression has occurred since.

The argument that upward economic mobility during prosperous times has removed the conomic class attitude of the 1930s overlooks one important fact: class feelings are <u>relative</u>. The fact that a person is objectively better off today (consumes more, works less) than he was in the 1930s does not mean that he is satisfied with his situation relative to the rest of the population. Fortunately for Democratic fortunes in 1960, an extension of this argument was successfully rebutted. We did not assume that the person whose improved economic condition allowed him to move to the suburbs had automatically become a Republican. Realizing that suburbia is not a homogeneous area of station wagons, power mowers and Republicanism; we campaigned on the assumption that many suburbanites would realize that, not with standing their improved state, they were still not getting a fair shake relative to others.

A related consideration was how to adapt Democratic party appeals to shifts in the values of certain sectors of the American public. The case of the northern Negro is particularyly revealing here. The Democratic party was popular with the northern Negro voter through the 1940s and 1950s largely because of the economic position which the Negro occupied in American society. But there was evidence in the late 1950s that the Negro was giving increased attention to matters other than economic ones. In other words the emergence of Civil Rights as an important value for Negro voters meant the Democratic party could no longer count on Negro votes simply because Negroes are low income voters. Democratic party imagery had to be enriched by greater emphasis on the Civil Rights position of the party.

It would seem to be a simple task to make these reasonings basic for any Democratic party campaign, and that until some other cataclysmic event occured, continued reinforcement of the theme, the Republican party

is the party of big business and the Democratic party is the party of the rest of us would be axiomatic. Democratic successes in 1958 and polls taken through 1959 indicated that there were many more Democrats than there were Republicans and that the basis of Democratic popularity is its economic class appeal.

Before President Kennedy's nomination this reasoning was the central theme of the publicity put out by the Democratic National Committee. Its culmination was the choice of the basic slogan used at the convention in Los Angeles: The Democrats Care. This was in the New Deal - Fair Deal tradition and expressed the solicitude of the party: its concern for the needs of the people. After the convention emphasis on the party's greatest psychological asset, its economic class appeal, was considerable although still less than was called for by survey data on the subject.

The failure of party strategists to make full use of their best propaganda weapon was due to a number of things. First among these was President Kennedy's belief that some things had to be said regardless of whether they would win votes; hence his exhortations to "Get America moving again," to regain our primacy in world politics. And as far as I know this point of view was not criticized. Some things did have to be said in the campaign given the state of world affairs and the ideals of the candidate. But there was also in the thinking of Kennedy's strategists an idea that might be called the "anthropomorphic fallacy." By this I mean the theory of looking on elections as contests between individuals. President Kennedy had won impressive victories in the Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries. His impact on political gatherings, his appearance and his quick intelligence added to the belief that he was an attractive political candidate. So it was not surprising that he and his lieutenants saw the coming election as a contest between Kennedy and Nixon rather than a contest between parties or programs. The public opinion polls with their matching of candidates also added to the attention focussed on the personalities of the two men.

For a large part of the electorate only very pertinent facts about a candidate are known. Below the level of the Presidency party is apt to be the <u>only</u> thing known about a candidate. With respect to Presidential candidates more does become known and party is only a major consideration among several, but even here,it is much more significant than is generally realized.

Advocacy of using party symbolism in the 1960 campaign was based on general findings of social science research. Favorable views of the Democratic party had a solid reality base in the policies of the New Deal and Fair Deal. One cannot simply poll the public on its needs and then offer to meet them. Prevailing attitudes about the parties have definite links to reality rather than being just responses to political speeches. The politician who is attentive to polls may come to think that he can change his "image" by manipulation of language. He cannot. After the Republican party's disaster of 1958 studies were made of the accumulated behavioral research findings of the 1940s and 1950s. It was found that image changing for a political party is not just a matter of propaganda . Propaganda can embellish, clarify, distort; but not do away with the fundamental realities on which people base their political judgements. The central realities of politics are still events and policies. The major events occurring when a party is in power (and in a position to receive credit or blame for the consequences) gradually

build an image of the party. The things Democratic politicians have said over the years have been of far less importance than the closer related thing of what the Democratic party has done. This fact has been obscured by the cliche many people express when they say they "vote for the man." This is a fashionable idea but to carry it out requires knowing more about the man than his party affiliation. Post-election surveys show that few people know much more than that the candidate is a Democrat, or in Kennedy's case that he is a Catholic. Statements such as: "He has had experience," " he'll get us into war" are rationalizations of the choice made almost automatically from easily taken cues: party, class and religion. Americans, according to the University of Michigan studies, are seldom ideological and are predominantly concerned with the interests of their own group; hence party, so long as party symbolism has a group-related base (as Democratic party symbolism has had since the 1930s) is the logical basis of choice because over the years, the voter learns where his best interests lie.

Bringing these motivational research data to the attention of party leaders was partly successful in that party was given considerable stress in the campaign. And considering the vanity of politicians one cannot expect them to run merely as spokesmen for the party.

We had less success with some of the other motivational research findings we presented to Democratic strategists. What has been pointed out above about party image and propaganda holds true for party slogans. Campaign slogans and speeches can remind people of the party's stance but cannot establish it. Truman failed to realize any of his major domestic aims but he did reinforce the image of the party that had taken shape under Franklin D. Roosevelt.

President Kennedy's choice of the phrase "New Frontier" and his basic campaign theme "Get America Moving again" violated this tenet of motivational research. A slogan should have an empirical referent, easily grasped. The New Deal implied that there was a bad "old deal," the depression; and voters would do well to reshuffle the cards. The Fair Deal similarly carried the idea that there was an "unfair deal" that the GOP would foist on the country. The New Frontier, could mean only forests and mountains and there is no evidence that the phrase ever had any other meaning.

As for the phrase "Get America moving again" and speaking only of its effectiveness as a campaign theme and not of its merits as an exhortation, it was a questionable and risky choice. There are no motivational research data on reactions to the words themselves but one can raise serious objections to the theme by reasoning from related data as follows: <u>The arousing of fears and anxieties bring about desired behavior only under special conditions</u>. By pointing to America's loss of prestige and power in the world, President Kennedy apparently thought that the voters would rally to him as a way of removing their fears about the situation. Psychological studies of anxiety arousing, as a device for bringing about desired behavior changes, show that it is not enough to elicit fear or anxiety; as this leaves the arouser in the position of a Cassandra associated with fears people would sooner repress, one must also pose effectively as a deliverer. In 1952, President Eisenhower could successfully emphasize the ugliness of the Korean war and, because of his military prestige, effectively offer deliverance. President Kennedy, on the other hand, risked bringing up ugly facts without being in a position to assure alleviation.

The most serious failure, from the standpoint of keeping the campaign consistant with known voter motivation findings, was President Kennedy's decision not to be divisive. Early in the campaign it was decided not to make speeches containing economic class appeals. President Kennedy chose to speak to all Americans rather than to lambast the privileged class.

Not to be divisive and to appeal to all the voters is for a Democratic candidate a misreading of the Eisenhower victories of 1952 and 1956. For the minority party the use of candidate above party was logical. For the majority party it meant throwing away a ready made advantage, and overlooked the fact that most basic political attitudes have a definite negative component. The popularity of the Democratic party in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, was based to a large degree on the association of the GOP with the depression and big business. Harry Truman "gave hell" to people who had presumably been unfair to average voters. The attempt of a Democratic candidate to be popular in the Eisenhower sense can be justified only if the candidate has comparable national prestige or if the party has lost its basic popularity with the voters. As of 1959 the Democratic party still had a substantial majority, it outnumbered the Republican party by about three to two.

The loyalties to Franklin Roosevelt and to the Democratic party through the 1930s and 1940s were, therefore, expressions of an economic class position and the political loyalties transmitted through a family in that period were expressions of that family's class identification with the Democratic party. The rejection of Franklin Roosevelt and allegiance to the Republican party were seen largely as an economic class identification with middle or upper class economic values. The Truman victory of 1948 seen in the light of Democratic party popularity was an extension of the trend established under FDR and a victory for an economic class speaking through its political vehicle, the Democratic party.

In the 1950s the phenomenon of President Eisenhower confused the picture and gave rise to a serious controversy as to the meaning of the 1952 and 1956 elections. The University of Michigan's Survey Research Center's position, simply stated, was that voting for President Eisenhower by people who had a nominal association of affiliation with the Democratic party was something of an aberation. It was explainable in terms of the nonpolitical characteristics of President Eisenhower, certainly of his characteristics other than the political party on whose platform he ran. Therefore, as this reasoning goes, when President Eisenhower left the scene people would return to the cultural family affiliations established in the 1930s and reinforced by President Truman in the 1940s.

This was reassuring to the Democratic party. Predictions for 1960 were that, other factors being generally equal, the Democratic party should have a resounding victory with the removal of the deviant factor, the great exception President Eisenhower. Even the introduction of a potent but uncontrollable factor, President Kennedy's Catholicism, left party emphasis as the obvious Democratic strategy for 1960.

However, critics of the above reasoning eventually prevailed when it came to planning the campaign. They did not believe that straying Democrats would return to the fold on the basis of party identification, because they felt that this had diminished over the years. They also thought that foreign affairs were becoming increasingly important to

voters as far as the Presidency was concerned. This theory was based on questionable poll results which showed foreign affairs as the top issue in the minds of the voters. I say questionable because of the tendency for people to give prestige answers when polled instead of admitting their "bread and butter" concerns.

Looking to the future it is clear that students of political behavior and attitudes can make important contributions to their chosen party. Applied motivational research should, I think, concentrate on keeping political leaders in touch with deep seated and enduring political values. A better understanding of these will help innoculate politicians against the extravagant claims of the Madison Avenue persuaders. Fundamental political values are changeable only with genuine actions. Effective research can help maximize the electoral pay off of actual party postures; it can also provide checks on how well a political leader is communicating with the public. Assuming that a party stands for definite policies and really tries to carry them out when in office, the problem still remains of keeping them before a public that is not always attentive to politics and seldom attentive to complex issues.

The gradual growth of national political parties can be speeded by the creation of institutions geared to winning the Presidency. The National Committees have been ineffectual because they failed to provide clear-cut services. Under Paul Butler's leadership the Democratic National Committee did take steps to give the national party substance. The Democratic Advisory Council and the Democratic Digest helped sustain the ideas and symbols associated with a national Democratic party. It is unfortunate that these services have been discontinued.

Because of the relative decline of State and local political interest the parties will have to nationalize themselves in the minds of the voters. Political leaders who recognize this necessity must make innovations to strengthen and preserve a national party leadership. With a complex national electorate already in existence (rather than an aggregation of State electorates) national leadership will need an efficient intelligence system. Motivational research will be an essential part of this system and it will provide an inestimable service to all elements of the parties. The parties must develop the organizations to supply them with orderly intelligence. The intelligence techniques exist and now political leaders must learn to use them effectively.

FIDEL CASTRO AND LATIN AMERICA

by

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An old Latin-American political axiom has it that "every 'ism' is a somebody-ism." Putting the matter that way of course exaggerates the situation. Nevertheless, "somebody-ist" movements abound in Latin America. Paraguay has its franquismo, supported by the admirers of General Rafael Franco;[1] Brazil had its querimismo;[2] Ecuador its velasquismo, based on the followers of President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra; Uruguay its batllismo, founded by President Jose Batlle y Ordonez; and Argentina its peronismo.

And Cuba has its fidelismo, with which this paper is concerned.

The curriculum vitae of fidelismo is readily provided. It began in 1947, when Fidel Castro Ruz, then a twenty-one-year-old Cuban law student, took part in an invasion of the Dominican Republic in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government of Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina. The following year found Fidel Castro in Colombia, where he took part in the bogotazo, the tumultuous rioting which began at Bogota during the Ninth International Conference of American States. In 1952, Dr. Castro, during

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[1] Not connected with Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

[2] Literally, "we-wantism," a popular abbreviation of the "We want Vargas" movement launched in 1945.

the course of his legal practice in Cuba, filed a brief with the Court of Constitutional Guarantees asking that body to declare unconstitutional the government of General Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar, who had resumed power by coup d'etat in March of that year. When the court rejected Castro's legal plea, he turned to revolutionary activity against the Batista regime. On July 26, 1953--fidelismo is known officially as the 26th of July Movement--Castro led an unsuccessful attack on a military post at Santiago, in eastern Cuba. Imprisoned for this act, he was freed through an amnesty in 1955. He then left Cuba to spend almost two years in exile, principally in Mexico, preparing for his major contest with Batista. In December of 1956, Castro and a small band of guerilla invaders landed in eastern Cuba. During the following two years the island was gripped by civil war, with Fidel Castro acquiring legendary stature as the guerilla leader of the rebels. Batista at length fell from power on January 1, 1959. Fidelismo then took up the reins of government. The last lines of this curriculum vitae remained to be written at the time this paper was prepared.

No doubt, much of fidelismo is peculiar to Castro, and much is indigenous to Cuba. Yet a substantial sector of the movement remains generalizable as a part of the revolution of our time. For the purpose of analysis of fidelismo in that context, it is helpful to examine the four major components of the movement. These components--let us call them the keys to fidelismo--are the historic political instability of Cuba, the political contrast between metropolitan Havana and the remainder of the island, domestic social and economic changes in Cuba, and problems in the country's relations with the United States. These components merit systematic examination.

I

Cuba's historic political instability stands first among the four major keys to fidelismo. Political instability may be regarded as a condition characterized by frequent so-called "revolution" and recurrent dictatorship, much of it short-lived. Far from being peculiar to Cuba, political instability, thus defined, is a general Latin-American characteristic. Each of its elements--frequent so-called "revolution" and chronic dictatorship--is worth consideration, from the twin standpoints of Latin America as a whole and Cuba in particular.

The American nations are famous for their "revolutions." Indeed, the Brazilian Emperor Dom Pedro II is said to have remarked, when he visited the Philadelphia Exposition in 1876, that many of the Latin-American countries had more revolutions per minute than the machines he saw on display at the exposition. However, few words are more loosely and promiscuously used in the Americas than "revolution." An amazing array of dissimilar and unrelated occurrences go by this name in the Western Hemisphere. The Wars of Independence have been so dubbed, as well as minor changes in government, the promulgation of new constitutions, and political violence of almost any variety. Actually, true revolution--that is, a basic change in the political system or a recasting of the social order--is surprisingly infrequent in Hispanic America. But "typical revolutions"--i. e., changes in government brought about by other than constitutional means, usually not accompanied by fundamental changes in the social or political order--are constantly recurring. Violence, or the threat of it, is often present in such movements. Their frequency is a major Latin-American political problem.

"Since the turn of the present century," a student of this phenomenon has observed, "the governments of the nations to the south have been overthrown . . . seventy-six times. . . . Revolutions are still the order of the day. . . . Bolivia, for example, has had violent changes of government in 1920, 1930, 1934, 1936, 1937, 1943, 1946, and 1952."[3] Thus far during the twentieth century, on the bare mathematics of the matter, the average Latin-American state has experienced four so-called "revolutions."

In this regard, Cuba is fairly typical of Hispanic America. Among the most recent of the states of the area to achieve national independence, Cuba has undergone somewhat more than the average number of "revolutions" since the island's national political career was launched in 1901. A violent uprising against the government of President Tomas Estrada Palma in 1906 brought military intervention by the United States, then acting under the Platt Amendment.[4] After the departure of the "North American" armed forces in 1909, the constitutional order was not again interrupted until General Gerardo Machado assumed the presidency in 1925. In a coup d'etat three years later, Machado prolonged his period in power and intensified his dictatorship. Two "revolutions" occurred in 1933. The first overthrew Machado and installed

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[3]Austin F. Macdonald, Latin-American Politics and Government (2nd ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1954), pp. 11-12. See also Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Revolutions: Western Hemisphere," The South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. LV, no. 3 (July 1956), pp. 263-279; and George I. Blanksten, "Revolutions," in Harold E. Davis (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: The Ronald Press, 1958), pp. 119-146.

[4]The controversial Platt Amendment is discussed on pp. 30-32, below.

Dr. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes as provisional president. The second, led by Batista, then an army sergeant, unseated Cespedes. Batista remained in power until the election of 1944, following which he went into voluntary exile in the United States. In a coup d'etat in 1952, Batista overthrew the government of President Carlos Prio Socarras to return to power. And it was this second Batista regime that Castro's "revolution" ousted in 1959. Measured against the general Latin-American average, this Cuban record is a little--but not much--more than par for the course.

Involved in the problem of political instability, in addition to the frequency of so-called "revolution," is the phenomenon of recurrent dictatorship. While the situation is continually changing, it is generally true that at any given moment at least a half-dozen of the Latin-American countries are governed by dictatorship, normally military in orientation. The reasons for this are many and deep-seated. Among them is the authoritarian political tradition the Spanish Empire imposed upon its American colonies. Itself historically governed by divine-right monarchy, Spain left a tradition of strong government in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, this tradition was so marked that many of the nineteenth-century leaders of the movements for Latin-American independence believed that monarchy should be retained as the newly independent states' form of government. In conformity with this reasoning, monarchies were in fact attempted in the nineteenth century in Mexico, Brazil, and Haiti. Even those who advocated the establishment of republican systems in Latin America were convinced that they should be strongly authoritarian. In preparing the draft of Bolivia's first constitution, "The Liberator" Simon Bolivar produced an instrument providing for a president with not only lifelong tenure but also the authority to choose his own successor. "The

President of the Republic becomes in our Constitution the sun, which, firm in the center, gives life to the universe," Bolivar wrote. "I have never been an enemy of monarchy, as far as general principles are concerned; on the contrary, I consider monarchies essential for the respectability and well-being of new nations. . . . The new states of America . . . need kings with the name of presidents."[5]

In seeking the keys to fidelismo, it is worth emphasizing that Cuba received much more than the average Hispanic-American dose of this Spanish tradition of political authoritarianism. Not only was Cuba one of the first places in the Western Hemisphere where Spanish colonial power was established, but it is also worth remembering that this island was the last place in the Americas to be freed from that power. Christopher Columbus, the celebrated Admiral of the Ocean Sea himself, visited Cuba during his second voyage in 1493, and Spanish colonial government was established there shortly thereafter, to remain in the island for four centuries. Cuba's history as a Spanish colony stands in marked contrast to that of, say, Argentina, where the Spanish Viceroyalty of the United Provinces of the La Plata River was not established until 1776, lasting only until the independence movement which began in 1810.[6] Not only did Cuba endure a longer history of Spanish colonial rule than any other American colony, but also the military and authoritarian orientation of that rule was heavier in the island than else-

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[5]Quoted in Blanksten, "Caudillismo in Northwestern South America," The South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. LI, no. 4 (October, 1952), pp. 498-499.

[6]Also worth contrasting with Cuba were the following colonial viceroyalties, with the dates of both their founding and the beginnings of the successful independence movements: New Spain (Mexico), 1535, 1821; New Castille (Peru), 1542, 1821; and New Granada (Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama), 1717, 1809.

where in Hispanic America. During the colonial period, Cuba served as a military and supply base, first for the Spanish conquest and later for the government of the New World. Spain conquered Mexico from Cuba, and moved from the island to other parts of the Americas as well. No other part of Latin America has endured a longer or more heavily military tradition of political authoritarianism than has Cuba.

Sine the achievement of Cuban independence, this tradition has been reflected in the recurrence of military dictatorship in the island's government. Among the most celebrated of the country's dictatorships was that presided over from 1925 until 1933 by General Gerardo Machado. His regime has been regarded as "one of the cruelest that Latin America has ever seen. Machado . . . ruthlessly oppressed his opponents, frequently by means of torture and murder. The . . . life of the republic was paralyzed."[7] Shortly after the fall of Machado, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista rose to national power, promoting himself to colonel during the process. Although Batista's first period in power, which lasted until 1944, bore many of the characteristics of dictatorship, the regime was mild as compared with Machado's, and a number of constitutional reforms were put into effect. These made possible the election of 1944, which ushered in an eight-year period of civilian constitutional government. During this time the presidency was occupied by Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin (1944-1948) and Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras (1948-1952). Batista's second regime (1952-1958), unlike his first, was a rigid dictatorship sufficiently ruthless to lead many Cubans to compare it with the Machado period. Castro overthrew this dictatorship. In establishing another, he

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[7] Miguel Jorrin, Governments of Latin America (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1953), p. 276.

presided over a continuation of, rather than a departure from, a four-century-old tradition of military authoritarianism. It was this consideration that gave point in 1959 to the widely-told joke to the effect that when the bearded Castro was secretly shaved he turned out to be Batista.

Cuba's historic political instability thus stands as a first key to fidelismo. A number of the movement's basic characteristics derive from this tradition. The most obvious of these is that fidelismo, like a number of previous Cuban regimes, has embraced the continuation of government through dictatorship. Few lists of fidelista objectives have assigned significant priority to the restoration of constitutional government in the country. The holding of elections, while mentioned as a possibility early in the Castro regime, eventually lost its place among fidelista intentions. The Cuban press, censored by Batista and a number of his predecessors, continued in censorship during the Castro regime. Radio, television, the theater, and other mass communications media were likewise controlled. While civil and political liberties were not much less curtailed by Castro than by many of the previous governments, neither were these liberties permitted by him in any way contrasting significantly with the policies of Machado or of Batista's second regime.

As a military dictatorship, the Castro regime illustrated a curious phase in the evolution of Cuban militarism. Beyond providing a defense system for the community, the Cuban army has long performed domestic political functions. The frequency with which military officers have assumed the presidency of the republic has already been noted. High-ranking army officers have historically been important politicians, and the military influence has provided a species of backdrop for politics. In view of the fact that the

significance of militarism in Latin-American politics has long been recognized, it is a curious circumstance that social scientists have only recently begun to turn their attention to this problem. Early studies indicate that the process of political clique-formation among army officers, correlations between military rank and the class systems, and relationships between military rank and political orientation offer potential insight into many aspects of Latin-American politics. In a number of the countries, for example, general officers tend to lead conservative political movements, while a significant radicalism recruits its political leadership from the group of military ranks bounded at the top by colonel and at the bottom by captain. Additional studies of these matters are sorely needed to test such hypotheses, which occupy intriguing places in the as yet small and pioneering literature on the armed forces of Latin America.[8]

In any case, the story of Machado, Batista, and Castro suggests a curious direction in the evolution of Cuban militarism. Machado's military regime was dominated by general officers who exercized a conservative influence on national politics. Batista was a sergeant at the time of his first uprising in 1933. Securing the aid of junior army officers, his movement effectively liquidated the officer class which had ruled Cuba before and during the Machado regime. Batista's military government differed from his predecessors' in that it was based upon a lower-ranking officer group. The latent political coalition between the large landowners and the military command was markedly weakened in Cuba after 1933. While the first Batista

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[8] See Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), passim.; and Robert J. Alexander, "The Army in Politics," in Davis, op. cit., pp. 147-165.

government was of course a military regime, it was a lower-ranking group that exercized political power then than had been the case in earlier governments. After the election of 1944, Batista maintained his contact with the junior army officers. When he made his coup d'etat in 1952, he confided that "I did it with captains and lieutenants."[9]

As Batista's revolution of 1933 had been a military purge, so, too, in a sense, was Castro's revolution. Shortly after Castro came to power in 1959, his firing squads embarked upon a sensationally wholesale program of executing military men who had served Batista's government. Much has been written about these executions. Castro called them, and the trials that preceded most of them, "revolutionary justice." His enemies pointed to the executions as additional evidence of the ruthless dictatorship of fidelismo. It may not be amiss to suggest that they constituted a new military purge in a country historically governed by its armed forces. It has been estimated that 557 men were executed by Castro's firing squads during the first few months of 1959. With very few exceptions these had been soldiers and policemen of the Batista government. Again the question of military rank becomes significant. The overwhelming majority of the executed were junior officers and men holding non-commissioned ranks. Also prominent among the victims were army conscripts who had been assigned to firing squads. Of the 557 executions, the most widely publicized was that of Captain Jesus Sosa Blanco. Among his distinctions was the fact that he was the highest-ranking of the military people put to death at that time. Batista's "captains and

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[9] Stanley R. Ross, "Some Observations on Military Coups in the Caribbean," in A. Curtis Wilgus (ed.), The Caribbean: Its Political Problems (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956), pp. 112-113.

lieutenants" were liquidated.

Fidel Castro's popular militia thereupon filled the military vacuum. The basic significance of this pattern of the evolution of Cuban militarism remained unclear at the time this paper was written. There appears to be a perhaps ironic democratization of the military, in the sense that its politically influential center of gravity has moved to progressively lower military ranks. Cuba remained under military rule, to be sure; but the progression from Machado's generals through Batista's junior officers to Castro's popular militia appears to reflect a broadening of the base of the country's militarism.

Cuba's historic political instability has also been reflected by remarkable difficulty in achieving political institutionalization, and this too throws light on the nature of fidelismo. Cuban opposition parties have been in the habit of accusing the groups in power of violating the country's written constitutions. These have indeed been violated, but traditional instability lies at the heart of the problem at least as much as does any personal skulduggery of men in public office. Since independence, Cuba has had two major written constitutions. Neither ever achieved genuine institutionalization. The first, promulgated in 1901, was violated in 1906, 1928, twice in 1933, 1934, and in 1937. The second, a Batista instrument proclaimed in 1940, not only has been violated at least as often as the first, but also will probably never actually function in Cuba. Theoretically, the Constitution of 1940 provides for a variation of parliamentary government, with the president of the republic functioning as a species of figurehead while major authority is to be exercized by a prime minister and his cabinet.

Batista found the parliamentary system, foreign to Cuban traditions and practices, to be the answer to a dictator's prayer. Serving as the "figurehead" president under the Constitution of 1940, he pursued the practice of obtaining the prime minister's and cabinet ministers' signed but undated resignations at the time he appointed them to office. When it suited his purposes, President Batista dated the resignations and delivered them to the press. Even during the eight-year constitutional period, from 1944 to 1952, the parliamentary system did not take genuine institutional hold. Because he declared that he expected the prime minister to exercize more power than he would himself, President Ramon Grau San Martin was berated by the Cuban press as a weakling unfit to hold national public office. Throughout the constitutional period prime ministers generally entertained the political ambition of becoming president, a pattern contrary to the spirit of the parliamentary system. Batista again lived comfortably with his constitution when he returned to power in 1952. And Castro's use of the parliamentary idea has been but a minor variation of Batista's. Theoretically, Castro has been prime minister, to be sure, and his presidents powerless figureheads; but neither prime minister nor president--not to mention a parliament!--has been elected. The record is clear that constitutional government has yet to take root in Cuba, and that the Constitutions of 1901 and 1940 have both failed to establish a viable institutional framework.[10]

Civilian political parties have not had much more success in achieving

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[10] See Fitzgibbon, "Constitutional Development in Latin America: A Synthesis," American Political Science Review, vol. XXXIX (June 1945), pp. 500-522; and William S. Stokes, "The Cuban Parliamentary System in Action, 1940-1947," Journal of Politics (April, 1949), pp. 335-364.

stable institutionalization on the island. During the first generation of national independence, the Liberal Party enjoyed something of stability, but this was damaged by the party's support of Machado. The Cuban Revolutionary (Autentico) Party emerged from the revolution of 1933 and endured to support the administrations of Presidents Grau and Prio. Leftist participation has been provided by the Party of the Cuban People and the Communist Party. But civilian political parties, whether of the right or of the left, have exhibited a remarkable instability and a chronic incapacity to work with, and otherwise relate to, each other. Fidelismo clearly demonstrates this condition of the parties. Numerous attempts have been made to relate civilian political parties to the Castro government, but all have failed. This has also been true of the opposition--it is more accurate to say "oppositions"--to Castro. Here too it has been virtually impossible for the parties to join together in a stable fashion in pursuit of a common cause.

Further, the country's political instability has tended to intensify personalismo in Cuba and, with it, a popular tendency to respond to charismatic leadership. Personalismo may be regarded as the custom of following or opposing a political leader on the basis of his personality rather than on ideological grounds. Many students of Latin-American politics have found this to be a widespread tendency in the area. Pierson and Gil, for example, point to "the high value placed on the individual and personal leadership," promoting "a disposition to vote for the man rather than the party or the platform."[11] Another student has said: "From earliest days the Latin-Americans . . . have always been more interested in their public men than in

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[11] William W. Pierson and Federico G. Gil, Governments of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1957), p. 31.

their public policies. They have tended to follow colorful leaders, to the subordination of issues. . . . A picturesque demagogue is virtually assured a large following."[12] Expanded personalismo has increased the tendency of charismatic leaders to rise to national power in Cuba. Convinced that he is the only figure on the scene who can "save the country," the charismatic leader feels an "inner call." He is recognized by his followers as a "natural" leader of men. They "do not obey him by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him," Max Weber has pointed out. He governs through a species of divine right, but "his divine mission must 'prove' itself in that those who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. If they do not fare well, he is obviously not the master sent by the gods."[13]

Personalismo is clearly central in fidelismo, and Fidel Castro is one of Latin America's leading case studies in charismatic leadership. Two implications of this are significant. First, his role is defined by his charismatic hold on his followers rather than by an institutional or constitutional position he might hold. Secondly, the magic of charisma is not easily transferable--Fidel Castro, and Fidel alone, heads fidelismo. From time to time during the course of his regime rumors arose to the effect that he was about to be displaced by one or more of his associates as leader of his movement. Prominently mentioned as candidates for this leadership were his younger brother, Raul Castro, fidelismo's military commander; Major Ernesto ("Che") Guevara, chief of the National Bank of Cuba ("'Che's National Bank"); and

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[12] Macdonald, op. cit., p. 2.

[13] Max Weber (H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, tr.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 79, 249.

Antonio Nunez Jimenez, head of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA). It seemed likely, however, that none of these figures would be able to inherit Fidel's charismatic hold on his movement. It has been said that "Fidel is the most charismatic figure produced by Latin America, at least in this century. . . . Castro's domination of Cuban events is virtually unique. . . . The history of Cuba in the last two or three years is the biography of Fidel."[14]

The island's historic political instability, then, stands as a first of the major keys to the nature of fidelismo. As such, this consideration points to the Castro revolution as one more upheaval in a country with more than the average Latin-American predilliction for "revolutions," and to the fidelista dictatorship as one more strong government in a culture historically given to political authoritarianism. As a military dictatorship, the Castro regime appears to have encouraged further democratization of the political role of the armed forces, as evidenced by the emergence of a popular militia on the ruins of Machado- and Batista-style armies. The place of political instability in fidelismo is further attested to in the lack of institutionalization which has characterized the movement. This has been reflected in the absence of constitutionalism, in the inability of civilian political parties to relate to Castro, and in the heavily charismatic, rather than institutional, leadership which has given fidelismo much of its course and character.

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[14] Fitzgibbon, "The Revolution Next Door: Cuba," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 334 (March 1961), pp. 113-122, especially pp. 114, 116-117.

II

A second significant key to the nature of the movement is to be found in the striking political contrast between metropolitan Havana and the rest of Cuba. Again, it may be helpful to compare the island with the remainder of Latin America. Throughout the area--indeed, in most underdeveloped areas[15] --sharp contrasts and conflicts characterize the relationships between urban centers and rural communities. These relationships appear to be a function of the process of economic development in two significant ways. First, urban centers in the developing areas serve as nucleii of commercialization and the beginnings of industrialization, as centers of "modernization" or "Westernization," and as focal points of secularization. In contrast, the rural areas live in a landed or agricultural rather than commercial or industrializing economy, and tend to be more "backward," traditional, religious, and superstitious. In the underdeveloped areas, illiteracy rates are sharply higher in rural than in urban communities, and standards of living differ dramatically, being much higher in the cities than in their hinterlands.

Secondly, underdeveloped areas are theaters of rapid social and economic change. A major facet of this change is urbanization, the movement of people from the rural areas to the cities. This trend, intensified by the tendency of European immigrants to locate in the major cities of Latin America, has been one of the area's major social phenomena of the twentieth century. There is no Hispanic-American country in which there has been a trend away from urbanization; everywhere the impressive fact has been the

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[15] See Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), especially pp. 455-531.

movement toward the city, the swelling of urban populations. This trend has given rise to what is sometimes referred to as the problem of la cabeza de Goliat (Goliath's head), characterizing a country in which a giant urban head rests upon a dwarflike rural body. In Latin America this situation is by no means peculiar to Cuba. It is acute in a number of other countries, such as Uruguay, where more than half of the national population lives in the metropolitan area of Montevideo; Argentina, where a little more than one-fourth of the people are located in Greater Buenos Aires; and Venezuela, where approximately twenty percent of the population lives in Caracas.

If the Cuban case is viewed in this general perspective, a number of significant propositions emerge. In the first place, the island is no mere case study in la cabeza de Goliat. Rather, Cuba exhibits an exaggerated caricature of the problem. Fifty-three percent--more than one-half--of the total national population lives in one city, the metropolitan area of Havana! Far from being representative of the cultural life of the rest of the island, Havana--secularized, commercialized, "Westernized," sophisticated, and "modern"--stands not only as the metropolis of the Caribbean, but also, ranking with New York, Chicago, Buenos Aires, and Mexico City, as one of the major metropolitan centers of the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, Havana has stood historically in a position of political opposition to the rest of the island. In the Americas, it has been pointed out, "Hispanic culture has always been strongly urbanized."[16] Throughout the imperial period Spain treated its American colonies as a collection of

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[16] Stokes, Latin-American Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1959), p. 502.

cities, setting the pattern for the deep division separating urban from rural life. The seat of governmental power in colonial times, Havana provided "the chief centers of political activity of the upper classes and, indeed, the only community levels upon which they--rather than the home government in Europe--could exercize power."[17] Traditionally the headquarters of elite groups, in contemporary times Havana has come to be the home of those political groups which gained in strength as the island's economic development proceeded. Especially important among these groups were organized labor, the urbanized "middle sectors"--identified as "politically ambitious middle groups" active in commerce and developing industry[18]--and other newly emerging industrializing and entrepreneurial groups. Caught in the economic development of Cuba, these Havana-based interests frequently pursued courses opposed to the desires of rural sectors, feeding the historic fires of rural-urban conflict.

Against this background, fidelismo took shape as a rural movement at war against Havana interests. During his years as the leader of the rebels against Batista, Fidel Castro led rural Cuba in its historic, and now open, war against Havana. Castro's image as the champion of the back country grew after December of 1956, when he set up rebel headquarters in the rural Sierra Maestra. The back country's enemies of Havana flocked to him in an intensely indigenous nationalism. Suffering real and imagined hardships at the cruel

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[17] Blanksten, "Problems of Local Government in the Caribbean," in Wilgus, op. cit., p. 226.

[18] John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. vii and passim.

hands of the metropolis, the rural fraternity of the disadvantaged provided fidelismo with an agrarian popular base.

Thus a second key to fidelismo. In a very real sense, Castro's rise to power was the triumph of rural Cuba over Havana. The imprisoned metropolis saw its interests crushed by Fidel. The industrializing "middle sectors" fell prey to the back country, and Cuba's economic development, insofar as it had depended upon urban leadership, was significantly retarded.[19] Seen as a rural victory over the metropolis, fidelismo was curiously reminiscent of the regime of General Juan Manuel Rosas, which had ruled Argentina more than a century before. It, too, was a triumph of the "interior" over the urban capital, of the intensely indigenous over the secular.

III

Domestic Cuban social and economic conditions cannot be ignored as a major key to fidelismo. The island, like most underdeveloped areas, is a theater of remarkably rapid change. In combination with the country's historic political instability, this pattern of social and economic transformation has influenced the nature of fidelismo in two ways. The first is a matter of public morality. The second gives Castro's movement something of the flavor of the agrarian-populistic or Aprista parties common in a number of Hispanic-American countries.

The problem of public morality is widespread in the Latin-American political culture in a form often difficult for "North Americans" to understand. In many of the countries, including Cuba, politicians and government

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[19] Johnson, "The Political Role of the Latin-American Middle Sectors," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 334 (March 1961), pp. 20-29.

officials are generally distrusted and popularly assumed to be guilty of a wide variety of forms of graft and corruption. Most Latin Americans are cynical about equating ordinary morality with politics, and la mordida (the "bite") is generally expected in the discharge of governmental functions. "They tell you that I am stealing your money," a Latin-American officeholder is said to have told a public rally. "Who would you rather have steal your money than me?"

It is important to distinguish the charge or expectation of corruption from the question of the extent to which it takes place in fact. Much more is known about the former than the latter. Mass media in most of the Latin-American countries indulge in the belief that their governments, or many of their officials, are corrupt, and the public acceptance of this belief is widespread. On the other hand, it is as difficult to substantiate as it is to disprove such accusations, and little is objectively known of the extent to which they are justified. This writer's guess--and it is only that--is that graft and corruption in fact do occur in Latin America, but probably not on as large a scale as is popularly believed.

In any case, pre-Castro Cuba was characterized by the typical Latin-American situation in this regard. Government officials were generally believed to be corrupt, and were often pictured in the press as enriching themselves at public expense. A few illustrations of this Cuban pattern might be mentioned here. During the administration of President Ramon Grau San Martin (1944-1948), one of the more celebrated Havana sights visited by guided tours was a huge diamond set in the floor of the Capitolio, the building in which the Cuban Congress met. In 1947, the diamond was stolen, and the Havana press rose to the mystery-solving challenge with considerable

zest. Many of the papers declared that it was inevitable that the diamond would be stolen, simply because it had been placed in the building where the national legislature, composed of Cuba's leading thieves, met. Some argued that President Grau himself was the culprit; many who disagreed pointed out that he could steal more without leaving the presidential office. Three years after the expiration of his term, Grau was formally charged with having misappropriated one hundred seventy-four million dollars; the ultimate indictment was for forty million, "mainly because valuable evidence was apparently stolen by gunmen from a public office."[20] Many exiled Cuban ex-presidents have been reported as living handsomely because of self-enrichment at public expense while in office. Among the leading recent instances of this is Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras, Grau's successor (1948-1952) in the presidency. Both of Batista's regimes were similarly characterized by charges and expectations of corruption. With the expansion of the "North American" tourist trade during his time, luxurious gambling casinos and other entertainment centers publicly supposed to be centers of dishonesty and immorality flourished in Havana.

One significant side of fidelismo is its role as a crusade for public morality. Castro's movement has been a species of political puritanism, curiously Spartanlike in character. An amazing variety of charges and accusations has been hurled against the Castro regime, to be sure; but graft and corruption are significantly absent among them. Virtually no looting was engaged in during the tumultuous first days after the fall of Batista; money

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[20] R. A. Gomez, Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 67.

taken from the raided gambling casinos lay virtually untouched in the streets. Fidelismo has moved, often in naive ways, against gambling and other activities assumed to be corrupt, and the administrative morality of the Castro government seems strangely out of place in a Cuba grown cynical in such matters.

The following news story offers some insight into the stern and humorless extremes achieved in fidelismo's war against la mordida:

> Premier Fidel Castro has decided to revise the rules of baseball, it was disclosed today.
>
> Last Sunday, after cutting cane at a nearby sugar mill, Dr. Castro pitched in a sandlot game. But when a runner stole second base on him, the Premier ordered him back to first.
>
> "In the revolution," Dr. Castro said, "no one can steal--even in baseball."[21]

The face of fidelismo as Spartanlike public morality should be neither ignored nor underestimated.

The rural character of fidelismo, springing from Cuba's historic rural-urban conflict, has already been noted. From this standpoint, the Castro movement has acquired a substantial agrarian-populistic base, and may be regarded as containing some of the elements of an Aprista party. Common in Latin America, Aprista parties have two distinguishing characteristics. First, they seek far-reaching social and economic changes in rural areas, usually including land reform. Second, they demand the integration of the rural lower classes into the political process; indeed, Aprismo boasts a greater percentage of lower-class adherents than can any other Latin-American political movement. The chief prototype of this class of political party is, of course, the

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[21]Quoted in The New Yorker, March 25, 1961, p. 29.

celebrated Aprista Party or APRA[22] of Peru. Other Aprista parties include Accion Democratica of Venezuela, and the National Liberation Party of Costa Rica.[23] In a sense, Mexico's governing PRI[24] is also a party of this type.

Rural conditions in pre-Castro Cuba were by no means the most severe in Latin America. Nevertheless, sufficiently inequitable circumstances to feed an agrarian-populistic revolt certainly existed. Forty-seven percent of the national population lived outside the metropolitan area of Havana, and forty percent of the island's work force was engaged in agriculture. In 1946, eight percent of the farmers owned 71.1 percent of the land while thirty-nine percent owned only 3.3 percent of the land. Many of the rural workers were the employees of the more than one hundred fifty sugar mills located throughout the country. Owing to the seasonal production of sugar, there was an average annual unemployment rate of twenty-five percent. "The typical Cuban agriculturalist," it has been pointed out, "is not a peasant in the usual European sense of the term but rather a landless proletarian who customarily works for wages in groups or gangs under the direction and supervision of others. . . . He has traditionally been the forgotten man of Cuban society. For the most part employed only a few months during the sugar, tobacco, or

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[22]After the initial letters of Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance).

[23]See Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), passim.; and Robert J. Alexander, "The Latin-American Aprista Parties," Political Quarterly, vol. 20 (1949), pp. 236-247.

[24]After the initial letters of Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party).

coffee harvests, he has barely managed to exist the remainder of the year."[25]

Especially during the years when fidelismo was a rebel movement in the back country fighting against Batista's Havana, Castro acquired a strong agrarian following increasingly dedicated to rural reforms. The construction of schools and other educational programs, of benefit especially to rural Cuba, acquired significant status among the goals of his movement. Housing and medical programs also found their way into fidelismo. So, too, did land reform, and the pattern of land tenure faced significant changes during the Castro regime. Following the promulgation in May of 1959 of the agrarian reform law, a government agency, the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA[26]), was established, under the leadership of Antonio Nunez Jimenez, to administer Castro's land program. It was estimated that, by mid-1960, INRA, then a gigantic administrative entity, held title to more than one-half the land surface of Cuba.[27] It thus seemed clear that substantial Aprista-like rural changes were contemplated by fidelismo.

Yet the relationship of these changes to the economic development of Cuba is at best questionable. This development, properly considered, is not a vague or general umbrella covering all varieties of change. Rather, economic development is the more sharply defined phenomenon of technological innovation resulting in greater efficiency on the part of the productive arts.

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[25] See Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960), passim., especially p. 80.

[26] After the initial letters of Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria.

[27] Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 115.

A more effective technology draws a higher level of production--that is, a greater gross national product per capita--from a known initial input into an economy.[28]

On the eve of the fall of Batista, Cuba's standard of living, expressed in terms of gross national product per capita, was the third highest in Latin America.[29] To be sure, a degree of perhaps inevitable bias is built into the gross national product figures. For one thing, international economic comparisons are never easy to make, as a number of significant factors are often difficult to reduce to quantitatively comparable terms. Moreover, translation of gross national product figures into United States dollars catches aspects of trade relations and foreign exchange rates not entirely relevant to economic development and standards of living. Finally, Cuban national figures are distorted by the problem of la cabeza de Goliat--more than half the island's population lives in the metropolitan area of Havana, where the standard of living is substantially higher than in the rest of the country. For example, eighty-seven percent of the dwelling units in the urban center have electricity whereas only nine percent of the island's rural units are so equipped.[30]

Even after due regard is paid to these statistical pitfalls, pre-Castro Cuba's standard of living remained among the highest in Latin America. It did not seem likely, at the time this paper was written, that national living standards might be expected to rise under fidelismo. Indeed, such

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[28]See Blanksten, "The Aspiration for Economic Development," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 334 (March 1961), pp. 10-19.

[29]See Table 1, p. 26, below.

[30]Huberman and Sweezy, op. cit., p. 4.

Table 1

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA+

(Rank Order of Countries Based on Gross National Product per Capita)

Rank	Country	Gross National Product per Capita (in U.S. Dollars)
1	Argentina	$ 688
2	Venezuela	457
3	CUBA	454
4	Uruguay	382
5	Panama	382
6	Chile	335
7	Brazil	278
8	Colombia	231
9	Costa Rica	203
10	Mexico	199
11	Dominican Republic	189
12	Guatemala	182
13	Nicaragua	168
14	El Salvador	167
15	Paraguay	166
16	Honduras	134
17	Peru	118
18	Bolivia	109
19	Ecuador	93
20	Haiti	62
For Comparison	United States	2,200

+Source: Blanksten, op. cit., pp. 10-19, especially p. 11. See also Davis, op. cit., pp. 50-93, especially pp. 60-71; and Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 455-531.

statistical changes as were in the making in 1961 seemed headed in the other direction. A number of propositions flow from this situation. In the first place, while revolutions and other political phenomena appear to flow from economic growth in the underdeveloped areas,[31] it does not seem possible to make a reasonable case for regarding fidelismo as deriving from, or contributing to, Cuba's economic development. The ties, if they exist at all, are not easy to find between Castro's movement and theories of revolutions of rising expectations or of "take-off" in economic growth.[32] The mainsprings of fidelismo must be sought elsewhere in the island's national life.

Moreover, economic development must depend heavily upon emerging industrializing and entrepreneurial groups. These groups--the so-called "middle sectors"--have developed in urban centers in Latin America, especially in Havana. Insofar as it has been an agrarian-populistic movement directed against Havana interest, fidelismo has warred against the urban "middle sectors," seriously paralyzing their ability to continue functioning. In this view, the Castro regime can be seen as opposing the country's economic

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[31] See Almond and Coleman, op. cit., passim.

[32] The reader may wish to consult the following works by W. W. Rostow: The Process of Economic Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); "Trends in the Allocation of Resources in Secular Growth," in Leon H. Dupriez (ed.), Economic Progress (Louvain: Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, 1955); "The Take-off into Self-Sustained Growth," The Economic Journal (March, 1956), pp. 25-48; "The Stages of Economic Growth," The Economic History Review, second series, vol. XII, no. 1 (August, 1959), pp. 1-16; and The Stages of Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

development insofar as technological innovation is central to the growth process.[33]

Domestic Cuban economic and social conditions, then, provide a third key to the Castro movement. As reflected in fidelismo, these have taken the forms of a puritanic crusade for the advancement of public morality and agrarian-populistic attempts to improve literacy, housing, medical, and land tenure conditions in the rural areas. In view of the nature of Havana's economy, and Cuba's overall level of economic development, however, it does not seem likely that this aspect of the movement might make a positive contribution to the island's standard of living.

IV

Finally, Cuba's relations with the United States provide a fourth major key to the nature of fidelismo. Again, comparisons with the experience of other Latin-American countries might be useful. It is worth noting that, of the twenty states of the area, some are far removed from the "Colossus of the North." Simply in terms of air miles, no European capital, not even Moscow, is farther from the geographic center of the United States than is Buenos Aires, Argentina; and only one European capital, Athens, Greece, is farther from that center than is Brasilia, the new seat of the Brazilian government. On the other hand, the Middle American countries--Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean islands--are closer to the "Yanquis" and much more subject to their influence. While there have been unhappy periods in the

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[33] See Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors, passim.; and Johnson, "The Political Role of the Latin-American Middle Sectors," pp. 20-29, especially pp. 28-29.

histories of the relations of the United States with most of the Latin-American countries[34]--it is instructive that Brazil is the only one in which a statue of James Monroe has been erected--the Middle American states have felt the influence of the United States much more than have the countries on the continent of South America. Many years ago, for example, a Mexican newspaper observed editorially that the United States "like everything big frightens us, like everything strong seduces us, like everything rich arouses our envy and makes us forget the clay feet of the Anglo-American colossus to focus our attention upon its head of gold."[35] General Porfirio Diaz is said to have complained thus: "Poor Mexico! So far from God; so close to the United States!"

Compared with the rest of Middle America, Cuba is once more a caricature rather than a case study. Indeed, if General Diaz had had a second tear, he might well have shed it for Cuba. Lying less than one hundred miles off the Florida coast, the island has been showered with virtually everything "Yanqui" ranging from the fragments of the battleship Maine to the debris of a shattered dream launched from Cape Canaveral. The island has been first occupied by the armed forces of the United States and then overrun by hordes of vacationing tourists sprawling on Havana's beaches by day and filling its night clubs and gambling casinos by night. "Yanqui" business firms have invested heavily in the Cuban economy and controlled much of it, and the "Colossus of the North" has provided the chief markets for the island's exports.

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[34]See, for example, Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (5th edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), passim.

[35]Quoted in Donald Marquand Dozer, Are We Good Neighbors? (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959), p. 2.

It was ever thus, throughout Cuba's national history. The United States, of course, played a major military role in the achievement of the island's independence of Spain. While the first Cuban president, Tomas Estrada Palma (1902-1909), expressed "the immense gratitude which the people feel towards the American nation,"[36] it is worth remembering that Jose Marti, the major national hero of the island's independence, had seen the United States as beginning "to bring into the open its latent spirit of aggression."[37] Marti's view of the "Yanquis'" part in the struggle for insular independence is much more widely held among Cubans than Estrada's attitude.

Indeed, the fateful Platt Amendment was to become the major symbol of their image of the United States. Adopted in 1901 by the Congress of the United States as an amendment to an Army appropriation bill, the Platt instrument was later written into Cuba's first constitution and also into a treaty between the Washington and Havana governments in 1904. The "Amendment" provided, among other things, for limitations on Cuba's authority to conduct its own foreign relations and to contract public debts. At the same time the United States was guaranteed the right to intervene militarily in the island to maintain order there, and to hold

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[36] Stuart, op. cit., p. 212.

[37] Dozer, op. cit., p. 2.

naval bases in Cuba.[38] The first "Yanqui" military occupation was terminated in 1902. Under the Platt Amendment, however, "North American" armed forces

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[38] The Platt Amendment has become so controversial in the relations between the United States and Cuba that the relevant clauses of that instrument deserve quotation in full:

> (1) That the Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign Power or Powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign Power or Powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said Island.
>
> (2) That said Government shall not assume or contract any public debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking-fund provision for discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the Island, after defraying the current expenses of the Government, shall be inadequate.
>
> (3) That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercize the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.
>
> (4) That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupation thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful right acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.
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> (5) That the Government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the Island to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.
>
> (6) That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto left to future adjustments by treaty.
>
> (7) That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.
>
> (8) That by way of further assurance the Government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States

See United States Statutes at Large, vol. XXXI, p.897, or House Document No. 2, 57th Congress, 1st Session, p.47. The reader may also wish to consult Raymond L.Buell, "Cuba and the Platt Amendment," Foreign Policy Reports, vol.V, no.3(April 17,1929)and Stuart,op.cit.,pp.186-230,especially pp.213-214.

returned four years later to occupy the country until 1909. During the administration of President Alfredo Zayas (1921-1925), the "Amendment" was invoked repeatedly. At length, "North American" President Franklin D. Roosevelt abrogated the Platt Amendment in 1934 as an early step in his administration's Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America. Provision was made at that time for the retention of the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, originally acquired under the "Amendment."

Following the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, United States influence continued in Cuba. As its forms changed, its volume increased. "Yanqui" investments in the island, already valued at $80,000,000 as early as 1901, rose steadily in the following half-century. Most of these investments were connected with the sugar industry, with "North American" firms owning or controlling fifty-four percent of the island's sugar mills during the Batista period. United States interests invested heavily in other sectors of Cuba's economy as well, particularly in tobacco, fruit, transportation, docks, electric light and power, telecommunications, banks, luxury hotels, and steamship and air lines. Late in the Batista regime, the island's imports achieved an annual average value of $640,000,000, and exports were valued at $766,000,000. Approximately two-thirds of each of these figures represented trade with the United States.

Under Batista, Cuba--principally Havana--became increasingly attractive as a vacation resort for "Yanqui" tourists. Many, originally oriented toward the pleasures of Miami Beach, seemed suddenly to discover an even more beckoning playground less than an hour away by commercial airline. Crowding into the luxury hotels, night clubs, and gambling casinos of Havana, these fun-seeking vacationers fed a Cuban image of the "Yanqui" as a shallow and

insensitive materialist with unlimited amounts of money to devote to amusing himself. This writer once visited a Havana night club whose management had secured the services of Jorge Negrete, then one of Mexico's most well-known popular singers. The Cuban master of ceremonies was obviously moved in announcing his pleasure in being able to introduce the distinguished Mexican artist, about to interpret the music of Mexico he loved most. "No, no!" shouted the "Yanqui"-dominated audience. "No Mexicans! If we wanted Mexican music we would have flown to Mexico! Give us Cubans! Viva Cuba!" The celebrated Mexican's chagrin could not have approximated that of his Cuban hosts.

Such continuing "North American" economic, cultural, and social influence in Cuba has given rise on the island to a phenomenon that has been called "Plattism."[39] This might be defined as the circumstance that, despite the abrogation of the Platt Amendment more than a generation before the rise of Fidel Castro, Cuba has "continued to experience a significant degree probably of economic and certainly of psychological subordination to the United States."[40] No doubt, "Plattism" is essentially psychological in nature. It is widely believed in Cuba that the Platt Amendment is still in force. While quantitative data on this are not available, it is probably true that the overwhelming majority of the Cubans who have heard of the document have not heard that it was abrogated. The heavy economic and other influences of the "Yanquis," and the retention of the United States naval base at Guantanamo

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[39] This writer is indebted to Dr. Russell H. Fitzgibbon for the term "Plattism," which was apparently first used in his article, "The Revolution Next Door: Cuba," p. 114.

[40] Ibid., p. 114.

Bay are, for most Cubans, more than ample evidence that the Platt Amendment still lives. Legally and technically, it was put to rest in 1934; psychologically, it continues to dominate Cubans. This discrepancy is the soul of "Plattism."

And "Plattism" is a major element of fidelismo, governing many of its attitudes and policies toward the United States. What to many "North Americans" might appear to be quaintly unrealistic windmill-tilting against a long-dead dragon is to the Cuba of Fidel Castro an urgent, necessary, and just war against a living Platt Amendment. In this context it has been necessary to eliminate "Yanqui" economic influence in the island; "Plattism" has no doubt motivated much of the nationalization and expropriation of United States business interests in Cuba in 1960. The same psychological phenomenon strains to do battle at Guantanamo Bay. Such fidelista policies would certainly have brought renewed United States military intervention in Cuba if the Platt Amendment had still been in force. That intervention, for the "Plattism" of fidelismo, is largely indistinguishable from the anti-Castro Cuban exiles' abortive "Yanqui"-aided invasion of the island in April of 1961.

Further, much of the interplay between fidelismo and Communism has derived its curious course and character from "Plattism." For one thing, it should be noted that the Cuban Communist Party had long been one of the four or five most important of the Communist organizations in Latin America, lagging behind only those of Brazil, Chile, and perhaps Argentina and Mexico.[41] It has been estimated that the Cuban Communists have from 20,000 to 30,000

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[41] See Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), passim.

members. If that figure seems small to "North Americans" accustomed to thinking in larger numbers, it would be, on a comparable basis, roughly equivalent to a Communist Party with more than 670,000 members in the United States.

Pre-Castro Cuban Communism, however, despite its influence among some of the rural sugar workers, was essentially an urban movement with its strength concentrated in, and almost restricted to, Havana. In the period before the fall of Batista--that is, when fidelismo was essentially a rural movement at war against the urban capital--there was little evidence of Communist association with the 26th of July movement. It is perhaps significant that those of Castro's lieutenants who were then reputed to be Communists--such as Raul Castro, Major Ernesto ("Che") Guevara, and Major Camilo Cienfuegos--acquired this reputation more from their foreign and international associations than from connections with the Havana-based Cuban Communist Party. It was not until fidelismo took Havana in 1959 that the island's Communist organization clearly threw its support to the already victorious Castro regime. "The Communists," it has been observed, "mounted the Castro bandwagon so late in its parade to success that their motives should have been suspect for that reason if for no other."[42] Fidel Castro is amost certainly not himself a Communist, but he reacted sympathetically to their organization for at least two major reasons. In the first place, he would have been something less than human not to have appreciated their vocal, imaginative, and dedicated support and assistance. Secondly, in the Cuban context "Plattism" operated to present the fidelistas and the Communists with a common enemy, the United States.

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[42] Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 117.

The role of "Plattism" has been somewhat less spectacular in Castro's relationships with Cuban Communists than in the case of international Communism. Under fidelista leadership, Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Korea, and other states with crucial roles in the Soviet bloc have been redefined, sometimes under sensational circumstances. Formal diplomatic relations with these countries have become remarkably cordial. Trade and other economic agreements have been entered into with Soviet-bloc governments in an endeavor to fill the vacuum in the Cuban economy left by the departing "Yanguis." Personally attending the session of the United Nations General Assembly at New York in September of 1960 as did the Soviets' Nikita Khrushchev, Castro made a major public spectacle of his endorsement of the Russian leader's opposition to the positions taken by the United States on a number of questions. Planes and tanks manufactured in the Soviet Union, machine guns and other small arms made in Czechoslovakia, and military aid from other Communist countries have flowed to Cuba. The value of these armaments in strengthening Castro's militia was demonstrated with devastating effectiveness by the defeat dealt the anti-fidelista invaders in April of 1961.

The place of Communism in fidelismo is both crucial and subtle. It seems likely that this role is far more negative than positive, that is, that it is motivated more by rejection of the United States than it is by acceptance of the Soviet system. Insofar as this is true, Castro's posture toward Communism appears to be the consummate expression of "Plattism." It has been noted that the imbalance or discrepancy between the legal extinctness, on the one hand, and, on the other, the psychological persistence of Cuba's subordination to the United States is the essence of "Plattism." There is some possibility that the process of fidelismo might itself work out this imbalance.

Such a solution cannot be depended upon, however, as the road leading in that direction is replete with dangerous pitfalls.

V

In one sense, the contribution of fidelismo to the revolution of our time is, in the Latin-American context, but the donation of one more bottle for the same old wine. Little--indeed, surprisingly little--is new, creative, or original in the Castro movement. At bottom, it is essentially the latest synthesis of elements which have been afoot in the Western Hemisphere since the opening years of the twentieth century. Yet this is precisely the appeal of fidelismo throughout Latin America. Fidel Castro strikes responsive chords in all countries of the Americas because his movement is composed of old and familiar elements, most of which have long been at large throughout the American republics. Fidelismo is more than exportable from Cuba to other Latin-American countries. Most of its components were already abroad in the Americas long before Castro seized upon them in Cuba.

Consider, for example, the various keys to fidelismo. The first of them, political instability, characterized by frequent so-called "revolution" and dictatorship, is as generally Latin-American as it is Cuban. Political authoritarianism, while more deeply-rooted historically in the Caribbean islands than elsewhere in the Americas, is by no means peculiar to Cuba. Neither does the island boast a monopoly in the Western Hemisphere on military dictatorship. A study published in 1960 indicated that no fewer than fourteen of the twenty Latin-American countries were living with at least as much political militarism as was Cuba.[43] Indeed, approved textbooks used in the

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[43] Lieuwen, op. cit., pp. 154-168.

military schools of Ecuador did not hesitate to teach that "the last step in a military career is the presidency of the republic."[44] Difficulty in achieving political institutionalization is likewise as generally Hispanic-American as Cuban. Constitutions come and go in the area, where the basic law that lives for more than a quarter of a century is rare indeed. No fewer than eight of the countries have each had ten or more written constitutions, and two of the states, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, have each had more than twenty.[45] The chronic instability of civilian political parties likewise belongs not merely to Cuba but also to the entire Latin-American world. "In these times," a Bolivian has written of his own country's parties, "nothing is simpler than to found a political party. To form a political party only three people and one object are necessary: a president, a vice president, a secretary, and a rubber stamp. The party can get along even without the vice president and the secretary. . . . There have been cases in which the existence of only the rubber stamp has been sufficient."[46] And Fidel Castro is probably not the last--he is certainly not the first--charismatic spellbinder to thrive on the personalismo of a Latin America that has known a Juan Domingo Peron, a Getulio Vargas, a Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, and a Victor Raul Haya de la Torre. "Never before had I heard such a speech," an Ecuadoran legislator once said of one more "man with a mission." "When it was finished, the president and congress were unashamedly in tears, and we stood up and voted unanimously for his bill. . . . I [was] such a fool, such a fool, to vote for his insane measure! . . . I have been mes-

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[44] Quoted in Blanksten, Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), p. 36.

[45] See Davis, op. cit., pp. 225-251.

[46] Luis Teran Gomez, Los Partidos Politicos y su Accion Democratica (La Paz: Editorial La Paz, 1942), pp. 60-61.

merized by experts. . . ."[47] In short, to export the first fidelista key to other Latin-American countries would be but to dump it on already badly glutted markets.

The second key, la cabeza de Goliat--the rural-urban conflict--will spread in Latin America with or without Fidel Castro's assistance. Goliath has already reared his ugly head in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Urbanization is apparently the inevitable handmaiden of economic development in the underdeveloped areas. As the growth process proceeds, the ever-widening schism separating the secularized, commercialized, and industrializing urban centers from the traditional and agrarian rural areas will doubtlessly aggravate the conflict, often giving rise to intensely indigenous anti-urban nationalisms. Hear the roar of the rural cannon trained on Goliath in Peru: the rural-urban "division is not merely physical. It pervades our entire social and economic life. . . . If it is true that no capital is really representative of the country that it governs, this is more than ever true in the case of Lima. . . . Lima is the center, but it is not central. It was the seat of Spanish colonial power; now it is the seat of the Government. . . . 'They founded it next to the sea, that it might look out toward Spain; ever since it has looked toward the outside world, courting foreigners; it is the sweetheart of the sailors of the seven seas; but it is not ours."[48] Essentially, the expansion of this conflict is a function of the increasing political modernization of Latin America. To lay this, too, at the door of

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[47] Quoted in Blanksten, op. cit., p. 50.

[48] Jose Carlos Mariategui, Siete Ensayos de Interpretacion de la Realidad Peruana (Lima: Biblioteca "Amanta," 1943), p. 153; and Moises Saenz, The Peruvian Indian (Washington: Strategic Index of the Americas, 1944), p. 8.

Fidel Castro would be to give him even more credit than he has claimed for himself.

Fidelismo's third key--internal social and economic conditions--tends to straddle the exportability question. On the one hand, this key contains an element, public morality, which is probably more difficult to export to other Latin-American countries than any other aspect of the Castro movement. Expectations of graft, corruption, and other forms of dishonesty in public office are widespread throughout the area. The diminution of this public immorality in Cuba is likely to be one of the long-range consequences of fidelismo in that country. But it is extremely difficult to imagine any circumstance under which the Castro regime could export its Spartan-like puritanism to any other American nation. Even assuming the future rise of fidelista power and influence to ridiculously unrealistic proportions, the prospects for the indefinite tenure of la mordida seem safe, secure, and generally unthreatened in the other American republics.

On the other hand, the agrarian-populistic nature of the 26th of July movement is substantially exportable to many of the Hispanic-American states which have long been sensitized to problems of land tenure, illiteracy, poor housing, problems of health and sanitation, and generally low standards of living. Throughout Latin America, Aprista parties--e. g., APRA in Peru, Accion Democratica in Venezuela, the National Liberation Party in Costa Rica, and the PRI in Mexico--have preached that reforms in these areas are both necessary and long overdue. It has been noted that this aspect of fidelismo is not likely to contribute to the economic development of Cuba. But it is ironic that insofar as this element of the Castro movement makes itself felt in other American countries, reforms promoting their economic development might

well be hastened in the states with more receptive standards of living. Throughout the Western Hemisphere Fidel Castro has come to symbolize "the aspirations of the Latin-American commoner for a better life," it has been pointed out. "That economic and perhaps even social improvement, though certainly not political democratization, can conceivably be achieved . . . has been brought home to the Latin-American man in the street by the vastly improved communications of mid-twentieth century. He is not as devoted to the traditional democracy of the West as are most people in the United States because he has known less of it."[49] There is therefore some likelihood that fidelismo might intensify demands, in many of the countries with lower standards of living, for greater speed in social and economic changes expected to promote the growth of the economies involved.

The final key to fidelismo, anti-United States sentiment, has, of course, long existed throughout Latin America. Indeed, a close student of such attitudes has reported in a recent study that "the normal state of Latin America is to be hostile to the United States."[50] Historically, this Yankeephobia has had its ups and downs. At the time of World War I, a Latin-American intellectual told the "North Americans" that "what you people must get out of your minds . . . is the idea that we . . . want to be like you. We do not--in any respect. . . . We don't want your type of education, your kind of religion, your commercialized ideas of living. . . . Our civilization is older than yours by centuries. It suits us. Your paternalism, your continual oversight of Latin-American affairs is irritating to us. You assume too much,

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[49] Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 121.

[50] Dozer, op. cit., p. 403.

and the benevolent role fools none of us. . . . Why talk about a unity that does not live? Why keep up all this Pan-American propaganda unless--what we all believe--for your own purposes of exploitation and political dominance?"[51] During the "Good Neighbor Policy" of the administration of the "North American" President Franklin D. Roosevelt, particularly during the years of World War II, Latin-American attitudes toward the United States were probably abnormally friendly. In the era of the Cold War, however, suspicion and distrust of the "Colossus of the North" have regained much lost ground in the Western Hemisphere.[52]

As a manifestation of renascent Yankeephobia, the "Plattism" of fidelismo has had a profound effect in a generally receptive Hispanic America. Although the formal declarations of some governments occasionally express a contrary view, it has been pointed out with considerable insight that "Castro is, to an uncomfortable degree, correct when he implies or states forthrightly that the governments in more than one Latin-American state do not really speak for large numbers of those they govern."[53] Throughout the Western Hemisphere, admiration is quick and widespread for regimes that dare to express defiance of the "Yanquis." Fidelismo "is definitely a danger to our continued peaceful relations with Latin America," Robert C. Hill, a United States Ambassador to Mexico during the administrations of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, declared

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[51] Mexican diplomat Luis Cabrera, quoted in Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics (2nd Edition; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1937), p. 347.

[52] This cooling of Latin-American attitudes is painstakingly documented in Dozer, op. cit., passim., especially pp. 188-354.

[53] Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 121.

in a recent press interview. "They have traditional reasons for hating and fearing us and when one of their own can thumb his nose at us and get away with it, he has their sympathy."[54] This observation has been substantiated by demonstrations throughout the Americas in support of fidelismo against the "Yanquis."

The Castro movement thus looms as a formidable component of the revolution of our time. Most, although not all, of its major elements are readily exportable to other Latin-American countries, where fidelismo has acquired increasing numbers of sympathizers in the Americas. Yet Cuba's involvement in the Cold War should not feed distorted views of the situation. Communists have supported Castro, and he has made friendly overtures to the Soviet Union and other Soviet-bloc governments, to be sure. But fidelismo should not be equated with Communism. Yankeephobia has achieved dizzying heights in the past in Latin America and, conceivably, might regain them in the future. But the gross error involved in the oversimplification that interprets anti-United States sentiment as Communism should be avoided. It is unlikely that the influence of fidelismo, however great, in Latin America could operate to win substantial support there for the Soviet cause should the chips of the Cold War be down.

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[54] Quoted in Chicago Sun-Times, April 30, 1961, Section Two, p. 2.

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FEDERALISM AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN GERMANY:

THE BROADCASTING CONTROVERSY

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"The dynamics of politics" is not an empty phrase. One appropriate test of this is an examination of the kaleidoscopic attitude of political parties toward their system of government. The study concerns itself with the German parties and their views on federalism, but will focus its attention more specifically on the position of broadcasting in the federal spectrum. To gain an understanding of the sharp clashes which have occurred over radio and television in the postwar era it is necessary first to survey the historical pattern of federalism in Germany.

I

The federal system has withstood the test of time despite major holocausts and persistent strains and stresses. From a myriad collection of kingdoms, principalities, and other territorial entities, the German Confederation (1815-1866) emerged. During this period the liberal and radical political movements opposed the particularism and feudalism of the well-entrenched states, and saw hope for progress only in a strong national government. Federalism, to these movements, did not signify the American model of unity and diversity in a democratic framework, but rather separateness and reaction. The non-democratic origin of federalism in Germany needs to be emphasized in the light of later developments. When the Reich was finally established in 1871, Bismarck was able to consolidate some powers in the national government, although conservative Prussia occupied a dominant position in Reich and state politics. The major parties supported this trend toward centralization - but for different reasons: the Conservatives because the prestige and power of Prussia had been enhanced, the Liberals because national unity had been achieved, and the Socialists because the alternative, particularism, represented political reaction. What the Progressives, a wing of the Liberals, and the Socialists actually desired from Bismarck's reign was a more liberal parliamentary system of government, but their hopes were frustrated until the end of World War I.

In the Weimar era the trend toward centralism continued. The national government received further legislative powers, and extended its administrative control into new domains, such as defense, transport, and finance. Although the Reichsrat, the upper house representing the states, no longer had the right of absolute veto over legislation, the states still administered the judicial system (except for the Reich supreme court), police, education, and local government. From a constitutional point of view the new Reich had more powers than its predecessor, but in practice some states such as Bavaria, Prussia, and Saxony enjoyed a wide degree of independence vis-a-vis the relatively weak central governments. Consequently the latter could not oppose the rising Nazi movement as effectively as they wished.

Such national parties as the Socialists and the Democrats (successors to the Progressives) maintained their anti-federalist position, while the emerging Communists, in theory, stood for a unitary state. The Catholic Center party was uncommitted, although it leaned toward a decentralized federalism,[1] while the Catholic separatist movements in Bavaria and the Rhineland advocated a complete territorial rupture.

Federalism in principle and practice suffered its worst blow during the Hitler era. The Nazis created a unitary state with total powers and relegated the states to administrative districts.[2]

What should be the nature of the new state after 1945? According to the Allied point of view the Nazi equation of a unitary nation and totalitarianism ruled out a unitary solution. The Americans and French, especially, decided instead on a federal solution. This meant the immediate creation of Länder (states) and the hope that a national government would be established eventually resting on a federal base. However, in the three western zones the boundaries of the new Länder were drawn primarily on the grounds of military occupation exigencies and, with few exceptions, represented little historical continuity or regional identity. In addition, with the reins of power in Allied hands, the Länder had no significant powers in the occupation period up to 1949.

By 1948, however, the Western Allies were ready to turn over to the Germans the responsibility of drafting a constitution for the projected West German state. Among the party delegates assembled in the Parliamentary Council to work on the document, there was no unanimity on the degree of federalism to be established. Within the new Christian Democratic Union the overwhelming sentiment was for a decentralized nation in which the states would retain their autonomy. The Christian Social Union the Bavarian affiliate of the CDU, was especially outspoken in this respect. The conservative German party (DP) shared these sentiments. On the other hand, the Social Democrats (SPD) desired a strong central government with limited powers granted the states and the upper house. The Free Democrats (FDP), heir to the liberals, also wanted a strong central government but with maximum local self-administration. Out of these discussions emerged a set of compromises. The distribution of powers between the central and Länder governments as set forth in the Basic Law (constitution) reflects to some extent the pattern of Weimar. However, the central government is more limited in several areas, especially financial affairs, while the upper house, the Bundesrat, is more important than its Weimar counterpart.

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1 In Germany anti-federalism is equated with support of a centralized national government, while federalism is equated with a weak national government.

2 There is an extensive literature on federalism in Germany before 1945. This writer has drawn on John Ford Colay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago, 1958); Rudolf Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe (New York, 1945); Arnold Brecht, Federalism and Regionalism in Germany: The Division of Prussia (New York, 1945); and Ossip K. Flechtheim, "Bund and Länder in der Sicht der Parteien", Zeitschrift für Politik, IV (N.F.), (1957), 348-361.

The Bundesrat, having the power of absolute veto in cases affecting the balance of the federal system and suspensive veto in other federal legislation, has defended effectively the interests of the Länder in the legislative process. In a majority of decisions, party affiliations of the representatives of the Länder in the Bundesrat have played no role at all; rather, the interests of the Länder against encroachment by the federal government are defended on a supra-party basis. Naturally this is not to signify that Länder headed by the CDU will always oppose the federal government headed by the same party. But it does mean that there are various shades of independence or loyalty to, the Bonn line.[3]

Heir to the German tradition, the federal government has primacy in legislative matters while the Länder have it in administrative matters. The Bund has exclusive legislative powers in eleven fields, such as foreign affairs, defense, railways, and posts and telecommunications; twenty-three concurrent powers with the Länder, such as civil and criminal law, laws relating to the economy, labor, agriculture, and anti-trust; while further powers, not specifically listed, are reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Länder. These include, among others, education, culture, police, religious affairs, and local government.[4]

This general survey of federalism in Germany has only hinted at the tense interplay between national and regional forces and between the political parties. To illustrate this interplay more graphically let us turn to one area of federalism, cultural affairs, and even more specifically to one of its subsiduary fields, radio and television broadcasting.

II

European states traditionally have been involved in cultural affairs much more directly than in the United States. The arts, for instance, have received what to us may be considered substantial financial largesse from national or state governments. In the broadcasting field, radio and television networks generally are government-supported public enterprises with a semi-autonomous status as public corporations. In unitary states, the national government assumes over-all direction, but in federal states practices vary. In Germany, the two levels of government have claimed jurisdiction since broadcasting was in its infancy (October 1923).

During the Weimar era, the Reich government asserted substantive jurisdiction on the basis of provisions in the Constitution granting it the right to set up a post and telegraph and telecommunications systems. The post office consequently

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3 The representatives in the Bundesrat receive their voting instructions from the Länder chief executives or the cabinets. Until now, the CDU, in control of a majority of Länder, always has had a majority in the Bundesrat. Olle Nyman, Der Westdeutsche Föderalismus (Stockholm, 1960), pp. 172-173; Karlheinz Neunreither, "Politics and Bureaucracy in the West German Bundesrat," The American Political Science Review, LIII (September, 1959), 724, 726-727.

4 For further details, see Golay, op. cit., passim; Peter H. Merkl, "Executive-Legislative Federalism in West Germany," The American Political Science Review, LIII (September, 1959), 732-741.

built the stations and the transmitters, and organized a national broadcasting corporation (Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft) which supervised eight regional broadcasting stations throughout the country. However, the state governments were dissatisfied with this arrangement, and in 1925 and 1926 obtained compromises. Acknowledged to have a constitutional primacy in cultural matters, they received supervisory powers over the stations, while the post office restricted its control to financial and technical matters.

Notwithstanding the shift in "manggement" and the proviso of non-partisanship, Reich and state governments used radio as a political instrument to control and even censor the type of political news sent over the airways. Under the authoritarian regime of von Papen, the government assumed more control by dispatching state commissars to each station to make sure that broadcasts would hew to a nationalist line and "strengthen the feeling for German honor."[5]

Under the Nazi regime, broadcasting of course became a tool of the Reich and led to the end of any Länder influence and of the semi-autonomy enjoyed until then by the stations. The Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda under the tutelage of Joseph Goebbels effectively directed and controlled all national programs, including those for children, and purged all "unreliable" elements in the industry. A centralization of the regional stations took place, in effect making them branch offices of the national corporation.[6]

With the collapse of the Nazi regime, the Allies swiftly granted the Allied Control Council full powers to set up broadcasting facilities. The Council in turn delegated the powers to the zonal commanders, thereby ensuring decentralization and a variety of approaches. Allied personnel operated all stations at first, but gradually German technicians and program specialists were hired. The Russians centralized the network in the East Zone and made it a tool of Communist propaganda. The three western Allies agreed that the state must no longer have any direct control over the radio, but differed in matters of organization. Although the French advocated a general decentralization in the public realm, their small zone of occupation made it unfeasible to establish several stations. The Baden-Baden Southwest Radio station was set up and remained in French hands until 1952. The British, true to their BBC tradition, organized one station (Northwest German Radio) for the much larger zone. NWDR was created as a financially independent public law corporation to be free of governmental and party influence. In 1955, the NWDR monopoly was ended in the British zone as North-Rhine Westphalia set up the Western German Radio, and the other Länder the North German Radio. The Americans, heralding the virtues of a decentralized federal state, created separate radio networks for each Land,

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5 "Richtlinien des deutschen Rundfunks", November 15, 1932. For the Weimar period see Adolf Grimme, "Rundfunk" Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften,(Stuttgart, 1956), 55-64; Hans Bausch, Der Rundfunk im politischen Kräftespiel der Weimarer Republik, 1923-1933 (Tübingen, 1956); Kurt Fischer, Dokumente zur Geschichte des deutschen Rundfunks und Fernsehens (Göttingen, 1957).

6 Gerhard Eckert, Der Rundfunk als Führungsmittel (Heidelberg, 1941); Heinz Pohle, Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik (Hamburg, 1955).

placed non-party management boards in control, and granted the Länder governments "benevolent protection".[7]

From 1948 on, as the radio networks in the western zones reverted to German hands the contradictory policies of the Allies began to fade, although the physical location of the stations, not too rationally placed in some areas, remained the same. As a result of the deliberations of the founding fathers of the new constitution, an accord was reached on a guarantee of freedom of reporting by radio (as well as press and film), and on any prohibition of censorship (Article 5), on the theory that the communications media are important molders of public opinion. But agreement was not easily reached on the question of how much power the future central government should possess over the broadcasting industry. Mindful of the strict Nazi controls, the first draft of the Basic Law rejected any central operation.[8] After some discussion this recommendation was reversed partially in later sessions of the Parliamentary Council. A final understanding was reached which does not appear specifically in the Basic Law. Technical aspects of broadcasting were to fall under exclusive federal supervision, and cultural aspects under Länder supervision. Who would have jurisdiction over organizational aspects remained an open question since no distinction was made between organization of technical matters and of programs.[9] This lack of clarity was to haunt future debates on broadcasting. In any case, some commentators have expressed the view, denied by others, that the federal government was not granted more powers in this sphere only because

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Terence Prittie, "The Progress of Broadcasting in Western Germany," The BBC Quarterly, IX (Summer, 1954), 74; Henry P. Pilgert, Press, Radio and Film in West Germany 1945-1953, Historical Division of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, 1953, pp.74-75. When national concepts differ radically, problems erupt. For instance, in preparation for turning the stations over to the Germans, American officials put emphasis on the principle that the stations be run as public service institutions, representing the cross-section of the community. But, as one observer put it, "German officials and legislators felt that they should determine what the people were to hear." Pilgert, op.cit., p.30. After discussions lasting over two years the Germans finally accepted the principle of decentralization without government control.

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Herren-Chiemsee Entwurf, p. 32, cited by Hermann von Mangoldt, Das Bonner Grundgesetz (Berlin, 1953), p.390.

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Parlamentarischer Rat, Hauptausschuss, 29th session, January 5, 1949, pp.351-352. Revealing in the debates are the attitudes of party delegates, which reflect their basic philosophy not only toward radio, but toward the extent of federalism as well. A Communist suggested the federal government have control over organization and culture since the two are inseparable; a Socialist, also inclined to give the federal government more powers, proposed the government deal with technical and organizational problems; and a Christian Democrat advocated the present solution. Suggestive of the majority view, the committee chairman (Carlo Schmid, SPD) said: "I do not think that one can label the transmission of a Beethoven symphony as part of a telecommunications system, as little as one can view a concert as falling under the jurisdiction of the violin makers' craft." Ibid., p. 352.

of the mistrust of the Allies.[10] Be that as it may, the Länder governments lost no time in working out administrative arrangements with the stations located in their respective territories. The general pattern, with exceptions, is the following: supervising the stations are broadcasting councils with a membership from twenty to forty who are selected from various cultural, educational and economic groups and who include representatives of the Land government. In theory, the members are to serve the general interest "regardless of their personal or political connections."[11] In practice, the parties in the Land legislatures help to select the members of the councils, and exert influence on the selection of top staff members of the stations. The strength of each party in the legislature may be reflected in the political make-up of the staff. A Land headed by the CDU normally will have a station manager sympathetic to the CDU, and an assistant station manager sympathetic to the SPD, or vice-versa, although in theory the station manager is selected by the council and by a smaller administrative council which serves as a watchdog unit. The manager is held responsible for the entire programming. The stations are public law corporations, and are financed by the traditional two D-marks per month collected by the post office.[12] This type of financing insures non-commercial operations, and autonomy of any outside private interest groups. The nine stations in the Federal Republic have banded together in a loose coordinating unit, ARD, which deals primarily with questions of joint programming, technical research, planning, and sponsorship of a short-wave hook-up for beaming programs overseas.

In spite of joint programming of major political and cultural events, each radio station produces the majority of its programs on an individual basis (most television programs are cooperative ventures). The contents are geared to a mass audience, although there are more outstanding programs appealing to the sophisticated than those on an average AM radio station in the United States. Political commentators, parliamentary debates, symphony concerts, and plays may be heard frequently.

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10 Hans Peters, "Die Rechtslage von Rundfunk und Fernsehen nach dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 28.2.61," Kulturpolitik und Föderalismus, Heft 1, Veröffentlichungen aus Kultur und Politik (Bonn, 1961), p. 10.

11 Pilgert, op.cit., p.31; see also ARD, Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Baden-Baden,n.d.); Kurt Magnus, Der Rundfunk in der Bundesrepublik und West-Berlin(Frankfurt/Main,1955), pp.25 ff.

12 Pilgert, op.cit.,p.77. The post office keeps twenty to twenty-five per cent for its services, such as the search for unregistered non-paying receiving sets, and plows the rest back to the stations.

Despite the cited party influences, the political or economic programs generally do not reflect a single party point of view.[13]

The Bonn government was unenthusiastic about its minor constitutional role in broadcasting, and the failure of the stations to cooperate effectively. It wanted to set up a dual Bonn-Länder system of broadcasting whereby it would be in charge of programs beamed overseas and to the Soviet Zone, and the Länder would maintain their existing stations. Such a reform would counter an exaggerated provincialism, inaugurate national broadcasts, and achieve a desirable balance between centralism and decentralization. Arguments to the effect that there would be reason to fear another tight national control comparable to the Nazi model were refuted with the counter-argument that enough controls exist in a democratic system to prevent any serious abuse of the independence of a national station. Envisaged was a supervisory council in which not only members of the government and deputies would sit, but members of the Länder governments as well.

The supporters of the federal government raised other criticisms. The arbitrary method of establishing stations on a zonal and Länder basis disregarded the historic cultural and provincial boundaries, a prime example being Radio Bremen set up by the Americans only because it was their port and supply base. Moreover, the stations were too dependent on the political whims of the Länder governments. More cooperation on the part of the stations would result in less duplication of effort, such as the necessity for a foreign statesman to grant several interviews on the same subject to the representatives of the nine stations, or for the maintenance of a net of foreign correspondents by each station. Finally, the lack of a variety of programs was decried. Demands were made to conduct systematic public opinion polls to find out what programs the people really wanted, and to establish a second, perhaps commercial, television network throughout the nation, which would compete with the television stations set up by the Länder in 1952, and provide any viewer a second channel from which to choose.[14]

In the first legislative period, deputies of the government coalition parties introduced in March 1953 a bill incorporating some of these reform proposals into the Bundestag (lower house), but due to the adjournment of the chamber a few

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13 Of course, the numbers interested in classical music (12 per cent) are less, by far, than those interested in variety shows (86 per cent), according to a NWDR survey, cited in W. Phillips Davison "The Mass Media in West German Political Life," West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, ed. by Hans Speier and Davison (Evanston, Ill., 1957), p. 267.

14 Hans Bausch, "Politik im Rundfunk," Die politische Meinung, III (September 1958), pp. 13-14; K. Wagenführ, Was meinen Hörer und Zuschauer?, Zur Neuordnung des Rundfunks (Hamburg, 1959), pp. 5-12; Der Rundfunk in Westschland, Sonderdruck für die Zeitschrift Fernsehen (Hamburg, 1955), passim; Gerhard Eckert, Monopol oder Wettbewerb im Deutschen Fernsehen (München, 1958), passim.

months later the bill died in the legislative maze.[15] During this time, backers of the Länder stations and the status quo launched a battery of convincing and not-so-convincing arguments. Such a bill, they argued, would transfer controls from experts in the stations to bureaucrats in Bonn, and would provide the governments not only with a monopoly in the development of radio, but with a potent propaganda weapon as well, especially if a ministry of information were to be created. Following further public outbursts, the idea of a ministry was shelved by the government after the 1953 election. But behind some of these arguments was the fear on the part of the opposition Social Democrats of a centralized radio control by the CDU in Bonn.

During the second legislative period (1953-1957), a mixed Bund-Länder commission attempted to iron out the major differences, but failed in its numerous efforts. For instance, in 1955 a draft of a treaty between the Bund and the Länder was agreed upon, but deemed to be unsatisfactory, was not submitted to a single Land parliament for ratification. Feelings were running at a high pitch. The Ministers President of the Länder in effect were accusing Bonn officials of not really wanting an agreement. Instead, so ran the argument, these officials wanted a federal law because control over the existing stations could be exerted more easily.[16] In turn, Länder ministers were accused of stalling negotiations for fear of having to make concessions to the federal government.

During the third legislative period (1957-1961), the government seized the initiative and the Länder were put on the defensive. To forestall pending legislative moves on the part of the government, the stations in 1958 finally were able to agree upon one reform. A system of fiscal equalization was inaugurated in which the wealthy stations - wealthy because they were located in densely populated areas - would donate some of their income to their poorer brethren. Obviously this one reform failed to satisfy the central government. In 1958 it introduced a bill similar to the one of 1953, including the establishment of a full program of short-wave broadcasts overseas (Deutsche Welle), long wave broadcasts within the Federal Republic and to the Soviet Zone (Deutschland-Funk), and a second television network (Deutschland-Fernsehen), the latter to be run on a private, commercial basis. To coordinate these three institution, a top broadcasting association (Deutscher Rundfunkverband) would be formed. To maintain independence from any pressures, supervisory councils for each of the three institutions would be created in which the government, the Länder, and private groups would be represented.[17]

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[15] Initiativantrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Bogel, Dr. Mende, Walter und Genossen vom 18. März 1953 - Drucksache Nr. 4198 der 1. Wahlperiode.

[16] Archiv-Dienst, Funk-Fernsehen-Film (fff press) , VIII, No. 26a (June 15, 1959), 109-112.

[17] The Deutschland-Funk, for instance would have a council of 15 members: 5 from the government, 5 from the Länder, 3 from religious denominations, 1 from the employers, and 1 from the trade unions. Bundesrat-Drucksache 315/59, Entwurf eines Gesetzes uber den Rundfunk.

The government justified its bill in terms of enhancing the national interest, creating more uniformity, and providing competition. It based its powers on certain provisions in the Basic Law, such as Article 73, #7 (the Federation has jurisdiction over postal and telecommunications systems), Article 5 (the freedom to express oneself), and Article 87, #3 (...corporate and other bodies of federal public law can be established by federal law for matters on which the Federation has the power to legislate."). It contested the Länder claim that they possessed exclusive jurisdiction over cultural affairs, since it too has numerous prerogatives in this vaguely-defined field.

In November 1959, the Bundesrat deliberated the bill. Reviewing past failures to arrive at an agreement, the rapporteur reiterated the willingness of the Länder to continue further negotiations, and assailed the negative response of the government in the summer of 1959. The Länder had agreed upon the draft of a treaty between Bund and Länder for a second television network in public, and not as the government bill envisaged, in private hands.[18] But the government had lacked interest in such an arrangement, and had decided upon the legislative alternative, knowing full well that such a move would oblige the Länder to test the constitutionality of the bill in the Federal Constitutional Court. He urged the Bundesrat to consider the bill to be unconstitutional, and to request the government to withdraw it from further legislative action.[19] The Bundesrat supported this proposal. What is remarkable about the statement of the rapporteur is the unanimity of its acceptance among all Länder delegations irrespective of party. When Länder prerogatives are at stake, the ranks in the Bundesrat tighten against the frontal assult of the government.

This was not the case in the Bundestag where the deputies of the coalition partie in general supported the government bill. The CDU spokesman, Dr. Heck, was not satisfied entirely as he warned the deputies of the danger of supervisory boards not remaining critical enough of operations and identifying themselves too much with the stations. Some other CDU deputies were wary of supporting the bill because their Länder governments were opposed to it, but loyalty to the party usually prevailed. The SPD spokesman, Kühn, opposed the bill on the grounds of an usurpation of power by the federal government, and of the need for a public and non-commercial network. Privately-run television would lower the cultural level of television by showing westerns during prime evening hours, would increase the financial power of the

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[18] Ironically enough, the Länder proposal caused a split within the SPD, and demonstrated anew the intertwining of party interests and broadcasting. Party officials in Bonn were unhappy with their Ministers President after calculating that only a maximum of four out of fifteen seats on the council of a Land-operated network would be held by those sympathetic to the party. But it is precisely on the Land level in which the SPD has any strength. Hence, the SPD opted for a Bund-supervised non-commercial network where it hoped to have a more favorable representation. That the government was preparing for a private commercial network the SPD did not know at the time. Der Spiegel, XIV (August 10, 1960), 20-22.

[19] Bundesrat, 211th Session, November 13, 1959, pp. 201-208.

advertisers, and would reflect a subtle pro-business and pro-CDU philosophy.[20]

Given the difficulty of securing a majority to override the negative Bundesrat vote, given the hope of receiving SPD approval for the less controversial parts of the bill, and given the lack of unity within CDU ranks concerning the advisability of having a commercial network, CDU tacticians decided to exclude the television section from the bill. Despite continued SPD opposition, the bill received a majority vote on June 29, 1960 in the Bundestag.[21]

Under constitutional provisions, the bill had to be submitted again to the Bundesrat for consideration of amendments made in the Bundestag. This time the united front in the Bundesrat collapsed and the discussion and vote ranged along party lines. The SPD urged a negative vote since the emasculated bill was unnecessary, Bund-Länder agreements already providing for some inter-national broadcasts. The CDU urged a positive vote since the television provision had been eliminated, and Länder interests would not be endangered if the Bund launched more international broadcasts based on its prerogative in foreign affairs.[22] Why this switch in the CDU position in the Bundesrat? Its public pronouncements were not entirely convincing. More likely, when the chips were down and the prestige of the government and the CDU were at stake, the Chancellor put pressure on his Ministers President in the Länder. He was successful, the CDU carried the vote, and a joint conference committee of the two chambers agreed upon minor changes suggested by the Bundesrat.[23] The bill became law on November 29, 1960,[24] but the Chancellor could not claim complete victory. From a legal point of view, a second television network was no nearer to realization.

From a practical point of view, a second network could have been inaugurated swiftly. For years already, business interests had made little-publicized but intensive preparations to operate a commercial network once licensing was forthcoming. In December 1958, they set up a corporation Free Television (Freies Fernsehen). The Federation of German Industry, the Brand Names Association, the newspaper publishers, and the periodicals publishers each had one-fourth of the share

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Deutscher Bundestag, 97th session, January 27, 1960, pp. 5330-5357. To counter the threat of a commercial network, most existing television stations had introduced commercials on a limited basis in a thirty-minute program preceding the regular programs. Newspaper owners were none too happy at first to have a competing medium advertising.

21
Deutscher Bundestag, 121st session, June 29, 1960, pp. 7001-7029.

22
Bundesrat, Drucksache 211/1-3/60, July 13, 1960.

23
Bundesrat, 222nd session, July 15, 1960; Deutscher Bundestag, 3. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 2141.

24
Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1960, Teil I, pp. 862-868 (Gesetz über die Errichtung von Rundfunkanstalten des Bundesrechts vom 29. November 1960).

In order to receive more public support, further interests, such as agriculture, trade, banks, and cultural organizations, were promised an opportunity to buy additional shares once the license was received.[25] Other private corporations also made preparations to begin commerdial bradcasting, but their weaker capital base gave them little chance of receiving the first license.[26]

These business interests were primarily interested in television as an additional medium for advertising. Even though they publicly denied it, political motivations also were important. Not sympathetic with some of the programs emanating from stations whose directors were Social Democrats, they envisaged a non-partisan second program weighted to the interests of business and to the line of the conservative Bonn government.[27] Their model was the British Independent Television Authority, a commercial network competing with the BBC.

Opponents of commercial broadcasting raised a chorus of protests. The Catholic bishops and a Protestant group dealing with broadcasting assailed commercialization as a cultural levelling. The trade unions and the SPD opposed the idea. And even the communications expert of the CDU demanded that party and interest pressures be rejected, and that advertising and programming be separated.[28] One television and radio director doubted the practicality of these noble ideas. Moreover, in his view, the British model cannot serve as a comparison to the German. In Great Britain, the ITA, a public corporation, represents a competition to the BBC, a centralized monopoly. But in Germany the television monopoly is diffused among the various states, thus providing some competition on a geographic basis.[29]

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[25] Markenverbank e.V., Wettbewerb um den Fernsehschirm (Wiesbaden, 1958); Studiengesellschaft für Funk- und Fernsehwerbung e.V., Möglichkeiten für die Verwirklichung eines zweiten Fernseh-Programms (n.p., 1958). Two pamphlets urging commercial programming.

[26] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 8, 1960; One such corporation was the Westdeutsche Fernseh A. G., Wiesbaden-Frankfurt/Main. See its Statute (8pp. multigraphed); letter from Dr. H. Schleussner, chairman, March 20, 1961.

[27] Personal interview with an official of the Federation of German Industry, Cologne, October 6, 1959.

[28] Bruno Heck, "Unabhangigkeit im Rundfunk," Die politische Meinung, IV (April 1959), 57.

[29] Hans Bausch, "Besseres Fernsehen möglich," Die politische Meinung, IV (February 1959), 41, 43, 48.

The government, too, made plans to launch a second, preferably commercial, network. On the basis of a government order in the summer of 1958, the postmaster-general began the necessary technical preparations to build a chain of transmitters. When parliament struck out the provision for a new television network, the Chancellor quickly found another alternative. On July 25, 1960 he established the privately incorporated German Television Corporation (DeutschesFernsehen, Gmbh). It would have the power to issue licenses to responsible, private organizations capable of producing television programs. This unilateral administrative edict, in which parliament and the Länder were not officially consulted, but which asked the Länder to participate, represented a juridical coup on the part of Adenauer.

As a matter of fact, Adenauer had consulted deputies and Ministers President of his party unofficially on several occasions before July 25 to explore with them the various alternatives. The Ministers President were opposed to his solution. Three days before the announcement of the new corporation, all Ministers President, CDU and SPD, met officially to present a counter-proposal to the government. That was rejected, and further negotiations collapsed. In retrospect, the government erred in not meeting the Länder half-way, since even the four Länder led by the SPD, Hesse, Hamburg, Bremen and Lower Saxony, were willing to arrive at a prompt settlement.[30]

The Adenauer move precipitated the dramatic showdown. The four Länder took the issue to the Federal Constitutional Court, and on December 17 the Court granted them an interim injunction, prohibiting the government-established corporation, the Länder, or any other organization from beginning a second program on January 1, 1961, as had been planned, until a final ruling would be handed down.[31]

On February 28, 1961, the Court ruled against the federal government concerning the establishment of a second program. It concurred with the interpretation of the Länder that in creating the private corporation, Deutschland-Fernsehen, the

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30 Several months later, in October, the Länder controlled by the CDU were weakening in their opposition to the Adenauer policy, and signed a BundLänder agreement, worked out by a CDU group and issued in the name of the Bavarian Minister President, in which the Länder individually or collectively would be able to produce another regional program on the basis of administrative contracts between Bund and Länder. This agreement was never ratified due to the action of the Court. Funk-Korrespondenz, No. 45 (November 2, 1960), pp. 1-3.

31 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvQ 4/60, 7/60, 10/60, 11/60

government had violated Article 30 of the Basic Law ("The exercise of the governmental powers...is the concern of the Länder insofar as this Basic Law does not otherwise prescribe or permit."), and had exceeded Article 73 (federal postal and telecommunications services), which concerns only technical aspects of broadcasting as part of their constitutional primacy in cultural affairs (Articles 30,70ff., and 83ff.).

The Court also assailed in most vigorous language the steamroller tactics of the government. The implied constitutional principle of a fraternal cooperation between Bund and Länder in matters of joint responsibility had been violated by Bonn. The government cannot operate on the thesis of divide et impera by seeking an agreement only with some of the Länder - those headed by the CDU - and not with the others.[32] Furthermore, it must grant the Länder enough time to assess the merit of a new proposal.[33]

The decision of the Court marked a milestone in the history of German federalism. Before assessing its long-range significance, the immediate reactions must be recorded. To an overconfident federal government it came as a shattering blow, since, at the most, a prohibition of the corporation had been expected. To an end came the repeated efforts of Bonn to prevent the Länder from organizing a second television program. There were government and CDU officials who denounced the decision as too sweeping an interpretation of federalism, and who advocated an amendment to the Basic Law granting the central government more powers.[34] They feared for the future of

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32 In a later rebuttal, Professor Peters asserted publicly that the reasoning of the Court would signify the end of all political negotiations if the government could not make agreements with some Länder, and isolate the others until they are ready to sign. Peters, op.cit., p. 22.

33 The Länder chiefs officially were informed of the plan to establish a corporation several hours after the fait accompli. The Court also dealt with a related controversy: the provision concerning technical services in the state treaty of June 10, 1955 establishing the North German Radio station was deemed unconstitutional because it exceeded Land sovereignty and was a federal matter. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvG, 1/60, 2/60, pp. 1-82.

34 However, such a proposal would fail to get the necessary 2/3rd vote in the Bundestag, less because of a basic distrust of centralization, than because of a distrust of political opportunism.

German democracy and assaults from extremist groups if an accentuated federalism develops comparable to that of the Weimar era. There were others who objected to the "political" decisions of the Court, and who insisted that the executive and the legislative branches should have the primary policy-making powers.[35]

The court decision marked a victory for the SPD and a defeat for the CDU in an election year. After a cabinet meeting on March 3, Adenauer glumly told the Bundestag that the decision was "wrong," that the government would not participate in any further television matters, and that the private corporation would be liquidated.[36]

Into the lap of the Länder fell the next move. Once it was no longer necessary to unite against the government the Länder divided along party lines. The SPD suggested the stations join together into two production groups to transmit two contrasting national programs, to be preceded by regional programs organized by private groups. In June, 1961, the Ministers President by majority decision rejected the SPD proposal and adopted that of the CDU. The new independent public law corporation will be formed (independent of the existing regional stations), to operate the second program on a national and non-commercial basis. The agreement specifies the composition of the supervisory organs and the election of the director. The SPD insisted on a 3/5th vote for his election in order to block an unsatisfactory nominee. By 1962 this corporation will finally, after nearly a decade of argumentation, launch the second program. (In the meantime, the existing TV stations are filling the gap with a second program.)

III

The protracted dispute reflects the dynamics of federalist politics. Both sides held commendable views and committed serious mistakes. Those who stood for increased centralization argued cogently in terms of providing responsible national programs to match the growing importance of the Federal Republic in international affairs, and especially in its opposition to the Soviet bloc. Those who stood for increased decentralization argued equally well in terms of Länder powers and pluralism. The struggle between the two well-matched blocs unpardonably delayed an urgent reform in broadcasting, and necessitated the intervention of a third power, the Court. Only then did the scales tip in favor of the federalists.

Thus, the Court has assumed an importance in politics not imagined in the

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35 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 1 and 2, 1961; Bulletin (Presseund Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung), March 9 and 11, 1961.

36 Bulletin, March 9 and 11, 1961; Die Zeit, March 24, 1961.

initial years of the Federal Republic. Its judgments on federalist questions will help shape the tenuous national-state relationships through a narrow or liberal interpretation of the Basic Law. Since 1949, Bonn has mounted an offensive against the Länder by gradually whittling away their powers. Now there are indications of a defensive posture on the part of Bonn in the light of a Länder rejuvenation. Bonn has been told to reduce its expenditures for cultural affairs, the major bastion of Land powers. Instead, the Länder offer to increase their own subsidies. As a matter of fact, their financial position of late has improved considerably. They are even contemplating aid to underdeveloped countries, a sphere in which the federal government has priority. To play a more significant role in German politics, the Länder are attempting to coordinate their efforts through frequent consultations and conferences.[37]

How do the Länder rationalize their actions? Do they provide a philosophical defense of federalism ? Their spokesmen rely heavily on the historical and doctrinal development of federalism in Germany as well as other countries. Federalism to them signifies the establishment of a corps intermédiaire between the state and the citizen, a means to counteract the mass state and the mass man, and the democratic alternative to conformity and dictatorship. It provides the opportunity for the opposition parties to at least be politically responsible in state governments, and may represent the political solution for a reunited national Germany.[38]

Proponents of a strong central government deem the Länder attitude parochial and anachronistic in a Europe moving toward supra-national organizations. Economic and social tasks, defense and atomic energy have become so complex that a sterile provincialism based on outdated regional borders cannot meet the challenge of the twentieth century. Even the Länder admit the necessity of coordinating the few powers left to them, after a chorus of complaints by the populace with, for example, the lack of uniformity in the school year, or the difficulty in transferring pupils from one land to another. Some observers boldly assert that due to the weaknesses of the Länder federalism in Germany has become more fiction than fact. They view the Länder as mere self-administering territorial units highly dependent on the central government.[39]

37
Kulturpolitik und Föderalismus, passim; Unternehmerbrief des Deutschen Industrieinstituts, No. 10, March 9, 1961; No. 14, April 6, 1961; No. 18, May 4, 1961.

38
See 10 Jahre Bundesrat (Köln, 1959), pp. 142-147; speeches of Minister President Meyers and others in Kulturpolitik und Föderalismus, op. cit.

39
These views are expressed by Professors Karl Loewenstein, Carlo Schmid, and Werner Weber. K. W. Wheare goes so far as to catalogue the Bonn Republic as unitary because the Länder are too dependent on the central government. Wheare, Federal Government (New York, 1946), pp. 5-7, 25-26. On the other hand, Olle Nyman sees federalism as a living, but weakened organism. Nyman, op. cit.,,pp.181-207. A leading proponent of a federal solution is Hans Nawiasky(Die Grundgedanken des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1950). For a perceptive discussion of this question, see Ossip K. Flechtheim, ed., Bund und Länder(Berlin, 1959) especially the chapters by Heinz Kreutzer, "Bund und Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" (pp.1-21)and Otto-Heinrich von der Gablentz,"Die Chancen des Föderalismus in der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft,"(pp.142-162);Merkl,op.cit.,pp.732-741.

Neither the defenders nor the opponents of federalism will deny the pull toward centralization in areas of coordinate responsibility. Even Land elections in which local and regional issues are less important than national issues represent to the parties a test of their national strength and prestige. Consequently, the erstwhile federalist-oriented CDU in recent years has become more unitary in its outlook, while the traditional unitary-oriented SPD has become more federalist. The position of each party in the broadcasting controversy confirms this shift. In the constitutional deliberations of 1948 and 1949 the CDU opted for a decentralized radio system, but sought more centralization in later years. The SPD took the exact opposite stand.

The explanation for this shift in broadcasting and other fields is based less on philosophical than on tactical grounds, and stems from the need to adapt to the political realities of life. In the saddle of national politics since 1949 the CDU must pursue a more centralist policy, even though aware of the tensions such a policy creates with its strongly federalist Land parties. The Chancellor has attempted to infuse more discipline into the party organization, but with no telling effects. [40]

The SPD faced a parallel clash of doctrine and practice. Originally, it stood for centralism. In 1951, for instance, it co-sponsored a constitutional amendment to establish a national police force. But as its role of a permanent opposition party on the national level continued, it gradually had to espouse for opportunistic reasons the cause of the Länder, especially in the traditional SPD redoubts of Hesse and Bremen.[41] Should the SPD obtain power in Bonn, most likely it will stress its former doctrinal position, and especially in economic affairs assume a more unitary position than the CDU ever has taken.

The parallel to the United States party system is striking. Here too a shift has occurred in which the Republican party has veered to decentralization while the majority of the Democratic party has become more articulate in defense of a centralized government. A reflection of economic and social developments, of the Great Depression and the rise of the welfare state, this change in position also is based on increased identification with the states' righters or with their opponents. Whether this shift represents a long-range ideological commitment remains to be seen.

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40 For further details see Arnold Heidenheimer, "Federalism and the Party System: The Case of West Germany," The American Political Science Review, LII (September 1958), 809-828; Flechtheim, op.cit., pp. 350-354.

41 Ibid., 356-361; Peter H. Merkl, "The Emergent Federal System of Western Germany" (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, 1958), pp. 701 ff. Similar trends can be observed in the smaller parties. The conservative German party, once federalist-oriented and a CDU partner, has reversed its stand. The liberal FDP has not accentuated its unitary-bent principles since it left the government coalition. Flechtheim, op.cit., 354-356.

In West Germany, predictions are even more hazardous, given the short span of life of the new republic. Until now the trend to centralisation of powers in the hands of the Bonn government has gained momentum. Whether the Länder in the long run can draw enough sustenance from the important Court verdict on broadcasting to increase their powers significantly is most doubtful. They are now in a more favorable constitutional position to defend their prerogatives. But the inexorable trend to centralization in other nations of a federal and even unitary type would serve to indicate that the doctrinaire states' righters in Germany have little cause for great optimism. If democracy is to flourish neither the states' righters nor the super-centralists should register any triumps. Rather, support should flow to those advocating a moderate and middle position.

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CHANGES AND VARIATIONS IN SOVIET POLICIES TOWARD THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

This is in the way of a preliminary report and a theoretical construct of a larger study covering Soviet and International Communist propaganda to the underdeveloped areas in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.[1] The purpose of this project is to conceptualize the Soviet image of the various underdeveloped areas and to trace the dynamics of this image as it has varied over time and space. The time period covered is from 1955 to the present. The Bandung Conference of April 1955 was taken as the beginning of the study because this was the first time the Soviet Union, as opposed to the individual Communist Parties, sought to play a dynamic role beyond the contiguous regions of the Soviet land mass after World War II. The study is divided into two parts. The first part is a discussion of the role assigned to the individual Communist Parties and the divergent patterns permitted by the USSR as seen from the international Communist press. The second part will deal with the attitude of the Soviet Government as seen from its official press, both party and government.

1. Definitions:

Since the relatively confused days of 1955 and 1956 when the Soviet Union and the Communist parties throughout the world were badly split and when Moscow first initiated the new line toward the underdeveloped world and the directives were excessively vague, policy discussions today have become much more specific and direct. Some of the parties as in Egypt and India are still split by factions but superficially at least the Communist international and each of the parties have reunited and worked out in detail a program of action based on national front. One of the main advantages of the new line is that it stresses individuality permitting variations in specific countries in theory and practice.[2]

In Communist parlance the euphemism for an analysis of party strategy in the underdeveloped areas are discussions of the role to be played by the various classes in the national and socialist revolutions. Thus the logical place to begin the analysis is with the class terminology as used today by Soviet and Communist periodicals. Communist use of class categories is not always consistent and meanings change from time to time, but it is possible to draw some general distinctions between group labels as used in Communist literature. In the underdeveloped countries it is the bourgeoisie which is of particular interest to Soviet strategy. The Communists divide up the bourgeoisie in a variety of ways. Of particular importance in the underdeveloped areas is the term "national bourgeoisie."[3] This group is composed of the native capitalists, the core of which are usually the small industrialists, or middle bourgeoisie, but in many of the underdeveloped countries the large native industrialists are included as well. The term "national bourgeoisie" is in turn broken down into various groups. The right-wing national bourgeoisie have sold themselves to the imperialists and are therefore of no value in the struggle against colonialism or neo-colonialism. Another sub-group often identified is the conciliatory bourgeoisie. Its attitude toward the colonial struggle tends to

fluctuate. At certain times it will support national independence but at crucial moments it may betray the cause to the imperialist powers. The term "progressive bourgeoisie" is applied to those elements which at the moment are considered trustworthy.

The comprador bourgeoisie is usually categorized as a group distinct from the national bourgeoisie. They are considered the agents of imperialism depending for their franchise and capital upon the monopoly imperialists. Consequently, it is rare that they can be trusted in the struggle for national independence. Also distinct from the national bourgeoisie, but not necessarily so, are the petty bourgeoisie composed of shopkeepers, craftsmen, and very small industrialists. Because this group is subject to discrimination and competition from the imperialist monopolists, the Communists expect it to play an important role in the national liberation struggle. In Southeast Asia, this group is characterized as playing an important political role but in the Middle East, in practice, it is not always a trusted sector of society. In Africa it is considered too small to be an effective political force. Occasionally, other forms of the bourgeoisie are also mentioned in the Communist press, such as colonial bourgeoisie, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and rural bourgeoisie composed of rich farmers and peasants. The category "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" is most often applied to Latin America where over a long period of time a class of government bureaucrats has developed separate from the industrial bourgeoisie and is organized as a powerful interest group. These various bourgeois subgroups as used by the Communists are not mutually exclusive and change from time to time. In a given article, however, it is usual for the writer to be explicit about the theoretical meaning of a term. But it is rare that actual groups within a country are identified as falling within a given category. Discussions of the problem are kept at a theoretical level.


The working class is also referred to in various forms. The term "toiling or working mass," which is the traditional term applied to the colonial areas, is today only infrequently employed. If it is used, it signifies a close identification between the working class and the poor and middle peasantry. The current preferred term is the "working class", the exact meaning of which is not always specified. Often it is used to mean wage earners in general and does not necessarily apply exlusively to industrial workers. The term "proletariat," however, does apply exclusively to industrial workers. But as in the case of the bourgeoisie the categories are theoretical and specific identifications are rare.

Communist nomenclature in the agricultural sector is also only theoretical. The landlords own the land but do not actually work it. The division between the rich, middle, and poor peasantry, as always, remains vague. The rich peasant is distinguished by the additional labor he hires and the poor peasant by the fact that he is forced to sell his own labor on a part-time basis. The agricultural worker or proletariat works entirely for wages. The Communists have also increasingly used the term "sharecropper" in discussions of the underdeveloped areas.

In conclusion it is possible to say that the Communists have dropped at least part of their stereotyped view of the world by permitting wide variations from area to area. Nevertheless, the Communists' analysis is still two dimensional and many of the groups in the underdeveloped societies are left out or are given a minor role. The intellectual elite, for example, is never considered a formidable force of its own, nor are there any discussions of the

significance of the military as a separate elite. The Soviet Union is unable to see any difference between the rule of the military elites in Latin America and the Middle East as contrasted with the civil leadership in Asia and Africa. In most cases they do not even consider the military elite to be a separate section of the bourgeoisie. One way, however, the Soviet analysts, in part, get around the rigid class view of society is to recognize that there exist important contradictions within the classes especially among the national bourgeoisie.

Having categorized, if only theoretically, the social and economic groups, it is possible to frame the crucial questions for Communist strategy: which groups and sub-groups can be considered an ally and for how long. The first step is to look at what are the characteristics of model allies in the underdeveloped areas from the Communist point of view. There would be two such models. In international relations, the model would be a political group which is strongly anti-imperialist, inalterably opposed to the Western powers, and is developing a pro-Soviet attitude on all issues. Close consultation and coordination with the Soviet Union, however, are not essential. Internally a model ally would be one which liquidates all "imperialist holdings" and then pushes for socio-economic reforms which have as their basic criteria the radical destruction of the landlords and big bourgeoisie. The Communists would also expect toleration and then an increasingly favorable attitude toward the local Communist Party. In both internal and external definitions, developmental expectations toward a pro-Communist, pro-Soviet attitude is important. From 1947-1953 there was no time element and an ally had to be not only anti-Western but immediately pro-Communist. Under Khrushchev the time factor has become crucial although it is nowhere made specific. At the time of Bandung in 1955, the Soviet Union seemed to accept the proposition that an anti-Western attitude was sufficient. Many politicians, particularly in Asia and Africa, assumed therefore that the USSR was thinking in terms of a three-camp world based on long-term co-existence, non-interference by the socialist camp in the neutralist camp. But such a proposition -- that development can be in two or more directions -- is contrary to the Marxian ideology. Although Khrushchev has drastically altered the ideology he continues to see change as linear with socialism of the USSR type at one end and imperialism at the other. Such concepts as the welfare state and neutral state are thought of only in terms of way stations between the two poles.



It is significant that in Communist works the term "neutralism" is rarely used. Reference is made rather to non-aligned or uncommitted states, which does not imply a third position. Using this linear scale, it is possible to define an ally in Soviet terminology as one who is moving towards the socialist pole on the scale. The group moving in the opposite direction, no matter where they may be on the scale, tends to become an enemy. Thus a leader like Nassar, moving towards socialism, is considered a close friend but even if he moderately reverses the trend, the reference to him in the Communist press becomes hostile. By 1959 this time factor expectation of the Soviet Union became apparent but how it operated under specific conditions was still not clear. The issue was made more confusing by the Chinese Communists who have a different set of developmental expectations and who by 1959 were refusing to accept some of the "friends" of the USSR.

2. The National Liberation Front:

Since 1948 the local Communist Parties have sought allies and influence through the creation of national liberation movements. The primary tactical questions of this policy have been who and on what basis are groups to be included in the Front, and who should lead the movements. Traditionally, the Soviet Union has looked upon the proletariat led by the Communist Party to lead any popular or national front. Ideally, the Communists still adhere to this pattern. The hard core of the movement must be a united front of the working class, achieved from below or from above depending upon whether the socialist leadership is considered hostile or cooperative. In long range terms it means that the united front of the proletariat is used to isolate the hostile leaders within the working class whether this includes only part of the socialist leadership as in the case of India or the entire socialist party leadership and replace it with "friendly" and Communist leadership. In practice the ideal has proven impossible. The Communists, therefore, in both Asia and Africa accept and acknowledge the leadership of the national bourgeoisie although still adhering in their overall ideology to the concept of the united front of the working class. In the case of Cuba the Communists recognize that the revolution is under the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie. Only in the case of the rest of Latin America do the Communists in theory and practice stress the need for proletarian leadership, even though the "anti-imperialist" movement is clearly not headed by the working class. In this case the Communists refuse to grant a leading role to the bourgeoisie because, from their point of view, the Latin American bourgeoisie have a long history of betrayal.[4] This divergence of reality and practice has led, in the Communist world, to an increasing number of oblique discussions on the issue of whether to bring theory and practice closer into line.

Based on the leadership of the proletariat the ideological image of the national liberation front envisages as its revolutionary fighting core an alliance with the poor and middle peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie with the revolutionary intelligensia as an appending group. The question as to which groups among the national bourgeoisie can also be included differs from country to country. Occasionally, even the comprador bourgeoisie can be included in the front. The criteria for the inclusion of these groups is whether ideologically they are anti-imperialist and whether they are moving right or left on the scale discussed above. Under Khrushchev the net has been thrown extremely wide to include even religious groups.[5] For example, in Southeast Asia the Communists are willing to ally with religious parties as long as they do not advocate a theocratic state. In practice the Communist ideal of a national front is rarely, if ever, achieved although the Communists may give certain alliances this complimentary label. Particularly in the case of Latin America the alliances often have been so little to the Communists' liking and so obviously a marriage of convenience that the Communists have openly admitted the opportunism and tentativeness of their cooperation.[6] With regard to Asia and Africa such reservations are rarely expressed although in many cases equally applicable.

The issue, therefore, is not really the formal structure of the national front because the Communists must accept, or not, fronts created by more powerful groups. The real question is: How far are they willing to go in accepting the program of others and how long will they accept a national front not controlled by Communists? The various discussions of this problem have resulted in nothing positive in the way of criteria.[7] Empirically it would appear that when the national front ceases to move toward socialism along the

socialism - imperialism scale regardless of where the country may be on the scale, the Communists begin to attack the national front leadership. It would also appear as if this decision were made centrally in Moscow. Thus in areas where the Communist Parties may be having a difficult time domestically, as long as the national front itself is not assuming an increasingly anti-Soviet attitude or openly attacking the Communist movement the individual Communist Parties are expected to refrain from absolute condemnation of the leadership. Even in countries where internally Communists are being attacked and the government is being denounced for its actions, the Communist Parties are not allowed to call for a national front against the government if it continues to support the Soviet Union on major international crises. Thus while Nassar, Kassim and Nehru have become increasingly hostile towards Communists internally and are criticized for it, there has been no call for a national front against them. Thus the national front is a move taken only against outright pro-imperialist governments.

The implication in the above analysis of the national front is that the Communist Parties are not in command of the situation and are frequently on the defensive accepting windfalls where they may come. An important question, therefore, is whether the Communists do in fact feel identified with the national revolution in which they are participating and whether they feel they are influencing the outcome. In other words, do the Communists feel on the offensive or defensive? This attitude is difficult to evaluate but below are some suggested measurements re-enforced by empirical criteria which could be scaled:

1. The amount and intensity of criticism in the Communist press of repressive actions being taken by a government against the Communists.

2. The willingness of the local Communist Parties to cooperate even with anti-Communists. (This criteria may be useful in Latin Ameria but not in such countries as Indonesia where clearly the whole policy is to get along with Sukarno and his policies no matter what the cost. In still other cases it may be a tactic to infiltrate the anti-Communist movement and destroy it. Thus certain exceptions are necessary.)

3. The general tone of the articles by local Communists about their activities.

4. The number and importance of the cabinet and administrative posts held by Communists.

5. The extent of Communist control over the trade unions and other mass organizations.

From such measurements certain tentative conclusions can be made:

In Latin America the Communist Parties have been continuously on the defensive. Although the Cuban revolution has given an important boost to the Communist movement in Latin America, it isn't possible as yet to talk about the Communists feeling that they are able to influence and manipulate political forces in this area. In the case of Indonesia, since the elections of 1955 Communist articles have spoken with greater authority but occasionally their optimism is dampened. In Iraq, a retreat began soon after January 1960.

Any discussion of the national front thesis must also include some surmise as to the end goals the Communists seek by this policy even though in most countries they may seem a long way off. It is clear socialism is not the immediate goal rather it is the creation of national democracies. The basic conditions for achieving this stage are (1) a complete and radical land reform, (2) nationalization of the imperialist monopolies, (3) a pro-Soviet foreign policy, and (4) an influential Communist Party. Today, Cuba most clearly fits this model and was declared a national democracy in November 1960.

3. The Role of the Communist Party in the Period of National Liberation:

The discussion thus far has been confined to an overall picture of the national front and the part of the Communist Parties in it. Given this image, what specific tactics are local Communists expected to follow in order to fulfill their role vis á vis the nationalist movement? The Communist Parties as they stand, however, present a serious problem. They are usually composed of a small group of malcontents among the intellectuals separate from the main body of native ruling elite. Even where the party has succeeded in infiltrating the trade unions the proletariat of most of the underdeveloped countries are not the decisive political force in the country. Therefore, most parties have been forced to fall back on the traditional tactics of opportunism, infiltration and competing with the extreme nationals for control over the city rabel. In other words they have the dreams of being a popular revolutionary party but more often have the organization of putschists, whom they deplore, and are forced to use their tactics.

The Communists are willing to participate in any capacity in any national front movement or government but they are careful never to merge with a larger group which they cannot control. For example, in Algeria where the FLN has pressured the Communists to combine and drop its separate existence, the Communist Party steadfastly refused to lose its identity. This is probably one reason why the Communists appear to have resisted thus far the merging of their party into a single party in Cuba. The Communist Party base must be preserved as the means to infiltrate other parties and trade unions.

The most obvious form of infiltration is through front organizations. The main difference from the Stalin period is that in many cases today the Communists openly work on behalf of these organs. At the same time the Communists have ceased creating their own competitive trade unions, but rather seek to infiltrate and detach the "progressive groups" from the reactionary leadership of the already established trade unions. Infiltration as a tactic is openly espoused.

In Latin America the Communists carry expediency even further. The Communists in Argentina, for example, openly cooperate with the Peronistas.[8] In the case of the military dictatorships in Lat America the Communists are known to have used the tactic of playing both sides as a means of securing influence in the trade unions. A certain number of Communists ostensibly resign from the party and create what is known as a black group. The black group collaborates with the regime as a means of securing positions in the labor unions. There is evidence that the technique of red and black parties was used in Cuba under Batista and in Venezuela.

In a similar attitude of expediency the Communist Parties are slow in condemning new governments, except where it is quite clear that a pro-Communist

government has been overthrown as in the case of Guatemala. When a new military group came into control in Thailand in 1960, the Soviet Government did not immediately condemn it but waited to see if the government might take an anti-Western orientation.

More often than not, being in a small minority, the Communists have been forced not only to cooperate but to identify with one of the strong power groups in the country. Thus in India, they have identified themselves as closely as possible with the Congress Party and in Indonesia with Sukarno and in Argentina with the labor Peronistas. This is done in order to appear stronger than they actually are and in order to gain prestige. If the power group is also the ruling party identification also tends to insure Communist security against government attack. Finally, such an association helps the Communist Party acquire legitimacy in the minds of the population as well as with the governmental elite. In India, for example, the Communist Party seeks to be recognized as the legitimate opposition to the Congress Party. Closely associated with this technique is the use of popular causes and accepted enemies as the basis of the Communist program. As a result it is difficult to distinguish Communist Party propaganda from the views of the most patriotic nationalists within the country. This might be called the technique of self-identification with the country. To what extent these identification techniques have succeeded is difficult to measure.

Although the main topic of Communist propaganda is nationalism as expressed in strong anti-imperialistic-anti-Western terms, once political independence is achieved the Communists also press for two basic internal reforms: a radical agricultural reform and the nationalization of the large monopolies. The agricultural reform has a demagogic appeal and is useful in exposing the agricultural bourgeoisie as reactionaries. At the same time, if the Communist proposed radical reforms are carried out, it would destroy the leadership of the landlords or bourgeoisie over the peasants and would atomize the peasantry for organization by the Communists. The Communists are not concerned with whether the reform leads to economic deterioration because they are interested in political control not economic progress. They also oppose any government-sponsored cooperative movement for fear government control will be substituted for landlord control. For example, in Iraq they condemn the plans for government cooperatives and favor instead political peasant unions where the Communists are stronger and have a better chance to agitate.[9] This may be the reason why the Communists were bothered by the government-controlled peasant cooperatives in Cuba and have been relatively slow in accepting them as part of their own program.

The demand for the immediate nationalization of large industries is calculated to eliminate the last of the colonial interests and undermine the large native capitalists opening the way to Soviet aid to government-controlled industries. Against these advantages the Communists are undoubtedly aware that nationalization also has certain disadvantages for them. First of all, it tends to strengthen the government and unless the Communists have a strong influence in the government, it means re-enforcing the anti-Communist bureaucracy. Second, it tends to weaken the trade unions where the Communists usually have their greatest strength. These factors may explain why the Indian Communists have not pushed for more nationalization, fearing the Nehru government is already too strong.

Any objective analysis must conclude that the Communist Parties have not come much closer to their goals by employing the above techniques in spite of increased flexibility and variety of methods. Even the advantage of being

the party of the anti-colonial revolutionary tradition has put the Communists at the head of few mass revolutionary forces. What successes Communist Parties have achieved were fortuitous depending on the negative policies of the colonial powers and the native elite or were due to the active participation of the Soviet Government. But in most cases the so-called national bourgeoisie, coveting their newly won power, have jealously shielded it from Communist influence and instead have used the Communists as scapegoats for their own failures. This empirically puts the whole national front concept in jeopardy. With this failure two alternative solutions have thus far presented themselves. One which has been followed by Khrushchev, is to play down the Communist Parties and seek the support of the new native elite directly through actions by the Soviet Government and by means of special native agents. The success of this approach will be analyzed in the next section. The second solution is to look beyond the working class and a section of the radical intellectuals for Communist cadres. The Chinese revolution suggested the value of the peasantry in the revolutionary struggle. The Cuban revolution seems to confirm the thesis and add the radical petty bourgeoisie as a leader of the struggle.[10] Practically speaking, the Chinese and Cuban examples seem more suitable to the underdeveloped countries than the so-called Soviet model based on the proletariat.[11] But until there are more examples the Communists are unlikely to abandon this long-held myth. Such a strategy also has the distinct disadvantage of being close to the Chinese pattern,and the Soviet Union, in its present ideological struggle with China, is reluctant to put China up as a model and as an inspiration for the entire anti-imperialist movement. Thus, for the Soviet-led parties it is a wait-and-see attitude. China has not committed itself as yet for the Castro pattern but is pressing for a more revolutionary approach. It still cannot speak with the force of the USSR, but it is significant that parties like the Indonesian Communist Party are paying special attention to building up cadres among the peasantry.

A third solution also empirically presents itself although it is never alluded to in the Soviet Communist press. It is based on the experiences of the successful Communist movements in Russia, China, North Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Indonesia. The disciplined cadres of these parties were forged in Civil War. It is only out of protracted struggle that a Communist Party can be created capable of seizing and maintaining power. It is essentially a military organizational problem. The 1947-48 attempt by Zdanov to re-establish the conditions of war perhaps may have been just such an attempt to lay the basis for building Communist cadres. The calculated withdrawal of the colonial powers, however, prevented long drawn out armed struggles except in Algeria. And in Algeria the Communists were slow to take advantage of the war and Arab nationalists stepped in instead.[12]

4. The Transition to Socialism:

In Communist ideology the next stage after a national democracy has been achieved is to prepare the basis for transition to socialism. Since the Soviet Union does not recognize most of the underdeveloped states as national democracies, there is little discussion of the basic criteria necessary in these areas for establishing a socialist society. Even in countries like Indonesia, no mention is made of the conditions for socialism. Although Cuba itself has announced it is moving toward socialism, this is not generally recognized by the Communist world. From the inconclusive discussion and from general Soviet views on the transition to socialism in the Communist press, certain basic conditions and problems can be surmised.

One ingredient seems to be particularly important in the eyes of the Soviet Union, that is, reliance on Soviet aid and trade. But the question as to whether in accepting Soviet aid it is necessary to cut out all or what part of a country's contacts with the West is not resolved. Ideally all contacts should be eliminated but practically the Soviet Government is unwilling and/or unable to assume the burden of supplying all the needs of these states.

It can be assumed also from the theoretical discussions that the leading role must be played by the proletariat. But in the underdeveloped countries where there is no large proletariat, is this possible without the presence of Soviet bloc troops or a Communist military organization? Perhaps one of the reasons the Communists are slow in accepting Cuban socialism is because they consider it still led by the petty bourgeoisie.

A third condition for the transition to socialism is undoubtedly the necessity of Communists assuming positions in the government. But it is difficult to answer whether this requires complete or only partial penetration by the Communists. This may be another reason why the Cuban declaration of moving towards socialism has not been accepted.


At this juncture of time it would be wrong, however, to assume the Soviet Union's interest in the transition to socialism is much more than academic. There is no indication that it is pressing this issue. Thus far it is willing to wait and reap the advantages of having these countries independent from the Western influence. They are willing to recognize the usefulness of a country being in the camp of peace with a pro-Soviet foreign policy without being socialistic. They are willing, therefore, to wait for the development of socialism as long as there is no actual retrogression. The Soviet Union has long recognized the usefulness of distinguishing foreign policy from domestic policy. In fact, it is this willingness to differentiate which has been one of the sources of friction between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese Communists apparently oppose this expediency and feel only those countries which will follow a pro-Communist internal policy should be given support and endorsement by the Communist bloc.

5. The Soviet Image of the Underdeveloped Countries:

Thus far this discussion has dealt mostly with the role and attitudes of the Communist Parties in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Although less securely than under Stalin, the Soviet leadership continues to direct the overall policies of these parties to complement its own position vis á vis the underdeveloped areas. Even though Communist parties may have ambitions of their own, the Soviet Union has successfully subordinated them to what it considers to be the key relationship between itself and the various underdeveloped countries. In order to see the pattern of this relationship it is useful to experiment with various schematics. One possible form is to categorize the manner in which the Soviet Union identifies the countries and their leaders. It is essential to include the top native leader or leaders because the Soviet press gives them a great deal of attention and often looks upon them as the national symbols. In fact the frequency of mention of a national leader in the Communist press in favorable or unfavorable terms can often be used as a measure of how strong the Soviets think he is. It is significant, for example, that Kassim is mentioned infrequently.

It is convenient to put the Soviet attitude toward the underdeveloped countries and their leaders into six categories. The country and its leader will not necessarily fall in the same category and obviously there is no permanency in the Soviet attitude. The first group and the closest to the Soviet Union includes those countries in the socialist camp such as North Vietnam and North Korea. The second group is composed of the nonsocialist countries which the Soviet Union recognizes as potential allies and as influentially key states in international relations. The indicating variables for this group are the amount of deference given to the country and leaders and the amount of restraint exercised in the Soviet and International Communist press from criticizing extensively the internal policies of the countries. An empirical check on classifying this category might be the frequency with which the country agrees with the USSR on major international issues. India under Nehru, at least until 1959, is the model for this group. Egypt and Indonesia would seem to qualify as countries, but Sukarno and Nassar have never been given the same deference as Nehru. Castro might qualify after April of 1961. The third category would include those nonsocialist states and leaders which the Soviet Union hopes to influence but whose position in international relations is such that the Soviet Union assumes a paternal relationship. In this case there is less reluctance to criticize internal policies although it is done generally in a friendly, paternal manner. States in this group would also be expected to side with the Soviet Union on the major international issues. The category would include Guinea under Sekou Touré, Ghana under Dr. K. Nkrumah, and Cuba under Castro prior to 1961. As individuals, Nassar prior to 1958 and Sukarno might fall into this group. In the fourth category are found the nonsocialist states and leaders with a weak power position whom the Soviet Union has little hope of winning over to an alliance but are nevertheless useful. In this case there is a moderate amount of wooing and the offer of a limited amount of aid and trade. The internal and external policies of these states and leaders are criticized extensively. Examples in this group would include Kassim and Nassar since 1958, the Sudan, Nigeria, Brazil and Ethiopia. The fifth category are those states and leaders which are basically hostile to the Soviet Union but whose occasional anti-imperialist acts can be appreciated by the Communists. States in this group would include Liberia under President Tubman and at times Argentina.[13] The final category would be those states which are in the process of changing governments and from the point of view of the Soviet Union, are in limbo. Toward these countries, the Soviet Union is unwilling to declare itself until the new government has shown its attitude toward the West.

Still another way of depicting the Soviet view of its relationship with the underdeveloped countries is to break down the above categorization into a three-dimensional matrix. By making certain assumptions about Soviet attitudes it is possible to use empirical measurements for at least two of the variables. A straight forward three-variable relationship is particularly suitable to the USSR because of its simplified view of the world viewed through Communist ideology and a long period of isolation.



A. U.S.A.
B. U.S.S.R.

The three axes are (X) - the relative power and influence of the underdeveloped country, (Y) - its anti-imperialist acts and attitudes, and (Z) - its movement toward socialism. To measure the power and influence of a country, it is assumed Western methods can be used because Soviet foreign policy in practice has shown a consistent appreciation for all the power factors making up a country's position, following the most "realistic" techniques of the West. Anti-imperialism can be measured by scaling the votes for and against the USSR in the United Nations on questions of colonialism and aggression and/or by an evaluation of the anti-imperialist attitude attributed to the country by the Soviet press. Movement toward socialism in this matrix is a function of (1) the direction of the country's movement on the linear scale between imperialism and socialism, (2) the position it has on the scale, and (3) the speed with which it is moving towards socialism. Each of these factors can be given equal weight. A country falling in the shaded area on the diagram above would be one which the Soviet Union would look upon with apprehension. This method of diagramming gives the overall picture which the Soviet Government has of the underdeveloped countries and their relative position to the Soviet Union. By adding the time factor this matrix is then able to indicate the dynamics of the Soviet image of the world and its expectations as to world Communism.

6. The Role of the Soviet Government in the Period of National Liberation:

In theory the tactics of the Soviet Government are to re-enforce the position of the local Communist parties, but in practice this has rarely been true. The interests of the Soviet Government always come first. Since 1955 the first priority in Soviet tactics has been to encourage the underdeveloped countries to accept trade and aid from the Soviet bloc. Soviet propaganda makes it the key to eliminating the last vestiges of Western imperialism. Surprisingly, however, the actual commitments of Soviet economic and military aid have remained essentially the same since 1955. It is still only a fraction of the aid rendered by the West and is generally concentrated in a few countries and in a few large rather well-publicized projects. There seems to be no effort to increase the amount. There are probably several reasons for this. The Soviet economy and the demands of the Soviet satellites and China make it impossible for the Soviet Union to spend a greater portion of her national income on foreign aid. Furthermore, more aid would not necessarily be an advantage to the Soviet Union. In fact it might be a liability. Large amounts of aid might in fact help the underdeveloped countries solve their basic economic problems which would not be in the Soviet interest. The Soviet objective in these areas is not stability and a higher standard of living, but chaos leading to political control. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Soviet Union does not want to help these non-Communist elites but merely wants to publicize its selfless big-brotherness. Thus far it has been able to accomplish this by keeping its commitments strictly limited. [14]

Another almost equally important tactic of the Soviet Government is the attempt to convince the uncommitted countries that Soviet socialism is superior to capitalism and the wave of the future. Communism is inevitable and has all the answers. At the same time it is necessary to convince the underdeveloped countries not to be complacent about their political independence and remain fearful of the imperialist enemies. Political colonialism has only been replaced by neo-colonialism, that is economic domination. Soviet and Communist propaganda also emphasize that although individual colonial powers have been seriously weakened, the imperialist world as a whole is still powerful and calculating. The imperialists have given up competitive colonialism and now work together in collective colonialism. The Soviet Union seeks to identify itself

as the leader against this so-called new threat of imperialism.

As with the Communist parties the policies of the Soviet Union in practice are pragmatic, accepting anti-Communist governments if it is useful. Thus the Soviet Union has maintained a close friendship with Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, although every Marxist analysis of his regime would condemn it. But the opportunism of the Soviet Government goes much further than that of the parties. It is willing to, and often does, sell out native Communist movements. (A Communist party, however, would never be able to sell out its support of the Soviet Union and remain long in the Soviet bloc.) Betrayal of Communist parties is not new; it was a favorite tactic of Stalin. The difference is that while for Stalin it was a tactical move, for Krushchev it is strategic indicating a fundamental policy difference between the Soviet Government and the Communist parties. Apparently Khrushchev has concluded as Stalin did before him, that the Communist parties have, in large part, been ineffective and unsuccessful. Although Stalin felt their "fifth column" activities useful, Khrushchev finds them more often to be a liability. As in the case of Iraq, the Communist parties have often acted too hastily for the long-run benefit of the Soviet Union. In other cases, the conspiratorial, tightly disciplined organization of the Communist parties have made them the easy focus of attack by governments who are seeking a scapegoat for difficulties. Today the danger of ill-conceived policies from the Soviet viewpoint is even greater because Khrushchev has been obliged to give the Communist parties greater autonomy. The problem of Soviet control is especially acute in the areas where Communist parties have not previously existed. The new groups have not had the long conditioning of obedience and absolute subordination to Moscow.

The conflict of interests between the Soviet Government and the Communist parties stems from their different objectives. The Soviet Government, in the short run, is more interested in wooing the underdeveloped countries away from the Western world, while the Communist parties are more interested in sharing power and taking over the government. As a result the Soviet Union has quite frequently abandoned the Communist parties in favor of supporting the government in power. This does not mean that the Soviet press does not condemn repressive acts against the Communists, but the Soviet Government is unwilling to retaliate by holding back aid or in any way withdrawing its support of these countries against the Western powers. Khrushchev is no longer content as was Stalin with merely a "fifth column" in the underdeveloped countries. He is seeking control over the entire nationalistic movement in this area. As instruments to this end the Communist parties have already proven themselves a failure as the crucial years of 1946-1950 in Asia proved. The strategies of first cooperation and then of armed struggle against the national bourgeois governments failed to bring any concrete results in Southeast Asia, except in areas which were still under colonial rule. Africa now offers a new opportunity and Khrushchev does not want to fail again. In Africa nationalism is only in its early stages and there is as yet no well-established elite to take over power. Thus, it is here that Khrushchev has been able to give the fullest expression to his new policy. To begin with there is no attempt to fit Africa into the Marxian mold. All Africans more or less are considered friends and there is no particular stress on the working class as the key to political power. In fact, the Soviet Government is making a play only for the national bourgeoisie and acknowledges it as the leader of the national independence movement. Since there have been no Communist parties in tropical Africa the Soviet Government has refrained from creating them. At the same time the Soviet Union is aware that native nationalists will not voluntarily submit to Soviet hegemony. They

are primarily useful for their anti-imperialism. Thus, while doing everything possible to dupe them, the Soviet Government count on tying them up with aid and penetrating the government heirarchy with agents. These agents are not the Soviet technicians who are sent to aid the country but they are Africans who go to Europe, either to Eastern or Western Europe, to be educated. In the universities of Europe they are then recruited and indoctrinated with Communism and sent back to serve as agents for the Soviet Union.

While the same wooing campaign by the USSR is being followed in the other underdeveloped areas, Soviet analysts stress that the circumstances in each country vary. Latin America is a particularly formidable problem to resolve. Being composed essentially of independent countries and not under colonial rule, it has been difficult for the Communists to sell the anti-imperialist line to the national bourgeoisie and the governing elite which, in the case of Latin America, is well entrenched. The masses, docile and largely illiterate, also have not responded in the past. Traditionally, Latin America has not had a high priority as far as the Communists are concerned because of its long distance from the USSR and because it was assume that the United States would never tolerate Soviet penetration into Latin America. The Guatemala incident a few years ago seemed to confirm this view. It was assumed that the U. S. hold over Latin America, because it was less obvious, was stronger and more lasting than the Western European hold over Africa and Asia. The Cuban revolution in the very shadow of the United States, however, has created new opportunities and hope for the Communists and Soviet Government.

The Bandung Conference in 1955 saw a sudden surge forth of the independence and anti-imperialists movements throughout Asia and Africa. Khrushchev's policy seemed particularly adapted to take advantage of this new surging nationalism. Soon the Soviet Union seemed to be riding the crest of a wave beginning with the Suez Crisis in 1956. The new elite of Asia and Africa seemed all too anxious to accept Soviet aid and promises and it seemed to some Western analysts only a matter of time before these areas would be drawn into theSoviet bloc. In fact Khrushchev's optimism soared to such an extent that he declared a peaceful transition to socialism is possible and the Soviet press suggested the possibility of combining in Africa, under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, the two stages of achieving national independence and moving toward socialism.[15] The possibility was conditioned on the acceptance of extensive Soviet aid and help. The nationalist leaders, however, proved not to be so gullible as the West had thought and the Soviet Union began to lose faith in some of its supposed friends. Soviet aid did permit certain underdeveloped countries to end their dependence on the West but it did not concurrently increase the amount of political influence which the Soviet Union was able to exercise. The Soviet leaders even had reason to wonder whether they were succeeding in turning these countries away from the West. The strongly anti-neutralist attitude of United States' foreign policy during the period of 1955 and 1956 was pushing the uncommitted countries more and more into the socialist camp, but after the Egyptian fiasco, the United States realized that the threat of withdrawing aid would not be sufficient to force these countries to break off relations with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States dropped its anti-neutralist policy and continued to aid countries even though they might be receiving aid from the Soviet Union. This, in turn, permitted the underdeveloped countries to adopt a genuine neutralist policy. As mentioned above, Communist ideology does not take into account this third position. As a result the growing neutralism of these countries can only by considered by

the Soviet Union to be retrogressive and in the long run anti-Soviet. Recently the literature has stopped discussing the possibility of moving in Africa toward socialism under the control of the national bourgeoisie, but as yet the Soviet Union has not abandoned its attempts to woo the national bourgeoisie.

The Soviet policy in the underdeveloped areas has been further complicated by differences with China. The Chinese Communists feel that the Soviet Union's attempt to win over the entire nationalistic movement has proven unsuccessful and insist that a strong Communist party base in the long run is the only possible method by which the area can be brought into the Communist world. The Soviet Union, however, thus far resists supporting these small isolated factions of Communists divorced from the new ruling elite in Asia, Africa and Latin America. At the same time the Soviet Union refuses to instigate wide-spread civil wars in these areas for fear they might lead to general wars. The Soviet Union's position is that China has been pushing too fast and is responsible for the deteriorating situation in Iraq where the Communist party responded to Chinese pressure. The USSR only entered the Algerian scene apparently in order not to be outmaneuvered by China. The disagreement has reached such a point that China is no longer cited as an example to be followed by underdeveloped countries and Chinese writers are not permitted to participate in international Communist propaganda controlled by the Soviet Union such as the World Marxist Review.[16]

The Cuban revolution further compounds the Soviet dilemna. It not only presents itself as an alternative model for national liberation, but suggests that socialism and national liberation together can be achieved under the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry and that the agricultural reform need not, at the first stage, stop with the breakup of the latifundi but can move on immediately to the collectivization of agriculture. From the Soviet and East European experiences the Communists have become wary of acting precipitously against the peasantry and respectful of their ability to disrupt production by passive resistance. The Cuban model seems particularly crucial for Latin America which has always been difficult for the Communists but now seems to be opening up fortuitously. The Soviet Union has been very slow to declare itself on Cuban development. It thus far has refused to accept the Castro regime as moving to socialism and has made it clear that the Cuban model is not necessarily applicable to the rest of Latin America.

The Soviet and Communist policies are being challenged in theory and practice, but if there are to be any changes, they are not yet apparent.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Soviet and Communist publications being analyzed in full are: For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, The World Marxist Review, Pravda, Izvestiia, Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, International Affairs, and the Soviet Foreign Broadcasts.

2. By 1953-54 there had developed, for example, a keen intellectual interest in the Soviet Union in the underdeveloped countries. The early concept that "There is here no absolute dividing line between Asia and Africa, but a difference in stages of social and political development (R. Palme Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire (London: 1953), p. 235)." was replaced by separate institutes and sections in the U.S.S.R. dealing with individual areas. This led to long range programs. For example, in February 1957 the Ethnographic Institute of the U.S.S.R. held a meeting of the Soviet African specialists and laid out a comprehensive work plan with seven parts. But most important has been the opportunity for Soviet scholars to travel to Africa and Asia for the first time to study the countries first hand.

3. See Walter Z. Laqueur, "Soviet Doctrine and the New Countries," Survey, no. 37 (July-September 1961), pp. 3-11 for an historical analysis of the use of the term "national bourgeoisie." For an example of a detailed Communist analysis see the article by N. Saveliev, "Concerning the National Bourgeoisie in the Countries of Southeast Asia," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1961, no. 4, pp. 38-51.

4. "Although their interests differ from those of imperialism and the landlord oligarchy the national bourgeoisie are linked with these enemies of progress; they are weak organizationally and fear the working-class movement. Hence their inconsistency, instability and venality. (Luis Corvalan, "Strenghtneing the National-Liberation Front," World Marxist Review, II, no. 4 (April 1959), pp. 40-47)"

5. In the case of Argentina: "To rescue the country from its chaotic state, it is necessary, as the Communist Party of Argentina points out, that Communists, Peronistas, Radicals, Socialists, progressive democrats, liberals, non-party people, Catholics and non-Catholics, civilians and military men unite to win conditions that would ensure democratic coexistence to all the people of Argentina. (Victor Perez, "The Situation in Argentina," For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, July 29, 1955)"

6. See for example the position of the Brazilian Communist Party in supporting Kubitschek for President (For a Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy, September 16, 1955 and Pravda, October 21, 1955.)

7. See Sovetskoe Vostokovednie, 1955, no. 4; 1957, no. 1; and World Marxist Review, 1959, nos. 7 and 8.

8. "It is clear that trade union unity can be preserved and consolidated only if the Communist workers continue to strengthen their ties with the Peronista workers — for these still constitute the majority of the working people — and if they endeavor to enhance their political class consciousness. (Victorio Codovilla, "Political Situtation in Argentina," For a Lasting Peace, for a Peoples Democracy, November 25, 1955)" See also Codovilla's article in 1960: World Marxist Review, III, no. 2 (February 1960), pp. 27-34.

9. See Zeki Hairi, "The Agrarian Reform Law in the Republic of Iraq," World Marxist Review, II, no. 4 (April 1959), pp. 59-60, and Khaled Bagdash, "Two Trends in the Arab National Movement, World Marxist Review, II, no. 11 (November 1959), pp. 28-34.

10. "The revolution marched triumphantly from the countryside to the towns, from the provinces to the capital. The political leadership of the armed struggle was in the hands of the petty bourgeoisie, while the rebel army consisted mainly of poor peasants and farm laborers. (Blas Roca, "The Cuban Revolution in Action," World Marxist Review, II, no. 8 (August 1959), pp. 16-22)" Blas Roca, General Secretary of the Cuban Popular Socialist Party, also admitted that the Communists played no role: "Although we had foreseen and had pointed to the need for armed struggle, we had done practically nothing to prepare it. This was our mistake. It is to the everlasting credit of Fidel Castro that he attended precisely to this side of the question. (Blas Roca, "8th National Congress of the Popular Socialist Party of Cuba," World Marxist Review, III, no. 11 (November 1960), pp. 37-43)"

11. Even in the Bolshevik Revolution the proletariat helped to trigger the revolution, but it did not really lead the revolution. The Communist Party actually developed out of the Civil War.

12. Another partial key to the success of some Communist parties, but one which does not really offer a fourth solution, is the quality of the leadership. This has been an important factor in France, Italy and Indonesia.

13. The following is a typical Communist comment on Argentina: "The Communist Party supported those of its measures which were progressive and at the same time appealed to the people to bring pressure to bear upon the Frondizi Government to compel it to drop its reactionary policies. (Jorge Flores, "The Communist Party of Argentina Intensifies its Struggle," World Marxist Review, II, no. 7 (July 1959), p. 68)"

14. From the Western point of view there might be a real advantage in publicizing the relatively small amount of Soviet aid and trying to pressure Russia to increase her contribution to something like that of the Western world. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union would respond and the Western world would have the advantage of showing up the Soviet Union that for all its propaganda it is not really interested in raising standards of living. Even if the Soviets come through it would not necessarily be detrimental to the West.

15. A. Belyakov and F. Burlatsky, "The Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and Our Times," Kommunist, 1960, no. 13, p. 13.

16. When the Chinese revolution is mentioned it is no longer considered unique and is equated with the Indian and Indonesian independent movements. See V. Nikhamin, "The New International Role of Eastern Countries," International Affairs, 1960, no. 5, p. 40.

17. Potentially the Communists might argue that in one coop countries where agriculture is crucial the government must collectivize in order to control the "commanding heights" of the economy. Thus far this argument has not been used.

THE BUSINESS CORPORATION AS A POLITICAL ORDER[1]

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"The Concurrent Hierarchy" is the phrase which best describes the internal political order of the business corporation. The apparent contradiction of the phrase, which conveys a hint of John C. Calhoun, calls attention to the fact that within business firms two quite distinct decision-making procedures are used to decide two distinct categories of problems. Personnel decisions--those dealing with employees' careers, compensation, assignments, and futures--are made by procedures which are relatively unilateral and hierarchical. But substantive decisions--decisions which guide actual business operations--are made by processes which require rather widespread consent; the latter processes are much like those advocated by Calhoun for the total political society. The internal "politics" of the corporation are largely produced by the logical and psychological contradictions which arise between these two decision-making procedures. This paper will describe the causes of these contradictions and note some of their consequences. The differences of degree which distinguish business firms from certain other kinds of organizations will be discussed.

I.

The crucial first fact about business corporations, and every subunit of them, is that they are organizations. The executives of all organizations--whether business, military, educational, religious, or philanthropic--face the same general problem. This is the problem of holding their organizations together. The foremost problems of the business executive (he will here be called the "boss") are to recruit and hold in the organization the people who are technically necessary to perform the job at hand, and to induce these people to work at the necessary level of activity.[2] To put it another way, the boss (like all executives) generally devotes much more time, worry, and energy to the problems of maintaining an organization which is capable of producing a product than to the "technical" problems of producing the product itself. The boss holds his organization together by distributing appropriate salaries, offering bonuses, promotions and auxiliary benefits, and by providing numerous intangible incentives, i.e., creating a sense of the product's dignity and worth, building a "team" operation and "team spirit," promoting organizational growth, maintaining fairness in his employee relations, staffing with congenial men, and generally arousing enthusiasm.

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1. This paper is essentially based upon impressions gained during research upon Chicago business corporations; the original field work was undertaken during the years 1956-58.

2. This conception of the executive's function, of course, is that of the late Chester Barnard; see his Functions of the Executive (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1956). The more organizational experience the present writer has gained, the more he appreciates Barnard's writings as the best single guide to organizational theory and practice. See also Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization," Administrative Science Quarterly, September 1961. This article elaborates upon Barnard's conception.

It is essentially the boss alone who distributes the incentives; this fact distinguishes the business corporation from many other kinds of organizations. The boss controls salaries, raises, and promotions. The boss's words of praise are the ones which really matter. The boss controls the ultimate corporate destinies of his men. This relationship holds true from the top to the bottom of the firm. The career of each subordinate ultimately (and often proximately) depends upon his superior. Notwithstanding some discussion in recent decades of committee personnel functions and promotion by committee, control over the fate of employees is largely unilateral and hierarchical.[3]

Hierarchical controls over business personnel should be contrasted with the personnel procedures used in certain other kinds of organizations. The formal power to promote and compensate university professors is often in the hands of a committee of faculty colleagues; informally this power may be distributed throughout an entire academic department. Voluntary association officers are usually selected by boards of directors or by the total membership. Some church congregations select their own ministers. Even military organizations may use promotion boards to make personnel decisions. And business personnel practices are less circumscribed by rules and regulations than are those of many other kinds of organizations; this is especially true in respect to the "policy making" ranks of business.

The business boss's prerogative unilaterally to influence individual destinies is carefully protected. Formally, corporation charters and bylaws guard it; the law stands behind the prerogative. Informally, efforts to bypass the "chain of command" are diligently controlled in personnel matters. While a disgruntled government bureaucrat can rather easily gain access to a congressman (and vice versa of course), a disgruntled corporation employee would have great difficulty enlisting the aid of a corporation director. And the employee would violate the expectations of possible future employers, to say nothing of those of his own firm, if he told his tale to the newspapers.

Enough has been said about hierarchical personnel controls to suggest a basic point: The personal character of the man who is boss has a very great effect upon the institutional character of his business. The boss's personal character influences his organization more than does the personal character of the chief executive in any other kind of organization. The corollary is this: A very great deal can be learned about the character of a business firm by knowing the character of its principal officer. One cannot learn as much about a voluntary association, a university department, a social club, or an army regiment by knowing the association president, the department chairman, the club leader, or the colonel.

This is not to say that knowing the boss will permit precise forecasts about what the firm will decide to do in any particular business situation (it will be argued below that substantive decisions are made in a complicated way which defies easy prediction). But the institutional character of a business firm (its motives, its honesty, the kinds of men who hold responsible positions in it, perhaps even the quality of its products) can be learned this way. This is not only because the boss himself selects the key men, but because the hierarchical relationship impells all of the key men to watch the boss for cues as to proper and appropriate behavior. Their behavior tends to become "boss-pleasing" (or at least not

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3. This comment (and this entire paper) applies only to employees who are not organized into labor unions. The hierarchical relationship has been greatly altered in those firms, departments, or operations in which labor unions exist.

"boss-displeasing"). The key men in turn communicate the boss's cues to their own subordinates, until ultimately the entire organization comes to be something of a reflection of the boss. The boss's criteria of judgment, his methods of operation, his morality, his personality and even his whims tend to be imprinted upon the organization.[4] The firm's character develops from the example of the boss. The outside observer may fail to detect the examples, for they are often matters of nuance and subtlety. But they are present nonetheless.

Because of this relationship, it is extremely difficult to answer in general terms certain of the questions about business which academics are fond of asking. For example, one such persistent question is: Are business decisions made with only profit maximization in mind? Aside from the difficulty of analyzing the mixture of facts involved in even a single decision, the question cannot be answered about business in general--for the answer will be different according to the character of each specific firm. If, in the eyes of his employees, the boss has appeared willing to subordinate all other considerations to profit, few employees will act in a contrary fashion. If, on the other hand, the boss has appeared to value other things--general goodwill, the favorable opinions of associates, friends, or the public at large, product quality, or certain standards of behavior which might reduce profits--the firm will act so as to reflect his values. This will happen even though the boss himself may take no part in the specific decisions at hand. The boss's criteria come to be known and used.

II

Although decisions about men's careers tend to be made in a unilateral fashion, operating decisions are usually made by a quite different procedure. Calhoun's concept of the "concurrent majority" describes this procedure more accurately than any other verbal formula known to the writer. The concurrent majority rule, of course, states that each interest which would be importantly affected by an impending decision should possess a potential veto over that decision.

Specific proposals for business action are generally produced at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy and, as they are passed upward through successively higher levels, they are adopted, vetoed, or modified. (This upward flow is understandable, since only the highest levels know the broad problems facing the firm and are equipped to judge a proposal's relevance, but only the lower levels have the specific technical knowledge to generate detailed plans of action.) Generally speaking, a proposal is moved upward for consideration only if it produces disagreement at lower levels. If no disagreement arises at a lower hierarchical level, it can usually be taken for granted that the proposal meets the firm's widely-known objectives and criteria and the proposal can simply be put into effect. Such a noncontroversial proposal will be passed upward only for purposes of information; the boss may not even go through the form of ratifying it. A controversial proposal may be moved all the way up to the boss.

The important point is this: The proposals that are adopted tend to be those to which everyone at the given hierarchical level consents. A vigorous dissent (voiced by any one of the men of equal rank at the level involved) has the effect of stopping a proposal--at least in its original form or for the time being. Depending upon the nature and urgency of the problem involved, the proposal may be referred back to a lower level for reconsideration, or it may be passed upward for a decision at a higher level. But if it is passed upward, the boss is unlikely arbitrarily to decide one way or the other. Instead, he will either not act or will direct the question back to a lower level for further study along the lines he indicates. The consequences of dissent are thus delay, a modification of the original proposal, or even an effective veto. Generally, if action is to be taken, the dissenter's objection must somehow be overcome.

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4. There is less turnover among business chief executives, of course, than among the chief executives of non-business organizations. This helps to explain the extent to which business firms develop in the boss's image. But the chief executives of few other kinds of organizations, it is suggested, possess the degree of hierarchical personnel control that business bosses do.

This description of consent proceedings may surprise those who accept the widely believed myth that all business decisions are made unilaterally. One may explain (in the sociological sense) the use of consent proceedings in several ways. Some may argue that consent proceedings are necessary simply to maintain morale. Business personnel expect to have their knowledge (and hence their objections) taken seriously; they would be displeased if they were ignored. This argument grows in weight in a time when businessmen hear and read a great deal about "corporate democracy." Use of consent proceedings in substantive matters may also help to make hierarchical personnel procedures more acceptable.

Use of this decision-making process also aids in assuring that all parts of the organization will lend their fullest co-operation to a proposal once it has been adopted. If every person whose work would be seriously affected by a decision has been given a chance to block it, it is less likely that anyone will try to sabotage the final decision once it is made.

However, in the last analysis it appears that informational and technical considerations require the widespread use of consent proceedings. Hierarchy and specialization of labor are needed, after all, because of the diversity of operation and technical complexity which exist in corporations. It is highly unlikely that the boss (or any single one of his subordinates) possesses enough detailed information to permit him (acting solely on his own information) to make a correct decision about a complex proposal. The boss's subordinate specialists, or their subordinate specialists, are likely to know a great deal more than the boss about particular aspects of a proposal and particular probable consequences. Thus, simply to protect himself and his organization from making serious mistakes, the boss must encourage subordinates to dissent to proposals which they feel are unwise, untimely, or otherwise dangerous to the organization. The dissenter may know a fact which shows that a plausible sounding proposal would be impossible or disastrous. It would be foolish for the boss to ignore his dissent.[5]

III.

The consent procedure places considerable power in the hands of subordinates. Few of them are slow to realize that they possess a potential veto. Few are slow to realize that they may be able to translate their capacity to veto into a capacity to improve their personal futures or the fortunes of their departments. A subordinate could veto proposals which might benefit the total organization but which would simultaneously injure the budget, staffing, or morale of his own department. In the extreme case, a subordinate could veto the proposals of an hierarchical equal who is his rival for promotion. In other words, technical objections may be used as masks for political objections (i.e., objections based upon the interests of men or departments). Subordinates may try to influence personnel decisions (which are made unilaterally) by manipulating substantive decisions (which are made through consent procedures). This produces one of the fundamental tensions within firms.

The boss (and the head of each subunit) must constantly strive to distinguish between those objections which are actually based upon technical grounds and those objections which result from political motives. It is conceivable that the boss could be such a master of technical information that he could immediately recognize the technical fallacies in what was in fact a political objection. But this is improbable. A man possessing such technical mastery would require no special-

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5. Some bosses, of course, are foolish and do not tolerate dissent. However, this is the exception and not the rule.

ist subordinates and would probably use no consent procedures. Large firms are too complex for any single man to master all aspects of everything; it would be inefficient to attempt to do so. Finally, bosses are not generally selected for their mastery of technical detail but for their ability to fulfill the basic executive function, that of holding men in the organization and keeping them working together effectively.

Thus, it would seem instead that most successful bosses distinguish between technical and political objections by using their great sensitivity to political motives, political interests, and political behavior. The successful boss is likely to be a man who can detect the hidden germ of politics in what appears to be a straightforward technical argument.[6]

However, ideally the boss should give his subordinates the impression that he possesses inordinate specialized and technical knowledge. To command the respect and loyalty of his subordinates (most of whom are technically trained or at least immersed in specialized work) the boss should be able to "talk their language." To the specialized subordinate, it is difficult to understand why a man should be selected to be boss unless that man is a master specialist. In the language of political analysis, the boss's "legitimacy" is based largely upon his technical competence or, more accurately, upon a belief in his technical competence.

Thus, another tension exists within the business corporation: The tension between the objective requirements of the executive function (psychological skills in dealing with men and detecting and solving political difficulties) and the subjective or reputational requirements (a reputation for a high order of technical knowledge). It seems that few men possess both.

A final tension arises between the two basic decision-making procedures. It has been suggested that most decisions about operations are made by gaining the consent of the principal personnel involved. Yet the boss cannot always do this; the use of consent procedures must not be totally predictable. If it becomes obvious that every proposal can be vetoed, the boss will soon be reduced to open bargaining with his subordinates in order to overcome their (constant) objections and get anything done. Or final decisions will become mere compromises. Or coalitions of subordinates will arrange agreements on proposals prior to the boss's participation and divide the spoils among themselves. In order to preserve the useful myth of absolute hierarchy and to preserve his own authority, the boss must occasionally abandon consent proceedings and make a substantive decision on an arbitrary basis.

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6. The reader may ask, why, if successful business executives are men possessing extraordinary sensitivity to interpersonal politics, do they not perform more successfully when drawn into government? The answer is implicit in the foregoing analysis: Business executives are accustomed to hierarchical personnel controls over subordinates. They are not accustomed to the necessity (faced in government) of bargaining with nominal "subordinates" who may in fact be equals in power. The new group of business executives experienced in labor relations may be expected to be more successful in government service.

Thus, attention is again directed to the great importance of the boss--even in operating matters wherein consent procedures are generally used and his personal views do not necessarily guide decisions. If the boss fails to detect political motives, useful proposals will be mistakenly abandoned. If he fails to give the impression of technical mastery and understanding, he will have difficulty inducing men to work to their fullest for him. If he fails to decide arbitrarily at the appropriate moments, he risks having to bargain with his men to get anything done. On the other hand, if he makes arbitrary decisions too often or unwisely, he loses the benefit of his organization's accumulated judgment and courts disaster.

IV.

Academics have often asked the question: Just how significant is a corporation's board of directors? Part of the answer has been provided above, by calling attention to the importance of the chief executive--both in his role as builder of institutional character and in his role as an occasional maker of substantive decisions. A board's most significant single function is selecting the boss.

A board's routine role is that of questioning and challenging management's major proposals, testing them against the criteria of outsiders. But this is essentially a checking or negative function. Only in rare emergency situations would it undertake positive direction of a corporation.

Choosing the boss is its positive function. In making that decision, a board judges a man's achievements in prior positions and his breadth. If it is a prudent board, it judges his personal character and criteria, his psychological skills as a judge of men and resolver of conflict, and it judges his repute as a specialist.

A board's judgment may take years to test. A boss's failure to distinguish between political and technical behavior has rather immediate consequences, but his failure to instill the proper institutional character will only become apparent over a great length of time. The significance of a board of directors is therefore not immediately felt in day to day operations. But the board possesses a vital power: That of influencing the basic character of the concurrent hierarchy.

TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS AND THE 1960 REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN

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When I was sworn in as consultant to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in early July, the nature of the role I would perform as such was explained to me with a story. This is the story of the Eastern debutante who spent a few weeks on a dude ranch in Wyoming. After days of confusion in the use of the terms mare, stallion and gelding, she at last attempted to get her nomenclature clear. The cowboy whom she asked to explain the terms gulped, blushed, and proceeded as follows: "Well, ma'm, there are mares, and there are stallions, and the stallions run with the mares. Then there are geldings, and they run with the mares too, but only on a consulting basis."

I believe this story gets to the point of the matter. The expert is, for the most part, noted not so much as a person who has direct responsibility for doing things. He is regarded as one whose job it is to explain to those who can and must do things, how they might best go about it. The party nominee for President is not necessarily an expert on winning elections. But he has the mandate and the responsibility to win an election. Toward that end he will have available to him and will employ political experts whose guidance may concern the optimum use of television, the framing of itineraries, the formulation of positions on policy matters, and, among other things, the peculiarities of the politics of the states in which he must campaign--meaning all 50 in 1960. Of course, all of these "experts" are, in the context of the campaign, enlightened amateurs, like the candidate himself. In large measure their credentials depend upon the outcome of the campaign.

Before talking with more specificity about the role of the expert in the 1960 Nixon campaign, let us dwell for a few more minutes upon the concept of the expert, or that of expertness. The expert cannot make his contribution to a political campaign unless he is able to communicate his opinion and advice to the person who he is supposed to advise.

This means that the person whom he is supposed to advise must be willing to receive his ideas, his advice, and even his criticism. It means also that the so-called expert must be persona grata to the person he is to advise, for no amount of claim to expert knowledge suffices if the personality of the expert is such as to offend and alienate the individual who is supposed to draw upon that fund of knowledge, experience and skill.

Also, the concept of the expert implies some kind of organizational framework within which the expert is one part in some way articulated with other parts, all of which are operating to produce the product of victory at the polls.

George Belknap has, to our profit, chosen to focus his study of the political specialist in the 1960 campaign upon the role of motivational research in the Kennedy campaign. Unfortunately, it is necessary for me to be more general, for while I was one of the National Committee Faculty Fellows in 1959, and a hold-over staff member at the Republican National Committee until June of 1960, it so happens that during the major portion of the campaign I occupied a Civil Service position in the Commission on Civil Rights, and thus, under the Hatch Act, was cautioned against active political participation. There may be a second reason why it is necessary to describe the role of the political specialist in the Nixon campaign a bit more generally. And that is, it is entirely possible that no one body of expertise played as important a role in the Nixon campaign as motivational research may have played in the Democratic campaign.

Politicians, like bureaucrats and academicians, tend to distinguish between two major categories of people--those who are expert in raising money, and those who spend it. Within each party's professional staff, these two vantage points probably afford a more significant mechanism for differentiating attitudes, then does any set of policy alternatives.

The fund-raiser is always conscious of the difficulty of raising money, of the competing efforts within the same party to raise funds for purposes other than those for which the National Finance Committee might have in mind, for example, and also he is constantly aware of the fact that it costs a great deal of money, not only to win an election but to lose one. This is the irony of the situation. He goes into an election hoping to win, anticipating victory, cognizant of the possibility of failure, and aware of the fact that in the months following election day he may find himself a member of the out-party desperately continuing in his effort to raise

funds, but this time attempting to raise funds to eliminate a deficit incurred in an unsuccessful attempt to elect a president. Thus, as of the end of October, 1960, with election-day imminent, the Republican Party found itself with a debt of $1,183,000--and little by way of immediate resources with which to meet it.

In the days prior to the convention a party facing a delegate fight is likely to discover that the party fund-raising activity must compete with those of the contesting candidates. Thus, in the pre-convention days, the Republican National Finance Committee finds itself competing with the candidates' pre-convention efforts to raise money. After the convention, the Republican National Finance Committee, even though it enjoys a quota arrangement with state finance committees, finds itself competing for funds with state and local candidates, and even with alternative fund-raising efforts at the national level, such as the neigh-to-neighbor program which is directed toward securing broad-base small contributions.

The fund raisers do not necessarily exercise a restraining influence upon campaign expenditure. One reason for this is that the peaks and valleys of monthly receipts in a campaign year fluctuate so radically that a kind of political survival instinct dictates that funds be obligated whether or not they are on hand. Secondly, the two party organizations, like the American organization-man, have discovered credit-card living. Thus it is not at all abnormal for them to use a multiplicity of telephone and airline credit cards to achieve movement and communication which might be drastically curbed were cash on the line demanded. Indeed, it sometimes is easier to fly the party Chairman to Alaska than to send out a mass mailing, for the government has not yet developed a mail credit card, and is old fashioned enough to demand cash on the barrel head.

Looking to the experts who obligate funds in ways calculated to win elections, let us, with perhaps an excessive emphasis upon classification, divide them into three groups.

First, there are those whom I would call the strategic experts. This group comprises the Bill Rogers, the Fred Seatons, and the Len Halls. It includes the trusted newspaper man and the occasional state chairman of experience and influence. What this group shares in common--presumably--is a certain claim, grounded upon training, talent, and experience, to knowing the temper of the times and the mood of the people. Presumably this is the level at which the candidate will consult prior to deciding whether the campaign should be dominated by the effort to win the independent vote, whether

to ignore the South, because you have it anyway, or to attempt to capture it, in the event that it is not a fief of your party.

The second group might be called the tactical experts. The tactical expert is an individual whose scope is limited and whose expertness is deep. He is the individual who will tell you what television time to buy, how much television to buy, and how far in advance of campaign needs you should purchase it. He will conduct polls and advise the candidate of their implications concerning the course of the campaign and the type of appeal which should prove effective in courting the voter, or various categories of voters. He may be an expert at framing efficient campaign itineraries, balancing the dictates of time and distance against speaking opportunities and political imperatives. This will be the man who will offer advice on whether to stop off in Louisiana on the way to Texas, and if so, whether to put down at New Orleans or Lafayette. Indeed, at a lower, but by no means unimportant level, it will be a tactical expert who will attempt to see that the campaign plane is properly equipped to accommodate electric typewriters and mimeograph machines. Probably most of the work of the candidate's press assistant falls into the tactical category, although, of course, he would have more opportunity than many to offer strategic advice.

One of the most important persons in this second category will be the public relations expert who plans and executes the mass media campaign for the party. In 1955, in anticipation of the 1956 campaign, the Republican National Committee negotiated contracts with the major television networks securing at a reasonable cost, all of the time which would be required in the course of the 1956 campaign. The time was contracted fully a year before it was used. The sense of public responsibility of the network, coupled with the enterprise of the public relations director of the Republican National Committee, Lou Guyley, combined to secure for the party A #1 time, without the expenditure for pre-emption costs which characterized the 1952 Republican campaign. In 1955, also, the Republican National Committee contracted for five-minute spots which were to appear at the beginning, or at the end, of some of the most popular programs then on the air. The Republicans thus captured for themselves audiences which had been built up through the largesse of some of the largest television advertisers in the country. Following the Republican example, the Democratic National Committee also made advance commitments for television time. In 1960, the cast of characters and the stage were pretty much the same. Eisenhower was in the White House, Nixon was running for President, the same faces were to be found either at the National Committee or on the Nixon staff, yet it was not until September-October 1960 that commitments could be made for television time. The reason

for this was not a lack of expertness. One of the most skilled persons in scheduling television time was on the Nixon campaign staff. Another proven performer was on the staff of the National Committee, but clearance could not be secured. And, in 1960, all clearance came from the Vice President.

Another of the great demands in campaign time is the demand for speakers. The Anchorage, Alaska, Young Republicans feel perfectly at ease in placing a long-distance telephone call to the Speakers Bureau of the Republican National Committee demanding the appearance, if not of the presidential candidate, at least of the vice-presidential candidate, or a senator or a representative, or a state-side Republican, at their quarterly barbecue, to be attended by three hundred persons. Such demands may not be ignored and must, if possible, be met. There is a kind of expertness that comes not so much from reading books and taking college courses as from developing contact and profiting by experience. This is the expertness of the speakers bureau, operated by people who know what senators will go where, and that most will not go anywhere; for one of the enduring, although perhaps not endearing traits of the Republican delegation on the Hill is a lack of interest in making speeches.[1]

Charges and counter-charges are so broadcast during the campaign that the problem of being certain that one has met every possible charge acquires expert treatment. In the 1960 campaign, the Republicans maintained a so-called answer-desk, staffed by Oliver Gale, former special assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The job of the answer-desk, as Republicans saw it, was to nail down every canard uttered by the Democrats and to provide an effective response to it. In addition to the answer-desk, there was a so-called "truth squad", familiar from the 1956 campaign. A prominent Senator and a member of the House jointly headed the

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[1]One might parenthetically remark at this point that the willingness of a Goldwater or a Tower to accept speaking engagements to talk to the Montgomery County, Maryland, Young Republicans and the Bloomington, Indiana, Ladies' Club, while not passing up the opportunity to address the Phoenix, Arizona, Rotarians, could well have a great deal to do with the supposed popularity the exponents of ultra-conservatism enjoy today. People like people who are accessible. If the people who are accessible are ultra-conservative, but are liked as people because they are accessible, the transfer from liking people to accepting, or liking, ultra-conservatism may be more readily effected than we realize.

"truth squad". The idea here was to trail Senator Kennedy in a chartered airplane and attempt to correct what, since the Senator was a Democrat, must be distortions of the truth in his representation of what would happen to the country were the Republicans to be given another lease on the White House. In the public relations field beyond this point, one finds himself dealing with general campaign literature produced by individuals who are expert at phrasiology and at the manipulation of ideas, and such campaign gimmickry as campaign buttons, fender stickers and placards. A logical question at this point is, where were the speech writers? Miscellaneous people in, around and outside of the Republican National Committee and the Nixon Campaign organization wrote speeches. The truth of the matter is, however, that none were written for the Vice President, who wrote all of his own speeches.

Backing up the efforts just described were, of course, the research personnel of the Republican National Committee and of the Nixon campaign headquarters. Very high quality people, indeed, developed facts and ideas, produced intellectual biographies of candidates and otherwise attempted to provide material which would be of use in furthering the Republican campaign cause. I find that a friend of mine who attempted to analyze in shorthand terms the allocation of responsibility for research in the Republican campaign effort for 1960 made the following note? "Grassmuck vs. Hamlin vs. Shepley vs. GOP (?)." The reference is to the fact that George Grassmuck, a political scientist from the University of Michigan, was taken on by the Nixon campaign staff in a research capacity. Prior to George's joining the Nixon campaign group, John Hamlin, formerly an assistant to the President with an office in the Executive Office Building, had moved into a suite in the Sheraton-Park Hotel, where he proceded to put together a file on Kennedy for the use of the Vice President. For a time, many people regarded Hamlin as the Nixon research man. When Professor Grassmuck came along, many people regarded Professor Grassmuck as having replaced Hamlin. Then along came Mr. James Shepley from the Time-Life organization. At this point many persons wondered who had replaced whom. Cordial as this trio's relations were with personnel on the Republican National Committee staff, there was always a question in the Committee as to whether the research division of the Republican National Committee was working with, for, or being worked against by the research staff of the Nixon campaign organization.

Ideas and images have appeals which may vary from group to group. George Belknap has referred to President Kennedy's refusal to be divisive in his campaigning and to make specialized appeals to varying groups. There are those, of course, who feel that the Martin Luther King telephone call constituted a

specialized appeal and a superb political gesture. There are those who feel that the refusal of Richard Nixon to make a major campaign speech in Harlem constituted an ill-informed effort to avoid the impression of pandering to, or attempting to solicit the votes of specialized groups. Each of the national committee's directed specialized appeals to special groups. The Republican National Committee has long maintained an office whose function it is to attract Negro voters. Without budget and without any demonstration of interest, there was little for this office to do in the 1960 campaign. The Republican National Committee traditionally attempts, in a campaign year, to round up nationality votes, as does Democratic National Committee. Both the Democrats and the Republicans found themselves accused of political trickery in the editing of film during the 1960 campaign. You will recall that in October, the Democrats were accused of editing the film of a Nixon-Kennedy debate in such a manner as to favor their candidate. There was also talk concerning the use of the film of Senator Kennedy's talk with the Baptist ministers in Texas in such a manner as to court the Catholic vote. Through its nationalities effort, the Republican National Committee ran into the same kind of criticism as a result of a film produced and shown in Washington, which seemed to give the Vice President credit for some decisions in the international relations field which actually had been made by the President.

Appeals to specialized groups were also framed in the area of senior citizens, college professors, and farmers. The farm group at the Republican National Committee appears to be the only group, other than the Young Republicans, which was able to maintain a field staff in 1960. The Vice President, during the campaign, enjoyed the advice of two farmers from Southern California. But it would appear that in this area, as in the area of specialized appeals to intellectuals, the Nixon campaign organization, at some point, conceded to the Republican National Committee authority to do the job. The National Committee was never able adequately to exploit the contacts which it does have within the major labor union organizations. As with the Negro voter, the labor voter was not allocated funds, and the persons responsible for maintaining contacts with these groups were, in consequence, hamstrung.

One of the divisions at the Republican National Committee which is particularly influential at any time, and was perhaps peculiarly inflential during the 1960 campaign, is the Southern Division, headed by the Virginia State Republican chairman, Lee Potter. The Southern Division exploited the talents of Barry Goldwater in an effort to break the south for the Vice President. Nixon, it will be recalled, went to Greensboro, North Carolina, to deliver a speech on civil rights. Beyond that he visited such

other states in the south as South Carolina and Louisiana and Texas. Indeed, he fulfilled his claim to visit every state of the Union. The course of the campaign suggests to this observer that the Southern Division at the Republican National Committee probably exerted more influence upon the thinking of the party candidate for President than any other group within the Committee staff.

We have mentioned two of the three categories of political experts active in the 1960 Nixon campaign. The third group I would designate operational experts. This is the person on the electoral firing-line. This person generally is operating at the local level, although he may be located at the Republican National Committee or, during the last campaign, might have been found at the Associates Building on 19th Street in Washington, working for the Nixon campaign staff. This is the individual who knows approximately the number of votes by which the Kennedy majority in Chicago will be depressed if an expenditure of X thousand dollars is made by the Republicans for poll watching on election day. This is the individual who knows how to get out the vote, and how to hamper the efforts of the opposition to do so. He may be skilled in the technique of stealing votes (whether by fixing voting machines or by more traditional methods), and he certainly is skilled in the techniques of preventing others from doing so. This is the party hack, the individual who many believe to be the key instrumentality for winning elections in the United States.

We have talked of the kinds of experts who participated in the Republican campaign, but have said little of the role which was allocated to them. Perhaps we can get at this by contrasting the 1956 and 1960 Republican campaign organizations. Probably the 1956 campaign was one of the best managed Republican campaigns in this century. Probably, one of the most efficient campaign organizations ever composed was that which managed the re-election of President Eisenhower in 1956. This is not to suggest that President Eisenhower would not have been re-elected had the campaign organization supporting him been inefficient. Indeed, it might be true that he would have been re-elected had he had no campaign organization. It remains true, however, that the Republican National Committee, in the 1956 campaign, was probably as well organized and as effective as it ever has been. You will recall that in that campaign Leonard W. Hall of New York was chairman. Below Len Hall the following divisions were arranged. The Campaign division, under the direction of Robert Humphreys, had responsibility for plans, programs, and implementation of policy incidental to the campaign. The executive division, under the direction of Chauncy Robbins, a veteran National Committee staff man, had charge of such matters as patronage and budget. The public relations division, under

L. Richard Guylay, a master of political public relations, had charge of the mass media aspect of the campaign, including, of course, radio and television, billboards, newspapers, the production of display materials, art and literature.

The organization of the National Committee--which in 1956 was the campaign organization--was that simple. All of the other activities of the Committee, including specialized appeals to minority and ethnic groups, Young Republican activities, and activities directed especially at women, or at professional groups, were arraigned under one or more of these divisions. The national campaign telephone directory for 1956 is probably one of the best campaign organization charts ever produced, and it is significant that its major heads relate to campaign functions.

Granted, the 1956 campaign organization was misleadingly simple. What really mattered was not the symetrical arrangement of the telephone directory, or the patterns of organization charts, but that people knew to whom to go for prompt decisions in various areas of activity, and, in many instances, it was possible to make decisions with confidence, months prior to the time they were to take effect. Here, of course, the once-disputed term "planning" comes into play. But charts and directories were in 1956 indicative of the sense of direction which pervaded the campaign.

And so they were too, in 1960, when the telephone directory for the Republican presidential campaign, could be produced only as an alphabetical listing of everyone of significance in any of the various cooperating, competing, and at times conflicting campaign organizations, scattered about Washington. It can be argued that a lack of campaign organization--or, perhaps, too many campaign organizations--was the hallmark of the 1960 Republican campaign.

It can be argued that a lack of clear-cut campaign organization was the hallmark of the 1960 Democratic campaign also. And this I would be willing to concede. However, if there was lack of organization, and if there was impression of chaos in the Democratic campaign, at least one thing was true of the Democratic campaign organization which was not true of the Republican campaign organization, and that is that persons were delegated authority to speak for the candidate, and individuals had authority to frame decisions. Discretion may have been allocated on a haphazard basis in the Democratic campaign organization, but it was delegated, and because of this, while individuals who were ready, willing, able, and competent to work in the Republican national campaign were sitting on their hands for lack of authority to act, members of the Kennedy campaign

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organization were moving. Thus, I am suggesting that whether or not he wishes it, the candidate must take on a form of expertness. Either he must be an expert on selecting people and delegating authority to them to act in his name and on his behalf, while reserving to himself the role which is normally associated with the candidate, namely, that of public appearances, speeches, etc., or for lack of being able and willing to assign functions and delegate authority, he must play the role of the universal expert, retaining at the top the prerogative of making all decisions, and thus, of course, foregoing the framing of decisions which he does have time to make.

I say this at this point because it seems to me that the role of the expert in the Republican campaign in 1960 was that of court attendant rather than confidant and respected ally. This comment is based not only upon newspaper research, but upon interviews with scores of persons who were active in the 1960 Republican campaign. And it cannot truly be taken as criticism of the Republican party's presidential candidate in 1960. Such is the nature of American politics that he who wins a presidential campaign is a hero. The method which he employed to win that campaign is effective and must be conceded to have been suited to the needs of the time. It is significant that in Theodore White's book on the 1960 campaign, he minimizes the closeness of the outcome. It is a book about a hero and a failure, but it must be remembered by serious students of American politics that the difference between the Kennedy victory and the Nixon failure was a difference of approximately one-half of one per cent of the popular vote. If there was a tendency in the Nixon campaign to fail or to refuse to delegate, and not so much to keep the expert on tap rather than on top, as to fail to turn on the tap, nonetheless, the decisions which the former Vice President made in the course of his quest for the presidency came within a hair's breadth of winning it for him.

THE BUREAUCRATIC MODEL:
MAX WEBER REJECTED, REDISCOVERED, REFORMED

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"The choice was put to them whether they would like to be kings or king's couriers. Like children they all wanted to be couriers. So now there are a great many couriers, they post through the world, and, as there are no kings left, shout to each other their meaningless and obsolete messages. They would gladly put an end to their wretched lives, but they dare not because of their oath of office."

Franz Kafka, The Great Wall of China; Stories and Reflections

"He /Franz Kafka/ lamented that it left him little time for his own writing, but he bowed to the social importance of his work; and in time came to write the following letter to a woman he loved, who had begged him to tell a lie to get leave of absence to spend some time with her (Letters to Milena): 'I can't come because I can't tell a lie to the office.... In all cases where, among the reasons that I would have for lying, happiness the necessity for happiness, is the main reason, there I cannot lie....You must realize, Milena, that the office is not just any old stupid institution... but it has been my life up to now....To me the office...is a living person who looks at me wherever I am with his innocent eyes, a person with whom I'm connected in some ways unknown to myself.'"

Rebecca West, The Court and the Castle: Some Treatments of a Recurrent Scheme

I.

There is no record that Franz Kafka, in the course of his university studies in Prague, read any part of Max Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. But even if he had not, this letter is evidence, confirmed also by his biographer and life-long friend Max Brod, that he was familiar with the rules for the operation of the "office" and for the conduct of the officials in the office which Weber had laid down in his ideal-type of a modern bureaucracy.[1] In this letter to Milena Kafka recognized the need for ordered rational procedures and for a form of discipline on the part of officials which would enforce respect for the spirit as well as the letter of regulations. At the same time, Max Brod reports, Kafka bridled at the formalism, the red tape, and the deadening influence of routine. Thus the image of the "couriers" "shouting their meaningless

and obsolete messages" not daring to quit because of their "oath of office," and in his two great stories, The Castle and The Trial, his bureaucratic experience provided the realistic setting in which he explored the fate of two men caught helplessly in bureaucratic systems.[2] In words almost as bitter as those of Kafka, Alvin Gouldner strikes out at all those who find that bureaucratization is inevitable because it is human nature, because it is the consequence of large size, of the division of labor, or because the "iron law of oligarchy" leaves us no other alternative:

> Wrapping themselves in the shrouds of nineteenth century political economy some social scientists appear to be bent on resurrecting a dismal science. For the iron law of wages...some sociologists have substituted the iron law of oligarchy....Much of the discussion of bureaucracy...seems to have provided a screen onto which some intellectuals have projected their own dispair and pessimism....Instead of telling men how bureaucracy might be mitigated, they insist that it is inevitable.[3]

We may not visualize the fate of bureaucracy's victims as did Kafka -- Josef K. in The Trial is assassinated by his warders without ever having been told what his crime had been, and K. in The Castle can never find out whether he has been appointed to the post of surveyor; we may not care to charge writers on bureaucracy with viewing their subject distorted by a "metaphysical pathos" as Gouldner did, we are nevertheless heirs to a tradition of discourse that has dominated the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[4] And in that tradition the writings of Max Weber have long dominated the scene, a domination that has extended even to those who have rejected his approach, his method, and his evidence. Weber's analysis of authority and organization, it has been suggested, can be traced to Saint-Simon who believed that modern government would be operated by administrators with specific skills and "positive knowledge." Though Comte departed from this tradition and placed primary emphasis on spontaneity rather than rational organization, Weber is clearly Saint-Simonean in his conception of modern organizations and the important role rationality, science, and the technical expert play in them.[5]

Modern large-scale organization in business, industry, and government was created in the West (Europe and North America), but has been applied, with increasing speed since the end of World War II, to non-Western areas and societies. Bureaucratization was, of course, part of this transfer of institutions and techniques. But those engaged in applying the new tools, Westerners as well as non-Westerners, encountered increasing difficulties in making those devices work properly in the new setting. At the same time, research in and experience with large-scale organization in the West -- the modern corporation, the large conscript army -- also encountered an ever-widening gap between the Weberian model of a rational bureaucracy and actual conditions in organizations. At times it seemed as if the requirements of rationality could be met only by impairing the efficient functioning of the organization, or one of its sub-systems; at other times non-rational elements in organization and behavior seemed to make a mockery of the formal, rational rules which were to govern operations. This was found to be true not only in governmental bureaucracies, but also in business and industrial enterprises. Thus organizational structure and behavior in Western, as well as non-Western societies, seemed to depart, or was reported as departing radically, from the canons of organizational rationality detailed by Weber.

This wide-spread dissatisfaction suggests that a reexamination of Weber's

writings on bureaucracy is in order, or one should say that a "reexamination of the reexamination of Max Weber" needs to be undertaken. In this paper I propose first to reexamine Weber's writings on bureaucracy by viewing them in the broader setting of his typology of authority (Herrschaft). Secondly, to analyze the more significant proposals for modifying the Weberian ideal-type and to identify shortcoming reported in Weber's method. Finally it is hoped that all this will yield some new suggestions about the manner in which Weber's analysis of bureaucracy might again be used profitably in research; some such suggestions already exist in the literature.

One might note at this point that much of the criticism of Weber's bureaucratic ideal-type has been beside the point, not only because Weber actually dealt with some of the problems he is alleged to have omitted, but also because the critics have used Weber in such a way as to isolate the bureaucratic model from the more inclusive system of ideal-types of which it is a sub-system.[6]

But before we can proceed to any of these tasks, it is necessary to take at least a brief look at the current status of "ideal-types" in social science theory. It is important to understand what Weber had in mind and what developments have occurred in methodology since his day that might bear on the problem.

II

Early modern sociology, it has been suggested, was dominated by a positivistic-organicist view.[7] Society was taken to be a sort of superorganism which evolved through time and which could be studied by the comparative method, using historical materials. Eventually social scientists had to abandon "social evolution," seek substitutes for the comparative method and refrain from using macroscopic terms like "society" or "civilization" as the basic units for sociological study. The abandonment of positivism also led to an inquiry into the relations between natural and social sciences, and raised the question whether the social sciences could establish any sort of general knowledge at all. In Germany, in whose intellectual tradition Max Weber must be placed,[8] Kant's notion of the world of "spirit" (Geist) fostered the growth of cultural studies (Kulturwissenschaften) which considered themselves to be sharply differentiated from the natural sciences. It was asserted that human affairs and behavior could be studied only historically and that each genetic sequence was unique.

One of Weber's principal intellectual efforts was an attempt to bridge this gulf by showing that "...generalized theoretical categories are as essential to proof of causal relationships in the human and cultural field as they are in the natural sciences."[9] He argued that in the natural sciences, as well as the cultural studies, empirical data, the facts, never gave a complete picture of the ontological reality of the phenomena. He used this argument to bolster his case that there was no deep methodological chasm between the two great areas of knowledge.

The generalized theoretical categories which Weber used most consistently in his work were the ideal-type which he defined as follows:

> "This [ideal-typical] conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantively, this construct in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality....An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great

> many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality...."[10]

This definition of the ideal-type and the use to which Weber put it in his work have raised a whole host of thorny, persistent issues; they have also produced their share of methodological red herrings which have been dragged across the trail of research more quickly than they could be removed. It is important for the subsequent analysis of the literature on Weber, as well as for the reexamination of Weber's own work, that these issues be considered carefully.

As the quotation above seems to make quite clear, the ideal-type as such has never existed, it is not a representation of reality but an abstraction in which certain features have been exaggerated in order to present them as forcefully as possible. But it would be indefensible to suggest that therefore the ideal-type contained only conceptual, but no observational or empirical elements.[11] As Udy has pointed out, the specifications for Weber's rational bureaucracy are the concrete traits of a bureaucracy rather than variables or categories in a model or classificatory scheme; they "represent not so much analytical categories as they do an attempt to capture the 'spirit' of contemporary administration."[12] Perhaps if there can be agreement on this less extreme position, further arguments about whether the ideal-type does or does not reflect reality can be abandoned.[13]

Equally persistent, and perhaps equally misleading, is the controversy over the normative character of the ideal-type. Weber's own phrase, terming the ideal-type a "utopia" lends support to the argument that the bureaucratic ideal-type represented Weber's personal preference for such an omnicompetent bureaucratic apparatus. The answer to any question about Weber's personal preferences must be sought not only in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft but also in those of his writings which deal with political and administrative questions in Germany during the years in which he was active in public affairs, and in a careful study of these activities. In several of the essays in Gesammelte politische Schriften Weber, far from applauding the tendencies toward bureaucratic rule in Wilhelminian Germany,demanded again and again that bureaucrats be clearly subordinated to the politicians, and the administration to parliament.[14] But in a recent work[15] Wolfgang Mommsen has mustered considerable evidence that Weber's preoccupation with the international position of Germany led him to place an increasing emphasis on the need for strong, charismatic leadership at the expense of parliament, if necessary. He suggests that logically there might well be only a short step from the plebiscitary caesarism that Weber seems to advocate to a regime without parties at all, and without meaningful popular consultation.[16] One may object to the manner in which Mommsen has marshalled much of his evidence concerning the "undemocratic" character of Weber's practical political proposals, but there should be little doubt left that Weber's personal values did not envisage a ruling bureaucracy. However, it will be necessary later on to consider the question whether Weber's rigid division between the sphere of the "political" and that of the "bureaucratic" world is not subject to other criticisms.

A third problem concerning ideal-types has been called to our attention by Talcott Parsons. Drawing on existing German scholarship he has pointed out that Weber actually employed two kinds of ideal-types. One, which one might call "individualistic," takes its departure from "the concrete historical individuals

which constitute the objects of causal analysis, such as...modern rational bourgeois capitalism.../ or / Chinese patrimonial bureaucracy." The second category contains no elements of real phenomena but "another order of object -- ideas" such as Calvinistic theology or the Brahmanic philosophy of transmigration, etc.[17] The ideal-types with which we will be concerned in this study are all of the former sort, but it is important to be aware of the existence of these others in the wider setting of Weber's work.

Still another aspect of Weber's theoretical apparatus which has troubled many was his insistence that any departure from the narrowly defined canons of "rationality" was irrational and therefore, to use a current but ugly word, dysfunctional. Parsons has sought to rescue Weber from this impasse by redefining rationality for any given situation in which an actor might find himself. He has suggested that any definition of rationality must include: (1) the empirical facts of the external non-social situation; (2) the structure of the actor's personality as it is relevant for his orientation to a given situation; and (3) the actor's basic value orientation. Together, these provide a complete description of what is "objectively" possible. Having redefined rationality Parsons has to admit that Weber falls far short of this more workable definition and thus tends towards a rigid rational-irrational dichotomy, if not outright naivete in dealing with rationality.[18] This problem is peculiar only to certain of the ideal-types, but because the ideal-types centering around the rationality principle are particularly important for the study of bureaucracy, it has been necessary to raise the question. In fact, this leads us directly to the final aspect of the ideal-type problem.

It will be recalled that in defining the ideal-type Weber emphasized its character as an internally consistent system in which the various parts would fit together harmoniously and would not cause internal contradictions. As far as the bureaucratic ideal-type is concerned it is almost impossible to maintain the position that it meets this test of internal consistency. For example, Weber seems not to have discerned any conflict between the requirement that officials be appointed on the basis of technical competence, and that superiors are to be obeyed on the basis of their incumbency of an office. This tension between the need for "loyalty" and the claims of "expertise" which has received widespread attention in the study of governmental as well as industrial bureaucracies, cannot be understood and resolved as long as we work with a single ideal-type of bureaucracy. Weber himself has indicated a possible solution when he suggested that at the very top of a bureaucratic system there is a chief whose claim to govern is not grounded in any legal-rational authority but stems from some other order, charismatic, or traditional. We have thus arrived at a crucial point in our concern with the bureaucratic ideal-type. We find in Weber's system a large number of ideal-types, a veritable ideal-type pluralism, in which some are closely tied to each other or are clustered together to form a larger system. The one which concerns us most is the cluster of three types of authority (Herrschaft), each supported by an administrative staff appropriate for that type of authority.[19] There we find that elements of different ideal-types exist side-by-side in empirical situations and parts of all three types of authority -- legal-rational, charismatic, and traditional - impinge on each other in the same social system. Parsons who criticizes Weber for this ideal-type "atomism," and would like to claim Weber on behalf of the Parsonian attempt to erect a coherent social system on the basis of structural-functional analysis, reluctantly admits that Weber lacks "the concept of a generalized social system on all main levels."[20] Those of us who question the usefulness of the Parsonian general system actually find this ideal-type pluralism the route which can lead us out of many of the difficulties in the comparative study of bureaucracy

caused by a too narrow attention to only one or two of the Weberian ideal-types. In other words, neither general system building nor ritualistic attention to narrow ideal-type analysis will yield usable results for research.

III

Many of the writers who apply Weber's bureaucratic ideal-type to empirical research or who undertake a methodological critique of Weber's writing seem to proceed as if that part of Weber's work existed in isolation and had no connection with the remainder of the system laid out in Weber's major enterprise, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. To be sure, they make some passing reference to the three types of authority and the administrative staff appropriate for each kind, but they pay little attention either to the relations between the three types of authority or the definite connection that Weber established between the type of authority and the nature of the administrative staff existing under this authority.[21] It will be possible to eliminate much needless debate and controversy if we do the following: (1) take a brief look at the overall structure of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, and (2) spell out more carefully the structure of the argument of those sections dealing with the three ideal-types of authorities and their administrative staffs.

Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft whose first edition dates from 1922 is divided into two parts. The first, written after the end of World War I between 1918 and 1920 contains a systematic statement of the major sociological, economic, and political categories on which the entire work is based. The second part, much longer than the first, was written chiefly during 1911-1913. In this second part the major types of religious, economic, and political orders are investigated in detail on the basis of the categories developed in part I.[22] Thus we see that Weber did the detailed studies before setting down his analytic apparatus, though the categories with which we worked must have been reasonably well formed before he stated them in systematic fashion after World War I. For our purpose, it suffices to point out that corresponding to a chapter entitled "Types of Authority" in part I, there is a section by the same title (relabeled "The Sociology of Authority" in the fourth edition) in part II. What must have caused confusion in American social science -- apart from Weber's difficult style which gains little in translation -- was the arrangement of the two major volumes of translations available in this country. Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (TSEO) contained the analytic material on the three types of authority and administrative staff while From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (FMW) contained the chapter on bureaucracy from part II, short passages from the sections on charisma and legitimacy, but nothing about the other types of authority or administrative staffs.

Starting from the most generalized concept about social relationships Weber defines power (Macht) as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance."[23] Authority (Herrschaft) however, "is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons."[24] Of the two power is the broader term extending to all conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable circumstances in which he might try to impose his will. Authority, on the other hand, is more carefully circumscribed: there must be an actual person successfully issuing orders. If he does so within the confines of a corporate group he will most often need an administrative staff to enforce his commands.[25] What determines the character of the corporate group "depends in the highest degree on the way in which the authority is legitimized,"[26] that is to say, what grounds are claimed and accepted for the basis on which authority

is exercised. So we must determine now the way in which Weber categorized the grounds on which the exercise of authority is claimed.

Though there might be some small corporate groups in which those exercising authority do not use an administrative staff, for any corporate group of the size with which we are concerned in political science, such a staff is indispensable. Because the members of the staff aid the superior(s) in exercising authority it is important that they are closely tied to him. They may be bound to the superior(s) in a variety of ways: custom, affectual ties, purely material interests, or ideal motives (wertrational - value rational). In just about all cases there will be some combination of these four, hardly is a single one decisive in characterizing the relationship between the superior(s) and the staff. But these alone are not enough, Weber continues:

> In addition every such system attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its 'legitimacy.' But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally....Hence, it is useful to classify the types of authority according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each.[27]

Having made the case for classifying authority on the basis of its legitimacy claim Weber then sets out the three pure types:

> 1. Rational grounds -- resting on a belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal - rational authority).
> 2. Traditional grounds -- resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or, finally,
> 3. Charismatic grounds -- resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority).[28]

The rules governing this system of ideal-types should be quite clear now. The nature of a corporate group, and especially of the administrative staff serving that group is profoundly influenced by the type of general political authority prevailing in that group. There should never have been any doubt that it would be quite improper to expect the ideal type legal-rational bureaucracy (the administrative staff appropriate for a legal-rational authority) to yield useful research results if the social system was not governed by an authority of the kind specified by Weber. There are other reasons, as well, why the bureaucratic ideal-type yielded unsatisfactory results -- but these, too, had been foreseen at least in part by Weber. We shall deal with them toward the end of this section.

In order to dramatize the relationships between the nature of authority and the nature of the administrative staff, and also in order to save a long exposition, the three authority-administrative staff patterns have been schematized and are presented in the appendix. But certain crucial features of each of these three patterns need to be emphasized here.

Legal-rational authority presents the well-known picture of an order based on legal commands and on the rational character of these commands.[29] These com-

mands, in turn, are to be applied according to prescribed rules and -- again -- in a rational manner. Obedience in this system is to the impersonal office and not to any individual as individual. In turn, this means that the members of the staff owe obedience only as far as their official activities are concerned which are carefully separated from their personal affairs and acts. One point, however, usually disregarded, needs to be made. Even in the most extreme form of rational bureaucratic administration the supreme head of the corporate group and his claim to authority may come from a different order: a hereditary charismatic ruler (a hereditary monarch) or a pure charismatic ruler (plebicitary president) may utilize a bureaucratic staff. If indeed the only charismatic element in the system is the supreme ruler and no other elements of the charismatic order are present, then the pure bureaucratic type might be applicable to that situation. But if preliminary inquiry into an actual situation should indicate the presence of strong elements from other types of authority then administrative staff types from these other forms of authority must be employed.

In the traditional order legitimacy is claimed and accepted on the basis of "sanctity of the order."[30] Obedience to the ruler is on the basis of tradition, but tradition often also has provided the ruler with an area in which he can exercise his free discretion -- an historical example would be royal prerogative. In such a system rules are not enacted but are "found," and a new situation is covered by finding a previous incident similar to it, i.e. precedent. The administrative staff appropriate to this form of authority stands in sharp contrast to the rational bureaucratic staff of the previous form. The staff is either a patrimonial staff -- its members owe traditional loyalty to the chief, or non-patrimonial, that is to say, staff members who are tied to the chief by purely personal loyalty, favorites, vassals, or simply persons who entered into such a relationship through a free contract. Though it is possible for a staff to be no more than the personal possession of the chief, it might also happen that in highly decentralized forms of patrimonialism the staff has come to appropriate certain advantages and offices and thus is able to limit the authority of the chief. However, the principal characteristic of this system is the absence of clearly defined rules, spheres of competence, etc.

In the charismatic order authority is claimed on the basis of the superhuman, supernatural qualities of the ruler.[31] It is a specifically irrational authority, in the sense of being foreign to all rules. Here there are neither legal-rational rules, nor the claims of tradition, but simply the divine sanction of the ruler. If the people accept this claim, it becomes their duty to obey him. Weber did not limit his use of the term "charisma" to Christ-like leaders, but to any sort of leader whose followers regard him as endowed with charismatic qualities. In its pure form charismatic authority has no administrative staff but disciples clustered around a master. Does such a ruler maintain himself in perpetuity? Weber denies this. If the charismatic qualities fail him, he suggests, his disciples will leave him, his charismatic authority will have disappeared.

But if charismatic authority is to be more than a transitory phase it must establish itself more fully, become "routinized." When this happens, there will come a profound change in the nature of the administrative staff. To maintain itself for longer than the life-time of a single ruler means for transmitting the charisma must be devised; Weber lists several possibilities ranging from oracles to designation by the charismatic staff. In these cases charisma becomes routinized in an authoritarian manner. It is also possible for charisma to become routinized in an anti-authoritarian direction, eventually legitimizing leadership on a democratic basis; the means for doing this is the plebiscite.

A particular kind of administrative staff becomes appropriate for the various forms of routinized charisma. Weber notes, quite pointedly, that often the chief proponents for routinizing purely charismatic authority are the members of the staff who in this way normalize recruitment, set up ordered methods of pay, etc. Again it must be noted, the close attention Weber paid to the task of developing in a coherent and connecting manner types of authority and types of administrative staffs.

At this time it might be well to make certain general observations about this system of ideal-type authorities and administrative staffs. The first would be that Weber carefully circumscribed the use of pure ideal-types both on empirical and analytic grounds. Though the absence of real life counterparts did not invalidate their use for purposes of analysis, it led Weber to construct the various forms of authority and administrative staff in such a way that they contained elements of several ideal-types. For example, charismatic authority as it becomes routinized in a non-authoritarian direction operates through an administrative staff possessing many features of a legal-rational bureaucracy; and a legal-rational order of authority will retain traditional and charismatic qualities. Thus he suggested, not as clearly and forcefully as one might have wished, the need for working with "mixed" types or with a cluster of several ideal-types carefully related to each other.[32]

In attempting to relate the three types of authority to each other, most commentators have stressed Weber's notion of the "disenchantment of the world," that is to say, his conviction that the world was moving irrevocably towards a more and more rationalized mode of life.[33] It is usually suggested that Weber had a "unilinear" conception of human development and foresaw the progressive removal of magical elements from human existence and their replacement by rational ones. This is a tenable position if the evidence is drawn only from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, though it is possible to point to several passages even there that indicate the persistent need for charisma in a legal-rational democratic order. However, Mommsen's argument and even a cursory reading of Weber's other political writings leave little doubt that he considered the continued existence of charisma indispensable for the successful operation of a legal-rational democratic order.[34] On the basis of this evidence it becomes questionable practice to use the Weberian ideal-types as if they implied an irrevocable rationalization of all human institutions, especially of political and administrative ones.

It is, of course, quite fruitless to speculate about the course of action Weber would have adopted had he been confronted by the Nazi regime in Germany. For a clue one may point to his continued record of criticism of Wilhelminian Germany, especially after Bismarck's removal from office, for its despotic and authoritarian propensities. But it is germane to inquire into the notion of "legality" which occupies such a central place in the legal-rational ideal-type. Weber conceived the effectiveness of legal-rational authority to rest on the notion that "any given norm may be established by agreement or by imposition...."[35] It is difficult to interpret this to include the Anglo-American notion of constitutionalism, that is to say, a set of rules that meet certain minimum standards of procedural and substantive rights of individuals, etc. If one considers this passage in the context of Weber's general conception of legal-rational authority, one can only conclude that as far as the bureaucratic staff is concerned "any given legal norm" that gets itself established is entitled to claim obedience to its orders, is to be recognized as legitimate. It has been suggested that this reduced the system of legal rules to pure formalism,[36] and thus Weber's definition of legal authority was devoid of any notion of higher law,

based either on natural law or natural rights, which could impose standards on this authority or limit it in any way.

The stage has now been set for an examination of a wide range of proposals, suggestions, etc. which implicitly or explicitly seek to modify the Weberian bureaucratic ideal-type or who reject it altogether on analytic or empirical grounds.

IV

The first studies to be presented are those which seek to retain the legal-rational bureaucratic ideal-type but propose the creation of additional bureaucratic types. Helen Constas centers her attention on the conditions under which charismatic authority is routinized and operates with an administrative staff that is almost indistinguishable from the legal-rational bureaucracy.[37] She mentions briefly the three types of authority and administrative staffs appropriate for them, but criticizes Weber for not recognizing that in a political system in which charisma has been routinized the bureaucracy will not simply be a value-neutral tool, but will actually constitute a "ruling class with a monopoly of power."[38] She traces this shortcoming of Weber's to his unilinear historical view, that is to say, she suggests that Weber was convinced of the routinization of charisma in a nonauthoritarian direction because he saw history moving inexorably towards rationalization and disenchantment. Thus Miss Constas concludes that implicit in Weber's work, but obscured by his rationalist bias, are two conceptions of bureaucracy: (1) the bureaucracy which is a technical tool to be used by whoever issues legal commands, and (2) the bureaucracy of totalitarian regimes which has become a power in itself through the process of routinization of the charisma. These bureaucrats are the successors of the original disciples and have worked diligently for the establishment and continued existence of their power position by claiming the mantle of the original charismatic authority.

It seems that Miss Constas' proposal for modifications points in the right direction. However, some of her criticisms of Weber will not stand up if one examines the wider setting of Weber's writings and work. There is little doubt that contrary to Miss Constas' claim, Weber had considerable sophistication about the power role of the bureaucracy.[39] Miss Constas also makes much of Weber's belief in the inexorable march of rationalization. This is, in effect, her principal reason for doubting Weber's ability to understand the role of a charismatic bureaucracy, or of the role of charisma in political systems as a whole. As was pointed out above, Weber was not totally devoid of understanding the continued need for affectual, value-rational, or charismatic elements in modern government and administration.

Perhaps the most imaginative use of, as well as modification of, Weber's bureaucratic ideal-type is to be found in Alvin Gouldner's Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy,[40] a study of administration in a gypsum plant. Gouldner's central concern was to find the causes of differential degrees of bureaucratization within the same industrial establishment -- a type of enterprise which should have fitted exactly Weber's specifications for a legal-rational bureaucracy.

Gouldner found in Weber's bureaucratic ideal-type a tension between the claims of expertise and the claim of obedience based on discipline:

> "Weber, then, thought of bureaucracy as a Janus-faced organization, looking two ways at once. On the one side, it was administration based on expertise;

> while on the other it was administration based on discipline.... Weber seems to have been describing implicitly not one but two types of bureaucracy. One of these may be termed the 'representative' form of bureaucracy, based on rules established by agreement....A second pattern which may be called the 'punishment-centered' bureaucracy, is based on the imposition of rules, and on obedience for its own sake."[41]

There is actually also a third form of bureaucracy: mock bureaucracy to whose rules neither management nor the workers pay any attention. But Weberian ideal types are in the end not sufficient to help Gouldner answer the question: what causes the various forms of bureaucracy? For this, he reports, he had to turn to directives contained in structural-functional analysis.

In examining more closely the three patterns of bureaucracy, Gouldner notes that in Weber's three types of authority, legal, traditional, and charismatic, there is no room for any "democratic" form.[42] From this Gouldner concludes that as in Michels where the masses yielded to oligarchic rules, so in Weber they must yield to bureaucratic rule. However, such a position can no longer be held in the light of the evidence, developed by Mommsen, which was reviewed earlier.[43] Unfortunately, the validity of Gouldner's conclusions about the inferior efficacy of the punishment-centered bureaucracy is further weakened by evidence like Presthus' that in Turkey "...motivation may be positively correlated with strong leadership and a minimum of participation, in the western sense of the term. This is a 'paradox' only from the standpoint of western values."[44] Shades of the Hawthorn experiments!! Thus the need, not only for a variety of ideal types, but also for close correlation between types of administrative staffs and types of authority becomes ever more apparent.

The nature of the three bureaucratic patterns identified by Gouldner emerge clearly from this summary of defining characteristics and symptoms:[45]

MOCK BUREAUCRACY	REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY	PUNISHMENT-CENTERED BUREAUCRACY
Rules are neither enforced by management nor obeyed by the workers	Rules are both enforced by management and obeyed by the workers	Rules either enforced by workers or management, and evaded by either
Usually entails little conflict between the two groups	Generates a few tensions, but little overt conflict	Entails relatively great tension and conflict
Joint violation and evasion of rules is buttressed by the informal sentiments of the participants	Joint support for rules buttressed by informal sentiments, mutual participation and education of workers and management	Enforced by punishment and supported by the informal sentiments of either workers or managers

Warren Bennis who has approached bureaucracy through the study of leadership, posited three elements in the pattern of administrative behavior: (1) an agent called leader, (2) a process of induction - power, and (3) induced behavior - influence. Using research reported in detail in the Administrative Science Quarterly Bennis was able to identify what Gouldner would call three

patterns of bureaucracy, differentiated from each other by a particular kind of power, influence, and leader. These three patterns Bennis calls (1) problem-solving bureaucracy - management by objective approach, (2) informal bureaucracy - the human relations approach, and (3) habit bureaucracy - corresponding closely to the Weberian ideal-type, but stressing the power of the incumbent of an office to issue orders while neglecting the "expertise" aspects which Gouldner highlighted in his "representative" bureaucratic pattern.[46]

The evidence from these three studies, all based on empirical data (Gouldner and Bennis on field research, Constas relying on more traditional printed sources), leaves little doubt that any codification of this empirical research might well lead to the formulation of additional ideal-types, though not necessarily to any sweeping modification of Weber's own bureaucratic type. But additional evidence remains to be examined.

We shall now turn to a series of proposals all of which advocate a radical shift in the focus of bureaucratic analysis, away from the Weberian emphasis on rationality and enforcement of commands.

Gouldner himself has identified the two major traditions of analysis: the rational model based on Weber, and the natural system model, based essentially on Comte and developed by Michels, Parsons, and Selznick.[47] He is concerned, as are many others working with the bureaucratic ideal-type, because it tends to focus attention of the researcher on the departure of any existing system from the rational "norm." He therefore proposes if not an outright abandonment of the rational model, then an approach centering on "...a single and synthesized model which will at once aid in analyzing distinctive characteristics of the modern organization as a rational bureaucracy, the characteristics which it shares with other social systems, and the relationship of these characteristics with one another."[48] In this single model the "rational" features (goal achievement, decisions based on rational calculations) will always be in tension with the "natural-system" features (survival, achievement of equilibrium "spontaneously and homeostatically"), for the bureaucracy needs both specialists and loyalty to the organization, both formal and informal processes.

Like Gouldner, Amitai Etzioni proposes that research be focused on a "system model" of bureaucracy.[49] He criticizes existing research on bureaucracy for centering too much on goal analysis. Research which tries to determine the gap between the professed goal of an organization and the actual results obtained trying to achieve that goal, often has such dismal results that it cannot serve as a guide for narrowing the gap between utopian goals and reality. The system model, he suggests, recognizes that goal achievement is not the only function of an organization which has service, custodial, and many other functions as well. The basic question to be asked is not how devoted is the organization to its goal, but rather: "...under the given conditions, how close does the organizational allocation of resources approach an optimum distribution?"[50] The system model may well bring out the paradox that the assignment of rather meager resources to goal attainment may be highly "functional" for the system. He warns that the cost of system model research is high but finds so many intellectual biases built into goal model research one can only conclude that he is prepared to pay this high price.

A recent proposal of Talcott Parsons' though it does not explicitly reject the Weberian bureaucratic ideal-type seems to suggest a considerable shift away from it.[51] "The central phenomenon of organization," Parson declares, "is the mobilization of power for the attainment of the goals of the organization. The

value system legitimizes the organization's goals, but it is only through power that its achievement can be made effective."[52] According to Weber legal rules legitimize authority in the legal-rational ideal-type and values have no place in the analytic scheme at all. One might be tempted to add that the Weberian model was also devoid of any concern with "power." As will be suggested shortly Weber was only too well aware of the power position of the bureaucracy and the relation of this phenomenon to the problems of achieving the goals of the political order of which the bureaucracy is a part. In concentrating on a value-power oriented type Parsons rejected at least one other possible approach: the study of bureaucracy in terms of the "roles" of individuals and groups. We will have occasion to consider research along these lines later on in this section.

It has been suggested earlier that the Weberian ideal-type has been employed in research in such a way as to isolate it from the other dimensions of the social and political system in which the bureaucracy operates. Parsons "sociological approach" carefully avoids this trap by defining the value system in such a way that it implies acceptance of the more generalized norms of the superordinate system of which the bureaucratic organization is a part. Thus "the most essential feature of the value system...is the evaluative legitimation of its place or 'role' in the superordinate system."[53] One would wish that this requirement be more widely obeyed than is now the case.

Representative of what one might well call a school of bureaucratic analysis is Philip Selznick. In his widely-quoted article which appeared almost twenty years ago he advocated abandoning the study of the formal structure and formal goals of an organization or a bureaucracy, and concentrate instead on the processes by which bureaucrats subvert the purposes of the organization by making it serve their own professional, social, or power ends.[54] Thus the problems of the officials become the problems of the organization; the actions of the officials become increasingly internally relevant and the organization is deflected from its original path, though the original goals continue to be professed as the formal goals of the organization. Stanley Udy's empirical testing of certain variables derived from the Weberian bureaucratic ideal-type has led him to the tentative conclusion that it might be possible to construct "...a model which accounts for a much wider range of phenomena than Weber is generally credited as having considered -- phenomena which frequently have been treated in ad hoc fashion as 'informal' characteristics."[55] Undoubtedly Weber paid little if any attention to the broad range of tensions and inconsistencies which could arise in the bureaucratic ideal-type, though he was not totally unaware of their existence. Reports on further research, promised by Udy, might well help in integrating conceptualization about "informal" organization into bureaucratic research.

It has been suggested several times already that Weber assumed the absence of any conflict or tension among the several components of the bureaucratic ideal-type. This has been the point of attack on Weber from an increasing number of scholars. Even those who took the ideal-type as a starting point for their research, like Gouldner, then proceeded to modify it and suggest alternative methods of research in bureaucracy. Gouldner and several others have also called our attention to the existence of certain tensions within the ideal-type, especially that between the need for expertise and the need for obedience to the incumbent of any given office. There has grown up a considerable body of empirical studies devoted to the exploration of these conflicts and tensions within what Weber had thought to be an "internally consistent" construct. Most of these center around the concept of "role" and seek to show either that within a given

bureaucratic system there exist several types of bureaucrats, or several bureaucratic roles (probably in conflict with each other), or that the demands of a single bureaucratic role conflict with demands made on the bureaucrat because of other "roles" -- either latent or manifest -- which he considers legitimate for a given situation. It is difficult to deny the validity of this line of criticism; one might note, however, that by definition the Weberian ideal-type exaggerates in a one-sided manner certain characteristics Weber wanted to stress, chiefly rationality and consistency. Furthermore, he was not as insensitive to the need for mixed types, charismatic elements in a legal-rational system, etc., as it is usually suggested.

Two studies will serve to illustrate the sort of empirical findings which suggest the existence of several bureaucratic types within the same bureaucratic system. Their spread in time and place, 11th century China and 20th century United States, only serves to underline the persistence of bureaucratic phenomena.

Examining certain changes in 11th century China, James Liu found a shift in behavioral bureaucratic types as the emphasis in the state administration shifted from "reform" -- a period when reform policy was a leading concern, to "post-reform" -- when administrative practice rather than reform policy was the principal issue.[56] Liu reports that in the reform period the following behavioral types could be found in the administration (in descending order of importance): (1) scholarly-idealistic reformers (in control), (2) career-minded executive bureaucrats, and (3) abusive-manipulative bureaucrats. As "reform" gave way to "administrative practice" a significant shift took place: abusive-manipulative bureaucrats gained control, the scholarly-idealistic reformers departing from the administration altogether; next came abusive-corrupt bureaucrats, followed career-minded conformist. The last two types, according to Liu, had been in the service earlier, but, being opposed to reform, had no influence on administration at all. One is tempted to apply this scheme to the federal service in the United States, taking dates like 1933-34 and 1951-52 as the points of comparison.

In his study of a group of professionally trained specialists in a state civil service system Leonard Reissman noted that "an adequate sociological presentation of bureaucracy must include the formal structure, the interpersonal relationships within it, and the effects of the surrounding social milieu."[57] These three together shape the "social role" of the bureaucrat. Culturally prescribed behavior, bureaucratically defined behavior, and individually defined behavior combined to define the situation in which the role is performed. From these variables Reissman outlined four distinct bureaucratic types: the functional bureaucrat, the specialist bureaucrat, the service bureaucrat, and the job bureaucrat. The first is oriented chiefly toward a professional group outside the service, as is the second type, the specialist bureaucrat; but the latter showed a greater awareness of his identification with the bureaucracy itself. The last two are principally oriented toward the bureaucratic job, but the service bureaucrat did seek recognition for his work from the outside professional group. Reissman does not suggest the existence of tensions or conflict between those four types, but he sensitizes us to the differing bureaucratic types we may expect to find in the same bureaucratic system, differences which result from the individual bureaucrat's personality, as well as his conception of his bureaucratic role and the relevance of certain elements of the social milieu to this bureaucratic role. In all this Reissman builds on Robert Merton's suggestions concerning the significance of personality for the study bureaucracy.[58]

It was Talcott Parsons who called attention to the difficulties created by Weber's failure to distinguish between the authority of the person incumbent in a given office and the authority of the "expert." A person occupying a certain office can legally give certain orders, provide for punishment in the case of non-compliance, etc. But the authority of the expert is really of a different kind, e.g. the patient obeying the doctor's orders not because of any legal requirement to do so but because he accepts the authority of the doctor's expertise.[59] Weber may have failed to clarify the position of the expert in the bureaucracy, but we can now draw on a considerable body of research which illuminates the tensions created by the conflicting claims on the bureaucrat's loyalty arising from his dual capacity as expert and as member of a bureaucratic staff.

A good recent example of such studies concerns role conflict in nursing.[60] Corwin shows the impact on nurses, especially those just graduated from nursing training, of the bureaucratic claims of the hospital, and the claims of their profession as implanted in them by their nursing education. Similar findings are reported in studies of school teachers,[61] prison officials,[62] professional soldiers,[63] and the classification of medical cases in the army.[64]

The notion of tensions within the Weberian system has been tested empirically in a remarkably ingenious way by Stanley Udy.[65] He selected seven specifications of the bureaucratic ideal-type and reformulated them as a set of variables which he then tested by applying them to a total of 150 organizations in 150 different societies on which data were available in the Human Relations Area File. Statistical testing uncovered two clusters of variables. The elements of these two clusters were associated positively with each other, but were negatively associated with the elements of the other cluster.[66] Udy called these two clusters "bureaucratic" and "rational" -- a terminology open to serious doubt in the light of Weber's own usage. "Bureaucratic" variables were those which emphasized obedience to a hierarchical structure of offices, while the "rational" variables denoted expertise. Udy also suggests that his two types of bureaucracy coincide generally with the "charismatic" and "legal-rational" bureaucratic types suggested by Constas.[67] Udy's report of his empirical findings further underlines the need for exploring the inconsistencies and tensions in the bureaucratic ideal-type so that we may either abandon it altogether or modify it to meet the criticisms raised by a rapidly growing body of empirical findings.

There remain to be examined two sets of criticisms of the bureaucratic ideal-type which have in common only the fact that they can be easily met.

The first group of critics finds Weber to be not sensitive enough to the power considerations of the bureaucrats. Selznick is particularly impatient with Weber's focus on formal organization. He suggests that Weber neglected that form of bureaucratic dynamism which leads to personal power seeking by bureaucrats. The bureaucrat as the agent of the ones who initiate policy becomes increasingly preoccupied with his own social position and in the end subverts the professed goals of the organization by concentrating only on his own power position.[68] Parsons, on the other hand, does not explicitly attack Weber, but by making power the central phenomenon of organization he implicitly suggests an approach to the study of bureaucracy differing from that of Weber.[69]

As has been suggested earlier, the critics of Weber often base their cases on Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft alone, or even only on the sections dealing with bureaucracy; other writings are often disregarded. But in the present case it is easy to deal with these criticisms, for the rebuttal can be confined to

passages from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft alone:

> "Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The 'political master' finds himself in the position of a'dilletante' who stands opposite the 'expert' facing the trained official who stands within the management of administration. This holds whether the 'master' whom the bureaucracy serves is a 'people,' equipped with the weapons of 'legislative initiative,' the 'referendum,' and the right to remove the officials, or a parliament, elected on a more aristocratic or more 'democratic' basis and equipped with the right to vote a lack of confidence, or with the actual authority to vote it. It holds whether the master is an aristocratic, collegiate body, legally or actually based on self-recruitment, or whether he is a popularly elected president, a hereditary and 'absolute' or 'constitutional' monarch."[70]

> "...the sure instincts of the bureaucracy for the condition of maintaining its power in its own state (and through it, in opposition to other states) are inseparably fused with the canonization of the abstract and 'objective' idea of 'reasons of state.' In the last analysis, the power interests of the bureaucracy only give a concretely exploitable content to this by no means unambiguous idea; and, in dubious cases, power interests tip the balance."[71]

But there is evidence also from Weber's other writings. He realized that the continued bureaucratization of all social relations would make the structure of society increasingly rigid, and thus he called for an ever greater emphasis on political leadership by parliament and the politicians.[72] "Politicians must resist any effort on the part of the bureaucrats to gain control," Weber insisted. The higher bureaucracy would always try to keep itself free from all controls and would attempt to fill cabinet positions with career civil servants.[73] He warned against the temptation to reduce all of government to administration by experts:

> "A nation which believes that the conduct of state affairs is a matter of 'administration' and that 'politics' is nothing but the part-time occupation of amateurs or a secondary task of bureaucrats might as well forget about playing a role in world affairs and be satisfied with being a petty principality (Kleinstaat) like a Swiss canton, Denmark, Holland, Baden, or Wurttemberg -- all well-enough administered states."[74]

Weber was preoccupied, if not possessed, with Germany's position as a great power in world affairs. Forms of government and administration he considered only as means to the end of strengthening Germany's international position. Charismatic-plebiscitary leadership with a firm command over the bureaucracy and over parliament would best be able to achieve this end and thus was chosen by him as the most efficient way of organizing the state.[75] It was precisely because he believed that rationalization and bureaucratization would increase the bureaucracy's hold on the modern society that he warned against the power seeking of the bureaucrats. In a most perceptive essay on Russia, written in 1906, he predicted that the coming to power of left radical forces would lead to concentrating all power and activities in the state and to extreme "centralist-bureaucratic tendencies."[76] Addressing himself to social reformers who wanted to limit if not eliminate all forms of private enterprise, he warned that "the central state bureaucracy will rule if all forms of private capitalism are eliminated."[77] It is not necessary to agree with Weber that bureaucratic state control is the only alternative to private enterprise, but if one should sub-

stitute "party bureaucracy" for "state bureaucracy" there is abundant evidence that this forecast has indeed proved correct.[78] Whether the bureaucratic power problem can be integrated more effectively into the ideal-type will be examined shortly.

The second set of criticisms has arisen from the recent American concern with the bureaucracies of developing societies. In two separate reports Morroe Berger and Robert Presthus inform us that the Weberian bureaucratic ideal-type failed to provide any sort of guidance for the study of bureaucracy in Egypt and Turkey, respectively.[79] Presthus suggests that the organization and operation of the Turkish nationalized coal industry reflected less the "Weberian claims for skill, impartiality, predictibility, and the achievement of the organization's formal objectives /than the/ welfare claims that stress co-operation, full employment, and fringe benefits."[80] Presthus thus proposes the construction of a new ideal-type "welfare bureaucracy."

In his study of the Egyptian higher civil service, Berger takes account of the Weberian ideal-types of authority and administration and describes the Egyptian bureaucracy as "moving from the model of 'traditional authority' to that of 'legal authority' and that vestiges of the older model persist to this day."[81] But then he relies almost entirely on the legal-rational ideal-type and on conceptualizations derived from it,[82] and found that those civil servants whom he identified as most highly exposed to western influences did not conform to western bureaucratic norms. This led him to brand the theorizing and model building in bureaucratic research as inadequate for non-western situations.[83]

In both of these studies, though their authors have in their total work exhibited a high level of sophistication and have been sensitive to the social and cultural setting of politics and administration, the relationship between type of authority and type of administrative staff had not been faced in constructing a model for the research at hand. This failure is the clue to the major shortcoming in the use of the Weberian model in recent years, and by examining this failure to relate type of administrative staff to type of authority we will be able to deal with the whole body of criticisms and modifications of the Weberian ideal-type.

V

The present state of the uses (and abuses) of Weber's bureaucratic ideal-type may be summed up in the following manner:

1. Much of the misunderstanding of the Weberian bureaucratic ideal-type stems from the failure to relate the type of administrative staff and organization to the appropriate form of authority. There never was a question in Weber's mind that the kind of administrative staff one might expect to find in a given political system would vary with the form of legitimate authority claimed and accepted in that society: "But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally."[84] Had Presthus and Berger been able to use the sort of ideal-types we will suggest below for their investigations in Turkey and Egypt they might have been spared the need to spell out in detail the considerable discrepancies between their findings and the Weberian construct, a construct not really applicable to the political orders they investigated.

2. There is today general agreement that little can be gained by treating

departures from the legal-rational bureaucratic model as "irrational." Instead one of two kinds of operations must be performed: (a) features from other ideal-types must be incorporated, as the nature of the legitimate authority demands, or (b) additional types of administrative staffs must be used, either those developed by Weber or new ones introduced for purposes of a particular piece of research, such as Constas' "charismatic bureaucracy," or Gouldner's "mock bureaucracy-representative bureaucracy-punishment centered bureaucracy" scheme. Such proposals do not represent as far a departure from Weber, as is usually suggested. Weber noted that of the three claimed grounds for legitimacy the legal-rational was inherently much weaker than either the charismatic or the traditional and that, therefore, traditional and charismatic elements are needed to reinforce the claims of legal-rational authority.[85] He denied emphatically that his scheme of ideal-types was meant to be exhaustive and to put history in a straight jacket. The usefulness of his scheme, he declared, "is derived from the fact that in a given case it is possible to distinguish what aspects of a given organized group can legitimately be identified as falling under or approximating to one or another of these categories."[86] In short, whatever scheme is devised it must help identify, classify, and understand existing organizations -- or the scheme is not worth the paper on which it is printed.

3. Considerable effort has gone into the task of disproving Weber's belief in the inevitability of rationalization and disenchantment. This is usually coupled with the assertion that because Weber believed this process to be inevitable and irreversible he conceived of only one type of administrative staff for a rational social order, the bureaucratic ideal-type. It would be impossible to disprove this contention in its entirety, but for a fuller understanding of Weber one must consider his total Weltbild, as Mommsen has done. It will then become quite clear that Weber did not foresee or predict the complete disappearance of traditional or charismatic authority. On the contrary, he carefully sketched the continued existence of charismatic, if not of traditional elements, in modern mass society. It is not unreasonable to conclude that had he lived he would have taken into account forms of charismatic rule which developed later in the 20th century. Any continued use or modification of his basic scheme requires that we make the necessary adjustments now and not spend our energy criticizing the original schema.

4. The most valid body of criticism of Weber's work on bureaucracy concerns the place in and the role of bureaucrats in this bureaucratic system.

a. Weber centered his attention on the needs of the organization only (or of those who command it) and neglected the needs of the staff. Focusing, as he did, on the formal organization which reflected the official goals, needs, etc. of the organization he made no provision for informal structures which might develop by which bureaucrats would try to satisfy their own needs.

b. As present-day critics point out quite correctly, Weber saw no inconsistencies in his bureaucratic scheme and thus did not envisage any contradictory demands which might be made on the staff. He failed to take into account any of the possible sources of tensions which might arise: tensions between elements of the bureaucratic scheme itself; tensions created by the presence of conflicting features from other ideal-types such as selection of staff on the basis of charismatic qualities and the requirements of technical competence; or tensions which might result from a conflict between organizational demands and the position of the bureaucrat in, or the more generalized values of, a larger society. Weber carefully correlated the type of administrative staff with that of the generalized authority but was not always alert to possible sources of tensions.

c. Weber cannot be charged with having failed to consider the power position of the bureaucracy in the legal-rational authority type. A variety of sources has been quoted earlier to dispose of that argument. Nevertheless, there are certain features of Weber's position on this topic which require additional attention, especially as they relate to the nature of bureaucracy as a "neutral" tool of authority.

5. Weber considered bureaucracy under a legal-rational type of authority to be a neutral tool which would carry out whatever orders were given by those claiming legitimate exercise of legal authority -- "legitimate," in this Weberian context, being whatever laws got themselves enacted and obeyed. Bureaucracy was neutral in the sense that it did not respond to charismatic or traditional claims as did the administrative staffs under these other types of authority. But this very notion of neutrality gives rise to a more fundamental problem in Weber's bureaucratic conceptualization, though the existence of certain ambiguities in it make a conclusive statement difficult indeed. Speculating on the future needs of German government and politics Weber seemed to draw a clear line between the scope of "policy" and that of "administration." Politicians in parliament and cabinet were to make policy while bureaucrats were to carry out the orders of their political bosses and should never be entrusted with policy-making functions:

> If an executive's essential character is that of a "bureaucrat" (Beamter), be he ever so competent, he will do his work according to prescribed rules, dutifully and honorably. But one must never place him at the head of a private corporation or of a state administration.[87]

Such bureaucrats had no conception of the needs of politics and would not know how to bear the sort of responsibility the politician must be willing to assume. Weber developed this argument at some length and cited the experiences of Wilhelminian Germany as evidence of what happened when bureaucrats took the place of responsible political leaders. But while seeming to draw such a sharp line between bureaucrat and politician, Weber was not insensitive to the needs of keeping all the affairs of government under effective political control: "...every problem, no matter how technical it might seem, can assume political significance and its solution can be decisively influenced by political considerations."[88] There are many instances where Weber seemed to insist on a rather simplistic policy-administration dichotomy, while in passages like the one just cited, he showed considerable sophistication in this regard and seemed to suggest that there really were no questions in government which were not "political" at least in some respects. To complicate matters even further, there are still other places where Weber expressed considerable doubt about the character of the legal-rational expert bureaucracy as a "neutral tool." A political authority which would be satisfied with formal bureaucratic compliance with its orders might well find a legal-rational bureaucracy a satisfactory servant. But for a political system based on some strongly-held values a less competent administrative staff might prove a more pliable instrument. The United States, Weber pointed out, sought recourse in a spoils system because it did not want to become dominated by a body of technical experts.[89] The policy-administration dichotomy which has loomed large in the study and practice of administration is, of course, a product of a rationalist tradition in government and administration. Aylmer in his study of Stuart administration points out that as late as the reign of Charles I there were not even rudimentary distinctions between political and non-political spheres of government, between politicians and administrators; "policy in the modern sense scarcely existed."[90] By the middle of the 20th century we again find it difficult to maintain the validity of the policy-administration dichotomy.

Weber, building on a tradition of rationalism and rationalization made use of the distinction which is an indispensable part of this rationalist tradition, but showed considerably more awareness of the ambiguities of the policy-administration concept than is usually realized. His ideal-type constructs were severely rational, but his own political experiences seemed to have taught him differently. This dualism requires us to refer both to his systematic writings and to the record of his involvement in German politics and government; light from both sources is needed for illumination.

Drawing then on the corpus of Weber's systematic analysis, his other political writings, his experience in government and politics, and the present survey of empirical studies and methodological critiques what proposals can we make for the comparative analysis of bureaucracies, using the Weberian ideal-type, as modified below.

1. The construction of types of administrative staffs must be preceded by the development of a typology of political authority. One should not assume that the generalized authority in society is of the legal-rational kind even though the bureaucracy to be investigated resembles the legal-rational bureaucracy of Weber's typology.

a. One should assume that the various types of authority are not internally consistent. Following Sjoberg "our fundamental premise /should be/ that all social systems are, at one time or another, plagued by contradictory functional requirements and that these are associated with the formation of mutually contradictory structural arrangements....Implied in this is the notion that some of these mutually contradictory structures may actually be essential to the 'operation' or 'maintenance' of the system."[91]

i. Admission of contradictory requirements will focus attention on questions such as "How does the social order maintain integration?"

ii. Recognition of contradictory requirements makes possible analysis of social system in terms of conflict and change.

b. Pure ideal-types have no empirical counterparts. For more effective treatment of empirical evidence ideal-types containing elements from several kinds of authority structures should be developed. These might well resemble the fragmented political culture type suggested by Almond.[92]

c. Avoid polarization of political authority (or political culture) types along a Western- non Western continuum. Weber was convinced of the fundamental variability of social institution and did not consider Western institutions as "natural" models for all other societies.[93]

d. Avoid a simple unilinear development of forms of authority from the less rational to the more rational. The evidence in Weber on this point is ambiguous, but one must assume the coexistence of several forms of non-rational authority with legal-rational authority.

2. The construction of types of administrative staffs must be closely correlated with the types of authority already developed.

a. There will thus be not one or two types of administrative staffs, but several, as well as types which contain elements of some of the pure types, along the lines proposed by Constas. Credit for alerting us to the need for several types must go to Alvin Gouldner.

b. The various types of administrative staff must provide for the accommodation of contradictory functional requirements, reflecting contradictory requirements in the various types of authority.

c. Bureaucracy is not a neutral tool but reflects the conditions existing in polity and society. Where there is little conflict in society bureaucracy based on skill and expertise will function smoothly, where agreement is weak or lacking entirely the bureaucracy will inescapably be drawn into the conflict.[94] Fragmented political authority will be reflected in the nature and functioning of the administrative staff.

d. Any ideal-type of an administrative staff must take into account the needs of the members of the staff.

i. The demands made by the staff on individual jobs and on the organization as a whole are influenced by the nature of political authority and the general culture.

ii. Several sets of demands, often contradictory, are made on the members of the staff. These include: demands made on them by the culture as a whole, by the nature of the legitimate authority, and by the nature of the organization.

APPENDIX A

Legal-rational Authority*

Nature of Legitimate Authority

1. Obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order
2. Legal norms may be established on any of a variety of bases(expediency, values,etc)
3. Abstract rules which are intentionally established are applied to specific cases
4. Person in authority occupies an "office"
5. Person who obeys command obeys "only the law" not an individual
6. Offices arranged in hierarchical manner with appeal and grievance machinery
7. Because application of norms is a rational process individuals in authority need specialized training
8. Officials separated from ownership of means of production; their private property strictly separated from public property
9. Office separated from living quarters
10. Official does not appropriate his "office"
11. Written documents are heart of process; all final decisions in writing
12. Ultimate source of authority in a legal-rational system may well be in another order(charisma)

Nature of Administrative Staff

1. Legal authority in purest form utilizes bureaucratic administrative staff
2. Characteristics of bureaucrats are:
   a. subject to authority only in official capacities
   b. organized in hierarchy of offices
   c. each office has defined competence
   d. office filled by free selection
   e. officials appointed on basis of technical competence
   f. paid in money; fixed, graded salary scale; pensions(responsibility as well as social status taken into account)
   g. office is primary occupation
   h. there is a career; advancement by seniority and/or achievement
   i. official is separated from means of administration
   j. official subject to discipline in conduct of office
3. Appointment is crucial feature because election impedes hierarchical discipline
4. Specialized knowledge is indispensable, even though at top of bureaucracy there is a non-bureaucrat
5. Administrative bureaucratic staff in purest form: "monocratic" type
   a. "the most rational means of carrying out imperative control over human beings
   b. primary source of superiority is technical knowledge
   c. can escape existing bureaucratic authority only by creating another bureaucratic authority
   d. capitalism has been major spur toward bureaucratization
   e. development of bureaucracy leads to social levelling, and social levelling favors bureaucracy(appointment by merit)

*For sources see n. 29

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APPENDIX C

Charismatic Authority and Its Routinization*

Nature of Legitimate Authority

1. Individual in power considered superhuman and supernatural; he is treated as leader
2. Those who consider leader's claim valid are followers; they do not elect him but recognize the charisma-this is their duty
3. Consistent failure of charisma may lead to deposition of leader
4. To be more than transitory, charisma must be routinized by finding successor:
   a. find person with specific characteristics(Dalai Lama)
   b. oracles, lots, etc.
   c. designation by original charisma holder
   d. designation by charismatically qualified staff
   e. charisma transmitted hereditarily
   f. charisma transmitted by ritual means (laying on of hands)
5. Most powerful motive for routinization is search for security(authority, social prestige, economic security)
6. Authority structure of routinized charisma is affected by manner in which administrative staff secures economic position: special case - "feudalism"
7. Charisma can also be routinized in anti-authoritarian direction:
   a. use of plebiscite to legitimize leadership is most important way for democracy to be combined with leadership
   b. it is a form of charismatic authority in which authoritarian elements are concealed by plebiscite
   c. anti-authoritarian routinized charisma may lead to emphasis on economic rationality, but at same time may do away with all rational procedures if this prevents obtaining benefits for followers

Nature of Administrative Staff

1. In pure form there is no administrative staff, only followers and disciples; there are no legal rules("It is written...but I say into you...")
   a. disciples chosen on basis of charismatic qualities
   b. no appointments, promotions, etc.
   c. no hierarchy, no specified spheres
   d. no salaries, benefices, etc.
   e. unlike traditional authority, not bound by precedent
2. Routinization also affects character of administrative staff
   a. norms for recruitment will be created
   b. method for selecting charismatic successor will also affect method for selecting administrative staff
   c. routinized staff may secure its economic position through benefices, fiefs, offices
3. Routinization of charisma in anti-authoritarian direction also will affect nature of administrative staff
   a. principle of election may be applied to staff
   b. election of staff will tend to curtail power of leader
   c. but as long as election limited to plebiscitary leader, then staff will usually be chosen on basis of personal loyalty(no rational selection criteria, no specific task spheres, no technical competence)

*For sources see n. 31

NOTES

[1]Max Brod, Franz Kafka: A Biography(2nd enl. ed.; New York: Schocken Books, 1960), pp. 70ff.

[2]The Trial describes the last days of a bank clerk who suddenly finds himself accused of a crime which is never defined. He is brought before a court that has no recognized court room and about which people seem to have only a vague understanding. The court's dealings with K. are clumsy, inefficient, and unjust, but in the end K. begins to believe that he is indeed guilty, and he is finally killed by the court attendants. In The Castle K. (again the hero bears the initial of the author's own name) appears in a village, believing himself to have been appointed as a surveyor by authorities in the castle situated above the village. K. is unable to get in touch with anybody in the castle and can never find out whether he has actually been appointed.

[3]Alwin W. Gouldner, "The Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," American Political Science Review, XLIX(June, 1955), 507.

[4]In examining what he considers to be the central problem of political sociology, the proper balance between conflict and consensus, Lipset identifies two major areas of concern: class conflict and consensus, exemplified by the writings of Marx and Tocqueville, and bureaucracy and democracy, as treated by Weber and Michels. Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 21-41. Sheldon Wolin approaching modern politics from a radically different direction states his own concern in terms not unlike those of Lipset: "...two closely interrelated problems which troubled almost every major nineteenth century writer and continue to perplex the present. They are the problems of community and of organization." Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1960), pp. 363, 368.

[5]Alwin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in Robert K. Merton and others, Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), p. 401.

[6]Günther Roth and Reinhard Bendix touch on some of these distortions and misplaced criticisms of Weber's work on bureaucracy in "Max Webers Einfluss auf die amerikanische Soziologie," Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, XI(1959), 38-53. See, of course, Bendix's own Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday, 1960).

[7]Don Martindale, "Sociological Theory and the Ideal Type," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co., 1959), p. 59.

[8]Talcott Parsons suggests that in spite of a quite different trend in German intellectual development in the 19th century, there is a rather exact convergence of Weber's work with that of Pareto and Durkheim. This is one of the central arguments of The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers (2nd ed., Glencoe: Free Press, 1949). Hereafter cited as Structure.

[9]Talcott Parsons, "Introduction," to Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, translators, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 9. Together with Hans Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, translated, edited, and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and

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C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), these two volumes constituted until recently the bulk of the English translation of Weber's work. They contain most of the relevant sections for the study of bureaucracy. The former will be hereafter cited as TSEO; the latter as FMW. Reinhard Bendix has carefully tabulated the status of English translations as of 1960 in his Max Weber, op. cit.

[10] Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated & edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), p. 90. All italics in original.

[11] Martindale, op. cit., p. 69

[12] Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organization Theory: An Empirical Study," American Sociological Review, XXIV(December, 1959), 791-792. I would agree with Martindale's definition that ideal-types are "devices intended to institute comparisons as precise as the stage of one's theory and the precision of his instruments will allow." Thus Martindale distinguishes them from theories which he considers to be interrelated bodies of empirical laws, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

[13] One other consequence of the gulf between reality and ideal-type has been pointed out by Amitai Etzioni. By organizing research in such a way that one tries to measure the departure of the real situation from the ideal-type, one finds reality so far removed from the ideal-type that few meaningful comparisons can be made. Etzioni's suggestions for an alternative approach will be examined later. "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Suggestion," Administrative Science Quarterly, V(September, 1960), 257-278.

[14] Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, ed. by Johannes Winkelmann (2nd enl. ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr / Paul Siebeck/, 1958). The most important essays are the following: "Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland"(written in December 1917), pp. 233-279, and "Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland"(written in May 1918), pp. 294-431.

[15] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik, 1890-1920 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr /Paul Siebeck/, 1959).

[16] See especially ch. X whose very title "Vom liberalen Verfassungsstaat zur plebiszitären Führerdemokratie(From the liberal constitution state to plebiscitary leadership democracy) indicates the drift of the argument, pp. 387-413. Mommsen points out that Carl Schmitt who became an apologist for the Nazi state took the step which led from Weber's charismatic mass democracy to a leadership oligarchy, p. 410. See below n. 76.

[17] Parsons, Structure, p. 605. The term "individualistic" in this context has been used in much the same manner as by J.W.N. Watkins, "Ideal Types and Historical Explanation," The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, III(1952), reprinted in an expanded version in Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1953), pp. 723-743.

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[19]Parsons, "Introduction," TSEO, pp. 16-17.

[19]The essay "Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft" was published posthumously in Preussische Jahrbücher. It has been reprinted as an appendix to Johannes Winkelmann, Legitimität und Legalität in Max Webers Herrschaftssoziologie(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr / Paul Siebeck /, 1952), pp. 106-120.

[20]Parsons, "Introduction," TSEO, p. 76. Martindale does not deny the existence of ideal-type "atomism," but does not consider it a serious shortcoming, op. cit., p. 83.

[21]Robert V. Presthus, "Weberian v. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society," Administrative Science Quarterly, VI(June, 1961), 1-24; Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt; a Study of the Higher Civil Service (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); and, to a lesser degree, Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy(Glencoe: Free Press, 1954), hereafter cited as Patterns. All of these will be examined in some detail later on.

[22]Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft(part III of Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, ed. by S. Altmann and others; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr / Paul Siebeck /, 1922); the most recent edition is Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Mit einem Anhang: Die rationalen und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik(4th rev. ed.; ed. by Johannes Winkelmann; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr / Paul Siebeck /, 1956. The first part, the systematic statement of the principal categories is identical in both editions. However, Johannes Winkelmann considerably rearranged the remainder of the work, the more detailed statements, and added some material from other sources not contained in the first edition. It seemed to me that these changes were not crucial for the purposes of this study, but cf. Hennessen, op. cit., p. x, n. 1 and passim. Citations to Weber's writings will first refer to the German original and then to the translations, see n. 9 above. All references will be to the first edition, but page references will also be given to the 4th edition where it differs from the first, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft(4th).

PLEASE MIT FOOTNOTE 23

AND ADJUST ALL SUBSEQUENT

FOOTNOTE NUMBERS BY ONE.

THUS FOOTNOTE 24 BECOMES

FOOTNOTE 25. ETC.

EO, p. 152. [25]Loc. cit.

ID, p. 153. [27]Loc. cit.

SEO, p. 325.

SEO, p. 328.

30; TSEO, pp. 329-341. See also Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft(4th), pp. 559-567; TSEO, 156-204.

[31]Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 139-140; TSEO, pp. 341-350. See also Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, pp. 679-734 or Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft(4th), pp. 561-630.

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[32] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 140-153, 155-158; TCEO, pp. 358-381; 386-392. See also *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 753-778 or *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (4th), pp. 661-695, translated in part in FMW, pp. 245-252.

[33] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 124, 153-155; TCEO, pp. 329, 382-386. See also Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (4th), pp. 551-558, one of the passages added to the 4th edition by Winkelmann.

[34] Gerth & Mills, "Introduction," FMW, p. 51. See also Mommsen, op. cit., p. 405.

[35] See Mommsen, op. cit., ch. X and the essays cited in n. 15 above.

[36] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 125; TCEO, p. 329.

[37] Mommsen, op. cit., p. 405. Winkelmann's argument which Mommsen attacks in his *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik* can be found in the work cited in n. 19 above and in his preface to *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (4th), pp. xi-xvii.

[38] Helen Constas, "Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy," The American Journal of Sociology, LXIII (January, 1958), 400-409.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 401. [40] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 128-130; TCEO, pp. 337-341.

[41] (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954). [42] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25. [43] *Ibid.*, pp. 225ff.

[44] See above p. 4. [45] Presthus, op. cit., pp. 16-17. [46] Gouldner, Patterns, p. 217.

[47] Warren G. Bennis, "Leadership Theory and Administrative Behavior: The Problem of Authority," Administrative Science Quarterly, IV (December, 1959), 259-301.

[48] Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," p. 401. [49] *Ibid.*, p. 426.

[50] Etzioni, op. cit.; see n. 13 above. [51] *Ibid.*, p. 262.

[52] Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, I (June and September, 1956), 63-85, 225-239. Hereafter cited as "Suggestions."

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 225. Italics in original. [54] *Ibid.*, p. 68. Italics in original.

[55] "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy," American Sociological Review, VIII (1943), 47-54. Much of Selznick's subsequent work builds on the ideas presented here.

[56] Udy, op. cit., p. 795.

[57] James T.C. Liu, "Eleventh-Century Bureaucrats: Some Historical Classifications and Behavioral Types," Administrative Science Quarterly, IV (September, 1959), 207-226.

[58] "A Study of Role Conceptions in Bureaucracy," Social Forces, XXVII (March, 1949), 305-310.

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[60] Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," Social Forces, XVII(May, 1940), 560-568.

[61] Presthus, "Introduction," ESQ, p. 58, n. 4.

[62] Donald O. Corwin, "The Professional Employee: A Study of Conflict in Nursing Roles," The American Journal of Sociology, LXVI(May, 1961), 604-615.

[63] Marion H. Gates and Peter M. Pellegrin, "Some Effects of Administrative Advancement: A Study in Role Theory," Administrative Science Quarterly, II(September, 1957), 204-215.

[64] Oscar Grusky, "Role Conflict in Organization: A Study of Prison Camp Officials," Administrative Science Quarterly, III(March, 1959), 452-472.

[65] Morris Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority: The Military Establishment," Administrative Science Quarterly, III(March, 1959), 473-493.

[66] Arnold M. Rose, "'Official' v. 'Administrative' Criteria for Classification of Career Breakdown Cases," Administrative Science Quarterly, III(September, 1958), 185-194.

[67] Udy, op. cit. See above n. 11. [68] Ibid., pp. 793-794.

[69] Ibid., p. 795; see also Gouldner, op. cit. [70] Blau, op. cit., pp. 52-56.

[71] Presthus, "Bureaucracy," p. 225.

[72] Gesellschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 671 or Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft(4th), p. 551; 1956, pp. 255-256.

[73] Gesellschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 64 or Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft(4th), p. 549; 1956, 920.

[74] Weber, op. cit., p. 305. "Particularly as an indispensable tool for controlling the civil service, increasing efficiency of administrative activities, removing unauthorized social or civil recognition, unfair chances, and fashioning party exposure chances." Gesammelte politische Schriften, p. 330; see above n. 15.

[75] Gesammelte politische Schriften, pp. 339-340. [76] Ibid., p. 277.

[77] Weber, op. cit., p. 304. Weber's position on this point is ambivalent. There are many passages in this essays in Gesammelte politische Schriften in which Weber extols the virtues of the parliament as the most effective organ for controlling the administrative abuses (p. 73). But Weber is quite clearly correct when he suggests that the legislature would have to yield ultimately to the charismatic-plebiscitary authority, and that the presidency of Hindenburg in the Weimar Republic is but one example. This very close to what Weber had in mind -- certainly much closer than Weber's statements on the British cabinet.

[78] Gesammelte Politische Schriften, pp. 42-46. [79] Ibid., p. 320.

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[1]Cometas, op. cit. In a recent study of state administration in Czechoslovakia Jiri Back showed most convincingly that the traditional state administrative machinery failed to meet the specifications of the Weberian ideal-type, simply because the total political system did not conform to the legal-rational type of authority: "Because of the monopolistic power position of the Party the state apparatus is kept in a state of structural formlessness...."Party Control and Bureaucratization in Czechoslovakia," The Journal of Politics, XXIII(1961), 379-394. This characterization of formlessness recalls the late Franz Neumann's analysis of the Nazi system in Behemoth: the Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1948(New York: Oxford University Press, 1944).

[2]See above n. 21. [3]Cometas, op. cit., p. 2. [4]Berger, op. cit., p. 17.

[5]Merton, op. cit.

[6]For Berger's detailed statement see his "Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative Science Quarterly, I(March, 1957), 518-529, and the response by Yehezkel Dror, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration," in Ibid., III(Dec., 1958), 505-525.

[7]Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 128; TSEO, p. 325. [8]Morrison, op. cit., p. 404.

[9]Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 154; TSEO, p. 303.

[10]Gemeine politische Gewalten, p. 522. [11]Ibid., p. 540.

[12]Neumann, op. cit., p. 403.

[13]J. H. Aylmer, The King's Servants: the Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-1642 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 11.

[14]Gideon Sjoberg, "Contradictory Functional Requirements and Social Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, I(June, 1957), 139.

[15]Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," The Journal of Politics, XVIII(August, 1956), 391-409. See also my "The Relevance of Comparative Politics for Comparative Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, V(June,1960), 97-113.

[16]Riggs, "Introduction," TSEO, p. 21. See also Gabriel Almond,"Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel Almond & James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 20-21.

[17]Alvin Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," Administrative Science Quarterly, II(December, 1957 and March, 1958), 444.

THE INFORMATION-ENERGY MODEL*

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(Panel 14: "Models" for the study of Comparative Administration -- Alternative and Complementary)

Introduction

This paper is an attempt to outline an approach to theory which, the author hopes, can help to organize our knowledge of and to direct our inquires into public administration. If it is of any utility for this purpose, it should also be useful in the analysis of social and political systems in general. For present purposes, after some preliminary remarks and an outline of central concepts of the theory, I shall try to suggest its possible utility in understanding government and developmental processes in one class of societies: those which, for want of a better term, most of us have called "underdeveloped," and for which our colleague Professor Fred W. Riggs proposes a designation with perhaps fewer pejorative or patronizing connotations: "prismatic."

This is a large order, and prudence suggests a few caveats at the beginning. First, what follows is at most only a beginning. It is crude and incomplete. Second, it may be a shot in the wrong direction which, even if it were developed later into a more refined and systematic form, might turn out to be irrelevant. Third, if it should however turn out to be aimed in the right direction, it might nevertheless be a premature attempt to direct theoretical inquiry to explain things about which we still know relatively little. Thus, presentation at this time is largely in the interest of soliciting critical appraisals and judgments which may be of use in refining, reformulating, or conceivably in deciding to abandon this line of inquiry.

A word about the intellectual derivation of this approach may also be helpful. For some years I have been intrigued by the possibility of using some of the basic ideas of communication theory and cybernetics to organize, at a general and abstract level, our understanding of the

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* I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Richard N. Adams, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and Professor Richard S. Rudner, Department of Philosophy, both of Michigan State University, who helped me to avoid serious blunders in an earlier version of this paper. Naturally, they are in no way responsibile for any nonsense which may remain in the present version.

behavior of administrative organizations.[1] But these concepts alone did not seem sufficient to deal with certain aspects of administration. There are, for example, the phenomena of work and the physical alteration of materials and the environment, which are difficult to handle in an information or communication framework. Then I learned about some work Professor Richard N. Adams, a Michigan State University anthropologist, was doing to develop theory based on concepts of energy and energy conversion.[2] At about the same time I came across some of the work of the "general systems" theorists, in which both information and energy are incorporated.[3] Finally there is the background in political science of attempts to develop theory around the concept of "systems"--specifically, the political system.[4] My own work has drawn on all of these, but they are absolved of any mangling their contributions may have suffered in the present formulation. In fact, my far from complete familiarity with the work of the information theorists, the energy theorists, the general systems theorists, and the political systems theorists precludes my borrowing the label of any of these approaches to lend academic respectability to my own efforts.

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[1] See the author's "A Communication Model for Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2 (December 1957, pp. 307-324, and the works cited therein. A similar approach was developed independently at about the same time by Lucien Mehl, "La Cybernetique et l'Administration," Revue Administrative, No. 58 (juillet-août 1957), pp. 410-419 and subsequent numbers. See also Georges Langrod, "Les Applications de la Cybernétique á l'Administration Publique," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 24 (1958), pp. 295-312.

[2] Richard N. Adams, "Energy and Expanding Systems," mimeographed paper prepared for presentation to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 31, 1960, New York, and other unpublished materials by the same author. See also Fred Cottrell, Energy and Society (New York: McGraw Hill, 1955).

[3] James G. Miller, "Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences," in Leonard D. White (ed.), The State of the Social Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 29-65; Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, Problems of Life (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952).

[4] David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1953), and "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, Vol. 9 (April 1957), pp. 383-400; Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G. A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-64, and his earlier "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, Vol. 18 (August 1956), pp. 391-409; Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria--Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in William J. Siffin (ed.), Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Department of Government, Indiana University, 1957).

Some Observations and Reflections Leading to this Approach

A suggestive point of departure is provided by the reflection that the human being (or any other living organism, for that matter) requires a minimum level of energy utilization to survive. But to acquire such energy (in the form of digestible nutrients), man needs sufficient information stored and circulating in his nervous system to organize and coordinate his motor activity with a certain degree of efficiency. He also needs information to guide his actions in seeking, identifying, and utilizing appropriate sources of energy. Although born with a certain amount of genetically transmitted information, which permits a limited range of responses to environmental stimuli, he must acquire and organize much additional information--learn--if he is to survive beyond the period of parental care. Some of this information is used by the nervous system to activate and guide increasingly complex patterns of muscular and glandular action: the individual acquires skills. Other information is organized and stored in the form of knowledge. Some, by complex processes which we understand very little involving pleasure and pain as well as cognition and conditioned response, is organized in forms which result in valuing activity.

The foregoing comments suggest that the human organism can, for certain purposes, be analyzed as a complex information processing and energy converting system.

The interdependence of individuals living in groups has suggested to many that human groupings can be analyzed as systems. Moreover, since interdependence is manifested in communication (information exchange) and in activities related to the production, exchange, and consumption of goods and services (energy forms), one is led to inquire whether the concept of an information processing and energy converting system might be used for the analysis of human groupings as well as of individual persons. The latter would then be viewed as subsystems of the groups of which they are members. The individual, of course, would be seen as a system constituted of many organically articulated subsystems; this mode of articulation is a vital difference (although not the only one of basic importance) which distinguishes individuals from groups. These ideas do not lead to an "organic" conception of society.

This approach would then lead to the application of the same basic concepts both to the individual organism and to the group of individuals. If political and administrative phenomena could be analyzed in the same terms, useful links might thereby be established with data and concepts from other social sciences and some "natural" sciences. At a minimum, a set of categories, or a frame of reference, would result which could be helpful because of its generality and inclusiveness and its reference to concrete, observable aspects of human behavior.

The relevance of the "information-energy" approach is suggested also by certain reflections upon the evolution of human societies from pre-historic times to the present. We know that over a period of a few tens of thousands of years, mankind has grown rapidly if not steadily in absolute numbers, in the number of collectivities in which he lives (families, other groups, and communities, however organized), and in the size and complexity of some of these collectivities. We also know that he has

enormously increased the amounts of surplus energy[5] at his individual and collective disposal, as well as the amounts of codified information (organized knowledge) about the world he inhabits. Of course, the availability of this surplus energy and the codified, transmissible information varies widely as between collectivities such as nation states, and as between individuals within such collectivities.

Clearly, the growth of the human species would not have been possible without significant increases in the energy which was available to pre-historic man. If the most primitive of human groups were those which subsisted by hunting and gathering, the ratio of population to territoty had to be very small indeed. To make possible denser population in a given area, larger amounts of energy had to be extracted from the environment. This could only be accomplished by codifying the information received from the environment in new ways to produce what we call technological innovation. Thus the accident, insight, or reasoning that resulted in the invention of the spear, which at some time must have been a new concept, augmented and concentrated the energy of muscle power, making its expenditure in hunting and defense much more efficient. This in turn enlarged the potential number of people which a game-rich area could support.

It was the same with each technological advance: information from the environment and from memory was processed and shaped into new forms and ideas--by chance discovery, intuition, imagination, trial and error, reason, and more recently by controlled experiment--to make possible new and more efficient means of converting energy from environmental sources into forms controllable and usable by man. The domestication of fire and of animals, the use of streams for transportation, the discovery of agriculture--all these developments increased by significant quantities the energy surplus for groups of men to exploit. The key steps in the industrial revolution of modern times have been the discovery and invention of ways to harness energy sources not accessible to preceding generations: steam, electricity, petroleum, atomic nuclei, and, still in its infancy, solar energy.

Another aspect of this developmental process was the discovery and invention of ways to relate man to man so as to exchange and process information more effectively and efficiently, and thus to mobilize the surplus energy of individuals for collective work, defense, aggression, and control. The collective approach to food gathering, defense, child rearing, play, etc., led quite naturally to some division of labor and specialization of function based on sex and age. With the development of language making possible much more complete and efficient exchange of information among members of the family, band, or tribe, the possibilities of planned and coordinated collective action increased immensely. The advantages this provided in hunting and defense against other forms of animal life are obvious. Relatively little individual energy in the form of muscle power, in organized combination with that of other individuals, could be made much more effective in protecting and increasing energy supplies. Techniques of military organization and tactics, and of imperial and colonial administration, made possible the development of the great bureaucratic empires. Breakthroughs in non-human energy technology have both made possible and required

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5 "Surplus" energy is that energy available to man in excess of that expended to make energy available. Cottrell, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

new social organizational technology. Large industrial complexes converting millions of kilowatt hours of energy would not be possible without far-flung and complicated organizations integrating hundreds of highly developed skills. But such organizations would be inconceivable without the means of communication and transportation provided by modern industrial technology. Thus we can see that information and energy processes interact. New information breakthroughs have led to new energy sources and converters, which have permitted extensions of communication and the accumulation, storage, and processing of more information, and so on. As advances were made in knowledge, communication, and energy conversion, the industrialization of western societies could proceed.

In the next section I shall attempt to present some of the basic concepts which would appear to be necessary for a systematically formulated theory based on the foregoing observations and reflections. It would be desirable to outline the theory in axiomatic or at least partly axiomatic form.[6] However, after attempting unsuccessfully to do this, I have formed the opinion that the definitions and terms to be outlined below are not yet adequate for such a presentation. Nevertheless, they may be sufficiently suggestive of the kinds of things which probably would be involved in such a theoretical formulation to warrant their presentation here.

Elements of a Theory

Some of the basic terms which would have to be defined in an information-energy theory are information, energy, and system. The definition of energy presents no serious problem; it is the ability to effect some change of form, time, or space in physical relationships--that is, to do work.[7] Energy conversion, consequently, is the manifestation of this capacity, or the process of effecting such changes. Information, however, is more elusive. As Miller suggests, information can be viewed as energy in certain forms or configurations.[8] Similarly, G. T. Guilbaud remarks that

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6 Richard S. Rudner, in "On the Structure of Economic Theories," mimeographed paper presented before the Joint Economic Agricultural Economics Seminar, Michigan State University, May 26, 1958, discusses the partial formalization of theory and its differences from full formalization. For the requisites of a full blown axiomatic system, see Herbert Hochberg, "Axiomatic Systems, Formalization, and Scientific Theories," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston, Illinois and White Plains, New York: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959) pp. 407-436. Indeed, see the whole volume. There is much of interest to political scientists concerned with the development of more systematic political theory. For example, Professor May Brodbeck, an eminent philosopher of science, argues forcefully in her contribution that the use of the term "model" as in the designation of this panel and the titles of these papers is all wrong.

7 Cottrell, op. cit, pp. 6-7.

8 Miller, op. cit., p. 38

> Information is not the same as energy--this much is clear --but it must be understood that there is no signal without some material embodiment, and that information can never be dissociated from energy.[9]

But if information and energy are essentially two forms of the same thing, or if one is a form of the other, their empirical manifestation and behavior at macroscopic levels seem sufficiently different to warrant distinguishing between them and treating them somewhat differently theorectically. The distinction is clear in Karl W. Deutsch's characterization of information as "a patterned relationship between events," and as "those aspects of the state description of [a series of physical processes] which all these processes have in common."[10] These notions need some elaboration, and perhaps Deutsch's own words are most appropriate for the purpose:

> When a spoken message is transmitted through a sequence of mechanical vibrations of the air and of a membrane, thence through electric impulses in a wire, thence through electric processes in a broadcasting station and through radio waves, thence through electric and mechanical processes in a receiver and recorder to a set of grooves on the surface of a disk, and is finally played and made audible to a listener--what has been transferred through this chain of processes, or channel of communication is something that has remained unchanged, invariant, over this whole sequence of processes. It is not matter, nor any one of the particular processes, nor any major amount of energy, since relays and electronic tubes make the qualities of the signal independent from a considerable range of energy inputs.
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> The same principle applies to the sequence of processes from the distribution of light reflected from a rock to the distribution of chemical changes on a photographic film, and further, to the distribution of black and white dots on a printing surface, or the distribution of electric "yes" or "no" impulses in picture telegraphy or television. What is transmitted here is neither light rays nor shadows, but information, the patterns of relationships between them.
>
> In the second group of examples, we could describe the state of the rock in terms of the distribution of light and dark points on its surface. This would be a state description of the rock at a particular time. If we then describe the state of the film after exposure in terms of the distribution of the dark grains of silver deposited on it and of the remaining clear spaces, we should get another state description.....

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9 G. T. Guilbaud, What Is Cybernetics? (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1960) p. 44.

10 Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1953) pp. 67-68

> The extent of the physical possibility of transferring and reproducing these patterns corresponds to the extent that there is "something" unchanging in all the relevant state descriptions of the physical processes by which this transmission is carried on. The "something" is information -- those aspects of the state descriptions of each physical process which all these processes had in common.[11]

A supplementary concept is needed to represent the transfer of a patterned relationship between one set of events to another set, or the transformation of one state description into another with common aspects. This concept is codification, or the substitution of one type of event for another, in such a way that the event substituted in some sense stands for the other.[12] From this we can say that communication is a process of transference of information involving one or more codifications.

The intuitive elements in these concepts may limit their utility for the eventual formalization of a theory in which they would comprise central concepts. However, they suffice for indicating that information is something that "knowledge, values, traditions, news, gossip, and commands all have in common...."[13] In a rather limited sense we can even talk about "amounts" or "quantities" of information quite precisely in mathematical terms--e.g., in the information capacity and other communications aspects of an electrical network.[14] But these usages are non-semantical, and as yet we have no mathematical formulation of a semantical information theory. More generally and intuitively, however, we can talk about "amounts" of information in a relative sense--when, for example, we recognize that a mature adult has accumulated and stored more information than a child, or that a man with a Ph.D. in French literature has more French literary information than a man who has just received an A.B. degree in French literature, or that a typical university library of one million volumes contains more information than one of only half a million volumes. It is with this second, less exact sense that we must be satisfied for the present in talking about amounts of information as the idea is used in this paper.

Another basic concept to be defined is that of "system." James G. Miller's "general systems" formulation has the advantage for present purposes of bringing together the two basic concepts of information and energy in the system idea.[15] Consequently, although the definition given here differs somewhat from Miller's, it is based upon it. A system is a bounded region in space and time, within which information and/or

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11 Ibid.

12 Gregory Bateson, "Information and Codification: A Philosophical Approach," in Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, Communication--The Social Matrix of Psychiatry (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.) p. 169.

13 Deutsch, op. cit., p. 64.

14 See Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana, Ill: University of Illinois Press, 1949).

15 Op. cit.

energy are exchanged among subsystems in greater quantities and/or at higher rates than the quantities exchanged or rates of exchange with anything outside the boundary, and within which the subsystems are to some degree interdependent. (It is possible that the specification of interdependence is unnecessary, because it might turn out that information and energy exchange patterns are independent variables and that interdependence depends on them. I am specifying it here just to be on the safe side.)

One of the difficulties of systems concepts in the social sciences has been that of conceptualizing "boundary" so as to let us know one when we see it. Without pretending to get completely around this difficulty, I would nevertheless like to propose the following definition as one which might serve as a starter. A system's boundary is a set of points, a line, or a zone comprised of a set of subsystems which habitually exchange greater amounts of information and/or energy, or exchange them at higher rates, with each other or with intermediate subsystems linking them interdependently than with other systems or sets of subsystems. Thus the empirical tracing of a boundary would require the identification of patterns of information and energy circulation, and the specification of quantitative differentials deemed sufficient to signal interdependence or independence of systems or subsystems engaged in exchanges. This would of course be more difficult in some instances than in others, but in many instances if not in all it should be at least possible in principle.

The generality of these basic concepts permits their application to a wide range of system types; it also requires that we indicate some criteria for distinguishing between types. Two major categories of systems need to be distinguished first: "open" systems[16] which, as a condition of their existence, regularly exchange some information and/or energy with their environments, and "closed" systems, which do not. Living organisms, societies, and populations are types of open systems, and it is obviously this category of systems which is of greatest interest to the social sciences. However, some inorganic entities function as open systems at least part of the time, such as some types of machines and fuel-driven or electrically-powered engines. The essential differences between these and living open systems would seem to be the capacity of the latter to seek and take in autonomously the information and energy they require, and to use portions of it for self-modification and adaptation. Inorganic open systems, in contrast, are dependent for information and/or energy inputs as well as for modifications they undergo on events or processes external to them, if such inputs or modification occur at all. Thus a classification cutting across both open and closed systems would appear to be useful.

At least one further definition needs to be supplied to complete the list of the most basic concepts. That is the notion of environment, which we can take to be anything outside the boundaries of a system from which it received or to which it transmits information and/or energy.

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16 Cf. Von Bertalanffy, op. cit., pp. 125-128.

For this set of concepts to be useful in the analysis of the types of political, social, and economic systems of interest to political scientists, it is necessary to go further and specify some of the properties of their behavior, or behavioral tendencies, and their operating processes. (In a formalized presentation, these would be the axioms of the theory.) For present purposes this can be done by abstracting some of the behavioral characteristics that seem to be common to various kinds of groups, organizations, communities, societies, and populations. Whether the ones specified here are the crucial ones remains to be seen; more formal and systematic formulation as well as empirical research might show them to be wrongly selected or inappropriately stated. The main reason for including them here is that they have appeared useful to me in attempting to analyze and understand political systems.

To begin with, we will postulate that open systems of the living variety, or those whose subsystems are living organisms, not only have the capacity (as specified above) but also have a tendency or disposition to seek and take in or utilize both information and energy, and that over the long run they tend to adapt or modify themselves in ways which increase the ratio of energy intake and utilization to energy needed for self-maintenance. Next, in accordance with the remarks in the second section of this paper, we postulate that the forms, quantities, distribution, and circulation of information in these systems determine and control the processes, quantities, and rates of energy conversion. In this statement, the "forms, quantities, distribution, and circulation of information" refer to such things as the organization or configuration, the numbers and locations, and the patterns and rates of flow of signs, symbols, messages, and propositions (or other forms in which information may be organized). Thus the relation of information to energy is such that, for example, both group behavior and potential group behavior are functions of the information coming into, stored within, and exchanged among its members.

Another feature of the behavior of systems of some types (particularly social systems) is that they incorporate and control as subsystems both other social systems and systems of differing kinds. That is, some groups incorporate, and assimilate to varying degree, other groups, and also engage in dominating or controlling relations with other types of systems. An example is the utilization by human groups of domesticated animals and plants, and mechanical devices and machines.

With the capacities and tendencies specified above, a system's mode of adaptation would be dependent upon the following sets of factors: the forms and amounts of both information and energy stored and available for use in the system, the character of the system's information processing and energy converting methods or procedures, and the forms and amounts of information and energy available in the environment. The specific "mix" of these factors would structure the system's behavior. With wide variation possible in each of them (e.g., form of information, amount of information, form of energy, amount of energy, etc.) the varieties of system behavior could be expected to be quite large. To simplify by classification, we can

discriminate by postulating three classes: contracting, steady state, and expanding systems.[17]

The contracting system is found where information inputs from the environment are inappropriate or too little to maintain a fixed level of energy inputs, conversion rates, or outputs, or where information inputs decrease in appropriateness of usability over time. Contraction reduces energy requirements. While in the short run contraction may be avoided by modification of internal structures and processes for more efficient information handling and energy conversion and for reallocating energy supplies between output and system maintenance, in the long run under these conditions contraction occurs. On the other hand, if information inputs remain constant or unchanged in form over time, on vary within constant limits, we postulate that the system adapts by developing homeostatic mechanisms or processes which allocate energy between outputs and system maintenance so as to hold both in a steady state in relation to energy inputs. Finally, if information inputs from the environment increase in variety of forms and usable amount over time, the system adapts by expanding. In the short run it may adapt by rearranging internal structures and processes to increase energy storage capacity and/or outputs, but in the long run expansion occurs.

As for the internal modifications or rearrangements of processes and structure alluded to in the preceding paragraph, I shall postulate only two: those which involve changes in the division and allocation of work (and consequently in specializations), and those which involve changes in the influence or control relations among subsystems. For the first, it will be assumed that the larger the quantities of information processed or of energy converted, or the higher the rates of each, the wider the range of specializations of process in the system. For the second, it will be assumed that the subsystems disposing of the larger amounts of information relevant to energy conversion exercise influence or control over other subsystems in proportion to their information superiority. From division of work and specialization the requirement of coordination proceeds. Where the number of subsystems engaged in information and energy exchange is not large, or the rate of their exchange is not high, coordination can be accomplished through duplicate stores or the sharing of information. In the absence of the latter, and in any event when the number of subsystems related through exchange patterns is large or the rate of exchange is high, one of the specializations to emerge is that of coordination and control of a portion of the information processing and energy conversion of the system as a whole. Such control may be more or less concentrated, more or less comprehensive in scope, and may involve larger or smaller amounts of information and energy; these are matters precluded from elaboration here due to space limitations.

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[17] Adams, op. cit., clarifies essential differences between contracing equilibrium, steady state, and expanding energy systems. The distinctions made in this formulation are based largely on his ideas. However, in order to take into account information phenomena as well as those of energy, it was necessary to introduce certain modifications. Whether this three-way classification would be more usefully viewed as inclusive of or subsidiary to one or more of the previously mentioned classes of systems I leave for subsequent synthesizing systematizers to deal with.

Application of the Theory in the Analysis of Social, Political, and Administrative Systems in Less Developed Societies

For the purpose of illustrating what the theory outlined above leads to in the real world, we postulate a system which has grown to include a large number of subsystems of varied types. We further specify that its surplus of information and energy (the amount available above that expended to make energy available) is, in comparison to the surplus of other systems in the environment, low. Thus we will think of the degree of development of a society in terms of the size of its information and energy surplus, and at least for the time being, we will avoid specifying quantitative measures of the size of such surplus by using the relative terms "higher" and "lower". We can then postulate a system characterized by "lower" information and energy and can attempt to infer the properties of states, processes, and structures that would characterize such a system in the light of the ideas outlined above. Such properties can be stated as hypotheses for testing by empirical data from less developed societies. In this preliminary and perhaps crude formulation, only the more general such properties will be indicated.

A large and complex system whose surpluses of information and energy are low has the following properties:

A. Information about means of extracting energy from the environment in quantities significantly higher than those required for subsistence is relatively scarce.

Hypothesis: Technical knowledge related to the extraction and/or conversion of energy in large quantities from the environment (e.g., scientific agriculture, electrical power, steam and gasoline engines) is relatively scarce, as measured by numbers of scientifically and technically trained people, levels of training, libraries, etc.

Hypothesis: Since relatively high average levels of education for the population as a whole are necessary for and probably lead to or develop concurrently with fairly widespread technical and scientific training, it can be hypothesized in the near absence of the latter that per capita information, in the form of knowledge as measured by average formal educational levels, is relatively low.

B. A high proportion of the component subsystems expend a high proportion of their energy in direct extraction of energy from the environment.

Hypothesis: In a less developed society a high proportion of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, fishing, and/or hunting.

Hypothesis: In such a society there are relatively few mechanical energy converters of the type driven by electricity and petroleum based fuels.

C. Since the relatively small surplus of energy must be allocated to activities other than direct extraction of energy from the environment, the number of such activities is small, and/or their energy requirements are not large.

Hypothesis: The number of people and groups engaged in activities other than subsistence agriculture, fishing, and/or hunting is small.

Hypothesis: Since the people engaged in such other activities includes those whose specialized activities are concerned with system maintenance and control, the number of different types of governmental, military, artisanal, and trade activities is relatively low.

D. Since energy is required for the transmission of information, the amounts and rates of information circulating in the system are relatively low.

Hypothesis: In comparison with societies having large information and energy surpluses, a higher proportion of total interpersonal communication is face to face and oral.

Hypothesis: Long distance communication is less common, and a smaller proportion of the population is exposed regularly to several mass media of communication in comparison to societies having large information and energy surpluses.

E. Since circulation of information and energy within the system is relatively low, the integration of component subsystems with the system as a whole is relatively low.

Hypothesis: Since communication and trade among communities in such a society is relatively limited, the interdependence of communities is relatively low, their degree of self-sufficiency is relatively high, and their integration with the society as a whole is relatively limited.

Hypothesis: If integration of the society as a whole is low, the need for universally shared symbol systems is low, the probability that differing symbol systems can develop and persist is high, and the existence of language barriers and value cleavages is more likely.

Other general propositions about systems with low surpluses of information and energy could undoubtedly be derived. Those given here would seem to be fairly important ones, and they accord with our general knowledge of conditions in the less developed societies. Rather than elaborating and refining these, however, let us go on to see what the theory implies for the political systems of such societies. For this purpose it is possible to derive from the basic concepts a definition of political power. Political power is the control by one person, or several people organized as a subsystem, of the energy conversion of others as a consequence of communication. The "energy conversion of others" refers to activity in general, including communicative activity. It was specified in the preceding section that subsystems specializing in coordination and control functions emerge under certain conditions. In a society, this would be the political system.

F. If, in a system whose surpluses of information and energy are relatively low, the surpluses are monopolized or concentrated in a single integrated subsystem, that subsystem can control other subsystems in proportion to the degree of information (and consequently energy) monopolization.

Hypothesis: The degree of control exercised by a political subsystem of a society is in proportion to its monopolization of the society's surplus information and energy.

G. In a system with relatively low surpluses of information and energy, it is more probable that a single subsystem will monopolize the surpluses because a relatively slight initial information and energy superiority on the part of one subsystem leaves other subsystems with little information and energy which could be utilized to exert countervailing tendencies.

Hypothesis: In the less developed societies, the limited resources available to groups other than the political system is such that they are unable to exercise effective controls over the political system; the political system is thus more likely to be autocratic, and "constitutionalism" and limited government are rare.

H. If in such a system the concentration of surplus information and energy in a single subsystem is not markedly greater than that in a number of other subsystems, so that such other subsystems retain portions of it, those subsystems exert reciprocal controls on each other and a high degree of integrated control by a single subsystem does not develop.

Hypothesis: In the less developed societies, if the central political system does not acquire a marked preponderance of information and energy control, other groups retain portions of it and a "feudalistic" type political system develops.

I. Regardless of the pattern of concentration or dispersion, if a system's surplus of information and energy is low, the information and energy transfer or circulation between dominant and other subsystems is relatively low in quantity and rate.

Hypothesis: Information in the form of demands communicated from component subsystems to the political system are limited in quantity and rate.

Hypothesis: Information in the form of demands communicated from the political subsystem to other component subsystems are likewise limited in quantity and rate.

Hypothesis: (From the above and from "E" concerning low integration): It is probable that demands both from and to the political system will refer to particular persons, groups, or situations, and relatively few to large or general categories of persons, groups, or situations. (In other words, there is less interest in general policies than in access to political decision making by particular individuals and groups, and in the impact of such decisions upon them.)

In addition to the preceding hypotheses about societies and political systems, the theory can suggest hypotheses about administration. Since the public administration of a society is a complex set of organizational subsystems interacting with the political system and the inclusive social system, this theory is particularly useful for identifying important relationships between administration and its environment. Some of these will be specified in the following hypotheses.

J. The relatively low degree of specialization in systems of low information and energy surplus characterizes their control and maintenance subsytems also; the range of variation in functionally differentiated subsystems related to control and maintenance is relatively small.

Hypothesis: In less developed societies the number of different kinds of functionally specialized departments, ministries, and other agencies of administration is less than in more highly developed societies.

K. When the limited surplus of information and energy is concentrated in the dominant subsystem, relatively little remains for other subsystems.

Hypothesis: In less developed societies the difference between average educational levels of administrative personnel and the bulk of the population are relatively wide.

L. The relative scarcity of information inputs to control and maintenance subsystems results in adaptations of such subsystems and of the system as a whole to its environment under relatively high degrees of uncertainty.

Hypothesis: Administrative decision making occurs under conditions of relatively high uncertainty.

M. The relative scarcity of information inputs in the form of accurate, systematic, and comprehensive reports on the state of the system as a whole and its environment results in a high degree of reliance for adaptation on information stored in the system.

Hypothesis: Administrative decision making relies heavily on precedent, previously (sometimes long previously) formulated doctrines, rules, and ritualized formulae.

N. The relative scarcity of information of the type described in "M" above, the resulting uncertainty, and the reliance on stored information, combined with limited energy resources to allocate to system change, restrict the speed and extent to which the system can modify itself in adapting to environmental changes.

Hypothesis: Administrative structures, processes, and practices in less developed societies are relatively change resistant and conservative.

Some Implications for Stimulating Development

Perhaps the preceding hypotheses are sufficient to illustrate the relevance of information and energy concepts and processes to the analysis of societies, political systems, and administration. If the theory can contribute to our understanding of such matters, it should also lead to applications in dealing with those developmental problems which are of such crucial importance throughout the world. Although it is risky to attempt application of a theory in such rudimentary form, at least a few pointers may be warranted.

Most obviously and generally, if low levels of development are to be equated with low supplies and surpluses of information and energy, then a society seeking development should try to increase its intake of both. International assistance programs recognize the need for increased information inputs when they provide technical advice, training, translations, textbooks, etc., and for increased information handling capacity when they aim at the establishment and extension of networks of transportation and communication, of libraries and mass media, of schools and research institutions, of filing and records management procedures, etc. Such programs increase energy intake and energy conversion capacity when they import foods and improve agricultural output, when they institute public health programs, when they import machinery and fuels and build power producing and industrial plants. But if these and many other things are done through the various international assistance programs, they are not done in the light of any explicitly recognized relationships between information and energy. Of course, what such relationships might be, particularly in quantitative terms, we do not yet empirically know. At this level then, the theory can only suggest the need for research to discover what relationships may exist under what conditions. If such relationships were established, they would be of inestimable value in indicating priorities and in programming international assistance of all kinds.

However, the theory does not permit us to say a bit more than the truistic "more research is needed." It suggests a higher priority for developing a society's information gathering and processing facilities than is accorded in most developmental programs. Large inputs of information from other societies, insofar as they can be absorbed and utilized, can result in dependence on such societies. Perhaps such a stage is to some extent unavoidable with present day pressures for rapid development from low to high information and energy levels. But to avoid continued dependence, a society must develop its own processes for locating, codifying, storing, and applying information. The same can be said of energy and energy conversion processes, of course, but control of the latter depends upon information, according to this theory. A steel mill with a source of power and a supply of raw materials would do little good for an agrarian or tribal society (unless manned by foreigners with the requisite skills) until the people in whose midst it was located acquired the skills to operate it.

At the same time, the theory recognizes the importance of a system's capacity to absorb and utilize information. The quantity and rate of absorption of a particular kind of information is probably a function of the quantity of similar or related information already absorbed (trigonometry is more quickly and easily taught to someone who understands algebra than to someone whose mathematical training ended with arithmetic; a platoon of scientists and engineers set down in a pre-industrial society would have little effect upon its organizational and productive processes until a batallion of technicians and skilled workers had been developed who could understand their concepts and proposals.) Information, in other words, cannot be transmitted in the absence of some degree of complementarity between originators and recipients of communications.[18] Unawareness of the implications of the requirements of complementarity for efficient communication sometimes leads to problems in technical assistance programs, as for

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18 Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 68-74.

example when an American or British technical advisor equates the term for "governmental employee" in a non-Western language with "civil servant" and its connotations of neutrality, merit, and service, while his counterpart advisee, a native speaker of the language in question, reads the same term as "state official" with its connotations of authority, rights, and privileges. The accretion of stores of information appropriate for the exploitation of high energy technology is slow, particularly for societies whose traditional value configurations predispose them to ignore or reject many of the secular and rationalistic assumptions and implications of high energy technology.

Moreover, the theory suggests an explanation for the rarity of democratic political systems in societies characterized by low information and energy surpluses. Where such surpluses are low, the requirements of the subsystems engaged in control and maintenance absorb enough of the surplus to leave little at the disposition of other subsystems. Such other subsystems thus have insufficient information and energy resources to limit or restrain significantly the activities of the dominant subsystems. In other words, the political system so far overshadows other groups and organizations that its power is largely unchecked by them; autocratic or authoritarian relationships continue until the development of information and energy concentrations in other subsystems to a level sufficient to impose effective reciprocal controls. However, the political system may prevent the development of such restrictions by incorporating subsystems which begin to develop such concentrations.

None of the implications suggested here are very startling. But the point is that they can all be derived from the relatively simple theory outlined in this paper. If the theory were formalized and empirically verified and elaborated, the yield of useful guidelines for policy could be expected to be significantly increased.

Some Suggestions for Further Research

The hypotheses already given suggest directions for research based on this information-energy theory. However, it may also be useful to suggest the principal areas in which further research could be fruitful in identifying variables and establishing relations between them.

One such area would be that of the information and energy inputs to systems--groups, organizations, political systems, or whole societies. For this purpose it would be necessary to classify the various types of inputs. For example, information inputs could be classified in two general categories, "demands" and "intelligence," on the basis of the form in which they are communicated. Demands can be distinguished on the basis of their statement or implication of a claim of some sort, the validity of which depends upon or is justified by reference to immediate, ulterior, or ultimate values. Intelligence is information communicated in such a way that it asserts or reports an empirical state of affairs, and thus depends for validity upon empirical test. Research could then attempt to identify the sources in the social system of demands and the processes by which they are fed into the political system and its administrative components. The same could be done with intelligence inputs. Energy inputs could also be divided into two classes: human and non-human. Human energy inputs can be

measured roughly in terms of manpower, and non-human energy in terms of horsepower or kilowatt hours, or some standardized equivalent. But human energy would have to be further differentiated according to types and levels of skill, and non-human energy according to its form (domesticated work animals, electricity, various kinds of fuels, etc.). In this type of classification, revenues could be seen as demand tokens whose import as well as quantity varies among societies.

Another focus for research would be the various processes by which a system converts information and energy inputs into outputs of different form. Here attention would be directed to the information screening, selecting, and channelling patterns, the relative priorities accorded to various classes and subclasses of information, and the relations between these and energy expenditure, particularly in programmed activity.[19] Organizational phenomena relevant to these processes include administrative values, particularly those related to authority and responsibility, organizational and program identification, the degree of centralization of decision making of various kinds, reporting, analysis, and filing procedures, skill distributions, inducements, training, and career patterns. An important distinction to make would be between information processing and energy conversion allocated to system maintenance and those more closely involved in producing outputs to the environment.

Finally, research effort should be directed to outputs. Here one could retain the basic categories of information and energy for the first classification of outputs. Information outputs would probably consist largely of demands in the form of laws, regulations, and prescriptions and proscriptions of various kinds, although the output of some administrative agencies is primarily intelligence. Energy outputs would consist of work modifying the environment, or of services and goods provided to other systems in the environment. Alternatively, outputs could be classified according to their functions in the social system as a whole; such functional categories as defense, regulation, and development might prove useful. But no matter what classification of outputs were used, analysis should be guided by the need to identify relationships between particular patterns of inputs, conversion processes, and outputs. Thus research would lead to conclusions concerning the relationships between information and energy conditions in a society and its public administration--and vice-versa. If, as the theory outlined in this paper postulates, such relationships are crucial for changing levels of development, research is needed to make them explicit and to state them, where possible, in quantitative form.[20]

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19 For a discussion of programming as the term is used here, see James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), pp. 141-150.

20 The author is currently engaged in an effort to analyze public administration in the Vietnamese political system according to a conceptual framework based on this information-energy theory.

THE POLITICS OF URBAN RENEWAL: SUGGESTIONS FOR A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

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We would be carrying coals to Newcastle if this audience were really constituted chiefly of St. Louisians. The St. Louis politics of urban renewal, I gather, could provide the basis for all the time we have today. ~~I gather, could provide the basis for all the time we have today.~~ I know only four things about it, but even these are enough to offer a point of departure for a paper on the politics of urban renewal generally: large financial resources have been brought to bear here to rip out slums and build huge slab buildings, themselves symbols of power; there is a two-headed administrative monster here, which works, the St. Louis housing and redevelopment authorities which overlap in membership and employ one director; the renewal enterprise has had large-scale local business support; and the election last April which returned Mayor Tucker to power with a margin less than is his wont, was fought against the tradition-shattering opposition of the Republican national committee which made the conduct of the urban renewal program the greatest single issue.

If this were not an academic gathering I would organize this talk around these four facts, not only because they are the only facts I possess in my pitiful collection for St. Louis but because, in the light projected by the comparative method, these are revealing facts. In one, two, three, four order, these say that the renewal politics in an urban area is not primarily local in its resources, is struggling with legalisms in its formal organization, is attracting support across a wide rainbow of interests, and is grappling with the make-or-break urban political issues of our time.

To complete my checklist of main themes which I have been sounding about urban renewal for the past few years I need only add that some of the best sources of information about the politics of urban renewal in St. Louis or any other American city are the national professional journals catering to participants in local renewal. Let me now repeat my empirical observations in a little more academic phraseology:

The urban renewal enterprise in St. Louis is a sub-system of a national political system, in the sense that its problems, resources, informed, benefitted, and burdened public, administrative structure, and elite all function within a national system; yet are brought together here as a creative product of strategies that are formulated and defended here.

Or, more plainly, initiative, design, entreprenurship, in brief, political leadership, lies here in the arena of city government. The tide of nonpartisan municipal reform which sought to make municipal government an efficient purveyor of services has ebbed, after 80 or 90 years, and given place to a tide in which city government is itself the fighting front in vigorous political controversy, drawing upon relatively passive national resources provided by the federal government, national mortgage lenders and municipal bond houses, political party supporters, and professional and trade associations. In this current tide we see the nationalization of resources but localization of political controversy. The national octopus is not manipulating the local

officials into prefects; it is supplying the machinery to whomever has the will to take it and for any of a very broad range of local program objectives.

Incidentally, to express the role of the federal government and other national organizations in all this, we may have to resort to the formula which isolationists use to describe the role of the armaments industries that they fatten on the conflict. And some would say it is hard to understand why a federal government, in particular, would finance any local renewal enterprise which meets merely minimum standards, why no adequate machinery exists to require that only the marginally most efficient projects will be financed, and why Congress would, for years on end, refuse to provide even a modicum of research money by which alone national standards of efficiency might be established.

I will not ask you to go along with me in further flights of fancy. For I might try next to convince you that this all goes back to what I consider the greatest political leap in this century, the adoption of the income tax amendment, that we are still adjusting our political institutions to its implications, and that opposed as he really was to the income tax, but eminently successful as he was in getting it adopted, the ghostly hero of this drama is none other than William Howard Taft.

In any case, the federal government and national lenders and support groups stand ready with the ammunition. While each local renewal enterprise must meet minimum standards they differ widely and expediently. As one city planner described it to an audience of fellow planners, the "expediency of urban renewal appeals to the instincts of politicians, civic leaders, and--most importantly--to businessmen." In fact, he says, "the urban renewal slogan has proved to be a clarion call to everyone within hearing distance, and an omnibus for all wayfarers, night crawlers, social workers, and city planners. Its sex appeal is simple: it has allowed a new start."[1]

In that last phrase, of course, he calls attention to something more than expediency. But he is surely right that the program appeals somewhat to everyone. Otto Davis and Andrew Whinston even find it necessary to explain why property owners did not renew their properties on their own, but waited until state law had granted eminent domain powers. They say that the owners all along would have been better off to improve their properties but did not so for the classic reason offered by the Prisoners' Dilemma, that none could do alone what would be most advantageous for each if done jointly.[2] This argument is a bit more convincing if one adds that redevelopment awaited federal cash even after eminent domain powers were available, because the costs, were so great for planning, for adjusting street pattern, for relocating occupants, and for outfitting the blighted areas with replacements for schools and other facilities which the demoralized property owners in blighted areas permitted to deteriorate. The easy generalization is almost true that under the present formula a locality which will replace its own worn-out facilities can meet federal aid requirements, and can get the federal government to bear all the other costs.

But in fairness to federal policy we cannot leave our description of it as a trade of federal funds for any local policy which will permit the removal of blighted areas at a profit to the owners and the property tax collector. While I think the offer in

1. Dean Swartzel, "Urban Renewal" in American Society of Planning Officials, Planning, 1958. Proceedings of the Annual National Planning Conference, p. 52
2. Otto A. Davis and Andrew B. Whinston, "Economics of Urban Renewal" Law and Contemporary Problems 26(1) (Winter, 1961) pp. 105-17

the Housing Act of 1949 was indeed sweet, there were always additional quids to be paid for the quos, and the Housing Act of 1954, consistent with other political changes between 1949 and 1954, expressed more worry about the drain on the federal income tax. More local action was demanded for those cities which wanted the federal aids for housing or renewal. Included among the administrator's requirements under this workable program provision was the apparently impossible one that cities should not only adopt local codes pertaining to housing conditions but should actually enforce them. At first it was accurate to say, as Martin Meyerson did in 1955 that the federal government's conduct in enforcing such requirements was in the tradition of "the parent who lets the child nibble on the candy he is only supposed to get if he has behaved all day."[1] But I have seen papa get a little angry, too. Although urban renewal offers something to everyone and thus permits almost unlimited types of support coalitions, it also takes its toll. Except in those states where jury awards in condemnation suits are rackets, the property owners are threatened by eminent domain and by enforcement procedures; the businessmen who think of renewal as conservation of purchasing power have to pay property taxes to meet the local obligations; people must move from the ghettos and certainly cannot always improve their living conditions thereby; and it is not necessarily true that the agencies who must get on with the clearance jobs will be the best agents to patch up the human problems which renewal makes visible. So there are real political issues in renewal, including an explosive mixture, displaced racial minorities and segregated and feudally fractionated metropolitan enclaves.

Furthermore, the issues are not safely banished to the parapolitical frontier peopled by nonparticipators nor in the struggle merely among private interest groups. Some of the issues sharpen tempers in adjoining offices at city hall. While the federal government has been even more tolerant about the administrative structure for renewal than about other aspects of the program, its own past policies rise to plague it. St. Louis' two-headed administrative structure, for instance, is the offspring of an independent local authority encouraged by federal policy of the thirties and one established under federal policy of the 'forties. More often there is no wedding but only a coordinator. Nevertheless, with the Housing Act of 1954 the government manual for the first time recognized such a thing as a local "chief executive." Yet no medal for heroism seems due for this act, in a period when the metropolitan press gives not a little prominence to the Mayor Lees, Mayor Dilworths, Mayor Wests and Mayor Tuckers. In any case, once the bee was put on the Mayors it is not surprising that they tried to get <u>some</u> control. But the courts have meanwhile ground out decisions freeing the special authorities from further threat of litigation, a threat which hangs over most of the plans for local reorganization.

Enough of this impressionistic review of the more obvious characteristics of local renewal programs. I have elsewhere elaborated practically all of these points and will leave just this trail of hints, while I get on with my main job for today. That is to present for discussion some ideas for a conceptual scheme which might be used in further studies of the politics of urban renewal and perhaps of other community-focussed enterprises. When I began studying urban renewal as a political and administrative system some years ago I thought I might use some models borrowed from the logic (but not necessarily from the assumptions) of economics. The scheme which a group of us including Deil Wright used in field studies left room for such development but did not attempt to carry it through, so this is the first airing for the scheme.

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1. Martin Meyerson, "Urban Renewal," American Society of Planning Officials, <u>Planning, 1955</u>, p. 170

CRITERIA FOR A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

If the empirical generalizations mentioned above are to be believed, we now have a rather difficult problem. There is no one hard and fast program although, among other things, the enterprise must remove blight or the threat of blight. There is no one legally definable organization which can be assumed to be the formal decision-maker, although city government is one of them and the federal government is another. It would be a gross distortion to treat only those aspects of the politics in question which relate to institutions within the community. We must not eliminate "the market" from study. On each or all of these grounds available renewal enterprises are not the kinds of situations for which the conceptual schemes for study of community politics were devised. At least, I am encouraged to build toward another, and to elaborate it far enough, to see whether it may at least suggest some minor corrections in one of the other schemes. I want to see a conceptual scheme which, in brief, will meet the following criteria:

1. It should accord with a defensible definition of political science.

2. It should lend itself to larger social science synthesis, if one can tell ahead of time about such things.

3. It should emphasize its assumptions concerning the kind of theory desirable or possible at present--whether a general or truly dynamic theory is possible at this point.

4. It should seek the political element in interactions whether or not they bear the label of politics. It should not cut observation off arbitrarily from elements within or outside the community which might prove to have significance for the politics of decisions carried out locally.

5. It should be useful at more than one level of analysis (i.e. at the level of the smallest unit and for larger aggregates.)

6. It should be of a character which can be checked for internal consistency and for agreement with what we know from common human experience. To my way of thinking this criterion favors a graphic presentation if the matter itself is at all complicated. A description in words cannot be telescoped for comprehensive attention to all parts at once. A description in mathematical terms at this stage is likely to get away from us. So far, those mathematical models which say anything more than can be said with a two dimensional diagram have not proved useful. Game theory and lineal programming, some parts of which are proving useful in economics, tend to assume constant the variables which constitute the heart of our problem. Only a far more elaborate mathematics than has been suggested so far for use in our problem is likely to carry the assumptions we need to make. And, in any case, most of us get all jittery and lose our flexibility and imaginativeness when we try to use mathematics. We await a generation raised on far better mathematics courses than we enjoyed. At this stage I suggest we try using diagrams.

I propose to use Easton's characterization of the political system as authoritative allocation of values (or valuable) for a whole society.[1] I add Easton's caution: "The fact that policies recognized as authoritative for the whole society must exist does not imply or assume that a central governmental organization is required in order to make decisions and effectuate them. Institutional devices for making and executing policy may take an infinite variety of forms." There is an emphasis on process, here, which is perhaps all too contemporary, but there is also emphasis on values and authority as structural elements.

1. Easton, David, The Political System. New York: Knopf, 1953, p. 138

I shall utilize the Parsonian actor as the smallest unit of analysis, and attempt to keep in harmony with the Parsonian system which offers a step toward social science synthesis. I would place our interest at the point marked with an "X" in the following table which, following Parsons' more recent suggestions, treats political, economic and other social systems as "parallel." Personality itself is regarded as another of these systems. Culture and physical environment are relevant to all these parallel systems in the sense that culture and the physical environment interact with the individual in one or another of his roles, and through his personality system on roles in each of the social systems. Thus the sharing of a culture and physical environment by a number of action systems is relevant. Given a common culture and physical environment we may more readily compare political systems as sub-system of the political system for that area and culture.

	Political Aspects as A System	Economic Aspects as A System	Other Aspects As Social Systems	Personality As a System
Cultural Aspects				
Roles and Action	X			
Physical elements Including Genetic Aspects				

(X indicates action with spatial and physical consequences within an urban area.)

In setting up the aspects of a system in this way I am indebted to Donald Foley in an unpublished paper.

I assume that at the present stage of social science theory, and certainly at the present stage of political science, we must curb our ambitions for dynamic and general coverage. We must be satisfied with structural-functional distinctions, describing the functions that sustain the structures, and describing change by reference to the structural snapshots. I assume that the concepts of equilibrium and disequilibrium provide sufficient starting points for tracing "process," and lend themselves to later dynamic development. We need to trace present tendencies to a prior disequilibrium but should be willing to end our chain of reasoning when we come upon an exogenous factor which originated a disequilibrium.

We include three aspects of power over decision, the aspects of value, action, and authority proper. We include in the value aspect the priorities given different values, and the distribution of them among actors. We include in the action aspect the processes by which the allocation of values is planned, decided, and carried out. And we include in authority proper that additional power which is less easily ascribed to immediate actions and value judgments. The empirical methods to which this points are ones where people who occupy officially recognized roles as government officials or as contractors or petititioners are questioned concerning the other people who exert power over the officials' or contractors' decisions, and their responses are suitably probed and cross-checked. This questioning process may begin with officials located in the urban area in question but, in tracing the chains of power, may be pursued far beyond such official and geographic boundaries.

It is notable that in Easton's definition the three aspects, just mentioned, of an actor's power over other actors are contained in namely values, allocational activity, and authority. I think value allocation should be interpreted broadly, as in economics which, while it has emphasized the theory of distribution, now questions how the sum total of economic values is augmented or diminished. Probably the notion of a sum total of values would be gibberish if we did not assume a culture, which serves as the vehicle for a particular hierarchy of values, and serves as a standard for judging increase and decrease in the total values realized. In any case, actors vary in their importance in determining what values will be pursued, who will benefit and who will be burdened, and what the "total" will be.

The second aspect of power and the political system is allocational activity. I find this a useful reminder of the power of routine administration, not excluding the kind of power exerted by a file clerk who loses or finds things needed for planning, for decisions and for control. From her decision-making role we may proceed upward and outward to include all those whose power over an authoritative allocation rests on physical and mental activity. The value distribution is not otherwise than it is partly because of each of them.

The third aspect of power and the political system is authority proper. None of the aspects of the political system can be separated empirically, but each can be(or should eventually be) analytically. One reason for working on a conceptual scheme is to attempt to clarify concepts which still carry an aura of magic. Authority is one of these, although the tough-minded have been hacking away at it. Simon defines authority by referring to a relation in which one person makes a proposal for action by another. If the latter carries out the proposal without being convinced of its merits (including the instance where he is convinced the proposal is wrong) authority is being accepted.[1] To Easton, "a policy is authoritative when the people to whom it is intended to apply or who are affected by it consider that they must or ought to obey it."[2]

Simon's definition of an authoritative relationship assumes not only a sufficient continuance flow of communication between an "A" and a "B," to permit prediction, but an actual signal from A to B, following decision. Simon's definition is meant to apply to modern large-scale organizations. Easton's avoids the prerequisite of a signal. I prefer the latter's definition since it is simpler.

Both authors are ambiguous whether the influenced actor thinks he "should" or thinks he "must" act in the way he expects would be desired. But in the context, Easton implies that in a thorough elaboration of a realtionship an observer would find what should be done, given the influenced actor's values, but that at a lower level of analysis one may deal provisionally with what must be done given the actor's apparent values.

In any case, the actors are uncertain. A accords authority when he guides his own actions by his expectation of B's probable response. A may assume that B has good reasons and can explain his response in respect to values and the situation, or, A may assume that even without giving "reasons" he must obey B because of B's ability to deprive A of values. But A cannot be sure. He cannot know for sure B's response, and may not be

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1. See the version of this Barnard-Simon definition in Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, Public Administration. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950, p. 182
2. Easton, David, The Political System, p. 132

sure that B will even learn of A's decision. And, from B's point of view, his use of authority depends upon the probability that A will appreciate what the consequences of A's action will be in respect to B's potential reaction. Thus each accepts a burden of uncertainty born of the double contingency on which authority rests.

But, so far, I have not distinguished authority from power. I think authority carries connotations of ability to give reasons, as mentioned above, or of discretion in use of power, or both.[1] But the need to accord authority rests on uncertainty, on the need to allow discretion. I hope to describe authority in a way which carries this connotation, and also the connotation that authority is potentially a more permanent relation, more a possession, than some other categories of power, whether authority centers on an individual as a personality or on a role in a social system.

In the study of power and authority in the allocation of values one may concentrate on an organization, with Simon, or on an issue with, say, Banfield, in his book Political Influence,[2] or on status in the larger social system, with sociologists since Max Weber. I am interested primarily in that aspect of power and authority which forwards a more or less well-defined program, rather than any of these other aspects. This has led me to contrast "organizations" with what I am calling an "enterprise," to concern myself not with general status, but with particular power ranking in respect to the program in question; and to contrast power displayed in major public controversies with power applied to an enterprise.[3] I was tempted to force the problem to appear as a study of "the career of an issue."[3] But that is not an accurate description of our problem.

I think it is reasonable at this stage in our thinking to assume that any proposed change raises issues. As is painfully evident to anyone with experience in a large bureaucratic organization, this comes close to being factually correct. Thus even if power and authority can only be determined in respect to an issue, it is not really necessary to seek out issues of wide public controversy. In fact, there is a certain bias in allowing such a criterion to affect one's research plans, a bias contrary to the assumption that bureaucracy really is the core of government.[4] I would prefer to start with a "program" or value cluster, and pursue the enterprise addressed to it far enough to find the controversies. Indeed, the aspects of an enterprise which are referred upward and outward to voting bodies help to define the limits of the enterprise, rather than its center.

The analogy with economics is perhaps useful here. Economists once took as their model free competition, a sort of analogy with pure controversy. But it has become evident that markets only become truly competitive under modern conditions when products have become highly standardized, the market is highly organized, and market information is elaborately and practically instantaneously transmitted. The existence of half a dozen such highly institutionalized markets is probably necessary to the whole economic system, to provide some checkpoints, but it is now surely obvious that most products of most firms are usually bought by people who would even deny that any two firms really produce the same commodity in the sense meant in the competitive model.

Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, New York: Random House, 1956, pp. 69-84

1. Carl J. Friedrich in his Authority. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958 and)
2. Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961
3. Peter H. Rossi, "Theory, Research, and Practice in Community Organization," in Charles R. Adrian, ed., Social Science and Community Action. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1960, pp. 9-24
4. Friedrich, Carl J., Constitutional Government and Democracy. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1946

I think we must be equally ready to cast aside the model of free competition among issues and policies offered to resolve issues. While the prospect that issues might be made publicly controversial and subjected to vote by legislative bodies, or even by the electorate, is as necessary to our system of analysis as to democracy itself, the bulk of the political work is not done that way. The chief function for a conceptual scheme for political research on enterprises is to propose standards of relevance. Most relevant of all, I think, are the degree, manner and points of <u>insulation</u> from free competition which are accorded an enterprise. Only through such insulation is it possible to proceed with an enterprise without great cost.

THE SITUATION OF THE DECISION MAKER

In the political system the decision-making role is the smallest unit of analysis. It is defined in respect to a time and place and in respect to a future period. Owing to our lack of standard units of measure, we suffer from special difficulties which are overcome in economics, first, by the dollar measure, and second by the acceptance of the convention of a unit appropriate for the particular "commodity" under study. But I think we can surmount the difficulties. As in economics, we find it necessary to assume a high degree of rationality among those whose decisions really matter. Indeed, we may offset the difficulties arising from lack of a unit of measure by assuming a degree of rationality such that the decision-maker makes his own consistent comparison between favorable and unfavorable factors in a situation, without having them measured for him in a market.

I can give some of you a sort of preview by referring to Banfield's recent use of the pair of concepts, "task" and "burden", and the pair "task" and "capability."[1] As I propose to view them these are primitive categories of what in economics would be input analysis. And I would argue that when the burden per unit of task is <u>multiplied</u> by the size of the task do we arrive at a more important political category. To compute the total political burden placed upon a decision-maker we must multiply them. Also to compute his total capability of handling it we must multiply his capability per unit by the size of the task. To compare capability with burden we may have to add up several distinct burdens, each computed by multiplying burden per unit by numbers of units in the task. I would further distort Banfield's very different intention by arguing that in the normal or equilibrium situation a decision-maker acts only when he sees an excess of capability over burden. Finally, I would urge that it is more profitable to measure the decision-maker's burdens and capabilities in terms of output than in terms of input, that is, in terms of benefits rather than burdens.

Without bringing in Banfield's scheme at all, I can present the same idea, but it must be at greater length. I shall illustrate with diagrams closely resembling those in the economic theory of the firm. Indeed, after relabelling the coordinates, I shall start with the literal reproduction of diagrams taken from economics and see how far I can usefully press the analogy.

The decisions open to an actor in the political system may first be stated in terms of a choice between varied "mixes" of two "inputs," other things being equal. He may foresee that those in a position to accord him power will accord him less power according to the resources demanded to implement the decision he makes. More precisely, the potential power of a decision-maker at the end of a future period is viewed by him as a function of the inputs that others perceive are required. Thus, two alternative decisions are described in Diagram IA where the two coordinates are respectively Input A and Input B. The decision lines are cast against a map like a contour map, showing curved lines of equal power loss. That decision which is tangent to the line further to the right involves the greater power loss. Decision 1 involves more power loss, Decision 2, less. In the political system the better decision is Decision 1 which involves less power loss.

The value system which basically accounts for the decision-maker's choice of Decision 2 is only implicit in the Diagram. Dicision 1 may be better because it takes less resources (it takes less of <u>both</u> inputs), or because of greater reduction in the more highly valued resource, or for some combination of these reasons. And we are told nothing about what lies behind such evaluations.

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1. Edward C. Banfield, "
in American Academy of Arts and Letters, <u>Daedalus</u>, Winter 1961 pp.

A decision may be described in terms of outputs rather than inputs. In Diagram IB, other things being equal, Decision 2 is preferable since it offers a greater power gain. This may be explained in part by the greater output (both A and B being greater), or by the greater value placed upon the combined output when the "mix" shifts in favor of output A. But what looks like a better decision in terms of output may be worse in terms of input, so we need a more elaborate and more generalized conceptual scheme which will permit better prediction of decision.

The series of figures on Diagram II are based on assumptions identical with those made previously. It is assumed that the decision-maker can project power potentials, and is concerned about them enough to let them affect his decision. He expects that his decision will be sufficiently well communicated to signal a rather predictable reaction from those who can accord him power. But at this level of analysis we need more precise and general definitions. Two sets of factors are shown on each diagram. We may concentrate on Diagram IIA.

We accommodate input and output factors on one diagram but we leave both input and output values as merely implicit in the more general term "value allocation." Probably, in political decisions, a consistent distinction between value inputs and value outputs is less useful than in economics, in any case. To get any particular value ratio adopted as the accepted definition of "efficiency" in politics is itself a major political achievement. For analytical purposes it is best not to try to draw a consistent distinction between input and output values. But we assume that the decision-maker draws such a distinction. We use the abscissa or horizontal coordinate to show whatever aspect of value allocation interests us.

To show power relationships we use the vertical coordinate. In the figures in Diagram II these are shown only by points on a line and thus we lose much information of a type shown in more detail in Diagram I. We intend to show the decision-maker's expectations concerning the power ranking to be accorded him by the end of the first period of time after decision--the period being long enough for his decision to be well enough communicated to signal a reaction from those able to accord him power. His power ranking measures his position relative to other people among whom his power position matters to him. We find it convenient to rank people's power position from the bottom up. Thus a high-ranking role is assigned a higher number than a low-ranking role.

Next, let the horizontal or value allocation coordinate represent the degree of <u>dispersion</u> of possible decisions around a particular value hierarchy and value distribution--a hierarchy and distribution which is generally accepted as the proper role of a given decision-maker. Then the further we proceed to the right in the diagram the greater the dispersion of the decision from that value allocation which is generally accepted.

We now have our two dimensions. On these we draw two sets of curves. Both sets refer to expectations of a decision-maker. The first set refers to the power rankings which the decision-maker expects would be accorded him at different degrees of dispersion in value allocation from that generally accepted as his role. These are the two straight lines lettered AA and MM. The AA schedule represents the power rank expected by the decision-maker, given the cumulative degree of dispersion in value allocation. The further to the right we follow the line the greater the dispersion; and the greater the dispersion the less the cumulative power rank. This line reflects a situation, common for officials, where dispersion from the generally accepted standards is expected to result in power loss. The MM schedule which falls more abruptly downward represents the <u>changes</u>, or first differences, between the successive power rankings shown on the AA curve. We call the MM line the schedule of marginal power rankings.

The other pair of schedules are shown as curved, the A and M schedules. Again, the A curve represents a cumulative tendency while the M curve represents its first differenc or the change in it. These two refer to the power losses which the decision-maker expect would result were actions taken in accord with his decision. As before, this depends in part upon communication, to those who can accord him power, of signals indicating that such measures are indeed implied in the decision. The schedule of marginal power losses crosses the schedule of cumulative power rankings, as it must if, as in the figure, the cumulative power rank is to rise again after falling in the range of lesser dispersion.

We next shift our attention to the sizes of areas which are related to these schedul and their points of intersection. In shifting from consideration of the two dimensions o power rank and value dispersion to an area drawn with respect to both we shift from aspec of power to something which I call potential power or power ex ante. Here, as in many other places, you may not like the definition. But I would argue that we have a reasonab good working definition of power of a role under the described conditions, when we accoun for the restraints on a decision-maker, as reflected in the tolerance of power rankings he anticipates for varying value dispersion. But three power areas are designated in IIA, ($P_2P_1R_2'R_2'$), ($OP_2R_2'R_2$) and ($R_2'R_1'R_1R_2$), the rectangles shown by dotted lines. We must distinguish them in order to clarify the meaning of power in this context.

It can be shown that under our assumptions the greatest power (measured as the area of a rectangle) is accorded the decision-maker if he makes his decision in favor of a value dispersion at the point along the horizontal axis where a vertical would pass throu the intersection of the two marginal schedules. By reference to the three rectangles and groupings of them I think we can not only clarify the definition of power but perceive some differences between power, authority, influence, and discretion. We shall not attempt to define each of these terms in terms of a different variable, or all of them in terms of one, as I think is sometimes done in political science literature, if not in popular speech. We define all of them in terms of some parts of the system of four schedules, and thus in terms of the two dimensions in which the schedules are drawn.

All the power concepts of the role in question are defined in terms of expected power rank and of expected tolerance for value dispersion. A power concept may be defined in an equilibrium or disequalibrium sense. The intersection of the marginal curves defines equilibrium. This intersection is at point Z. A vertical drawn through the point of intersection (R_2R_2') indicates a point on the horizontal axis, and thus indicate the degree of value dispersion. Where the vertical intersects the AA schedule (R_2') it indicates the cumulative power ranking (equal to OP_1). The entire tall rectangle $OP_1R_2'R_2$ represents the potential power of the decision-maker at equilibrium. His power is defined as the maximum product of power rank and range of discretion of which he is capable throu making a decision.

Properly speaking, only the squat rectangle at the top of this rectangle represents the decision-maker's potential authority at equilibrium. It is an "excess" of power rank over and above that which will be lost when those who accord him power realize the full implications if his decision is to be realized. This is shown by the difference between the heights P_1 and P_2 which arises because it is necessary to deduct the cumulative power losses. For value dispersion of R_2 the cumulative power losses (which are read on the A schedule where the vertical through R_2 intersects) are R_2R_2' which is equal to OP_2.

At this point I may whet the flagging appetites of those who hoped I would talk about renewal by suggesting that where the federal government promises to absorb much of the cost of renewal, the renewal decision-makers find the A and M curves shift downward, and the intersection with the MM curve moves to the right. This also opens up new prospe tending to shift the AA and MM curves upward. As a result, the power and authority of such decision-makers tend to increase. But that is to get ahead of my story.

It is more important at this stage to point out that the equilibrium decision calls for less value dispersion than that which the cumulative power rank schedule would permit. Our hero, the decision-maker, would not "run out of" power if he scattered values as flagrantly as at R_1 from which a vertical intersects the power loss curve at a point no higher than the curve for cumulative power rank. He holds back, however, to point R_2, in order to maximize his authority. I submit that this offers a kind of solution to the vexing definitional problem of authority and its relation to power.

Diagram IIA also suggests a description of the phenomenon of influence and of its relation to discretion. Because there tends to be an unused discretionary power in respect to value allocation, and an excess of authority over power, a decision-maker can yield to the influence of others. Within the zone of his discretion, a decision-maker can divert values from that allocation which his role is generally expected to serve. The zone of discretion may exist not only because of lack of knowledge of the actual decisions but because people simply shrink, at some point, from further interference with the decision-maker, as, on the whole, a man of better judgment in the role than any available alternative. Whatever the explanation, there is a power area which we may refer to as discretion bounded to left and right by verticals through R_2 and R_1, and below a horizontal drawn through P_2. But, as can be seen from the slope of the AA schedule, the further the vertical is allowed to range to the right, the lower the power rank will be, at equilibrium. That is, the decision-maker risks his authority when exercising his discretion. Since what he calls exercise of discretion will be called by some others a yielding to influence, we had best define the area between the verticals as both the "area of discretion" and the area in which influence may be exerted.

If these definitions prove useful, then it may be useful, also to use the diagram to distinguish responsibility from authority. In administrative jargon they "should be equa In our Diagram, responsibility is a rectangle extending to the right as far as the vertic through R_1, and below P_2. Authority, properly speaking, is only the small rectangle abov P_2. But, perhaps, the slogan applies to authority in a loose sense, meaning power and authority. Then the slogan may mean that the rectangle of responsibility should be no greater than the rectangle of power and authority.

Just how this scheme is to be differentiated beyond a single, rather long, period is something I shall not tackle today. But, on the basis of experience with economic theory it should be possible to do so. A comprehensive calculation of power potentials would "capitalize" a whole series of future situations, subject only to the requirement that expected cumulative power losses over time at no point exceed cumulative power over time, with due allowance for differences in uncertainties relating to different periods. Incidentally, maximum power depends upon people foreseeing some aspects of a decision and not other aspects. This may make the neat, "compound interest" approach of economics a useless analogy for political analysis.

Diagram IIA, besides being useful in defining terms, also lends itself to describing the role of specific organizations such as government as decision-maker in offering public services. However, for analyzing its role in contracting for factors, IIB, which is based on inputs rather than outputs, might be more useful, and the situations of some decision-makers might best be pictured by other models common in economic theory as indicated by IIC and IID. Figure II might prove interesting when contrasted with the other models because it is based on an analogy with monopoly and monopsony.

In governments the roles of decision-makers are defined by inelastic response to value dispersion. But an unfettered private enterprise might approach the situation shown in IID where power rank would not vary with value-dispersion. The debt-free, one-man,

flexible owner-operator-capitalist is a possible example, a decision-maker who would "just as soon" that his firm allocated one value as another, and among one group as another. Between him and a government there are many shades and variations. Some are empirically discernible types including the firm "vested with a public interest," and the quasi-government corporation, and within these broad categories many degrees of governmentally-imposed, market-imposed and other socially-imposed limitations are possible.

An intolerance toward dispersion in value allocation, on the part of those according power, may be called the dispersion gradient of power. The dispersion gradient is high when intolerance is high. Authority tends to be greater for those roles where the dispersion gradient is low. And the dispersion gradient tends to differ as between men whose authority in other enterprises is known to be great and those whose authority is low or unknown. In this sense authority is a sort of investment which can be expected to carry over to some degree from enterprise to enterprise.

There is some tendency to specialize, to define some roles by a high dispersion gradient, and to assign the function of reviewing dispersion to supervisory officials who may not be subject to a high dispersion gradient but are subject to great uncertainty as to what the dispersion gradient is. This is characteristic of administrative hierarchies. Thus, in hierarchies, roles tend to be defined in terms of uncertainty-bearing as well as dispersion gradient. Public matters tend to be handled through roles rather meticulously defined in respect to all three, the enterprises to be served, the dispersion gradient, and the uncertainty to be borne.

GENERAL APPLICATIONS OF AN ACTION THEORY OF POWER, AUTHORITY AND INFLUENCE

Instead of waiting until I have returned to urban renewal before I point out some general applications of this conceptual scheme, I shall proceed directly to them. I think urban renewal applications will mean more to you if I can show first how the scheme relates to schemes with which you may be more familiar.

First of all, I refer to Sayre and Kaufman's suggestion that we view the politics of the local community as a contest or set of contests.[1] Their picturing of a community's politics as a set of contests suggests to me at least that while small parts or elimination heats may be won as zero-sum games, the system as a whole allocates to many different people some rank in the final standing. On the other hand, I find the notion of a contest rather too confining because it is so silent about what happens to those not playing. Surely our conceptual scheme would oversimplify if it pictured the politician as winning prizes regardless of those which he earns for others. This brings me to another scheme, that suggested by Robert Dahl in his stimulating essay on "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities."[2] Perhaps the relevance of the conceptual scheme used here to Dahl's lies chiefly in further beating back the more personal explanations of power phenomena in favor of social processes. One of Dahl's accomplishments in his article is to show that the failure of actors to utilize all the influence that they can make efficient and effective use of, is dependent in part upon the opportunity costs and in part upon diminishing returns. But both these economic concepts tend to lead us out of social categories and into physical items, via technological issues. Indeed, it seems to me that the whole apparatus of thinking of power as efficient and effective use of resources by the actor offers this bias. If Dahl avoids being pulled too far in this direction it is through his concept of "access" which, in addition to efficiency and effectiveness, he finds

1. Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City, New York: Russell Sage, 1960
2. Charles R. Adrian, ed., Social Science and Community Action, E. Lansing: Michigan State University 1960, pp. 25-42

necessary to explain resource use. But he doesn't do much with the access concept nor clarify who controls access. He doesn't differentiate it as in the notion of whole schedules exhibiting dispersion gradients. In less careful hands than his, I think theory built on his concepts would too closely resemble the labor theory of value in economics before it was put in better perspective under the attack of the marginal utility theorists. In brief, he doesn't leave enough scope for the public, who accord power. So much said, I hasten to add that I think Dahl is correct in his estimate that the "slack" in the system cannot be wholly explained in terms other than the moral aspects of personality structure. But I am sure he would appreciate that we should not fall back on that defense until we have made as effective use as feasible of the analogy to the restriction of output practiced by monopolists. Decision-makers may hold back, to their <u>own positive advantage</u> (in increased authority).

The relevance of the conceptual scheme I have been describing to Banfield's is not so easily analyzed. In the writings of his with which I am familiar he has been exploring in depth different aspects of politics. With each additional study his system becomes more comprehensive and more comprehensible to me. The <u>Daedalus</u> article seemed to me to brilliantly marshall the individual concepts, of task, burden, and capability, but lacked in manipulation of these concepts. If burden is multiplied by task (and if capability is) the whole set of concepts becomes much more useful. While the particular application of these concepts he made in the article would then probably collapse, the concepts themselves would appear in their true importance.

Let us also compare Blau's generalization from the authority which a wisely lenient foreman exercises over his men.[1] This is given diagrammatic expression in our IIB. Here the M and A schedules represent the decision-maker's expectations of the power rank which would be accorded him <u>by his men</u> for every degree of dispersion in his allocation of values to them. Their power ranking for him is sloped upward. Only as he cuts back on allocations to them do they accord him less power. Consequently, he is able to satisfy them, while his reputations holds, with less dispersion in value allocations, without yielding as much of his cumulative power rank as one would expect if one looked to their <u>marginal</u> power ranking related to the decision of the moment.

APPLICATIONS OF THE SCHEME TO LOCAL URBAN RENEWAL ENTERPRISES

Now (at last) I am willing to return to the application of the scheme to urban renewal. Most briefly, the chief advantages of the scheme for that are (1) that it defines some of the terms, (2) it permits one basic analytical orientation toward many different participants, including the several different governments, and (3) that it suggests something akin to a process of dynamic development (by referring to the disequilibrium when occupants of roles exercise discretion.

With this conceptual scheme I am able to describe the politics of urban renewal at the level of a single role and for larger aggregates than individual roles. For instance, we had found it necessary to contrast the demands on an official in the urban renewal enterprise with his role in his organization. We developed language to express the rather dangerous but necessary strategy-making activity performed by such leaders of a renewal enterprise. We referred to this activity as bridging. This was our way of calling attention to the tensions of leadership by organization men. I think it helps to see that the bridging activity is dangerous because the brinkmanship in exercising discretion threatens his own authority even though it does not actually conflict with his responsibility

1. Peter M. Blau, <u>Bureaucracy in Modern Society</u>, pp. 69-84

The conceptual scheme suggests to me, at least, that the tolerance of an organization for a new enterprise such as urban renewal is startlingly similar to its tolerance for influence peddlers. The range of discretion is necessary if officials are to respond to either. The failure of city manager government to produce vastly better renewal programs than unreformed local governments is easier to comprehend if we see this as a lack of power of discretion, born of lack of authority in those city manager governments where the manager is literally a servant of the council. At the same time, the source of the vigorous renewal program under some city managers may be explainable in part by the authority possessed by him and/or by the authority accorded others within the administration (to the extent permitted in council-manager governments).

Similarly, the role of the single early enthusiast for urban renewal on the city council or city planning commission can be seen in better perspective. I had been troubled by this role, particularly since, at later stages of renewal programs such roles did not produce leaders. (Leadership then appeared to be exerted by chairman and executive officers but practically never by anyone else on such polyarchic bodies.) I now think that while the "lower" roles are not accorded <u>much</u> power they do have the benefit of tolerance toward their value-dispersing decisions. They have less authority to lose but more influence to gain.

In describing urban renewal enterprises we found it necessary to label several structural clusters. The local renewal enterprise was one such cluster. The "core group" was another. And "the rest of the web" or "network" was another. We even turned organization charts up on end with their heads together in a circle. But I think we need a view of each role as having needs and as capable of making demands which permit it to form such liaisons, a capability which depends upon expectations concerning the attitudes of others.

Also, we recognized various kinds of leadership. Some leaders appeared important chiefly by altering the value mix in the local renewal enterprise; others chiefly by their activity, including their maintenance of communication; and still others by their rather direct loan of authority. Rather vaguely we asserted that these aspects of leadership were interrelated. But I think we needed a more definite picture of these three aspects and their interrelations. And we certainly needed a better picture of the leadership given by those who hide information, which can be as important as those who expedite communication. These questions are fairly well handled with the conceptual scheme I have described.


I think we need to further explore the scheme to see whether it offers any further ideas for a typology of leadership or a typology of power. I am mindful of Talcott Parsons' suggestion that the analogy with economics might well be pushed to discovering phenomena analogous with wages, with profit, with interest, and with rent. I think I see the analogies with wages and with monopoly profits, but the use of the analogy with interest and rent is not yet clear to me.


In the perspective of our conceptual scheme, we may understand the tendency, particularly in large cities, to continue with the renewal enterprise, but to refuse to turn over control to line officials of city government. Instead, authority is divided among a number of commission-governed agencies, more commissions, typically, than have to act on matters other than urban renewal. Three aspects of this pattern are worth noting, the existence of commissions of people each representative of a different sector in a rather wide range of special interests; the tendency for commissions to work more visibly in the glare of publicity than is true of departments; and the tendency for them to take longer. Assuming I am correct in these three judgments about commissions, their wide use in renewal is explainable as a way of making special arrangements for urban renewal, without changing the practices in other municipal affairs, to allow for the

more elastic power rankings in renewal. The more elastic the power ranking schedule, the less the authority and the discretion permitted officials. Of course, authority could be reduced for each official by making it possible to bypass any one. But this would be damaging to morale. The purpose can be better served. A nice way to do this is to make each official subject to being overruled by or outvoted on a commission. Furthermore, by the commission device publicity and delay is likely to be sufficient to permit the interested groups to speak up. The commission device is a very neat answer to the technical problem of how to prevent a value allocation that departs far from what any of the interested groups would like. It is particularly useful when such groups don't know ahead of time just what they will want; when, in other words, they are vaguely apprehensive, although attracted by some of the possibilities.


Perhaps the most severe test of the conceptual scheme is to apply it to situations where disagreements on issues are intense and opposing sides are nearly equal in strength. In this case the decision-maker cannot count upon a preponderance of support no matter what he does, and yet must stand ready to exert power over recalcitrant opposition. In terms of our diagrammatic scheme, his power needs are as shown in the upper curved line of IID while the power that will be accorded him is lower (at A) and very sensitive to the slightest change in the allocation of values. He foresees no possibility that he can find a value allocation which will win sufficient power.

Finally, I think we can see a little more clearly the process which we had noticed "in the large," a tendency for local renewal enterprises to diverge tremendously, some spiralling inward toward less and less controversial and smaller and smaller projects, others spiralling outward toward more comprehensive programs where controversy is settled through providing something for everybody rather than by depriving no one of anything. This process is sufficiently explainable, perhaps, by the federal procedures which allow cities to find their own level within the aided program. But I had noticed that leadership in early stages was largely by persons with little authority but specialized interests, whereas the leadership which lifted the declining programs out of their downward path tended to come from people of obvious authority, in a number of cases, apparently, from the mayor. I am convinced that while a mayor is likely to keep his distance from new programs which have little active support, his sense of risk in this respect is related to his sense of authority. He must protect his authority. The presence of much authority suggests a steeply sloping power ranking schedule which curbs his discretion But when the decline of the renewal enterprise appears as a threat to his established reputation (and thus to his authority, rather than as a challenge to his discretion) he tends to act much more vigorously.



I A
POWER LOSS
ISO QUANTS
INPUT
A
DECISION 2
DECISION 1
INPUT B


I B
POWER GAIN
ISO QUANTS
OUTPUT
A
DECISION 2
DECISION 1
OUTPUT B


II A




II B



II C



II D



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BRITISH CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LABOUR PARTY

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It is possible that neither the title nor the subject of this paper will appear directly devoted to the panel's concern with socialist theory. A reason for this, which ought to be stated, is that the paper was originally written for another purpose and only drafted for the panel as a late substitute for someone else's paper on British socialism. The author assumes, however, that any changes in the social basis of the British Labour party are relevant to that aspect of socialist theory relying on a predominantly working-class political movement for the accomplishment of socialist objectives. Implicit, then, is the view that diminution of class consciousness is a cause of the crisis in western socialist theory. Proving any such diminution is, of course, extremely difficult. The most that can be attempted here is to argue that a decreasing class consciousness is likely in response to recent changes in objective circumstances. In so doing, the leadership of the Labour party by men of distinctly working-class origins is treated as an important symptom of a class-conscious society, and a decline in leadership of this type is thought to reflect a different kind of society. That difference is to be found in objective conditions and in subjective attitudes, both of which are taken into account even though it is appreciated that class consciousness refers directly to the latter.

I

Until recently, the British Labour party was customarily regarded as the natural product of an advanced industrial society. Given a sufficiently developed economy, like Britain's in the early years of the twentieth century, it was assumed that a socialist working-class party was due to emerge as an increasingly large and effective force. In this democratized version of Marxism, the absence of such a party in the United States had to be explained as the result of the relative immaturity of American industrial society. Labor in the United States was on the same political road as labor in Western Europe, but well behind. Especially did it seem behind labor in Britain, "the country in which," as Cole wrote, "modern Capitalism first emerged to full growth--the country which was, therefore, the pioneer of Labour organisation."[1]

That this entire approach needs to be reconsidered is now plain. Recent American political trends fail to support the expectation of a European-style working-class movement in the United States, and this type of party in Western Europe itself appears by this time to have had more of a past than it has a future. Socialism is hardly a thriving faith in advanced western nations, and the old class base for protest movements is being shaken as Western European societies share larger national products, assimilate increasingly their higher paid workers to bourgeois sytles of life, decrease the proportion of manualists in the total work force, and provide wider educational opportunities. As Aneurin Bevan said deploringly of the new generation of British working-class voters, whose support Labour had failed to attract in the 1959 general election, "This section of the population has become thoroughly Americanized."[2] At least, the rigorous separateness of the working class is withering away. The Labour party will not necessarily disappear as a result, but it is reasonable to suppose that its character will be affected.

This character in vital respects has been the product of conditions that no longer exist. Britain is not now the same kind of class society that it was during the rise of the Labour party in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Then the industrial working class, newly enfranchised, stood poles apart from the governing class--economically, socially, and educationally. Workers and their children were a most distinct social stratum. They were conscious of it and so were their betters. Although occupational upward mobility was possible and even frequent in business, almost as much so as in the United States,[3] this did not mean that public life was equally accessible for the bright and energetic sons of the working class. Public life was different from "trade." The sons of the working class could have neither the education, the money, nor the manner of the gentlemen who held power in the established political parties.

To an extraordinary degree, before the rise of the Labour party, political power had been the monopoly of those raised in privileged circumstances. Np cabinet member had been the son of working-class parents in the whole period from 1801 to 1905.[4] A majority of cabinet members had, in fact, been sons of the nobility, and the others, increasing in proportion during the nineteenth century, had been from substantial middle-class backgrounds.[5] It is, however, the complete absence in this period of sons of workers that contrasts most significantly with American experience. In the United States, although the data are not strictly comparable, at least a few sons of wage earners plus a larger number of sons of farmers, many of whom could be called working class, had risen to cabinet status through the traditional political party routes.[6] The American proportion of working-class origin thus achieving top political positions may have been small, understandably so given the exceptional talent and energy required for such a one-generation rise in any country. But at least it was sufficient to supply material evidence for the American belief in unlimited opportunity at a time when British public life provided no similar evidence at all.[7]

In British conditions at the turn of the century, a working-class party could fulfill two functions, the first of which at least was not relevant in the United States. Such a party could meet the desires of potential working-class leaders for public careers as well as the needs of the mass of economically-aggrieved workers for remedial legislation. Thus, in accord with the first function, it was a goal for workers in Britain to have literally their own elected representatives in a way that it never was in the United States. This element of working-class leadership deserves emphasis in describing the difference between the British Labour party and any important political movement in American politics.

In this perspective, the requisite for a successful working-class party was not just a mass of industrial workers, which the United States had at nearly the same time as Britain, but a class of workers whose members regarded themselves as sharply distinct. That this should have been the case in Britain but not in the United States is hardly surprising in light of the general historical differences between the two societies. The British working class developed within a social framework that had been feudal and aristocratic in ways virtually unknown and certainly unaccepted in American tradition.[8] Equality of opportunity, whatever the facts about occupational mobility in industrial societies generally, was not established as the prevailing ethos in Britain. There was no equivalent of the log cabin to White House theme. The mass of the population had not even been admitted formally to the political process until the franchise extensions of the late nineteenth century, by which time a very large industrial working class had already come into existence and into a consciousness of its deprivation. In that circumstance, as Perlman has stated, workers knew that they "were a class apart and should therefore be 'class-conscious.' There ran a line like a red

thread between the laboring class and the other classes."[9] Nor was working-class consciousness likely soon to be diminished by the British educational system. Elementary schooling, universal since 1870, was still essentially segregated along class lines, and secondary schooling on a full-time basis remained virtually unobtainable for working-class children until well into the twentieth century.[10]

II

It is possible to amplify and illustrate the thesis that the leadership factor in the rise of the British Labour party was a response to a class society different from that of the United States and different as well from that which is now developing in Britain and the rest of Western Europe. The pressure for direct workers' representation was itself an important early British phenomenon, certainly antedating the creation of the Labour party. Movements to elect workers to the House of Commons were immediate reactions to the enfranchisement of urban labor in 1867. As the Labour Representation League, formed in 1869, stated in its prospectus, there were 20,000,000 members of the working class, "and yet, not one actual working man has found a seat in the present Parliament.... The principal duty of the League was "to secure the return to Parliament of qualified working men."[11] It sponsored a dozen working-class candidates in 1874, electing two of them (both miners' union officials). Similarly the Labour Electoral Association, established as such in 1887 after earlier status as an Electoral Committee affiliated with the Trades Union Congress, said it wanted candidates who were either working men or of working-class origin.[12] This, in fact, was the reason for the organization's existence. It was ideologically a Radical organization trying to elect working class representatives to act with the Liberals in Parliament. Only later, with the formation of a separate Labour party, did the organized movement for workers' representation regularly tolerate some middle-class candidates. Even with this concession, significantly paving the way for Labour to become more than a purely class party, the drive to elect workers to Parliament did not lose its force. Nor by any means was the predominantly working-class character of the movement's leadership quickly transformed.

This leadership did not turn to a separate Labour party until it had failed in its efforts, through sufficient working-class representation, to join the Liberal party. At first, this had seemed the likeliest step for working-class men of political ambition. Conservatives and Liberals monopolized the routes to power, and the Liberals, in their Radical and non-conformist ranks, represented a fairly congenial ideological home for prospective working-class leaders, many of whom had been raised to admire Gladstone. Moreover, the Liberal party nationally had good political reasons to try to attract the newly enfranchised urban masses by the adoption, if necessary, of working-class leaders as Liberal or Liberal-supported parliamentary candidates. As an old class party in a class society, the Liberals could demonstrate with worker candidates that they stood for more than one class. (The Conservatives, championing nation and empire, found another way to do this.) The fact was that the Liberals did, beginning late in the nineteenth century, adopt, or stand aside for, some worker candidates, notably in mining constituencies. The practice would have been more widespread, perhaps widespread enough to absorb the most active working-class leaders, if more local Liberal associations had been willing to follow the advice of their national party headquarters.[13] Instead, certain Liberal associations, partly for financial reasons, rejected important proffered candidacies--among them, the candidacies of three men, Keir Hardie, Arthur Henderson, and Ramsay MacDonald, who subsequentl:

became the most important political figures in the early development of the Labour party. Hardie did not form his Independent Labour Party, under whose banner he was returned to Parliament, until after a Liberal caucus had rejected his candidacy in 1888.[14] Henderson joined Hardie following his own rebuff by local Liberals in 1895.[15] And MacDonald had a similar experience in this same period.[16] The Liberals simply were not hospitable enough. In retrospect, this is understandable. What was asked of the Liberals was not merely to accept working-class programs, which was hard enough, but also to adopt working-class candidates in constituencies that were only partly working-class and not overwhelmingly so as in mining areas.

After 1900, when the Independent Labour party was able to link itself to trade-union support in the new Labour Representation Committee, it had become too late for the Liberals to absorb the drive for working-class representation. Thus the 1906 bargain between Liberal and Labour headquarters, under which the two parties agreed not to oppose each other's candidates in selected districts, involved a recognition of Labour as an independent party.[17] To be sure, there were short-run advantages in this bargain for the Liberal as well as the Labour party, but a separate working-class movement was now institutionalized in a new way.

The earlier Liberal failure to prevent this accomplishment is instructive. It contrasts sharply with the successful absorption of trade-union political activism by the American Democratic party in the 1930's. The reasons for the difference seem to lie in those aspects of British social structure that made both the Liberal caucuses and the new Labour leaders heavily class conscious at the turn of the century. The whole political system was marked by this class consciousness. Parliamentary membership was so much a gentleman's occupation that it was still unsalaried. And it was not as middle-class Liberal gentlemen that Hardie and Henderson, at least, sought parliamentary candidacies. Their terms for adoption as Liberal candidates included a continued identification as working-class leaders. They wanted to keep intact their working-class credentials, as they later could and did successfully in their own party. Here they were joined by others of similar background who, in a class-conscious society, found satisfaction in linking the improvement of their own status with the improvement of the status of their class. Working-class leaders generally, as long as they were brought up in a society where they were as likely by background to exclude themselves from middle-class status as they were to be excluded by others, had their most comfortable political home in a workers' party.[18] In a way, it is true, many of these men did achieve a kind of middle-class status as successful leaders even of the Labour party, but their continued identification with workers remained. Significantly, for example, British trade-union officials, whose ranks supplied most working-class political leaders, have never received the high salaries of American union leaders.

The extent to which the Labour party in its first decades was led by men of working-class origin is apparent. Except for a few famous socialist intellectuals , whose role was not primarily in political organization or candidature, the original party leadership was almost exclusively working-class. Only when the party was already well-launched, after the bulk of trade-union support had been secured, did Labour attract many important politicians from the middle and upper classes. Their influx dates mainly from the sharp decline of Liberalism at the end of World War I, when Labour was about to become the official opposition and soon afterward to form a minority government. It was by then decidedly attractive to men of status, particularly from the Radical wing of the Liberal

party. Similarly in subsequent decades Labour, as the significant party of the Left, attracted aspiring middle-class politicians of a variety of non-Conservative views. But these are simply accretions, important though some individuals have been, to a party that was a going concern and that had been, in its first generation, primarily a vehicle for men of the working class. The latter characteristic was marked in 1906 when all 29 of Labour's parliamentary contingent[19] and all but one of the party's 50 candidates, were of working-class origin. As late as 1918, 90 per cent of the members of the Parliamentary Labour party had had no more full-time education than that provided by elementary school--virtually a sure sign of working-class background. This percentage, incidentally, was still about 70 per cent in the 1930's.[20]

More revealing of the nature of early Labour leadership, if less impressive statistically, is the biographical material on the first Labour cabinet of 1924. Despite Prime Minister MacDonald's deliberate effort to raise his government's level of experience and prestige by the inclusion of very recent and even dubious converts to Labour, thus diluting with newcomers the top ranks of his party's old leadership, 11 of the 20 cabinet members were plainly of working-class origin.[21] The other nine, with the exception of Sidney Webb, had had virtually no substantial previous Labour party experience. Thus the 11, all of course old Labour men, did represent the most successful of the party's early twentieth-century leadership. Their lives and backgrounds typify those of the men who built the party, and they display a good deal of what it meant to have been born into the British working class between the late 1850's and the early 1870's.[22] Full-time education ended early. Except for the special cases of MacDonald and Snowden, who prolonged their school years by remaining as "pupil-teachers" until they were 18 and 15 respectively, this group of Labour leaders had turned to manual work, most often mining, at ages ranging from 8 to 13.[23] Education after that age had to be part-time at best, and while evening classes became available in the developing worker's education program, much had to be painfully acquired by individual effort in public libraries. This working-class generation did have an advantage denied to its predecessors: elementary school as provided by the Education Act of 1870. The crucial tools of literacy were supplied to children before they went into the mining pits or textile mills, and for men of outstanding native ability this much formal schooling was enough to allow, even to encourage, the further self-education necessary for occupational ascent from manual work to white-collar jobs--and more particularly to leadership positions in the growing trade-union movement.

Men of this background continued to bulk large at the top levels of the Labour party well beyond 1924. This was true of the Labour government of 1929, when 8 (or possibly 9) of 19 cabinet members had up-by-their-own-bootstraps careers. Even in the governments of 1945 and 1950, half of each Labour cabinet consisted of men with the old familiar working-class pattern in which manual labor had put a stop to full-time education at the elementary level (see Table 1). This is not surprising in light of the fact that political leaders as late as 1950 would have been born in the 1880's or 1890's, and so have been raised under essentially the same conditions, certainly educationally, as men who had been born 10 or 20 years earlier. The Labour party's successes of the second quarter of the twentieth century were made by the generation whose careers had been well-started before the relative reduction of class barriers in this century. The lives of Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison, and even of the younger Aneurin Bevan, are leading examples.[24] Bevin, the oldest, had the harshest time. His father unknown and his empoverished mother dead when he was only eight, Bevin left school at 11 to become a farm laborer and subsequently a van boy in Bristol. Subjectively as well, Bevin's working-class identification was

Table 1

WORKING-CLASS BACKGROUND

OF LABOUR PARTY LEADERS

Year	Total Membership	Working-class Background*
1924 Cabinet	20	11
1929 Cabinet	19	8
1935 Shadow Cabinet	14	7
1945 Cabinet	20	10
1950 Cabinet	18	9
1951 Shadow Cabinet	14	3 or 4**
1955 Shadow Cabinet	14	3 or 4**
1959 Shadow Cabinet	14	3 or 4**

*"Working-class Background" is a classification conservatively made from standard biographical sources indicated in n. 23. To be so classified, the leader had to be the son of a working-class father and to have started his own career as a worker or at any rate with only an elementary education. The tabulation is not exactly the same as that by Guttsman, "Changes in British Labour Leadership," cited in n. 5, p. 104, where members of Labour cabinets (but not of shadow cabinets) are classified according to both background and subsequent occupational route into four different working-class categories. Guttsman's two most thoroughly working-class categories, however, produce a total number for each of the cabinets that is no more than one higher or lower than the corresponding figures above. This similarity seems to strengthen the case for the reliability of each independently made classification. See also the tabulation made by Bonnor, cited in n. 5.

**Uncertainty about the number arises in these years because of incomplete biographical information about one Shadow Cabinet member. The accounts in Who's Who and in the Times Guide to the House of Commons, relied on for contemporary figures, were not as full as the sketches in the Dictionary of National Biography, used heavily for the earlier leaders.

clear and definite. As he told a group of employers in 1917, by which time Bevin spoke for his trade union:

> You have had one set of education for yourselves and another for us. I had to work at ten years of age while my employer's son went to the university until he was twenty. You have set out for me a different set of conditions. I was taught to bow to the squire and touch my hat to the parson; my employer's son was not. All these things have produced within me an intense hatred, a hatred which has caused me to organise for my fellows and direct my mind to a policy to give to my class a power to control their own destiny and labour.[25]

No better text than this self-portrait could be found to illustrate the theme that the Labour party was built by men who were the product of the pre-modern class structure of nineteenth-century Britain. Here, in Bevin's experience, is even the impact of the residual feudalism of rural England. This was shared, although in less difficult personal circumstances, in the youthful careers of other early Labour leaders.

Herbert Morrison's background may, by comparison, seem only marginally working-class. His father, it is true, was a London police constable, but the family's means were so much like those of working-class neighbors that Morrison's formal education was assumed to end at 14 when he went to work as an errand boy in his brother's grocery. "Secondary education," Morrison writes, "was hardly thought of by parents of my class and time."[26] Despite his considerable subsequent self-education, Morrison's origins distinguished him, certainly at the start of his career, from middle-class politicians. He could be sociologically at home in the Labour party in a way that would have been impossible for him un the old established parties at the turn of the century.

A working-class background has undoubtedly been a source of pride and probably an advantage for one pursuing a career within the Labour party. This remained the case long after the party opened its ranks to politicians of middle-class origin, rewarded some with cabinet positions, and even, beginning with Attlee, made a strictly middle-class man its top leader. Yet to have come from the working class, handicapped though one was by absence of extended formal education, was still a useful credential for Labour leadership. Certainly the party leaders possessing this credential remained willing, even eager, to display it. Their biographical sketches, furnished for parliamentary guides, official party histories, or Who's Who, ordinarily state their early school-leaving ages and both their own and their fathers' manual occupations. This is a significantly different tendency in biographical statement from that of upward mobile British corporation directors, who (in contrast also to American executives) have been less likely to report their first menial jobs.[27] The point is that successful British business men have left their working-class origins to become middle-class and it is natural, in a more class-conscious society than America's, that they should want to make their new identification as complete as possible. On the other hand, British Labour leaders, who have risen with their class, even if more strikingly than their fellow-workers, have all the reasons drawn from a class-conscious society to proclaim their original status. It is the very class-consciousness of Britain which made a successful Labour party and thereby the rise of its leadership to honored public positions. British business men of working-class origin have, in contrast, risen in spite of their society's class consciousness.

III

It should follow, if this analysis is correct, that the class character of Labour leadership would diminish in response to changes in those conditions that originally caused working-class leaders to build their own political movement. While allowing for some persistence of old attitudes, a new generation of the working class, if less marked off economically, socially, and educationally from the rest of the community, would be less likely than preceding generations to produce many able Labour leaders from its own ranks. Apart from anything else, greater educational opportunities should enable more of the highly talented sons of the working class to rise even in public life by non-Labour means. This would leave the Labour party, unless it were to disintegrate, to be led more completely by conventional middle-class politicians.[28] That something like this process is occurring does seem logical and probable although it cannot be demonstrated conclusively. The proportion of Labour M.P.s with no more than elementary schooling did, by one reckoning, fall to 50 per cent after World War II, from the prewar figure of 70 per cent and the 1918 figure of 90 per cent already noted.[29] More recent and not strictly comparable calculations, however, do not show any further diminution through the 1950's; in fact, the number as well as the percentage of Labour M.P.s with only elementary education was a little higher in 1955 and 1959 than in 1951. Those recorded as manual workers declined only slightly in the 1950's.[30]

On the other hand, there was in the 1950's a sharp drop in the working-class character of the party's top parliamentary leadership (for which, incidentally, the data are more certain despite a few gaps). Table 1 shows clearly that the shadow cabinets of 1951, 1955, and 1959 had significantly fewer members of working-class background than either the Labour governments of 1945 and 1950 or the shadow cabinet of 1935. At this level, the dominant group is now of fairly high middle-class status, usually so by origin but with one or two cases of upward mobility from a slightly lower rung as a result of university scholarships. The change can be described in various ways. Partly it represents a decline in the number of top-flight trade unionists pursuing parliamentary careers; many, it is thought, now prefer to rise through the strictly industrial side of the Labour movement. Related to this is the increased professionalization of parliamentary life. Labour M.P.s are drawn more and more from middle-class occupations requiring university education. Careers in the Labour party may thus become assimilated to a more general British political pattern.[31]

As evidence that Labour's political leadership has already been permanently shifted from the working class to the middle class, the data here are admittedly tenuous. It could hardly be otherwise at this stage. There has not yet been time for projected socio-economic changes fully to take effect. Two or three more decades may be required before the consequences of still recent changes in British society become entirely apparent in the character of political leadership. It is only in the years since World War II that the British community has been generally prosperous enough so as to begin to provide a large portion of the working class with the type of consumer goods (cars, for example) previously reserved for the middle class. The working-class generation raised between the wars, suffering of course from a prolonged depression, may have had more in common, by way of sources of class consciousness, with the generation of the early 1900's than with the one brought up since 1945.

Even the great economic changes since World War II cannot on their own be expected to transform class attitudes. These attitudes were not, in the first place, entirely the product of economic circumstances. Instead, as has previously

been indicated, much of the class consciousness that helped to make the Labour party can be explained by such factors as the lateness of mass enfranchisement and the general carry ever, into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, of Britain's aristocratic and pre-industrial norms. These norms, it is reasonable to believe, made it natural for the British working class and its leaders, unlike their American counterparts, to build their own political party in order to improve their situations.[32] Once created, this party, as well as the class consciousness behind it, may have a life of its own. This resembles the process described by Schumpeter when he said that classes "harden in their mold and perpetuate themselves, even when the social conditions that created them have disappeared."[33]

Surely the British educational system, although itself a product of the class structure, has played a vital part in the perpetuation of class distinctions. The relative importance of fee-paying schools in the scheme of secondary education always provided, and still does provide, an invidious comparison, especially between upper-middle class children and the rest. But, in addition, even the publicly supported secondary system remained a predominantly middle-class educational avenue before the 1944 Act established the principle of secondary schooling for the bulk of the population. Earlier twentieth-century extensions of educational opportunity, while making important improvements beyond the elementary level provided in 1870, had not drastically changed the order of things by which working-class children, including many of the most talented, were likely to receive an education that was briefer and qualitatively different, intellectually as well as socially, from that of children from the middle and upper classes. Even the 1944 Act may not be accomplishing a complete or rapid transformation. Its secondary schools are now so divided, principally between academically superior grammar schools and the newer "secondary moderns," that the old distinctions along class lines are partly maintained despite the fact that the distribution of pupils between the two types ofschools is determined by examination scores.[34] At any rate, the equality of opportunity, which does seem implicit in the 1944 Act, could not yet have produced all of the social consequences possible in the future. In this, as in other respects, British society is not really Americanized.

To be Americanized, it seems, would involve among other things so diminished (or at least qualitatively so changed) a class consciousness that the pattern of political leadership would come to resemble that of the United States, where, in fact, there have been fewer political leaders of working-class origin than in twentieth-century Britain. This fact, representing a striking reversal of the nineteenth century difference, has been called "the paradox of the more equalitarian of the two societies having fewer members of the lower social strata among its political decision-makers than the more rigid and class-bound society."[35] It is a paradox readily understandable in terms of the analysis applied here to the British Labour party. The more rigid and class-bound society is more likely to produce, at a crucial stage of development, working-class party leadership from a reservoir of talent precluded from traditional political careers and unattracted by non-political career opportunities.[36] The latter point, however, raises a troublesome question. Why were the early working-class leaders of the Labour party not attracted instead by non-political opportunities for upward mobility? These opportunities, we know, existed in British business and industry substantially as they did in the United States, and they were taken advantage of by other men of working-class origin. Moreover, rising in business or industry must have seemed more readily rewarding to a calculating careerist than climbing with the new and struggling Labour party at the turn of the century. That some

workers chose nevertheless to link their mobility to the Labour party may be partially explained by the sheer number of potential upwardly mobile British workers, in relation to the existing state of economic opportunity, or by the greater prestige of British than of American public life as a special attraction for ambitious and talented men determined to make their mark in the way that counted most in their society. But it seems most likely that the greater grievances of the British working class gave not only a feeling of solidarity to its off-spring but also a notable sense of satisfaction in being able to lead a movement to remedy such grievances.[37]

The vital point in this analysis is not so much that the Labour party gave an opportunity for upward mobility to working-class leaders. Of course, it did so, but upward mobility would almost certainly have been possible for such men in non-political fields. What is important is that working-class men of great capacity were willing and able to lead the Labour party. By building its organization and accomplishing its election victories, they joined their own career success to that of their class. This pattern, as has been argued, was probably a function of a particular stage of economic and social development, characteristic of Britain as of much of Western Europe in the seventy or eighty years before the middle of this century. Now, at a more advanced and more nearly American stage, Britain seems much less likely to produce Hardies and Hendersons, Bevins and Morrisons, or Aneurin Bevans.[38] Not only are men of unusual ability frequently going to be removed from the working class by early educational opportunities, but in any case they cannot be expected to have the consciousness of class that formerly gave a sense of political mission that could only be fulfilled in the Labour party.

The absence of men of this type would not mean that, therefore, the Labour party lacked competent leaders. Middle-class professionals are certainly available. Complete or nearly complete transfer of power and responsibility to this group would be only a sign of change, not necessarily of decline, in the quality of party leadership. It might even be a sign of successful adjustment of the Labour party to a society in which neither voters nor leaders can any longer be heavily recruited on the basis of traditional class consciousness.

FOOTNOTES

1 G. D. H. Cole, A Short History of the British Working-Class Movement 1789-1947 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948), p. 7.

2 Quoted in U.S. News and World Report, Oct. 26, 1959, p. 26. Bevan was writing of the "brash materialism" of workers buying their homes on heavy mortgages or buying domestic equipment on installment plans.

3 The generally high rate of mobility in industrial societies, including Britain, is made evident by Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), chap. ii.

4 Harold J. Laski, "The Personnel of the English Cabinet, 1801-1924," American Political Science Review, Vol. XXII, pp. 12-31 (February 1928). The only sons of workers to achieve cabinet rank after 1905 but before the first Labour government of 1924 were John Burns, whose earlier independent working-class following commended him to the Liberal government of 1906, and Arthur Henderson, the Labour party's own representative in the coalition government of World War I.

5 W. L. Guttsman, "The Changing Social Structure of the British Political Elite, 1886-1935," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. II, pp. 122-34 (1951). This study, and other thorough, insightful work by Guttsman, is relevant to the present subject. See particularly his "Changes in British Labour Leadership," in Political Decision-Makers, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), which appeared after this paper was substantially completed. Another recent and useful analysis is by Jean Bonnor, "The Four Labour Cabinets," Sociological Review, Vol. VI, pp. 37-48 (July 1958).

6 Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1954), p. 23; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 400-02. Matthews assembled data relating to men who had been president, vice-president, or of cabinet rank from 1789 to 1934. Mills had information on the same office-holders plus speakers of the House of Representatives and Supreme Court justices from 1789 to 1953.

7 In an illuminating study explicitly devoted to Anglo-American career comparisons, but not limited to politics, Joseph Schneider found that among those achieving fame between 1600 and 1900, as established by entries in the Dictionary of American Biography and in the English Dictionary of National Biography, a significantly higher percentage of the Englishmen originated in elite families and a significantly higher percentage of Americans originated among yeomen and farmers. Schneider also makes the point that before 1900 those from various lower groups more frequently achieved fame through politics in the United States than in Great Britain. "Social Origins and Fame" The United States and England," American Sociological Review, Vol. X, pp. 52-60 (February 1945). See particularly Schneider's statement at p. 56: "The institution of political democracy contributed to the greater relative number of famous persons from the business, working, and farming groups found in the DAB. Politics was made a probable field of distinction for all in the United States without implying a necessary change in social status."

8 An especially strong and cogent argument for the importance of feudalism in distinguishing European from American politics is made by Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1955), as at p. 234: "Everywhere in Europe, in MacDonald's England hardly less than in Kautsky's Germany, socialism was inspired considerably by the class spirit that hung over not from capitalism but from the feudal system itself."

9 Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labour Movement (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1949), pp. 167-68.

10 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949) pp. 57, 63; and Jean Floud, "The Educational Experience of the Adult Population of England and Wales as at July 1949," in Social Mobility in England, ed. by David V. Glass (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), chap. v.

11 A. W. Humphrey, A History of Labour Representation (London: Constable & Co., 1912), pp. 188, 189.

12 Ibid., p. 97.

13 As Herbert Gladstone, a Liberal chief whip, said: "The long and short of it is that the constituencies, for social, financial, and trade reasons are extremely slow to adopt Labour candidates." Quoted by Henry Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party 1880-1900 (London: Macmillan, 1954), p. 237.

14 Ibid., pp. 68-69.

15 Mary Agnes Hamilton, Arthur Henderson (London: Heinemann, 1938), pp. 29-3

16 Frank Bealey and Henry Pelling, Labour and Politics 1900-1906 (London: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 30, 128.

17 Philip P. Poirier, The Advent of the British Labour Party (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), chap. x.

18 For comment on the way in which a labor politician rises with his group, see Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), pp. 202-03.

19 Henry Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party (London: Macmillan, 1961), p. 16.

20 J. F. S. Ross, Elections and Electors (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1955), pp. 412-14.

21 That only 11 cabinet members, and 14 of 24 junior ministers, were of proletarian origin was a source of parliamentary complaint. Richard W. Lyman, The First Labour Government 1924 (London: Chapman & Hall, 1958), p. 104.

22 Two important early party leaders not in the Labour cabinet had similar backgrounds. They were Keir Hardie, already dead, and Robert Smillie, who refused office in 1924. Hardie, the son of a ship's carpenter, had started work at age 6, and Smillie at age 9. See Hamilton Fyfe, Keir Hardie (London: Duckworth, 1935), and for Smillie the 1931-40 Dictionary of National Biography sketch by Mary Agnes Hamilton, pp. 813-15.

23 Data on the lives of these and other Labour leaders are from the appropriate volumes of the Dictionary of National Biography, occasionally from other biographical or autobiographical works, and, where necessary for later figures, from the British Who's Who or the Times Guide to the House of Commons.

24 Others, for whom biographical material is readily available, are George Tomlinson and Emanuel Shinwell. See the biography by Fred Blackburn, George Tomlinson (London: Heinemann, 1954), and Shinwell's own Conflict Without Malice (London: Odhams Press, 1955). Aneurin Bevan portrays some of his self-education in In Place of Fear (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1952).

25 Quoted by Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol. I (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 69.

26 Lord Morrison, Herbert Morrison (London: Odhams Press, 1960), p. 20.

27 Lipset and Bendix, cited in n. 3, pp. 82-83.

28 The difficulties created by the absence of up-from-the-ranks labor leaders, when all talented working-class children will have achieved upward mobility through university education, are tellingly and amusingly depicted by Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy 1870-2033 (London: Thames & Hudson, 1958).

29 Ross, cited in n. 20.

30 Data on Labour M.P.s in the 1950's come from the Nuffield studies by D. E. Butler, The British General Election of 1951 (London: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 38, 39, 41, and The British General Election of 1955 (London: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 41, 42, 43, and by D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959 (London: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 128, 129, 130. The basis for classifying by educational levels in the Nuffield studies apparently differs from Ross's since in 1951, for which year both have data, Ross's percentage of Labour M.P.s with only elementary education is much higher than Butler's. For this reason, no direct comparison is made here between Labour M.P.s of the 1950's and those of the earlier period.

31 Guttsman has an enlightening discussion of the "embourgeoisement" of the Labour party in his "Changes in British Labour Leadership," cited in n. 5. In the same volume, Political Decision-Makers, there is a partly comparable chapter on France by Mattei Dogan, "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870-1958." The increase in the proportion of deputies of proletarian origin is notable between the wars, particularly in parties of the Left, but the increase is not continued after World War II (p. 74).

32 This accords with S. M. Lipset's observation: "In a society with aristocratic origins where norms derivative from a pre-industrial social system still retain force, and where they have often been accepted in part by the new upper class of industrial society, there is, of course, greater emphasis on the propriety of class-consciousness or identification with one's own stratum." "Trade Unions and Social Structure: A Comparative Analysis," mimeographed 1961.

33 Joseph Schumpeter, "Social Classes in an Ethnically Homogeneous Environment," in Imperialism and Social Classes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1951), p. 145.

34 H. T. Himmelweit, "Social Status and Secondary Education Since the 1944 Act: Some Data from London," in Social Mobility in England, cited in n. 10, chap. vi.

35 Matthews, cited in n. 6, p. 48.

36 A broader manifestation of the same general tendency has been found in a careful comparative study of political activism in Norway and the United States. Norwegian citizens of little formal education and of lower social-class status were more active in politics than similar citizens in the United States. The more status-polarized party system of Norway, it was believed, was more likely to be congenial to active working-class participation. Stein Rokkan and Angus Campbell, "Norway and the United States," in a symposium on "Citizenship Participation in Political Life," International Social Science Journal, Vol. XII, pp. 69-99 (1960).

37 It has been pointed out, in a wider context, that upward mobiles in Western Europe are more likely to retain political links with their class of origin than are American upward mobiles. Lipset and Bendix, cited in n. 3, p. 66.

38 "Diffusion of power linked with comparatively free social mobility and open entry to all positions of power," Guttsman has observed, "reduces the pressure to enter the political elite." "Social Stratification and Political Elite," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. XI, p. 148 (June 1960).

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THE DECLINE OF NEO-FEUDALISM: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

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The struggle for national independence is often led by a charismatic movement. Once independence has been gained, such movements tend -- to use Max Weber's terminology -- to become "routinized" by developing either "traditional" or "bureaucratic" structures. The outcome of the conflict between these two tendencies to a large extent determines the degree of political stability, the extent of civil rights, and the economic viability of the young nations. In the case of Israel, the bureaucratic elements are rapidly gaining over the traditional ones. An examination of this process as it is occurring there casts some light on the process of bureaucratization in other newly independent nations.

The pre-independence nationalist movements manifest the elements typical of charismatic movements in general. First, they are led by potent leaders such as Gandhi, Nekhruma, and Ben-Gurion. Second, their mass membership is drawn from the disintegrating traditional structures, whether they be the village in India, the tribe in Ghana, or the traditional Jewish community in the Diaspora. The traditional bonds are usually broken at least in part by some ecological dislocation. This often takes the form of migration from the country to the emerging cities though in the Israeli case, it was an emigration from the cities in the Diaspora to the country-side of Palestine. Third, like other charismatic movements, movements for national independence command intense ideological commitments: they are anti-colonial, nationalist, and radical - that is, they subscribe to some social reform or revolutionary doctrine, of a Socialist character. Finally, as in other charismatic movements, there is little interest in economic, administrative, or scientific activities; neither are there available to the movement the social instruments which these activities require. Rarely do the independence movements have elaborate administrative apparatuses or stable economic resources and income of their own (e.g., their activities tend to be financed by contribution rather than by taxation).

Routinization begins either with the gaining of independence or shortly before it. With independence, when the movement's charismatic leader becomes the first premier or president and the members -- become citizens. The movement has to take charge of whatever economic and administrative machinery already exists

and thus the process of routinization begins or is greatly accelerated. The degree to which routinization is begun before the gaining of political independence depends on the length of the struggle for preceeding it, the degree to which the colonial power allowed the independence movement gradually to assume responsibilities, and the degree to which the movement developed autonomous administrative and economic organizations. In the case of the Jewish community in Palestime, all of the foregoing conditions were met to a relatively high degree: hence, pre-independence routinization was comparatively advanced, and hence the transition to statehood smooth.

Routinization may take one of two courses: the charismatic movement may give birth either to a highly bureaucratic or to a traditional social structure. In the first case, the powers of the charismatic leadership are transferred to the state's elite: the old leader becomes the recognized head of the young state; other leaders gain positions as members of Cabinet's Parliament, heads of administrative agencies, etc. The followers transfer their commitments from the movement to the nation, from rebellion to loyalty, from support of the particular norms of a subgroup (the movement) to the universal norms of the legal system of the state.

In the second case, a political "fixation" occurs. The central power continues to reside outside the government in the person of tribal chiefs, village heads, union or party leaders. The followers' loyalty remains primarily committed to the traditional units (e.g., tribes) or to those created by the independence movement, but are not transferred to the state. The situation in the Congo, 1961, provides an extreme illustration.

Here it may be well to provide a brief conceptual note. Weber referred to the two products of the routinization of charisma as "bureaucratic" and "traditional". The latter is a particularly inadequate concept for our purposes since we must be concerned not only with such local, traditional units as tribes and villages, but also with recently created foci of loyalty such as the independence movement itself, or various political units (or parties, labor unions) which might withhold loyalty and power from the state after independence. Following Parsons, we prefer to designate as universalistic those units which uphold norms that apply without discrimination to all citizens (this being both the essence and the prerequisite of a true bureaucratic structure) and as particularistic those units, either traditional or new, which are committed to norms limited only to certain sub-populations.

Highly particularistic political systems have been referred to as neo-feudal; the various political organizations which, unlike the state agencies, encompass only sub-populations, are

reminesant of barons; like in a feudal state, there are no true citizens, but only vassals and sub-vassals. These provide the "baron" with political support (votes) in exchange for which he supplies services which may range from employment opportunities (or patronage) to a rich variety of welfare services. The political machines of some American cities approached a neo-feudal structure, since each ethnic group had its own "boss" or overlord to whom it was bound by reciprocal obligations and loyalty and showed little normative commitment or political loyalty either to the city government itself or to its laws.

It is important to stress that the universalism-particularism distinction, is not a sharp dichotomy but rather a continuum. For no political system (or any society) is either completely universalistic or wholly particularistic; each contains some of both elements, though they differ greatly in the proportions and the ways in which they are combined.

Extreme universalism is characteristic of totalitarian states in which the particularistic units have been disintegrated or subordinated to a single over-riding political unit. In such totalitarian systems the autonomous intermediary bodies between the citizen and the state (or the party) are very few and weak. On the other hand, in confederations particularism is predominantly intermediary bodies are strong, and universalistic governmental agencies are limited and weak.

It is crucial to realize that the optimal structure for the implementation of many social values is not -- as numerous students of bureaucracy were wont to assume in the past -- a highly universalistic one. Minority rights and to a considerable degree civil liberties often depend upon the existence of relatively strong particularistic units and sentiments. These are also the basis for the emotional stability of the average citizen which is, in turn, the foundation of his ability to accept universalistic norms and to engage in politically responsible behavior. A viable democracy, for example, requires not only identification with the Constitution, the President, and the Supreme Court -- all universalistic institutions -- but also with some particularistic political party. Public administration, economies, and professionalism, however, can tolerate and even benefit from higher degrees of universalism.

We shall now examine the development of particularism (or neo-feudalism) in Israel. There during the period of British rule and before the establishment of the state of Israel neo-feudalism was powerful. Since independence, however, neo-feudalism has been constantly declining while bureaucratization -- and with it increased stress on universalistic norms -- has been progressing rapidly.

The Emergence of Neo-Feudalism

The "barons" of the Jewish community in Palestine were not village heads, tribal chiefs, or landlords, but political parties. The Palestinian Jewish community was established mainly by the process of immigration, and as a result the traditional units were left behind and new social bonds were formed. These new bonds took the form of numerous small, highly solidary political bodies which organized immigration to Palestine and subsequent settlement there. Joining a political party often even before immigrating to Palestine (for party emissaries travelled through the Diaspora to recruit settlers), provided the potential immigrant quite frequently with the financial backing for his trip, the assurance of a reception in the new country, training for his new way of life, and -- as the parties increased in size, power, and financial resources -- with all the major services, including health, welfare, housing, schooling, employment, etc. (In exchange, the immigrant owed the party Baron his allegiance.) But unlike the rather commercial and sometimes coercive relationship between the political machine and the immigrant in some American cities, in the case of the Jewish community in Palestine, the close social relationship between the immigrant and the political leader and the intense ideological commitment to the party platform made politicall allegiance natural and easily enforced. The "vasal" had to give much more than his vote; he had to be willing to serve the emerging political collectivity in ways specified by the party, from drying the swamps ("pioneering") to serving as a soldier of the underground units. Lacking a framework of a Jewish state and rejecting the colonial one, the parties, and some inter-parties organizations, carried out the various state-type political functions.

As in the typical feudal social structure, a second layer of "lords" developed over and above the political parties. In 1920, the Histadrut or the General Federation of Labor was established. (It was founded by a number of parties of the Left and of the labor unions; it gradually took over some of the financial and administrative activities of its component parts, later developing a large number of functions of its own.) But, as in a genuine feudal structure, the ultimate loyalty of each vassal was to his immediate lord rather than to this over-lord. The parties remained the focus of identification and the predominant power centers.

Not all parties were equal in power; like in many developing countries, in the Jewish community of Palestine the political bodies on the Left were considerably more powerful than those of the Right and of the Center. The existence of the Histadrut, as the "over-organization" of the Left, without an equivalent in the other political wings, was both an indication and a cause of this effect. Other factors leading to a more powerful

Left parties were their larger membership and the higher legitimation enjoyed by them as compared with parties of the Right and of the Center. The latter point is of much import. Most observers of developing countries are accustomed to think in terms of the Western model of industrialization in which the bourgeniouse, free-enterprise, liberal middle class emerged first and gained both power and legitimation, and in which the working class, Labor parties and unions came later. The Left had to fight for a place, share, and recognition in a society dominated by middle class values and powers. On the other hand, in practically all newly independent nations the process is reversed. Because of the close association of the middle classes (merchants, white collar employees) with the colonial power, and the tendency of the independence movement to be lead by left wing groups, the newly independent nations tend to have parties in offices which are left of center, and to grant more legitimation to left wing ideologies than the right wing ones. Here middle class representatives and ideas have to struggle for position and recognition, rather than the other way around. This is crucial to keep in mind when we come to analyze the role of the left wing parties and Histadrut in the process of routinization in Israel.

The Decline of Neo-Feudalism

With the establishment of the state of Israel, the role and power of the political parties and other political associations declined; many of their functions were transferred to the state as was a good measure of the loyalties of their followers. Party members acquired a new role - that of a citizen. The parralel growth of universalism is of much interest to the student of bureaucratization, and hence deserves some detailed reporting. For that purpose it may be well to focus upon its progress in a number of different institutional spheres. Such an examination reveals that the process develops unevenly within these different spheres.

Thus, in the case of Israel, the process is completely successful in one sphere, almost completely successful in another, highly successful in a third, moderately successful in a fourth, and has hardly begun in the last. The process is continuing more markedly in the bureaucratic direction.

1. Completely Successful: The Judicial System

During the Palestinian or Mandate period the courts were run under what was mostly British law with an admixture of some Ottoman traditions from the earlier rulers of Palestine (prior to 1917). The Jewish community, in its efforts to develop its own political institutions, put considerable pressure on its members to refrain from using the British

courts, and to use instead informal courts provided by various Jewish organizations. Nevertheless, in most criminal and many civil matters Jews did turn to British courts, though there was an effort to minimize litigation in general. Large segments of the law -- such as those which restricted the use of weapons by Jews, their immigration to Palestine, and their purchase of land there -- were strictly particularistic, explicitly oriented against one group (the Jews) and by this very token favoring the other, Arabic group.

With the establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, a new court system was instituted. The law upon which it is based is a mixture of traditional Jewish law, British and Ottoman legal traditions, and a considerable amount of new legislation. The system utilizes appointed judges; there are no juries. It is extremely universalistic. The same laws with the exception of those which are based on religious preference of the citizens (ten per cent of Israel's citizens are Arabs, the majority of which are Moslems), apply to all groups of the populations. The impartiality of the judges and of the courts is accorded the highest respect. Throughout the state's existence, the courts have been the only institutions against which the charge of political favoritism was never seriously raised. Judges are appointed by the President (who, unlike that of the United States, is a non-political figure) on the recommendation of a Nominating Committee which includes various Justices, the Minister of Justice, and the Bar Association. Their appointments are based upon merit and they enjoy permanent tenure. The impartiality of the Supreme Court is especially respected. That the majority of its judges are either members of the Mapai (Labor Party) or the Progressives (Liberals) is hardly known and seems to have no effect upon the discharging of their duties.

2. Almost Complete Success: The Military

The anti-British underground of the Jews in Palestine, like the various undergrounds in France and other European countries during World War II, had strong political affiliations. The largest underground organization, the Hagana, was long split into two groups or factions (known simply as A [left-wing] and B [right-wing]). Moreover, the Commando units of Haganah, known as the Pal-Mach, which were established in 1941, drew about eighty per cent of their members and practically all of their officers from one left-wing political party (Achdut Ha'Avoda). Similarly, the Irgun, a dissenting underground force, recruited many of its officers and obtained much of its financial support from the Revisionists (today the Herut of the Right). At least in one instance, the Pal-Mach came to the aid of strikers at a factory, while the Irgun helped the strike-breakers.

Before 1948, Haganah A and B merged to form a more universalistic organization, directly under the control of the Jewish National Committee, a weak super-political organization representing the political parties of the Palestinian Jewish community. The Pal-Mach or the Commando units were subordinated to the united Hagana, while the Irgun continued throughout most of this period in its independent dissenting course.

When the State of Israel was established, an Israeli Defense Army, basically grafted onto the Hagana, was officially proclaimed. At this point came one of the most crucial tests of universalism of the new state: would the various politically bound particularistic armies join the united defense force created by the state or would they insist on maintaining their "private" force? In July, 1948, the Irgun and Pal-Mach still maintained their own military organizations and fought on separate fronts in the War of Independence. In the same month, a 30 day armistice was signed under the supervision of the UN. It included a provision forbidding arms to be imported by either Israel or the Arabs. When the Irgun landed a ship carrying weapons close to UN headquarters on the Tel Aviv beach, thus violating, in a highly visible manner, the commitment of the Israeli government, the government ordered the ship destroyed and disbanded the Irgun. A half year later, the Pal-Mach was also disbanded.

At present, Israeli military units are strictly a-political. None is known to have any political affiliations or commitments. Officers and enlisted men alike are forbidden to be active politically either in the army or in the civilian society though all have the right to vote.

With the continuing sensitivity to security matters and the residue of the conflicts which accompanied the disbanding of the Irgun and the Pal-Mach, it would seem that the Israeli government still must pay considerable attention to the political backgrounds of the higher-echelon officers. All six Israeli Chiefs of staff either have had no political affiliation or were members of the Mapai (Labor Party), the central power within the government and national political life. None of the senior officers is known to be a member of opposition parties of the extreme Left or the extreme Right. The loyalty of the military to the state and conformity to its orders seems to be highly assured not only because of its neutral universalistic character of the army as a whole, but also because its key leaders support the particular party in power.* That

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* This is enhanced by the fact that the same party Mapai dominated all Israeli governments and always held the office of the Defense Ministry.

some elements of particularism are maintained is, therefore, at least functional for the stability of the political structure.

3. Highly Successful: The De-Politicization of Schools

Since the English government in Palestine neither financed nor organized a school system for the Jewish population, and since the municipal governments were financially weak, various political associations assumed the task of developing the schools. In the pre-state period, each major political body financed its own school system, trained its teachers, supervised the quality of education, printed textbooks, etc. Although there were only three major systems, labor, relgious, and "general" (right wing), considerable sub-divisions existed to allow for the expression of more subtle political differences. (The extreme left Hashomer Hazaier, for instance, had its own sub-system, tied to its Kibbutz movement.)

Shortly after the establishment of the state considerable attention was given to the depoliticization of the schools. In 1950, appropriate laws were passed in the Israeli parliament despite strong objection from extremely religious groups and from much of the Left, which had by far the strongest educational system. The law left place for expression of needs of particularistic groups: while it decrees that 75 per cent of all studies be uniform in all schools, to be determined by the Ministry of Education and to be taught by textbooks approved and often issued by it and by teachers trained under its supervision, the remaining 25 per cent of the curriculum is to be determined by the local school in accordance with the parents' preferences. The law recognizes only two types of schools -- state education (the standard 75 per cent plus 25 per cent of various other secular studies, e.g., handicraft) and state-religious education (the standard 75 per cent plus 25 percent of religious studies). The various leftist kibbutz (communal settlements) movements de facto use the 25 per cent clause to introduce their Socialist education. Teachers for the "twenty-five per cent" are often trained in separate teaching institutions of the various particularistic groups though their standards are under state supervision.

In 1950 it was widely believed that the law nationalizing the schools would, to a large degree, remain a piece of paper with teachers and parents combining to assure the kind of education they would like. But in a few years the old system all but disappeared. The particularistic preferences of parents and teachers find adequate expression in the 25 per cent clause. The issuing of new text books, transferring of teachers and principals which reduced the political homogeneity of a school's staff, the re-organization of the teacher colleges by the Ministry of Education, and above all,

the opening of many new schools to absorb the mass of immigrant children, all made for suprisingly rapid universalization of schools.

4. Moderately Successful: Welfare and the Civil Service

Universalization has been more limited in its success in the diverse areas of labor exchanges, housing, welfare, and in the development of the civil service.

"Labor-exchanges" or employment agencies serve to supply workers with jobs and employers with workers. In the period before independence, these exchanges were to a very large degree controlled by the Histadrut, the Federation of Jewish Labor. Considerably smaller and less powerful exchanges were run by the right-wing Revisionist parties and by a religious-labor party (HaPoel HaMizrachi).

The exchanges were a source of much political power; it was widely known that a "note" from the local secretary of a party could go a long way in getting a job. The system operated more or less smoothly on what was known as the "key system" by which various parties obtained a number of representatives on the exchange staff and a number of jobs roughly proportional to their national and local power as reflected in election results. Obviously, the parties were very reluctant to give up this strategic power. It was only ten years after the nationalization of the army and of the schools, that the major law was passed regulating the labor exchanges. The law nationalized the labor exchanges so that they are now agencies of the Ministry of Labor. According to the law their clerks are appointed and salaried by the state and promotions are based upon merit and upon examinations. The State determines the regulations according to which work is allocated. In actuality, the State has been only gradually gaining control over the exchanges primarily because the old staff, which carries over much of the earlier traditions, still remains (only three years have passed since the law was enacted). Nonetheless, the direction of the change is unmistakenly in the general universalistic direction.

Welfare, which was previously supplied by the parties and various "over-organizations," is now to an increasing degree administered by a host of non-political voluntary associations, by the State's Ministry of Welfare, and through various municipal programs. While there is some overlapping, with the various agencies penetrating each others' spheres, a division of labor of sorts has developed. The state focuses on relief and Social Security, which include in Israel old age pensions, survivors' insurance, industrial accident insurance, and maternity benefits. The voluntary associations tend to focus on specific problems such as rehabilitation or homes

for the aged. The parties, especially Histadrut, while conducting some of each of these activities, often augmenting the sums alloted by the State, concentrate on needs which are not met by the government, such as nursery schools and re-training programs. In those allocations particularistic criteria prevail. That is, services are restricted to members.

The situation in housing is rather similar. While a great deal -- and an ever increasing amount -- of construction in the development areas (e.g., the Negev desert is conducted by the State, and in the developed areas such as Tel Aviv by private construction firms, the parties still continue to build projects for their members as they did in the period prior to independence. Typically the allocation of housing constructed by the state is governed by a host of highly universalistic principles which rigidly allocate apartments according to age, size of family, length of stay in the country, etc. While parties allocate houses built under their auspicies with clear preference to members of long standing, functionaires, etc..

The development of universalistism in the civil service is of much interest. Some of the employees were on the staff of the pre-independence British civil service, and some on the staffs of various Jewish institutions, in particular the Jewish Agency (both contributed together only 13% of the present Civil Service). But the large majority of employees joined the Service after the state was established.

Over the years, a large set of regulations were developed which are typical of modern civil services in other countries, with particular influence by the English. Regulations require that workers for the lower unskilled positions be recruited through the state-controlled labor exchange (that is, according to its universalistic rules which attempt to assure an even distribution of work among the unemployed, taking into account differences in the size of families, etc.). All other positions, with the exception of a few top ones, recruit on the basis of examinations after public announcement of open positions. Promotions are based on merit; there is a certain minimum length of service required for advancement and consideration of seniority. Many ranks require specific training and degrees. Salaries are standardized by ranks, training, etc. With the exception of standardization of salaries, which is generally enforced, all other regulations are quite frequently circumvented or violated. The extent of such particularism is hard to establish, but informed observers seem to agree that it is declining.

Particularism still exists on all levels of the civil service. The state is run chiefly by sixteen Ministries (their number changes). The ministers in charge are political

appointees and constitute the Cabinet. But since the Israeli government is a multi-party coalition, the Cabinet is composed of representatives of various parties. This means that with a change in the composition of the coalition, the parties in charge of various ministries change. But the change is far from random. As pointed out in some detail elsewhere,* the nine central ministries have always been in the hands of the Mapai (Labor Party). Other ministries have traditionally though not always drawn their heads from one party or another; for instance, Development was often the province of a left party Welfare of a religious party, and Justice of the liberal Progessive Party. Hence a good way of testing the degree to which the civil service is universalistic is by checking the party affiliations of the employees of the various ministries. There is no direct data to support the following contention, but those familiar with the situation seems to agree that while members of most parties will be found in most ministries, there is considerable over-representation within a ministry of the party in charge which increases the longer the party is in control and the higher the level of rank examined.**

Universalization occurs through the expansion of the examination system as the basis for recruitment and promotion. This limits the degree to which particularism can prevail, e.g., each party has to recruit from among those of its members which can pass the various tests. Moreover, since many employees are hired when fairly young and unions make dismissal practically impossible even with change of party in office, a certain amount of mixture of party - affiliates is created in many ministries especially in those in which the party in charge tends to change with the changes in the composition of the coalition government. In addition training develops a certain amount of civil service esprit-de-corps which itself builds up resistance to particularism. Still, in toto, the civil service is only moderately universalistic.

Highly Particularistic: The Health Services

Health services, like welfare, housing, schools, etc., were not supplied to the Jewish population by the British government;

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* "Alternative ways to Democracy: The Example of Israel," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 74, No. 2, 1959, pp. 196-214.

** This becomes especially apparent in the case of the Post Office which was for long periods in the hands of the religious parties, and hence the percentage of its staff which follows the orthodox Jewish custom of covering the head with a skull-cap is visibly higher than, let us, say, in the Mapai-dominated Treasury.

therefore, the various Jewish political bodies organized their own health plans. The Histadrut health service serves the Left and most independents; there is a much smaller right-wing medical service, and another one organized by the religious-labor party. Thus doctors, nurses and patients were divided by their political affiliations.

The Histadrut health service (the Workers' Sick Fund) whose budget is almost today twice that of the State's service, is especially successful; it includes a vast network of hospitals, clinics, medical training institutions, etc., still serving about seventy per cent of the population. The service is paid for out of the members' union-dues; as a rule one cannot enjoy its benefits without being a union member, nor can one be a union member without having to pay the service. Its health plan is widely believed to be the most powerful hold the Histadrut has over its members.

Since the establishment of the State, the government has developed some health services, primarily by taking over the few hospitals left by the British. In addition, it supervises medical standards in the clinics and hospitals run by the various political units. Compared to universalization and nationalization in other areas, however, little has been done here.

There are several reasons for this. First, health happened to be the last major item on the list of services rendered particularistically, and thus the Histadrut used all of its great political power to protect this hold it had over its members. Second, the health operation is much more extensive than the others. It is estimated that were the government to nationalize the health service and compensate the Histadrut for the property involved, it would have to divert all of its development budget for the next ten years to this purpose alone (nationalization without due compensation was never practiced in Israel). Finally, the government does not relish the large increases in both taxes and staff which would be required to maintain these services.

In sum, out of the eight institutional areas examined (which include all the important ones), in three universalization has progressed to a high degree, in four it has been fairly successful, and only in one has it just begun.

Some General Comments on Universalization

First of all, it is crucial to realize that the transfer of functions, responsibilities, and budgets from particularistic units (the political parties; the Histadrut) to the state involves a reallocation of power: the state, which had little

is gaining power while the various political units are losing it. This in turn is surely one factor accounting for the increase in the floating vote in Israel (as the power of the parties declines, more people "dare" to change sides) which further decreases the power of each single party. Hence, the parties, especially those successful in providing services to their members, were naturally at best ambivalent about turning these functions over to the State. Since the left has been more powerful in the neo-feudal period, naturally it is more resistant to the universalization process, though without its consent - however reluctant and ambivalent it might be - the process could not be carried out. The fact that Mapai (Labor party) heads the government as well as the Histadrut is of course extremely helpful to the process.

Nationalization of functions does not necessarily mean universalizatin. For instance, transferring the management of the labor-exchanges from that of the Histradrut, whose Executive Committee has a majority of Mapai members, to the Ministry of Labor, which now runs the exchanges and which is in the hands of a Mapai minister, involves some universalization but less than one would expect from the sheer fact of nationalization. Thus, as long as the particularistic elements are still powerful in the civil service, nationalization will bring about only a decline in particularism but will not eliminate it -- the special importance of the decline of particularism in the civil service.

Not only does nationalization not spell automatic universalization, but not every lessening of particularism is achieved by transferring functions and powers to the state. a) To a small degree it is attained by the development of the a-political, non-governmental sector (e.g., voluntary associations such as Hadassah, which set up and ran T.B. hospitals). b) More important, the rapid growth of population (which more than doubled in the past thirteen years) requires constant development of new units of all services. These can be rather freely developed along the more universalistic lines even when the old units are left relatively intact. c) Once the universalism of the new units is well established, transfers between them and the older ones, allow the extension of the new spirit, although they may sometimes provide an opening for the old one to sneak in. d) Much progress is attained by imposing new universalistic standards of supervision on old units.

Finally, as we have pointed out above, completely universalistic systems are by no means the most effective or desirable ones. Thus, for example, the fact that none of the Israeli generals and chiefs of staff is of the extreme Left or Right introduces an element of particularism, but one which is not necessarily dysfunctional. That only 75% of the

school program is universalistic allows various sub-groups to fulfill their own educational needs, while still assuring that all children will acquire a large set of universally shared values and knowledge. The failure to nationalize the health services may be detrimental to universalization in other areas because it leaves important power in the hands of the political bodies, especially the Histadrut; but in a state in which the population is very highly taxed, allowing one major service to be financed by voluntary payments may be highly functional, at least from the economic viewpoint. The fact that no one is forced to use any particular service (there are at least three health services, while the state cares for relief cases, and of course there is private service) somewhat reduces possible undesirable side-effects of a particularistic health plan. State supervision of the standards of the health services provided by the political units, to their members, is another way in which the universalistic and particularistic structures penetrate each other.

Future Trends

Further universalization is almost unavoidable. First, past universalization breeds that of the future. As the number of individuals who were educated in state schools, served in the unified national army, obtained their jobs through the state-controlled labor exchanges, etc., continues to grow, the number of young voters who are considerably less party oriented and loyal than their elders also will continue to increase. As the power of the parties, continues to decline and that of the state to increase, even the party allegiances of the older generation will diminish.

The increasing role of a-political voluntary associations, especially charity and professional organizations, creates a nongovernmental universalistic type of competition for the particularistic units and further reduces their impact. The same is true of the increasing size of the private enterprise economy.

The absorption and education of immigrants, especially of the less educated types, as occurred in the U.S. will surely reduce their propensity for accepting particularistic bonds.

The intellectual assaults on Neo-Feudalism, common in the last decade, will also continue to aid in building up an anti-particularism, pro-universalism ideology.

Thus, while particularism or neo-feudalism is far from dead in Israel, it has declined very markedly and will in all

likelihood continue to decline in the near future. Its complete elimination, we suggest, is undesirable from the viewpoint of the values to which most citizens, parties, and the state are all committed to.

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The Party as a Reference Group in the Process of Legislative Consent*

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Introductory Note. It is the better part of wisdom to say, at the very outset, that this paper represents something of a tour de force. It deals with a set of data which were not collected for the uses to which they are put. It does not altogether meet the canons of methodological elegance. And it suggests an outrageous hypothesis which seems to defy common sense. If this somewhat Quixotish effort is presented, it is, first of all, because there was some fun in trying to make sense out of the data; and, second, because the interpretation of the data leaves enough doubt to make for discussion. In other words, the reader is asked to be both tolerant and appropriately critical. But as no claims are made, no claims need to be rejected.

The data which occasioned the following speculations were collected in interviews with American state legislators conducted in four states during the 1957 legislative sessions.[1] It was one of the hypotheses of the research that party conflict in the legislative process could be pervasive, yet functional for the maintenance of the legislative system, provided the antagonists--Democrats and Republicans--are able, in the words of George Herbert Mead, "to take the role of the other."[2] Tension was operationally defined as the absence of appropriate role-taking, and it must not be confused with conflict. Two actors may be in conflict, but the tension accompanying the conflict is low if they take each other's role. In fact, the better they take each other's role, i.e., the more accurately they anticipate future moves of the other, the more sharply can they define the nature of the conflict.[3]

In order to collect relevant data about the relationship between party conflict and tension in the legislative process, it was necessary to develop (a) a "true index of partisan stand" on some issue, i.e., an index which would measure the parties' positions on an issue; and (b) evidence of partisan role-taking. But the proposed analysis never came off. It did not come off because, as will appear later on, it was impossible to discover party positions on the issue which had been pre-selected as the only one likely to engage the legislatures in the four states where the research was to be conducted--the issue of "school needs."

Yet, though the data could not serve the purpose for which they had been collected, they seemed to require some interpretation, if not explanation. It is the purpose of this paper to salvage what can be salvaged from a research design which misfired.

There is an element of venture in the attempt to make sense of empirical data which seem to elude theoretical treatment--an aspect of research rarely reported and, in fact, difficult to describe. It is something like a jigsaw puzzle, a "playing around" with the data which may not be good methodological etiquette, but which it is impossible to resist. As this mulling process went on, it appeared that the data might shed some light on the process of legislative consent, especially when it culminates in unanimity or near-unanimity, and the function of party differentiation in that process.

Unanimity as a Problem. The great amount of unanimous or near-unanimous decision-making in the final state of the legislative process is a matter of record.[4] Of course, many legislative decisions are made by the formal rule of "unanimous consent" or on private-bill calendars which prohibit passage if a single member objects or requests that the bill be delayed for future consideration. Most of these actions lie outside the arena of party warfare or any other lines of cleavage. But others, as Keefe has pointed out, involve subjects of real importance for individuals or groups in a state.[5] Some of these have bi-partisan endorsement, making for unanimity or near-unanimity, but others do not. It is this set of decisions--where one should expect division, possibly along party lines, but where it does not occur--which makes unanimity a puzzling affair. For there is no overt evidence as to why unanimity should occur--no log-rolling, no bi-partisan leadership instructions, no purposive "engineering of consent." There has been some speculation about the possible dynamics of the legislative process when it culminates in this kind of unplanned unanimity, but empirical research evidence is lacking.

In part, this lack of evidence is probably due to prevailing research strategies. Studies of legislative decision-making by way of roll-call votes are usually limited to the relatively few situations in which legislatures are divided. The criteria used in determining whether a roll-call is to be considered "controversial" vary, and different research methods employed by different students have led to different findings about the importance of party in legislative voting. Jewell, for instance, computes the frequency of party roll-calls and comes to the conclusion that the parties are important.[6] Keefe, on the other hand, deals with all issues on which roll-calls occurred and concludes that, though the parties differed on some genuine policy issues as well as minor ones, they do not provide real alternatives.[7] More recently, in a study comparing roll-calls with interview data concerning the party as a factor in legislative voting, Crane shows that reliance on roll-calls alone may lead to absurd conclusions about either the importance or unimportance of party influence.[8]

Our concern here is not with the viability of these research strategies in determining the extent of party voting. Clear-cut party divisions may occur in important policy decisions as well as trivial ones, and unanimity or near-unanimity may occur in vital policy matters and minor ones. Regardless, therefore, of whether issues of policy significance are involved or not, the fact that some legislative action where controversy might be expected is consummated by unanimity or near-unanimity poses a problem for political theory.

In democratic political systems differences over matters of public policy are not looked upon as dysfunctional. Differentiation between political actors and conflict between them is expected. The party system, in particular, is a contrivance to institutionalize conflict and to facilitate the clarification, crystallization and resolution of political differences. A democratic legislature is, almost by definition, an institution composed of opposed forces, and lines of division are expected to be drawn. The more these lines of division follow party lines, the easier it presumably is to resolve conflicts in some rational manner. We shall discuss this more fully below from the point of view of the individual legislator. Our point here is that if party divisions do not occur, the problem-solving task of the legislature would seem to be all the more difficult. Unanimity, then, especially if it involves issues where differences should be expected, becomes problematical.

That unanimity in legislative voting is a genuine problem, both for democratic theory and scientific research, appears more clearly if we look at other political sub-systems where conflict is also found, but where division is not formally expected. In courts of law, decision by a strong majority or unanimity is

preferred. Conflict also occurs in administrative agencies, but its open manifestation is suppressed: instead, "unity of command" is the formally recognized mode of interaction. By way of contrast, a close division in legislative voting is considered as legitimizing a decision as much as a heavy majority or unanimous vote. This is not to imply that in every case of legislative action division is thought desirable: in crisis situations, notably war and economic emergencies involving community survival, unanimity rather than division is the preferred norm, the "bi-partisanship" is celebrated as a political achievement. But this is a problem of value which empirical research cannot appraise. What empirical research can do is to assess the function of party differentiation in the democratic process of consent and the problematics involved if the process culminates in unanimity when one should expect conflict.

Some Hypotheses. There has been some speculation about the process by which unanimous or near-unanimous legislative decisions come about. Keefe, for instance, has suggested that "the area of agreement on legislative questions is so large in some two-party states that significant divisions along discernible lines (e.g., party, rural-urban, sectional, conservative-liberal, etc.) must necessarily be something less than frequent. It may not be so much a matter of 'leadership' as simply a case of like-minded legislators moving from bill to bill in the broad fields of state public policy where consensus rather than conflict obtains."[9] But Keefe's speculation takes for granted what should be the burden of empirical proof: does unanimity mean that, prior to the unanimous decision, legislators were, in fact, "like-minded?" We can push the question even further and ask: If they were like-minded, where does this like-mindedness come from or how did it come about? To say that unanimity registers like-mindedness begs the problem of unanimity and is tautological.

Just the opposite hypothesis is cherished by Truman. He suggests that "even where virtual unanimity prevails in the legislature, the process of reconciling prevailing interests must have taken place--though perhaps at an earlier stage wholly or partly outside the legislature and the formal institutions of government. When this happens, the legislature merely registers the decision...."[10] Truman's hypothesis, too, makes the leap from the known--unanimity, to the unknown - the assumption that, first, there has been conflict, and, second, that the conflict must have been solved somehow. But again, it does not answer the critical question: why does the resolution culminate in unanimity and not, as one might expect, in a majority-minority division?

In both cases, then, the roll-call is accepted as an accurate reflection of the end-stage of the process of consent, but the end is reached, evidently, from quite different beginnings and, presumably, by different routes. Of the two, Truman's hypothesis is the theoretically more viable, for it assumes that a matter would not have reached the legislature in the first place if it had not been an "issue" requiring an authoritative decision. But Keefe's notion cannot be rejected out of hand. Even if one does not assume that most or all legislators were of one mind with regard to an issue all along, it is possible that perhaps many were--at least enough to set the "tone" of legislative action, possibly having a kind of psychological "band wagon" effect on the process of consent. If so, conflict crystallization and resolution would take place in a context and through a process heavily skewed toward unanimity in the final stage of legislative decision-making.

A third hypothesis may be inferred from one of Crane's negative findings. It could be surmised that the absence of conflict is simply a function of legislators' indifference concerning a piece of legislation. But, as Crane found, just the opposite seems to be the case. His respondents "were more concerned about those conflicts of rural-urban interests and of private organizations on

which indices of party likeness were high than aboutthose party, local, and minor bills on which indices of party likness were low. Party cohesion was most easily maintained on those issues about which legislators were least concerned and apparently regarded as least important."[11] If we extend this finding, it disallows any a priori assumption that unanimity is due to lack of interest or concern. Whether it is or not becomes an empirical question.

Finally, there is the possibility of "false unanimity" which seeks to limit conflict through concealment. Vidich and Bensman have described in some detail the "politics of unanimity" they encountered in their study of the village and school boards of "Small Town." On the village board, they note, "there is always the danger that, should an issue come into the open, conflicting parties will appeal to outside individuals or groups or to more important figures in the machine. Public sentiment could easily be mobilized around the issues.... In the ordinary conduct of business in this manner, issues and conflict never become visible at the public level. Undisciplined appeals to outside groups which would threaten the monopoly of power of the controlling group do not occur."[12] Similarly the school board "reaches its decisions through a process of discussion which results in an inchoately arrived-at unanimous decision in which no vote, or only a perfunctory one, is taken.... It becomes central to the psychology of the members of the board to attempt to minimize or avoid crises, and this leads to further demands for unanimity and concealment."[13] As a hypothesis, the notion of "false unanimity" is quite viable in small legislative bodies, but it is unlikely to be pertinent in explaining unanimity in large institutionalized groups like state legislatures where concealment is practically impossible.

An Outrageous Hypothesis. If unanimity is not a function of formal rules, and if it cannot be assumed to be indicative of some pre-existing consensus, or of the prior resolution of conflict, or of indifference, or of concealment, how can it be explained? We shall suggest here at outrageous hypothesis which, at first glance, seems to be absurd, but which, we hope to show, ony not be altogether irrelevant. Nor do we intend to "test" the hypothesis. Rather, it is our intention to demonstrate that the hypothesis may be helpful in making sense of data which would otherwise remain meaningless.

Stated bluntly, the hypothesis holds that unanimity or near-unanimity occurs in legislative bodies when the area of diagreement over an issue is so large and the alternatives are so ambiguous that the parties cannot function effectively as crystallizers of opinion, with the result that the conflict over an issue fails to be institutionalized in the party system. Yet, if the issue is of great concern to legislators and, therefore, the strain toward settlement is great, unanimity or near-unanimity is the product of legislators' psychological need to "structure" an ambiguous political situation in a way which makes a decision possible. And in this structuring process the parties may yet function as significant reference groups.

Before examining the psychological mechanisms on which the hypothesis is based, it may be useful to take a look at those institutional arrangements where unanimity is a formal requirement for decision-making. The most obvious case is an international decision-making body such as the Security Council of the United Nations. Here unanimity is a requirement for any substantive decision to be made. The reasons for the rule are well-known: on the one hand, the area of potential disagreement is so large, and, on the other hand, its "interests" are considered so "vital" by each participating nation, that, in order to win support for and acceptance of a decision, unanimity rather than simple majority voting is the formal and effective rule.[14]

Unanimity as a voting requirement has a time-honored history. Indeed, unanimity did not give way to majority voting until conditions as just those underlying the unanimity rule in the Security Council had given way to other conditions. Gierke reports that in the political life of the early Germanic tribes unanimous consent was sought for decisions precisely because a strong feeling of individuality made for the recognition that what could not be done unanimously would not be done at all.[15] Simmel discussed the dysfunctional consequences of the unanimity rule in the Polish diet and the Aragonese Cortes, but of interest here are the conditions which made for maintaining the rule, among them the inequality in status and power of the participants, insufficient rules for deliberation, resistance of the constituent members to a feeble executive, and others.[16] It is interesting to note that John Locke defended majority voting on the ground that the community was created "by the consent of every individual," i.e., by unanimous decision, as a prerequisite.[17] In England, even as late as 1791, the heyday of Whig-Tory conflict, Bentham reports, ninety-nine out of a hundred motions in Parliament were carried without division.[18]

It is difficult, of course, to find in modern legislative bodies strict empirical equivalents for the conditions underlying the formal unanimity rule in the medieval legislatures, and which might help in explaining why "voluntary unanimity" occurs. But it does not seem too far-fetched to suggest some conceptual equivalents. An issue may be such that the number of alternatives is so great that rational choice becomes difficult, if not impossible. The "interests" with a stake in one solution rather than another may be so divergent that no effective coalitions can be formed. As a result, the parties--modern equivalents, functionally speaking, of the royal executive--cannot give strong leadership. In this situation, if something must be done which--another alternative--cannot be put off, nothing short of unanimity or near-unanimity will prove satisfactory. The process involved is difficult to identify, for it is far removed from the highly rational process which is implicit in the formal unanimity rule. Yet, we shall suggest, it is rational and functional, even though the psychological mechanism involved may appear to be irrational. And in this process the parties are not irrelevant.

The Party as Reference Group. In a model two-party legislature the most critical factor in split as against unanimous voting is the political party. Members are elected from constituencies, but the most immediate reality is their membership in the political party. The model is defied by many actual situations, but it is at least partially relevant: the parties organize the legislative body, and there is some differentiation among the members in terms of party, even if not practiced as fully as the model prescribes. What, then, is the function of party differentiation as far as the individual legislator's behavior is concerned? What is his behavior likely to be if party differentiation is weak, if not absent?

The legislator is constantly faced with the problem of orienting himself to "the legislative situation." A large part of this orientation involves what Parsons calls the cognitive problem of action.[19] This is the problem of identifying and classifying himself vis-a-vis these objects. The legislator has to develop some sort of frame of reference within which his perceptions can be organized and made meaningful. He has to be able to insure a fairly high level of predictability with respect to the probable actions and reactions of others. In other words, he has to construct for himself a "definition of the situation." In the legislative setting the problem boils down to the identification and evaluation of alternatives. How can the legislator structure his perceptual environment so as to reduce the possible number of alternatives or choices to a minimum?

The most important way in which the number of alternatives is reduced is through a definition of the legislative situation in terms of the legislator's role expectations. He is able to organize his perceptions around the fact that as an occupant of a unique status he is expected to perform certain actions, more or less, and to refrain from certain other actions. To a large extent the role of legislator, like all institutionalized roles, contains a built-in set of orientations which provide a ready-made frame of reference. Among these orientations those provided by membership in a party may be relevant. However, specific role orientations only go so far, and a great deal is left ot the discretion of the actor. It is with this area of discretion that we shall be concerned.

Let us consider for a moment a somewhat idealized picture of the legislative situation as it appears from the point of view of the individual member. Imagine that a problem is before the chamber, such as, for example, the problem of what to do about school needs. The member is expected to select one solution from among several alternatives, support this solution to varying degrees, and eventually commit himself to it by voting for it. Each of these acts is surrounded, first, by a greater or lesser degree of uncertainty, and, second, by a greater or lesser degree of risk. One important goal of the member is to take those actions which combine the maximum rewards with the minimum of risks. So his most important task--still on a somewhat abstract level--is to be able to predict the probable outcomes of all the possible courses of action that he might take.

In reality, of course, most of the possible alternatives are never taken into consideration. The member makes his selection from among a rather small range of actions--most often those previously successful or at least not drastically unsuccessful. However, there may still be a good deal of uncertainty with respect to these comparatively few alternatives. The member is in need of relevant information on which to base his decision. Most important, he wants to know how others stand on the issue, what their expectations of him are, and what the probable outcome of the issue will be. Each bit of information he gains reduces his uncertainty and, presumably, makes action that much easier and safer. The question is: how does he get this information?

In the ideal-typical model of the two-party legislature the range of alternatives on an issue is reduced to a manageable number by the existence of parties. From the member's point of view a considerable amount of information is provided by their existence--on the condition that they differ in some respect. If this happens, the member's ability to classify fellow legislators on the basis of their party membership tells him a good deal about them. Instead of having to find out the position of every other member, he need only discover the position of the parties. Second, and perhaps even more important, the member is able to identify his own proper position on the issue, if he decides to take a partisan role; and even if he does not go along with his party, he has an advantage in knowing how his position will appear to other members. Finally, the member is able to foresee the eventual outcome of the issue: barring unusual circumstance, the majority party will be able to enforce its preference. The member is thus able to take into account the possible results of his action on the future of the issue, and on his own chances of incurring rewards or penalties.

Party differentiation, then, would seem to have the effect of solving the problem of defining the situation for the individual legislator. But what of the opposite situation, where party differences on an issue are weak or absent, and where party labels are poor indicators of the owner's position? This situation is closer to the reality of American politics, and especially the politics of many state legislatures. We have here a case in which the "message" sent by the party label is robbed of its power to transmit information. Moreover,

if the issue at stake has high conflict potential, if the number of alternatives is large, the legislative situation is likely to be highly ambiguous. Yet, if there is a strain for decision, some structuring of the situation is needed. It is our contention that in a politically ambiguous situation actors will tend to project their own preferred solution on others, and they will tend to do so in a familiar frame of reference.

Even though the parties may not take a stand on an issue, they readily supply a needed frame of reference. In the perceptually ambiguous legislative situation, the member is likely to project his individually preferred solution, first ofaall, on his own party. Not knowing where his party colleagues stand, such projection provides him with a perceptual anchorage point. He expects his colleagues to behave in the way he himself behaves. But, as party differentiation on the issue is low or absent, he is also unrestrained from projecting his own stand on the members of the other party to which he does not belong. This psychological ordering of the ambiguous situation involves a great deal of perceptual distortion.[20] But it also has the effect of creating a cognitive environment in which psychological pressure towards a unanimous decision becomes very great. For unanimity can serve as a kind of protective screen from responsibility for failure to resolve the issue in those terms in which it was originally defined by the legislator himself. He will "go along" because every one else seems to be going along. With whom he will go along in reality is an interesting question. We shall deal with it in our review of some of the data.

Source of Data. The speculations in which we have indulged did not precede, but were occasioned by, the data to be analyzed. A series of questions had been designed to uncover legislators' own perceptions of the legislative process with respect to a particular issue. As it was one of the main purposes of the research to develop comparative analysis, the issue of "school needs" had been chosen. In the following treatment New Jersey will be omitted because, for the purposes to be pursued here, the larger Ohio legislature represents a better example of a two-party system which can be compared with the weak California system and the "one-party" system of Tennessee.

These ascriptive classificatory terms are, however, rather unfortunate for analyzing the data. Ohio had a two-party system, but the Democratic minority was ill-served by its leaders and rather impotent as an opposition. California's legislature was, at the time, in a process of transition from its traditional non-partisan stance, facilitated by cross-filing in elections, to a weak two-party system. In this process, the data showed, the Democrats, under the impact of the Democratic Clubs movement, had the jump on the Republicans and appeared more active than the Republicans. And to describe the Tennessee legislature as a one-party system is probably most inaccurate. If anything, it was what one may call a "multi-minority" system consisting of Democratic factions and the Republicans as another minority faction. For our purposes, therefore, it is more advantageous to think of a continuum which ranges from a two-party system with a strong majority party (Ohio) through a very weak, but changing, two-party system (California) to a factional-party system (Tennessee).

The Legislative Situation. How was the situation concerning school needs perceived by the legislators in the three states? Three sets of data are of initial relevance. The answer patterns are of interest because they shed some light on the conditions under which projection may take place and unanimity may emerge. In the first place, as Table 1 shows, the legislators in all three states indicated a high degree of concern in the matter of school needs. In other words, we can assume that there was a very strong strain in the situation to arrive at some settlement of the issue.

Table 1. Degree of Concern with School Needs*

Degree of concern	Ohio N - 154	California N - 82	Tennessee N - 114
Great	73%	86%	80%
Some	21	11	17
Little	3	3	1
None	2	-	-
DK/NA	1	-	2
Total	100%	100%	100%

* The question: "Now I'd like to ask you some questions about the work of this session of the legislature. The issue of school needs is one almost every legislative session faces. Would you say that this particular matter is of great concern to you personally, of some concern, of little concern, or of no concern?"

Second, the data indicate that the range of alternatives which could serve as bases for settlement of the issue was considerable. Legislators were asked an open-ended question as to what solution they personally favored. Table 2 presents the array of responses. It shows that the suggested solutions were not only highly diverse, but that some were directly contradictory, suggesting considerable potential for conflict. Some respondents saw the issue as either a financial, or an administrative, or a curriculum problem alone. Others mentioned two in combination or all three. Some legislators favored and others opposed new taxes; some welcomed and others opposed state or federal aid; some favored allocation of resources to school construction, and others wanted to raise teacher salaries; and so on.

Table 2. Suggested Solutions of School Needs Issue*

Suggested solution	Ohio N - 155	California N -79	Tennessee N - 113
New taxes	18%	13%	6%
No new taxes	6	11	8
State aid (general reserve fund, surplus sources, etc.)	11	62	26
Federal aid	3	1	4
No federal aid	5	3	4
More local financial effort; local self-help; less state aid	16	6	18
More money for construction, capital outlays	10	18	15
More money for teacher salaries	14	18	51
More money for student scholarships	5	..	-
Administrative economy; cut out frills, no free texts, etc.	23	6	4
Consolidation of school districts	17	4	3
Standarization of construction	3	1	..
More efficient use of existing facilities	5	..	6
Better teacher training	2	1	8
Relaxing of certification and tenure requirements for teachers	..	3	7
Streamline personnel, cut out unnecessary supervisors	6	..	-
Maintain local control	3	4	5
Curriculum retrenchment	3	1	5
Curriculum expansion	2	1	2
Develop and expand colleges and universities	7	..	1
Further study needed	4	20	6

* The question: "Can you tell me what solution you would personally favor for this general problem?" Percentages in the table total more than 100% because more than one answer possible.

Third, the data show that what conflicts over school needs existed were seen by only relatively small proportions of legislators as involving the political parties. As Table 3 shows, when asked to rank potential lines of cleavage with regard to school needs in order of their importance, party division did not appear as very important. But the table also shows that other lines of cleavage were considered important by sizeable proportions: in Ohio, three-four saw the legislature divided along urban-rural lines: in California, over a half saw the issue as an ideological battle between liberals and conservatives; and, not surprisingly, almost three-fourth of the Tennessee respondents saw it as a conflict between the Governor and his opponents. In other words, the issue of school needs was by no means perceived as a "non-controversial" topic.

Table 3. Lines of Cleavage over School Needs Ranked High*

Lines of cleavage	Ohio N - 150	California N - 82	Tennessee N - 111
Republicans vs. Democrats	15%	9%	14%
Cities vs. rural countries	75	35	41
Liberals vs. conservatives	28	55	18
Governor vs. his opponents	19	7	73
Labor vs. opponents of labor	3	31	1
Geographic area vs. area	18	2	1
Can't rank; none important	15	24	17

* The question: "This is the list of different conflicts of opinion we mentioned a while ago. How would you rank these opinion-conflicts in the order of their importance on this issue of school needs?" Percentages in the table total more than 100% because "high" ranking was defined as involving first and second choices.

The spread of the distributions of conflict rankings in Table 3 also suggests that there may be a good deal of ambiguity in the legislative situation. There is enough overlap in the rankings to make a stable frame of reference in terms of which the legislator can orient himself to action rather difficult. For this reason, party differentiation may yet serve as a perception-structuring element. In order to appraise the party factor in the school needs issue alone, we must examine the whole range of rankings given it by the legislators, and we shall do so in terms of their formal party affiliation. Table 4 presents the data. One result is immediately apparent: regardless of the nature of the party system in any one of the three states, in every case greater proportions of the formal minority (Democrats in Ohio and California; Republicans in Tennessee) tend to perceive and rank party cleavage over school needs "high" than do the members of the majority. The differences are not statistically significant, but the data suggest that party may yet serve as a reference group at least for some legislators in appraising an issue which, on the surface, does not seem to involve cleavage along party lines to any important extent.

Table 4. Importance Rankings of Party Conflict over School Needs, by Party*

	Ohio		California		Tennessee	
Party conflict ranking	Rep. Maj. N-88	Dem. Min. N-40	Rep. Maj. N-34	Dem. Min. N-28	Dem. Maj. N-74	Rep. Min. N-18
High	22%	30%	19%	28%	30%	39%
Low	78	70	81	72	70	61
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* All legislators ranking party conflict over school needs first, second and third, or tied for these rankings, are "high" raters; and those ranking party conflict fourth, fifth and sixth, or tied, are categorized as "low" raters. Not included are those who could not rank or denied that cleavage of any kind existed.

It is in just this kind of ambiguous situation--where the number of alternatives is great, where party conflict is peripheral, where other lines of cleavage overlap, and where concern over an issue strains for settlement--that the party may yet function as a factor in the process of consent. The interview data on pre-decisional perceptions of an issue and lines of cleavage presented so far suggest a point of convergence with the interview findings reported by Crane in Wisconsin. Because an issue is not clearly one on which the parties give battle, it does not follow that legislators do not refer in their perceptions to the political parties in an effort to orient themselves towards action. But as no cues may be forthcoming from the party leadership, or only very weak cues,[21] the party is subtly transformed from a reference group into an object of projection, but still in a party-related frame of reference. To this aspect of the data we shall turn next.

The Party as an Object of Projection. Presumably, the more correctly the legislator can anticipate the behavior of others, the more rationally can he calculate his own action. But in a situation as we have described it--in which the party fails the legislator as a reference group, yet in which he may wish to rely on it in orienting himself to action and in anticipating the behavior of his fellows--the legislator can resort to projection, i.e., the convenient belief that others feel the way he does.

It was possible to measure the extent of projection by legislators' responses to a question originally designed to investigate their ability to "take the role of the other." Respondents were asked the following question:

> Now, I would like you to help me find out how members of the House (Senate) generally feel about this school needs problem. (1) Take the Republicans, for instance. How do you think most of them feel about it? Do most of them agree with you, or disagree? (2) What about the Democrats? Do you think most of them agree with you on this, or disagree?

Of course, the respondents were also given an opportunity to indicate whether in their view party members were split or didn't care, and whether party attitudes were relevant or not. The responses yielded 26 possible answer categories which, to facilitate analysis, were reduced to four "Partisanship response types," as follows:

1. Bi Partisans: most of both parties' members are seen as agreeing with respondent.

2. Partisans: most of own party's members are seen as agreeing with respondent, and most of other party's members are seen as disagreeing, split, not caring or not ascertainable.

3. Counter-Partisans: most of other party's members are seen as agreeing with respondent, while most of own party's members are seen as disagreeing, split, not caring or not ascertainable.

4. Non-Partisans: most of both parties' members are seen as disagreeing with the respondent, split, not caring or not ascertainable.

In persuing the distribution of these types in Table 5, it is well to keep in mind that the nomenclature used here is strictly limited to the operationally defined categories in response to the question on school needs, and that it must not be confused, therefore, with more generalized uses to which the terms may be put. It is also important to realize that, in so far as projection has taken place, the types probably reflect different degrees of distortion. In view of the wide variety of solutions that had been suggested, and in view of the absence of manifest party positions on the issue of school needs, it would seem that the perceptions of the Non-Partisans are probably closest to the reality of the situation and least distorted. However, as will appear later on, Ohio's majority Republican Bi-Partisans, and Tennessee's "majority" Democratic Counter-Partisans, may also perceive the situation quite accurately. But, in general, the previous data in no way support any assumption about any perceptual accuracy of the Parisans or Bi-Partisans. They had, in reality, very little to go by in giving the responses they did give.

n Table 5. Partisanship Response Types on School Needs Issue, by Party

	Ohio			California			Tennessee		
	Rep. Maj. N-91	Dem. Min. N-45	Total N-136	Rep. Maj. N-38	Dem. Min. N-36	Total N-74	Dem. Maj. N-90	Rep. Min. N-21	Total N-111
Bi-Partisans	65%	49%	59%	47%	50%	48%	46%	57%	48%
Partisans	15	22	18	13	17	15	17	33	20
Counter-Partisans	0	2	*	6	0	3	14	0	12
Non-Partisans	20	27	23	34	33	34	23	10	21
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Less than one per cent.

In the first place, then, the distributions in Table 5 indicate that only slightly more than a fifth of the legislators in Ohio and Tennessee, and a third in California, do not seek in one party or another, or both, a party-rooted anchorage point in terms of which to relate themselves to the ambiguous legislative situation. These are the Non-Partisans. For the great majority, on the other hand, the parties are perceptually salient, even though resort to projection makes for a great deal of distortion. That more legislators in all three states emerge as Bi-Partisans rather than as Partisans would suggest that bi-partisan cognitive structuring may serve to reduce the degree of uncertainty inherent in an ambiguous situation with a high potential for conflict. Bi-partisanship is perhaps experienced as a protective device against possible sanctions from those interests--rural or urban, conservative or liberal, and so on--whose antagonisms constitute the crux of the real conflict, but whose demands, the legislator more or less vaguely feels, are unlikely to be satisfied. And from projective bi-partisanship in the working phase of the legislative process it is only a small step towards unanimity in the decisional phase. These are, of course, speculations suggested by the data and not inferences from the data. They seem to make sense in view of some of the conditions for unanimity suggested earlier. If nobody can be satisfied, yet everybody must be satisfied, unanimity looms large as the only feasible alternative. Bi-partisanship in the perceptual structuring of a difficult dilemma is a step on the road.

Second, it appears that bi-partisanship is more characteristic of Ohio's two-party system than of California's weak, traditionally non-partisan, system, and of Tennessee's complex multi-minority, factionalized system. On the other hand, a surprisingly large proportion of the Tennessee respondents emerge as Partisans (20 per cent) or Counter-Partisans (12 per cent)--that is, about a third take a partisan stance of one kind or another, as against less than a fifth in the other two states. This result seems to support the notion that factions in a nominally "one-party" state may be functional equivalents of parties in a fluid multi-party system. Finally, and not surprisingly, more of the California respondents than legislators elsewhere were Non-Partisans--a result quite in line with the state's traditional non-partisan politics. It suggests that in a system where the parties have been traditionally insignificant as a political factor, the ambiguity of the situation in connection with the school needs issue may have been less felt than elsewhere, and there seemed to have been less need to project one's own solutions on the political parties.

The different distributions of the partisanship response types in the three states suggest that the process of consent in an ambiguous situation may be somewhat different in different types of party system. A closer look at the four types in terms of legislators' party affiliation and the majority-minority status of their parties may be suggestive. In this connection, the data in Table 5 reveal a number of interesting similarities and differences from one system to the other.

First, it appears that in competitive, two-party Ohio Bi-Partisans are more likely to be members of the majority than of the minority party. Correspondingly, Partisans are more frequent among the minority. Counter-Partisans do not seem to represent a problem, and Non-Partisans are only slightly more frequent among the minority than the majority party. We may speculate that in an ambiguous situation in a two-part system, the greater the majority's strength, the greater the tendency toward bi-partisanship and possibly unanimity, especially among majority members, but also among the minority. There may be, in fact, an element of reality in this perceptual structuring. The majority members know, in advance, that the overwhelmed minority will come along, and some minority members sense that they must go along. In other words, party conflict is unlikely if majority and minority are too unevenly balanced. On the other hand, there remain enough Partisans in the minority party to constitute a token opposition. We may even speculate further and suggest that in a two-party system the absence of a strong opposition may be dysfunctional because what might be a party issue is not articulated and agitated, thus contributing to the ambiguity of the situation. From this point of view, then, unanimity or near-unanimity on roll-calls in a presumably competitive two-party system may conceal unresolved tensions in the process of consent.

Second, as Table 5 shows, there are only negligible differences between California's majority and minority members as they distribute among the four partisanship response types. This is not surprising in a system where the distinction between majority party and minority party has had little meaning traditionally. We already commented on the greater frequency of the Non-Partisans in California, and we may now note that they are almost equally distributed between the two parties. But as the California system in 1957 was undergoing gradual change from non-partisanship into a more competitive, if weak, two-party structure, we may assume that the parties were somewhat more relevant as reference points--whether in terms of the Bi-Partisan or Partisan stance--than would have been the case some years earlier. And as the parties, unlike in Ohio, were almost equally balanced, neither Bi-Partisanship nor Partisanship was more characteristic of the majority than of the minority. But as Bi-Partisans outnumbered Partisans by a ratio of about three to one in both parties, we should expect that in an ambiguous political situation, as in the school needs issue,

the process of consent is likely to follow a coalition pattern, with unanimity or near-unanimity less likely to occur than in a more well-organized two-party system where bi-partisan tendencies derive from the inability of a greatly outnumbered minority to countervail the strength of the dominant party.

Finally, Table 5 shows an altogether different pattern of distributions in formally one-party Tennessee. While the formal Republican minority includes more Bi-Partisans as well as Partisans than the formal Democratic majority, the latter includes more Counter-Partisans and Non-Partisans. These distributions make more sense, however, if we think of the Tennessee system as a multi-minority structure in which the members of the formal majority constitute party factions. In such a system the formal minority may actually carry considerable weight in the legislative process as a balancing power group. The data suggest that Partisanship has more meaning for the minority Republicans precisely because internal cohesion in their vastly outnumbered group may be conducive to giving them some influence in the factional battles among the Democrats. The absence of Counter-Partisans among the Tennessee Republicans would seem to confirm this interpretation. On the other hand, the relatively large proportion of Counter-Partisans among the formal majority Democrats suggests that these legislators accurately diagnose the factional cleavage in their party. Similarly, considerably more of the majority Democrats than of the minority Republicans fall into the Non-Parisan category, a fact which suggests that factional lines of cleavage with regard to the school needs issue may have been difficult to identify. In Tennessee, then, in a politically ambiguous situation-ambiguous not only by virtue of the issue at stake, but ambiguous also by virtue of the legislature's latest organizational confusion--the process of consent is likely to be especially complex, and unanimity, when it occurs, is likely to be due to factional attrition rather than a strong bi-partisan consensus.

Orientation to Action. It has been a guiding assumption all along that in a politically ambiguous situation the mechanism of projection serves the legislator to orient himself to action. Moreover, it is clearly necessary that, in face of the great many alternatives available--as well noted in the school needs issue--some legislators must take the initiative in engineering consent among their colleagues. The following data are very limited and not very satisfactory for the purpose of pursuing this line of inquiry, but they seem to offer some further ground for speculation.

We may speculate, for instance, that in the ambiguous situation the greater the tendency to project, the greater the reduction of psychological uncertainty, and, therefore, the greater the potential for action. We suggested earlier that, of the four partisanship response types, the Parisans were probably the most prone to distort the situation precisely because the parties failed the legislator as guides or reference points in the matter of school needs. We should expect, therefore, that legislators of this type are more likely than others to perceive controversy over an issue like school needs as involving conflict between the parties. It is possible to locate the four types on a simple index reporting their average scores in ranking lines of cleavage in the legislature. Table 6 reports.

Table 6. Perception of School Needs Issue as Involving Party Conflict, for Partisanship Response Types*

	Ohio	California	Tennessee
Republicans			
Partisans	3.25	2.84	2.90
Counter-Partisans	----	#	----
Bi-Partisans	2.40	2.03	2.88
Non-Partisans	2.34	1.67	1.50
Democrats			
Partisans	4.05	4.00	3.21
Counter-Partisans	#	----	3.03
Bi-Partisans	2.65	1.94	2.46
Non-Partisans	1.90	1.80	2.00

* Scores are averages of the individual conflict-ranking scores, which ranged from 6, for party conflict being ranked first, to zero, for no conflict ranking. If party conflict was tied in the rankings with one or more other conflicts, intermediate values were assigned.
Too few cases for meaningful score computation.

the results. As the table shows, the scores vary from state to state and party to party, and though the differences are small, they are consistent in the direction of their magnitude. Regardless of state or party, Partisans consistently ranked party conflict on the school needs issue higher than did the Counter-Partisans, followed by the Bi-Partisans and Non-Partisans, in a transitive order.

The data suggest that, especially for Partisans and Counter-Partisans, the political party seems to remain a significant point of reference in legislator's orientation to action in a highly ambiguous situation in which the parties as such do not explicitly serve as cue-givers with regard to a specific issue. The perceptual distortion of reality involved in the ratings, especially in the case of Partisans, need not be dysfunctional. In fact, the data seem to confirm the wisdom of the famous dictum by W. I. Thomas that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."[22] We may turn, therefore, to some other data which indicate the action-orientation of the four partisanship response types.

As legislatures are systems of action, legislators are necessarily concerned with anticipating the outcome of an issue, especially in an ambiguous situation. In particular, we should expect that in orienting themselves to action legislators will seek to determine the probability of a preferred outcome. In making these estimates, legislators' partisanship stance is likely to be a factor, even in a situation where party cues are not immediately forthcoming. However, partisanship stances may have different consequences for estimates of the future, depending on the character of the legislative party system. For instance, where the parties could be meaningful antagonists, as in Ohio, we should expect that majority Partisans are more likely to anticipate a favorable outcome than other partisanship response types, followed by the Bi-Partisans of either party, while the minority Partisans should be expected to take a dim view of the future. Table 7 presents some relevant data. Legislators were asked whether they thought

the solution the legislature was likely to reach in the matter of school needs would be personally satisfactory to them. In Ohio, it appears, the data are in line with our speculation, though it also appears that the Democratic minority Non-Partisans are even more skeptic about the outcome than the minority Partisans.

Table 7. Anticipated Satisfaction with Solution of School Needs Issue*

	Ohio	California	Tennessee
Republicans			
Partisans	1.71	1.40	1.29
Counter-Partisans	----	#	---
Bi-Partisans	1.57	1.69	1.33
Non-Partisans	1.26	1.67	#
Democrats			
Partisans	1.22	1.16	1.85
Counter-Partisans	#	----	1.39
Bi-Partisans	1.32	1.65	1.62
Non-Partisans	.82	1.75	1.71

* The question: "Do you think the solution the legislature is likely to reach in this matter (of school needs) will be satisfactory to you personally?" Scores are averages of the individual scores, which ranged from 2, for a "yes" answer, to zero, for a "don't know" or "can't say" answer. The higher the group score, then, the more does a given partisanship response type anticipate a satisfactory solution.
Too few cases for meaningful score computation.

On the other hand, in the California system where party conflict had traditionally low salience as a technique of issue resolution, the projective party frame of reference is likely to have other consequences in estimating the probability of an outcome. The relative absence of party conflict is probably "felt" less strongly than is likely to be the case in a stronger two-party system. In California, the legislator who fails to perceive an issue, such as that involving school needs, in a party frame of reference "isn't missing anything" in the first place. Indeed, the data of Table 7 show that in California the Bi-Partisans and Non-Partisans in both parties were more likely to anticipate a personally satisfactory solution than the respective Partisans. But, as in Ohio, the minority Partisans seemed to feel particularly frustrated, if for other reasons: as we noted earlier, California Democrats tended towards partisanship in the period of transition more than did the Republicans. We may assume that the Democratic minority Partisans made up a disciplined avant-garde which was particularly dissatisfied with the traditional non-partisan coalition politics of the legislature.

In Tennessee, finally, the data show the Democratic Partisans to be the most optimistic about the outcome of the school needs issue, while the Democratic Counter-Partisans are the least optimistic among the formal majority. We are probably dealing here with members of two, perhaps more, factions in the Democratic majority. One faction appears to be dominant and hopeful, the other faction--Counter-Partisans--less strong and pessimistic. Similarly, the official Republican minority, regardless of their partisanship stance, seem to take a dim view of the future. Their hopes for a satisfactory solution, we may surmise,

depends on their ability to participate successfully in the formal majority's factional politics.

The data suggest that even in an ambiguous situation where the potential for controversy is great, but where no party directives are available, the tendency of legislators to project their own solutions on the parties may yet influence their orientation to action. An optimistic or pessimistic assessment of the future is likely to be relevant in the present.

In order to determine legislators' actual activity in behalf of the solution they preferred for the school needs issue, they were asked just what they had done or still expected to do to promote their cause. Respondents were given a number of alternatives, such as authorship of a bill, committee work, participation in debate, private persuasion or search for outside support. It was possible to count a legislator's past or proposed actions as a rough estimate of the extent of his activity in behalf of his preferred solution. Table 8 presents the average number of acts reported by the four partisanship response types.

Table 8. Legislator's Extent of Action in Support of Solution Preferred in School Needs Issue

	Ohio	California	Tennessee
Republicans			
Partisans	1.93	3.40	2.14
Counter-Partisans	----	#	----
Bi-Partisans	2.04	1.89	2.42
Non-Partisans	1.80	1.85	#
Democrats			
Partisans	3.00	2.33	2.28
Counter-Partisans	#	----	3.16
Bi-Partisans	1.86	2.24	2.33
Non-Partisans	2.63	2.08	1.67

* The figures in the table report the average number of acts reported by legislators in response to the question: "Just what have you done, or what do you still expect to do, to promote the solution you favor in this school needs matter?"
Too few cases for meaningful averaging.

The data are not too promising for speculation about how the actions of the various partisanship response types might affect the process of consent. The differences are small, but a number of figures stand out. In Ohio, it seems, majority Bi-Partisans and Partisans are likely to be vigorously opposed by a small band of minority Partisans. But the latter, a small group, are unable to stem the current towards unanimous or near-unanimous consent as it emerges from the combination of majority and minority Bi-Partisans. If anything, unanimity is likely to mean consent on the majority's terms.

The California data suggest that, on the school needs issue, the coalition may have been led by an active group of Republican majority Partisans. Among the minority Democrats, as in Ohio, the Partisans seem to have been somewhat more active than their party colleagues, presumably in opposition to the tendency

towards unanimity. This we may infer from the fact that both the Ohio and California Democratic Partisans took a particularly dim view of the outcome of their efforts on behalf of the solution they favored.

On the other hand, the Tennessee data show that the majority Counter-Partisans, though most pessimistic about the outcome, reported more activity than any of the other partisanship response types. This is possibly indicative of the bitterness of the factional struggle within the formal majority party and perhaps suggestive, as we noted earlier, of the difficulty to attain unanimity in a system like Tennessee's multi-minority legislature.

Footnotes

* This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Political Behavior Committee of the Social Science Research Council. The data used in the analysis were collected as part of the State Legislative Research Project. For a full report, see John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, forthcoming). I am indebted to Mr. Jack Yellott for preliminary treatment of the data in connection with his participation in a "Seminar on Secondary Analysis of Survey Data," held at Stanford University, Summer, 1960, with the aid of a grant from the Public Affairs Committee of Stanford University. None of the organizations or individuals mentioned is responsible for the analysis.

1 474 legislators--94% in California, 100% in New Jersey, 94% in Ohio and 91% in Tennessee--were interviewed. The interviews, using fixed schedules, uniform in all four states, averaged about one-and-a-half hours. For a fuller statement of research strategy and tactics, see John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and LeRoy C. Ferguson, "The Annals of Research: A Case of Collaboration in Comparative Study of Legislative Behavior," The American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 4 (May, 1961), pp. 3-9.

2 See Heinz Eulau, "A Working Model for the Measurement of Tension in the Legislative System," unpublished manuscript, dated August 16, 1956.

3 An analogy may serve to illustrate the relationship between conflict and tension. The boxer enters the ring as either champion or challenger. But the roles are in doubt. It is, in part, a function of the match to redefine these roles. Tension is high. It remains high in the first few rounds as the antagonists "feel each other out," and the intensity of the conflict is relatively low. As the match proceeds, the boxer tries to anticipate the moves of his opponent, i.e., he seeks to take his opponent's role and correspondingly define his own role. As the antagonists come to recognize each other's strengths and weaknesses, the conflict becomes more intense, but tension decreases. Doubt about the outcome is increasingly reduced as the match goes on. At the end of the conflict - regardless of whether it culminates in a knock-out, a decision or a draw--the antagonists' roles are clearly defined: there is a victor and a vanquished, or there are two equals. The conflict has been terminated and tension is zero.

4 See V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 4th ed., 1958), pp. 727-31; and Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 339-44.

5 William J. Keefe, "Comparative Study of the Role of Political Parties in State Legislatures," in Heinz Eulau, Morris Janowitz and Samuel J. Eldersveld, eds., Political Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 315, note 27.

[6] Malcolm E. Jewell, "Party Voting in American State Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Vol. 49 (September, 1955), pp. 773-91.

[7] Keefe, op. cit. pp. 308-17.

[8] Wilder Crane, Jr., "A Caveat on Roll-Call Studies of Party Voting," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (August, 1960), pp. 237-49.

[9] Keefe, op. cit., p. 311.

[10] David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 392.

[11] Crane, op. cit., pp. 246-7.

[12] Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 130-1.

[13] Ibid., p. 176.

[14] For a mathematical formulation of the formal unanimity rule in international bodies, see Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 140-55.

[15] Otto von Gierke, "Ueber die Geschichte des Majoritaetsprinzips," in Sir Paul Vinogradoff, ed., Essays in Legal History (London, 1913), pp. 312-35.

[16] Georg Simmel, "The Phenomenon of Outvoting," in Kurt H. Wolff, transl. and ed., The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 240-1.

[17] John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, Bk. II. sec. 96.

[18] Jeremy Benthan, Works, II: 349.

[19] Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 62.

[20] For examples of the projection hypothesis in politics, especially in voting, see A. Thomsen, "Psychological Projection and Election," Journal of Psychology, Vol. 2 (1941), pp. 115-17; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1948), p. 168; Heinz Eulau, "Class Identification and Projection in Voting Behavior," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 8 (September, 1955), pp. 441-52.

[21] Legislators were asked this question: "Just to get an overall picture, how important would you rate each of these items in leading you to see this school needs problem as you do?" The items referred to views of friends, advice of party leaders, word from people back home, views of lobbyists, and others. 73 per cent of the legislators in California, 56 per cent in Tennessee and 52 per cent in Ohio ranked advice from party leaders in the lowest category; only 6 per cent in California, 11 per cent in Tennessee and 14 per cent in Ohio ranked it in the highest category.

[22] W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, The Child in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 572. See also Edmund Volkart, ed., Social Behavior and Personality--Contributions of W. I. Thomas to Theory and Social Research (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1951), pp. 1-32.

REVOLUTIONARY NATIONS AND THE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

by

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The tone of world politics today is set by powerful revolutionary nations. A revolutionary nation is a state in which the government has sought or is seeking to reconstitute a national society in opposition to an established social order. Frequently a revolutionary nation is the outcome of a successful revolutionary movement that has gained control of the governmental machinery by illegal means. Occasionally, as with Hitler's Germany, a revolutionary élite is voted into power by constitutional means. The Soviet Union is designated as the oldest existing revolutionary nation. Communist China, The United Arab Republic and Cuba are others. The existence of these revolutionary nations is responsible for an extremely unstable pattern of international relations. This essay seeks to examine the effect of this instability upon the role of law in world affairs. The sequence of inquiry will be: first, a description of the manner in which international law is today conditioned by the dominance of revolutionary politics; second, the impact of this conditioning upon legal norms governing the use of coercion across national boundaries; third, an indication of the bearing of representative norms of international law upon the specific phenomenon of internal revolution.

It should be stressed that the international atmosphere is composed of many elements only one of which is law. Economic, social, psychological, military, cultural factors all interact to generate stability or instability. Law is a relatively <u>dependent</u> variable, significantly useful in a stable social system, dramatically marginal in an unstable social system. By itself legal technique cannot

introduce stability. It is deceptive to rely upon international law as an independent variable. This explains why we should not isolate the study of international law from concern with the broad social and political conditions prevailing in the world. International law can contribute to world order only in conjunction with other stabilizing pressures.

I.

A central aspect of the revolutionary spirit is a refusal to accept the limits of permissible behavior as developed by the established order, especially its legal limits. Law is identified with the status quo, and it is the status quo that is the target of revolutionary energy. Law thus bears a problematic relevance to the politics of revolution.[1/]

Nevertheless certain other extra-legal factors give law, particularly international law, a potential importance for current world affairs. Law provides a convenient way for political rivals to specify limits of permissible behavior. If the consequence of unrestrained conflict is mutually destructive then it is rational to seek common limits that will prevent such unrestrained conflict from taking place. For instance, in the Korean War supply centers behind the Yalu and in Japan were both exempted from military attack.[2/] The development of nuclear weapons has made unrestrained conflict mutually destructive and the establishment of a legal régime mutually beneficial. There exists an urgent need to use suitable legal techniques to contain struggles for world power within safe boundaries. Thus,

despite the existence of the revolutionary nations, international law is peculiarly relevant to contemporary politics because never before has it been so generally felt that legal means must be found to prevent the outbreak of major war between political rivals. The tension between the pressure for unrestraint generated by revolutionary energies and the pressure for restraint generated by the fear of nuclear war is central to an understanding of the contemporary relevance of international law.

This tension is made dangerously taut by the inability of the world community to legislate peaceful changes.[3] Oppressive élites in control of national societies yield only to coercion. The character of reactionary oppression is such that external aid is often needed by the internal protest/if it is to succeed in its struggle for control of the national society. Two comments follow from this. First, internal social change in oppressive societies must come about by lawless coercion; the oppressive élite will otherwise tend to refuse the internal demands for social change, even when these demands have the support of the world community. The Union of South Africa is an instructive instance. Second, internal revolutionary situations can easily become the scenes of Cold War conflict as a result of opposing Soviet and American interventions. Thus internal social change can neither be achieved peacefully nor can it be kept separate from the Cold War. Traditional international law is ill-conditioned to control such political phenomena since it is premised upon the irrelevance of internal coercion to the maintenance of world order. One way to emphasize the contemporary problem posed for international law by the revolutionary nations is to insist upon the current fundamental relevance of internal coercion to international

stability. The role of the United Nations in the Congo is at least partly [4] an acknowledgment of this relevance. Recognition of this relevance leads to a repudiation of the traditional characterization of internal coercion as a matter of domestic concern.[5]

These introductory comments seek to convey a sense of the texture of world affairs as it relates to the contemporary role of international law. Countless other correlative extra-legal developments are important law-conditioning factors: the growing participation in world affairs of Afro-Asian countries, the development of economic and military regionalism, the growth of specialized and general supranational institutions, the ideological commitments in the current struggle for power, the impacts of shifting military strategies (e.g. the gradual replacement of bombers by missiles), the vitality and impatience of movements for national indepedence and social innovation in the newly developing portions of the world, and the bipolarization of the international political structure.

Revolutionary nations generate instability that challenges the role of international law. For one thing, a revolutionary nation is often evangelical in spirit, exemplary for nascent revolutionary movements in neighboring nations and interventionary in practice;[6] there is a strong tendency, hardened into an ideology of world revolution in Communist countries, to export the revolution to status quo states. The new Draft Program of the Soviet Communist Party puts this explicitly when it accepts the "duty to support the sacred struggle of the oppressed people and their just anti-imperialist wars of liberation."[7] The revolutionary nations of Africa and the Middle East are eager to sponsor revolutions that aim to overthrow

reactionary élites and replace them by revolutionary élites committed to radical internal social change. The missionary zeal of these revolutionary nations induces the status quo nations to use their influence to resist the spread of the destabilizing gospel. The United States, as the dominant status quo nation, feels especially threatened by the revolutionary pressures generated by the communist movement. It resists the spread of communism by recourse to every available means short of initiating a general war. This reflects the animosity that arises from ideological antagonisms between rival leaders in the Cold War. It is partly also a competitive struggle for world domination. One effect is to compel the liberal democracies to support anti-democratic governments so as to resist a radical élite that has become identified with the communist movement; United States relations with China since 1930 express fully this dilemma. It also leads the status quo nations to sponsor counter-revolutionary internal movements. The rules of international law are today very ineffective to assure national governments their customary control over internal affairs.

Beyond this the success of a revolution is often accompanied by a repudiation of those norms of international law which restrict the freedom of a state to shape its internal society. The revolutionary nation is usually committed to a program of rapid social change. This leads it to take control over internal capital and to relieve itself of external commitments, like bonded indebtedness. The Soviet Union, as a revolutionary nation, typified this pattern. It expropriated all property that it could reach without providing any suitable compensation and repudiated the debts of predecessor

Russian governments. One effect of widespread revolution is thus to weaken the legal support given to international investment. For, in addition to the actual losses incurred, investors tend to withdraw capital or avoid further commitments when the prospects for revolution grow strong. The security of American investment throughout Latin America is at least part of the explanation for our preoccupation with Castroism. The rules of international law were developed to support the interests of the capitalist nations of Western Europe during their expansionist phases of development. This is very vividly perceived by the revolutionary nations, especially those equipped with a coherent radical ideology. International law, in general, is viewed by orthodox Marxist thought as one way by which the bourgeoise perpetuates its favored position in the world. This produces a basic disrespect for international law by the leadership of the revolutionary state.

Such disrespect is extended by the internal revolutionary experience. The revolutionary movement has necessarily flaunted the law to gain power and it has probably been subject to a variety of legal attempts by the former government to suppress its activities. Thus "the law" tends to be identified with "the enemy" by the revolutionary élite.

In addition, the revolutionary nation is not sensitive to the dangers, even to itself, of external instability. In its early years it fails to perceive the advantages for its own internal development that would result from a reliable minimum world order. Red China continues to take a highly cavalier posture towards external instability.

These considerations lead one to be very skeptical about the impact of international law upon the conduct of revolutionary nations. However, a revolutionary nation, if it survives, comes to appreciate some of the advantages offered by an effective legal order. With the success of the revolution a passionate insistence upon internal stability emerges so as to frustrate counter-revolutionary tendencies. This may lead to the moderation of interventionary external practices in tacit exchange for reciprocal deference to its own internal order. The Communist nations have always, in their formal participation in world affairs, emphasized the sanctity of the most conservative aspect of international law -- that is, a broad, unrestricted doctrine of national sovereignty. The Soviet advocacy of an absolute position on sovereign immunity is an obvious matter of self-interest. State ownership combined with sovereign immunity would exempt socialist nations from legal duties in their commercial dealing in capitalist nations without depriving them of legal rights.

The experience of a successful revolutionary nation may in other ways lead it towards conservative participation in world affairs. It may regard war as a genuine danger to its future, and seek to use law to reduce the risk. The Soviet Union often seems to be moving in this direction and is perhaps encouraged by its belief that there are safe ways to increase its relative position in the struggle with the West for world power; it is necessary to distinguish between conservative revolutionary nations (Soviet Union) and radical revolutionary nations (China). The radical revolutionary nation poses the most direct challenge to the maintenance

of minimum legal order in international relations. The early experience of a revolutionary government tends to emphasize the negative tasks of eliminating the old order. But the experience of reconstituting the internal society along orderly lines makes the leadership dependent upon legal technique.[8] The revolutionary nation may be isolated in its early years of existence, but when it has consolidated its internal position, then it is likely to seek at least minimal external contacts. This leads to an appreciation for the convenience of legal standards to regulate routine contacts across national boundaries. The early hostility to international law tends to dissolve, and is replaced by a rather pragmatic attitude towards the rule of law. Soviet leadership has been particularly adept at improvising ad hoc invocations of international legal norms to promote its political policies. Thus it stresses very much the doctrine of nonintervention in relation to Western efforts to transmit hostile propaganda to Eastern Europe[9] and behaves in a very interventionary manner in the dependent parts of the world, particularly in a non-European country controlled by a European imperialistic élite.

Revolutionary nations, then, are very likely to be lawless and hostile to law in their early years of power. Later this attitude is likely to grow more flexible, and is expressed by a pragmatic use of the legal norms provided by international law. The nature of revolutionary ideology leads to a special burden upon the legal rules designed to preserve the independence of nations; interventionary policy generates counter-intervention and creates conflict situations of high intensity. This is especially true when direct

conflict is precluded by the obsolescence of recourse to war as a means of waging a struggle for world power. Status quo nations which today include the liberal democracies also seem to regard international legal norms from a pragmatic angle that accords priority to Cold War considerations. The significance of revolutionary nations then is to reduce the relevance of law to international politics for all national actors (including non-revolutionary nations).

The distinctive quality of international law as a legal system adds to the difficulty of achieving stability in a world community that includes revolutionary nations.[10] Compared with domestic legal orders, the formulation, interpretation and implementation of legal norms is very decentralized in international society. The principal ordering device is reciprocity.[11] This requires communication and a basic confidence between leading national actors since adherence to legal norms, except in marginal contacts, is voluntary. Fairness results from self-restraint. The incentive for conformity is supplied by the mutual advantages to all states that result from fair and reliable legal standards. Such a predominantly horizontal legal order, working effectively without a hierarchy of legal institutions or centralized organs for consistent enforcement, achieves fair and predictable legal behavior in stable societies;[12] this pattern is suggested by the legal order prevailing in numerous primitive societies.[13] It depends, however, on a community commitment to stability and to a common base of shared values. International law as it emerged from the natural law tradition of Western Europe fulfilled this need so long as world affairs were dominated

by Western European actors.[14] But with the significant world participation of non-Western European nations the divergent cultural backgrounds placed burdens on the horizontal structures of international law; effective communication depends greatly upon the shared experience of a common culture. Distrust and misunderstanding of alien tradition is a universal phenomenon.

This basic tendency to destabilize the common base of understanding needed for a legal order that relies heavily on reciprocity has been accentuated by the emergence of powerful revolutionary actors. For the revolutionary energy is often directed against the restraints and standards that are urged by status quo nations. The revolutionary nation emerges in a situation of internal instability often confronted by hostile status quo nations. The status quo nations fear infiltration and subversion by the revolutionary nation; the revolutionary nation fears counter-revolutionary or interventionary pressure by the status quo nations. Thus instability is introduced at the core of the international legal order, undermining the kind of trust needed for the communication that must accompany the reciprocal patterns of practice. Unless nations believe that there is a mutual desire for stability in their relations with one another instability will result. The dominance of a reciprocal threat to national security induces leading nations to subordinate common standards of legal restraint to political and military goals. The U-2 incident and the April 1961 interventions in Cuba by the United States contrast with the rhetorical pleas of our statesmen for the rule of law in world affairs.[15] Thus the presence of revolutionary nations generates a destabilizing response

by status quo nations thereby reducing the opportunities for horizontal legal order. And by the same circumstance states are reluctant to transfer important legal authority to vertical, international institutions; the Connally Reservation instances extreme legal inhibition by the leading status quo nation. With such diffidence exhibited by status quo nations -- the states responsible for the development of international law -- it is hardly surprising that revolutionary nations are reluctant to participate at all in international judicial proceedings, and refuse, for example, to settle disputes in the World Court. For the instability occasioned by the rivalry between status quo and revolutionary nations is even more detrimental to the growth of the vertical forms of international law than it is to the horizontal forms.

Another way to state this consequence of fundamental distrust is to emphasize the decentralized power of decision entrusted to nations in relation to norms of international law. A state has been allowed great discretion by international law to characterize its behavior in a self-serving manner. The notion of consent as the basis of international obligation and deference to sovereign prerogative is expressed with celebrated clarity in the Lotus case.[16/] This decentralization does not mean that international law is a futile pretense, but it does mean that the effectiveness of the rule is dependent upon the mutual commitment of nations to minimal standards of legal order. So long as stability is perceived as mutually beneficial for all major states the horizontality of international society is not a disadvantage. The capacity of states to attribute legality to their own contested conduct, without being

forced to submit their description to third-party judgment, makes it very important to look at the social reality behind the norms and doctrines of international law. The meaning of the legal norm must be comprehended by an inquiry into the process by which it is translated into behavior.

Independent of the revolutionary situation, skepticism about the role of international law is generated by the refusal of contending states to commit themselves to a procedure that includes impartial characterization. For legal norms exist in complementary sets of opposed prescriptions, thus providing a national actor on every occasion with a lawful explanation of his conduct.[17] Centralizations of authority to characterize legal conduct often produce a more significant growth in international law than do the elaborate codifications of legal norms in law-making treaties like the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea. In this regard the Nottebohm[18] and Asylum[19] cases have immense juridical importance. For in Nottebohm the World Court asserted a vertical test for nationality rejecting the self-serving characterization made by Lichtenstein and in the Asylum case the majority judgment denied Colombia the right to determine unilaterally whether Haya de la Torre was entitled to diplomatic asylum. Acceptance of vertical characterization is essential to the growth of legal standards in a world composed of states that rarely trust one another. This constructive movement gains momentum as more nations can be made to feel that the risk of an unfavorable vertical characterization is more desirable than the disorder produced by two contradictory decentralized characterizations. Revolutionary nations in the early

years of their existence are too jealous of their power, too distrustful of their adversary, too eager for unrestrained expansion to give important legal competence to international decision-makers.

Many discount the meaning of nonintervention pledges or renunciations of the use of force because the nations have not established an impartial procedure for determining when contested behavior falls within the prohibition of the legal rule. Legal rules, standing by themselves, do no more than frame diplomatic debate. The challenged nation invokes one group of legal norms to justify its conduct and the complaining nation invokes the complementary set of legal norms. The United States condemns the Soviet Union for its "armed intervention" in the internal affairs of Hungary in 1956; the Soviet Union defends its conduct as a response to a request by the "legitimate" (Kadar) government for help in restoring internal order in a time of lawless civil strife. The invocation pattern is reversed if one examines reactions to the entry of American military forces into Lebanon in 1958. Impartial characterization of behavior is needed to assure the relevance of legal norms to patterns of conduct. Actors mutually committed to stability may be expected normally to restrain their conduct in accord with impartial characterizations.[20/] It is common to find domestic courts, for instance, determining a controversy brought before it by deference to the national interests of another state. The doctrines of act of state and sovereign immunity, as well as the solution of international choice of laws problems, reveal areas in which impartial legal standards of self-enforcement operate successfully because of the prevalent acceptance of the criteria

of reciprocity. Expansions of this mode of legal order into central areas of contention such as, for instance, nonintervention is precluded by the revolutionary postulate. Political rivalry is given priority over legal moderation, especially where coercion is used by a bloc leader in the Cold War to increase or preserve its relative power. The dominant political instability makes it impossible to render an impartial decision. Each rival views a determination adverse to its national interest as biased and is unlikely to entrust the power of decision to any third-party procedure that did not instiutionalize its political ideology. The relative willingness of the United States to fight Cold War issues within the United Nations is less attributable to its preference for the rule of law than it is to its political assurance of voting majorities on most controversial issues. In this respect even status quo nations have not displayed a willingness to accept legal limits when vital national interests were involved. Political considerations in Kashmir quickly revealed the scope of India's commitment to the rule of law, and the Suez campaign in 1956 illustrated the willingness of even extreme status quo nations to override the limits of law.

Despite the fact that complementary norms give nations a "legal" explanation for "illegal" conduct the consensus of world sentiment tends to provide an independent judgment. This can result in conforming behavior to the legal norm if both superpowers happen to agree with the majority judgment; the effective response of the United Nations to the Suez invasion by France, England, and Israel provides a leading illustration. Even when the superpowers disagree the vote in the General Assembly provides a weak form of

objective characterization that has law-inducing consequences. For the growing strength of world opinion, especially as expressed in the United Nations, gives to resolutions of censure the status of an inchoate sanction. It is relevant to compare the prominent ordering role played by ridicule in primitive societies. The Soviet Union has not been unmindful of its international prestige. The prospect of censure, with a resulting crystalization of world opinion, seems to influence, if not restrain, national actions; it acts as a marginal factor to discourage repetitions of Budapest and it may yet spare Castro an invasion by the United States marines.

One hopes that the passage of time will transform the outlook of the revolutionary nations in the direction of the status quo nations.[21/] The process is cumulative, as when the status quo nations perceive the waning of the revolutionary zeal they will, in turn, also rely more upon stabilities of law and less upon stabilities of force. The nuclear risks encourage both types of nations to hasten a willingness to strengthen legal order.

II.

The effort of post-Medieval Europe to restrict the right of a state to wage war to those instances in which it had "a just cause" ended in failure. Despite the moralizing rhetoric of the bellum justum doctrine, drawn by jurists from the corpus of natural law, it became evident that most nations were unwilling to adhere to legal limits when they had sufficient power to attain national goals by conquest. It was the wisdom of the XIXth Century

to shift the emphasis from a delineation of the occasions when it was legitimate to wage war to a system of shifting alliances between the leading European states designed to make it impossible for a nation to mobilize superior force against its political rivals. Thus stability was not a matter of enforcing rules restricting the use of force, but rather the control of force depended upon the existence of countervailing force. Political mechanisms of stability were more successful than the earlier attempt to establish stability by positing clear rules. Law thus became virtually irrelevant to the use of war to promote national interests, although law made important contributions to the effort to restrict the scope of war by the doctrine of neutrality and to regularize the conduct of hostilities to eliminate superfluous horror. The decision to use force, however, was not subject to third-party characterization, and a state was in a position to legitimate recourse to war by giving its own explanation.

World War I marked the end of the balance of power system. The destructivity of war in the XXth Century gave solemn urgency to the endeavor to control the use of force. The League of Nations was created to provide collective machinery for the determination of unlawful uses of force, thus internationalizing the characterization of war and aggregating the counter force of the world community. However, the unanimity principle, the non-participation of the United States, and the unwillingness of nations to act on behalf of world community interests made the League unable to cope with flagrantly aggressive recourses to

force by Germany, Italy, and Japan. Widespread efforts were made to persuade nations to renounce the use of force in international relations, culminating in the solemn pledge of the Pact of Paris in 1928 to restrict recourse to force to situations of self-defense. One could question the seriousness of the legal commitment in view of the failure to provide definitions of aggressive war or self-defense and the absence of a mechanism for an impartial characterization of conduct alleged to be in violation of the pledge. With neither a standard nor an agency for third-party interpretation and enforcement the legal commitment to renounce the aggressive use of force proved to be ineffectual, except possibly as sedation for status quo nations. Legal rules, without the backing of available and sufficient force, seem unable to discourage recourse to international violence. This observation continues to pertain to the present world situation. The United Nations Charter restricts the lawful use of force to "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" in Article 51 and expresses in Article 2(4) a commitment by members to refrain from the use or threat of force in international relations. The prohibition of aggressive war was implicit in the Nuremberg Judgment and received the unanimous support of the General Assembly in a resolution adopting the Nuremberg Principles. Thus recourse to unlawful war, if unsuccessful, might well result in criminal responsibility for the leaders of the defeated nation. But no serious progress has been made to outlaw war as a way to promote national interests. An authoritative definition of aggression is needed to establish a legal standard that could guide states and suggest the outer limits of permissible coercion. However, one notes with regret,

that the United Nations has failed in its attempts to formulate an acceptable definition of aggression;[22] instead reliance is placed upon an ad hoc political determination by the Security Council in the unlikely event of agreement among the permanent members or by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. Major states do not seem willing to entrust the determination of and control over recourses to force to a non-political commission operating with an advance definition and empowered to compel police action.[23] It is exceedingly problematic to rely upon the indubitable "norm" of international law proscribing aggressive war. For without an effective process for implementing the definition, could it be agreed upon, it is unlikely to govern the behavior of expanding states in their pursuit of national goals. The mere "norm" of international law positing a standard of behavior does not deserve the status of "law" unless it is accompanied by a process of implementation. However, it is not essential that the process be supplied by a central or supranational ("vertical") institution; it may bring about the desired behavioral results by decentralized or national ("horizontal") regularities. For instance, the modest success of the neutrality system in confining the scope of war was based upon the horizontal interplay of self-interested belligerent and neutral nations. Horizontal efforts to control aggressive war reveal more promise. Thus Cold War rivals are intimidated by the probable fulfillment of collective self-defense commitments and the fear of a retaliation that includes nuclear devastation. Such deterrent threats seem to have discouraged the cruder and more central exertions of coercion in

the Cold War; the Korean conflict is a special instance because the boundary crossed was not "international" and the United States had been publicly ambivalent about undertaking an advance commitment to defend South Korea. When border-crossing occurs outside the main context of the Cold War, as in Suez in 1956, then the collective machinery of the United Nations increasingly provides effective community response.

Thus the prohibition of aggressive war seems to be an effective contemporary legal doctrine if the concept of aggression is very crudely defined. However, subtle forms of coercion, even across borders, are not brought under legal control. The UN would not respond to the complaints by Israel of episodic Egyptian border-crossings for purposes of terrizing inhabitants of Israeli territory; such coercive conduct fell short of "an armed attack" and Israel was not entitled to act in self-defense. The absence of control over subtle forms of coercion imposes an immense burden upon a nation that is expected to refrain from the use of "aggressive" force. It is on these grounds that Julius Stone defends the Sinai campaign in 1956.[24] The background threat of nuclear war is so overwhelming that the clear minimum standards of identifying coercion as border-crossing of sustained magnitude must be upheld, even though it may have been very unfair to expect Israel in 1956 to suffer continuing harrassment at the hands of Egyptian terrorists.

The instabilities of the era, combining the expansive energies of the Communistic bloc and the eruptive energies of the various Afro-Asian-Latin American revolutionary élites, have not been expressed in conventional war. Nuclear deterrence makes it

highly irrational to promote national interests by recourse to war. Thus the legal norm is backed by political reality. However, the cost of "law enforcement" is exceedingly high, involving the immense outlay of resources needed to ensure a crippling second strike capacity and the horrible risk of accidental war in one of its several forms.[25] It is characteristic of revolutionary politics to maintain order by a reliance upon terror, and it is this frightful condition that appears to be an integral aspect of the current situation. For the very presence of revolutionary impetus in the world particularly rigidifies the distrust of the status quo nations, especially when the pendulum starts to swing against them, so as to make it impossible to transfer the struggle onto a level where the stakes are less ultimate. Consequently, legal arrangements to banish nuclear weapons and to give to an international organization the force needed to discourage non-nuclear "aggressive war" have small hope for significant adoption even though the dynamics of the actual conflict would remain unchanged. That is, the Communist bloc would continue to support internal revolutionary movements in the less developed parts of the world and the Western nations would counter that support by helping the presently constituted governments. This is a crisis of confidence and imagination which must be overcome if law is to contribute its techniques to enable the conflict to be waged without endangering human survival. For the horizontal system of deterrence based upon a reasonable consensus as to the nature of "aggression" may break down if one side finds itself losing the Cold War. The dysfunctional rigidity of the American response to Castro is an

alarming sign of such a possibility. The accumulation of such signs may lead to the triggering of nuclear war, and thus to a further fulfillment of Samson's last testament.

The tendency of revolutionary nations to export their ideological impetus rarely requires a direct use of force, much less recourse to a full-scale aggressive war. The expansion by the revolutionary nations is carried on by subtler forms of coercion than are entailed by the concept of "armed attack." In addition, the revolutionary spirit in the XXth Century is based upon an anti-imperialist ideology which stresses the urgency of radical internal social and economic changes. Despite the empire-building patterns of the Soviet Union, and now China, the revolutionary mission is primarily the sponsor of nationalist eruptions in the status quo nations. Subordinate revolutionary energies in the Arab and African world stress racial unification on a political level; one supposes that Nasser and Nkrumuh envision themselves as eventual heads of sprawling resurgent racial empires. The basic revolutionary appeal, however, is directed to the oppressed classes who are urged to seize control, redistribute wealth, and provide the state with a wide capital base that will support rapid industrial development.

Subtler forms of coercion, often called "indirect aggression," are difficult to regulate partly because of the special status conferred upon nation-states by international law. The classical formulations of international law underscore the dominance of states in world affairs. It is a historical fact that national governments consolidated internal power to permit effective participation in external ventures of discovery, settlement, and

trade. This led to affirmations of the exclusivity of the authority of a state within its own borders and to marginal restrictions upon the capacity of a state to act in world affairs. Thus there arose considerable doctrinal support for the independence of a state, and the implied right of a national society to be free from external interference. Participation in world affairs was confined to the leading monarchies of Europe. Each sought to maximize its power at the expense of the others, but had no particular impulse to interfere with the internal affairs of its rival. If conflict was unavoidable by balance of power calculations then war settled the issue -- preferably fought on some colonial land far from the home country; war represented a conflict of professional armies, and was not nearly so likely to require the total support of the internal population. However, the success of the American and French revolutions changed the character of world affairs. From the Congress of Vienna onwards the continental monarchies perceived the democratic objectives of revolutionary movements as a contagious disease to be stamped out wherever it appeared. Prussia, Russia, and Austria adopted a responsive interventionary policy in defense of the principle of legitimacy. Armed interventions restored monarchies in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. The avowal of intentions to recapture for Spain control over her revolting colonies led to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 with its insistence that European nations refrain from intervention in the Western hemisphere. It is well-known how the shield became a sword as the century progressed. Although Europe was kept out the United States intervened to restore internal order or to

protect American economic interests. The details of the story are no longer important as a series of XXth Century hemispheric agreements incorporated an absolute renunciation of the right of unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.[26] However, the internal events in another state were not sealed off from international concern. The adoption of the principle of collective self-defense in Article 3 of Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was supplemented by the Declaration of Solidarity at Caracas in 1954 with its condemnation of the interventionary character of the internationalist communist movement and an a priori commitment to view its appearance in any part of the hemisphere as "a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American states" that called for collective action. In effect, the formal claim was to revive the concept of protective intervention implicit in the experience of the Monroe Doctrine in order to set limits upon the expansionist tendencies of the communist movement.

The development of American policy was influenced by events leading up to World War II that suggested political limits to the legal commitment to nonintervention. The end of World War I had led to strong sentiment, most dramatically attributed to Wilson, favoring policies of self-determination and nonintervention. The costly war was itself seen to be in part an outgrowth of colonial greed. The reaction led to a widespread endorsement of the right of a people to control their own political destiny. It was also felt that if noninterference prevailed conflict could be localized. Gradually this induced the status quo powers to

give up interventionary practices and adhere to their pledges of nonintervention. Such a pattern of commitment was part of the atmosphere favorable to the aggressions of Nazi Germany. A combination of subversive intervention by Germany and nonintervention by other European nations facilitated the increases in national power won so easily by Hitler in the years leading up to World War II. The acme of nonintervention by the Western democracies took place during the Spanish Civil War and was paralleled by the full-scale intervention of the Fascist nations on the side of Franco and the Soviet Union on the Loyalist side. It became evident that intervention short of armed attack was an effective way to increase national power, at least assuring a friendly government. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that a potential aggressor becomes much more dangerous if it can consolidate its power by maximum use of interventionary tactics prior to recourse to war. The implication of nonintervention is to watch while a potential enemy grows strong through a series of successful interventions. When the occasion to resist arises for the "law-abiding" state, then it may be too late, or at least it is more arduous than it would have been at a stage when the aggressor was weaker. Certainly Hitler was more difficult to defeat because the liberal democracies did not regard his earlier manifestations of aggressiveness as an occasion for counter-action. Nonintervention is a system that brings stability only if all states powerful enough to intervene refrain from using their power. As soon as one state embarks on an interventionary policy then the legal standards used to measure the duties of nonintervention are a trap for <u>status quo</u> nations and a shield for an aggressor

nation. Thus in the years leading up to World War II nonintervention was deference to aggression rather than to self-determination. Hence protective and preventive intervention may be essential to resist the pressure of expansion. This insight has been at the basis of United States policy in the Cold War accounting for American interventions in Iran, Guatemala, Lebanon, and now, abortively, Cuba and Laos.

Revolutionary internal action necessarily invites intervention under modern circumstances. The dominant elite in control of the national government can often suppress a purely domestic revolutionary movement. However, the internal revolutionary group, especially if it is situated near the periphery of Communist influence, can receive external help; such intervention transforms the domestic revolution into an arena for Cold War conflict, subordinating the welfare of the inhabitants to the global struggle for power. This was the sad experience of Korea, Indochina, and Laos. Cold War rivalry can also be used by the successful nationalist revolution to obtain significant external economic aid to allow rapid internal capital development to take place. Nasser discovered this way to exploit the revolutionary situation of world affairs without endangering national independence. Castro, gaining control of a strategically situated nation, has tried the same tactic; but American property interests in Cuba and the widespread fear that Castroism is a spreading cancer led to intervention.[27] The United States acted to prevent the successful revolutionary leader from taking advantage of the Cold War to achieve internal material gains.

The historical-political pattern of the revolutionary era

conditions the legal norms prohibiting intervention in very comprehensive terms. Article 15 of the Charter of Bogotá is typical of the broad doctrinal commitment to nonintervention:

> No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.

The Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind even proposes individual criminal responsibility for promoting intervention in the political affairs of another country. But here, unlike with aggression, there is no horizontal implementation of the broad prohibitive legal commitment.[28] The superpowers do not think that an intervention will provoke a massive retaliation by their rival. In fact the obsolescence of recourse to war shifts the international struggle for power into a series of interventionary settings. The United Arab Republic has found that intervention by hostile propaganda, subversion, and other means more subtle than so-called "dictatorial interference" in internal affairs is an economical and effective way to expand its influence across national boundaries by sponsoring internal revolutions in neighboring conservative countries. It is ordinarily true that intervention in Africa and Asia is a progressive force for social change unless it leads to an armed clash in the context of the Cold War; it provides the oppressed peoples with an external lever or power that can often enable the revolution to overcome internal weakness. If the occasion for intervention is to prevent a defection by a Cold War bloc member then the danger of major nuclear conflict tends to discourage counter-intervention. This

certainly seems to be evident for the U.S. intervention in Guatamala in 1954 and in Cuba in 1961, and for the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956.

Political factors take consistent precedence over legal considerations with regard to interventionary phenomena. The legal rules are quite clear, but the urgencies of revolutionary energy in the midst of the Cold War rivalry, give them little more than a rhetorical relevance. That is, especially the United States, seeks to veil its interventionary practices by legalistic devices. Thus the Eisenhower Doctrine stressed the consent of the constituted government to justify action taken to suppress internal revolutionary pressures and President Kennedy emphasized the absence of direct military intervention to defend America's role in staging the 1961 counter-revolution against Castro. Such concern with legality is significant so far as it actually influences American decisions to resort to military intervention or to refrain from sending troops into a foreign country when the head of state has not requested their presence. In this sense the phenomena of intervention can be confined or enlarged by the broad relevance of reciprocity to the behavior of the leading actors in the Cold War. Thus the way the United States intervenes in Cuba may influence the way in which the Soviet Union intervenes in Laos. But from the viewpoint of the smaller <u>status quo</u> nations in Latin America and elsewhere reliance upon such legalistic factors does not disguise the defeat of the legal principle, and its embodied policy, that one state is not entitled to use its coercive influence to control the internal affairs of another state. For conformity to a technical interpretation of a

norm matters far less than the fulfillment of the guiding policy of the rule by finding behavioral ways to unite power with prescriptive imperatives.

The Soviet Union has consistently abetted internal revolutions in the non-socialist parts of the world by following an openly interventionary policy.[29] In the context of colonialism the principle of self-determination is given precedence over norms of nonintervention. But when a socialist country is the target of intervention then the Soviet Union strongly stresses notions of domestic concern and noninterventionism. For instance, Premier Khrushchev's April 22, 1961 Message to President Kennedy on the American role in financing, training, and administering the rebel attack on Cuba relied heavily and piously upon the norm of international law proscribing intervention:

> What standards of law can be invoked to justify these interventions? . . . If such methods were to become predominant in the relations among states, there would be no place left for law. Its place would be taken by lawlessness and arbitrariness.

And later in his Message Khrushchev says:

> We are for the peaceful coexistence of all states and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. . . . We consider that any interference by one state in the affairs of another, especially armed interference is a violation of all international laws.[30]

At the same time it is accurate to attribute a schizophrenic quality to the American endorsement of noninterventionism. At the same time that we revive, like Lazarus, the Monroe Doctrine to justify intervention in Cuba, alleging our action to be in accord with the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity, we continue to celebrate Captive Nations Week each July by unanimous Resolution

of Congress despite its frankly interventionary tenor.[31] It is evident that the distinction between intervention and nonintervention is manipulated by the Cold War leaders to justify their preferred political solution to a given situation. There is no adherence to a common standard, although Khrushchev's Message on Cuba emphasizes the destabilizing effect of the reciprocal acceptance by the Soviet Union of military security as a basis for intervention in states, like Pakistan and Turkey, that have American bases on the geographical border of Russia. This is an important consideration, as the degree of restraint in an unstable world is based more on reciprocal patterns of practice than it is upon abstract norms of legal control. Revolutionary nations when their position grows strong may shift from lawlessness to gradual patterns of reciprocal adherence to common standards. This may be one way to discern the transformation of a revolutionary nation into a status quo nation.

The policy of nonintervention is closely allied to legal rules about territorial sovereignty, equality and independence of states, and domestic jurisdiction. The fundamental policy objective is to affirm the internal supremacy of the national government; however, generally, international law is not concerned with coercive internal movements, including revolutions, that threaten to overthrow the existing government. External states may give aid to the constituted government if the civil strife is characterized as "insurgency" but must remain neutral if it is regarded as "belligerency"; some regard the duty of noninterference to include a refusal to give the established government help regardless of the stage of civil strife. Despite contrary claims, no inter-

ventionary right ordinarily arises as a result of civil strife. Thus under the Charter civil strife is a matter "essentially within domestic jurisdiction" unless it constitutes a threat to the peace. That is, the duty of the United Nations is to maintain international, not internal peace; but the expanding tendencies of civil strife under revolutionary world conditions very quickly transforms an internal war into an international conflict situation. This certainly accounts for the presence and the immense difficulty encountered by the United Nations in its effort to establish order in the Congo in 1960-61. The Congo conflict combines the Cold War and the battle against coloniaism with intense internal struggles for power. The factions are not susceptible, it has seemed, to reconciliation; the establishment of order requires the UN to make choices for and against the contending factions, thereby identifying itself with one side in the global rivalry and alienating the opposed side. The UN has met this fate in the Congo operation, and yet it is not easy to conceive how else it might have acted to carry out its decision to intervene. The emergence of revolutionary nations -- of the left and of the right - tends to subordinate actual implementation of centralized interventionary decisions to the urgencies of the Cold War. This was curiously manifest in a recent study of intervention from the perspective of diplomatic history: "Intervention is legal when it is used to protect vital national or international interests which are in imminent jeopardy and which cannot be protected by other means. When it is undertaken to safeguard lesser stakes, or when peril is not pressing, or when other means are available, or when it violates contractual obligation, intervention is

illegal.[32] In a decentralized legal order this makes law into an appeal to conscience; there are no criteria given whereby patterns of reciprocal behavior can establish reasonable limits to interventionary policy. This is a regressive approach to the relation between law and politics, as it confirms the primacy of political considerations. It is recommended that the motive for interference should not govern the legality of the interference unless it is carried out under mandate of the United Nations. The illegality of intervention is preferably viewed as a series of coordinates ranging from the manifest illegality of armed interference in internal affairs to the subtle legality of a prolonged withholding of recognition from a hostile government, as a second set of coordinates ranging from the illegality of unilateral interventions to the legality of world community intervention, and as a third set of coordinates that express the extent of coercive impact. Such a system of normative classification would help us to understand the legal quality of interventionary practice.

A second level of analysis could then relate a particular intervention to the dynamics of the revolutionary situation of the Cold War. From such a perspective we can distinguish the Indian interventions in Kashmir and Hyderabad from the Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the American interventions in Guatemala and Cuba. In this connection it is useful to emphasize the spatial relation between the target state and the intervening Cold War actor; compare, for instance, the American response to the Chinese intervention in Tibet with the alleged Soviet intervention in Cuba on behalf of Castro. Part of the variation here is based upon the feasibility of counter-

intervention. We find, as well, a minimal stability that results from reciprocal deference by the leading Cold War rivals to a region of acknowledged hegemony;[33/] here it is useful to compare the verbal "counter-intervention" with military counter-intervention -- for instance, United States-Soviet responses to Guatemala in 1954, Hungary in 1956, and Laos in 1961.

Thus the interventionary policy of a revolutionary political era takes precedence over the norms of nonintervention present in international law. However, the aging of major revlutionary nations, the threat of war arising out of interventionary clashes, and the growth of regional and international institutions suggests that possibly legal claims will be given greater weight in the future. Certainly adequate norms and implementing processes relevant to nonintervention are a prerequisite of a successful shift from instability to stability in world politics.

III.

The relevance of norms of international law to the specific phenomenon of an internal revolution is evident. The Communist governments of the Soviet Union and mainland China attained power by successfully staged revolutions. The main way in which the leading revolutionary nations seek to expand their influence, and this includes a non-Communist nation like the UAR, is to sponsor revolutionary movements in status quo nations. Techniques of infiltration, subversion, and espionage have been perfected as instruments of indirect aggression without exposing the actor to the immense hazard of direct attack. The bearing of legal norm upon the phenomenon of revolution is a crucial aspect of the

relation between a revolutionary nation and international law. The effort to export revolutions is, of course, prohibited by the norms of nonintervention; subversion, infiltration, and propaganda, designed to foment a foreign revolution is a maximum instance of an effort to influence the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In addition to this central notion of non-intervention, international law provides other norms which are more compatible with the interests of the revolutionary nation in instability. For instance, there is the positive legal duty to remain aloof from civil strife, thus legitimating the normal interest of revolutionary nations in denying external relief to the constituted government in its struggle to suppress the revolutionary movement. The nonintervention system of the liberal democracies contributed to the triumph of the rightest revolution of Franco in Spain. Once a revolutionary government attains control of its national territory it frequently expropriates private property and public assets of its predecessor government. The legal rules of act of state and sovereign immunity in the domestic courts of foreign status quo states tend to facilitate this process. Domestic courts may, however, seek to interfere with expropriation of property, especially if it is located outside the revolutionary nation. In fact, if a large portion of the assets of revolutionary nations are located in foreign status quo nations refusals to give effect to nationalization decrees can seriously interfere with the social program of the revolutionary nations. This is an indecisive area of law with many divergent decisions;[34/] considerable disagreement among commentators exists as to the

wisdom and effectiveness of using such invalidating legal norms as a weapon in the battle against revolutionary nations. Such partisan use of horizontal institutions of the world legal order (domestic courts) can undermine that portion of international law dependent upon reciprocity.

In addition, status quo nations can withhold diplomatic recognition from and resist the admission to the United Nations of a revolutionary nation, thereby restricting its participation in world affairs. This politicizes the recognition process making it depend upon the attitude of the status quo nation to the revolutionary government, rather than making it depend upon the legal (objective) standard of factual control over land, territory, and institutions. Such politicization of legal norms enhances instability in international affairs and seems to have a dubious impact upon the target nation. American nonrecognition policy directed first at the Soviet Union, now at China, seems to be dubious politics, as well as weakening the appeal of our plea to other nations to adhere to the rule of law in world affairs. It also tends to legitimate resort to premature recognition by the revolutionary nations. The right to give political fugitives diplomatic asylum within the territory of a foreign state also has an obvious relation to revolutionary activity. Here again, however, the instability generated by the existence of revolutionary nations makes the institution of asylum also selectively valuable to status quo nations. One thinks, for instance, of the grant of asylum to Cardinal Midzenty by the United States.

This brief discussion intends only to illustrate how international law bears upon the specific phenomenon of internal revolution. The legal problems raised here are very diverse, complex, and generate controversial solutions, and require fuller consideration to permit an adequate appreciation of the relevance of norms of international law to revolutionary activity.

Conclusion

The advent of revolutionary nations has accentuated the tendency of nations to pursue selfish ends by coercive means in world politics. Military strategy and latent internal instability in the newly developing portions of the world have shaped the patterns of coercion used by Cold War rivals. Legal norms serve to restrain behavior only when they accord with a powerful nation's perception of its national security. Thus the current relevance of legal norms to world affairs depends upon a careful comprehension of the bearing of social, economic, military, and political variables.

The dominance and pervasity of the Cold War makes manifest the fact that the nations of the globe do not compose a world community. Divergent ideologies and cultures stress the absence of the kind of social cohesiveness propitious to the growth of law.

And yet we find a continued emphasis by our leaders upon the need to replace the reign of force by the rule of law. President Eisenhower put this very well at New Delhi in 1959: "The time has come for mankind to make the rule of law in international affairs as normal as it is now in domestic affairs." The

sincerity of this sentiment makes especially ironic an emerging American pattern of departure from a law-oriented approach to world affairs. Such a departure has been highlighted by the U-2 incident, retention of the Connally Reservation, prolonged non-recognition of Communist China, and intervention in the internal affairs of Castro's Cuba.

This distance between authoritative rhetoric and conduct is more than cynical opportunism by national leaders. It reflects the trap that seems to have been set for status quo nations by the instabilities generated by the aggressive revolutionary nations. We are caught between the irreconcilable aspiration for a just international order and the necessity to meet force with force to assure our survival. The atmosphere is made particularly tense by the frightful dangers of nuclear conflagration. It is my feeling that this apparent crisis is partly a consequence of a failure of intellect and will. There appears to be a growing awareness that power politics is now more like Russian roulette than a game played for rational gain. But there is at the same time considerable official reticence to acknowledge the implications of this perception. Nevertheless I am led to hope, perhaps naively, that an awareness of the futility of a game will encourage its eventual abandoment.[35/] If such an instrumental consensus can assert itself -- called recently a "community of fear" -- then the task of just ordering assigned to law is clear. But it will be a task that is less concerned with the formulation of "norms" and "doctrine" than with the implementation of rules in action by the development of strong procedures, processes,

and institutions for making certain that the word becomes flesh. This desideratum suggests a whole direction for a contextual rethinking of the role of international law in world affairs.

Footnotes

*It is a pleasure to thank my colleague Roland J. Stanger for helping me so generously with this essay.

1/ It is relevant to observe that the Draft Program of the Soviet Communist Party for the 22nd Party Congress fails to make a single reference to international law in the course of an elaborate reformulation of Soviet foreign policy and aspiration. Even in the extended discussion of the relations between the Soviet Union and other members of the Communist bloc there is little tangible indication of a willingness to overcome national rivalries by the promotion of supranational political and legal integration. There is not even an expressed desire for regional institutions of an extent comparable to those developing in Western Europe. See full text of the Draft Program, N. Y. Times, August 1, 1961, pp. 13-20. For negative accounts of the Soviet attitude towards international law see KOROWICZ, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 108-156 (1959); LIPSON, OUTER SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-17 (Rand Paper P-1434, 1959).

2/ Throughout this essay it is important to take account of the particular character of the legal norm. The range of norms includes rules of the game and very specific provisions in international agreements. My preference is to extend the characterization "law" to any "norm" that appears to standardize international behavior. This acknowledges the decentralized character of the international system, and emphasizes

2/ cont'd

its deficient norm-producing procedures and institutions. The text example from the Korean War suffers from its specificity in time and place. We usually think of law as providing standards of more general application. Here again, however, the ad hoc nature of international regimes is part of the quality of contemporary world order. This feature of specificity serves to remind us of the primitive character of international law. However, it is important to use an inclusive image of law for international affairs so as to perceive all existing ordering possibilities. In contrast, a strict image of law, as developed by Austinian positivism, may usefully focus the task of the jurist in an orderly and advanced social system.

3/ Perceptively foreshadowed in SMITH, THE CRISIS IN THE LAW OF NATIONS (1947).

4/ The United Nations initially was requested to send military assistance to the government of the Congo to permit it to repel "the present external aggression" charged to Belgium as a result of "the despatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the Treaty of Friendship" between the two countries. However, it was evident that the Security Council responded to Lumumba's request primarily because, as it stated in its Resolution of July 22, 1960, "the complete restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security." See generally E. M. Miller, Legal Aspects of U.N. Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1961).

5/ Traditional international law, as developed before nuclear weapons, emphasized the territorial state as a sovereign minimum unit in world affairs. Territorial jurisdiction was absolute except for the duty to respect the rights of alien residents. Otherwise international law exempted internal phenomena, even when it crossed the threshold of violence. This exemption was accelerated in the XXth Century by the gospel of self-determination given initial impetus by Woodrow Wilson. With nuclear weapons and the Cold War political stability for the world rests progressively upon the control of internal violence. A sensitive study of the bearing of the new military technology upon the old political system is Herz, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE ATOMIC AGE (1959).

6/ Cuba exemplified this pattern by a series of futile interventions through Central America. The power used was so inadequate (a handful of men with an armful of light weapons) to the ends pursued (the overthrow of a well-organized government) that the revolutionary zeal of the Castro forces seemed like a bad comedy. For a brief description of these 1959 Cuban interventions see STEBBINS, THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1959, 353-357 (1960).

7/ N. Y. Times, August 1, 1961, p. 16, col. 4; see also W. W. Rostow, Guerilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas, 45 DEPT STATE BULL. 233, 234 (1958).

8/ See analysis that suggests general tendencies of social systems to develop an orientation favorable to the application of legal rules, **Fisher,** Bringing Law To Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1961); Fisher, Should We Veto the Troika?, The New Republic, August 21, 1961, pp. 11-14.

9/ See the second Khrushchev Message to President Kennedy protesting United States invervention in April 1961 in Cuba, "MR. KHRUSHCHEV TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY," (unofficial translation of message dated April 22, 1961), reprinted in 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 664 (1961).

10/ Kaplan and Katzenbach, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 30-55 (1961).

11/ See McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960).

12/ This depiction is developed in some detail in Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 295 (1959).

13/ See e.g., MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926); GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTZE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955).

14/ Cf. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND, 63-172 (1958); NORTHROP, THE TAMING OF NATIONS (1952).

15/ For a collection of statements by important recent political figures in the United States ranging from Robert Taft to Adlai Stevenson agreeing on the urgency of extending the international rule of law see A.B.A., Special Committee on World Peace Through Law, COMPILATION OF QUOTATIONS (1960); Cf. also Bishop, The International Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REV. 553 (1961).

16/ S. S. LOTUS, PCIJ., Ser. A, No. 10 (1927).

17/ Cf. Excellent study by McDougal and Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J. 1057 (1959) (discussion of complementary prescriptions is clearly stated on pp. 1059-1063).

18/ Nottebohm (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4.

19/ Colombia Peruvian Asylum Case [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266.

20/ It is well to observe that national actors have never operated in conditions of "normalcy" where vital matters were involved. Prior to our revolutionary age, the egoistic pursuit of national interest led states to refuse to accept comprehensive legal standards. For an excellent treatment of the earlier politicization of world affairs along these lines see Visscher, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-129 (1957). Perhaps the advent of nuclear weapons during the European stage of world history might have produced an effective world legal order. A common cultural heritage might have overcome political differences in the face of the threat of mutual extermination.

21/ A liberalization of the internal regime tends to encourage the pressure for external accommodation. Such a tendency is transformed by some into a presupposition; that is, legal arrangements with totalitarian nations are a trap for liberal democracies. Thus we must not expect to develop a universal legal order until there has been decisive internal liberalization in the communist states. This position is developed by McDougal and Lasswell in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, "The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order," 3-10 (1960).

22/ See Q. Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 514, 517 (1956); Sohn, The Definition of Aggression, 45 VA. L. REV. 697 (1959).

23/ STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1958).

24/ Id. at 99-103.

25/ See Phelps and others, Accidental War: Some Dangers in the 1960's (Mershon National Security Program Research Paper 1960).

26/ Comprehensive review found in GRABER, CRISIS DIPLOMACY (1959); THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS (1956).

27/ For analysis of Cuban intervention see Falk, United States Participation in the Cuban Invasion and the Rule of Law, 1961 OHIO STATE L.J.

28/ Domestic (horizontal) implementation of nonintervention policy is technically fulfilled by the provisions of the United States Neutrality Laws. See 22 USCA §§ 441-465, 18 USCA §960.

29/ Premier Khrushchev has publicly promised Soviet support for internal wars of liberation.

30/ N. Y. Times, April 23, 1961.

31/ Q. Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 521 (1960).

32/ Graber, op. cit. supra, at 361.

33/ See perceptive analyses, Schwarzenberger, Hegemonial Intervention, The Year Book of World Affairs, 236-265 (1955); Kaplan and Katzenbach, The Patterns of International Politics and of International Law, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 693 (1959).

34/ Decisions are interestingly represented in KATZ and BREWSTER, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, 299-398 (1960).

35/ This line of thinking is somewhat suggested by RAPOPORT, FIGHTS, GAMES AND DEBATES (1960); and see H. S. Hughes, The Strategy of Deterrence, COMMENTARY, XXXI, No. 3, 185-192 (1961).

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The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration

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Political Science research on Congress has produced a time-tested consensus on the very considerable power and autonomy of Congressional committees. Because of these two characteristics, it makes empirical and analytical sense to treat the Congressional committee as a discrete unit for analysis. We can think of a committee, in the most general terms, as a social system. More particularly, it is a political system; and most specifically it is a political subsystem. As a social system, the committee has three characteristics: a distinctive set of interdependent relationships among its constituent elements, a set of activities which sets it off from its environment, and a tendency over time to promote its own survival. As a political subsystem, it participates in the making of authoritative decisions for a society--which activity is the distinctive mark of the political system. To view the committee as a system calls attention to its internal life and to the environment in which it lives, and it relates the two aspects one to the other. It invites us to focus on the functional problems facing the committee, to analyze the degree to which these functional problems are solved, and to relate the solution of these problems to committee survival.[1]

This study is a partial description of one congressional committee during one specific period--The Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, 1947-1961.[2] Its immediate aim is to add to our understanding of appropriations politics in Congress.[3] Hopefully, however, it might also suggest the usefulness of this type of analysis for studying the activities of any congressional committee.

The House Committee on Appropriations is a subsystem of the American political system. It is one decision-making unit which interacts with other units in the process of making authoritative decisions for the United States. It is also a subsystem of the Congress and, most importantly, of the House of Representatives. Committee decisions must be made the object of further decisions by the House and the Congress (as well as by the President) before they become binding for the society. The Committee is, therefore, a political subsystem related primarily to other legislative subsystems and, through them, to the total American political system. Probably the three most important functional problems which it needs to solve in order to survive are these: 1. Externally there is the problem of adaptation to the other subsystems of its environment--especially the House, but also the Senate and its Appropriations Committee, executive branch agencies, and clientele groups. 2. Internally, the Committee must achieve certain goals or perform certain tasks set for it by other subsystems and by its own members. This it does primarily by organizing a decision-making structure and making decisions. 3. Internally,

too, the Committee must be able to hold itself together or remain integrated in making decisions and in adapting to its environment. The three problems should be treated together for any complete understanding of the Committee subsystem. This paper, however, is focused only on the internal problems of the Committee, and on one of these--the problem of integration--in particular.

The Appropriations Committee, like every organization, exhibits the basic structural characteristic of differentiation among its elements. Faced with the basic problem of 'who shall do what, and how', the Committee provides for the allocation of positions and tasks. This differentiation applies most importantly to two elements--individual positions together with the roles that flow therefrom and subgroups. A role is constituted by "the ways of behaving which are expected of any individual who occupies a certain position."[4] A subgroup is constituted by a collectivity of Committee members, smaller than the Committee itself, which cooperates in the performance of some task.[5] Distinctive positions and roles may derive from a subgroup as well as from the Committee as a whole. Differentiation among positions-plus-roles and subgroups has two aspects--expected behavior and actual behavior. The Committee, that is to say, has an agreed upon set of views as to how each individual in a given position is expected to behave (e.g. his role); and the Committee has a set of views as to how each subgroup is expected to behave. These views about the expected or appropriate behavior are embodied in the Committee's norms. But the actual behavior of individuals (e.g. role behavior) and of subgroups may not entirely correspond with Committee norms. On the Committee, the two aspects coincide most of the time. Where they do not, however, the distinction becomes crucial to a description of Committee structure.

The fact of differentiation among the positions-plus-roles and the subgroups of the Committee necessitates their integration. That is to say, the Committee faces another problem, 'how shall these diverse elements be made to mesh together or function in support of one another?' No political system (or subsystem) is perfectly integrated; yet no political system can survive without some minimum degree of integration among its differentiated parts. Committee integration is defined as the degree to which there is a working together or a meshing together or mutual support among its positions-plus-roles and subgroups. Conversely, integration is defined as the degree to which the Committee is able to minimize conflict among its roles and its subgroups, either by heading it off or resolving it when it does arise.[6] Since expectations stated in norms furnish guides to behavior, a concomitant of integration is the existence of a fairly consistent set of norms, widely agreed upon and widely followed by the members. Another concomitant of integration consequent to the existence of effective norms is the existence of control mechanisms (i.e. socialization and sanctioning mechanisms) capable of maintaining reasonable conformity to norms. In other words, the more highly integrated the Committee, the smaller will be the gap between expected and actual behavior.

The focus of this study is on integration as a structural characteristic of and as a functional problem for the Appropriations Committee. It is concerned,

first, with describing certain basic characteristics of the Committee which help to explain the integration of its parts. Secondly, it undertakes a partial description of the degree to which and the ways in which the Committee achieves integration. No attempt is made to state in quantitative terms "how much" integration obtains on the Committee. But integration is examined in terms of the meshing together or the minimization of conflict among certain subgroups and among certain key positions-plus-roles. Also, important control mechanisms are described. The study concludes with some comments on the consequences of Committee integration for appropriations politics and on the usefulness of further Congressional committee analysis in terms of functional problems such as this one.

I

Five important characteristics of the Appropriations Committee which help explain Committee integration are: 1. the existence of a well-articulated and deeply-rooted consensus on Committee goals or tasks, 2. the nature of the Committee's subject matter, 3. the legislative orientation of its members, 4. the attractiveness of the Committee for its members, 5. the stability of Committee membership.

Consensus The Appropriations Committee's perception of its tasks takes form within the broad guidelines set by its parent body, the House of Representatives. For it is the primary condition of the Committee's existence that it was created by the House for the purpose of assisting the House in the performance of its legislative tasks in the area of appropriations. What the House has granted--in this case the legitimacy, the jurisdiction and the tasks of the Committee--the House can take, and indeed has taken, away. Committee-House tension is indigenous to their relationship, but the Appropriations Committee cannot survive protracted and serious conflict with the House.[7] Its members are agreed, therefore, that their overall task is to serve the House in the manner and with the substantive results that the House prescribes.

The Committee subscribes to the important norms of the House and assists in the following House tasks: its lawmaking task, by making recommendations as to amounts and conditions of appropriations; its control task, by exercising continuous oversight of administrative activity; its representative task, by being responsive to the persistent demands (for and against appropriations) of a variety of publics; its consensus-building task, by bargaining for sufficient support among interested groups to make politically viable appropriations decisions; and its negotiating task, by acting as the House spokesman in appropriations dealings with "the other body".

What the Committee accepts from the House are the outer boundaries of its activity and a range of broadly stated, imprecise expectations fixed within those limits. House surveillance of Committee activity is intermittent and highly permissive. To the Committee, therefore, is left the job of elaborating a definition of tasks and a supporting set of perceptions (of itself and of others) explicit enough to furnish day to day guidance.

The Committee's view begins with the Constitution-based and custom sanctioned preeminence of the House of Representatives in appropriations affairs. It moves easily to the conviction that, as the efficient part of the House in this regard, the Constitution has endowed it with special obligations and special prerogatives. It ends in the view that the Committee on Appropriations, far from being one among many units in a complicated legislative-executive process, is THE most important, most responsible unit in the appropriations process.[8] Hand in hand with the consensus on their primacy goes a consensus that all of their House-prescribed tasks can be fulfilled by superimposing upon them one, single, paramount task. That all-encompassing task is to guard the Federal Treasury. Committee members state their goals in the essentially negative terms of guardianship--screening requests for money, checking against ill-advised expenditures, and protecting the taxpayer's dollar. In the language of the Committee's official history, the job of each member is, "constantly and courageously to protect the Federal Treasury against thousands of appeals and imperative demands for unnecessary, unwise, and excessive expenditures".[9]

To buttress its self-image as guardian of the Federal Treasury, the Committee elaborates a set of perceptions about others to which most members hold most of the time. For example, each executive official is seen to be interested in the expansion of his own particular program. Each one asks, therefore, for more money than he really needs, in view of the total picture, to run an adequate program. The Budget Bureau is the object of scorn and/or hostility for about half the Committee. At its worst, it is considered as a usurper or a pretender in the Kingdom of the Treasury; at its best, it is said to present a set of figures from which the Committee must begin its own independent investigation of budget estimates. The Senate provokes nearly unanimous exasperation. Its members are felt to be too busy, too far removed from "the people", and too interested in doing favors for one another to hold off the many interests which seek "to get into the Federal Treasury". By virtue of their House membership, Committee members share some of the attitudes and problems of one of the groups trying to extract money from the Treasury--e.g. their fellow Representatives. The fact of overlapping membership plus the Committee's status as a subsystem of the House renders Committee members sympathetic to and understanding of the desires of their colleagues for increased appropriations. They resist these desires, often to the point of incurring the wrath of the House, but it is a moderated resistance. It lacks the spur of institutional antagonism which colors Committee attitudes toward the bureaucracy, the Budget Bureau and the Senate.

These perceptions of others help the Committee to define the instrumental task which it prescribes for itself in pursuit of its main task. It is that most budget estimates can, should, and must be reduced--and, since no one else can be trusted to do it, by the House Committee. To the consensus on the task of protecting the Treasury is added, therefore, a consensus on the task of cutting budget estimates.

In terms of immediate action, Committee members agree that they must strike a highly critical, aggressive posture toward budget requests, and that they

should, all things being equal, reduce them. In the words of the Committee's veterans: "There has never been a budget submitted to the Congress that couldn't be cut." "There isn't a budget that can't be cut 10% immediately." "I've been on the Committee for 17 years. No subcommittee of which I have been a member has ever reported out a bill without a cut in the budget. I'm proud of that record." The goal of budget-cutting is a strongly internalized one for the Committee member. "It's a tradition in the Appropriations Committee to cut." "You're grounded in it . . . It's ingrained in you from the time you get on the Committee." For the purposes of a larger study, the appropriations case histories of 37 executive bureaus have been examined for a 12 year period (1947-1959).[10] Of 443 separate bureau estimates, the Committee reduced 77.2% (342) of them.

It is a mark of the intensity and the self-consciousness with which the Committee consensus on budget-cutting is held that it is couched in a distinctive vocabulary. The workaday lingo of the Committee member is replete with negative verbs, undesirable objects of attention, and effective instruments of action. Agency budgets are said to be filled with "fat", "padding", "grease", "pork", "oleaginous substance", "water", "oil", "cushions" "avoirdupois", "waste tissue", and "soft spots". The action verbs most commonly used are "cut", "carve", "slice", "prune", "whittle", "squeeze", "wring", "trim", "lop off", "chop", "slash", "pare", "shave", "fry", and "whack". The tools of the trade are appropriately referred to as "knife", "blade", "meat axe", "scalpel", "meat cleaver", "hatchet", "shears", "wringer", and "fine-tooth comb". Members are hailed by their fellows as being "pretty sharp with the knife". Agencies may "have the meat axe thrown at them". Executives are urged to put their agencies "on a fat boy's diet". Budgets are praised when they are "cut to the bone". And members agree that "You can always get a little more fat out of a piece of pork if you fry it a little longer and a little harder".

To the major task of protecting the Treasury and the instrumental task of cutting budget estimates, each Committee member adds, usually by way of exception, a third task--serving the constituency to which he owes his election. The broad goals of the House are subscribed to by the Committee as a unit; but the particular goals of a congressional district are subscribed to by each Committee member. The members find, therefore, that their most common role-conflict is between a Committee-oriented budget-reducing role and a constituency oriented budget-increasing role.[11] Committee ideology resolves the conflict by assigning top, long-run priority to the budget-cutting task and making of the constituency service a permissable, short-run exception. No Member is expected to commit electoral suicide; but no member is expected to allow his district's desire for federal funds to dominate his Committee behavior.[12]

Subject Matter Appropriations Committee integration is facilitated because of the subject matter with which the group deals. The Committee makes decisions on the same controversial issues as do the committees handling substantive legislation. But a money decision--however vitally it affects national policy--is, or at least seems to be, less directly a policy decision.

Since they deal immediately with dollars and cents, it is easy for the members to hold to the idea that they are not dealing with programmatic matters at all.[13] It is, on the whole, less troublesome to bargain and compromise among figures of, say, 115 million, 125 million and 130 million to fund a program than it is to reach agreement among alternative substantive approaches to that program. The subject matter, furthermore, keeps Committee members relatively free agents which promotes intra-Committee maneuvering and, hence, conflict avoidance. Members do not commit themselves to their constituents in terms of precise money amounts. Members of committees dealing directly with controversial issues are often pressured into taking concrete stands on these issues; consequently, they come to their committee work with fixed and hardened attitudes. This leads to unavoidable, head-on intra-committee conflict and renders integrative mechanisms relatively useless. By the same token, it may be more difficult for a constituent or clientele group to punish or reward a member because he favored 50 million instead of 60 million to finance a farm program than it would be to deal with a vote for or against the farm program in the first place. Appropriations decisions seem to be a good distance behind the main battle lines over public policy, and the Committee fosters this appearance through its efforts to avoid publicity.[14]

Integration is aided by appropriations subject matter in two other ways. The fact of an annual appropriations process means that Committee members perform the same operations with respect to the same subject matters year after year--and frequently more than once in a given year.[15] Substantive and procedural repetition promotes familiarity with key problems and provides ample opportunity to test and confirm the most satisfactory methods of dealing with them. And the absolute necessity that appropriations bills do pass gives urgency to the search for such methods. The fact that appropriations matters are so time consuming has led to the stipulation that no Committee member can serve on another standing committee.[16] This House rule is a deterrent against the fragmentation of Committee member activity which could be a source of difficulty in holding the group together.[17] If a committee has developed (as this one has) a number of norms designed to foster integration, repeated and concentrated exposure to them increases the likelihood that they will be understood, accepted and followed.

Legislative Orientation The recruitment of members for the Appropriations Committee is, together with the prescription of tasks, controlled by the House of Representatives. The selection process, by party leaders and special committees, has been fully described elsewhere--with one vital exception for this Committee.[18] John Taber, the senior Republican on the Committee, has been given, informally, dominant influence in choosing members from his side of the aisle.[19] The process produces a group of individuals strong in characteristics which are conducive to Committee integration. Those who make the selection pay special attention--in addition to regional and state considerations and, in the case of the Republicans, economy mindedness--to predisposition toward cooperation as a means of achieving goals and some demonstrated talent for this mode of behavior. Nicholas Masters has ably described the characteristic as that of a responsible legislator--a man who approves of and conforms to the norms of the legislative process

and of the House of Representatives.[20] Most prominent among these norms are those of mutual respect, willingness to compromise, reciprocity, devotion to work, and a concern for the prestige of the House.[21] All tend to promote cooperative rather than disruptive legislative behavior.

Key selectors speak of wanting, for the Appropriations Committee, "the kind of man you can deal with" or "a fellow who is well-balanced and won't go off half-cocked on things". A Northern liberal Democrat felt that he had been chosen over eight competitors because, "I had made a lot of friends and was known as a nice guy"--especially, he noted, among Southern Congressman. Another Democrat explained, "I got the blessing of the Speaker and the leadership. It's personal friendships. I had done a lot of things for them in the past, and when I went to them and asked them, they gave it to me". A Republican chosen for the Committee in his first term recalled, "The Chairman (Rep. Taber) I guess did some checking around in my area. After all, I was new and he didn't know me. People told me that they were called to see if I was--well, unstable or apt to go off on tangents . . . to see whether or not I had any preconceived notions about things and would not be flexible--whether I would oppose things even though it was obvious". The evaluation of the "responsible legislator" is not easily conducted at long range; but it is a testimony to the care with which candidates are screened that checks will be made in the home district if necessary. A key criterion in each of the cases mentioned was a demonstrable record of, or an assumed predisposition toward, legislative give and take.

Prospective members of the group are expected, in the words of a most senior member, to "serve a few years before the mast--a period of probation. . . If they are good men, they are taken off the other committee and put on the Appropriations Committee".[22] The 106 Appropriations Committee members serving between 1947 and 1961 spent an average of 3.6 years on other House committees before coming to the Committee. Except when party control of the House shifts, producing a large number of vacancies on the new majority side, first term Congressmen are unlikely to secure membership. Only 17 of the 106 were selected as first term Congressmen.[23] A House apprenticeship (which Appropriations maintains more successfully than all committees save Ways and Means and Rules[24]) provides the time in which legislative reputations can be established on the part of the Member and the time in which an assessment of that reputation in terms of Appropriations Committee requirements can be made. Moreover, the mere fact that a Member survives for a couple of terms is some indication of an electoral situation conducive to his "responsible" legislative behavior. The optimum bet for the Committee is a Member from a sufficiently safe district to permit him freedom of maneuver inside the House without fear of reprisal at the polls.[25] The degree of responsiveness to House norms which the Committee selectors value may be the product of a safe district as well as an individual temperament.

Attractiveness In addition to fulfilling the tasks set for it by the House, the Committee must, like any social system, fulfill tasks set for it by its members. Dissatisfaction, withdrawal or apathy on the part of its members can threaten the survival of the Committee just as seriously as any punitive

action of the House. The Committee must, therefore, satisfy individual member needs--such as the need for power, prestige, recognition, respect, self-esteem, and friendship. To the degree that the Committee satisfies these internal needs, its members will be attracted to it. They will develop a sense of identification with and loyalty to the Committee. These characteristics will, in turn, motivate the members toward cooperative or integrative activity rather than toward activities which might destroy the group.

An objective measure of Committee attractiveness can be found in the extraordinarily low rate of departure from it. Its members do not leave it for service on other committees. To the contrary, they are attracted to it from nearly every other committee.[26] Of the 106 members in the 1947-1961 period, only two men left the Committee voluntarily; and neither of them initiated the move.[27] Of the 21 members who were forced off the Committee for lack of seniority during a change in party control, or who were defeated for reelection and later returned, 20 sought to regain Committee membership at the earliest opportunity. Based on its holding and pulling power relative to other House committees, the Appropriations Committee ranks high in the prestige hierarchy of House Committees.[28] A committee's rank in this hierarchy may have consequences for its internal structure. The case of the Appropriations Committee suggests a correlation between high prestige and well-integrated committees.

The sources of Committee attractiveness emerged in response to the query, "Why did you want to get on the Appropriations Committee in the first place?" In every case, the answer (which referred to both early expectations and present satisfaction) included a reference to the power of the Committee and to the main source of it--control over the financial resources of the federal government. "Where the money is, that's where the power is", sums up the feeling of the members. They prize their ability to reward and punish so many other participants in the political process--the executive officials, their fellow Congressmen, their constituents, and other clientele groups. In the eyes of its own members, the Committee is either the most powerful in the House or it is on a par with Ways and Means or, less frequently, on a par with Ways and Means and Rules.[29] The Committee's outward visible signs of prestige serve to confirm for the members their own self-estimate. Thus, it is one of three single-assignment committees. It is the only committee permitted to hold all its hearings in executive session. And it is granted special privileges in bringing its bills to the floor.

Another important ingredient in member satisfaction is the government-wide scope of Committee activity. Second only to a sense of power is the sense that, "Everything comes to a focus in the Appropriations Committee. You learn about everything, not just one area". The ordinary Congressman may feel that he has too little knowledge of and too little control over his environment. Membership on this Committee compensates for this feeling of helplessness in terms of the wider contacts, the greater amount of information, and the sense of being "in the middle of things" which are consequent to the Committee's overview of government activity.[30]

Committee power, however, is not sufficient to explain the attraction which it continues to have for its members nor the high state of their morale. Power, by itself does not supply the sentiments of pride and exclusiveness which Committee members express and which their fellow Congressmen recognize as a hallmark of the group. The additional element is the Committee's recognizable and distinctive political style--one that is, moreover, highly valued in American political culture. The style is that of hard work; and the Committee's prideful self-image is that of "the hardest working Committee in Congress".

From the time a Congressman makes known his aspiration to membership on the Committee until the eulogies of his colleagues are spoken from the well of the House upon his death, his willingness to work is the Committee member's badge of identification. It brings him prestige, respect and self-fulfillment--as well as the jealousy, criticism and hostility of others. The fact that he works hard colors his attitudes and actions toward the federal administrators, the Senators, the Congressmen and the constituents with whom he comes in contact. When he stakes out a public claim to Committee expertise, he backs it up with assertions about its industriousness. Much of the informal "horsing-around" among members takes the form of mutual commiseration over their forced attention to Committee business. A very senior member captured the pervasive influence of Committee style when he exclaimed, "This Committee is no place for a man who doesn't work. They have to be hard working. It's a way of life. It isn't just a job; it's a way of life".

The mere existence of some identifiable and valued style or "way of life" is a cohesive force for a group. But the particular style of hard work is one which increases group morale, in this case, twice over. Hard work means a long, dull, and tedious application to detail, via the technique of "dig, dig, dig, day after day behind closed doors"--in an estimated 460 subcommittee and full committee meetings a year. By adopting the style of hard work, the Committee discourages highly individualized forms of legislative behavior, which could be disruptive within the Committee. It rewards its members with power, but it is power based on work inside the Committee rather than power based on the political glamour of activities carried on in the limelight of the mass media.[31] On the positive side, the frequency with which members interact with one another encourages sentiments of mutual regard, sympathy and solidarity. Hard work is a private virtue and it promotes internal esprit. This esprit is, in turn, functional for integration on the Committee. A Republican leader summed up, "I think it's more closely knit than any other committee. Yet it's the biggest committee, and you'd think it would be the reverse. I know on my subcommittee, you sit together day after day. You get better acquainted. You have sympathy when the other fellows go off to play golf. There's a lot of esprit de corps in the Committee."
The strong attraction which members have for the Committee increases the influence which the Committee and its norms exercise on all of them. It increases the susceptibility of the newcomer to Committee socialization and of the veteran to Committee sanctions applicable against deviant behavior.[32]

Membership Stability Members of the Appropriations Committee are strongly attracted to it; they also have, which bears out their selection as "responsible legislators", a strong attraction for a career in the House of Representatives. The 50 members on the Committee in 1961 had served an average of 13.1 years in the House. The result of these twin attractions is a noteworthy stability of Committee membership. In the period from the 80th to the 87th Congress, 35.7% of the Committee's membership remained constant. That is to say, of the 42 members on the Committee in March 1947, 15 of them were still on the Committee in March 1961.[33] The 50 members of the Committee as of 1961 averaged 9.3 years of prior service on that Committee. In no single year during the last 14 years has the Committee had to absorb an influx of new members totalling more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of its membership. And this figure was approached only four times in that period. At all times, in other words, at least 3/4 of the members have had previous Committee experience. When the 87th Congress convened in 1961, John Taber had been the Committee's ranking Republican since 1933, and Clarence Cannon had been ranking Democrat since 1942. This extraordinary stability of personnel extends into the staff as well. As of June 1961, its 15 professionals had served an average of 10.7 years with the Committee.

The opportunity exists not only for a gradual working out of personal accomodations, but also for the development of traditional ways of regulating internal Committee behavior. It is a characteristic of this Committee that many of its distinctive norms are of an informal character. And it is striking how frequently they are explained and defended by the prescriptive notion that, "I don't know why it is, but it's been done for a generation" or "It's just a tradition, I guess". The Committee's traditional ways of behaving are articulated, transmitted and perpetuated by its durable group of senior members. Stable Committee leadership promotes stable, traditional norms; and the stability of both eases problems of intra-Committee behavior.

Stability of membership means, in addition, that young members rise to the top seniority rankings with glacier-like speed. Ample time is afforded in which they are exposed to, learn and internalize Committee traditions. The very fact that they are unwritten, that they are, as one freshman put it "like cosmic rays", requires a more extensive socialization period than might otherwise be the case. Time is provided for it on the Appropriations Committee. The Committee does not suffer from the potentially disruptive consequences of rapid changeovers in its leadership group. Nor does it face the dysfunctional consequences of sudden impositions of new sets of norms prescribing disruptive changes in internal Committee behavior.

II

Since the main activity of a political system is decision-making, the acid test of its internal integration is its capacity to make collective decisions without flying apart in the process. Any analysis of Committee integration must focus directly, therefore, upon the subgroups and positions-plus-roles of its decision-making structure.[34] Two kinds of subgroups are of central importance--subcommittees and majority/minority party groups. The first is

wholly under the control of the Committee, thus emphasizing Committee autonomy. The second is imposed upon the Committee by the House, and testifies to the dependence of the Committee upon that larger and more inclusive subsystem. A description of integration must focus partly on the degree to which there is a meshing together of activity among subcommittees and between the majority and minority party groups. Ultimately, however, the analysis of subgroup activity rests on an analysis of individual Committee positions-plus-roles. The roles which relate most closely to Committee decision-making derive from: 1. positions which each member holds by virtue of his subgroup attachments, e.g. subcommittee member, majority (or minority) party member, 2. positions which relate to full Committee membership, e.g. Committee member and the seniority rankings of veteran, man of moderate experience, and newcomer,[35] 3. positions which relate to both subgroup and full Committee membership, e.g. Chairman of the Committee, ranking minority member of the Committee, subcommittee chairman, ranking subcommittee member. Clusters of norms state the behavior expected from the occupants of each position. A description of integration must focus also upon the ways in which these norms and the roles they define mesh together and the ways in which these expectations are, in fact, fulfilled.

Subgroup Integration The day to day work of the Committee is carried on in its subcommittees (14 of them in 1961), each of which is given jurisdiction over a number of related governmental units. Each subcommittee holds hearings on the budget estimates of the agencies assigned to it, meets in executive session to decide what figures and what language to recommend to the full Committee (to "mark up" the bill), defends its recommendations before the full Committee, writes the Committee's report to the House, dominates the debate on the floor, and bargains for the House in conference committee. Within its jurisdiction, each subcommittee functions independently of the others and guards its autonomy jealously. The Chairman and ranking minority member of the full Committee have, as we shall see, certain opportunities to oversee and dip into the operations of all subcommittees. But their intervention is expected to be minimal. Moreover, they themselves operate largely within the subcommittee framework by sitting as chairman or ranking minority member of the subcommittee in which they are most interested. Each subcommittee, under the guidance of its chairman, transacts its business in considerable isolation from every other one. One subcommittee chairman exclaimed, "Why, you'd be branded an imposter if you went into one of those other subcommittee meetings. The only time I go is by appointment, by arrangement with the chairman at a special time. I'm as much a stranger in another subcommittee as I would be in the legislative Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Each one does its work apart from all others."

All members of all subcommittees are expected to behave in similar fashion in their role as subcommittee member. Three main norms define this role; to the extent that they are observed, they promote harmony and reduce conflict among subcommittees.[36] Subcommittee autonomy gives to the House norm of specialization an intensified application on the Appropriations

Committee. Each member is expected to play the role of specialist in the activities of one subcommittee. He will sit on from one to five subcommittees, but normally will specialize in the work of only one. And within that one (especially on such subcommittees as Agriculture, Defense, and Interior) he may specialize twice over by concentrating on the work of one or a few agencies or programs. Except for the Chairman, ranking minority member and their confidants, a Committee member's time, energy, contacts and experience center around his subcommittees. Specialization is, therefore, among the earliest and most compelling Committee norms to which a newcomer is exposed. Within the Committee, respect, deference and power are earned through subcommittee activity and, hence to a degree, through specialization. Specialization is valued further because it is well suited to the task of guarding the Treasury. Only by specializing, Committee members believe, can they unearth the volume of factual information necessary for the intelligent screening of budget requests. Since "the facts" are acquired only through industriousness, he who is an effective specialist will, perforce, adopt and promote the Committee's style of hard work.

Committee-wide acceptance of specialization is an integrative force in decision-making because it helps support a second norm--that of reciprocity. The point at which a subcommittee makes its recommendations is a potential point of internal friction. Subcommittees could clash with one another and engage in tests of strength to control the full Committee. Conflict among subcommittees (or between one subcommittee and the rest of the Committee) is minimized by the deference which is traditionally accorded to the recommendation of the subcommittee which has specialized in the area, has worked hard, and has "the facts", "You don't go barging into another man's field unless something is patently wrong." "It's a matter of 'You respect my work and I'll respect yours'". "It's frowned upon if you offer an amendment in the full Committee if you aren't on the subcommittee. It's considered presumptuous to pose as an expert if you aren't on the subcommittee." Though records of full Committee decisions are not available, members agree that subcommittee recommendations are "very rarely changed", "almost always approved", "changed one time in fifty", "very seldom changed" etc. The optimum condition for changing a subcommittee recommendation occurs when the fight is led by a dissident member of that subcommittee--by a man, that is, who can draw on the norm of specialization and its concomitants of information and hard work.

No subcommittee is likely to command the deference of the full Committee unless its recommendations have widespread support among its own members. To this end, a third norm--that of subcommittee unity--is expected to be observed by subcommittee members. Unity refers to a willingness to support (or not to oppose) the recommendations of one's own subcommittee. Reciprocity and unity are closely dependent upon one another. Reciprocity is difficult to maintain when subcommittees themselves are badly divided; and unity has little appeal unless reciprocity will subsequently be observed. The norm of reciprocity functions to minimize inter-subcommittee conflict. The norm of unity functions to minimize intra-subcommittee conflict. Both are essential to subcommittee influence.

The technique for producing subcommittee unity is the basic legislative technique of compromise. One payoff for the original selection of "responsible legislators" is their special willingness to compromise in pursuit of subcommittee unity. The impulse toward subcommittee unity is registered most strongly at the time when the subcommittee meets in executive session to mark up the bill. Two ranking minority members explained this aspect of markup procedure in their subcommittees. "If there's agreement, we go right along. If there's a lot of controversy, we put the item aside and go on. Then, after a day or two, we may have a list of ten controversial items. We give and take and pound them down till we get agreement." "We have a unanimous agreement on everything. If a fellow enters an objection and we can't talk him out of it--and sometimes we can get him to go along--that's it. We put it in there." A Committee newcomer recently returned from his first markup experience in a third subcommittee reported that the pervasiveness of the unity norm was his greatest revelation. "If there's any way on earth to bring out a unanimous report, they'll do it. They'll sit there long hours. They'll back-scratch and give and take and compromise." Once the bargain is struck, the subcommittee is expected to "stick together".

It is, of course, easier to achieve unity among the five, seven, or nine members of a subcommittee than it is among the fifty members of the full Committee. But members are expected wherever possible to observe the norm of unity in the full Committee as well. That is, they should not only defer to the recommendations of the subcommittee involved, but they should support (or not oppose) that recommendation when it reaches the floor in the form of a Committee decision. On the floor, Committee members believe, their power and prestige depend largely on the degree to which the norms of reciprocity and unity continue to be observed. Members warn each other that if they go to the floor in disarray they will be "rolled", "jumped", or "run over" by the membership. It is a cardinal maxim among Committee members that "You can't turn an appropriations bill loose on the floor." Two senior subcommittee chairmen explain, "We iron out our differences in Committee. We argue it out and usually have a meeting of the minds, a composite view of the Committee . . . If we went on the floor in wide disagreement, they would say, 'If you can't agree after listening to the testimony and discussing it, how can we understand it? We'll just vote on the basis of who we like the best.'" "I tell them (the full Committee) we should have a united front. If there are any objections or changes, we ought to hear it now, and not wash our dirty linen out on the floor. If we don't have a bill that we can all agree on and support, we ought not to report it out. To do that is like throwing a piece of meat to a bunch of hungry animals."

One of the most functional Committee practices supporting the norm of unity is the tradition against minority reports in the subcommittee and in the full committee. It is symptomatic of Committee integration that custom should proscribe the use of the most formal and irrevocable symbol of congressional committee disunity--the minority report. A few have been written--but only 9 out of a possible 141 during the 11 years, 1947-1957. That is to say, 94% of all original appropriations bills in this period were reported out unanimously.[37] The technique of "reserving" is

the Committee's equivalent for the registering of dissent. In subcommittee or Committee, when a member reserves, he goes on record informally by informing his colleagues that he reserves the right to disagree on a specified item later on in the proceedings. He may seek a change or support a change in that particular item in full Committee on or the floor. But he does not publicize his dissent. The subcommittee or the full Committee can then make a unanimous recommendation. The individual retains some freedom of maneuver without firm commitment. Many a member reserves on an appropriations item but takes no further action. A member explained how the procedure operates in subcommittee, "If there's something I feel too strongly about, and just can't go along, I'll say, 'Mr. Chairman, we can have a unanimous report, but I reserve the right to bring this up in full Committee. I feel duty bound to make a play for it and see if I can't sell it to the other members.' But if I don't say anything, or don't reserve this right, and then I bring it up in full Committee, they'll say, 'Who are you trying to embarrass? You're a member of the team, aren't you? That's not the way to get along.'" Disagreement cannot, of course, be eliminated from the Committee. But the Committee has accepted a method for ventilating it which produces a minimum of internal disruption.

The attractiveness of the Committee for its members is both cause and effect in relation to a well-developed sense of differentiation between themselves as a unit and the House as a unit. It is an attitude which is returned in kind by House members. And its basis rests in House-Committee conflict over Committee prerogatives like executive hearings, over Committee control of the flow of appropriations information, over legislative provisions which appear in appropriations bills, over Committee-oriented rather than House-oriented socialization of the Committee's young, and over the generalized feeling that, as one House leader put it, "The Appropriations Committee likes to grasp for power, they like to reach out and concentrate." The Committee views their House environment as laden with potential and actual hostility--which view reenforces their self-generated tendencies toward integration. Members believe that the greater their internal unity, the greater the likelihood that their recommendations will pass the House.

The degree to which the role of the subcommittee member can be played and subcommittee conflict minimized depends upon the minimization of conflict between the majority and minority party subgroups. Nothing would be more dysfunctional for Committee integration via reciprocity, unity and the techniques of compromise and reserving than bitter and extended partisan controversy. It is, therefore, important to Appropriations Committee integration that a fourth norm--that of <u>minimal partisanship</u>--should be observed by members of both party contingents. Under most circumstances, that is, Committee members are expected to minimize their party-oriented behavior. Nearly every respondent emphasized, with approval, that "very little" or "not much" partisanship prevailed on the Committee. One subcommittee chairman stated flatly, "My job is to keep down partisanship."

A ranking minority member said, "You might think that we Republicans would defend the Administration and the budget, but we don't." Majority and minority party ratios are constant and do not change (i.e. in 1958) to reflect changes in the party complexion of the House. The Committee operates with a completely non-partisan professional staff, which does not change in tune with shifts in party control. Subcommittees can produce unanimous recommendations and the full Committee can adopt unanimous reports precisely because party conflict is (during the period 1947-1961) the exception rather than the rule.

The Committee is in no sense immune from the temperature of party conflict, but it does have a relatively high specific heat. Intense party strife or a strongly taken presidential position will get reflected in subcommittee and in Committee recommendations. Sharp divisions in party policy were carried, with disruptive impact, into some areas of Committee activity during the 80th Congress and subsequently, by way of reaction, into the 81st Congress.[38] During the Eisenhower years, extraordinary presidential pleas, especially concerning foreign aid, were given special heed by the Republican members of the Committee.[39] Partisanship is normally generated from the environment and not from within the Committee's party groups. Partisanship is, therefore, likely to be least evident in subcommittee activity, stronger in the full Committee, and most potent at the floor stage. Studies which have focussed on roll call analysis have stressed the influence of party in legislative decision-making.[40] In the appropriations process, at any rate, the floor stage probably represents party influence at its maximum. Our examination, by interview, of decision-making at the subcommittee and full Committee level would stress the influence of Committee-oriented norms--the strength of which tends to vary inversely with that of party bonds.[41] Committee members speak feelingly of their exposure, at the roll call stage, to role conflict between that of Committee member and that of partisan. On the floor, the issue becomes a direct and oversimplified, "Are you with us or against us?" Since this question is frequently cast in party terms, the Member will respond in kind. In the secrecy and intimacy of the subcommittee and full Committee hearing rooms, however, the member finds it easy to compromise on questions of more or less, to take money from one program and give it to another and, in general, to avoid yes-or-no type party stands. It is these decisions, taken in response to the integrative norms of the Committee that are the most important ones in the entire appropriations process.[41a]

Role Integration The roles of subcommittee member and party member are common to all. Integration among subgroups is achieved through the observance of common norms and similar modes of behavior. Within and apart from these subgroup positions, other more specific decision-making positions are allocated among the members. In this case, different positions produce different roles, which call for different kinds of behavior. In an integrated system, these different roles must also fit together. Integration, in other words, must be achieved through the complementarity or reciprocity of roles as well as through a similarity of roles. For the purposes of this study, complementarity and reciprocity will be used interchangeably. They refer to a pattern of mutual support rather than conflict among roles and role behaviors. This

may mean a pattern in which expectations are so different that there is very little contact between individuals; or it may mean a pattern in which contact among certain individuals requires the working out of an involved system of exchange of obligations and rewards.[42] In either case, the desired result is the minimization of conflict among prominent Committee roles. Two crucial instances of role reciprocity on the Committee are those involving the seniority positions of old-timer and newcomer and those involving the leadership positions of Chairman and ranking minority member (on both the full Committee and on each subcommittee).

The differentiation of roles between senior and junior members of the Committee is the broadest definition of who shall and who shall not actively participate in the making of its decisions. Of a junior member, it will be said, "Oh, he doesn't count--what I mean is, he hasn't been on the Committee long enough." He is not expected to and does not have much influence on Committee decisions. His role is that of apprentice. He is expected to learn the business and the norms of the Committee by applying himself to its work. He is expected to acquiesce in an arrangement which gives decision-making influence (except in affairs involving him locally) to the veterans of the group. Newcomers will be advised to "follow the chairman until you get your bearings. For the first two years, follow the chairman. He knows." "Be a good member of the Committee . . . Don't be what we call a rabble rouser." "Work hard, keep quiet and attend the Committee sessions. We don't want to listen to some new person coming in here." And newcomers perceive their role in identical terms: "You have to sit in the back seat and edge up little by little." "You just go to subcommittee meetings and assimilate the routine. The new members are made to feel welcome, but you know that you have a lot of rope learning to do before you carry much weight. The apprentice role is common to all new members of the House. But it is wrong to assume that each Committee will give it the same emphasis. Some pay it scant heed.[43] The Appropriations Committee makes it a cornerstone of its internal structure.

At every stage of Committee decision-making, the apprentice-decision-maker role differentiation prevails. There is remarkable agreement on the radically different sets of expectations which are involved. During the hearings, the view of the elders is that, "Newcomers . . . don't know what the score is and they don't have enough information to ask intelligent questions." A newcomer described his behavior in typically similar terms: "I attended all the hearings and studied and collected information that I can use next year. I'm just marking time now." During the crucial subcommittee markup, the newcomer will have little opportunity to speak--save in locally important matters. A subcommittee chairman stated the norm from his viewpoint this way. "When we get a compromise, nobody's going to break that up. If someone tries, we sit on him fast. We don't want young people who throw bricks or slow things down." And a newcomer reciprocated by stating the norm which is expected to govern his markup conduct: "I'm not provocative. I'm in there for information. They're the experts in the field. I go along."

In full Committee, on the floor, and in conference committee, the Committee's senior members take the lead and the junior members are expected to follow. In return for the deference which he pays to his elders, the newcomer receives a short run influence over appropriations affecting him locally and long run influence in his own right. If the new member has been chosen according to the criteria of the "responsible legislator", he will be dedicated to a legislative career and will be under relatively little outside pressure to make his mark immediately. Conflict between the veteran and the newcomer is also minimized by the fact that both are expected to conform to the norms of specialization, reciprocity, unity, and low partisanship--all to be overlaid with the traditions of hard work. Those who wield influence are expected to abide by these norms in using it; those who are without influence are expected to use their apprenticeship to learn them.

Among the Committee's veterans, the key decision-making roles are those of Committee Chairman and ranking minority member, and their counterparts in every subcommittee. It is a measure of Committee integration and the low degree of partisanship existing on it that considerable reciprocity obtains between these roles, thus minimizing conflict. Their partisan status sets limits to the degree of integration that can take place. The Chairman is given certain authority which he and only he can exercise. But save in times of extreme party controversy, the expectation is that chairman-ranking minority member cooperation and consultation shall lubricate the Committee's entire decision-making machinery. For example, by Committee tradition, its Chairman and ranking minority member are both ex officio voting members of each subcommittee and of every conference committee. The two of them thus have joint access to every stage of internal decision-making. A subcommittee chairman, too, is expected to discuss matters of scheduling and agenda with his opposite minority number. He is expected to work with him during the markup session and to give him (and, normally, only him) an opportunity to read and comment on the subcommittee report.[44/] A ranking subcommittee member described his subcommittee markup procedure approvingly: "Frequently the chairman has a figure which he states. Sometimes he will have no figure, and he'll turn to me and say, '-----, what do you think?' Maybe I'll have a figure. It's very flexible. Everyone has a chance to say what he thinks, and we'll move it around. Sometimes it takes a long time . . . He's a rabid partisan on the floor, but he is a very fair man in the subcommittee."

Where influence is shared, an important exchange of rewards occurs. The chairman gains support for his leadership and the ranking minority member gains intra-Committee power. The Committee as a whole insures against the possibility of drastic change in its internal structure by giving to its key minority members a stake in its operation. Chairmen and ranking minority members will, in the course of time, exchange positions; and it is expected that such a switch will produce no form of retribution nor any change in the functioning of the Committee. Reciprocity of roles, in this case, promotes continued integration. A ranking minority member testified to one successful arrangement when he took the floor in the 83rd Congress

to say: "The gentleman and I have been see sawing back and forth on this committee for some time. He was chairman in the 80th Congress. I had the privilege of serving as chairman in the 81st and 82nd Congresses. Now he is back in the saddle. I can say that he has never failed to give me his utmost cooperation, and I have tried to give him the same cooperation during his service as chairman of this Committee. We seldom disagree, but we have found out that we can disagree without being disagreeable. Consequently, we have unusual harmony on this committee."[45]

Reciprocity between chairmen and ranking minority members on the Appropriations Committee is to some incalculable degree a function of the stability of membership which allows a pair of particular individuals to work out the kind of personal accommodation described above. The close working relationship of Clarence Cannon and John Taber, whose service on the Committee totals 68 years and who have been exchanging the statuses of Chairman and ranking minority member for 19 years, highlights the reciprocity that exists throughout the group. Despite widely divergent voting records in the House, they concur that they "have a lot in common", "stand shoulder to shoulder", and "usually agree" when it comes to the business of the Committee. They speak of sitting down together with some of the appropriations bills and deciding jointly what ought to go in and what ought to come out. They are in constant consultation with each other face to face and through the senior staff men. It is they who inaugurated the important tradition by which the ranking minority member (in addition to the Chairman who had alw ys done so) votes on all subcommittees and conferences. One subcommittee chairman remarked that, "In all the markup sessions I've attended, I've never seen any friction between Mr. Cannon and Mr. Taber." Other Committee members agree that they "work very closely together", "fight for the same things", and "confide in each other".[46] In a system where the teaching of norms is done by example, the Taber-Cannon comity multiplies itself as a model for others. Such longtime subcommittee twosomes as Reps. Gary and Canfield, Kirwan and Jensen, Whitten and Andersen have alternated in majority and minority subcommittee roles and maintained similarly harmonious internal working relationships. Membership stability guarantees that no subcommittee will be constituted without a core of individuals with considerable experience at working together. The likelihood is thus increased that a pattern of majority-minority reciprocity will obtain throughout the Committee.

Internal Control Mechanisms The expectations which apply to subcommittee, to party, to veterans and to newcomers, to chairmen and to ranking minority members prescribe behaviors that are highly integrative and only minimally disruptive for the Committee. We have concentrated on these expectations; and we have both illustrated and assumed the close correlation between expected and actual behavior. This does not mean that all the norms of the Committee have been canvassed. Nor does it mean that deviation from the integrative norms we have discussed does not occur. It does. From what can be gathered, however, from piecing together a study of the public record on appropriations from 1947 to 1961 with interview materials, the Committee has been markedly successful in maintaining a stable internal

structure over time. Changes and threats of change have been generated more from the environment than from inside the subsystem itself. One source of internal stability, and an added reason for assuming a correlation between expected and actual behavior, is the existence of what appear to be reasonably effective internal control mechanisms. Two of these are the socialization processes which are applied to newcomers and the sanctioning mechanisms applicable to all Committee members.

Socialization is in part a training in perception. Before members of a group can be expected to behave in accordance with its norms, they must learn to see and interpret the world around them with reasonably similar results. The socialization of the Committee newcomer during his 1-2 terms of apprenticeship serves to bring his perceptions and his attitudes sufficiently into line with those of the other members to serve as a basis for Committee integration. Radically differing perceptions of reality might lead to internal conflict. The Committee, as we have seen, is chosen from Congressmen whose political flexibility connotes an aptitude for learning. Furthermore, the high degree of satisfaction of its members with the group increases their susceptibility to its processes of learning and training.

For example, one half of the Committee's Democrats are Northerners and Westerners from urban constituencies, whose voting records are just as "liberal" on behalf of domestic social welfare programs as non-Committee Democrats from like constituencies. They come to the Committee favorably disposed toward the high level of federal spending necessary to support such programs. They come, in other words, with no sense of urgency about the Committee's tasks of guarding the Treasury or reducing budget estimates. Given the criteria governing their selection, however, they come without rigid preconceptions and with a built-in responsiveness to the socialization processes of any legislative group of which they are members. It is crucial to Committee integration that they learn to temper their potentially disruptive welfare state ideology with a conservative's concern for saving money. They must change their perceptions and attitudes sufficiently so that they view the Committee's tasks in nearly the same terms as their naturally more conservative Southern Democratic and Republican colleagues do. What their elders perceive as reality (i.e. the disposition of executives to ask for more money than is necessary) they, too, must see as reality. A subcommittee chairman explained: "When you have sat on the Committee, you see that these bureaus are always asking for more money--always up, never down. They want to build up their organization. You reach the point--I have--where it sickens you, where you rebel against it. Year after year, they want more money. They say, 'Only $50,000 this year'; but you know the pattern. Next year they'll be back for $100,000, then $200,000. The younger members haven't been on the Committee long enough, haven't had the experience to know this."

The younger men, in this case the younger liberals, do learn from their Committee experience. Within one or two terms, they are differentiating between themselves and the "wild-eyed spenders" or the "free spenders" in

the House. "Some of these guys would spend you through the roof", exclaimed one liberal of moderate seniority. Repeated exposure to Committee work and to fellow members has altered their perceptions and their attitudes in money matters. Half a dozen Northern Democrats of low or moderate seniority agreed with two of their number who said: "Yes, it's true. I can see it myself. I suppose I came here a flaming liberal; but as the years go by I get more conservative. You just hate like hell to spend all this money . . . You come to the point where you say, 'By God, this is enough jobs.'" "Yes, I think you do (get more conservative on the Committee). You get to sympathize more with the taxpayer. You get insight into where the money comes from and where it goes. You want to save as much as you can. You get to feel it. It's like a wage earner. He knows where the money comes from and how hard it is to get it, and he's careful in spending it. There's an inherent desire to economize in the members of the Committee." These men will remain more inclined toward spending than their Committee colleagues, but their perceptions and hence their attitudes have been brought close enough to the others to support a consensus on tasks. They are responsive to appeals on budget-cutting grounds that would not have registered earlier and which remain meaningless to liberals outside the Committee. In cases, therefore, where Committee selection does not and cannot produce individuals with a predisposition toward protecting the Treasury, the same result is achieved by socialization.

Socialization is a training in behavior as well as in perception. For the newcomer, conformity to norms in specific situations is insured through the appropriate application, by the Committee veterans, of rewards and punishments. For the Committee member who serves his apprenticeship creditably, the passage of time holds the promise that he will inherit a position of influence. He may, as an incentive, be given some small reward in the present. One man, in his second year on the Committee, had been assigned the task of specializing in one particular program. However narrow the scope of his specialization, it had placed him on the road to influence within the Committee. He explained with evident pleasure, "The first year, you let things go by. You can't participate. But you learn by watching the others operate. The next year, you know what you're interested in and when to step in . . . For instance, I've become an expert on the ---- program. The chairman said to me, 'This is something you ought to get interested in.' I did; and now I'm the expert on the Committee. Whatever I say on that, the other members listen to me and do what I want."

At some later date, provided he continues to observe Committee norms, he will be granted additional influence, perhaps through a prominent floor role. A model Committee man of moderate seniority who had just attained to this stage of accomplishment, and who had suffered through several political campaigns back home fending off charges that he was a do-nothing Congressman, spoke about the rewards he was beginning to reap. "When you perform well on the floor when you bring out a bill, and Members know that you know the bill, you develop prestige with other Members of Congress. They come over and ask you what you think, because they know you've studied it. You begin to get a reputation beyond your subcommittee. And you get inner satisfaction,

too. You don't feel that you're down here doing nothing." The first taste of influence which comes to men on this Committee is compensation for the frustrations of apprenticeship. Committee integration in general, and the meshing of roles between elders and newcomers in particular, rests on the fact that conformity to role expectations over time does guarantee to the young positive rewards--the very kind of rewards of power, prestige, and personal satisfaction which led most of them to seek Committee membership in the first place.

The important function of apprenticeship is that it provides the necessary time during which socialization can go forward. And teaching proceeds with the aid of punishments as well as rewards. Should a new member inadvertently or deliberately run afoul of Committee norms during his apprenticeship, he will find himself confronted with negative sanctions ranging in subtlety from "jaundiced eyes" to a changed subcommittee assignment. Several members, for example, recalled their earliest encounter with the norm of unity and the tradition against minority reports. One remembered his attempt to file a minority report. "The Chairman was pretty upset about it. It's just a tradition, I guess, not to have minority reports. I didn't know it was a tradition. When I said I was going to write a minority report, some eyebrows were raised. The Chairman said it just wasn't the thing to do. Nothing more was said about it. But it wasn't a very popular thing to do, I guess." He added that he had not filed one since. A freshman, who recalled his attempt to add a second minority report to one of the rare ones that was written, received sharper treatment as befitted his double violation of an integrative norm. "I tried to file additional views, too, but I got caught with my pants down. I got knocked down by the Chairman on a technicality. That's the way you get to be a good Congressman--by getting your knuckles rapped. Next time I'll know better."

Some younger members have congenital difficulty in observing the norms of the apprentice's role. In the context of the 86th Congress, these types tended to come from the Republican minority. The minority newcomers (described by one of the men who selected them as "eight young, energetic, fighting conservatives") were a group of economy minded individuals some of whom chafed against any barrier which kept them from immediate influence on Committee policy. Their reaction was quite different from that of the young Democrats, whose difficulty was in learning to become economy minded, but who did not actively resent their lack of influence. One freshman, who felt that "The appropriations system is lousy, inadequate and old fashioned", recalled that he had spoken out in full Committee against the recommendations of a subcommittee of which he was not a member. Having failed, he continued to oppose the recommendation during floor debate. By speaking up, speaking in relation to the work of another subcommittee and by opposing a Committee recommendation, he had violated the particular norms of his apprentice role plus the generally applicable norms of reciprocity and unity. He explained what he had learned, but remained only partially socialized. "They want to wash their dirty linen in the Committee and they want no opposition afterward. They let me say my piece in Committee . . . But I just couldn't keep quiet. I said some things on the floor, and

I found out that's about all they would take . . . If you don't get along with your Committee and have their support, you don't get anything accomplished around here . . . I'm trying to be a loyal, cooperative member of the Committee. You hate to be a stinker; but I'm still picking at the little things because I can't work on the big things. There's nothing for the new men to do, so they have to find places to needle in order to take some part in it."

Another freshman, who had deliberately violated apprenticeship norms by trying to ask "as many questions as the chairman" during subcommittee hearings, reported a story of unremitting counteraction against his deviation "In the hearings, I have to wait sometimes nine or ten hours for a chance; and he hopes I'll get tired and stay home. I've had to wait till some pretty unreasonable hours. Once I've gotten the floor, though, I've been able to make a good case. Sometimes I've been the only person there . . . He's all powerful. He's got all the power. He wouldn't think of taking me on a trip with him when he goes to hold hearings. Last year, he went to -----. He wouldn't give me a nudge there. And in the hearings, when I'm questioning a witness, he'll keep butting in so that my case won't appear to be too rosy." Carried on over a period of two years, this behavior resulted in considerable personal friction between a Committee elder and the newcomer. Other members of his subcommittee gave him a pointedly great lack of support for his non-conformity. "They tried to slow him down and tone him down a little", not because he and his subcommittee chairman disagreed, but on the grounds that the Committee has developed accepted ways of disagreeing which minimize, rather than exacerbate, interpersonal friction.[47]

One internal threat to Committee integration comes from new members who from untutored perceptions, from ignorance of norms, or from dissatisfaction with the apprentice role may not act in accordance with Committee expectations. The seriousness of this threat is minimized, however, by the fact that the deviant newcomer does not possess sufficient resources to adversely affect the operation of the system. Even if he does not respond immediately to the application of sanctions, he can be held in check and subjected to an extended and (given the frequency of interaction among members) intensive period of socialization. The success of Committee socialization is indicated by the fact that whereas wholesale criticism of Committee operations was frequently voiced among junior members, it had disappeared among the men of moderate experience. And what these middle seniority members now accept as the facts of Committee life, the veterans vigorously assert and defend as the essentials of a smoothly functioning system. Satisfaction with the Committee's internal structure increases with length of Committee service.

An important reason for changing member attitudes is that those who have attained leadership positions have learned, as newcomers characteristically have not, that their conformity to Committee norms is the ultimate source of their influence inside the group. Freshman members do not as readily perceive the degree to which interpersonal influence is rooted in obedience to group norms. They seem to convert their own sense of powerlessness into

the view that the Committee's leaders possess, by virtue of their positions, arbitrary, absolute, and awesome power. Typically, they say: "If you're a subcommittee chairman, it's your Committee." "The Chairman runs the show. He gets what he wants. He decides what he wants and gets it through." "He's the boss. He gets about what he wants." Older members of the Committee, however, view the power of the leaders as a highly contingent and revocable grant, tendered by the Committee for so long and only so long as their leaders abide by Committee expectations. In commenting on internal influence, their typical reaction is: "Of course, the Committee wouldn't follow him if it didn't want to. He has a great deal of respect. He's an able man, a hard-working man." "He knows the bill backwards and forwards. He works hard, awfully hard and the members know it. He's worked with these people for years and he knows them like a book. He does more work on the bill than all the other members combined. I know I don't do as much as I would if I knew I had to have the information." Committee leaders have an imposing set of formal prerogatives. But they can capitalize on them only if they command the respect, confidence and deference of their colleagues.

It is basic to Committee integration that those members who have the greatest power to change the system evidence the least disposition to do so. Despite their institutional conservatism, however, Committee elders do violate the norms applicable to them and hence represent a potential threat to successful integration. Excessive deviation from Committee expectations by some leaders will bring counter-measures by other leaders. Thus, for example, the Chairman and his subcommittee chairman exercise reciprocal controls over one another's behavior. The Chairman has the authority to appoint the chairmen and members of each subcommittee and fix its jurisdiction. "He runs the Committee. He has a lot of power", agreed one subcommittee chairman. "But it's all done on the basis of personal friendship. If he tries to get too big, the members can whack him down by majority vote."

In the 84th Congress, Chairman Cannon attempted an unusually broad reorganization of subcommittee jurisdictions. The subcommittee chairman most adversely affected rallied his senior colleagues against the Chairman's action--on the grounds that it was an excessive violation of role expectations and threatening to subcommittee autonomy. Faced with the prospect of a negative Committee vote, the Chairman was forced to act in closer conformity to the expectations of the other leaders. As one participant described the episode, "Mr. Cannon, for reasons of his own, tried to bust up one of the subcommittees. We didn't like that . . . He was breaking up the whole Committee. A couple of weeks later, a few of the senior members got together and worked out a compromise. By that time, he had seen a few things, so we went to him and talked to him and worked it out." On the subcommittees, too, it is the veterans of both parties who will levy sanctions against an offending chairman. It is they who speak of "cutting down to size" and "trimming the whiskers" of leaders who become "too cocky", "too stubborn" or who "do things wrong too often." Committee integration is underwritten by the fact that no member high or low is free from the operation of its sanctioning mechanisms.

III

Data concerning internal committee activity can be organized and presented in various ways.[48] One way is to use key functional problems like integration as the focal points for descriptive analysis. On the basis of our analysis (and without, for the time being, having devised any precise measure of integration), we are led to the summary observation that the House Appropriations Committee appears to be a well-integrated, if not an extremely well-integrated, committee. The question arises as to whether anything can be gained from this study other than a description of one property of one political subsystem. It is reasonable to assume that the internal life of a congressional committee affects all legislative activity involving that committee, and that the analysis of a committee's internal relationships will produce useful knowledge about legislative behavior. If there is any validity to these assumptions, they indicate some broader implications for a study such as this one.

In the first place, the success of the House Appropriations Committee in solving the problem of integration probably does have important consequences for the appropriations process. Some of the possible relationships can be stated as hypotheses and tested; others can be suggested as possible guides to understanding. All of them require further research. Of primary interest is the relationship between integration and the power of the Committee. There is little doubt about the fact of Committee power. Of the 443 separate case histories of bureau appropriations examined, the House accepted Committee recommendations in 87.4% (387) of them; and in 33.6% (159) of the cases, the House Committee's original recommendations on money amounts were the exact ones enacted into law. The hypothesis that the greater the degree of Committee unity the greater the probability that its recommendations will be accepted is being tested as part of a larger study.[49] House Committee integration may be a key factor in producing House victories in conference committee. This relationship, too, might be tested. Integration appears, also, to help provide the House conferees with a feeling of confidence and superiority which is one of their important advantages in the mix of psychological factors affecting conference deliberations.

Another suggested consequence of high integration is that party groups have a relatively small influence upon appropriations decisions. It suggests, too, that Committee oriented behavior should be duly emphasized in any analysis of Congressional oversight of administrative activity by this Committee. Successful integration promotes the achievement of the Committee's goals, and doubtless helps account for the consistent production of budget-cutting decisions. Another consequence will be found in the strategies adopted by people seeking favorable Committee decisions. For example, the pattern of contact from executive officials to the Committee will run to the chairman and the ranking minority member (and to the professional staff man) of the single subcommittee handling their agency's appropriations. The ways in which the Committee achieves integration may even affect the success of failure of a bureau in getting its appropriations. Committee members, for instance, will react more favorably toward an administrator

who conforms to their self-image of the hard-working master-of-detail than to an administrator who does not--and Committee response to individual administrators bulks large in their determinations.

Finally, the internal integration of this Committee helps to explain the extraordinary stability, since 1920, of appropriations procedures--in the face of repeated proposals to change them through omnibus appropriations, legislative budgets, new budgetary forms, item veto, Treasury borrowing etc. Integration is a stabilizing force, and the stability of the House Appropriations Committee has been a force for stabilization throughout the entire process. It was, for example, the disagreement between Cannon and Taber which led to the indecisiveness reflected in the short-lived single appropriations bill; and it has been the lack of Committee integration which has guaranteed the success of "backdoor spending" proposals in recent years.[50] One needs only to examine the conditions most likely to decrease Committee integration to ascertain some of the critical factors for producing changes in the appropriations process. A description of integration is also an excellent base line from which to analyze change in internal structure.

All of these are speculative propositions which call for further research. But they suggest, as a second implication, that committee integration does have important consequences for legislative activity and, hence, that it is a key variable in the study of legislative politics. It would seem to be, therefore, a useful focal point for the study of other congressional committees. This view is confirmed by the results of interviews conducted by the author with members of the House Committee on Education and Labor together with an examination of that Committee's activity in one policy area. They indicate very significant contrasts between the internal structure of that Committee and that of the Appropriations Committee--contrasts which center around their comparative success in meeting the problem of integration.[51]

The House Committee on Education and Labor appears to be a poorly integrated committee. Its internal structure is characterized by a great deal of subgroup conflict, relatively little role reciprocity, and minimally effective internal control mechanisms. Factors which promote Appropriations Committee integration are not present to any marked degree. There is: a shallow consensus on Committee tasks, visibly controversial policy areas with which to deal, only a moderate degree of attractiveness for its members, and a relatively high rate of membership turnover. The criteria for selection of members place little or no emphasis on a legislative orientation. The members possess little sense of group identification and pride; and they articulate virtually no distinctive Committee norms and traditions. They are much more issue-oriented (toward policy questions) than style oriented (toward hard work). Their Committee and its institutional concerns exercise only the barest of influence over their actions. External concerns, like those of party, constituency and clientele groups, are probably more effective in determining Committee decisions than is likely to be the case in a well-integrated committee. These superficial and impressionistic

contrasts are made to suggest that some comparative committee analysis could usefully be devoted to: 1. the factors which tend to increase or decrease integration, 2. the degree to which integration is achieved, 3. the consequences of varying degrees of integration for committee behavior and influence.

Whatever value there is in an analysis of committee integration, it should encourage the analysis and the classification of congressional committees along functional lines. It should lead to the discussion of interrelated problems of committee survival. Our discussion of integration has touched tangentially on the problems of decision-making and adaptation--sufficiently, at least, to indicate that the solution of one problem has consequences for the solution of the others. Functional classifications of committees (i.e. well-integrated, poorly-integrated etc.), derived from a large number of descriptive analyses of several problems, may prove helpful in constructing more general propositions about the legislative process.

FOOTNOTES

1 On social systems, see: George Homans, The Human Group (New York, 1950); Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 1957); Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward A General Theory of Action (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 190-234. Most helpful with reference to the political system has been David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems" World Politics (April, 1957), pp. 383-400.

2 A limitation applicable to generalizations for the entire period stems from the fact that the two major sources of data for the study do not cover exactly the same period. An intensive study of the public record of appropriations for 37 executive bureaus has been made for the period 1947-1959. Interviews with members of the Committee and its staff took place from 1959-1961.

3 This study is a part of a larger study of the appropriations process now in progress. The author wishes to acknowledge his great debt to the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council for the research grant which made this present study and the larger one possible. Important studies of appropriations politics include: Robert Wallace, Congressional Control of Federal Spending (Detroit, 1960); Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (Ithaca, 1950); David Knapp, "Congressional Control of Agricultural Conservation Policy: A Case Study of the Appropriations Process", Political Science Quarterly (June, 1956); Arthur Macmahan, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse", Political Science Quarterly, 1943, Vol. 58, pp. 161-190, 380-414; Earle Wallace, "The Politics of River Basin Appropriations: A Case Study of the Roanoke River Nasin", Unpublished MSS (U. of North Carolina, 1959); Dwaine Marvick, "Congressional Appropriations Politics", Unpublished MSS (Columbia, 1952). Joseph Harris has written a study of appropriations control soon to be published by the Brookings Institution.

4 The definition is by Theodore M. Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York, 1951), p. 280. The excellent discussion of role from which this definition was taken appears in N. Gross, W. Mason and A. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis; Studies of the School Superintendency Role (New York, 1958). A role should not be taken to prescribe one fixed pattern of behavior, but rather a range of behaviors. Every role allows for some "slippage".

5 Cf. Harry M. Johnson, Sociology (New York, 1960), Chapter 3.

6 The usage here follows most closely that used by Robert Merton. He quotes, with approval the following definition by Radcliffe-Brown of "functional unity", and uses it synonymously with integration thereafter: "a condition in which all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency i.e. without producing persistent conflicts which can neither be

resolved nor regulated". Merton, op. cit., p. 26. See also pp. 27-29. The discussion of differentiation and integration also owes a good deal to Scott Greer, Social Organization (New York, 1955)

7 The functional problem of Appropriations Committee adaptation to its environment centers around the management of House-Committee tensions. It is not treated in this study. High points for analysis would be the 1885 contest in which the House took away all Committee jurisdiction over 6 of its 12 appropriations bills (17 Congressional Record, Part I, pp. 138-338); the 1920 contest in which jurisdiction over all appropriations bills was restored to the Committee (59 Congressional Record, Part 8, pp. 8102-8120; and the recent running dispute over direct treasury financing ("backdoor spending") as opposed to financing through the appropriations process (e.g. through the Committee).)

8 This and all other generalizations about member attitudes and perceptions depend heavily on extensive interviews held with Committee members. Semi-structured interviews, averaging 3/4 of an hour in length were held with 45 of the 50 Committee members during the 86th Congress. Certain key questions, all of which were open-ended, were asked of all respondents. The schedule was kept very flexible, however, in order to permit particular topics to be explored with those individuals best equipped to discuss them. In a few cases, where respondents encouraged it, notes were taken during the interviews. In most cases no notes were taken, but were transcribed immediately after the interview. This technique, plus the lack of a fixed schedule, plus the use of open ended questions were all used so as to maximize the possibility of a helpful rapport between interviewer and respondent. There are many limitations to the interview technique and to loosely scheduled interviews. But the subject matter of Committee integration is one which must, to a large degree, be plumbed through interviews--dealing as it does with internal Committee affairs. Only by interview, furthermore, can the attitudes and perceptions so important to this study be discovered. For the most part interviewees have been used as respondents rather than as informants in reconstructing events. A description of actual Committee decision-making, for example, would rely much more heavily on the printed record and less on interviews than this one.

9 "History of the Committee on Appropriations", House Document No. 299, House of Representatives, 77th Congress, 1st Session, 1941-2, p. 11.

10 The bureaus being studied are all concerned with domestic policy and are situated in the Agriculture, Interior, Labor, Commerce, Treasury, Justice and Health, Education and Welfare Departments. For a similar pattern of Committee decision-making in foreign affairs, see Holbert Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pittsburgh, 1958), Chapter 9.

11 Budget-cutting, linked as it is to decreased federal spending and a balanced budget, does have widespread public (e.g. constituency) support. This may take form in a structured and stable conservative philosophy or in an unstructured and volatile "economy mood".

12 As stated by Chairman Cannon, the Committee rule is: "It is the intent of every member of this Committee . . . to provide as economical a budget as possible. Every member of this Committee . . . has pledged to his constituents back home to observe the strictest economy here--of course, except in places where local interests are involved". House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Budget for 1958, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1957), p. 27.

13 Members often refer to it as a "business" committee as distinguished from a "policy" committee. One member said, typically, "A disagreement on money isn't like a legislative program--it's a matter of money rather than a difference in philosophy".

14 An exception here is the highly publicized controversy of recent years over whether to finance foreign aid by borrowing from a fund established in the Treasury for an extended period or through the traditional annual appropriations process. The publicity initiative, in this case, has come from the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations and not from the Committee.

15 This study, however, does not treat deficiency or supplemental appropriations bills.

16 The only exception is Rep. Glenard Lipscomb who also serves on the Committee on House Administration.

17 One reason why the Senate Committee on Appropriations appears unable to achieve the same degree of integration as the House Committee is that all of its members sit on other powerful committees as well as on Appropriations.

18 Nicholas A. Masters, "House Committee Assignments", American Political Science Review (June, 1961).

19 Taber's activity is made possible because of the high personal regard in which Taber is held by party leaders. Every Republican respondent mentioned Taber as a key man in their appointment to the Committee. His position stands in contrast to that of Clarence Cannon, and suggests much closer ties between party and Committee on the Republican side than on the Democratic side. Thus: Cannon on Rayburn "Sam stacked the Committee against me"; Rayburn on Cannon "I can't do anything with Cannon. He's the most powerful man in the House". Time, February 2, 1959.

20 Masters, op. cit., p. 352.

21 They appear to be, in general, the same ones as reported for the Senate by Matthews. See Donald Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill, 1960), Chapter 5.

22 Most, but not all, Committee members actively seek membership. Of the 39 respondents who described the dynamics of their selection, five were coopted into the Committee without their prior knowledge or consent.

23 Twelve of the 17 were selected as the result of a change in party control of the House. When, for example, the Republicans regained control of the House in 1953, they had 13 vacancies to fill. Six of the thirteen were freshmen.

24 In the period from 1947 through 1959, (80th to 86th Congress) 79 separate appointments were made to the Appropriations Committee, with 14 going to freshmen. The Committee filled, in other words, 17.7% of its vacancies with freshmen. The Rules Committee had 26 vacancies and selected no freshmen at all. The Ways and Means Committee had 36 vacancies and selected 2 freshmen (5.6%). All other Committees had a higher percentage of freshmen appointments. Armed Services ranked fourth, with 45 vacancies, 12 freshmen appointed for a percentage of 26.7%. Foreign Affairs figures were 46, 14, 30.4%; UnAmerican Activities were 22, 7, 31.8%. The figures on freshman appointments were taken from Masters, op. cit.

25 Candidates must ordinarily prove to the selectors that they can hold their districts without the help of a Committee position. The logic is the reverse from those committees where assignments are given so as to help a member to hold his district. Only 2 of the 14 men taken on the Committee as freshmen between 1947 and 1960 were defeated at the next election, thus indicating that the safeness of the district was probably a consideration in these cases as well. In the 1960 elections, 31 out of the current 50 members received more than 55.1% of the vote in their districts. By a common definition, therefore, only 9 of the 50 came from marginal districts.

26 The 106 members came to Appropriations from every committee except Ways and Means.

27 One was personally requested by the Speaker to move to Ways and Means. The other was chosen by a caucus of regional Congressmen to be his party's representative on the Rules Committee.

28 See the study reported in George Galloway, Congress at the Crossroads (New York, 1946), p. 90; George Goodwin "The Seniority System in Congress", American Political Science Review (June, 1959), p. 433.

29 Only one respondent ranked it below Ways and Means or Rules in prestige; and he ranked it below both. This individual was the only respondent to volunteer that he would not come on the Committee if he had it to do over again. He was the only respondent to complain about the very aspect of Committee life in which most members take pride--hard work. This case suggests something of the internal consistency among Committee attitudes.

30 The most frequent reason members gave for wanting to leave the Committee they were on was that they were "unhappy", "frustrated" and "dissatisfied" on a Committee whose scope was narrow and which did relatively little work. The opposition of many Committee members to direct Treasury financing can be viewed in part as a reaction to a reduction in the scope of Committee activity, contacts and information.

31 For a stimulating analysis of a somewhat contrasting style--that of the investigating Congressman, see Edward Shils, "Resentments and Hostilities of Legislators: Sources, Objects, Consequences", in J. Wahlke and H. Eulau, Legislative Behavior (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 347-354.

32 This proposition is spelled out at some length in J. Thibaut and H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York, 1959), p. 247, and in D. Cartwright and A. Zander, Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (Evanston, 1953), p. 420.

33 This figure is 9% greater than the next most stable House Committee during this particular period. The top four, in order, were Appropriations (35.7%), Agriculture (26.7%), Armed Services (25%), Foreign Affairs (20.8%).

34 What follows does not purport to be an analysis of decision-making on the Committee. Integration clearly affects the way in which decisions are made but it by no means tells us all we need to know about decision-making.

35 "Newcomers" are defined as men who have served 1-2 terms on the Committee. "Men of moderate experience" are those with 3-5 terms of service. "Veterans" are those who have 6 or more terms of Committee service.

36 A statement of expected behavior was taken to be a Committee norm when it was expressed by a substantial number of respondents (a dozen or so) who represented both parties, and varying degrees of experience. In nearly every case, moreover, no refutation of them was encountered. Moreover, there is ample confirmation of the existence of each of these norms in the public record. Articulation of them came most frequently from the veterans of the group.

37 Five of these minority reports were one-man objections and were not concurred in by any colleagues. The most extraordinary minority report of the period occured in the 84th Congress--and not on a regular appropriations bill. The Committee majority wrote a politically inspired report following President Eisenhower's veto of a soil bank proposal, appropriating 1.2 billion dollars for a soil bank program. The unilateral procedure used by the majority violated nearly every Committee norm we have discussed. The minority report made a major point out of the "perversion of the traditional processes of a great committee" and the "departure from the better traditions of the Appropriations Committee". House Report No. 2016, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956.

38 See, for example, the internal conflict on the subcommittee dealing with the Labor Department. 93 Congressional Record, pp. 2465-2562 passim; 94 Congressional Record, pp. 7605-7607.

39 See, for example, the unusual minority report of Committee Republicans on the foreign aid appropriations bill in 1960. Their protest against Committee cuts in the budget estimates was the result of strenuous urging by the Eisenhower Administration. House of Representatives, Report on Mutual Security and Related Agency Appropriation Bill, 1961, House Report No. 1798, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960.

40 David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York, 1959); Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, 1951).

41 Charles Jones has stressed the importance of internal Committee concerns to Committee behavior in his study of the House Committee on Agriculture. See Charles Jones, "Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Committee", American Political Science Review (June, 1961).

41a Another subgroup which might be considered a part of the subsystem is the Committee's permanent professional staff (as distinguished from its temporary investigating staff). Evidence is that the staff, too, is well-integrated. To the degree that a staff member's role is determined by the expectations of his fellow staffers, group-established norms are highly integrative. Thus, a staff member is expected to coordinate his work informally with that of his fellow "clerks", assist them whenever called upon to do so, work irregular hours under conditions of harassing pressure, and remain as faceless in the world of congressional staffs as his bosses do in the public political world. In its essential properties--such as stable membership, high job satisfaction, hard working style, non-partisanship--it is a carbon copy of the Committee. It adds, by its unified efforts, to the integration of the Committee.

42 The ideas of "reciprocity" and "complementarity" are discussed in Alvin Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity", American Sociological Review (April, 1960). Most helpful in explaining the idea of a role system have been J. Wahlke, H. Eulau, W. Buchanan, L Ferguson, "The Role Concept in the Comparative Study of State Legislatures" and "Interstate Variations in Legislators' Role Orientations", papers prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1958.

43 One House Committee on which it is observed only minimally is Education and Labor. See Footnote #51.

44 See the exchange in 101 Congressional Record, pp. 3832, 3844, 3874.

45 99 Congressional Record, p. 4933.

46 A publicized exception was the controversy over the firing of the Committee's investigating staff and the hiring of a new one when party control of the Committee changed in 1949. See 95 Congressional Record, p. 4107; 96 Congressional Record, pp. 4699-4701, 4934-4938 passim. Public power and agricultural policy seem the most likely to produce differences between them inside the Committee.

47 A member of his own party commented: "You're not supposed to agree with your subcommittee chairman on everything or polish for him or anything like that. I don't; and if you did, you wouldn't be doing your job. But there are ways to do it . . . After all, your decisions are made in markup and not out there in the hearings. There are ways to do things".

48 In addition to studies already cited, see: J. Lieper Freeman, The Political Process (New York, 1955); Ralph K. Huitt, "The Congressional Committee: A Case Study", American Political Science Review (June, 1954); James A. Robinson, "Decision Making in the House Rules Committee", Administrative Science Quarterly (June, 1958); Seymour Scher, "Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers", American Political Science Review (December, 1960).

49 The hypothesis was first suggested by Dwaine Marvick. Some confirma- has been provided in his study of two Congresses. See Marvick, op. cit.

50 On the omnibus appropriations bill, see Dalmas Nelson, "The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950", Journal of Politics (May, 1953). Committee disunity on Treasury financing was best illustrated by the contest--first in the House Bill, and later over the conference report--over the Housing Act of 1959. By amendment ("The Thomas Amendment") the House put in a provision calling for financing through the regular appropriations process. Committee members voted 39-11 in favor. The provision was taken out in conference. And on the vote accepting the conference report with its provision for direct treasury financing,

Committee members voted 20-27 in favor of the report. Nine members who voted against "backdoor spending" the first time voted for it when the policy issue of public housing was forcefully superimposed upon it. 105 Congressional Record, pp. 8667-8674, 8844-8845, 10557-10563.

51 An analysis of the internal life of the Committee on Education and Labor, drawn partly from interviews with 19 members of that group, will appear in a forthcoming study on the politics of federal aid to education to be published by Syracuse University Press and written by Professor Frank Munger and the author.

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THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES IN NIGERIA AND GHANA

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Ghana became independent in 1957, Nigeria in 1960. It is a cliche that change takes place in Africa at a speed which astounds even those who mouthe such cliches. Nevertheless the time span since independence has been so short that it is impossible to understand the present role of the public services in the political life of these two countries without extensive reference to their historical development. Today Ghana and Nigeria seem to be evolving in somewhat different directions politically. By examining the largely common forces at work within these countries in the past we may gain a better perspective from which to view the dynamics of their divergence in the present and in the future.

Colonial rule can be described by many terms, and means different things to different people. To some it is a synonym for exploitation; to some it is liberative in that it develops the potentialities of colonial peoples; to others it is authoritarian; to still others it is socialistic. But all must agree on one point--it is bureaucratic,[1] not necessarily in terms of the way day-to-day decisions are arrived at, for individual officials in the field (particularly in remote areas) are likely to be able to exercise considerable freedom of judgment, but as a whole. The colonial system is bureaucratic in it s essence. It is a system of authority which is its own justification; it exists in response to decisions made elsewhere than in the political life of the people governed

In the colonial territory, the civil servant is the politician's master. The heritage of all states which have emerged from colonial status is thus necessarily the heritage of an era in which the locus of power was centralized in a governmental bureaucracy rather than in other social institutions. This can and is being changed and modified in a variety of ways in different nations, but for all former colonial nations it is the inevitable point of departure. Indeed, the very existence of such "nations" as Ghana and Nigeria is itself the creation of colonial bureaucracy.[2]

Insofar as both Ghana and Nigeria were governed for many decades (and parts of them for centuries) by the British crown, their heritage of colonial bureaucratic rule is similar. Yet even in the pre-independence period important differences emerged which set the stage for divergent patterns following independence.

In both nations the colonial bureaucracy were so much involved in making political decisions that to a large extent the political character of these decisions went unrecognized. The slow realization on the part of American public administrators that it is impossible to separate administration from politics--that each decision to build a bridge here rather than there or to increase this tax rather than that is never made wholly on the basis of objective criteria--took, and in some quarters is still taking, decades; British colonial administrators have had the same problem in realizing that almost anything they did to some extent altered the distribution of goods and services, and above all the locus of power, within the community affected. The colonial officials at least had the excuse that in the communities with which they were dealing there was less economic and social stratification than in England or the United States

and that the power structures which they were reinforcing or undermining were not so readily apparent as in these countries.

Their mistake was still a significant one nonetheless. Colonial administration has left behind a vastly important intellectual legacy. This is the belief—shared by administrators and populace alike—in a government above parties, or, more precisely, above special interests. The indigenous administrator may fail to create such an administration because of his own selfish desires or because of the nature of the new nation's constitutional or political system, but the ideal of civil service neutrality is still strongly rooted in the political ethos of such nations as Ghana and Nigeria.

Because in the colonial past the civil service was the government, the way was opened for a broader concept of the neutrality of government as such than is found in the U.S. or Britain. The intellectual germs of the one party state, which seems to have become the norm throughout much of Africa, are to be found in the colonial system. Under the general control of a beneficent overlord in London, the colonial administrator was, in theory at least, above local factions. Now the government administrator is still considered to be above local factions, under the control of a beneficent and indigenous overlord in the person of the president or premier of a government completely dominated by one party which claims to represent all of the people.

The ability of the one party state in Africa to represent all segments and interests of the people equally is as fictitious as was the ability of the colonial administrator to deal only in administration, not in politics; but as a myth governing the status and conduct of the government official it is just as important today as was the older myth in governing the position and conduct of the colonial official in the past. A civil service system staffed by theoretically non-partisan officials through the level of permanent secretary, and all the attendant trappings, are the embodiment of this myth of the superiority of the public servant to the currents of factional, class, and regional dynamics in the country. One party bureaucracy is the direct descendant of colonial bureaucratic rule.

There are two principal respects in which the history of colonial administration in Ghana and Nigeria differ. These do not affect the basic nature of colonial bureaucracy, although they do alter its details and consequences.

The first difference lies in the somewhat differing application of the principal of indirect rule in parts of Ghana and Nigeria. The theory of indirect rule as developed by Lord Lugard in Uganda and Northern Nigeria[3] was that the British government did not wish to rule the native population directly, but wished simply to provide the framework of sanctions which would guarantee the continued rule of the traditional local authorities. Such an approach had two alleged advantages. It was much cheaper (and Britain was interested in keeping the costs of colonial administration to a minimum) and it did less violence to the lives and psyches of the people (which also helped to keep the costs down since leaving the traditional ways undisturbed made the native population more docile and thus less expensive to police, and also made it more unlikely that they would come to demand costly new social services).

Indirect rule reinforced the myth of the civil servant as above the political struggle. The British official in Northern Nigeria or the Northern Territories of Ghana could not be accused of interfering in local politics if

he simply backed up the local emir or chief in doing the things he had always done. At least he could not be if one accepted the curious though seldom questioned premise that to maintain the status quo is not to take political action. The local emir or chief was always himself considered to be above the factional struggle, only applying rather than making Koranic or tribal law. Indirect rule tended therefore to confirm the idea of the bureaucracy as above the political struggle.

There are a few minor exceptions however. In Ghana indirect rule over the powerful middle belt kingdom of Ashanti was only instituted in 1924. Prior to this time the British colonial administrator was obviously a party to a real struggle for political power designed to break the strength of the ancient kingdom. After 1924, he was again involved in a partisan struggle in striving to reinstitute the Asantahene's power in the face of the opposition of the modernizing elements which had grown up under and been encouraged by earlier British pressures against the traditional Ashanti system.[4]

In Western Nigeria the extension of indirect rule to this part of the south had similar results in placing the colonial bureaucracy at the center of an obvious struggle for power. In Western Nigeria the bolstering of the power of the Yoruba chiefs against their followers and rivalswas an act of an obviously political nature. In the East, where the British searched in vain for local chiefs and eventually had to invent them, the extent to which the colonial government had interfered directly in the local power struggle was even more obvious and resistance to the institution of this kind of indirect rule through chiefs among the egalitarian Ibos was sufficient to force its early abandonment. Even in such areas as Northern Nigeria, where indirect rule was instituted at the outset and consistently maintained, it earned the dislike of the educated few who were systematically excluded by the British from participation in the native authorities through which it was carried on.[5]

Nonetheless, since in Northern Nigeria the pretensions of the emirs (as well as of the British District Officers on whose support they depended) to be above factions were widely accepted, and since Northern Nigeria is geographically and demographically dominant in Nigeria, the tradition of indirect rule on the whole has served to bolster the concept of bureaucratic neutrality in Nigeria. In Ghana, indirect rule did not play so important a role in confirming the stereotype of the colonial bureaucrat as above the political struggle.

The second factor which differentially affected the nature of the bureaucracy in Nigeria and Ghana has to do with the conditions under which the Africanization of the civil service took place in the two countries.

In both countries Africanization of the bureaucracy had tremendous symbolic importance, far outreaching its actual importance in the power struggle or even the administrative results to which it led.[6] In both countries the struggle for independence and self-rule was closely tied to the struggle for Africanization of the bureaucracy, with political power being used as a means to gain access to bureaucratic power.

One of the earliest aims of nationalist agitation was not so much to make the alien bureaucracy directly responsible to indigenous political direction, but to wrest the bureaucratic levers of power from the hands of the British, and the Sierra Leoneans and West Indians, who comprised the civil service.[7] The goal of the struggle was to gain the admission of educated

Ghanaians and Nigerians to civil service posts, not to subject the service as a whole to more effective political control by the Ghanaian or Nigerian people. But with the approach of independence in the two countries a divergence appeared in the nature of the personnel staffing the public services. While in Nigeria independence has in general meant that the social groups which were the holders of political power became the holders of bureaucratic power as well, in Ghana a split occurred in the ranks of Ghanaian leadership prior to independence which is to some extent reflected in a split between the political and bureaucratic elites.

In both nations the early nationalist movements were the creation of that small segment of the population which had been educated in mission schools at home or, in a few cases, in Britain. They were mainly drawn from the people who lived near the coast, who had had the longest contact with the British, and who had most thoroughly assimilated British ways. These persons were interested in taking over the civil service and in time the political reins of government as well, but not necessarily in extending political power to the population as a whole or in attacking the economic or social status quo. The fact that differences in economic conditions between rich and poor were minor by American standards did not of course diminish the social distance to which they gave rise, or class rivalry, although it did serve to mitigate its bitterness.

It was this Westernized group, drawn from a small localized segment of the population, which moved into the bureaucracy as the British moved or were pushed out and, because the colonial bureaucratic system had monopolized virtually all social and economic activity, they became the new ruling elite.

In Nigeria this process continued up to and through independence, with political and bureaucratic power in the hands of persons of the same backgrounds and loyalties (at least within each of the three regions). There is no split in Nigeria between the party and the bureaucracy.[8]

In Ghana the story was different. The creation of the Convention Peoples Party by Kwame Nkrumah and the consequent eclipse of the United Gold Coast Convention meant not only that the nation was brought to independence under the rule of a different political group than that which had lead the nationalist struggle throughout the early years—a group of generally lower social status, not part of the old westernized elite, and with a different attitude toward the social status quo. Especially important for our purposes, this was not the same group which had moved into the bureaucracy during the slow, limited process of Africanization of the public services.

Even where they had not already taken places in the civil service, the old elite in Ghana offered virtually the only available source of candidates qualified to replace the British when the advent of self-government speeded up the process of Africanization. The situation which obtained at independence remains largely unchanged today. The people who staff the bureaucracy are not representative of those who control or support the party which controls the government. This raises issues which will be discussed later in this paper.

With the exception of the differential impact of indirect rule and the differing degrees of congruence between bureaucratic and political elites, Ghana and Nigeria had more features in common than points of divergence in the era prior to the attainment of their independence. Most of these remain today, though divergences between them are gradually becoming more apparent.

As previously indicated, in the colonial countries the bureaucracy was necessarily responsible for all aspects of lifenot al ready provided for within the existing traditional system, and even here acted as the final court of appeal. Today the governmental bureaucracies in these countries continue to monopolize most positions of power and prestige; the bureaucracy in these countries is the surest and most obvious path to social advancement.

In both countries there is an independent bar of some significance, and there are of course the church hierarchies. Elected political leaders have high status, of course, as do a few traditional leaders. But there is no indigenous entrepreneurial class of any significance. Such local business men and women as there are are petty retailers, contractors, real estate speculators, or money-lenders--marginal occupations closely related to each other and to political influence and access.[9] Virtually anyone of any substance is politician or government employee.[10]

There are few large factories of any kind. Farm produce raised for export is sold through government-controlled marketing boards. Most economic enterprise of any magnitude such as railroads, wharfs, telephone companies, etc., have always been in the hands of the government. In Ghana even the cooperative movement and the trade unions have now been tied into the government bureaucracy. Virtually all large-scale wholesale and retail trade, along with the newly emergent service industries are still in the hands of large British and French[11] firms in which only now are they beginning to use Africans in executive positions. Almost all teachers are also part of the bureaucracy, since even mission teachers usually receive most of their salary from the government. All colleges and universities are government institutions.

This bureaucratic monopoly of expertise deprives the political leaders of independent sources of information and makes them dependent on the "expert" judgments of the bureaucracy to a degree not possible elsewhere.[12] Despite the legend to the contrary, the British colonial administration never had any plans for ultimately turning over the top jobs in the administration to Africans and never systematically attempted to train Africans to fill them,[13] so that there is still a great shortage of competent personnel available even in countries like Nigeria and Ghana which are comparatively well off. Because the bureaucracy continues to have the prestigious glitter that it gained through being the real ruler during the colonial period, it still seems to offer the most attractive career to the literate. As long as there continues to be a need for additional trained administrators and technical personnel in government it is unlikely that private enterprise will have much success in attracting school or university graduates of high caliber (although if they run formal training schools of some kind they are likely to be swamped with applications). A complicating factor is that most college and university students are on full government scholarship in return for which they have already contracted to work for a given number of years for the government after they graduate.

The position and power of the bureaucracy is reinforced by this almost total abasence of competing social elites. The university professor is a government employee, the businessman is dependent on government loans, the contractor or land speculator on government favor, even the university student is dependent on the government for his room, board, and tuition. The social elites, which in most Western nations it is the role of government to adjudicate among or struggle with for power are lacking. None of the groups which compete with the public service for the control of society in the United States, France or Britain—

business, labor, the farmer--have sufficient independent power to enter the contest in Ghana or Nigeria with any hope of success. The very parties and pressure groups through which such interests tend to be expressed in democratic nations are in Africa still representative primarily of regional and ethnic groups,[14] and thus are open to charges of being divisive and anti-nationalistic. Even here therefore the bureaucracy has a built-in advantage as the non-partisan instrument of the whole people.

In both Ghana and Nigeria the bureaucracy is in theory subordinate to the political party in control of parliament,[15] whose authority is derived from a functioning electoral system. Although the parliamentary system is somewhat precarious in Ghana, a good example of what Professor Shils has called a "tutelary democracy,"[16] even here there are still proportionately more opposition members of parliament, despite the pronounced trend toward a one-party state, than there are in many other independent African nations. Indeed it would be difficult to contend that the parliamentary opposition in Ghana was weaker or under greater pressure than that in Northern Nigeria. In any event there is no question of the bureaucracy operating as the embodiment of the nation backed solely by force as is the case in some of the countries of Asia and the Middle East.

On the other hand it is clear that Ghana and the three regions of Nigeria, though not yet the federal government of Nigeria, are in practice one-party states in which victory for the opposition could only come about as the result of major social and political upheaval. Indeed, only ethnic diversity and the federal system enables opposition parties to survive in Nigeria, an eventuality the Nkrumah government summarily disposed off upon coming to power. This being the case, the bureaucracies in these countries are the agents of a single all-powerful party.

The bureaucracy may claim to be neutral, but the party, though it may claim to represent the whole people and be above divisive factions, finds this posture of neutrality more difficult since it is necessarily involved in the formulation and advancement of policy positions. In addition, the parties, in an attempt to gain their ends, are not above exerting pressures which are of dubious ethical and legal standing. How then does a bureaucracy which regards itself as non-partisan adjust to its role as the parties' agent in these matters?

Here again the colonial heritage comes in handy. Neutrality in the context of colonial government meant supporting the wishes of the colonial government rather than yielding to pressures from any section of the governed. One need not adopt Hannah Arendt's thesis[17] that colonialism was a perfect school for totalitarianism in order to assert that in the last analysis the claim of the district commissioner to rule was based on force, on the British troops held in reserve--far in reserve it is true, but there none the less.

No bribe or pressure could swerve the local official from his duty--to his political bosses. But if that duty required the de-stooling of a chief for failure to collect taxes properly or for allowing dissidence among his subjects, neutrality not only permitted but required that repressive measures be taken. Nor, of course, did neutrality mean any absence of slurs and attacks upon nationalist leaders who rejected the whole system of colonial rule and were therefore outside the pale and fair game.[18] But once these very African nationalists were installed in seats of power, the British colonial civil servants loyally followed their bidding--even before independence was granted, as Nkrumah has testified.[19]

The civil service has continued to obey its political masters, but now these are party bosses rather than colonial office bureaucrats or governors. Neutrality then means obeying orders.

The concept of civil service neutrality and political nonpartisanship is a dominant myth among the educated of both Ghana and Nigeria.[20] It was believed by the British of themselves and taught by them to their young African students and junior civil servants as both reality and ideal. It is enshrined in the constitutions of both Nigeria and Ghana, and is institutionalized by the setting up in both countries of Public Service Commissions designed to protect the integrity of the civil service.[21] Just as in Britain or the United States, departures from the ideal of neutrality, however flagrant and widespread, must be considered not normal but deviant behavior, not to be admitted or accepted publicly by decent men and women.

The current Ghanaian formulation of the concept of neutrality is especially interesting. According to the "New Charter for the Ghanaian Civil Service" the civil servant's role is now changed because under colonialism there was "an element of 'government' as opposed to 'administration and execution' . . . which is totally inappropriate in present-day circumstances."[22] Yet, "As a servant of the State a civil servant's first loyalty is to the State, and, since the Government is charged, by popular choice and by the authority of Parliament, with responsibility for managing the affairs of the State, the civil servant should appropriately feel a positive and consistent loyalty to the interests of the Government as his employer."[23] According to the new Ghanaian Constitution, all control of the civil service, including "appointment, transfer, termination of appointment, dismissal, and disciplinary control" shall be "vested in the President."[24]

The continued presence of large numbers of expatriates in the civil service of both Ghana and Nigeria has considerably strengthened the concept of neutrality. Expatriates are even less tempted to be swerved from their duty as outlined by their political superiors, even if that duty might require measures repugnant to them. They are less personally involved in domestic power struggles and more vulnerable to attack if they fail to follow orders.

This is not to imply an absence of ethical standards on the part of the civil service of either Ghana or Nigeria, but there is no question that behind the mask of neutrality corruption has occurred that might well have come to light earlier in regimes subject to the pressures of political competition and to partisan stresses within the bureaucracy. The party has taken the place of the British Crown as the source of legitimacy for the use of force in society and the notion that the king can do no wrong has in large measure been transferred to the government of the day.

It is illustrative to note that while there is much latent hostility between the expatriate bureaucrats and local political leaders,[25] the only occasions on which there has been substantial conflict have concerned the power of the politicians to affect the job structure and perquisites of the bureaucracy. In the course of Africanization a constitutional crisis developed in Eastern Nigeria when the government sought to abolish posts previously held by expatriates and the still expatriate-dominated bureaucracy fought back.[26] In general, however, the aplomb with which the expatriate civil servant has assisted in strengthening the control of the party over the population in both these nations, Ghana especially, would be the envy of any German civil servant.[27]

There are, however, at present important tensions between bureaucracy, politicians, and population in both countries. It has already been remarked that there exists in Ghana a phenomenon, dating from 1954, which is not present yet in Nigeria--a hostility between the party and the bureaucracy because of different social origins and ideological outlook.[28] The bureaucrat is often forced to implement measures with which he may not be in complete sympathy, at the behest of political leaders of whom he is not fond, to a much greater extent than in Nigeria.[29] However, there is no substantial evidence of his working actively to obstruct the implementation of government policy.

While there is hostility in Ghana between party and bureaucracy, there is little tension within the nation on ethnic grounds. Both the CPP and the bureaucracy are primarily drawn from the old Gold Coast Colony. The hostility of the traditional leaders of the Ashanti toward the government has been largely deprived of any institutional means of expression. The Northern territories of Ghana have never really had a rallying point and appear to be completely under southern domination.

The situation in Nigeria is very different. Nigeria is divided into three self-governing regions, the semi-deliberate creation of British colonial policy. Their separate public services are of relatively recent origin, dating only from 1954.[30] Within the two southern regions the dominant local group (Yoruba in the West, Ibos in the East) is basically unchallenged and there is notension between the bureaucracy and the majority of the people within the region on racial grounds. In the North the problem has been that large numbers of southerners have had to be imported to staff the bureaucracy because of the lack of modern education in the North; this practice was begun by the British and the southerners still form a significant proportion in the Northen civil service. A campaign of Northernization of the bureaucracy has taken place,[31] but this has had one unusual result. Because Christian missionary activity in Northern Nigeria was restricted by the British to the pagan tribes along the Niger and Benue rivers, these, not the Muslim Hausa who constitute the majority of the population, are the people who are best able to compete for the available bureaucratic positions, so that Northernization has to some extent meant throwing out Yoruba or Ibos only to replace them with other non-Hausa. The importance of the local emirate governments, preserved from the days of indirect rule, has somewhat cushioned the problem, but large numbers of British officials have been retained in the North until Northern Moslems could be trained to take over their jobs to prevent non-Muslims from controlling all the most important jobs in the civil service.[32]

The Northern need to retain expatriates in large numbers has been further aggravated by independence. Since independence the tendency toward increasing the power of the federal center as against the regional governments has been steady and to all appearances irreversible. The North controls the central parliament politically, but has found it necessary to send some of its most capable leaders to the Lagos in order to do this. In addition, it has tried to place as many Northerners as it could find in the federal bureaucracy, lest it win political control but lose effective control over the machinery of government. Given its shortage of educated persons in comparison with the East and the West, this has meant an even greater diminution of its ability to staff positions in the Northern government.

On the federal level, the hostility of many Ibos to domination by the Yoruba,[33] the leader in education among ethnic groups, is important, as is the

Northern hostility to both.[34] These tensions have been aggravated within the federal bureaucracy by party hostility—the correlation of Yoruba and Action Group, Ibo and NCNC—and even by the fact that the Ibo are more likely to have been trained by Americans, both at home and abroad, and the Ibos' degrees—all important in bureaucratic status struggles—are looked down upon by their Commonwealth educated rivals.

There are also differences between Ghana and Nigeria in the way in which the problem of corruption in government is dealt with. Nkrumah has been ruthless with both the government and the party bureaucracy whenever corruption has occurred which could threaten party success and solidarity.[35] This insistence that the ship of state be kept trim for political reasons (external as well as internal) was highlighted by Nkrumah's "Dawn speech" in April, and the rigid control of the outside activities of politicians and bureaucrats instituted by it. This served as a warning to state as well as party bureaucrats that the till belongs, like the state, to the party, and that no private dipping into it will be tolerated.[36] The extent of Nkrumah's puritan attack on those who would take advantage of their public positions for private gain suggests a deliberate attempt to prevent any private centers of power from developing which might enable individuals to become to the slightest degree independent of the wishes of their leader.[37]

The handling of corruption in Nigeria presents a different picture. In both the Eastern region bank scandal of 1958 and the Western region bank scandal of 1961 the charges touched the highest leaders of the respective parties. In both cases investigation and pressures for remedy have not come from within the party but from without. In the case of Azikiwe and the African National bank, the NCNC leader alleged the investigation was a British plot to retain a banking monopoly and the effect of the charges was dissipated.[38] In the case of Awolowo and the Bank of Nigeria, the investigation came from a Nigerian federal government controlled by the opposing political parties. But these major public scandals are only the capstones of the favoritism and bribery which are to be found at various levels of government.[37] The failure to generate any kind of internal corrective for these abuses indicates both that the civil service is not disposed to interfere in the conduct of government activities which benefit party favorites (as in the case of loan policies of development corporations, for example), and that party dynamism is not sufficiently great to overcome the tendency of individuals within the government to use their power to build private financial empires.

The greater domination of party over bureaucratic interests in Ghana is also illustrated by the recent evolution of local government in the two nations. In the days of colonial rule the dominant local figure was the British District Officer and above him the District Commissioner. He was at once policeman, judge, local lawmaker, and administrator of every activity carried on by the executive branch of government from executing the death sentence on murderers to giving agricultural advice.[40] He was the local embodiment of the authority of the British crown, and even in areas where indirect rule held sway his suggestions to local rulers usually had the force of commands on the occasions when he felt it necessary to intervene.

As time went on the functions of the D.O. became dissipated and confused as regional, local, and national lawmaking bodies took over his rulemaking powers and field agents of the technical and functional departments of government took over most of his substantive activities. But he still remained important in the

eyes of those he had in the past ruled. And especially during the period when the local agents of other bodies had less experience than he, he was important as coordinator and observer, the continuing symbol of the British governor's authority.

In Nigeria after independence the District Officer remained important in Eastern Nigeria, despite a formal reduction in power, and very important in Northern Nigeria. He is increasingly an African, though expatriates continue to fill many of these posts in Nigeria. He is still the local incarnation of paternalistic and authoritarian rule of the people by a bureaucratic executive,[41] and his political role is played down.

Not so in Ghana. The 1951 Constitution called for the replacement of the District Officer (who had been the chief symbol of colonial rule) by a "Government Agent" responsible to a Ministry of Local Government.[42] But under Nkrumah the District Officer has been revived as the District Commissioner, and deliberately politicized. The D. C. is a political appointee who lives in the district which he supervises; his role again is that of coordinator, but a politically motivated one. An executive officer, who is a civil servant in the traditional sense of the term, helps him oversee the operations in his district of the functional government departments and he himself is essentially a watchdog over the local civil service. Though the direct powers of command of the District Commissioner are limited, his job is to see that other do theirs satisfactorily. He serves as a first court of appeal for anyone in his district who feels he has been ill served by the local representatives of the State bureaucracy. If the District Commissioner cannot prod the civil servants into doing what should be done, he can take the matter to his superior, the Regional Commissioner. This official is an elected member of parliament from the region he rules. His secretary is the chief civil servant of the region and the formal superior of the District Commissioner's executive officer. The Regional Commissioner is chosen by the party to supervise government in his region. He is a member of the Cabinet and as such is able to deal as an equal with the ministers who head government departments and thus if necessary resolve at the hgihest level any problems regarding the operation of these departments in his region.

Thus together the District and Regional Commissioners act as the agents of the party in seeing to it that the civil service takes care of local problems as they arise so that the populace will have no reason to be discontented with the rule of the CPP. This institution also gives Nkrumah a ready source of independent information about how the departments of his government are functioning. It represents an interesting attempt to adapt a system of purely executive rule by a nonpartisan bureaucracy to rule by a political party acting through the bureaucracy.[43]

Regardless of the differing relation between party and bureaucracy in the two countries, the power of the bureaucracy increases day by day in both. In both the bureaucratization of the economy continues apace, although this is not necessarily the result of deliberate policy. Both Nkrumah[44] and the leaders of Nigeria[45] have recently and with apparent sincerity denied any intention of completely nationalizing the economies of these countries. But government direction and domination is inherent in their economic situations.

Because of a lack of experience and capital, potential businessmen and even farmers must turn to government and its agents for help, including capital,

to a degree unknown even in industrialized Western nations. The typical procedure in small operations is for the government to make a loan and provide advice to the aspiring entrepreneur—provided he is politically reliable of course. In larger enterprises the government goes into partnership itself with a foreign firm, or sets up a corporation in which all of the stock is owned by the government or some of it by the government and some by private citizens. A catalog of government enterprises in Ghana would range from government trading corporations controlling the export of cocoa (which provides the overwhelming proportion of the country's wealth), to shipbuilding, to the manufacture of such products as gin.[46] In Nigeria the list would go from a similar monopoly over the foreign sale of cocoa, palm oil, and peanuts (the nation's major crops) to activity in the field of insurance,[47] cement,[48] the milling of flour,[49] and the printing of ruled notebook paper.[50]

The government's control of the export of major raw materials is especially important, since by selling on world markets at a price substantially higher that that it pays the producer, the government obtains a large sum which can be invested in public enterprises or lent to individuals through the various development corporations. Indeed the marketing boards constitute by far the largest sources of capital accumulation in Nigeria and Ghana.[51] In theory, and to a lesser extent in practice there is a difference between Nigeria and Ghana in that the latter—variously described as a "socialist" state by its president and an "Nkrumah-socialist" state by his supporters[52]—is openly hostile to private enterprise while the former is overtly friendly. But, as might be suspected from the similarity of their economic positions, both nations exhibit in practice much the same relationship between private and public enterprises. Both are examples of widescale government participation in the financing, management and supervision of industry.

This widereaching activity of government in the economy means more than merely the strengthening of the role of the public service in the nation, it also involves necessarily the inhibition of the growth of competing centers of power. Even the means of controlling public opinion are not exempt from this trend. Both Ghana and Nigeria have government monopolies of radio and television and recently the Nigerian federal government started its own newspaper with public funds, to present "the views and policies of the federal government,"[53] following in the footsteps of an already well-established Northern region practice.[54] In Ghana the CPP, though not the government as such has long had its own daily press as have the Action Group and the NCNC in Nigeria. In Ghana in recent months government censorship has brought to heel the principal opposition organ, the Ashanti Pioneer.[55]

The social services in Nigeria and Ghana are both more and less developed than in the industrial nations of the West. More is done in the fields of housing and medicine, less in the fields of social insurance and pensions, a result of the superimposition of a colonial rule on tribal conditions. In all welfare benefits, government employees are specially privileged. Indeed, the welfare measures which exist are largely an extension of the privileges of colonial civil servants to the indigenous ones, and then, very slowly, to the rest of the population, while the areas of weakness represent areas that in pre-industrial societies fall within the province of the village and extended family, institutions whose ability to continue to provide them is weakened by the general processes of social change.[56]

One tendency which is far advanced in Ghana has as yet no real counterpart in Nigeria. This is the absorption of all organs of communal activity into

the party. Since the party is the state this means that communal activity becomes absorbed into the joint party-state bureaucracy. Plans are underway to absorb the Farmers Union, the Cooperative movement, and the Trades Union Congress into the party.[57] Although this change will be largely a formal one, since these organizations have always had close ties to the party, it has been met with some resistence and at this writing its future is uncertain. The farmers have been unhappy anyway about recent changes in the organization of cocoa marketing;[58] the world cooperative movement has protested the proposed complete destruction of the freedom of Ghana Coops. The independence of the labor movement may be maintained for a while in order to facilitate penetration and control of labor movements elsewhere in Africa. But here too the direction is clear, as Nkrumah's statement in his Dawn speech that "unbridled militant trade unionism" is out of date clearly shows.[59]

The CPP of course has its own bureaucracy but with time its distinctness from that of the state—as in the Soviet Union—wil become increasingly formal rather than real. Already CPP members of Parliament who do not presently hold senior administrative positions are required to take active administrative roles in various government and government-sponsored activities when Parliament is not in session.[60]

The sponsorship by the government of such organizations as the Builder's Brigade (a cross between the Civilian Conservation Corps and an election-time storm troop organization),[61] women's groups, and a Ghana Young Pioneers with the technical assistance of the Soviet government[62] attest the increasing bureaucratization of Ghanaian life.

Shadow merges with shadow, the life of the nation becomes the political life of the one-party state, and the role of obscure cliques and interest groups within the public service becomes of necessity the prime focus of interest for the observer in the absence of the overt clash of political parties or interest groups. Within such a system it is difficult to observe the role of the public service in the state and the cleavages within it.

In Nigeria as in Ghana the bureaucracy at first glance exhibits few signs of internal cleavage and is marked by a high degree of homogeneity of background and outlook. At present the bureaucracies of both countries are securely in control of their position; they are subject to the dictates of parties, yet at the same time indispensible to them, retaining in their hands the decision-making power to an even greater extent than in other nations, because of the lack of independent sources of expertise: the universities are part of the state, the domestic business community is weak to the point of impotence, and is only the imported expert in a position to tell the political head of a department that what his permament secretary has been telling him is incorrect.

Yet in these countries the bureaucracy is not an independent social force. It is not—nor does it conceive itself to be—a class or group apart from the rest of the nation.[63] As individuals its members may be snobbish, arrogant, and self-seeking, but the very absence of effective competition for power by other groups causes the bureaucracy to identify itself with the nation and short-circuits thoughts of conflict of interest with other groups. The politicians are tolerated in Nigeria and feared in Ghana, but the bureaucracy feels secure in its role and position, and, sticking to what it considers to be the real levers of power, lets the politicians make the speeches.

In both Ghana and Nigeria the university bureaucracy presents something of a special problem. They have been more difficult to Africanize because of the highly specialized skills required, and expatriate or cosmopolitan ideas have continued to contest the monopoly of the cliches of nationalist politics which prevails outside the universities. The type of training required of university personnel has led to a staff highly sympathetic to "non-national" codes and cultures. There is an inherent clash between the role of the intellectual as independent observer and critic and that of the civil servant which has led to considerable tension and occasional trials of strength, particularly in Ghana.

One group remains which could threaten the position of the civil service bureaucracy and the political rulers as well--the military bureaucracy. They could seize control as they have in a score of underdeveloped countries, where timocracy seems to be the coming thing.

Neither Ghana nor Nigeria gained its independence through violent revolution or through an army-led national revival. There is therefore in these countries no equivalent to the situation which existed in Indonesia or much of the Middle East. Nor were these totally British-controlled nations in the position of the semi-sovereign states in many parts of the world, where the old orders, fearful of losing their prerogatives through conquest from without, modernized their armed forces and in this way created a disequilibrium in the old order itself and a focal point for a modernizing elite.

Armies in British Africa were small frontier forces, kept small from financial considerations and lack of need for their services, officered by the British and low in social prestige. Today in Ghana the army of some several thousand men is still largely British-officered.[64] Without doubt this is a deliberate policy on Nkrumah's part. He is taking no chances of the army becoming an independent political force. The professional officer is the neutral civil servant par excellence, at least in theory, and the army represents an extreme case of Nkrumah's general tactic of using British dependent on him and without ties to the life of the nation to assure his complete control over all the levers of power.[65]

In Nigeria the situation is similar. The armies and the police are of course much larger, though by no means in proportion to the difference in population. But here also they are as yet of no political significance. The fact that Nigerianization of command of the military is proceeding apace, however, is a possible augury for the future.[66]

What is the future of the civil service in these countries? Will the civil bureaucracy continue as in the past to enjoy a virtual monopoly of actual day-to-day power and prestige in society, ruling in behalf of the one-party political regimes as they did in behalf of the no-party regimes of colonialism?

In part the answer to this question depends on whether or not the bureaucracies maintain their own unity. If they split, or are split by new forces of cleavage within the nations they rule, the situation could change radically. In Ghana there is considerable political conflict at the top, though shrouded in obscurity and largely personal in nature. The Nkrumah regime is making every effort to keep class cleavages from becoming important by eliminating all of the somewhat privileged classes of the past and making the only basis for reward that of service to the state, and even here making service a sacrifice rather than a means toward gain.[67] If cleavage occurs then it will come about not so

much through the creation of new social centers of power--including revitalization of ethnic rivalries--but because the existing civil service still largely represents groups with ties to an older era.

There is one source of cleavage in both Ghanaian and Nigerian bureaucracy which is a heritage from the British system, which, unlike the civil service system in the U.S., maintains a sharp distinction between the administrative class and other civil servants, including high-ranking technicians. Many who have risen through the technical ranks of the civil service as far as they can go are increasingly resentful to find their paths to further advancement blocked by what seems to be, especially in an African context, a meaningless class distinction. The administrative class (who are supposed to hold liberal arts degrees) control the positions of permanent secretary, permanent under-secretary, etc., in all departments and do not (unlike the technical personnel) remain within one department but are shifted about as occasion and opportunities for advancement dictate. The problem is aggravated by the fact that many African technicians are better trained than their administrative class superiors who are often glorified clerks carried into high posts by rapid Africanization. At the very least these technicians feel that they are more competent to make expert judgments in what has been their area of specialization than is some administrator with little knowledge or understanding of the problems with which they have to deal.

There is a further natural source of discord in the system, one which no regime can wholly eradicate, but which is greatly aggravated in Africa today. This is the cleavage based on age. The young and the old exist in every society and every bureaucracy, and they are natural enemies.[68] Up till now this conflict has been mitigated by the shortage of qualified Africans to fill posts being vacated by Europeans, thus assuring even the youngest persons with even marginal qualifications a challenging job. But the very ease of upward movement in the recent past makes for difficulties for the near future. The new generation finds its path blocked not by old men soon to retire but by men two or five or ten years older who will almost certainly not retire in time to make their own careers possible. This clash is further intensified by the fact that the younger group are on the whole better trained and often more dedicated than their superiors, and know it. This cleavage will almost certainly seek ideological expression, however arbitrary. Throughout Africa there will be a tendency for the young to turn to the left politically as an expression of their opposition to their superiors both administrative and political. The conditions of pre-independence nationalist agitation combined with the desire to advance oneself will almost certainly give rise to what has been called the "opposition mentality," the habit of opposition as a way of life.[69]

The one-party state in de facto existence in Ghana has prevented open conflict between a radical younger generation and the older bureaucrats, and indeed, although the universities have been centers of coldness toward the CPP, the apoliticism of the students, on government scholarship and pledged to take government jobs, is everywhere evident. As long as the older group of bureaucrats continues to enjoy Nkrumah's confidence they are safe. As long as he remains a charismatic leader in control of the CPP the party will be able to follow the old French maxim of making sure that there are "no enemies on the left," though the recent necessity to quash rumors of all-out socialization and the reference in the Dawn speech to "unauthorized statements" of bureaucrats are indications that a problem of control exists even for Nkrumah.[70] But the young Turks seeking power in the government will not in the foreseeable future be able or willing to act outside the party but will have to whisper within it and seek to oust their rivals on an individual basis. Already the political activity of

of some individuals within the civil service has occasioned disciplinary problems, as party-oriented individuals seek to use their party positions to defy their superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy.[71]

In the foreseeable future Nkruma is going to remain firmly in control Recent speculation has suggested that attempts were being made to decrease his power by psuhing him upstairs through a process of increasingly glorifying him personally to the extent that he comes to be thought of as above politics. But his recent moves in centralizing many functions of government directly in the office of the president has strengthened his position vis-a-vis untrustworthy elements in the bureaucracy. He now has personal direct control of the armed forces, the police, and the Budget Bureau, while his secretariat controls economic development and planning, labor, and the Volta River project.[72] This centralization could in time mean a more politicized state apparatus , with the distinction between party and state bureaucracy further blurred and party symbols more and more paramount. How long the traditions of civil service neutrality and the rule of the law bequeathed by the British would remain even at the level of lip service under such conditions offers a rather melancholy speculation.

The situation in Nigeria is considerably different. There is not only the opposition between age groups but there are political focal points for this opposition and there is no one overshadowing national leader to rally the nation. In the Western region the appeal of the more left-wing NCNC is available for those dissatisfied with the existing Action Group bureaucracy and its de facto alliance with dissident younger elements.[73] In the Eastern region there still exists cadres of extreme leftism within the NCNC, remnants of the old Zikist vanguard. Azikiwe over a decade ago did to the Nigerian nationalist movement what Nkrumah did to the UGCC, but has never been strong enough to fend off opposition from further left, even permitting it to organize among his own followers. Highly significant in recent months has been the fact that the Action Group, which fought the last election on a more conservative and pro-Western policy line than the NCNC,[74] has sought to preserve a national base by shifting its line and deliberately appealing to dissident young leftist elements in the Eastern region.

In the North the ruling NPC party of the emirs seems in firm control. Their smashing victory in the last federal election (gained according to some observers with the studied non-neutrality of the British, who tended to overlook violations of electoral procedure favorable to the NPC[75]) has been followed by consolidation of their power. But dissatisfaction is rampant among the young Mallams, the teachers and young district officers of the Northern region government. Their strategy, it is no secret, is to abandon the radical Northern Elements Progressive Union and to try to take over control of the North from within, as younger elements have striven to do in the past within the bureaucracies of other Muslim nations. They have an advantage not possessed by their contemporaries in other regions in that they are the first really sizeable group of educated persons in their region, and can move up to positions of power more easily since they do not have a layer of slightly older bureaucrats above them. Thus there is no need for them to work from outside the bureaucratic power structure in order to take control of it and the government.

Actually, throughout Nigeria there is a restlessness and dissatisfaction with the nation's slow progress much greater than many casual observers seem to realize. Riots in Lagos, activities of groups such as Chike Obi's

fascist Dynamic Party, interparty pressures on the pro-capitalist and pro-Western line of the ruling NPC-NCNC coalition--all these are only the symptoms of widespread discontent. Communist China is vaguely idealized. A failure by the West to provide the massive aid needed over the next decade to get Nigeria on her feet economically could be the signal for a general overthrow of the present regime. So far the opposition to the whole system is not really organized, and there are no ready-made vehicles for its expression. The Nigerian Labor movement is not powerful enough to serve this purpose, and there is no real agrarian problem as such, so that peasant movements could not substitute for industrial labor. If a turn to the left comes it will almost certainly be led by the younger bureaucrats and would be bureaucratic, a revolution largely within the public services against the groups which now dominate it.

Here the growing Nigerian military forces must be taken into account. Thpresent coalition government of the federation--the central power of which is daily being strengthened--is highly unstable, as is the national party system itself. A breakdown of parliamentary government in Nigeria--highly possible within the next decade--would undoubtedly be preceded by prolonged bitter quarreling among the leading politicians. The psychological and ideological setting for a South Korean or Sudanese or Pakistani solution is obvious. As already noted, the Nigerianization of the army and police force is proceeding rapidly, and within the next decade they will be under the leadership of Nigerian officers trained in the British tradition of service to the nation, yet, unlike their British mentors in not having the Conservative party to turn to for cues. The key role of the police has already been recognized in a series of constitutional squabbles which eventuated in its becoming a concurrent function of the federal and regional governments. The army's role in sealing the troubled Cameroon border and in the UN operation in the Congo has greatly increased its prestige.

Could the army take over control and set a revitalized and depoliticized civil service the task of rationalizing Nigerian life under a government of national union? The answer might easily be yes save for one circumstance. Curiously enough, most of the officers of both the army and the police are of Southern ethnic origin, so far has the once great military tradition of the Northern emirates declined. On the other hand, the bulk of the army enlisted men (though not of the police) are of Northern Muslim origin. For an army coup on behalf of a regime of national unity to succeed some way would have to be found to assure these Northerners that they were not acting against their extremely conservative Islamic tradition. It would appear that active assistance from the younger reformers of the North, still identified in the public mind with Islam would be necessary, a far from impossible eventuality. This would be the beginning of a bureaucratic system par excellence.

In summary, both Ghana and Nigeria are nations which have been ruled by bureaucracy in the past and will continue to be in the future. The public service in both nations has so far been less an independent social entity, in contention for power with other organized groups, than the sole focus of effective power in the society. In Ghana the civil bureaucracy is becoming increasingly merged with the bureaucracy of a highly ideological party which could only be overthrown by the very unlikely growth of the military into an independent social force. In Nigeria the bureaucracy--or more properly--the bureaucracies, have been the instruments of primarily ethnic parties whose staying power and survival value is highly precarious, and which could be overthrown either by a revolt of younger elements or a coup of the armed forces, or perhaps a sequence or combination of both.

Given the stage of economic development of both nations, and the inevitability of the role of government as the dynamic element in economic growth, continued rule by government bureaucracy appears to be a foregone conclusion. The question becomes then the basis of the rule by the public services. Will it be the mandate of a monopolistic party, the support of the armed forces, or can these nations find their way to a condition in which rule of the bureaucracy will be based on the consent of the governed and the rule of law as known to the democratic tradition?

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf., James M. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 44-45.

2. Cf., Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 360.

3. F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 4th edition (London: William Blackwood, 1929) is the classic exposition of this philosophy.

4. Rather than merely accepting the existing power structure, the British were the real force behind the native rulers. F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence, 1919-1957 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 159.

5. Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 53, 153, 162. By 1948, when attempts were made to bring the educated into the system they passed up the opportunity in order to work in regional or central governments—Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Developments in Nigeria (Cambridge: University Press, 1960), p. 85.

6. Cf., the decision of Western Nigeria to get rid of all expatriate permanent secretaries by Independence day on the grounds that no self-respecting country could tolerate administration of its affairs by aliens—James M. Coleman, "Political Modernization in Africa" (Unpublished Paper), p. 12.

7. On the role of "native foreigner" see Coleman, Nigeria, p. 157.

8. For the close relation between Native Authority officials and elective officials in Northern Nigeria see Coleman, Nigeria, p. 379.

9. Hugh H. and Mabel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite (Stanford: University Press, 1960), pp. 72-84, 105, 171.

10. A recent Nigerian novel has a noted lady of easy virtue, Jagwa by name (after the car of course), tell an ardent young suitor that women like her are reserved for the Top People, identified as "Senior Service, Contractors, Politicians." See the review of Cyprian Ekwensi's Jagwa Nana in West Africa (May 27, 1961), p. 579.

11. But private business cannot compete with government as an employer at any level. In Accra, for instance, it is estimated that there are 13,500 government jobs as against 3000 in the United Africa Company, the major private employer.—Peter Wormseley, "One Party Democracy," West Africa (Oct. 1, 1960), p. 1121.

FOOTNOTES (Continued)

12. See David Kimble, The Machinery of Self-Government (London: Penguin Book, 1956), p. 102.

13. Cf., Coleman and Almond, Developing Areas, p. 268. Some of the resultant problems of creating adequate bureaucratic structures are given extensive treatment in Kenneth Younger, The Public Service in the New States, A Study in Some Trained Manpower Problems (New York: Oxford, 1960).

14. Cf., Coleman and Almond, Developing Areas, p. 326.

15. In both countries the situation is complicated by the fact that civil servants are allowed to seek and hold legislative office while on leave status from their jobs, so that there is always a large sprinkling of government employees in parliament. In Ghana especially the relatively small size of parliament means that a substantial proportion of government front-benchers are also holders of bureaucratic office. Kimble, Self-Government, p. 48.

16. Edward Shils, "Political Developments in the New States: II," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II (1960), 389-393.

17. Cf., The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1948).

18. The use of a government-owned newspaper to attack Azikiwe during World War II is an interesting example of this. See Sam Epelle, The Promise of Nigeria (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1960).

19. Kimble, Self-Government, p.96; Ezera, Nigeria, p. 222.

20. Kimble, Self-Government, p. 100; J. G. Amanoo, The New Ghana (London: Pan Books, Ltd., 1958).

21. Relative to Ghana see Amanoo, The New Ghana, p. 96; Bourret, Ghana, p. 178, p. 199; Article 53 of the 1960 Constitution; and A New Charter for the Civil Service, White Paper No. 2/60, Accra: Government Printer, 1960, pp. 2-3. Relative to Nigeria see Ezera, Nigeria, p. 125, and L. G. Coke Wallis, "Th Public Service Commission in Nigeria," Civilisations, X (1960), 233-238.

22. A New Charter, p. 1

23. Ibid.

24. Article 51.

25. See Ezera, Nigeria, 217-220.

26. Ibid, pp. 220-223.

27. The role of the expatriate civil servant, particularly the more highly placed, is still difficult and politically sensitive; see West Africa (Nov. 19, 1960), p. 1298.

28. On Nkrumah's regime generally see Wormsley, "One Party Democracy," op. cit., p. 1131.

FOOTNOTES (Continued)

29. Africa Special Report for May 1960 (p. 5) reports most intellectuals anti CPP; this conincides with the writer's own observations of the intellectual-breaucratic class generally.

30. Ezera, Nigeria, pp. 191-2.

31. See Coleman and Almond, Developing Areas, p. 317.

32. There is, however, an Institute of Public Administration at Zaria which has a wide variety of programs for training or upgrading public servants for the Northern region—everyone from stenographers to Islamic judges and elected heads of district councils. Their extensive and rigorous program for training Assistant District Officers (the bottom rung of the Administrative career ladder) and their other training programs have been the object of considerable interest on the part of other countries lacking trained public service personnel.

33. Yoruba predominance in politics and the civil service began to decline in the 1940's—Ezera, Nigeria, p. 90.

34. Southerners, who dominated the services due to their educational advantages were deliberately assigned away from their areas of birth by the British--Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 48, 133. They were widely accused of discriminating against Northerners, ibid., p. 360.

35. For a discussion of the bribery of CPP ministers in 1953 see Amanoo, The New Ghana, p. 78. For the handling of corruption in the Cocoa Purchasing Co. in 1956 see Bourret, Ghana, pp. 180-1.

36. For the attack on patronage, West Africa (Oct. 1, 1960), p. 1102.

37. Nrumah attacked MP's who seek to become a "new ruling class of self-seekers and careerists,", forgetting that they owe their position to the party. West Africa (April 15, 1961), p. 401; (April 22, 1961), p. 430; Africa Report, (May, 1961), p. 11.

38. See Ezera, Nigeria, pp. 229-31.

39. Note the recent setting aside of tax assessments in a town in Western Nigeria by the regional minister of Local Government, Alhazi Agenbenro on the grounds that the members of the opposition party were discriminated against—West Africa (Mar. 18, 1960), p. 299. For every such openly contested or discussed case a thousand instances flourish in silence.

40. Joyce Cary in his novel Mister Johnson provides a revealing account of the life and duties of a colonial district officer.

41. See Ronald E. Wraith, Local Government (London: Penguin, 1956) for an increasingly dated but still valuable handbook, especially pp. 60, 108-9, 118-9.

42. Bourret, Ghana, pp. 182-3.

43. The foregoing description is based largely on personal observation and conversations in Ghana in 1960. See also "Machet's Diary," West Africa (Apr. 22, 1961), p. 429.

44. See "Dr. Nkrumah Re-States His Policy," West Africa (Oct. 15, 1960), p. 1179.

45. "Nationalization Denials for East and West," West Africa (Oct. 29, 1960), p. 1233.

46. West Africa (July 23 1960), p. 819

47. West Africa (April 1, 1961), p. 357. 48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., (April 8, 1961), p. 385. 50. Personal Observation 1960

51. It is noteworthy that the difference between the pride paid to farmers and the world market price is substantially greater in Ghana than in Nigeria, possibly an index of the relative responsiveness of the two political systems to group pressures.

52. See "Nkrumahism in Action," West Africa (May 13, 1961), p. 506.

53. West Africa (Mar. 18, 1961), p. 298.

54. Gaskiya, the Northern printing establishment, prints books and magazines as well as a newspaper; it began as a private enterprise. Ezera, Nigeria, p. 55.

55. West Africa (Sep. 10, 1961), p. 1029.

56. On the social services and their activities see Edward Warner Brice, "Development of Social Welfare Institutions in Africa," Journal of Human Relations, 8 (1960), 668-81; and T. Peter Omari, "The Social Services in Ghana," ibid., 682-699.

57. On the TUC and the party see West Africa (Feb. 25, 1961), p. 215. In the meantime the government is auditing the books of the TUC and the United Farmers to prevent corruption--West Africa, (Apr. 15, 1961), p. 401.

58. The whole idea of cocoa marketing controls was first objected to when imposed by the British as a wartime measure in 1939--Bourret, Ghana, p. 150. Crops are now purchased through the co-op organization, West Africa (Oct. 8, 1960), p. 1150.

59. West Africa (Apr. 15, 1961), p. 401.

60. Those not ministers or ministerial secretaries "will be assigned duties in the field of industrial, social and organization projects," according to Nkrumah. West Africa (Apr. 22, 1961), p. 439.

61. See Africa Digest, VII (1959), 67; also, "Ghana's Builders Brigade," West Africa (Sep. 17, 1960), 1043. Political use of force at election time has, of course, never been a CPP monopoly in Ghana.

62. See "Ghana's Young Pioneers," West Africa (Jan. 28, 1961), p. 43. Sports also are increasingly under government control, but this is not so unusual by European standards--West Africa (Sep. 10, 1960), p. 1031.

63. On the self-image of the Nigerian elite see Smythe, New Nigerian Elite, p. 120.

64. The first officer candidates only recently entered Ghana's first military academy--West Africa (Oct. 15, 1960), p. 1179.

65. See Coleman, "Political Modernization," p. 19.

66. The present role of the military in the Nigerian elite is discussed in Smythe, New Nigerian Elite, p. 87.

67. Nkrumah's Dawn speech and recent interpretations of party doctrines have led some observers to believe that no large communal middle class can ever arise in Ghana. See "Nkrumahism in Action," West Africa (May 13, 1961), p. 506.

68. On this clash see Coleman, Political Modernization, pp. 18-19; Coleman and Almond, Developing Areas, p344. On the tensions of the would-be elite striving to get into the charmed circle see Smyth, New Nigerian Elite, pp. 108, 162-3, 174.

70. West Africa (Apr. 15, 1961), p. 401.

71. West Africa (Nov. 19, 1960), p. 1317; ibid., (Nov. 26, 1960), p 1342.

72. West Africa (Apr. 22, 1961), p. 439.

73. The recent action of parliament in creating a fourth region of Nigeria, a Mid West state with its capital at Benin, dominated by the Edo and the Ijaw, though weakening the power of the Western region will probably strengthen the position of the Action Group within it. The political balance in the new unit can only be the subject of speculation at present.

74. Party platforms for 1960 can be found in Africa Digest (Nov. 1959).

75. The administration of elections in 1960 is discussed by K. W. U. Post in "Nigerian Election Afterthoughts," West Africa (July 23, 1960), p. 825. The observation about expatriate non-neutrality is based on personal conversations in Nigeria.

76. See Epelle, Nigeria, pp. 83, 88-91. The NCNC and the British opposed regionalization of the police--Ezera, Nigeria, p. 236

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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE AREAL ORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION *

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American and British patterns of field administration have lent themselves to description and analysis in terms of administrative, rather than political, values. Although the politics-administration dichotomy has gone out of fashion in many phases of political science, it has persisted in the study of field administration. This is partly because our scholars have neglected to look for the political aspects of field administration or, when they found them, have tended to condemn them as regrettable departures from the presumed model.[1]

The tendency to judge Anglo-American field administration by administrative values is also, however, a consequence of the governmental systems and field systems themselves. In the United States the federal system and in Britain the strength of the local government tradition have left certain major political matters substantially outside the national government's immediate control. In both countries, for example, election administration

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1 Exceptions may be noted. J. Leiper Freeman (who has kindly made his manuscript available to me) has studied the characteristics of a sample of higher Federal field officials stationed in the South, and has noted the significance of the high proportion of Southerners in the group. William J. Gore, in "Administrative Decision-Making in Federal Field Offices," Public Administration Review 16 (Autumn 1956), pp. 281-291, has studied the search for policy support by Federal field offices in the state of Washington. And the politics of agriculture and natural resources in the field have been examined by a number of political scientists, among them Charles Hardin, Henry C. Hart, Arthur Maass, Grant McConnell, Charles McKinley, W. Robert Parks, and Norman Wengert. Although my own writings have been characterized by under-emphasis on the political aspects, these receive some attention in my "Field Organization," in Fritz Morstein Marx (ed.), Elements of Public Administration (2nd ed., 1959), pp. 246-273, especially pp. 252f, 256-8, 269.

is largely dispersed among local (and state) governments;[2] in both countries the police function is predominantly a local government concern. The governmental systems of the two countries are characterized by a plurality of avenues of access for local interests to the central government. The local and regional press, the locally elected members of the central legislature, the political party machinery, the ready entrée that state and city officials have to the offices of central political and departmental officials, the lobbying channels of organized interest groups, the hearings by legislative committees and royal commissions[3]--all these reduce dependence on field administration as a political communication channel. In both countries the field agents, including regional directors, are for the most part career civil servants, expected to operate under the standard doctrines of behavior for a neutral civil service.

Of prime significance is the fact that both countries have organized their field structures around specialized functions: departments and even bureaus within departments each have their own field staffs and their own administrative geography of regional boundaries and regional offices. This means two things. First, there is in no region a broadly empowered official representing the national government and in a strategic position to concert national agencies' activities for political purposes. Second, the regional directors of specialized functional agencies are likely themselves to be specialists or, if not specialists in the professional sense, to be rather narrowly committed to effective implementation of <u>particular</u> national programs.

Let me repeat that politics are not irrelevant to these countries' field systems. But abandonment of the politics-administration dichotomy should not lead us to abandon all differentiation of situations.[4] The nature of the 'mix' of politics and administration can vary, and it is important to pay attention to the proportions. In American and British field administration the administrative ingredient is much more substantial than the political ingredient.

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2 For a description and appraisal of the dispersion of election administration responsibilities in Britain, see W. J. M. Mackenzie, <u>Free Elections</u> (1958), pp. 102f.

3 In the United States, Congressional subcommittees seem increasingly to hold hearings in the various regions.

4 The point made is applicable to the study of public administration generally. Partly because of the natural history of revolts against conventional wisdom, there are tendencies (a) to condemn the error of an old orthodoxy without endeavoring to fill the vacuum thus created, (b) to hold that all distinctions, both of kind and of degree, are obliterated by the discovery of interpenetration of categories, or (c) to make the newly identified element the independent variable to which the earlier perceived part of reality becomes a merely dependent variable.

I

When one breaks out of the confines of the Anglo-American pattern to obtain a more broadly comparative perspective on the areal organization of administration the striking discovery is the immense weight that politics carries in other field systems. Again to reject artificial dichotomies, this does not mean that administrative necessities are absent. Every government confronts the elementary need for making its central will effective outside the capital city. The answer in most countries is national field administration, a hierarchy of national field agents with its apex in the capital.

Politics for present purposes means minimally the maintenance of the stability of the state and its existing system of government, and, often, means as well the maximizing of probabilities that those currently holding power under the system of government will retain their power. I state these goals from the viewpoint of those in charge of the national government, for the intended political role of the centrally created system of field administration is the service of their goals. The obverse of this statement is that those citizens and groups who have goals different from those held by the central rulers will wish to weaken or to seize control of all or parts of the field system. They will attempt to win away the loyalties of field agents, to erect competing power structures in certain areas, or to neutralize the field service through laws reducing the discretion of the government of the day over recruitment, promotion, transfer, and removal of field personnel.

With the political stakes so high, the key questions tend to be these: (a) the nature and seriousness of threats to stability of the state, to the pattern of government, and to the current rulers' retention of central power; (b) the availability of stability-maximizers alternative or complementary to the field organization; (c) the adequacy of the ruling group's resources for establishing and maintaining a field system against the external pressures of other powerful groups in the society and, closely related to this, the ruling group's mastery of the repertory of methods for keeping field administrators in loyal service of the goal of stability; and (d) the effect of internal pressures for fragmentation of power that arise from rivalries among central departments and officials, from the increased volume of work of the government, from the increased technicality of governmental functions, and from a shift to a functional mix of governmental activity that gives greater prominence to functions that are not integrally associated with the problem of stability, that preponderantly confer benefits rather than exact sacrifices, and that together constitute positive programs of economic and social development.

II

The nature and seriousness of threats to stability are a key variable in determination of the character of field organization. The threats may be objectively true, or rulers and others may imagine threats where none in fact exist or exaggerate the seriousness of those that do exist. Because rulers must anticipate successful hostile behavior and take present action against this future contingency, a field system may rest as much on false fears or false confidence as on objective experience and sound prediction.

In a society characterized by substantial consensus, field administration need not carry the heavy burden of imposing compliance and extracting revenues from a resistant citizenry, of suppressing revolts and other serious disturbances of the peace, and of operating an intelligence service to alert field administrators and the capital to incipient movements against the regime. Absent consensus, or at least passivity, the field system is likely to be a major instrument of the center in assuring stability. This tends to require a field organization strongly shaped by authoritarian values. Commonly this takes the form of a prefectoral system which, in its pure model, means a single set of administrative areas each headed by a single national official—prefect, provincial governor, or district commissioner—with authority and responsibility for all national functions in his area.[5]

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[5] Another explanation for the occurence of the prefectoral structure has at least equal plausibility with my hypothesis of absence of consensus. This is the dominance in the national culture of an "aristocratic, authoritarian and hierarchical view of life" (the phrase, though not its linkage to a prefectoral pattern, is from Frank Tannenbaum, "Toward an Appreciation of Latin America," in American Assembly, The United States and Latin America (1959), p. 54). Without troubling here with the possibility of the currency of contradictory or modifying philosophical ideas in such cultures, one may suppose such a view to be characteristic of countries of Latin culture (France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, as well as Latin America), Arab and other Asian national, and, possibly, African states. It is strongly reinforced by such unphilosophical facts as highly discrepant economic and educational opportunities and achievements (e.g. those distinguishing the elite from the peasants in many countries) and racial distinctions, (e.g. those between the mestizos and the Indians in Latin America). But here we verge on repeating that consensus is lacking. Whether philosophical ideas or economic and social facts (including, to a point, those facts that are attitudinal) are the more likely to shape political and administrative institutions is, of course, an old controversy. It is striking, however, that predispositions to authority and hierarchy have failed in many countries to carry so far as the establishment of stable governments. This is partly because the hierarchies are many and are culturally identified with families, clans, tribes, and other less-than-national groups. As Tannenbaum points out, the army may be the only nationally oriented group.

Two qualifications may be added. First, the instruments of power include not only force and threats of force, but persuasion and symbolism. Principal field administrators need not be military commanders; indeed, very early in the evolution of field administration in various countries one finds development of differentiation between civil administration and military administration, save in the border marches where the nation's frontiers need protection against foreign enemies and subversive activity. Nor need the principal field administrators be crude bullies. A persistent theme is that the principal field administrator in an area "represents" the ruler: he is a "little king" or, in its exact sense in early 19th century France, a "little Napoleon." [6]

An area's principal field administrator is expected to be a worthy and impressive representative, his physical office and residence to approach the palatial style, and his role to include ceremonial duties. His influence is expected to play not only on the ordinary citizen, but as well on the local "notables", that is, the propertied, ecclesiastical, political, and other holders of power in the area. To hold his own with these notables he ideally should match or outclass them in intelligence, education and culture.

Second, a field pattern shaped by authoritarian values may be substantially duplicated, at least in outward form, in a society in which threats to stability have abated or even did not exist when the field pattern was chosen. This may be accounted for by the persistence of old institutional arrangements, or by the phenomenon of imitation. Woodrow Wilson, it may be recalled, thought that Prussian administration had something to teach the United States insofar as it expressed the values of efficiency in organization and methods, and believed that democratic goals could be substituted for the Prussian absolutist goals. [8a] The Napoleonic system of prefects has been widely copied, partly because it was imposed by Napoleon on conquered countries which, once free of the yoke, simply retained the prefectoral system, partly because France l a t e r introduced the system in new colonies, and partly because France has long exerted considerable intellectual influence on countries of the Middle East[8b] and Latin America. Copying of the Napoleonic system has also, of course, been attractive to rulers of countries having the characteristic predisposition to authoritarian patterns. In such cases, the Napoleonic influence may have served simply to revive or refine indigenous forms of field administration. In yet other countries, though currently enjoying internal stability, cautious rulers may prefer the latent strength of a prefectoral system to alternative systems that are ill-designed for activition in a repressive role.

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[6] The theme carries over to non-authoritarian field systems. The War Production Board's regional directors were to be "little Don Nelsons"--Nelson being the Chairman of the WPB. U.S.Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War(1947),p. 267. See also Carroll K. Shaw, Field Organization and Administration of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies, May 1940 to November, 1945 (processed: Civilian Production Administration, Special Study No. 25, 1947.

[7] The atmosphere of the French prefect's residence and the "style" of his and his wife's social behavior are charmingly described in Joan Chapman, "The Prefect at Home," Public Administration 30 (Summer 1952) pp. 179-182.

[8a] Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration", Political Science Quarterly 2 (June 1887), pp. 198ff.

[8b] The circumstances that made the French field-administration model attractive to the Middle East in the 19th century are well sketched in early paragraphs of W. Hardy Wickwar's "Pattern and Problems of Local Administration in the Middle East,"Middle East Journal 12,(Summer 1958), pp.249-260, and "Note on Local Administration Areas and Local Government Units in the Middle East," International Review of Administra-Sciences 24 (No. 2, 1958), pp. 148-151.

The absence of consensus takes two forms. One is a widespread, diffused disaffection where a whole economic class, a race, adherents of a major religion, or members of a major political party—in each case distributed throughout the country—sense themselves threatened, or deprived of rights and benefits, by the national government's policies or perhaps even by its very existence. The other is a geographically specialized disaffection. A single region, differing by race, religion, customs, and the like from the rest of the country, may possess a structure of power that facilitates mobilization of its anti-national tendencies, either for secession or for sabotage of national law enforcement. Here again, dichotomies may serve us ill. A single country typically experiences both kinds of disaffection.

A more interesting problem lies in the flatness of the terms of both parts of the dichotomy. Offhand it is difficult to think of any country of which it cannot be said that the regions differ substantially in geographic features and natural resources, or to think of a country that can claim a homogenous population, one without discernible regional differences of accent, way of life, traditions, and economic interest. Despite the compactness of the United Kingdom, the melting-pot and high-mobility characteristics of the United States, and the degree of consensus in each, the Yorkshireman and Scot, the Texan and Southerner remind us of how difficult it would be to correlate systems of field administration with presence or absence of the variable of homogeneity of geography and population.

"Disaffection" as a variable might be expected to serve us better than lack of homogeneity. But every society must disappoint some groups of citizens by the distributive pattern of benefits and deprivations that its rulers permit or impose. One may, then, assume a range of disaffection that is tolerable and not threatening to stability. It is not enough, though, to convert disaffection into a matter of degree and hypothesize a point or zone where prudent rulers will 'take measures.' The political system itself and all the specific variations that can be introduced into it affect our ability to fix the point of 'too much' disaffection. It would carry us far afield to develop the point. We therefore merely state that there is a wide repertory of measures, not closely related to field administration, by which disaffection can be diverted into constructive, self-regulating, or neutralizing channels; mastery of this repertory, the differential utility of the various measures, and the timing of their application and withdrawal, constitutes a good part of statesmanship.

To sharpen the issue, however, note how more obviously is presented the threat to stability of the state, its pattern of government, and its current power-wielders in some familiar circumstances. The simplest case is a country or territory newly acquired, especially if by conquest. Here civilian field administration often may expect slight local cooperation (though some local persons may attach themselves to whoever has the power to reward them); irredentism may be a threat for years, and a quasi-authoritarian rule seem requisite. The government of colonies offers a similar situation, to which are added the racial difference and presumed racial inferiority of the natives, the often actual backwardness of the natives in education, technology, and cultural level, and, at least until recently, the exploitative or extractive objectives of the metropolitan power. Again, authoritarian values and means have traditionally characterized imperial administration, from colonial governor down to provincial commissioner and district officer, with not wholly incompatible concessions to doctrines such as 'indirect rule' or reliance on village headmen at the lowest level.

Finally, there are a number of countries where the problem is neither the administration of newly acquired territory nor the administration of colonies but where, nonetheless, consensus is weak, the retention of power an overriding goal, and a prefectoral system one way of instrumenting that goal. The pattern is found in many Asian, Latin American, and African countries. Stability in them often depends upon the support of such supposedly monolithic structures as the army, the church, the single party, and the civil bureaucracy. The field administration staff takes it place as part of the civil bureaucracy, and so as an ally, or alternative to the other structures, and one whose loyalty may be assured more readily than that of army or church.

The field administration staff has another and more specific role. Threats to the regime may express themselves as palace or capital-city revolutions and field administration not be directly involved. However, it is the field administrators that extract revenues whose abundant flow may provide the central ruling group with the means to keep the army and civil bureaucracy contented and to buy off political rivals. More important yet, field administrators may suppress, or warn the central government of, developing regional threats to the regime. History, geography, poor communication facilities, slight circulation between capital and province, and highly dissimilar cultural patterns may help to perpetuate centrifugal forces; local and regional structures may vest powers of resistance or aggression in tribal chiefs (as in Africa, and Arab states), regional caudillos (as in Latin America), or dukes, barons, and other great landed magnates (as in medieval France, England, and many an Asian and Latin American country). While field administration is far from being the sole instrument, it can contribute a measure of the centripetal force necessary to maintain the minimal equilibrium for continuance of the state, its system of government, and, often, its current ruling group. To perform this role such powers as the central government can exert on the local scene are gathered up into the hands of one principal field agent. Such at least is the intent of the orthodox prefectoral model.

Threats to stability may be endemic to certain of the more developed, as well as to the less developed, countries. Western countries that provide no mechanism by which an opposition may bid for power peacefully, in which any opposition is thought dangerous to the regime--of which Portugal, Spain, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy may serve as examples--are likely to adopt an authoritarian structure. In such a structure administration plays an important political role, and the prefectoral form of field administration may be expected to commend itself to the rulers. Even liberal democracies that lack the political stability that substantial consensus makes possible may feel that administration, including field administration, should play the political role of manipulating matters so that a kind of stability is achieved.

France in the nineteenth and on into the twentieth century, it has often been said, continued to fight the French Revolution. Monarchists and republicans Catholics and secularists, the aristocracy and the ordinary people perpetuated schismatic controversy that seemed so little compromisable that the issue was the regime and not the temporary exercise of power under the established regime.

More recently, workers and capitalists, peasants and urban consumers, civil servants and taxpayers, small businessmen and the government, even colonial-minded army men and General DeGaulle have disputed, and the major disputes have usually exploded into revolts, strikes, demonstrations, or sabotage against the government itself. The most recent expression of disaffection, significantly enough, has seen peasants mobilizing their tractors and laying siege to the prefectures in their départements. Frenchmen vote "No" by voting for the Communist Party to the extent of 20 to 25 percent of the total votes cast. "Parliamentarism" is a bad word in France and the Gaullist regime a temporary expedient by which one man may embody and interpret a mystical kind of consensus supporting a revival of France's grandeur.

France's prefectoral system was designed and perpetuated with the problems of stability much in mind. At first Napoleon's instrument for authoritarian administration, it was under subsequent regimes an instrument for suppressing disorders, for alerting the central government to the state of public opinion and dangers to the state, and for manipulating elections to support the government of the day. So important a political tool did field administration become that control of the Ministry of the Interior, under which the prefects served, was an important objective for the political parties. The Constitution of the Fourth Republic, until amended in 1954, even attempted to neutralize the Ministry whenever dissolution of the National Assembly occurred and an election therefore impended, by requiring that the existing Minister of the Interior be displaced by someone recommended by the all-party bureau of the Assembly.

Italy, even apart from its Fascist period, has also been plagued by threats to stability. The development of its field administration has been masterfully analyzed by Robert C. Fried,[9] and I perhaps need but note that since World War II it has been troubled by the largest Leftist (Communist and Left Socialist) vote of the western democracies, and that a number of its most important cities are governed by Communists. As Fried has noted, one of the important services of the Italian prefects in the areas containing Communist municipal governments has been the strict and discriminating use of such prefectoral powers as review, allocation of grants-in-aid, application of sanctions, and the like, to weaken the Communist party's hold on those cities. Here again, then, the prefectoral system appears in part a prop to stability, a political instrument.

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[9] Robert C. Fried, "The Italian Prefects" (typewritten doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1961).

III

There are other possible responses to the need for stability of the state, its pattern of government, and its current ruling group. A major alternative or complement to a prefectoral field system is the recognition of potentially disaffected groups and the enlistment of their leaders in the service of the state. This may mean a voluntary or reluctant sharing of power at the capital, and political history abounds with examples. The English king's baronial council, the English parliament, the French king's court in the 13th century and later the Parlement of Paris, even the American President's Cabinet suggest the frequency of this strategy [10] and as well its hazards. But if its consequence is a continuing identification of power groups with the regime and their consent in support of the policies adopted, field administration need not carry so heavy a burden of political responsibilities.

Another alternative is the use of existing regional structures as the field mechanisms of the central government. The problem is how to assure effective implementation of centrally made national policies through regional units whose identifications are far more regional than national and whose shared or geographically differentiated interests may run counter to those of the national rulers. Feudal arrangements in the Middle Ages presented this problem in its starkest form. The king's agents dealt only with subjects on the king's limited proprietary domain, while feudal lords had to be looked to for provision of troops, armor, horses, and other military supplies, for revenues, and for enforcement of the king's law in their own fiefs. Even after establishment of a more far-reaching royal field administration, lay and ecclesiastical lords and the burghers of the cities often bought from the king the privilege of doing their own administering and adjudicating.

The development of true nations, historically associated with monarchical absolutism, required substantial abandonment of this delegated and fragmented administration and substitution for it of national field administration.

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[10] Of course, the sharing of power may be thrust upon a ruler rather than be a strategy that he independently chooses.

France's case is more clearly of this nature than England's[11] but both yield consistent ideas of highly suggestive value for our analytical purposes.

In both countries, the political danger lay not in the principle of regionalized power, whether royally delegated or simply successfully asserted and hallowed by custom. Rather, the danger lay in an unfavorable relation between the power resources of the king and the power resources of the barons. For successful rule the king needed to be the greatest baron of the nation in his own right, with great wealth, especially productive land, and profit-yielding functions like adjudication, as his personal property or royal right. If dukes and earls were greater men than he in these terms, or even if not greater had substantial resources, the kind's bargaining position and prestige were bound to suffer. He was unlikely to find such men always loyal and prompt in application of royal orders to their vassals and in contributions to royal revenues. And he lacked the resources to induce such behavior by bestowal of favors and imposition of penalties. Great lords were also threats to stability in more dramatic ways. When the power elite consisted of but a limited number of magnates, a few of them could readily join forces or ally themselves with a foreign power and launch a revolt or war against the king. And they might also form rival leagues that, even if neither was specifically directed against the king, could for decades disturb the peace beyond the capacity of the king to restore it.[12]

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11 In England the Norman conquerors converted the sheriff, already a royally appointed centralizing agent in Anglo-Saxon times, to yet a stronger role as the mainspring of royal administration and local government in the county. By the 14th century, however, the sheriff was less prominent. This resulted from the importance of the itinerant justices, the heavy reliance in the 14th century on household administration by Chamber and Wardrobe rather than on, for example, the Exchequer to which the sheriffs were most closely tied, and the rise of justices of the peace; the latter, though local residents and chaired by a local magnate, were nonetheless royal agents and their rise was more at the expense of local self-government by county moots than at the expense of royal power. Aylmer estimates that in the 1630's the whole of England and Wales had national field agents, apart from the unpaid justices of the peace and constables, numbering only in the hundreds, compared with the over 3,000 or 4,000 in the one French province of Normandy. He adds, "Looking at the situation in France [where sale of offices was rampant], one is tempted to ask whether the English Crown was in all respects the weaker for having so few central officials in the localities." (G.E. Aylmer, The King's Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-1642 (1961), p. 440, 450.

12 The point is specifically made by Tout: "The whole history of the fifteenth century [in England] shows that the ultimate result of the policy [of conciliating the magnates by extraordinary grants] was a growth of faction and a weakness of the central power that reduced the fifteenth-century monarchy to a level which prevented it from maintaining order and peace in a land split up by rival aristocratic feuds. While, in earlier times, the barons had combined against the king, in later years they made rival claims to the Crown a pretext for fighting each other." Thomas Frederick Tout, "Some Conflicting Tendencies in English Administrative History During the Fourteenth Century," (1923-24) in The Collected Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout, vol. III (1934), p. 246.

The responsive strategy in power terms, though often successfully blocked, was for the king to attempt over the long run to break up great holdings into smaller portions scattered among a greater number of nobles, to undercut the magnates by dealing directly with their vassals, and to press constantly for the accretion of royal possessions by full use of his rights as suzerain and sovereign to take over permanently or temporarily lands forfeit for treason, left without heirs, or inherited by minors. Administrative, and the scarcely distinguishable judicial, kinds of strategies were useful supplements to the broader effort. The quality of royal administration and adjudication attracted business that might otherwise have remained in baronial jurisdiction. And royal field agents played no small part in eroding feudal autonomies on a day-by-day basis, often even disregarding royal ordinances forced on the king by the barons at his court.

In sum, dependence of national interests upon execution by regional, autonomous structures is an arrangement that works best when the regional structures are weak enough, relative to the center, that their loyal performance can be reasonably well assured. Granting such regional authorities the role of field agencies in itself constitutes an addition to their power. All the more reason then to regard the arrangement as viable only when (a) the regional authorities are numerous and small, and (b) the central government has at its disposal means of inducing compliance.

Modern illustrations can be adduced. Under this country's Articles of Confederation, the national government's dependence on the states for revenues, troops, and adjudication proved to be an infirmity of a kind and proportion that recall the frustrations of the medieval monarch.[13] Germany's pattern of central dependence upon the Länder for administration of national laws proved viable under the Second Reich because the Länder governments shared the central executive's conservatism and the central executive fully controlled Prussia, the Land embracing two-thirds of Germany; the Weimar Republic abandoned the pattern in the collection of revenue, establishing its own field system for this purpose, and in other functional fields suffered from its incapacity for inducing the Länder to administer national laws loyally and responsively; the Third Reich abrogated Land autonomy and installed centrally-appointed governors; resumption under the Bonn regime of reliance on Land administration of national laws appears to have worked because Prussia was fragmented and because the Bundesrat, the political parties, central influence in local elections, and informal administrative practices have afforded national-provincial interpenetration that reduce frictional possibilities in the formal administrative channels. This, at least, I understand to be the interpretation of Herbert Jacob in his thoughtful study of the development of German field administration.[14]

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[13] Herbert Jacob, "Field Administration in Germany, 1871-1959" (Typewritten doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1960).

[14] However, as Louis Hartz has pointed out, an important distinction exists between the national government installed by the American revolutionists and the national government of the medieval monarch. He quotes Sir William Ashley's remark that "'as feudalism was not transplanted to the New World, there was no need for the strong arm of a central power to destroy it.'" Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955), p. 43. While this fact did not make viable a distribution of powers such as that of the Articles of Confederation, it may help to explain the failure of the United States Government under the Constitution to develop a prefectoral field system such as that used by medieval kings to maximize their feudal and sovereign powers while undermining those of the feudal lords.

The point is further illustrated in Vietnam, where a recommendation that existing field-administration provinces be consolidated into fewer and larger provinces fell afoul of the President's shrewd political perception that this would enlarge the territory and resources that would fall into hostile control should the Communist Viet Cong capture any one provincial headquarters.

Federal and local home-rule arrangements would confuse our theme were it not possible to distinguish three quite different ways in which they bear upon our problem. First, they may contribute to national stability by removing matters from the national policy-making agenda. In the traditional formulation, these are subjects of primarily local or regional concern, appropriate for geographical variation in policies and for local tax support and bearing slightly, if at all, on the national interest in the security of the nation against external and internal threats to stability. Relieving the central government of concerns to which it can afford to be indifferent, and, often, relieving it of the more divisive domestic issues such as education, religion, and police activities, the federal or home-rule arrangement may doubly aid the national government to concentrate its resources, including national field-administration and judicial systems, on the maintenance of a national economy and polity.

Second, the existence of a general government intermediate between nation and locality may serve also to meet some of the needs met by prefect-governors in prefectoral systems, and specifically make more possible a functionally fragmented national field-administration system. Such an intermediate government has a wide range of functions whose mutual consistency and coordinated operation are presumably the concern of that government's legislature and governor (though American state governments fall considerably short of fulfilling this presumption); so the "gathering together" of functions needs less the services of a national prefect. The elected governor, his mansion, the capitol building, and citizens' identification of themselves with the state help to meet the need for ceremonial and symbolic services that in other countries are performed by the national prefect. Finally, this intermediate government supervises local governments, an integral part of the prefect's role (though we have neglected it in the present paper) in prefectoral systems. [15]

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[15] Britain, of course, lacks both prefect and intermediate government of the sort we are here considering. Brian Chapman observes, "It may be that Britain has developed into such a highly centralized state through lack of such an office as the prefect-governor empowered to control local governments: The Profession of Government (1959), p. 73. Here he is renewing an earlier observation, ". . . whereas the growth of national services in Great Britain has led to drastic centralization, the French have preserved a steadier mean; in France powers can accumulate in the hands of the local prefect; in Britain powers taken from local authorities pass automatically to a central authority, in default of a local administrative service of tested competence." Chapman, The Prefects and Provincial France (1955), pp. 230f.

Third, a federal or home-rule system may be enlisted for the administration of some national policies. Such use of the "states as agents of the nation," to borrow Arthur Holcombe's apt phrase, is a specific alternative or complement to use of the national field-administration system. The conditions for its success, in terms of national interests, are much the same as those we have considered in the broader framework of regional autonomous structures. Financial inducement, as in conditional grants-in-aid programs, and the sanction of withdrawal, provide the means of assuring compliance with national goals and standards in the United States. The existence of fifty state governments, rather than five or ten regional governments, also strengthens the viability of the arrangement. This has importance for national effectiveness even apart from grants-in-aid programs. One might speculate, for example, on how different would be the recent history and the prospects of compliance with the Supreme Court's segregation decision if there existed a regional government of the South.

The conclusions emerge that (a) second only to protection against external threats to the nation is the concern of national rulers for the security of the state, its system of government, and, often, its current ruling group, against domestic threats; (b) when consensus is absent or weak in support of these goals, whether among the populace or among the power elite, and whether widely distributed or geographically specialized, the rulers tend to invoke a patently or latently authoritarian politico-administrative structure; (c) an important component of such a structure is a prefectoral field-administration system; (d) the co-opting of leaders of potentially disaffected groups into national policy-making councils may promote consensus and so reduce the political role of field administration; (e) the alternative of relying on already power-endowed regional structures for transmission of the central will tends to encourage threats to stability unless such structures are small and numerous and the central government is well-armed with compliance-promoting inducements and sanctions.

IV

A field-administration system, including one shaped along prefectoral lines, cannot perform its political role in support of stability unless other conditions are met. There need to be adequate means for keeping field administrators loyal to the national goals, and the central power holders need to have adequate resources for maintaining the field system even though it threatens goals of other powerful groups in the society. The problem is partly that of the whole national bureaucracy. The temptations to civil servants to play favorites in performance of public services and imposition of penalties for infractions of the law are strong in both capital and countryside, and the remunerativeness of the practice is a constant challenge to the capacity of rulers to institute remedies. In capital and countryside, too, civil servants may be sought as allies by those organizing cabals to obtain self-serving national policies or to challenge the ruling group directly.

There are peculiar features that accentuate and differentiate the problems of the field. Men serving at the capital can be closely watched, their intrigues unmasked, their rivalries played upon to the advantage of the ruler. Men serving in distant parts of the nation are under no such daily surveillance. Instead, even if they have no personal ambition to organize resistance to the capital, they are constantly exposed to the local notables' and ordinary people's concern for the interests of the region. Their own and their families' happiness may seem to depend on the warmth of acceptance they can earn from the regional society. If long resident there, they may imperceptibly come to identify with the region. More than this, though, some regional administrators of the prefectoral type may in fact yearn to mount an attack on the nation's current rulers. This is the more likely if they already have some status in their own persons, as when they have a more or less legitimate claim to the throne, or head a noble family or other faction long disgruntled with the ruling group. Essential to their considering so radical a course is the circumstance that in many countries the prefect or governor of a province, by reason of his very possession of the office, has at his disposal substantial resources of men and treasure. These can be mobilized in an alliance with a few other similar administrators for an attack on the capital or, more commonly, they can be mobilized simply for the assertion of regional autonomy.

Running throughout the history of all field-administration systems serving political goals is the development of strategies to keep the field administration loyal and to protect it against the efforts of others to subvert it. The beginning of wisdom has seemed to be resistance by rulers to the attractiveness of appointing already powerful and even disaffected men as field administrators. Exiling such men from the capital, where they might too readily intrigue, to distant provinces as governors is a recourse of dubious advantage. The designation of men already resident and powerful in their regions as governors of those regions is another version of the same practice but one even more questionable because it is so closely allied to the use of what we have called regional autonomous structures. Instead, rulers aware of the stakes involved have chosen men with slight or no status in their own right, men, as the phrase goes, "raised from the dust" who would thus owe all that they are and might be to the ruler's confidence in their loyalty and competence. [16]

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16 "Raised from the dust" is hyperbolic and "status" is a relative term. Peasants and slaves have seldom been given posts as principal field administrators. The lesser nobility, the bourgeoisie, the lesser clerics of the church (itself important as an egalitarian recruiter of talent), younger sons of nobles, sons of nontraditional chiefs (in Africa), and foreigners have been the groups from which the ruler might find men ambitious to serve him and presumptively loyal to him.

While Western European examples might be cited, consider instead a more obscure instance, that of the development of the African Buganda Kingdom in the 19th century. There, when one of the princes of the royal family was chosen as the ruler, the "Kabaka," he immediately executed his brothers, thus removing quasi-legitimate claimants to the throne around whom disaffected interests might organize. Audrey I. Richards [17] has described the rise to political dominance of the Kabaka through manipulation of field administration:

> "The first step seems to have been the gradual elimination of, or reduction of the power of hereditary clan and lineage heads, who ruled over their own districts during the days of the first Kabakas and some of whom maintained rights of succession to important territorial rulerships. The clan heads were ousted by king's governors made administrative heads over the large named districts now known as counties (<u>amasaza</u>). /A late 19th century prime minister reported/ that the kings first appointed as clan heads loyal supporters of theirs who happened to be members of the clan of the previous holder of the office and that their next step was to appoint a personal representative of the 'crown' to live near the borders of the clan territory (<u>butaka</u>) and to report how things were going on. These king's representatives finally assumed administrative control over districts as governors or saza chiefs, while the clan authorities were limited to ruling over the hills where their ancestors were buried. * * * Many clan authorities seem to have been killed, although they were supposed to be immune from arrest or execution by the king's officers, and mass murders of members of lineage groups are remembered."

Save for its more brutal aspects, this has points of remarkable similarity to the constriction and supersession of feudal lords' authority by the 13th and 14th century field administrators of France and to the relations developed in England between the king's sheriff and the holders of franchises or liberties in his county. It is instructive, though, to compare what this Buganda politico-administrative hierarchy of prime minister, saza chiefs, and their subordinates was with what it looked like to Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston, Queen Victoria's Special Commissioner for the Uganda Protectorate, in 1899.

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[17] Audrey I. Richards, East African Chiefs (1960), pp. 45f.

As Low observes, although to Johnston it

> "might seem a perfect reflection of British notions of a chiefly hierarchy of administrative agents, it was in fact something far more complex. In addition to being the residuary administrators of their areas, the Bakungo /the chiefly hierarchs/ were, to begin with, both the personal representatives of the Kabaka and the supports of his throne. They were, too, the powerful disposers of jurisdiction over lands and peasants and political leaders of the utmost importance. They were far from being just the local administrative agents of the central authority in the land. Yet this was the only one of their roles which Johnston was apparently prepared to recognize." 18

Even if the way is open for the choice of field administrators who, on the basis of their background, are not likely to be either powerful or hostile, there remains the serious problem of assuring continued loyalty. Training prior to appointment has often been used to inculcate respect for the ruler as well as familiarity with the art of government. Pages' schools at the courts of France and England, of the Busoga Kingdom (which adjoined Buganda), and of Siam, to cite a few instances, served to produce well indoctrinated recruits for the field service, as well as for the central bureaucracy. In modern times the continental law schools and such specialized schools as France's National School of Administration have shaped the character as well as taught the methods to be used by general administrators, both central and field.

The field service's special difficulties in the matter of loyalty are not solved by pre-entry training. Stern sanctions are threatened and invoked. The medieval English king often included in his orders to the royal sheriffs the phrase, "As you cherish your life and all that you have, see to it . . . ." 19

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18 D. Anthony Low, "The Making and Implementation of the Uganda Agreement of 1900," in Low and R. Cranford Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955 (1960), p. 47. I am using the passage to emphasize the saza chiefs' performance of political as well as administrative functions for the Kabaka. It also, of course, attests to the chiefs' development of political power that might be turned against the Kabaka, a problem to be noted below.

19 E. g. Henry III's letters close and patent to the sheriffs on collection of scutage (1218) and collection of carucage (1220), in Carl Stephenson and Frederick George Marcham (eds.), Sources of English Constitutional History (1937), pp. 133 and 134f.

The king of Siam, in the course of a 1727 edict of instructions to governors and other provincial officials three times specified that for disobedience "punishment ranges up to death." In addition, he provided that "men in positions of trust who betray that trust shall be heavily punished by molten silver being poured down their throats."[20]

Negative sanctions, however, have seldom been so effective as systematic measures to remove temptation and to regularize supervision. Even a field administrator "raised from the dust" falls prey to local influences if he already has ties in the locality or develops them through long residence. A common practice has been the avoidance of appointment of men to a field area where they already reside or from which they come. The "stranger in their midst" is more likely to keep national interests clearly in view. Yet even a stranger may become localized if he remains in an area long, makes friends, develops family ties through marriage, acquires property, and the like. Prudent rulers have set limits to the time a field administrator can serve in a single area. This is true even in colonial administration, where friendship with chiefs and affective identification with tribes are the dangers, rather than economic interest, and where mastery of the local language might be thought worth encouraging. In British East Africa, for example, District Commissioners rarely serve longer than three years in the same district.[21] The general principle of limited tours of duty is the more remarkable and thus highlights the problem of loyalty, because the national government loses important advantages by applying the principle. Especially where the field administrator is expected to play a political role, his possession of an intimate familiarity with the people of the district, the local problems, the intrigues, the interests and ambitions that can be played off against one another, would seem of the highest importance. But distrust of the administrator himself forces the national rulers to sacrifice this potential gain.

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[20] "Edict on the Method of Provincial Administration" in the reign of King Day Srah, dated 1727, in H. C. Quaritch Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Administration (1934) pp. 126-130.

[21] A story is told in Kenya of a District Commissioner too long assigned to a district occupied by the Masai tribe; appearing at the colonial headquarters in Nairobi, bearing a spear and leading a group of Masai chiefs, he acted as spokesman, starting with "We Masai demand. . . !" The three-year term is associated with the provision of six months' home leave for the British colonial administrators every three years, and is related also to the fact that some (but far from all) districts are 'hardship posts', especially from the standpoint of health. The introduction of social and economic development programs has increased criticism of the short term assignments, which had a greater logic when the key role was the political one of maintaining law and order. Sir Andrew Cohen, as governor general of Uganda set five years as the normal term: see his British Policy in Changing Africa (1959), p. 72. See also Roland Young and Henry A. Fosbrooke, Smoke in the Hills: Political Tension in the Morogoro District of Tanganyika, (1960), pp. 125f, 139, 166.

The history of field administration is filled with as many failures as successes, and a weak or inactive ruler or an imperceptive counselor may permit long service by field administrators in their districts. Even if they do not appoint local magnates to the post or auction it to the highest bidder, they may sacrifice the value of loyalty by letting a previously obscure field administrator develop local support over so long a time that he cannot be removed or transferred without risking sharp offense to local opinion. Meantime, the field administrator may have become the largest landholder in the district, and somehow have so entrenched his son that the post becomes hereditary. Too, he may have even amassed sufficient political power that he can claim the right to serve as one of the king's councillors.

Other devices have been used to assure loyalty. Field administrators may be required to appear at the capital three or four times a year, for review of their financial accounts, an auditing of their performance, and a reminder of the majesty of the state and its rulers. [22] Men of the central court may be sent on tour to the provinces, to investigate, report, reprimand, and correct. This was the early practice in England, with her itinerant justices, and France, with her touring bailiffs and a host of ad hoc commissioners of investigation. Note the close relation to loyalty: these were not merely accountants and appellate judges performing their technical tasks; they brought the values of the capital to the field in a way that resident field administrators could not be expected to match. Another device, though sometimes not consciously chosen for the purpose, is for the center to keep a constant stream of orders moving to the field; while this is no substitute for supervision and sanctions, it saves the field men from feeling isolated and forgotten and, perhaps more than they might wish, provides almost daily prods to action in the national interest. The growth of an independent hierarchy of courts and judges, perambulating or distributed throughout the country, affords a check on field administrators that serves both the rulers' and the citizens' interests even though the function performed be strictly judicial rather than one of general surveillance.[23]

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[22] The ruler may even require virtually constant attendance at court by his principal field administrators (as was true in the Buganda Kingdom) or may achieve the same object by designating central officials to serve simultaneously as principal field administrators (as was true at various stages of English history). Often, too, the capital and the court are magnets for field administrators, who prefer the greater personal security, the more elegant life and the opportunity to attract the king's and his councillors' notice.

[23] In late 16th century Siam, though the provincial governors were responsible to the chief civil minister, the minister of the palace appointed a high-ranking provincial official to act as chief judge and serve as a check on the governor. H. G. Quaritch Wales, op. cit., pp. 111f.
In Germany, the absence of a supreme administrative court for the Reich under the Weimar Republic and provision for such a court under the Bonn regime (in addition to lower courts in both periods) appear significant differences for subjection of field officials to national goals and standards. Herbert Jacob, op. cit.

Some devices to keep a basically prefectoral system operating loyally and effectively have adulterated the system itself. The elementary idea of a prefectoral system serving political ends is that in each field area there should be a comprehensively empowered official who can be expected to serve the interests of the state and its rulers. Failure to find perhaps a few score men who can be trusted to give loyal and effective service in these key posts obviously brings the system itself into question. But often the system is formally maintained at the same time that incompatible elements are introduced. A parallel or intermixed hierarchy of officials may be introduced as spies, controllers, and rivals of the prefectoral officials. The military hierarchy has served this purpose in Siam, the Buganda Kingdom, Prussia, and other political systems. In some countries and periods, a separate hierarchy for fiscal functions has performed the same role.

In totalitarian countries the party hierarchy competes with, informs on, and sometimes attempts to give orders to the official prefect-governors. The phenomenon is well documented for Communist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy. In these, and in one-party states that fall short of totalitarianism (a category that has been increasing in Africa and Asia), there is often some ambiguity as to whether the official administrative hierarchy should be taken over at its important levels by appointment of the powerful men of the party or should be staffed with competent civil servants whose actions are subjected to surveillance and criticism by members of the party hierarchy. The problem is specifically confronting, for example, former British colonies in Africa, where the district commissionerships designed to be held by British colonial civil servants, are being Africanized.

V

A system designed to meet the need for stability in a country weak in consensus confronts sharp challenges when other needs and conditions arise. When the king's court or council gives birth to functionally differentiated departments and bureaus, the center itself loses the unity that the single prefectoral administrator is supposed to embody in the field. Instead, he becomes subject to multiple supervision and the central departments may chafe at the low priority he accords their particular functions. As this differentiation at the center tends to coincide with an increase in the volume of governmental work, which puts great burdens on the field administrators, both problems may find a temporary solution in functionally differentiated subordinates of the field administrator. Soon, however, these subordinates acquire a degree of independence in law or in fact and establish direct links to the central departments corresponding to their special concerns. Revenue assessment and collection, adjudication, and regulation of forests and waters may be "separated out" in whole or in part. But the prefectoral official remains, still concerned with maintenance of law and order, and contributing his knowledge of the district and the support of his sanctions to the slightly more specialized field agents of the central government. Occasionally, the central ruler or his strong surrogate will become dismayed at the fragmentation in the field, and then a new prefectoral-type system may be superimposed on the confusion.

As governmental functions increase in technicality and as the appropriate professional training develops for the various specialties, the fragmenting tendencies gain ascendancy. The generalist, serving as prefect-governor, loses relevance for the specialized functions and his important skills fail to command recognition by the technicians at the capital and in the field. The familiar drive of specialists for autonomy leads to adoption of strategies designed to exclude the generalist from his intermediate position in the line of command or to subject his proposed decisions to detailed review by specialized staffs in the capital. Not infrequently the specialist departments resort to the strategy of developing sets of field areas that differ materially from the master set of areas that is essential to the prefectoral system. This strategy has markedly reduced the role of the prefect in France.

A field administration system built around the problem of stability is affected when the government's programs come to be concerned substantially with activities less directly tied to the stability goal. To be sure, all governmental programs bear on the problem of stability, for the satisfaction of the people through governmental services may be a condition for retention of power in a society of high expectations. But a welfare-oriented set of programs focuses on the conferring of benefits rather than the imposition of sacrifices or the suppression of dissidents. If successful, indeed, such programs may foster a public view of government that is favorable and in itself promotive of stability. Controversy is likely to focus on the influencing of policy at the center rather than take the form of revolt in the field. With substantial consensus thus taken for granted, the government's task in the field becomes preponderantly a matter of efficient, and substantially routinized administration of the specialized programs. The field administrator's ancient political role of keeping the peace becomes a small part of the total task of field administration.

Some important qualifications must be added. Programs of economic and social development, particularly but not solely in underdeveloped countries, typically demand intensive mobilization of manpower and revenues, the disturbing of vested interests and cultural habits, and the coordinating of competitive high-priority activities. If specialists are available for service in the field, they nonetheless need the field generalist as coordinator, facilitator, influencer of public opinion, and sanction-invoking representative of the state. If, as is common in underdeveloped countries, specialists are in short supply, the programs must inevitably depend on the field generalist as direct agent for their achievement. In many an underdeveloped country localism or tribalism prevails, the sense of belonging to a nation is weak, and consequently impulses to separatism and autonomy threaten both stability and the realization of economic and social development programs. Here, then, the field administrator has a major political role. Even in so modern a nation as France, assignment to the prefect of a major role in economic planning and development gives rise to a question of its compatibility with his traditional stability-supporting role.

Roger Bonnaud-Delamare, Prefect of Doubs, clearly reveals that the question exists, even though he affirms the compatibility of the two roles:

> "Two aspects of prefectoral action are distinguishable, and sometimes appear to have opposite meanings, that of upholder of public order and that of stimulator, knowing how to evoke new problems, or orienter toward economic arrangements that are as yet poorly defined. To maintain the established order on the one hand, but at the same time to create a new order--such are the present-day tasks of the prefect. These two activities are not at all contradictory, the first concerning political stability, and the second associating the action of the State with economic vigor. In this double role, prefectoral action needs to be balanced, both supporting the stability of the State in its old structures and its fundamental principles, and encouraging the new economic forms that give it its vitality and its strength. The importance of the prefectoral function is thus affirmed in a new day, serving as intermediary not only between the State and the citizen, but also between the two forces of stability and change which animate the Fifth Republic."[24]

Patently the importance of the generalist field agent's political role varies with the number and efficiency of a nation's other instruments for modiating between rulers and ruled, capital and countryside, and the more favored and the less favored citizens and interests. It varies also with the political objectives in view and the obstacles in the way of their achievement. Gabriel Almond has helpfully distinguished four input functions of any political system: political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and polititical communication.[25] When there are few other institutional arrangements for the performance of these input functions, the field agent must play a political role. Furthermore, the failure of the input functions to develop substantial consensus usually means that when the field agent plays his administrative role on the output side of the political system by attending to "rule application" (in Almond's terms) his task is more difficult and may require the political instruments of force and the threat of force.

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[24] Roger Bonnaud-Delamare, "Le prefet dans le cadre de la Constitution française de 1958," International Review of Administrative Sciences 27 (No. 1, 1961), pp. 5-15, at p. 15.

[25] Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (1960), pp. 3-64. James Coleman's concluding chapter, at pp. 532-576, will also be found highly germane to the present paper's concern with the political setting and political role of field administration.

Consistently with these propositions, when a society provides for the input functions through other institutional arrangements--e.g. general public education, associational interest groups, political parties and representative legislatures, "an autonomous, neutral, and thoroughly penetrative system of communication" --the field service will be only incidentally supplementary on the input side.[26] Its main task may then be thought of as on the output side, and its task of rule application is the easier because other institutions have sufficiently well performed the input functions that the political instruments of force and the threat of force need rarely be invoked.

We are back, then, where we started. A society characterized by a high degree of consensus and instrumented by institutions for maintaining consensus and channeling frictional controversies so as to permit their expression and resolution, need not assign a major political role to the field-administration system. Where these conditions do not prevail, field administration is relied on for political support of stability. There are consequences for the structure of the field system. In the first situation, responsibility for maintenance of law and order, for punishment of its few challengers, and for the conduct of elections may be diffused among less-than-national governments, among investigating and prosecuting agencies, among functionally specialized bureaus and departments. In the second situation, maintenance of law and order is typically concentrated in the hands of a single territorial representative of the national government, he is given authority over all or most field activities of the national government in his area so that his sanctions may support them and his judgment of local political reactions modify them, and he is made the supervisor of elections and of local governments.

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[26] This helps to explain for such a society, the failure of expectations that field agents can contribute materially to the capital's awareness of the reactions of regional publics to the operation of national programs. Under the Roosevelt Administration state directors of the National Emergency Council filed fortnightly reports designed to contribute to such awareness. But this had only occasional value, for newspapers from all over the country were subscribed to by the President's office and executive agencies and carefully scrutinized, clipped, and abstracted on matters of interest. Furthermore, senators and representatives served their constituencies by reflecting local opinion to executive agencies; governors, state department heads, and mayors of large cities had communication channels to Washington; regionalized interest groups made their views known; and the mail to Washington from ordinary citizens received respectful attention. This, of course, does not mean that regional field administrators may not add to the rationality of central decisions by evaluating (as distinguished from merely reporting) local reactions to specific programs; but it does mean that the capital is not solely or primarily dependent on regional officials' information and judgment.

VI

As Almond has wisely said, all political systems are culturally mixed, containing elements of traditionality and rationality; and "all political systems . . . are transitional systems, or systems in which cultural change is taking place." [27] So, too, a state without any consensus and a state without any dissension are contradictory of both the preconditions and the functions of statehood. Given the fact of a varying mix of stability-supporting and stability-threatening elements in actual states, one may expect field administration systems to be impure, that is, to be mixtures of prefectoral and functional styles of organization, and to be animated by mixed political and administrative objectives. The proportions in those mixes will vary, however. The intent of the present paper, addressed to an audience accustomed to a predominantly functional and administrative field system in a society favored by a stability-supporting consensus, has been to explore and explain the less familiar pattern and problems of a predominantly prefectoral and political field system in societies troubled by latent or apparent stability-threatening dissension.

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[27] Gabriel A. Almond, op. cit., pp. 20-25. This does not mean that political systems elude classification. It is particularly in point that he contrasts Britain and France in terms of the former's success in fusing "the modern and the pre-modern attitudes . . . in such a way as to produce a homogeneous political culture . . . ." and the latter's "polarization of political culture, with some elements and regions manifesting traditionality and others manifesting rationality." pp. 24f.

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FEDERALISM AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN BRAZIL

by

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It is elementary, but nonetheless true, to premise a consideration of the subject by remarking that there are federations and federations. They may vary from a small, tightly knit, historically assimilated unit such as Switzerland to one as huge, amorphous, unintegrated (and in some respects, unknown) as Brazil. Obviously, the character and appearance of the stage on which the actors move will condition, at least in part, the roles they play. It is in order, then, to try to determine briefly what of a geographical, historical, political, or other element in the Brazilian past helped to condition the recent development and contemporary operation of parties in that country.

It is again elementary to point out that Brazil is a vast, sprawling country, occupying almost half of South America. Its maximum extensions, north to south and east to west, are almost identical and in each case are just under 2,700 miles. The country extends from the north tropic zone into the south temperate zone. The heartland of Amazonia contains the world's largest river but is in general an area of rain and heat, leached land and heavy forest, primitive peoples and economic backwardness, which offers almost insuperable obstacles to development. In the northeast is the great drought-ridden region which has become a national, almost an international, social, economic, and political problem. More than half of Brazil is composed of highlands, by no means uniformly infertile but frequently offering serious difficulties to development of adequate transportation. Behind much of the coast runs the Great Escarpment, making access from the sea to the hinterland difficult and sometimes expensive.

And yet, there are definite geographical advantages, not the least of which is the fact that probably more than 80 per cent of Brazil's area is potentially productive. The country has more natural resources -- and perhaps more in proportion to its size -- than any other in Latin America. But the ironic fact is that in Brazil -- which, like the myth that is Hollywood, must be described in superlatives -- the geographical debits frequently and spectacularly cancel out the geographical credits. A tremendous iron-ore supply is balanced by an unfortunate absence of adequate coal; the world's greatest river straddles the equator, where almost no traffic is to be found; and so it goes.

Effective Brazil, then, is limited largely to a coastal area in the southern third, extending not more than a very few hundred miles inland. Whether the bold (but expensive) gesture of establishing Brasilia many hundreds of miles in the interior will significantly alter this situation remains to be seen.

In terms of historical conditioning the situation was equally challenging and frustrating. After a few years of almost total lack of interest in her vast colony, Portugal for a variety of reasons -- fear of Spain, concern over French acquisitiveness, a wish to exploit Brazil's dyewood, and the languishing trade with India, among others -- began to try to recapture control and influence over

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the stepchild now become a child. The initial method, however, was in significant contrast to that used by neighboring colonial Spain -- and it would have an effect 400 years later on the development of political parties. Spain retained a tightly centralized control over her colonies; Portugal began the granting of princely captaincies in which the privileges, the profits (if any), and the responsibility for development were put on a quasi-feudal basis.

The fact that only two of the original twelve captaincies were really profitable was of little moment. What counted was that a pattern of provincialism was established; the immense distances and the effective absence of overland transportation meant that Brazil was demographically set up on a basis of a few small coastal settlements most of which had more contact with mother Portugal than they did with each other. Lack of submissiveness by the turbulent immigrants added to the problems and bafflement of the proprietors who tried to extend effective control inland -- "We are obliged to conquer by inches the lands Your Majesty granted us by leagues," one of the early captains donatary complained.

Steps taken in the middle of the sixteenth century and more effective ones in the middle of the eighteenth to establish genuine royal control did not fully achieve their end; Portugal, after all, had not undergone the centralistic conditioning which the Reconquest had given Spain. Almost to the end of the colonial period Brazilians enjoyed the "salutary neglect" on which Burke congratulated the American colonists. Brazilians were highly individualistic, they did not suffer fools gladly, they remained, in Gilberto Freyre's vivid phrase, "unbridled stallions."

Brazil's first constitution, in 1824, set up a unitary -- and monarchical -- state. But it was a unitarism which was fictitious, and in even greater degree than in the United States half a century earlier. An important difference was that in the United States it was only gradually that the imposition of a federal system was made good on an initial foundation of confederatism whereas in Brazil a nominal centralism could not disguise the real political divergences that characterized the regions and provinces. The only effective instrument of unity in Brazil during much of the nineteenth century was the emperor and his political and administrative appendages; had there been other than the remarkable Dom Pedro II on the throne for half a century even that instrument -- and symbol -- would have lost much of its effectiveness. Perhaps it is not too much to credit Dom Pedro, who provided a sort of "father image" for Brazilians, with almost single-handedly forestalling the natural centrifugal tendencies of nineteenth-century Brazilian politics which could otherwise easily have torn the country apart.

Federalism was constitutionally recognized by the first republican basic law in 1891 -- the provisional government had, indeed, laid down a mandate that the constitutional flooring to be provided for the permanent regime must be federal in nature. Thus a political fact was legally recognized. Brazil moved toward federalism from a nominally though not an actually opposite direction from that followed in the United States. In terms of actual national-state relations, Brazil occupied an intermediate position between the United States and, say, Argentina as a representative illustration of a Spanish-descended federation. Centralization was more easily achieved in Brazil -- witness Vargas' later impact -- than in the United States, but less easily than in Argentina. Certain ones but not all of the individual Brazilian states were almost as tenacious of their ancient political and governmental prerogatives and tradition as were their counterparts in the United States.

It was in a constitutional context of this sort that political parties made their appearance. Comment, necessarily brief, on those of the imperial period

involves a word of warning. It is easy to assume that since we apply the rubric "political parties" to groups active even as early as the time of the wars for independence in Latin America and also use the term to describe groups on the public stage from then to the present, these aggregations must reflect common characteristics. To assume that, however, is a gross oversimplification and quite inaccurate. In the nineteenth-century United States, political parties were not, of course, as broadly based as they now are -- political consciousness and articulateness was not then as widespread or as deep as now. Nonetheless, the "parties" of ninteenth-century Brazil, and indeed, of all other Latin American states, were far narrower and shallower than in the United States. They had no tap roots, not even grass roots -- they were, by and large, simply parasitical growths suspended in the air with no connection with the political or demographic earth of Brazil or other Latin American countries. Rather than comparing them with United States parties, a better, though not perfect, analogy can be found in the parties of eighteenth-century England.

With that caveat, a word or two about the early Brazilian parties is now in order. The first ones were the seemingly inevitable Liberals and Conservatives. They were more accurately to be thought of as philosophical positions or points of view than as parties in an organized sense. Conservatives were "the representatives of law and order," opposed to political revolutions, in favor of centralization and a restricted suffrage. Liberals, on the other hand, waved a banner of "progress," occasionally advocated partially unrealistic programs of social and political reform, and were more tolerant of suggestions for decentralization and broadening the suffrage. In both instances they existed and operated only among the very small fraction of politically vocal population; they had no characteristics whatever of mass-based parties. These were the two groups which provided the sole "party" activity of most of the imperial period.

Late in the day the Republican party came into the picture (it was a more logically named group than its homonym in the United States). The Republican party spearheaded and to some extent catalyzed the agitation for overthrow of the empire but to a considerable degree it was simply riding the crest of a mounting groundswell of diverse oppositions to the imperial regime and was not, by itself alone, creating the undercurrents of adverse public opinion. It had few deputies in the parliament and no more of a mass base -- which was none -- than its older contemporary parties. It had some ideological foundation in its enthusiasm for Comtean positivism (still reflected in the design of the Brazilian republican flag) but it lacked the apparatus of twentieth-century parties.

Viscount Bryce, writing less than a quarter of a century after establishment of the republic, observed that in the then contemporary Brazil many factions existed but no organized parties or even definite political principles or policies advocated by groups of men. This was perhaps not quite fair or accurate. In the loose use of the term, groups that were called parties did exist in the first few decades of the republic but they were largely the personalistic followings of state political leaders; hence they became, in effect, state parties and not national organizations. It is sometimes said that the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States are no more than federations of the more solidly knit state organizations. That may or may not be true, but it was certainly the case that the early twentieth-century Brazilian parties were confined almost entirely within the bounds of individual states and, in a few instances, had only the vaguest sort of mutual relationship, as, for example, in some instances, under the common label of the Conservative Republican party, so flimsy an organization that it did not deserve to be called a national party. The Conservative Republican party, so-called, was a "government" party, but it was more clique than party and in effect was the government's political "machine."

The year 1927 saw the formation of the National Democratic party, but it was not even as broadly or solidly based as its nominal opponent; in 1929 it elected six deputies from two states. The first three decades of the century ended with political expression being still primarily on a personal rather than an organizational basis. The center of gravity was in large part still rural: the fazendeiro exercised disproportionate political influence, just as had, at corresponding times, his psychological cousins, the Argentine estanciero and the Mexican hacendado.

The real change, though not immediately obvious, came with the Vargas-led revolution of 1930. In the presidential election of March 1, 1930, Vargas had run as the candidate of the Liberal Alliance, a grouping of convenience engineered by political leaders in Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraiba. The principal purpose of the Liberal Alliance was to provide a vehicle (certainly a jerry-built one) by which a candidate could travel in opposition to the threat by political cheiftans in São Paulo to retain the presidency in that state rather than to pass it in turn to Minas Gerais as the unofficial pact of rotation called for. The Liberal Alliance was not a party; it was simply an organizational façade for opposing the pretensions of São Paulo. When those pretensions were realized in the election of Julio Prestes, Vargas and his colleagues went out in successful revolt, not as a party or an alliance but simply in a personalist movement with, at the most, a rationale of state rivalries.

The opportunistic Vargas had at least one element of consistency. He wanted to bring a spirit of nationalism to Brazil -- he wanted people to think of themselves as Brazilians first and only secondarily as mineiros, paulistas, cariocas, or gauchos. This logically should have suggested the dredging of national party channels for currents of politics. It did not so happen. The personalistic and chameleonic Vargas, to change the figure, preferred to be able to play the tunes by ear without being bound to the score of party operation and discipline. One of the superficially curious things about the decade and a half of Vargas dictatorship was that he made so little use of party mechanisms and possibilities, unlike Perón in Argentina or Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. The explanation is to be found partly in the differing personalities of the three dictators, partly in the sorry experience Vargas had in the early 1930's with national party vehicles in Brazil.

The first half of that decade saw two parties arise with potential mass bases: the Integralistas on the Right and the Communists on the Left. Each was personalistic in its leadership (Plinio Salgado and Luiz Carlos Prestes, respectively) and each largely disregarded state lines and sought its membership and influence in Brazil as a whole. Vargas flirted with each in turn but at different times fought bravely and bitterly with each. The Communists gave him the ostensible excuse for his coup of November, 1937 (as he did not fail to note in the new constitution's curious preamble), by which he began a completely personalistic rule and as an incident to which he dissolved all political parties.

Neither federalism nor political parties won any rounds between 1937 and 1944. The symbolic burning of state flags, the appointment of federal interventors to rule the states, and the generally great concentration of authority in the hands of national executive officials meant that the federal principle was almost abandoned, at least de facto, for the time being. The Communist party was supple and tenacious enough simply to go underground but the more brittle Integralista organization suffered a blow from which it did not recover. The flimsy Conservative Republican and National Democratic groups had permanently disappeared.

Rising discontent forced Vargas early in 1945 to promise presidential elections for late that year. Had he not appointed his unpopular brother as Rio police chief he might have lived politically to serve out his term, though many Brazilians were fearful of another coup such as that which forestalled the scheduled election of January, 1938 -- the naming of brother Benjamin seemed a straw in the wind.

It is a tribute to Brazilian resiliency and good sense and also to Vargas' decision to make a virtue out of necessity that the elections of 1945 went through despite the ouster of the dictator and the immediately subsequent political uncertainty. Now, at long last, Vargas' nationalizing efforts seemed to have borne party fruit. Half a dozen parties sprang up to take part in the 1945 campaign. Some of them had only localized strength and in one case, that of the Social Progressive party, the limitation was effectively only to the state of São Paulo. In at least two instances, however, parties became active on a genuinely national basis. These two were the Social Democratic party and the National Democratic Union.

It must be admitted that in both instances the parties were essentially the groups following the two major candidates as individuals, respectively, General Eurico Dutra and Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. Personalism was an important aspect of the campaign; nonetheless, party organization and activity as such immediately achieved a far greater respectability and recognition than had ever before been true. There were also the Christian Socialists, the Republican party, the Labor party, the Communists, and the Agrarians, some of which groups, however, supported one or the other of the two major candidates. The Communist party was declared illegal in May, 1947, but it was scarcely inconvenienced by its subsequent sub rosa operation pending a later hoped-for legalization.

Now, too, Vargas saw fit to begin riding a party vehicle. The Labor party became a devoted pro-Vargas group, although he never turned to it with the verve and fanfare with which Perón made use of his self-named Peronista party in Argentina. Even in the instance of the highly personalistic Labor party, organization was perfected sufficiently that it could survive Vargas' suicide in 1954. It is interesting to speculate what effect a sudden disappearance of Adhemar de Barros of São Paulo from the political scene might have on the fortunes of the Social Progressive party, which thus far has operated almost entirely as his personal property.

By the time of the presidential campaign of 1950 the instability and uncertainty of the party pattern had become obvious. The major organizations still remained the Social Democratic party (PSD) and the National Democratic Union (UDN) but as many as a dozen parties were represented in the congress. The multiplicity of parties is increased, of course, by the existence of proportional representation, inasmuch as members of the chamber of deputies (though not the senate) are chosen by that method. In terms of such party organization and discipline as were reflected by the campaign of 1950, the PSD and the UDN still dominated the scene. Results of the election, however, confounded any conclusion that organization and discipline might have advanced very far. The "queremistas" ("we-wanters") were extremely vocal about their wish for a return of Vargas to power and Dom Getulio's acceptance of the nomination of the Brazilian Labor party (PTB) provided a nominal vehicle for his triumphal ride through the campaign.

Vargas' margin of a million and a half over UDN candidate Gomes and of two million over PSD (and "government") candidate Cristiano Machado marked a great personal triumph for the charismatic little man from Rio Grande do Sul. It also, in terms of the hard realities of operation of the government, meant the immediate necessity of organizing a party coalition in the congress.

The presidential election of 1955 saw some of the inconsistencies of Brazilian party relationships maintained. The PSD, UDN, and PTB kept their positions as the strongest parties but again the diffusion of voting was such that a coalition in congress was necessary, this time between the PSD and PTB. The successful candidate, Juscelino Kubitschek of the PSD, found, as had his recent predecessors, that the absence of strong, undivided, and majority party support was a considerable political embarrassment at times.

Party positions and shifts in the campaign of 1960 represented confusion confounded. For the fourth presidential election in succession the major candidates received support from more than one recognized party. For the third successive election a vice president was chosen who was not a member of the same party as the successful presidential candidate. Brazilian electoral law, curiously, permits election of president and vice president from different party tickets, an invitation to confusion which in the United States was remedied (for different historical reasons, of course) by the twelfth amendment to the Constitution; in Brazil, too, a vice president, though not a president, may be immediately re-elected.

A brief outline of the currents and cross-currents of the 1960 campaign is perhaps in order if for no other reason than to delineate the almost institutionalized confusion which prevailed. By early in 1960 the two principal candidates had emerged, Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott, long a politically oriented high-ranking army officer, and Jânio Quadros, former governor of São Paulo. Lott, as war minister and a career army man, had not had traditional party ties but received the nomination of the PSD and PTB. Quadros, although he had supported the UDN presidential candidate in 1955, had been elected a federal deputy from Paraná on the PTB ticket as recently as 1958; at earlier stages he had been elected to offices on the ticket of the Christian Democratic party (PDC); in 1953 he was elected mayor of the city of São Paulo as an independent over an eight-party coalition and the following year he was chosen as governor of São Paulo state as the official candidate of only two small groups, the National Labor party (PTN) and the Brazilian Socialist party (PSB). His campaign for the presidency in 1960 was supported primarily by the UDN although he was officially the candidate of the PTN and PDC; he also received support from the smaller Republican (PR) and Liberation parties (PL) and from dissidents in still other parties.

Thus, neither of the major candidates was a deeply rooted party stalwart. Quadros made almost a fetish of independence of party controls, and had indeed antagonized the UDN party president when he temporarily withdrew from the campaign late in 1959.

Although João ("Jango") Goulart, a former political protégé of Vargas and long a leader of the PTB, was nominally the vice-presidential running mate of Lott on the PSD ticket, he tacitly encouraged independent efforts to cross party lines and organize support for a "Jan-Jan" coalition, i.e., Jânio Quadros for president and "Jango" Goulart for vice president.

The election itself on October 3, 1960, gave proof that the campaign had been personalistic in nature more than party dominated. Of a qualified electorate of 14,529,188, a total of 12,586,354 ballots actually were cast; this represented a very respectable 87.31 per cent of the eligible voters. The presidential vote was:

Quadros	5,636,623 (44.78%)
Lott	3,846,825 (30.56%)
de Barros	2,195,709 (17.44%)

Quadros' lead was thus a million and three quarters over Lott and almost three and a half million over de Barros. The number of blank and nullified votes for president were, respectively, 433,391 and 473,806. The three respective party vice-presidential running mates of the major candidates drew the following votes:

Milton Campos	4,237,719 (33.66%)
João Goulart	4,547,010 (36.12%)
Fernando Ferrari	2,137,382 (16.97%)

Blank and nullified votes cast in the vice-presidential balloting were, respectively, 1,305,865 and 358,378. (An interesting footnote to long-standing Brazilian practice in personal nomenclature is that a vote tabulation officially released by the Ministry of Foreign Relations identified two of the presidential candidates -- though not Marshal Lott -- by their first names: "Jânio" and "Adhemar.")

The almost 45 per cent of the vote won by Quadros (47.85 per cent if only the valid ballots are counted) was substantially larger than the approximately 35 per cent of the vote won by the far more strongly party-attached victor, Kubitschek, in 1955. The mere fact of the considerable percentage shifts in party votes for the two major national offices, i.e., the wholesale tendency of voters to cross party lines in their presidential and vice-presidential selections, indicates the tenuous hold that party organizations had on the electorate and, for that matter, on the candidates themselves. The fluid nature of the situation is further underscored by the party combinations and coalition tickets employed in 1960, as, indeed, had been almost regularly done previously. Lott and Goulart represented different parties, and, though the situation was not identical with the winning ticket, it, too, represented anything but stability and regularity. Milton Campos, the vice-presidential running mate with Quadros, was a party "regular" (he had formerly been a UDN party president) but Quadros would have been the first to deny his own complete allegiance and subordination to the party.

The post-election political scene in Brazil has been characterized by additional confusion in the party picture. Quadros' cabinet selections included representatives of various parties and factions, some of them little known in Brazilian politics. The president has exhibited a characteristic independence of control by party machinery either in or out of the congress. His relationships with his vice president have at times been strained -- after all, their presence together in the government is purely fortuitous. The former insubstantial coalition between the PSD and the PTB has been dissolved. Dissatisfied groups within various ones of the major parties, notably the PTB, are challenging the traditional leadership of those parties for control. This dissidence, a sort of Young Turk movement in some cases, further footnotes the lack of effective party discipline. Strong suggestions have been made that the collision of party planets in the chaotic Brazilian political cosmos may break off larger or smaller chunks which will then go into orbit on their own as new parties. Indeed, even before the 1960 election it was proposed by a UDN official that a new party should be formed of the diverse elements supporting Quadros; there has been no suggestion from Jânio at any time, however, that he would welcome such a move.

The role of the Communist party in the recent political drama has been a mixed one. Still technically illegal, its activity has scarcely been handicapped by that fact. In the 1960 campaign the party and its undisputed leader, Prestes, threw their support to Lott and while this was not to be regarded as a kiss of death for him, its value in terms of vote-getting was doubtful. In fact, several recent elections in addition to that for the presidency in 1960 have helped

destroy the previously carefully cultivated myth that a candidate could not win without Communist support. If backing by the Communists of a career military man in 1960 be considered anomalous it must be remembered that Prestes himself had been an army officer in his early adult life and that there had frequently been ties between Communists and army officers; indeed, the alleged Communist "infiltration" of the army in the early 1950's became almost a national scandal. By May, 1961, Prestes was laying plans to try to register the Communist party under another name to restore its ability to nominate candidates on its own; he had apparently abandoned hope that Quadros would permit the early legalization of the party, as he had previously given some implication of doing.

A number of broad questions are pertinent insofar as any analysis of the present and future impact of the Brazilian party system is concerned. Where does the actual decision-making function rest? What occupational or economic allegiances do the various parties have and what changes does such a pattern show? Do parties show signs of broadening their bases and becoming truly mass parties? If this latter change does occur, what will be its relationship to Brazilian federalism?

Colonel Wyckoff has aptly suggested that the components of Brazilian political society can be considered as three in number: the decision-makers, the people in general, and the interest groups. The decision-making process is not, of course, as highly institutionalized as is the case in many countries where the democratic experience has been longer than in Brazil. Brazil shares, however, with virtually all other Latin American states, a situation in which the president stands out far above all others as the most important location of the decision-making power. This exercise of such an executive function is less clearly defined and recognized politically in Brazil than in many Spanish-American states but it is nonetheless there. The lack of clarity of definition may be due in part to the deep-rooted Brazilian intolerance of superciliousness or pomposity on the part of rulers -- Vargas strutted far less than Perón or Trujillo, for example -- and in part to the subtle but important differences in the history of concentration of executive power in Brazil and Spanish America, differences running back through the independent and colonial periods and even into the pre-colonial.

The decision-making function and process spreads out in fan shape in what is in effect a continuum through descending hierarchical levels into the great body of the Brazilian bureaucracy. Bureaucratization of the government service is further developed in Brazil than in most parts of Latin America, not only because the service is numerically larger but also because of the tradition of protection and professionalization of the civil servants which has grown through the years. It is symptomatic that the study of public administration is better developed in Brazil than in probably any other Latin American country.

This dissemination and petrifaction (if the latter is not too strong a word) of the decision-making process naturally affects the functioning of political parties. Civil servants who are protected in their jobs are less subject to either blunt or subtle party pressures. A president who is as personalistic as Quadros obviously makes many decisions with little or no regard for party considerations.

The people, as such, remain in Brazil, as in all countries in relative degree, an amorphous group. Out of the rapidly growing Brazilian population are emerging, however, crystallized interest groups of greater variety and complexity. Politics used to be largely the monopoly of the established families. During the imperial period the "party" organization in a given locality was likely to inhere,

almost as a matter of "right," in some prominent family of the vicinity. The influence of the fazendeiros and what they stand for has not disappeared from the political scene but it is relatively much less than it was a hundred years ago.

Two traditional organized groups, often representing "vested" interests in Latin American political history, are the army (considered broadly) and the Church. Both have played a part in Brazilian politics, the army the greater of the two. The role of the Church can be quickly disposed of. Brazil is one of the most religiously tolerant of all Latin American countries and somewhat by the same token the Church as an institution has had less political influence than in many other countries of the area. The Christian Democratic party (PDC) is Church-oriented but has played only a small part on the party stage.

The absence of a heavy hand of militarism during most of Brazil's history logically should point toward a correspondingly small political influence exerted by the army. This has not been quite as true of that body as of the Church, however. Especially in the post-Vargas period the army has intervened, sometimes centrally, in politics. The Vargas dictatorship itself was not, of course, an army-based rule, and it was the army which finally forced him out in 1945. Despite the long activity of Brigadier Gomes, an air force officer, it is the army proper which, among the military services, has been most politically active. At least two reasons may be cited: the army's feeling, in Brazil as in some other Latin American countries, that it must be the defender and guarantor of the constitution, a feeling which admittedly has some actual constitutional foundation. It is probably not naive to ascribe this attitude to a neo-nationalism and patriotism on the part of professionally-trained military organizations jealous of their good names. At any rate, in Brazil it has led a theoretically above-the-battle sort of position to become paradoxically expressed by actual political interference of a major kind, as, for example, in the confused electoral picture in 1945-46 and again in 1955.

The other possible explanation of army activity in politics is a more personal one: the tradition growing out of tenentismo when in the early 1920's a number of young army officers -- Eduardo Gomes, João Alberto Lins de Barros, Luiz Carlos Prestes, among others -- became politically oriented and active. In recent years the names of Brigadier Gomes, Generals Lott, Távora, Estillac Leal, and Góes Monteiro, and others, have very often made political news.

If the political roles of the Church and the army both seem headed toward ultimate decline, those of new groups are just as apparently on the ascendant. These are groups growing out of the great ferment in Brazilian society. Not only is the population of Brazil increasing very rapidly -- its social complexity and integration is also progressing. The most obvious and politically important reflection of this change is the growth of the urban business, middle, and laboring classes. Manufacturers, merchants, and bankers are exercising increasing power in the explosively (but not always harmoniously) expanding Brazilian economy and they of course need no prompting to realize that gove: government policies and decisions can affect them at every turn. Their political mindedness is hence automatic and continuous.

Brazil's burgeoning industrialization naturally results in a growth of the labor force. The city of São Paulo has become one of the great manufacturing centers of the world; other Brazilian cities, though behind São Paulo, are highly important in their own right as industrial areas. More than two and a half million Brazilians were in 1955 affiliated with labor organizations, and this of course represented by no means all of the potential union membership. Organized labor has been slower than the business community to recognize the

rewards of political participation and its techniques have been less sophisticated but its political consciousness and activity are growing and doubtless will continue to do so.

In between the ostensible top and bottom of the socio-economic ladder is the rapidly growing middle class. Brazil is not the relatively most advanced Latin American illustration of middle-class domination of society -- Uruguay would undoubtedly fill that position -- but Brazil, along with Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and perhaps one or two others, is coming to be a country in which the middle class is a potent and growing social and economic force, even though it is still largely amorphous and its members are in many instances not willing to admit that they are "middle class." The prestige of the traditional aristocracy is still so great that de facto middle-class status is often hopefully considered even yet to be merely a way station on the road to final entry into the upper class. Francisco Matarazzo, the powerful and wealthy industrial and commercial entrepreneur (and foreign-descended!) would seem to provide a good Horatio-Alger example of how the gates of the oligarchy can be crashed. But the fact that the incumbent president was a school teacher no more than fifteen years ago is an indication that a middle-class representative can also make his weight felt.

The action of these three active classes, business, laboring, and middle, means that the political center of gravity is certainly in process of moving, if it has not already moved, from the fazenda to the city. Inasmuch as it is an urban rather than a rural locale which is the focus of the large part of social change which is taking place currently in Brazil, this shift of political emphasis is of immense importance. It means that political currents will not flow placidly through the static rural channels of the past but will now be conducted dynamically by way of urban-dominated courses in which change is normal and crisis almost as common. These trends date back in part to the Vargas revolution of 1930, but in part, also, they are post-World-War-II developments. To the extent that the latter date identifies the changes they are virtually simultaneous with the origin of Brazilian parties in their contemporary form.

Economic orientations or alignments of Brazilian parties are to be suggested only with caution, a caution born in part of the considerable flux in which parties now operate. In general both the PSD and the UDN draw support from the same conservative groups, although often the support of the PSD has been relatively more from the fazendeiro and that of the UDN from the urban business group. The philosophical differences between the two may not be as much as between the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. Nonetheless, the possibly apocryphal quip attributed years ago to Luiz Carlos Prestes was probably unjustified: that the PSD and UDN represented no greater differences than those between tweedledum and tweedleDutra. It is an interesting question whether or not the progressive advance in the fortunes of the UDN (finally winning the presidency, after a fashion, in 1960), accompanied by a corresponding decline in PSD strength may have any effect-cause relationship to a simultaneous shift of the political center of gravity from country to city.

The party generally regarded as third in strength, the PTB, is not a labor party in the sense that the British Labour party is, or at least was, in its early years. That is, it has no inherent or organic core relationship to the ranks of organized labor in Brazil. The PTB was the vehicle which Vargas used to ride back into the presidency in 1950. It was then largely his personal organization, and his protégé, João Goulart, fell heir to it, although Jango maintains far less hold over it than Vargas held charismatically but did not fully exploit. The PTB, both as regards membership and leadership, is geared

to a lower socio-economic stratum than are the PSD and the UDN. Its original members were in considerable measure the Brazilian counterpart of the descamisados whom Perón apotheosized so blatantly and successfully in Argentina.

The PSD is tied to Adhemar de Barros as an individual more than any other contemporary Brazilian party to any one man. The relationship is probably even more important than was that of the PTB to Vargas a decade ago and certainly is maintained with more sophistication and finesse. Originally limited almost entirely to São Paulo, the PSD now has considerable strength in the Northeast. De Barros does not now have São Paulo in the hollow of his hand. His vote in that state in 1960 almost doubled Lott's, but Quadros' vote almost doubled Adhemar's in that same key state.

Such minor parties as the Republican, the Socialist, the Liberation, the National Labor, and others, have in some instances a more explicit ideological position than do the major parties but the situation involving them is so fluid that they cannot easily or permanently be pinned to any single philosophical base. One of the interesting aspects of the portion of the political spectrum occupied by the minor parties is the rapidity with which they come and go. Since 1945 six have appeared and then disappeared and four others have successfully established themselves, although often with only localized strength.

The three top parties, PSD, UDN, and PTB, are now more nearly equal in general strength than was formerly the case, and this is perhaps a superficial straw showing the wind to be blowing more in the direction of stability -- but it is only a straw. The fact that a UDN-backed candidate now occupies the presidency was of course a matter of gratification to that party, and perhaps deflated a tendency on the part of some UDN lesser leaders to think in terms of military rather than electoral victory, but the inability of the party to bring Quadros into any degree of subordination continues to be frustrating to it.

Despite setbacks of various sorts, Brazilian parties are moving toward the establishment of more of a mass base in several instances. The PSD and UDN in 1945 both seemed reasonably well launched as national party organizations. By 1947 this national foundation appeared to be deteriorating and parties seemed to be gravitating back to a state basis of organization. The PTB, even though its strength has been greatest in Guanabara (formerly the federal district) and Rio Grande do Sul, had a good deal of the appearance of being a national movement -- because its hero, Vargas, was a national figure -- and hence partially reversed the retrogressive trend of the late 1940's. All three of the top parties now have voting and congressional strength in virtually all geographic sections of Brazil.

Another factor pointing toward the nationalization of the base of party organization and activity is the ease and frequency with which candidates of wide appeal may change the constituency from which they run for office. Quadros, as mentioned, did it as recently as 1958; Kubitschek, a mineiro, in May, 1961, announced his candidacy for the Senate in 1962 from Goiás (this would presumably be a stepping stone to another race for the presidency in 1965).

Another factor in the picture is the quite possible increase in the size of the Brazilian electorate. The fourteen and a half million eligible voters in 1960 constituted only 22 per cent of the whole population at that time. The potential voting population in 1958 -- those eighteen years of age or older -- was estimated to be 31,000,000; of this number some 17,000,000 were disfranchised, chiefly because of the literacy requirement for voting. Such a

highly knowledgeable authority as Dr. Orlando M. Carvalho, rector of the University of Minas Gerais, maintains that "It just isn't right to keep 17,000,000 Brazilians away from the polls principally because they can't read and write." He very possibly is a precursor of a movement to liberalize the suffrage, perhaps by a change to permit illiterates to vote by making a selection among party symbols as is done in Ceylon and some African states, which would result in enormously increasing the voting population. This would quite possible give certain parties more of a national appeal and base.

All of such changes would leave their mark on the present pattern of federalism in Brazil. At present, Brazil is, in terms of "politico-constitutionalism" in somewhat the same stage that the United States was in the 1780's and the years following. That is, the emphasis, because of long historic roots, was on the state -- mutual jealousies and rivalries among these units tended to vitiate or retard progress toward achieving a true nationalism. In the United States many decades ago economic growth and westward expansion combined to accelerate the putting of the individual state in proper perspective in relation to the country as a whole. At the same time, there came a gradual realization -- not completed until after, and as a consequence of, the Civil War -- that a federal regime had succeeded a confederate system, with a consequent enhancement of the position of the central government. In Brazil, economic growth (one might almost say economic explosion) is so obvious as not to need further comment. Westward expansion, at least psychologically as symbolized by Brasilia, is also an element in the picture. There is in Brazil no process exactly comparable to the substitution of a federalist for a confederate political psychology as gradually occurred in the United States in the early nineteenth century, but the nationalizing tendencies, especially as stimulated by Vargas, have at least partially supplanted the previous emphasis on state autonomy in a way which permits de facto comparison with what happened earlier in the United States.

Economic opportunity and possibilities are by no means equalized in the various Brazilian states and regions. Probably they never will be -- and this is also true in the United States. But this has not prevented in the United States the development of an attitude which, in the face of crisis, allows or even requires the various states, regions, and parties to close ranks and present a generally common and solid front. Probably it is not too much to expect the same sort of development in Brazil.

Brazil is a land of enormous ferment and enormous potential. Her people are characterized by a wholesome tolerance and sense of political balance. Some of her political institutions are young -- parties, for example, in their modern form -- but a practice of developing them within a democratic and civilian framework now seems firmly established. The day would appear to be past when an Hermes da Fonseca could set up a quasi-military regime or even when a Vargas could establish a civilian dictatorship. Parties need solidifying and rooting in the Brazilian landscape, but there seems no good reason why it will not come.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SPACE EXPLORATION

BY

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A paper for the American Political Science Association, 57th Annual Meeting September 6, 1961, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, St. Louis, Missouri, presented for the program on National Government, Panel 1: Fashioning a Public Policy for Space.

Contents:

1. Introduction.
2. The Nature of Space Exploration.
3. Policy, Program, and Budget.
4. Executive-Legislative Relations.
5. Interdepartmental Coordination and the Role of the Vice President.
6. Civilian-Military Relations.
7. Relation of Government and Industry.
8. Organization of Congress.
9. International Space Activities.
10. Government and Science and Political Science.

1. Introduction

Almost four years have now passed since the dramatic advent of the space age in October 1957. During this time the main features of a public policy for space exploration have been formulated and implemented by an active program with a strong supporting budget. Thus we are in a position to examine the substance of the policy, how it was fashioned, and the implications for the political science profession.

Few problems of government can compare in complexity and scope with those involved in man's venture into the new environment of outer space. And yet this effort is not altogether shrouded in mystery for those of us who are not scientists and engineers. In fact, the first questions considered in the formulation of policy involved the application of essentially familiar concepts of political science to a new field. Perhaps these concepts were not easily detected in the stream of scientific information on the orbiting data of satellites, discovery of radiation belts, and the thrust of launching vehicles. Nonetheless, our first problem was how to organize and administer our activities on earth so that we could carry on an effective space program. The scientific and technological nature of the subject should not obscure the fact that toward the end of 1957 and the beginning of 1958, a basic task lay in the field of government organization. That this situation was not widely understood at the time by the political science profession, however, may be inferred from the fact that the formulation of objectives and organizational arrangements was largely the work of elected officials and their staff members, lawyers, and scientists who found themselves playing a major role in government operations.

The governmental problems of outer space continue as ever present factors in the execution of the United States space program. In the future, the wealth of the background of political science may more easily be drawn upon in contributing toward an understanding and solution of these problems if our experience with space exploration is analyzed in accordance with some of our recognized patterns of approach; policy, program and budget; executive-legislative relations; interdepartmental coordination and the role of the Vice President; civilian-military relations; the relation of government to industry; the organization of Congress; the organization and administration of international space activities; government and science and political science. Such an approach requires, first of all, a knowledge of what is involved in man's attempt to explore the Universe.

2. The Nature of Space Exploration

Earth satellites were first sent into orbit during the International Geophysical Year (July 1, 1957 - December 31, 1958) when the scientists of 66 nations combined their efforts to extend our knowledge of earth and space. The IGY exemplified what could be accomplished through cooperation by the international scientific community whose peaceful objectives and projects were organized under the aegis of the International Council of Scientific Unions. Man's curiosity is a force which has always spurred him on to explore strange lands and unknown seas. Through the IGY, this compelling urge to investigate was organized on a worldwide basis with the advantage of new technological tools.

Success in achieving the objectives of space research depends upon the coordination of the requisite elements in the basic sciences: astronomy, chemistry, physics, physiology, and psychology. Specializations within these fields, of which nuclear physics and observational astronomy may be given as examples, must be combined with composite sciences such as astrophysics, meteorology, medicine, etc. These disciplines had been used prior to the space age to carry on research into the upper atmosphere by m eans of balloons and high altitude sounding rockets. The development of rockets capable of thrusting objects into outer space made possible the investigation of this new environment. The technological problems are challenging, and these also require the coordination of many different techniques for their solution. In fact, the motif of space exploration is coordination whether we consider science and technology, international relations, or the operation of national governments.

Although rocket technology had its inception in connection with missiles, the use of launching equipment for space research was for peaceful, scientific objectives which were international in character. The United States and the U.S.S.R. were the only nations at first capable of launching satellites and space probes, but the scientists and engineers of many nations participated in the worldwide network of tracking stations essential for receiving data which required evaluation. No country exercises sovereignty over sufficient territory for the adequate tracking of satellites which flash over national boundary lines in earth orbits whose time is usually measured in minutes.

The practical applications of space research can benefit the people of all nations. Meteorological satellites can improve predictions of the weather, foretelling the paths of hurricanes and effecting savings in life and property. Navigation satellites will provide an all-weather, day-and-night system whose accuracy, far exceeding existing methods, will benefit ships and planes. Communication satellites will provide instantaneous world-

wide coverage for messages, expanding our presently overloaded systems with facilities which are expected to be commercially profitable. To these and other tangible benefits, we must add a consideration of the various ways in which space exploration has had an impact upon society.

The sudden and dramatic success of the first earth satellite produced an immediate psychological effect upon world opinion. Space exploration became a symbol of national achievement in science and technology, and a factor in world politics. This, in turn, had the effect of accelerating the rate of developing space projects. The fact that most of these activities take place on the surface of our globe cannot be overemphasized. The personnel, resources, and facilities which make it possible to investigate the space environment are located on the earth. The tremendous cost of a full-scale space program is borne by the people who may also enjoy the practical results and make them available to mankind as a whole.

The implications for the defense of the Free World were obvious because the Soviet capability of launching spacecraft was evidence of ability to project intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The possibility of new weapons of mass destruction, directed toward the earth from outer space, has repercussions on defense preparedness. At the same time, the potential of reconnaissance satellites to warn of impending hostilities offers a new method of deterring military aggression. Both military and international "police" purposes have implications for disarmament proposals which require methods of inspection for effectiveness in preventing military attacks.

A complicating factor in the situation is the close relationship between the civilian and military uses of outer space. The peaceful purposes of space research in meteorology, navigation, and communications have military implications. This is not surprising inasmuch as weather prediction, accuracy in navigation, and swift communications play a part in daily life during times of peace, cold war, and war. But the difficulty of defining the difference between military and civilian purposes, in terms of international law, highlights the necessity of establishing the intent of the user of space vehicles before they are sent into outer space. The international scope of the subject is established by the fact that the whole world can be affected by the purposes of spacecraft; the cooperation of many nations is needed to obtain worldwide data; and numerous countries have scientific and technical skills to contribute toward space exploration.

Among the repercussions in the United States of the Soviet Union being first to orbit a man-made moon was a reappraisal of our educational system and its capacity to produce the needed number of scientists and engineers for the future. As in so many other areas of our culture, this self-analysis reflected strong public support in favor of a space program.

The significance of space activities, their potential for peaceful purposes contributing toward international cooperation as well as their possible use for military operations, confronted the government with the necessity of making decisions on a policy, program, and budget adequate to meet the future.

3. Policy, Program, and Budget

Most of the major component parts of our basic policy on space activities are set forth in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended (P. L. 85-568, 85th Congress). Considering the number of Federal agencies with interests in this field, and

the accelerated rate of progress in space science and technology, it is to be expected that our guidelines must be amplified and clarified when necessary. As new issues arise, augmenting policy decisions are made by the President or by agencies other than the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, particularly by the Department of Defense. Parts of several laws are applicable to the U.S. space program, but in general, an outline of the main provisions of the NASA Act will afford a background for beginning an examination of the political science concepts involved.

Declaring that the policy of the United States is that space activities should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind, and that our welfare and security require an adequate program and leadership, the law provides for the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Building its organization upon the nucleus of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and certain functions transferred from the Department of Defense, NASA is given authority "to plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities" except those primarily concerned with defense. The Department of Defense has responsibility over "activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems." Both agencies have authority to engage in research and development in this area.

Having divided responsibility for the U.S. space program between NASA and the Department of Defense, and considering the space-related interests of other agencies, the NASA Act provides for coordination by the National Aeronautics and Space Council, an advisory body to the President. In addition, a Civilian Military Liaison Committee was established to effect close cooperation between the Department of Defense and NASA. The implementation of these legislative provisions on coordination will be discussed in subsequent sections of this paper.

The NASA Act declares that it is our policy to cooperate with other nations, and groups of nations, in the peaceful applications of space technology, and toward the attainment of this objective NASA is authorized to carry on a program of international cooperation under the foreign policy guidance of the President. Among the other legal provisions, one in particular should be noted: that NASA is directed to conduct a program of public information.

The program for implementing these general policy directives is presented at the beginning of each year to the Congressional committees concerned with space activities. Government administrators, scientists, and engineers use colored picture slides and charts to explain current projects and future long-range plans. Distinguished panels of experts interpret scientific data in briefings which can be understood by laymen. The results are easily obtainable in the published hearings of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on NASA's Scientific and Technical Programs.

NASA's civilian-oriented space record is impressive in the production of scientific data on the solar system; the use of earth satellites for weather research and forecasting, communications, and navigation; the progress made in handling the problems of man in space; and in outstanding achievements in international cooperation.

Simultaneously, the space technology program of the Department of Defense is directed toward the use of new methods for improving the capabilities of the armed forces. Space applications to meet military requirements or strengthen our capacity for defense include

communications, navigation, satellite alarm systems which will detect the launching of ballistic missiles, and reconnaissance.

Ten other agencies have responsibilities for space-related projects and may influence the formation of significant aspects of our public policy. This situation requires analysis in terms of interdepartmental coordination, but it may suffice to mention, at this point, that the Atomic Energy Commission has charge of nuclear rocket propulsion, while the Weather Bureau of the Department of Commerce is engaged in the development of an operational meteorological satellite system.

The score of the number of satellites and space probes thus far successfully launched by the United States and the U.S.S.R. provides one form of index to achievements in this field. By August 21, 1961, the United States had launched 46 satellites of which 28 were still in earth orbit. Of 12 launched by the U.S.S.R., one was still orbiting the earth. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. had 2 satellites in solar orbit. The U.S.S.R. had one lunar impact, and sent two men into orbits of the earth; the United States had 2 suborbital man flights. It is significant that 12 of the U.S. satellites were still transmitting data to the earth, whereas the U.S.S.R. had none. The heavier payloads launched by the Soviet Union point to their advantage in big boosters, but the United States is ahead in the versatility of its multiple approach to the practical applications of space technology and the collection of scientific information.

We must look to the appropriations to determine the extent to which our policy and program are being supported by the budget. The appropriations for NASA rose from $523,575,000 in fiscal 1960 to $964,000,000 in fiscal 1961, and for the current fiscal year, 1962, the funds made available by Congress come to $1,671,750,000. Following the request of the Eisenhower administration on January 16, 1961 for a NASA appropriation of $1,109,630,000, the space program was twice reviewed by the new administration. The result was that President Kennedy, in a second State of the Union Message on May 25, 1961, asked for additional funds to achieve four national goals: (1) to land a man on the moon and return him safely to earth before 1970; (2) to speed up the nuclear-powered rocket program; (3) to accelerate space satellites for worldwide communications; and (4) to establish a satellite system for global weather observation at the earliest possible date.

Advancing the target dates for these goals required increases in the 1962 budgets of other agencies in addition to NASA, resulting in approximate totals for space and space-related projects for the Department of Defense of $1,079,400,000; for the AEC, $255,700,000; and for the Weather Bureau, $52,970,000. It is difficult to calculate the exact amounts for Defense Department space programs because some facilities are used for other defense purposes and some are shared with NASA, e.g., use of the launching facilities at the Atlantic and Pacific Missile Ranges. It is fair to say, however, that well over $3 billion is scheduled for expenditure on space activities during fiscal 1962. Estimating that an additional $7-$9 billion will be required over the next five years, President Kennedy made clear to the Congress on May 25th that

> ...this is a judgment which the Members of the Congress must finally make--let it be clear that I am asking the Congress and the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of action--a course which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs...I think every citizen of this country as well as the Members of Congress should consider the matter carefully

> in making their judgment... there is no sense in agreeing, or desiring, that the United States take an affirmative position in outer space unless we are prepared to do the work and bear the burdens to make it successful. ...

The response of the Congress was affirmative, marking one more milestone in the history of executive-legislative relations concerning the subject of outer space.

4. Executive-Legislative Relations

The support of the American people for a preeminent space program is reflected in the bipartisan nature of executive-legislative efforts, as well as in the unanimous votes or overwhelming approval by Congress of space legislation and appropriations. Following the November 1958 election when the Democratic Party won striking majorities in the House and Senate, there appeared to be some anxiety among our allies as to whether an impasse in the conduct of foreign policy might develop between the President and the Congress.

Secretary of State Dulles, on behalf of President Eisenhower, extended an invitation to the Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon B. Johnson, to represent the United States in the United Nations which was then considering a resolution to establish an Ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. On November 17, 1958, Senator Johnson addressed the UN Political and Security Committee:

> ... I am here to express to you the essential unity of the American people in their support of the goals of the resolution offered now in their name. This resolution is presented, as our system requires, by the representative of the executive branch of our Government. I speak here today at its request.
>
> The executive position in the United States is held by the Republican Party through the mandate of the people. I am here as a member of one house of the legislative branch, in which the majority position is held, also at the mandate of the people, by the Democratic Party, of which I am a member.
>
> These are distinctions. They are not, on this resolution, differences. On the goal of dedicating outer space to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind there are no differences within our Government, between our parties, or among our people. The executive and the legislative branches of our Government are together. ...

Thus, we have, within the context of space exploration, one of our outstanding examples of bipartisan foreign policy.

On the domestic side, however, some adjustments were required between the executive and legislative branches in formulating certain provisions of the NASA Act. The President and Congress easily agreed that the uses of space technology should be peaceful and promote international cooperation; that a new civilian space agency should be established; and

that essentially military space projects remain the responsibility of the Department of Defense. These proposals were originally formulated by officials in the executive branch, particularly in the White House, the Bureau of the Budget, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The draft legislation sent to the Congress by the President was based upon the philosophy of Introduction to Outer Space, a report by the President's Scientific Advisory Committee of which Dr. James R. Killian was chairman.

Meanwhile, the Congress had already undertaken its own investigation. The Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee began hearings on the missile/satellite situation in November 1957. Throughout the 1958 Congressional session, full-scale studies on the problems generated by the feasibility of space exploration were undertaken by the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics and the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration.

The differences which developed between the executive and legislative branches concerning the NASA Act were not rooted in divergent party views; rather, they emerged from different assumptions concerning the nature of the problem requiring solution. The draft legislation sent to the Hill made no provision for coordinating the work of all federal agencies engaged in space activities, nor did it provide for specific coordination between the two principals: the Department of Defense and NASA. The assumption was that the agencies would cooperate voluntarily and prevent unnecessary duplication. Congress preferred to establish by statute the National Aeronautics and Space Council and the Civilian Military Liaison Committee, which will be discussed in subsequent sections of this paper on interdepartmental coordination and civilian-military relations.

During the time when the President and Congress represented different political parties, some differences developed over the use of executive privilege to withhold certain information requested by Congressional committees. In the spring of 1959, Senator Symington chaired a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, holding hearings on "Governmental Organization for Space Activities." When the administrator of NASA, Dr. T. Keith Glennan, was questioned about the work of the Space Council, he replied that its deliberations were advisory to the President and therefore confidential. Dr. Glennan was requested to check back with the President to see if executive privilege could be removed from this area. The consequence was that Dr. Glennan wrote a letter to the chairman of the Subcommittee on April 7, 1959, stating that he had consulted with the President who maintained that the effectiveness of the advisory body required that its deliberations be confidential.

The Subcommittee concluded that Congress "has difficulty in obtaining information concerning overall space policies, plans, programs, and accomplishments." This led to the further conclusion that the only method by which Congress could obtain coordinated information on total U.S. space activities was by calling witnesses from all agencies involved and by seeking information in connection with the budget requests of each agency. The problem of how interdepartmental coordination for space activities was being carried on in the executive branch became a matter of increasing concern to the Congress.

5. Interdepartmental Coordination and the Role of the Vice President

The purpose of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, whose origin traces back to the legislative record of the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, is to

ensure coordination at the highest level of the efforts of major departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

Originally, the NASA Act provided that the membership of the Space Council must be composed of the President, who "shall preside", the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, an additional member appointed by the President from one of the Federal agencies, and not more than three distinguished private citizens. The Act directed the Council to advise the President concerning his defined duties; to survey significant activities, including policies, plans, programs, and accomplishments; to develop a comprehensive program of aeronautical and space activities to be conducted by agencies of the United States; to provide particularly for effective coordination between NASA and the Department of Defense; and to resolve differences between agencies.

The agencies whose space or space-related activities require coordination include

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Department of Defense
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Department of State
National Science Foundation
Department of Commerce:
- National Bureau of Standards
- Weather Bureau
- Coast and Geodetic Survey

Space Science Board (National Academy of Sciences - quasi-official)
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
Federal Communications Commission
United States Information Agency

From time to time other agencies may be involved, e.g., the Department of Justice in connection with patents and antitrust legislation, and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in its Telecommunications function.

The Space Council was authorized to employ a small professional staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This provision of the law was not implemented during the Eisenhower Administration, although an acting executive secretary was designated to serve.

Coordination between departments was often achieved by means of joint agreements for cooperation, an arrangement which still continues since this is a characteristic pattern used within the Government for any subject requiring mutual effort by two or more agencies. A joint Nuclear Propulsion Office was established by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Administrator of NASA. The Pioneer III and Pioneer IV space probes were directed by NASA with the Army as agent. NASA and the National Science Foundation cooperated in supporting the Space Science Board. Tiros I, the satellite for weather research, involved cooperation mainly between NASA and the Weather Bureau. The international tracking system is an example of cooperation between NASA and the Department of State, an essential arrangement when bilateral and multilateral agreements are required for the establishment and operation of facilities in foreign countries.

By the spring of 1959, there was evidence of misunderstanding by the government

administrators concerning the meaning of the legal requirement for "a comprehensive program of aeronautical and space activities to be conducted by the agencies of the United States." This situation was revealed in the testimony given to the Subcommittee on Governmental Organization for Space Activities, Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. The Subcommittee considered that lack of comprehensive, overall direction would result in weaknesses in liaison and coordination, making it difficult for Congress to authorize and appropriate funds in accordance with current and long-range considerations. To dispel the confusion, the Subcommittee's report of August 25, 1959 defined the intent of Congress:

> Within the context of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 "a comprehensive space program" means a planned course of action, present and future, designed to achieve all the objectives set forth in the declaration of policy by taking into account the needs and requirements of all civilian and military agencies engaged in space activities.

Nevertheless, the title in the NASA Act on "Coordination of Aeronautical and Space Activities" was not popular in the Executive Branch, and in January 1960, President Eisenhower asked that the Space Council be abolished. Such an amendment passed the House of Representatives on June 9, 1960, but the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences issued a Memorandum on August 31, 1960 stating that such action was clearly not urgent, inasmuch as the Space Council had held only one meeting during the year and no future meetings were planned. The Committee pointed out that it was only a short time before January 20, 1961 when a new President would take office, that he might have different views on the matter, and his freedom of action should not be restricted.

President Kennedy decided to activate the Space Council, and on April 25, 1961 the NASA Act was amended so that the Vice President became Chairman, the other members being the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the NASA Administrator, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The President is no longer a statutory member of the Space Council nor are his functions enumerated in the law. The Council, which is located in the Executive Office of the President, is to advise and assist the President "as he may request with respect to the performance of functions in the aeronautics and space field." These functions are similar to those originally spelled out as duties of the President, except that the wording emphasizes that cooperation should be provided "among all departments and agencies of the United States."

A civilian executive secretary was appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and a specific appropriation was made for the work of the Space Council.

The amendment of the NASA Act had the effect of enhancing the role of the Vice President. His statutory position on the National Security Council is that of a member, but his chairmanship of the Space Council enables him to make a significant contribution to interdepartmental coordination. The President has frequently referred to the role of the Vice President in space activities, and among the requests for advice from the Space Council is that concerning the relations of government and industry on space communications.

During the same period when the Space Council was being revived as an instrument of interdepartmental coordination, the President abolished numerous other coordinating mechanisms, notably the Operations Coordinating Board. The Federal Council for Science and Technology was retained, however, with responsibility for improving coordination, planning, and management of scientific and technical programs of the Federal Government. The different methods which have been, and are being, tried for interdepartmental coordination afford an opportunity for political scientists to make comparative studies of alternative procedures for solving problems of liaison and cooperation.

6. Civilian-Military Relations

The relation between NASA and the Department of Defense is unique in civilian-military developments. The problem is not altogether one of civilian control in the ordinary sense of that term because both agencies are operated under civilian administrators. The problem is how best to manage an enterprise which is separate in some respects, while in others, maximum cooperation is required for the effective use of personnel, facilities and funds.

Mention has already been made of the close connection between the scientific, peaceful uses of outer space and their implications for military operations and defense. Similarly, military research and development may yield valuable applications for civilian purposes. Some overlapping interests are inevitable, but in a program costing billions of dollars, an essential objective is the elimination of duplication. Prior to the establishment of NASA, it was estimated that between 75 and 90 percent of U.S. space activities were located in the Department of Defense. When the decision was made to have a civilian-oriented program, some of the space functions and facilities of the Department of Defense were transferred to NASA.

Congress sought to provide a method of interagency cooperation by means of the Civilian Military Liaison Committee, a body whose legislative history began in the bill reported by the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. The Chairman of the CMLC was to be appointed by the President and representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and NASA were to serve on the Committee. The first Chairman said that the CMLC had turned out to be little more than a "post office." In practice, the CMLC was bypassed because cooperation between the two agencies was handled by top officials at one level and by operating specialists at other levels where mutual interests required joint efforts by experts on space science and technology. The weaknesses of the CMLC were first made public in Congressional hearings during the spring of 1959, and the President issued a revised charter to strengthen the organization on July 1, 1959. The Chairman resigned in April 1960, however, and the CMLC fell into disuse.

President Eisenhower's request to the Congress to abolish the CMLC was part of the same proposal in which he expressed a desire to eliminate the Space Council. The House of Representatives voted to replace the CMLC with an "Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board", but the Senate took no action. The Bureau of the Budget, NASA, and the Department of Defense were opposed to the creation of the Board by statute. On June 28, 1960, however, a joint Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board was established by agreement between NASA and the Department of Defense. The co-chairmen of the Board are the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Deputy Administrator of NASA. The function of this Board is to "review planning to avoid duplication; coordinate

activities of common interest; identify problems requiring solution by either NASA or DOD and insure a steady exchange of information."

There was tacit acceptance of this situation by the Congress, and on May 10, 1961 an Administration proposal for abolishing the CMLC was referred to the appropriate committees for consideration.

Questions concerning the balance between military and civilian space efforts were raised following the "Report to the President-Elect of the Ad hoc Committee on Space", of which Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner was Chairman. Dr. Wiesner was subsequently appointed by President Kennedy to be Chairman of the Science Advisory Committee and Chairman of the Federal Council for Science and Technology. On March 9, 1961, the Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Hon. Overton Brooks, wrote President Kennedy that

> I cannot fail to take cognizance of the fact that emphasis on the military uses of space is being promoted in a quasi-public fashion within the defense establishment. Nor can I ignore the suggestion, implicit in the unabridged version of the Wiesner report that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration role in space is purely one of scientific research and that the military role in the development of space systems will be predominant... I feel obliged to point out that in view of the recent Defense Department decision to concentrate all military space research in a single service, this question of civilian preeminence in space exploration becomes paramount.

Chairman Brooks pointed out that the NASA Act "makes it crystal clear that the prime American mission in space is toward peaceful purposes."

In his reply of March 23, 1961, President Kennedy reassured Mr. Brooks that

> ...there is no basic disagreement between us. It is not now, nor has it ever been, my intention to subordinate the activities in space of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to those of the Department of Defense... Furthermore I have been assured by Dr. Wiesner that it was not the intention of his space task force to recommend the restriction of the NASA to the area of scientific research in space... In making policy decisions on such programs, I intend to rely heavily on the advice of the Vice President, based on his invaluable experience with the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.

The internal situation within the Pentagon to which Hon. Overton Brooks referred concerned the coordination of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The 1958 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 strengthened the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense and created the post of Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The Director is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on scientific and technical matters. He has authority to direct and control research and engineering projects which, in the opinion of the Secretary, require centralized manage-

ment. The head of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) reports to the Director who also has charge of the cooperative arrangements which are being worked out between the Department of Defense and NASA.

The policy adopted by the Department of Defense for the development of space systems permits each military department, under conditions prescribed by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to conduct preliminary research related to its assigned function, but beyond that proposals must be submitted to the Director. Responsibility for space research, development, test, and engineering is assigned to the Air Force, and only in "unusual circumstances" will an exception be made by the Secretary of Defense or his Deputy.

It is evident that civilian-military relations in the conduct of space programs, affecting both national and international affairs, afford an unusual opportunity for research and analysis by political scientists.

7. Relation of Government and Industry

Political scientists could find no more fascinating and intriguing problem than that of fashioning a public policy for space communications. Every concept of political science analyzed elsewhere in this paper is applicable to the achievement of a worldwide satellite communications system. Indeed, the combination of factors involved in this effort -- scientific, technological, economic, international, and political -- will undoubtedly lead to a series of policies as we progress in developing this new enterprise.

The United States scored a triumph in demonstrating the feasibility of communications satellites at a time when existing international systems of transmitting information by telephone, telegraph, radio, and television, are overloaded, and future estimates indicate a tremendous increase in the demand for global communications.

The commercial possibilities raised the issue of who should own and operate the satellite system. One alternative was U.S. government ownership and operation. A second method was ownership and operation by the United Nations. A third answer to the question was private ownership emphasizing the role of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Still a fourth alternative was a joint organization of several domestic and foreign companies; and this plan, in turn, created an additional issue of whether the joint venture should be carried on only by the international common carriers or should also include equipment manufacturers. Each of these alternatives contained some provision for furnishing communications services to other users.

On June 15, 1961, President Kennedy requested the Vice President, as Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, to study the "government-wide policy recommendations for bringing into optimum use at the earliest practicable time operational communications satellites." The President indicated that consideration should be given to a global system; that the highest priority be accorded "public interest objectives" and

> Policy proposals should include recommendations not only as to the nature and diversity of ownership and operation of communications systems and parts thereof, but also proposed objectives. Effective utilization of both our public and private resources needs to be

assured, as well as close cooperation with other countries and their communications systems. Continuing coordination of the governmental agencies responsible for regulatory, space, military, and other aspects of this field is essential.

The procedure followed by the Space Council in assisting the President to develop such a policy was described by the Executive Secretary, Dr. E. C. Welsh, in testimony given before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Small Business Committee, August 11, 1961. It is seldom that the steps in a policymaking process have been made public in so clear and concise a statement:

1. Prior to its public release, the President's letter of June 15 was distributed to the heads of interested agencies;

2. Representatives of the following agencies were invited to meet with me to work out draft policy language: State, Defense, NASA, AEC, Justice, FCC, OCDM, Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of the President's Scientific Adviser;

3. Various policy questions were distributed from time to time so that the participants would be ready to discuss them and suggest language at the next meeting. After a series of such meetings, I drafted a working paper, which reflected significant suggestions and proposals previously received from the staff participants. During this period, suggestions received from various non-government sources were also studied.

4. On July 5, a meeting was held, at which time a word-by-word examination of the draft working paper was made.

5. Modifications in that paper were adopted by unanimous agreement and the paper was circulated for internal coordination in the respective staffs. A few additional editorial changes were adopted as a result of this re-examination.

6. A formal Space Council meeting was held on July 14. The Vice President presided. In addition to the statutory members of the Council, those who attended and participated in the meeting included the Attorney General, the Chairman of the FCC, and the Deputy Director of OCDM.

7. Unanimous agreement was reached in the Council meeting. On instruction from the Vice President, the recommendations were delivered to the President.

8. The President evaluated the recommendations and made a public announcement of the policy on July 24.

The Executive Secretary has been requested to work with the interested agencies in order to maintain a continuing follow-up on communication

Satellite problems and policy, and also to give specific attention to the question of patent policy and how if affects or may affect the communication satellite picture.

The Statement of the President on Communication Satellite Policy was issued on July 24, 1961, nine days after policy recommendations had been requested from the Space Council. The President again invited all nations to take part in a communication satellite system in the interest of world peace. He pointed out that both the U.S. civil and military programs are in the research and development stage, and that as yet no commitments between government and private industry had been made on an operational system.

The policy enunciated by the President favors private ownership and operation of that part of the worldwide communications system for which the United States is responsible, provided certain requirements are met. At the earliest practicable date, a global system covering even non-profitable portions of the world, is to provide opportunities for foreign participation. The system is to be used by authorized communications carriers on a non-discriminatory and equitable basis. Communications are to be economical and effective competition is to be achieved by competitive bidding, the structure of ownership or control, "full compliance with the antitrust legislation" and governmental regulatory controls.

The responsibilities of the U.S. Government, in addition to regulatory controls, are to encourage research and development; supervise international negotiations and agreements; control launchings of U.S. spacecraft; provide effective use of the radio-frequency spectrum; discontinue electronic functioning of satellites when necessary; provide technical assistance to newly-developing countries; and join with other nations in examining the role of the United Nations and the International Telecommunication Union in international space communications. Furthermore, the policy is to "make use of the commercial system for general governmental purposes and establish separate communications satellite systems when required to meet unique government needs which cannot, in the national interest, be met by the commercial system."

All agencies are to cooperate with the Space Council in order to assure continuing policy coordination and recommendations concerning compliance with the policy.

Understandings between the government and private industry are now in the process of negotiation by several federal agencies and private companies whose interest in space communications is matched in the Congress by a number of committees which have held hearings on the subject.

8. Congressional Committee Organization and Jurisdiction

Space exploration created some puzzling problems of committee organization and jurisdiction for the Congress. When the comprehensive nature of space activities was revealed in the hearings held by the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee toward the end of 1957, it became evident that the subject matter of major component parts of a United States space program cut across the jurisdictional lines of several standing committees of the House and Senate. A different combination of the substantive committees could be involved with each new piece of space legislation, in addition to the regular processes of the Committees on Appropriations.

The complicated parliamentary situation which might arise in the referral of bills to the committees was recognized and became a factor in the selection of the fifteen members appointed to the Special Committee on Space and Astronautics established by the Senate on February 6, 1958. For the most part, the Special Committee was composed of the chairmen and ranking minority members of the standing committees which had a logical interest in space exploration: Appropriations, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Government Operations, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The importance attached to space exploration by the Congress was indicated by the election as committee chairman of the Majority Leader of the Senate, Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson.

The House of Representatives created the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration on March 5, 1958, with thirteen members whose permanent committee assignment also largely reflected the possible extension of their interests to space or space-related subjects. As in the case of the Senate, the Majority Leader, Honorable John W. McCormack, became chairman.

The future organization of Congress for handling legislative space matters was a task for internal consideration rather than one whose solution could reasonably be sought through the process of public testimony. Four alternative methods of committee organization and jurisdiction were analyzed by the committee members and staff in terms of their advantages and disadvantages:

1. Division of Jurisdiction on Outer Space Among Present Standing Committees of the House and Senate

2. Creation of Separate Standing Committees on Outer Space in the House and Senate

3. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy To Absorb Jurisdiction over Outer Space Problems

4. Proposal for a Joint Committee on Aeronautics and Space.

DIVISION OF JURISDICTION ON OUTER SPACE AMONG PRESENT STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE

Advantages	Disadvantages
The committees on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations, would take up large subject areas involved in outer space. The remaining aspects could be referred according to their primary subject matter to the Committees on Government Operations, Judiciary, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as appropriate.	There would be no focal point in the Congress to consider the whole United States' program on space exploration, and the resulting fragmentation would deprive Congress of an organizational "watchdog" which could ensure concentration on a program which is likely to run into billions of dollars.
The problem of assignment of members to a new Committee would not be raised. (This is more of a problem in the Senate than the House where there are approximately 4-1/3 members for every Senator, and most House members have only one committee assignment.)	Some of the standing committees might consider their workload already too heavy and be reluctant to give this complicated subject their attention; or tend to relegate outer space to subcommittees which would have neither the status given the subject in the Executive Branch nor that of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
An issue would be avoided if some standing committees proved to be unwilling to relinquish or share jurisdiction over subject areas which are of primary concern both to them and to an outer space committee.	The result would be dispersed authorizations for segments of outer space programs with no assurance that the total national interest would result from the sum of these parts.

Advantages

Separate standing committees preserve the bicameral legislative system which often results in improvement in legislation as it undergoes dual scrutiny.

It is an advantage to executive agencies engaged in scientific and technical matters to be able to build up an understanding of their operations among as many members of Congress as possible. A broad base of legislative knowledge also results in greater public understanding of the issues involved in science and technology.

The temporary House and Senate committees */ created to deal with problems of space exploration could be transformed into permanent standing committees, continuing the advantageous concept of cross-membership with existing standing committees with jurisdictions related to outer space, e.g., Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations, Government Operations, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Any problems of overlapping committee jurisdiction could also be handled by joint hearings, a usage already followed, on occasion, in such matters as national defense and foreign relations.

Disadvantages

It is more time-consuming for officials of executive agencies to present their legislative problems and authorization requests for funds to two separate committees rather than one joint committee.

Congressional professional staff assistance will be required to handle scientific and technological problems and their relation to political and economic matters; two separate committee staffs would be more expensive than a joint staff serving both the House and Senate. Two separate staffs would also be more difficult to recruit in an area where qualified personnel is scarce.

Separate standing committees would still be faced with the problem of working out their relationships with established permanent standing committees whose jurisdiction include space-related matters such as communications, foreign relations, weather, patents, and questions of indemnity.

*/ House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration
Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY TO ABSORB JURISDICTION OVER OUTER SPACE PROBLEMS

Advantages

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is already established and operates with a high degree of success in a scientific and technical field.

The scientific, engineering, national, and international aspects of outer space are sufficiently similar to those of atomic energy to conclude that it is logical for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to expand into this new area.

Only one professional Congressional staff would be required to service both the House and Senate.

The assumption is that the time of officials in the Executive Branch would be saved because they would have to testify before only one joint committee.

Disadvantages

Space exploration involves many more factors than those specifically related to atomic energy: satellite communications systems, weather prediction and control, navigation, international tracking systems and evaluation of data. The main common interest between atomic energy and outer space is that of nuclear propulsion of rockets. Thus a very considerable expansion of the present jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy would be involved if it were to cover major matters concerning space activities. This, in turn, would lead to increasing the number of Committee members as well as the professional staff.

Referring outer space problems to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the legislature would be equivalent to expanding the Atomic Energy Commission to include outer space in the Executive Branch. No such proposal has been made; the recommendation of the Executive Branch is to expand the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics into a new civilian space agency, leaving military space missions with the Department of Defense.

The new space agency (NASA) would still have to report not only to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but also to other committees in order to have its total executive jurisdiction covered.

PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICS AND SPACE

Advantages

A joint Committee on Aeronautics and Space would provide one focal point in the Congress for legislation, authorization of appropriations,and the exercise of continuous watchfulness over the development of space activities in the Executive Branch.

Time and money would be saved by having one professional staff and one major place where executive agencies could present legislative problems on space exploration.

Congressional organization would be more nearly patterned in accordance with the organization of space activities in the Executive Branch,thus paralleling the successful experience of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in dealing with the Atomic Energy Commission. Outer space would be given the same Congressional status as that created for atomic energy.

Any overlapping between the Joint Committee on Aeronautics and Space and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or the permanent standing committees could be handled by concurrent referral of such matters to the committees concerned, by cross-membership of committees engaged in studying similar problems,or by joint hearings.

Disadvantages

A Joint Committee would not have the advantages of the bicameral legislative system which provides more time for the prudent consideration of proposals before the enactment of law.

The membership of a Joint Committee would be smaller than that of two new permanent standing committees,and thus fewer members of the House and Senate would have an opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of space activities through their committee service.

A Joint Committee on Aeronautics and Space would still be faced with the necessity of working out its relationships with other standing committees such as Armed Services,Judiciary,Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations. (This problem of overlapping jurisdiction and the necessity for coordination,common both to the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government,is created by the inherent nature of space activities which require the assemblage of many factors for success. The difficulty a Joint Committee would face is not, therefore,unique; the same situation would be faced by any committee arrangement,including that of two new standing committees on outer space. Sometimes,however,the proposal for a Joint Committee is advanced as if its singleness of organization would automatically result in solving problems of coordination and in saving the time of executive officials in testifying before committees.

At one point in the legislative history, there was a strong probability that provision for a Joint Committee on Aeronautics and Space would be contained in the bill which was ultimately enacted as Public Law 85-568, 85th Congress, H.R. 12575, July 29, 1958. In reporting the legislation to the House on the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration recommended a joint Congressional Committee. The idea was abandoned by the House, however, in favor of amending its rules to provide for a separate Committee on Science and Astronautics composed of 25 members (enlarged in 1961 to 28 members).

The Senate version of the space legislation actually provided for a Joint Committee on Aeronautics and Space, but when the matter was considered by the Conference Committee the Senate conferees acceded to the expressed preference of the House for a separate standing committee. The Senate then amended its own rules and established the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences with 15 members chosen primarily because of their membership on other Senate committees with overlapping interests in space exploration.

The result is that there are two standing committees whose titles reflect the difference in their jurisdictions. The House committee has broad jurisdiction over science, including but not confined to astronautics; whereas the Senate committee, as its name implies, has responsibility for aeronautical and space sciences.

In creating the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, certain functions of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce were transferred, after consultation with their chairmen, to the new committee. Primary legislative jurisdiction was given to the Committee on Science and Astronautics over outer space activities as well as certain scientific agencies: the Bureau of Standards, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and the National Science Foundation. The Committee was also assigned responsibility for scientific research and development, and science scholarships.

The new Senate Committee has jurisdiction over the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and is responsible for aeronautical and space sciences, except those primarily concerned with the development of weapons systems or military operations which are reserved to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Senate Space Committee has authority, however, to survey and report on both the military and civilian space activities of all agencies of the United States.

It is evident that the problem of coordination of space activities in the Executive Branch is also present in the Congress. This problem is an inevitable concomitant of space exploration because of the many factors which must be combined in order to achieve success.

9. International Space Activities

Policy objectives of the United Nations for international space activities began to take shape as part of the comprehensive negotiations on disarmament. On January 12, 1957, almost nine months before an earth satellite was first orbited, the United States indicated readiness to participate in "fair, balanced, reliable systems" for controlling outer space vehicles in order to devote their use exclusively to peaceful, scientific purposes. Toward

this objective, the United Nations General Assembly included provision for a joint study of an outer space inspection system in the disarmament resolution adopted on November 14, 1957. The Soviet Union voted against this resolution, and on March 15, 1958, proposed to the United Nations that the use of cosmic space for military purposes be banned, that foreign military bases be eliminated, and that the United Nations should establish an agency for international cooperation to study space problems. The idea that controls for the uses of outer space should be contingent upon the liquidation of bases was not acceptable to the United States. In September 1958, the United States requested the General Assembly to consider a program for international cooperation in outer space, and to declare itself on "the separability of the question of the peaceful uses of outer space from that of disarmament." This policy determination was deemed desirable so that lack of agreement on an effective system of inspection and control of armaments need not delay progress in analyzing the unusual effects of space exploration upon international relations.

On December 13, 1958, the General Assembly established the United Nations Ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Although given membership on this 18-nation Ad hoc Committee, the Soviet Union refused to participate in its work, alleging that the membership was one-sided in favor of the western nations. The U.S.S.R. was joined by four other nations: Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, and the United Arab Republic. The other 13 nations, including the United States which considered that the Committee membership was "more than fair" to the Soviet Union, met their responsibility to the United Nations in a report (June 25, 1959) analyzing the scientific and technical aspects of outer space, existing arrangements for international organization and administration, and the legal problems of space exploration.

The major scientific fields concerned with experimentation in outer space were found to be already organized in a number of non-governmental unions, and the International Council of Scientific Unions was commended for having successfully demonstrated its capacity to coordinate voluntary scientific activities on a worldwide scale, particularly during the International Geophysical Year.

The inter-governmental organizations with a substantial interest in space activities were described by the Ad hoc Committee which concluded that this was neither the time to establish a new autonomous inter-governmental agency nor would it be practicable to delegate the overall task to one of the existing specialized organizations. The continuance of present procedures was favored, together with the suggestion that information on space activities be included in the reports of the specialized organizations to the United Nations. From such practices, functional controls may be expected to develop over such areas as weather prediction through the World Meteorological Organization and the allocation of radio frequencies to spacecraft through the International Telecommunication Union. Numerous specialized agencies already have rules and regulations which may apply in some degree to space activities of different kinds.

The problem of international control is how to coordinate the administrative regulations of various agencies concerned with specific functions of space exploration. Coordination of certain space information is already being undertaken by the non-governmental International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) through its Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), an organization whose charter provides for a president, and two vice presidents

who alternate in precedence. The United States National Academy of Sciences (a quasi-governmental body) and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. present separate nominating slates for the two vice presidential positions.

Among the legal problems of space exploration, the Ad hoc Committee selected six for priority treatment.

(1) The Committee noted that the satellite program of the IGY was based upon the premise that nations had permission to launch such vehicles even though they traversed an orbit above national boundary lines. Within the context of strictly peaceful uses, nations may have recognized that outer space is freely available "in accordance with existing or future international law or agreements." Since this premise was examined, one incident has raised questions of sovereignty over outer space. Following the orbiting by the United States of the Tiros III weather satellite by NASA, and the Midas III rocket-detecting satellite by the Air Force, a newspaper of the Soviet Armed Forces, Krasnaya Zvezda, objected on July 23, 1961, stating that "A spy is a spy no matter at what height it flies."

(2) The problem of liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicles.

(3) Allocation of radio frequencies to space vehicles. The solution of this problem was considered a "matter of life and death" to space exploration by the Committee. Since this vital question was raised in the Committee report, the Administrative Radio Conference of the International Telecommunication Union held a conference in Geneva during the last four months of 1959. The result was the formulation of a treaty involving approximately 101 nations, including the United States and the U.S.S.R. Among the provisions are certain agreements concerning radio frequencies for space vehicles.

(4) Avoidance of interference between space vehicles and aircraft.

(5) The identification and registration of space vehicles and the coordination of launchings.

(6) The reentry and landing of space vehicles will necessitate agreement among nations.

Although the Soviet Union would not participate in the work, or accept the findings, of the UN Ad hoc Committee, agreement was finally reached toward the end of 1959 on the creation of a new permanent committee. On December 12, 1959, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on "International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space." In establishing the 24-member Committee, on which both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have membership, the resolution states that the General Assembly recognizes the common interest of mankind in the peaceful uses of outer space; believes that space should be used only for the benefit of mankind and "the benefit of States irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development;" desires "to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new field"; recognizes the importance of international cooperation; notes the continuing programs of the international scientific community; and believes that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space should be promoted by the United Nations.

The directives given by the General Assembly to the Committee indicate the role of the United Nations and the means of achieving international cooperation: UN assistance for research, exchange and dissemination of information, encouragement of national research programs, and the study of legal problems arising from space exploration. The Committee was also called upon to arrange an international scientific conference of interested members of the United Nations and the specialized agencies during 1960 and 1961. Although the Soviet Union agreed to the resolution and the membership, its subsequent objections have obstructed the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space from beginning its work.

Harmony between the objectives and organization of national and international programs is vital for successful coordination. The policy objectives and organization of the United States for international space activities are in consonance with those of the United Nations and the world scientific community. By unanimous vote, Congress passed a House Concurrent Resolution, introduced on May 13, 1958, by Hon. John W. McCormack, requesting the President to work toward the attainment of certain conditions required for the attainment of the international peaceful uses of outer space. In accordance with similar policy directives in the law establishing our civilian space agency, NASA cooperates with the United Nations and, working through the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, with the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). An Office of International Programs has been established by NASA to develop cooperative activities.

International NASA programs that are now under way fall into four main categories: the worldwide network of tracking and telemetry stations so essential for the acquisition of data from satellites and space probes; joint programs with scientists and engineers of nations cooperating in space research; exchange of scientific and technical information, making data available for evaluation to scientists throughout the world; and training programs and exchanges with foreign scientists.

Both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy have supported international control of space activities through the United Nations. On September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower addressed the United Nations, proposing that

> 1. We agree that celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by any claims of sovereignty.
> 2. We agree that the nations of the world shall not engage in warlike activities on these bodies.
> 3. We agree, subject to appropriate verification, that no nation will put into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction. All launchings of spacecraft should be verified in advance by the United Nations.
> 4. We press forward with a program of international cooperation for constructive peaceful uses of outer space under the United Nations...

In his State of the Union message of January 20, 1961 President Kennedy stated that

> ...this administration intends to explore promptly all possible areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union and other nations "to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors." Specifically, I now invite all nations -- including the Soviet Union -- to join

> with us in developing a weather prediction program, in a new communications satellite program, and in preparation for probing the distant planets of Mars and Venus, probes which may some day unlock the deepest secrets of the universe...

Government and Science and Political Science

Space exploration has thrust the development of science and technology into a new dimension, and the impact on society is pervasive and far-reaching. No longer earthbound, our thinking is interplanetary. Space vehicles have already given us a new tool for international cooperation, forged during the International Geophysical Year and used thereafter to extend agreements among nations and scientists. Spacecraft have also provided a new tool for national defense in performing the function of reconnaissance, depriving a potential aggressor of the advantage of surprise attack. The benefits which will accrue from peaceful uses for communications, navigation, and weather prediction will be worldwide in their effects, and their commercial possibilities will bring about changes in our national economy as well as in international economic conditions. Our educational system is making adjustments toward training the scientists and engineers needed for these vast new space programs whose success has become a symbol of national prestige. The money being spent on earth in laboratories and industries, universities and government agencies will strengthen the whole base of science and technology in the United States. Many practical applications for industrial and commercial uses are expected to flow from knowledge gained from space research and development.

Scientific progress has always created new situations which call for decisions on public policy to guide and control the effects of discoveries and inventions upon the lives of the people. But never in history has the choice between good and evil been posed for mankind on a scale of such magnitude as that which results from the discovery of atomic energy and the feasibility of space exploration. The rewards of the peacetime benefits and the devastation that would result from military operations are all too clear to those entrusted with our government.

Scientists are aware of their responsibility to interpret the effects of scientific progress upon the welfare of mankind. The Federation of American Scientists, established after the advent of the atomic bomb, is a medium for the profession to express viewpoints on political problems generated by scientific advances. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has published discerning articles on national and international problems which require a knowledge of science for their solution. The Society for Social Responsibility in Science is concerned with restricting scientific applications to ethical purposes. Many individual scientists and ad hoc groups have taken positions on issues whose interpretation depends upon relating scientific facts to alternative courses of political action.

On July 8, 1960, the American Association for the Advancement of Science issued a report on Science and Human Welfare, explaining that

> For nearly two decades, scientists have viewed with growing concern the troublesome events that have been evoked by the interaction between scientific progress and public affairs. With each advance in our knowledge of nature, science adds to the already immense power that the social order exerts over human welfare. With each increment in power, the problem of directing its use toward beneficial

> ends becomes more complex, the consequences of failure more disastrous, and the time for decision more brief.
>
> The problem is not new, either in the history of human affairs or of science. What is without past parallel is its urgency. ...
>
> In the last few years the disparity between scientific progress and the resolution of the social issues which it has evoked has become even greater. What was once merely a gap now threatens to become a discontinuity which may disrupt the history of man.

The procedures adopted by the AAAS to meet the obligation of scientists "to help mediate the effects of scientific progress on human welfare", are to stimulate discussion of the issues within the scientific community; to furnish the facts on issues and analyze the possible consequences of different courses of action; to prepare and disseminate reports for the general public; and to develop liaison arrangements between scientists and people at the local community level.

Meanwhile, within the Government there has been a tremendous increase in scientific research and development as space activities have been added to other responsibilities, particularly those of the Department of Defense. The Federal Council for Science and Technology estimates that total expenditures by the Federal Government for research and development during fiscal 1962 will come to approximately $10 billion. During the past four years, scientists, engineers, and government administrators of scientific programs have been facing crucial national and international problems of organization and administration. Scientists are learning about government, and the record of participation in policymaking indicates that both in the Executive and Legislative Branches, they are being expected to solve governmental problems, some of which are specifically in the field of public administration. Although the scientists are sometimes prodded by writers who want them to be less specialized and to perform more of a generalist role in relating scientific facts to the social sciences, actually they have brought to the task certain outstanding assets.

For many years scientists have been organized into unions which are coordinated at the national and international levels. Collectively in organizations and as individuals, they have what has come to be called "the scientific community." It is rather difficult to define this term, and one distinguished witness could tell a Congressional Committee only that the concept of the "scientific community" was all "rather weird." Be that as it may, there does exist, within and among nations, a highly-qualified body of like-minded scientists who are held together by some psychological force emanating from their recognition of common interests and purposes. The strength of their feeling of unity was evident in the organization and achievements of the International Geophysical Year. The vitality of this nongovernmental organization was sufficient to attract various types of support by many national governments. Another source of strength is that members of the scientific community organize their efforts to achieve objectives in connection with specific programs. A scientific project may almost be said to exert a magnetic force in drawing unto itself those persons and resources essential for its successful completion.

These observations may have some value for the political science profession in determining its future role in analyzing and proposing solutions for the problems of government arising from scientific activities. Perhaps the lack of a "political science community", and the lack of definite projects and objectives around which like-minded

political scientists could cohere, accounts for the nonparticipation of the profession in helping to fashion public policy for space activities during the past four years. The few individual exceptions have all been government employees.

It seems strange to record the fact that since October 1957 when the first earth satellite was orbited and the Government faced unparalleled problems of organization and administration, no articles on space activities have appeared in the leading political science journals. And, to my knowledge, no individual political scientist asked to testify before Congressional Committees charged with the responsibility of organizing and reorganizing our governmental structure for the conduct of a vast program of space exploration. This record is even more strange when we consider that there has been a continuous stream of research materials and information produced by the Congress, the Executive Branch, and scientific organizations, much of it specifically designed for legislative policymakers who must make judgments on programs and budgets. A special effort has been made to publish scientific space materials in lay language, and there are innumerable documents which are free or inexpensive.

We must expect adjustments in important segments of public policy as advances are made in science and technology. The problems of government organization and administration are continuing, and thus raise the question of whether their solution is to be brought about only by scientists or whether political scientists will also participate in the formulation of policy. If political scientists are to play a role in the processes of democratic government, it will be necessary for them to fashion a policy for doing so.

A Committee on Government and Science could be established. As first items on its agenda, this Committee could arrange for participation by members of the scientific community who are interested in public affairs; prepare a study illustrating the type of scientific information needed for the analysis of specific scientific problems; consider the appointment of subcommittees on defined areas of science and government; publish a report on research materials available for study; determine the form in which reports are likely to be most helpful to government policymakers; consider the timing of published reports in order to achieve a realistic relation to the solution of current and emerging problems; and explore the possibility of liaison arrangements with the American Association for the Advancement of Science in its program of relating science to human welfare.

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GENESIS AND MODERNIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN CHILE

by

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The University of North Carolina

Prepared for delivery at the 1961 Annual Meeting of
The American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Mo.,
Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 6-9, 1961.

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Today there is more popular participation in the political processes of Latin America than at any other period in its history. This increased participation is closely related to the impact of modern capitalism and technology. The hold of the landed oligarchy over political life has been weakened, and in many countries new political parties have been formed. It has become apparent that politics in Latin America is undergoing a modernization process and that political struggles there can no longer be interpreted simply in terms of scrambles for power, prestige, and plunder within a narrow circle of semi-feudal landowners and the hierarchy of the Church, armed men and parasitical politicians. A more adequate explanation may be that the patterns of political behavior now developing in Latin America are best regarded as class struggles, taking different forms in the several countries in consonance with their varying economic and social structures.

Evident similarities exist between these emergent patterns and the metamorphoses through which those countries, that have been more nearly in the main line of the economic, social and political development in the Western world, have passed. This suggests that the methods of comparative analysis may be fruitfully applied in the study of Latin American politics. Indeed, the use of these methods in this geographical area may be particularly rewarding just at the present stage of the effort to develop theory adequate for scientific investigation of political structures and behavior in differing cultural settings. Genuine advancement in the theory and methodology of comparative politics has come with the recognition of relevant distinctions between the politics of Western and of non-Western countries. Latin America, however, does not fit neatly into either of these categories. Although in some countries the Indian and African heritages provide distinctly non-Western elements in the culture, Latin America certainly cannot be appropriately classified as non-Western in cultural characteristics or background. Yet, perhaps because of a time lag, for geographical reasons, or for other causes not so easily discovered, the patterns of economic, social and political institutions and behavior that have developed there can equally certainly not be called typically Western. For this reason, the countries in the area have in many ways been just as definitely influenced from the outside in the past century by the impact of the recent Western culture of the late nineteenth

and twentieth centuries as the countries of Asia, the Middle East or Africa, which were until that period distinctly non-Western in their culture. The Latin American countries, then, provide unique situational contexts for political research which can make contributions of peculiar importance to the strategy and tactics of theoretical and methodological development in the study of comparative politics. Even if the adjective "developing" (or underdeveloped") were substituted for "non-Western," the fact remains that Latin America must be accorded a special portion in any comparative study due to the peculiar aspects of the relationships to Western culture to be found there.

Latin America poses a problem in ambiguity, in the sense that the effects of modern capitalism and technology are found superimposed upon centuries-old institutions that originally derived from the successful transplantation of Spanish and Portuguese semi-feudal traditions. Thus, European influence upon Latin America is not a new phenomenon but an ancient and continuous one. A rich and weighty Western heritage, perhaps in contrast to most other underdeveloped areas of the world, existed in this region long before the industrial-urban culture complex arrived. The influence of France upon Latin America after its independence, for example, cannot be overemphasized. Students of French politics would, no doubt, be amazed by the striking similarities between patterns of political development in France and in Chile. Latin American political phenomena and terminology generally have greater meaning for continental Europeans than they have for those nurtured in political tradition of the United States. Louis Hartz, in his The Liberal Tradition in America: an Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution, has aptly pointed to the lack of a feudal tradition as the explanation for the absence of political extremisms in the American scene. The developmental patterns of Latin American conservatism and leftism are much closer to those of Europe, than to those of the United States, precisely for this reason.

Chile was selected as the subject of this paper primarily because it is representative of the Latin American species of underdeveloped country, in that development tends to be shackled by imponderable institutional and organizational handicaps rather than by the all-pervading physical-institutional barriers that are commonly associated with other underdeveloped areas. Chile's relative industrial progress furnishes an excellent example of the problems of industrialization in a country hampered by institutions and behavioral patterns of a semi-feudal agrarian tradition and "buffeted by the leveling blasts of twentieth century egalitarianism."[1] Many of the features of the system of Spanish colonial government, which remained in existence for over three centuries, endured to become conditioning elements in the social, economic, and political development of modern Chile. The latifundio system, the social structure, the all-pervading influence of the Church, the characteristics of the frontier, and many political institutions, survived separation from Spain and continued to influence government in the republican era.

Federico G. Gil
Genesis and Modernization of
Political Parties in Chile

This paper is limited to an analysis of the changes which have occurred in the political party system of Chile incidental to the diffusion of Western technology and related phenomena. This limitation is dictated by the personal research interests of this writer in the area of Latin American political organizations. No attempt will be made to examine, except incidentally, changes which have affected structures other than political parties. A general description of the historical pattern of political modernization, interrupted by the periodic appraisal of substantial changes at particularly significant periods, will be adopted as the most effective and only suitable method of dealing with the problem of ambiguity suggested above.

As a way of clarifying the meaning given here to political modernization, it may be well to refer to the sort of definition of "modernizing" or transitional systems given in The Politics of the Developing Areas. This work states that in such systems:

> ...we may find differentiated governmental and political structures operating along with traditional and intermittent ones. [The latter] are not regulated by the modern ones but continue to operate inside and outside the bureaucracy, parliament, parties, interest groups, and media of communication. The traditional and intermittent structures are not penetrated by or fused to the modern ones. They continue to function autonomously and legitimately. Unlike the modern system, their performance of political functions is not regulated by the differentiated and specialized structures. The modern political system does not eliminate intermittency and traditionality; it tends to regulate and control it. Diffuse and primary structures perform governmental and political functions within the modern structures.[2]

The Early Republican Era

The revolution for independence in Chile was almost accidental, in the sense that it was precipitated by the succession of events that occurred in Spain after 1808. There is no evidence that there existed in Chile before these occurrences any strong desire for political innovations. In the war for independence there was no social upheaval involved nor was there any basic change in institutions. When the struggle ended, Chile found itself free from all political ties to Spain, but its social structure emerged intact -- a respectable aristocracy united by blood ties and common interests, whose political experience was insignificant at one end of the social scale; at the other, an ignorant and servile mass incapable of understanding and practicing the rights and duties of a free people.

It was only to be expected that at the outset, the military leaders of the successful revolution having won great prestige and the new army being the only organized force in the country, these elements would prevail over the rest of the colonial aristocracy, occupied as it was in recovering from the material losses it had suffered. Consequently, during the period from 1817 to 1823, Bernardo O'Higgins, the distinguished military hero, headed a government legally constituted under an autocratic institutional system. When, believing that in order to institute a real republic it was necessary first to modify society, O'Higgins attempted reforms, he was confronted with revolt in 1823. Rather than subject the country to civil strife, he resigned his authority.

O'Higgins' renunciation marked the appearance of two distinct political tendencies which were later to result in the creation of Chile's early parties. One favored a real republic, free and democratic, and the liberalization of social institutions accordingly, regardless of the lack of traditions in political habits; the other demanded a strong centralized government, as opposed to the federalization advocated by its opponents, and aspired, in general, to a system which would not break completely with colonial traditions, one which would not modify the existing structure of society, and which, in short, would not be different from the one maintained under Spanish control.

All of those who were supporters of the first tendency were known as the liberales or pipiolos (liberals or novices), while the group who subscribed to more conservative ideas became known as the pelucones (big-wigs). Except for a short period after the fall of OHiggins, the pipiolos were in ascendency until 1830. After a series of constitutional experiments, which included an attempt to establish a federal form of government, a liberal victory in an election of deputies to a new constituent assembly and consequent prospects of social reform were among the causes of the civil war of 1829. This war brought success to the conservatives and the inauguration of an "autocratic republic." At this time, there were not yet in existence any well-defined political organizations, but only confused and vague aspirations for a constitutional system. These took only such form as existed in the broad tendencies that have been mentioned.

The Autocratic Republic (1830-1871)

In the midst of the chaos a new group, the estanqueros, made its appearance under the leadership of a remarkable man, Diego Portales, who was to lead Chile out of anarchy and into strong, solid, and orderly government. A man of intuition, Portales understood the necessity of giving a social foundation to the political structure, of grouping all social forces in support

of an impersonal regime of legitimate tradition which could offer legal regularity, decorum and circumspection, a guarantee of order, and, finally, good government.[3] To Portales, constitutional techniques were only accessory; the essential issue was to set up what he called "the mainspring of the machinery" -- traditional authority, a quiet and silent force, loyally obeyed and respected, eternal, above any caudillos and factions.

Portales' task of restoring peace and establishing a strong, stable government, was facilitated by various factors. In the first place, Chile was, of all the former Spanish colonies, the one with the most compact social and geographical unity. Its territory, confined to what today is central Chile, was relatively small; most of its inhabitants lived in the area between la Serena and Bío-Bío. This population was racially homogeneous, most Indians having been pushed south of the Bío-Bío River and the remaining ones having mixed with whites. In addition, Chile already had a political and social head, the city of Santiago, which stood far above all other cities in influence and wealth.

Not only the geographical conditions of the country and the relative simplicity of its social structure were important in the consolidation of the state built by Portales, for no less significant were its isolation from the world and the relative backwardness of the Chile of 1830. These conditions account for the survival of the colonial spirit of passive obedience and respect for hierarchy which, in time, made possible the restoration by Portales of the monarchical and aristocratic traditions of colonial Chile under a new legal framework, outwardly republican. The old social order had been preserved by what Portales, using a picturesque expression, often called "the weight of the night," that is, Chile's traditional habits of obedience and respect for authority, ingrained by centuries of colonial domination.

The Chilean aristocracy provided the base for the authoritarian structure created by Portales. Just as geographical conditions tended to encourage unity and stability, historical accident had also created a social encouragement. The Chilean aristocracy was significantly different from the aristocracies of other Latin American countries in that it was already a mixed aristocracy, at the same time bourgeois and feudal, in which at the advent of independence there were successfully intermingled the old families of conquistadores and landowners with new stocks of enterprising Basque immigrants who had become successful businessmen. There was not a bourgeois class in Chile because it had fused with the old nobility, forming only one group after 1750. The wealthy bourgeois and the aristocrat could not clash because they were one. From the combination of landowners and merchants, this mixed aristocracy derived its virtues as well as its defects. Industry and economy and a good practical sense, narrow mindedness and lack of imagination, essentially bourgeois qualities, were mixed in the Chilean aristocrat with the ambitions for power, pride in independence, and rebellious spirit inherited

from his feudal ancestors.[4] Portales was to be the providential leader of this aristocracy. The legal framework was provided by the constitution of 1833, which with some alterations was to remain in force for almost a century. During the ensuing forty years, the powers of the executive were without an effective counterweight. Under that instrument, Chile was to acquire a reputation for stability in striking contrast to the reputations of other Latin American republics, which were periodically rent by revolutions and military dictatorships. For approximately twenty years the oligarchy made no attempt to oppose the presidential absolutism created by Portales. However, after 1849 and up to 1891, in the words of a Chilean political writer, "The politics of Chile [were] synthesized principally in the conflict between two organic spiritual elements, both of which belonged to the past: the aristocracy and the monarchy". Alberto Edwards has, in his admirable discussion of this struggle between the feudal-bourgeois oligarchy and executive absolutism, almost invariably peaceful in nature, used the term fronda aristocrática. He compares it with the phenomenon, which in Europe, especially after 1848, transformed the traditional monarchies based on the divine right theory into parliamentary regimes dominated by the bourgeois plutocracy.[5]

According to Edwards, survival of the monarchical and aristocratic traditions of colonial Chile after its independence made it possible to organize the country under a political system which, after 1830, did not necessarily rest upon forceable seizure of power or upon arbitrariness and cruelty in the use and abuse of this power. Slowly this system was to develop into parliamentarism, at the same pace as the aristocracy became stronger than the presidents, until finally the fronda defeated executive absolutism. Chile became an exception among the former Spanish colonies, enjoying political stability precisely because of having preserved intact its colonial past. It was, in this sense, socially the most backward of them all.

It is not possible to speak of well-defined political parties in reference to that period of Chilean history. Rather than real parties, there were alignments and groupings dictated by the common interests of the restricted circle which constituted the oligarchy and created as instruments to influence the government. As a matter of convenience, the development of political parties in Chile can be divided into four periods. From 1830 to 1860, political organizations (not actually political parties in the true sense) participated very little, if at all, in a system in which presidential authority was all pervasive. From 1860 to 1890, the presidents governed with support of parties, and there existed a sort of unstable equilibrium between executives and the groups which supported them. During the third period, the period of the "parliamentary republic," from 1891 to 1920, presidential influence became almost extinct and parties ruled at will. The fourth, beginning in 1920, has been marked by the rebellion of an electorate, until then submissive, and the appearance of new party types.

The thirty-year period beginning in 1830 witnessed the orderly ten-year "reigns" of three successive presidents,[6] General Joaquín Prieto (1831-1841), elected under the auspices of Portales, who was to die at the hands of assassins in 1837; Manuel Bulnes (1841-1851); and Manuel Montt (1851-1861). Long before the end of this period, however, divisions began to arise in the conservative camp.

The material progress of the country was a most powerful agent in an intellectual movement which began in 1842. This intellectual awakening of Chile was to have immediate consequences in its political life. The progress of education, especially after the founding of the University of Chile in 1842, the influence of foreign exiles, particularly from Argentina, the appearance of several periodicals, and the emergence of national writers and poets were significant in awakening public interest in social and political reforms. A new liberal spirit, which had little in common with the approach of the early liberals, was growing in a new generation. This spirit was strongly apparent in the works of Francisco Bilbao and José Victorino Lastarria, whose criticisms of the past, including religion as well as politics were quite severe. During this period there also emerged the figure of an early champion of social reform, Santiago Arcos. A young disciple of French utopian socialism, Arcos was the first national writer to study Chilean society in a systematic manner. Anticipating the later labor movement, he believed that a proletarian party representing the interests of the working classes might be formed and proposed that drastic economic reforms, beginning with land distribution, would have to precede changes in the political system, if these were to be given solid foundation. Inspired by self-denying love for the poor, he vigorously defended their cause. "Everywhere in the world," he said, "there are the rich and the poor, but not everywhere are there poor like those of Chile. In the United States, in England, and in Spain there are people who are poor, but in these places poverty is an accident, and not a normal state, while in Chile, poverty is a condition of life."[7]

The ten-year period of Montt witnessed remarkable economic progress and with it the development of a new and vigorous group of wealthy mining and merchant families who, rebelling against the existing semi-feudal system, began to demand liberal reforms. Economic development had built up new wealth and created new power structures. The clergy, a powerful group since colonial times, and the nobility were consequently weakened, and a new governmental ideal more in consonance with social development began to arise -- the liberal-democratic program calling for respect of civil liberties, freedom of suffrage, secularization and limitation of executive authority.[8]

The period is one of transition between two types of economy: the feudal and the capitalist. It is a critical period in that it is marked by changing ideas and by the development of a strong opposition to the heretofore unquestioned authority of those in power.[9]

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At the end of the period of the "aristocratic republic," it was clear that questions of moral and constitutional import were determining the delimitation of political camps. "While for the conservatives political authority and religious dogma were two fundamentals of well-being and of collective progress, for their adversaries liberty in politics and freedom in ideas were conditions for social development."[10] The social transformation which was needed to permit the passing from the "autocratic republic" to the "liberal republic" had occurred. The growth of the new mining and commercial bourgeoisie, the newly acquired consciousness of strength acquired by this class, were determining factors in the ensuing era of moderation in which political parties began to take a more active role in the nation's life. Until this time, presidents had been able to rule without the assistance of organized political forces. With the rise of liberalism, this was no longer the case; the presidential authoritarianism could not continue to function independently without this assistance. During the "liberal republic" the president felt impelled to seek the support of at least one of the existing political groups, although, thanks to his decisive influence in the electoral machinery, he was to remain undisputed master of his own political faction. Although still far from party government, the system required at least some participation of organized groups in national politics.[11]

A new political organization which has existed up to this time was born in 1861. This new political group, calling itself the Radical Party, was formed by the most advanced or orthodox liberals, who wanted political reforms at all costs and who were ready to launch a vigorous opposition campaign. The foundations of the Radical Party, destined to play a great role in Chilean politics, had been laid by Pedro León Gallo, rich miner of the north who led an unsuccessful revolt in 1859, and by the Matta brothers, Manuel Antonio and Guillermo. At first only a small group of dissident liberals, the Party was soon to grow into a formidable force as lower-middle-class intellectuals, Masons, members of "reform clubs," and small merchants began to swell its ranks. In the beginning the Radical Party program included four essential points: constitutional reform, state supervision over education, administrative decentralization, and freedom of suffrage. Later the Radicals were to acquire the strong anti-clerical taint which became a distinctive mark of this political group. Socially and economically, then, the Radical Party was at first the expression of the political demands of the new wealthy bourgeosie produced by the development of mining in the north and subsequently became the focus of the resistance by the agricultural provinces of the south to the centralization of power in Santiago. Later it was reinforced by the other social groups which emerged as a middle class began to develop in the cities.

The Liberal Republic (1871-1891)

After 1864 the so-called "theological questions" became the crucial issue in Chilean politics. By this time, conflict and upheaval were open and common, and the period was to witness a fierce political struggle which ended with victory for the liberal cause. The opposition's campaign in behalf of freedom of instruction, strongly resisted by the conservative elements which formed part of the administration of Federico Errázuriz Zañartu (1871-75), precipitated the split of the government coalition.

Other religious questions contributed to this division. The reforms which were advanced by the liberal elements included suppression of the ecclesiastical fuero,[12] "secularization" of cemeteries, civil marriage, and separation of church and state. "The political struggle therefore degenerated into a religious struggle, and the Conservative Party was transformed into a clerical or "ultramontane" group, as its adversaries branded it, as opposed to the other extreme party, the Radical or 'Red', as it was nicknamed."[13] The old conservatives, embittered by defeat, were to become more intransigent than ever, to the point of desiring, once displaced from power, even the destruction of the authoritarian structure created by Portales, which was now the stronghold of their enemy.[14]

When Aníbal Pinto, the new President elected by the Liberals in 1876, took office, the country was passing through a severe economic crisis. The seriousness of the situation forced what amounted to a temporary truce in political battles. These halted altogether when, in 1879, Chile entered upon the greatest of all the conflicts in its national existence, the War of the Pacific. Had this national crisis not occurred, it is possible that revolution would have ended Pinto's administration. As a consequence of its victory over Peru and Bolivia, Chile remained in possession of rich nitrate and copper territories, the development of which had been the cause of the conflict. The newly-acquired wealth meant for the country the opening of an era of expansion and economic development which was to have repercussions in the structure of society as well as in politics. Chile had increased its territory by more than a third and the revenues derived from nitrate began increasingly to augment private wealth and public revenue. With the end of the war came also the end of what has been called "The Golden Era of Liberalism," which had given a new veneer to the old authoritarian political system, making it acceptable for a few more years.[15]

The new President, Domingo Santa María, was a true exponent of political authoritarianism and religious liberalism, the essence of liberal thought of the time. Although the Santa María administration was far from being characterized by political liberty (it freely used executive control over elections), the reform spirit which animated the regime resulted in the enactment of anti-clerical laws and legislation extending suffrage to all Chilean males of 25 years of age and removing the income and property restrictions imposed by the Constitution of 1833.[16]

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The War of the Pacific had opened an era of prosperity, evidenced by the fact that in ten years the income of the Chilean treasury was nearly quadrupled (from 15 to 60 million).[17] This prosperity radiated to all the social classes, but it was in particular concentrated in the upper classes of society. With the riches of the public treasury at its disposal the government undertook public works programs, opened new roads, promoted immigration, established war pensions, and increased wages of public employees. Currency problems, however, were aggravated because of the government's failure to redeem paper money issued as an extraordinary measure during the economic crisis in the Pinto administration and later employed to finance the war. The peso dropped 50 per cent by the end of the war, compounding the existing currency weakness. The cost of living increased, and the mass of consumers became the victims of monetary depreciation. Such was the origin of the chronic inflation which has affected Chile to this day.

The nitrate revenues, however, were applied to everything but the redemption of paper money issues. This policy seemed clearly in the interests of the upper classes, since it saved them from the necessity of levying taxes on themselves. The systematic depreciation of the currency favored the interests of the great landowners and commercial magnates by permitting them to pay the salaried and laboring classes the same wages in depreciated money, while increasing the profits they themselves received for Chilean exports sold in the world market.[18] Thus currency manipulation became a habit and "probably the most subtle and at the same time the most effective of the various exploitive techniques of the oligarchs."[19] It led one deputy to make in Congress the following statement: "In Chile, there exist two industries. One is that of the rotos (poor), who saw-off guns to rob the rich, and another, that of the rich, who saw-off pesos to rob the rotos."[20]

If the mining wealth meant the salvation of the ruling class by assuring its political and economic dominance, it also brought a grave risk--an exaggerated dependence upon foreign markets which was in the future to unbalance Chile's internal economy. In addition, it marked the arrival of large foreign investments.

Another event of significance during the period was the complete pacification of the Araucanians which occurred with the opening of a large area of southern Chile. A significant number of nationals and immigrants from Europe began to flock to the new territories. A new human type developed in this region, the "frontier man", tough and courageous, but, in contrast to the conservative and patriarchal farmer of central Chile, receptive to new influences. The frontier was to become the main source of strength of the Radical Party. These new provinces found in this party the means of expressing their demands for greater autonomy against the centralization of Santiago.

Ideologically, they were to find in the same way expression for their anti-clerical ideas. The varied social-economic base of the newly opened Chile soon supported political attitudes in opposition to those of the traditional interests, resulting in further amplification of political activities confined almost exclusively, until then, to the great land-owning and commercial class.

With most of the religious issues settled by the end of the Santa María administration, the liberal forces, left without the anti-clerical banner, began to disintegrate. It was in 1891, during the administration of José Manuel Balmaceda, that a split in the Chilean aristocracy culminated in civil war. Now that the religious problems were definitely settled, the historical issue which divided the ruling elite was whether a strong executive was to control the power of the parliament representing this aristocracy, or whether the power of that parliament was to prevail over presidential power, establishing itself in undisputed predominance.

There was no great social reform involved in this conflict. Neither Congress, which was the focal point of the anti-presidential movement, nor the President spoke for the lower classes. Both represented one single economic group which had monopolistic political control. The Civil War of 1891 marks the end of the conflict between the authoritarian monarchical tradition and the Chilean aristocracy which had begun in 1810. "When Balmaceda, in the anguish of the final battle with feudalism, wished, like the Kings of old in Europe, to appeal to the people, to democratic sentiment, events proved that the ill-fated President had requested the protection of something which did not exist."[21]

Balmaceda took the lead in constitutional reforms which broadened the right of suffrage, but political disorganization prevailed and the old parties, splitting more and more into splinter groups, refused to come to an understanding with the executive. All parties helped to bring down the political system created by the old pelucones and characterized by presidential omnipotence. It had already been weakened by the reforms of the liberal era, but despite modern innovations, the cornerstone of the system, i.e., presidential dictatorship, though no longer legal, nevertheless effectively subsisted in obsolescence.

Other considerations of an economic nature played a part in the complete annihilation of presidential omnipotence. Balmaceda's attempts to implement measures designed to put an end to currency depreciation, to parcel out land to small holders, and to curtail the growing influence of foreign investments encountered the violent opposition of the landowners and big exporters on one hand, and on the other, the hostility of the influential foreign nitrate interests.[22]

Balmaceda has been characterized by some as a champion of a new middle class in the effort to promote a peaceful bourgeois revolution on the European model. A more accurate protrait of the unfortunate President appears to be the one that depicts him neither as an enlightened reformer nor as an autocrat, but as a composite of both, a nationalist who was ideologically a little of everything, "an eclectic true to the patchwork nature of the Chilean economy," who was "destined for failure as the representative of no one socially and politically potent segment of the population."[23]

The Parliamentary Republic (1891-1925)

Balmaceda's suicide marked the end of the old presidential regime and the beginning of another era, the era of the parliamentary republic. In place of the old omnipotence of the executive was substituted the supremacy of Congress. From then until 1920, presidential authority was to disappear almost entirely; political parties were to multiply rapidly and the oligarchs in Congress were to wield unrestricted power.

With these events, the political party picture became more complex. Even before the conflict, the economic changes brought about by the new national resources caused a certain amount of political restructuring. With the opening of the northern mineral regions and the coal mines of the south, a populist trend appeared and with it a primitive pattern of political unionism developed. In the south, foreign immigration and colonization were fostering the development of a class of small farmers. A new political organization, the Democratic Party, was formed in 1887. Essentially protectionist and pro-industry, this party aimed at the political organization of the artisan class, a small nucleus of workers in the cities, and some segments of the middle class. Its membership was to grow appreciably in the future, but either because the artisan class was small in size and socially insignificant or because of the moderate tone of its ideology, the Democratic Party was destined to play only a subordinate role in Chilean politics.

The relatively simple partisan divisions of the earlier periods with the establishment of the parliamentary republic gave way to a multitude of political organizations. During the period of conservative domination, there existed two parties: the Conservative and the Liberal. During the Liberal period there had been four: Conservative, Liberal, National and Radical, to which the Democratic was added in 1887. But after the victory of the congressionalist forces in the Civil War, seven parties appeared.

The existence of multiple parties required the formation of blocs in order to secure parliamentary majorities. These coalitions were subject to such kaleidoscopic changes as to make lines of responsibility unclear if not non-existent. Given the absence of a central issue around which factions could rally, politics became little more than struggles for personal advantage. Only between Radicals and Conservatives did there seem to exist clear lines of demarcation, determined in this case by the different attitudes of these two groups toward education and religion.

Federico G. Gil
Genesis and Modernization of
Political Parties in Chile

Government in Chile reached its lowest ebb during the period of parliamentary rule. The degree of ministerial instability is shown by the fact that while from 1831 to 1886, a fifty-five-year period, the Chilean government was headed by thirty-one cabinets, in the thirty-three-year period of the parliamentary republic there existed 121 different cabinets with a total of 530 ministers.[24] Instability was accompanied by deplorable financial waste in administrative organization. Even worse than irresponsible government was the posthumous influence of the parliamentary system upon electoral habits. The principle of electoral freedom now formally established, bribery and fraud became substitutes for the earlier governmental intervention. For the sake of prestige, seats in Congress were bought by wealthy aristocrats in the same way that their ancestors had purchased titles of nobility. Civic spirit and patriotism seemed to be lost, and the masses submitted to the congressional oligarchy with the same resignation with which they had accepted presidential absolutism after 1830, apparently indifferent to the neglect of the national interest and to administrative inefficiency and political corruption.

Six presidents, mere shadows of their predecessors, presided over this sad state of affairs during the period from 1891 to 1920, each as politically inert as the oligarchy which wielded power.[25] By 1915, however, a harsh reaction in civic spirit became noticeable and the presidential election of 1920 was transcendental. The campaign revolved around clearer issues and developed chiefly as a struggle between the partisans of stability in the prevailing order and those who favored profound social and political changes-- a "new system," as Arturo Alessandri, their candidate, called it.

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The tendencies toward "democratization" and reform of Chilean national institutions that caused the destruction of oligarchical domination and the victory of Alessandri had a gradual development. Despite the many vices of congressional rule, the three preceding decades were a period of preparation for change rather than of complete social stagnation.[26] In the first place, it is interesting to note that there prevailed throughout the period a scrupulous respect for civic liberties, which made possible political debates and a public airing of new social doctrines[27] and, in general, of all political problems. In many ways the parliamentary era afforded an excellent opportunity for the civic schooling of the Chilean people. Its political peace and juridical normality contrasted with the unrest of other states of Latin America during the same period. It must also be noted that some of Balmaceda's reforms were retained, particularly those related to education and religion. Prosperity, evident in the increase of fiscal receipts, was also evident in all phases of national activity, for it brought a certain measure of improvement in the well-being of the general population.

Paralleling these economic changes, profound alterations were also taking place in the social-political complex, leading to a great social and economic upheaval. The social restructuring affected all levels. The aristocratic oligarchy transformed itself gradually into a plutocracy, as the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie continued to swell its ranks. A new mentality, more enterprising but also more utilitarian than the old patriarchal one of the early nineteenth century, began to characterize the aristocracy, which developed a new set of values and a new attitude toward politics and life in general. The prosperity brought by nitrate and copper replaced its frugal and orderly manner of living with habits of luxury and idleness, and, moved by the desire of wealth, the aristocracy lost its patriotic sense of social and civic responsibility.

Economic developments gave rise, in turn, to the integration of new and significant groups into the middle class, groups which contributed substance and vigor to it. Industrial and commercial growth created a considerable force of middle-class private employees; the expansion of the administrative machine of the government added an important segment of bureaucrats; expansion to the south and subsequent immigration furnished a valuable contingent of independent farmers to the middle-income groups; and finally, a new and growing intellectual nucleus resulted from the more active development of public education.[28] Of course, the rapid growth of Chilean population after 1890 was a wider factor in the reinforcement of this social group. Formed by such heterogeneous elements, the middle class still lacked any real class consciousness and common ideology. However, since none of these new elements was accustomed to the tradition of passive submission to oligarchical domination, they became the vanguard of the movement for socio-economic reform.

It is also important to note that the middle class which was growing so rapidly was in a sense a "proletarized" group quite distinct from the middle classes in Europe, since it lacked the economic and social consistency of its counterparts. This "proletarization" of the middle class was chiefly the result of the prevailing land tenure system and of the peculiar characteristics of the mineral regions which prevented the healthy growth of a numerous class of small holders (comparable to the French rentier class) and of small industrial entrepreneurs. The systematic depreciation of currency under the influence of the oligarchy prevented, in turn, the emphasis on savings so distinctive of other middle classes.[29] In addition, a large "intellectual proletariat," as one writer calls it, was formed by the enormous expansion of the state-controlled education system. These individuals, who could not claim the privileges of birth and wealth and were denied the opportunities which the aristocracy had formerly afforded them, became the leaders of the masses.[30] This process played a part in aggravating the so-called "social question."

As economic development and democratization made progress after the revolution of 1891, the middle class acquired some measure of consciousness of its condition and, abandoning its former timidity and inertia, became the center of political agitation. In 1920, it was the backbone of the "revolt of the electorate," which gave the masses their first electoral victory.

The lower class was not less affected than the others by the restructuring brought about by economic changes. The rich northern mineral regions and the coal mines of the south had given rise to an industrial proletariat. According to the 1907 census, the salaried class, or proletariat, constituted almost one million persons.[31] The living and working conditions of this large conglomerate were deplorable. Despite Chile's material progress, they had remained far below the standards of other civilized countries. Many writers, both foreign and Chilean, have left accounts of the incredible fate of the nitrate workers. The lot of the urban worker was no better. Wages were low and he lived in slum tenements, damp, close, and unhealthy, where he was subjected to numerous endemic and epidemic diseases resulting from lack of sanitation.[33] As for the rural workers, the situation of the inquilino (tenant-farmer) and the migrant worker had in many respects worsened rather than improved, for they remained in a semi-servile condition while the relationship between them and the landowners underwent a significant change. The softening influence of traditional paternalism gave way to much more formal relations between employer and worker, with some oppression. The Chilean workers finally awakened to their plight. Gradually they learned to give the middle class electoral support and began to supply "the necessary violence and strong-arm methods which the order-loving middle class could not have been expected to provide."[34]

This proletariat, which had at first only a confused, almost unconscious aspiration, to better its material being, had its strongest center in Valparaíso, with other principal nuclei in the provinces of Santiago, Tarapacá, Concepción, and Antofagasta. These early manifestations of a social crisis in the making were ruthlessly repressed by the administrations in power. There occurred in Iquique in 1907 a senseless massacre of two thousand nitrate workers. Equally tragic were the events that took place in Puerto Natales in 1919, and in Magallanes in 1920, which served as further examples of the determination of the ruling elite to crush social unrest at any cost. Repression, however, made the situation worse rather than better, for it served as an effective catalyst for the revolutionary movement, generating thereby a further consolidation of its power. As the labor movement began to feel its strength, animosities grew more acute and strikes became more frequent. From 1911 to 1920, there occurred 293 strikes involving over 150,000 workers.[35]

The first groups which were strictly trade unions in a modern sense began to appear at the turn of the century in the nitrate and coal mine industry, but only with the accelerated expansion of industry in the interval between the two world wars was the Chilean labor movement converted into a popular mass organization with a strong voice in politics.[36] During the first decades of the twentieth

century, the labor movement was led by a capable and dedicated leader, Luis Emilio Recabarren, who performed the miracle of being elected to the Congress in 1906, but he found himself excluded from this body by decision of the aristocratic majority. He inspired the founding of the Workers' Federation of Chile in 1909, and founded in 1912 the first labor party, the Workers' Socialist Party, which was affiliated with the Second International. In 1919, Recabarren led the Workers' Federation into the central union organization of Moscow, laying the basis for the inception of the Communist Party several years later.

The pattern of Chilean society was changing, and changing rapidly. It was no longer to be characterized by the existence of a small elite and an amorphous and submissive mass, without ideas and aspirations. Now public opinion had been aroused and new segments were voicing demands for a fundamental redistribution of power.

This process of change had more emphatic effects upon the political scene after 1920. The existing political parties represented long-established classes and interests, and except for the educational and religious issues, no vital question separated them. What may be called a "right bloc" was formed by the Conservative, National, Liberal and Liberal-Democratic parties. The Conservatives were the defenders of the landowners and of the Church. Political control over the tenant farmers on the great estates and over an appreciable segment of the middle class through the religious institutions, particularly in central Chile, assured the party substantial electoral support. Since governmental measures of reform never touched the hacienda economy, the Conservative Party was the least affected by the chaotic situation brought about by the parliamentary regime. The Liberal Party, socially and economically, was now intimately connected with the Conservatives. Separated in the past by religious conflict, no real barriers existed between them after the fall of Balmaceda. The Liberal Party represented no particular ideological position, but in practical politics it was the protector of the great grape-growers, the nitrate and industrial interests, and big business in general. Its weak defense of state control of education was the only difference between it and the Conservatives.

The National Party was the political agency of the high bureaucracy. Its members were closely connected with the large private banks and commercial interests. Although at its best the National Party had championed the cause of state supremacy over the Church, during the parliamentary era it sought the further weakening of presidential authority and invariably placed itself in the ranks of the Conservative bloc.

The Liberal Democratic Party, heir in 1893 to Balmaceda's ideas, had soon become a group devoid of ideologies and engaged only in an opportunistic struggle for privilege in high office. Socially, it was composed of an aristocratic group of well-to-do families plus some upper-middle-class groups in the provinces.

The Radical Party had a broader base than any other political organization. It represented the interests of the southern region, but it principally spoke for the dissident upper middle class and the middle groups which have been described above. After the "doctrinaire" struggles of the period 1864-1884 ended, the Radicals, forgetting all ideological differences, had joined the parliamentary oligarchy in order to bring down Balmaceda's regime. The Radical program adopted at the Party convention held in 1888 said nothing about socio-economic problems, except for a vague statement favoring the "improvement of the conditions of proletarians and workers." The failure of the Radicals to give a more explicit expression to the new social demands can be explained by the existence within their ranks of an intellectual nucleus which held advanced ideas but which was closely linked to the aristocracy. It was only after 1906, when the "socialistic" tendency, led by Valentin Letelier, triumphed over the extreme individualism represented by Enrique MacIver, that the party's program began to reflect the growing demand for reform which animated its followers among the middle class.

The Democratic Party was distinctive in that it was the only organization during the period with a popular base, but its congressional representation did not have any influence until long after its founding in 1887. Its program clearly advocated some economic and social reform, but in spite of its reformist program, the Democratic Party played with enthusiasm the political game of alliances and party combinations. Its failure to identify itself with the labor movement had serious consequences, for the Chilean worker, searching for leadership in the early stages of the labor movement and not finding it among the established political groups, turned to the Marxists. This explains why in Chile the organized labor movement assumed a totally revolutionary position in which Communism was to have a preponderant influence, as it still does today.[37]

The Revolt of the Electorate

Such were the conditions in Chile in 1920 when oligarchical domination collapsed. Change had come swiftly -- an industrial revolution and social upheaval hand-in-hand -- the machine, the proletariat, the metropolis and the intellectual middle class appearing almost simultaneously on the scene. While these changes were in the making, parties remained alien to the social revolution. They were imposing structures without substance, too absorbed in political machinations and petty rivalries to grasp the significance of the transformation. The downfall of the system was inevitable. Its demise can be chiefly attributed to the revolt of the middle class supported by the new proletariat, the loss of its political prestige by the traditional oligarchy, administrative chaos, a government on the brink of bankruptcy, and the scandal of parliamentary majorities created by bribery and fraud.[38] To these, the impact of an economic crisis was added when the nitrate boom collapsed after 1910 with the development of synthetic production elsewhere. The country could no longer depend on nitrate revenue to finance the government, and if new taxes were necessary, the land-owning interests might be affected. The mining workers had been hit hard and the ranks of the unemployed were swelling daily. Furthermore, the agricultural interests of the Central Valley and the southern areas, deprived of their northern market, were in difficulty. Lastly, the influence of recent and successful social revolutions in Mexico and Russia was not insignificant.

At this point a new leader emerged to express the general dissatisfaction with this state of affairs and to become the champion of the common man, Arturo Alessandri Palma. It was he who led a modified Liberal Alliance to victory in the presidential elections of 1920. The Radicals and Democrats provided the basis for this coalition, with additional support from the Liberal faction and a few other small groups. Opposing Alessandri was a new rightist coalition, the National Union, formed of the Conservatives, a majority of the Liberals, some Balmacedistas, and the Nationals.

The campaign was characterized by emotion and enthusiasm, aroused to a fevered pitch by the flowery oratory and charismatic appeal of Alessandri. The significance of his victory was that it demonstrated that the passive obedience of the masses of the people to the old oligarchy had ceased to exist.

Faced with strong opposition in the Senate, Alessandri could not go far along the road of reform. Other causes combined with congressional obstruction to prevent realization of his program. Among them were the postwar slump, lack of foreign market for Chilean mineral production, unemployment, and the inefficiency of the inexperienced group now surrounding the president.[39] "As a result of economic depression, Chile's social-economic liberalism of 1920, like the United States New Deal of 1932, was handicapped by the necessity of recovering and reforming at the same time."[40] Although the congressional elections of 1934 gave Alessandri a majority in both houses, the new congress failed to act upon the president's messages submitted for its consideration. The matter came to a head when this congress, instead of approving some urgent projects, voted itself pay increases in violation of the constitution.

This astonishing action, which startled the country, moved officers of the Chilean army to intervene openly in politics for the first time in almost a century. The cabinet fell. In an hour and without debate "the suggestive rattling of army sabres in the congressional galleries,"[41] obtained approval of a complete program of social legislation, which had been pending for years in the congress.

On the same day, the president, aware that his authority was now subject to military force, left the country. A military junta was established and congress was dissolved. This junta lasted but five months, when another military clique, led by young and reformist officers who desired the implementation of the reform program and a return to constitutional forms, took control of the government.

The majority of the Chilean armed forces, composed of middle-class members in the officer corps and of men of proletarian origin in the rank-and-file, were sympathetic to the national cry for reform. Suspicious of the original junta's subservience to the oligarchy, the young clique recalled Alessandri. With army support and free from political obstructionism, Alessandri returned in 1925 and began to rule by decree. He set about introducing economic and social reforms designed to protect the laboring groups. A graduated income tax and a permanent electoral register were established. The president, with the assistance of advisers from each political party and each national interest group, promptly concentrated his efforts on the reform of the constitution.

The new constitution provided for a strong executive and put an end to the parliamentary system. Above all, the new instrument was designed to prevent the restoration of the old system under which a small group of powerful landlords ruled the whole country as though it were but one great hacienda. The power of the oligarchy was diminished by the provisions which established widespread suffrage and the direct election of the president, and by those which gave the chief executive effective authority and control of finances. It was no longer possible for the congress to dominate the presidency by its control over the national treasury.

Three features of the constitutional regime established in 1925 were to have great influence upon Chile's prospects for stable government: a system of proportional representation, the selection of the President by the Congress if any candidate failed to receive a majority, and the separation of the dates of congressional and presidential elections. Proportional representation has in practice encouraged party fragmentation and unstable congressional coalitions. Throwing doubtful presidential contests into Congress has meant that, in a multiparty system, the president has often owed his election to a parliamentary coalition. Because he has had to reward the various factions with patronage, squabbles over the spoils have frequently broken out and the coalition has disintegrated. As a result, ministerial instability has persisted, and interference by party leaders has taken the place of interference by parliamentary cliques. Separation in the dates of congressional and presidential elections has meant that variable public opinion has sometimes given office to a President and Congress hostile to one another.

Adoption of the constitution on September 18, 1925, marks the official end of the anarchical years of the parliamentary republic and the re-establishment of a presidential regime. This was, however, "purely a structural restoration; it did not carry with it the restoration of the dominance of a given socio-economic class."[42]

Incidents during the electoral campaign of 1925 ended Alessandri's regime three months before completion of his term. The presidential ambitions of Colonel Carlos Ibáñez and Alessandri's refusal to support him led to the President's resignation. When elections were held, Emiliano Figueroa Larraín, supported by all political parties, was elected. The fact that another candidate, José Santos Salas, without any party support made a surprisingly strong race is extremely significant. In a few days of campaigning without any organized assistance, except perhaps from the Communists, candidate Santos Salas attracted over 100,000 votes, an indication that the existing parties did not appeal to a large mass of voters, particularly among the workers.

Within a short period, Ibáñez forced Larraín out and in 1927 established a dictatorship which was to last for the next four years. His regime gave impetus to the reform of public administration; state interventions and activities began to acquire new dimensions, while a vast plan of public works was completed. Foreign capital poured into Chile and the need to finance new services and to satisfy

new luxury demands pushed foreign trade to unprecendented levels. A sense of prosperity pervaded the country. There existed, however, a reverse side to the picture, which was characterized by political repression and arbitrariness. Political parties practically ceased to exist and their leaders were deported, banished, or jailed, in accordance with the regime's publicly expressed notion that parties were useless to the nation.

By 1930 a sharp economic depression began to be felt. Public agitation and civil disturbances finally brought the collapse of Ibáñez' dictatorship on July of 1931. Naturally enough, the fall of Ibáñez was followed by a period of political agitation and social unrest which witnessed the failure of nine different governments, two general strikes, and even a naval revolt in the short space of fifteen months. Ibáñez's successor, Juan Esteban Montero, remained in office only five months. A coup d'etat of military men and civilians proclaimed a "socialist republic" dismissed Congress, and formed a governing junta. These revolutionaries were not able to accomplish much during the brief period of their rule (December, 1931, to September, 1932), but they did decree some important measures. They proposed to nationalize the coal, copper, and nitrate-mining industries, and they gave strong encouragement to the trade union movement. Some of this reform legislation long survived the government which enacted it.[43]

A new military coup put an end to the socialist republic in September, 1932, one hundred days after the accession of its president, Carlos Dávila, to power, and turned over the government to the chief justice of the Supreme Court. In the same month, new elections were called.

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Forced out of the political arena by the repressive policies of Ibáñez, political parties had reached a maximum point of disorganization during the period of the socialist government. The "social question" had now completely displaced all other political issues, and parties, after a decade of disorder and experimentation, were confronted with the necessity of reorganizing themselves before taking their battle positions.

Among all parties, the Conservative Party came out of the turmoil better than any other organization, principally because of the high degree of cohesion among its members, but also because recent political developments had scarcely affected the interest groups that it represented. At no time, despite the revolutionary ferment, had the land system been in danger of dissolution, expropriation, or heavy taxation. The economic base of Conservative power had emerged intact from all the harrying confusion. In the 1932 convention, the Conservatives reaffirmed their traditional ideological position, opposed to liberalism, particularly of the socio-economic kind. In practical terms, the Conservatives unmistakably associated themselves with the extreme Right.[44]

Fragmentation within the Liberal party was unprecendented. The several factions which existed before the dictatorship had now multiplied into new numbers. In reality, nothing differentiated the majority of the Liberals from the Conservatives, for beyond the façade of political factionalism there was the fundamental fact that both represented identical economic interests and the same social stratum. The membership of both parties had the same characteristics: their leaders belonged to the old Chilean aristocracy; they were the owners of the vast majority of the agricultural lands, a fact which was the base of their electoral power; and they had practical control of the large banking and industrial enterprises. Economically, they represented capital, and socially, the old power elite. Politically, they were dedicated to the defense of the liberal-capitalistic economic system. Previous areas of disagreement between the two essentially conservative parties involved only politico-religious questions and the degree to which commercial or agricultural activities were to be the prime focus of governmental protection and encouragement. Now that these issues had been removed, having no barriers to separate them, the two parties were destined to unite in a powerful bloc of the Right.[45]

The acuteness of the class struggles during the preceding decade had had great repercussions in the Radical Party. This group, essentially individualistically oriented in the beginning, had now turned away from this philosophy and was inclining more toward the primacy of collective rights. While the rest of the parties represented a relatively narrow segment of Chilean society, the Radicals included northern liberals from the mines and southern large and small landholders, and was, at the same time, the stronghold of the urban middle class. The leftist inclinations of this latter group, the petite bourgeoisie of professionals and bureaucrats, prevailed over other segments in 1931. After that date it became clear that the Radical Party had taken the side of the proletarian class and that it advocated a system in which individualism would be replaced by social solidarity.

The struggle between these two currents within the Radical Party had actually commenced in 1906. Until 1920, as we have seen, political parties had tended to align themselves into two camps: a conservative coalition and a liberal alliance of which the Radicals were the backbone. The Liberal Party had fluctuated between both, as a center force, key to all majorities. Now that a compromise between Liberals and Conservatives had brought them together, the Radical Party ceased being liberalism's extreme wing to become the stronghold of the middle masses and part of the proletariat, with ideological inspirations which ranged the spectrum, from moderate state socialism to communism. Having once been the vanguard of the liberal movement, the Radicals were to play a new role, that of the moderating or center force within the ranks of the new social economic leftism.

The extremely varied composition of the Radical Party played a large role in the continuous indecision and vacillation that are so characteristic of this group. With its middle-and lower-class elements dominating Party assemblies and conservative interests prevailing in everyday politics, the party's position must necessarily reflect an ambiguity which stems from the dual nature which so troubles it. Its support of Masonry and distaste for the Church, make it a natural enemy of the Conservatives. It has little affinity with Liberals, who reject state interventionism, but, at the same time, it cannot unreservedly line up with the Socialists who seek full collectivism. As a result, the Radical Party lives a double life. In the electoral arena it is fond of slogans and frequently allies itself with the Socialists and Communists. When in control of the government it often has a rightist twist, allying itself with Conservatives and Liberals in defense of the vested interests. A graphic expression used by one writer to describe this peculiar role is that of "lightningrod for the proletarian storm."[46]

While the Radicals veered to the Left, the first of the Populist parties, the Democratic Party, was undergoing a transformation in the opposite direction, slowly moving away from its proletarian base and becoming more and more a lower-middle-class organization. Two other Populist parties, however, were giving forceful and dramatic presentation of national socio-economic problems. They constituted formidable new forces, and they carried the banners of the newly born Chilean Left. With the overthrow of Ibáñez in 1931, a split in the Communist Party had become public, the result of the Stalinist-Trotskyite feud in the Comintern. Although somewhat weakened by this internal division, the Communists had continued to grow, devoting all of their energies to the labor movement. Some years later, the Trotskyite group, living a precarious life, merged with the Socialists, abandoning the camp to the Stalinists.

After the "socialist republic" fell, there occurred a merger of the small groups which had contributed to the triumph of the socialist coup but which had failed to lend the government the needed support of a disciplined, well-organized political organization. These formed the second of the leftist groups, the Socialist Party of Chile, on April 19, 1933. The new party was destined to play a very significant part in Chile's political life. Its membership grew with remarkable rapidity and for a time it became the strongest of all the mass parties. In its first declaration of principles, the Socialist Party avowed its allegiance to Marxism and advocated the collectivization of private property, the temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, and the economic and political unity of all the Latin American countries.[47]

The multiplicity of party organizations which had gradually become characteristic of the Chilean political system was evident in the election of 1932. Five candidates entered the presidential race. Among these, two represented the rightist forces, two the socialist and communist Left, and the fifth, Arturo Alessandri, the winner, represented the middle class, and received the support of most center groups.

Considering that leading the country to constitutional order was his most urgent task, Alessandri, the champion of the people, during his second administration (1932-1938) was to yield more and more to the claims of the rightist parties and to detach himself from leftist support. In doing so, he was faced with strong opposition, and since there were constant demands for social and economic reforms by the forces of the Left, these were the principal victims of a policy of repression. The Radicals and other "popular" parties began to move together into unified opposition when it became clear that the "Lion of Tarapacá," as Alessandri was called, had ceased to roar and was not going to inaugurate a progressive program.

Another new group was to build up, in a short time, a new party with a promising future. Since the encyclical Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII, there had existed a new current among conservative forces. After 1927, new Catholic social ideas began to gain acceptance in university student circles. The activities of Catholic Action organizations and the appearance of the Quadragesimo Anno encyclical gave further impetus to Christian Socialism. The younger generation among the conservative class, detached from party influences during the Ibáñez dictatorship, was highly receptive to the theories and philosophy emanating from European Social Christian movements. When this Chilean youth, following tradition, joined the Conservative Party, it had already developed definite reformist tendencies. The result was that a conflict soon arose within conservative ranks between the progressive attitudes and ideas of the "Conservative Youth," which after 1935 banded together to unify these elements, and the attitudes and ideas of the traditional Conservatives. This conflict eventually led to a break in 1938. By then the Conservative Youth movement had in any case practically become a separate political entity. After the split, it adopted the name, Falange Nacional.

The success of the Chilean Christian Socialists in building a small but disciplined and effective political organization was remarkable. In relatively short time, they attracted many followers in intellectual circles, in the trade union movement, and in the new industrialist class. "With its democratic political ideals, its roots in a traditional religion made consistent with the modern atmosphere, and its neo-socialistic economic doctrine,"[48] their party, calling itself subsequently the Christian Democratic party, became in later years a major competitor in Chilean politics.

The Popular Front (1938-1941)

In the wake of severe repressive measures and the dissolution of Congress by Alessandri, following a wave of strikes sparked by railroad workers the parties of the center and left rallied together in preparation for the presidential election of 1938. The example of several successful Popular Front coalitions in Europe at this time gave impetus to a similar development in Chile. Obviously, the Comintern's decision in its 1935 Congress to recommend alliances with democratic parties, soon crystalized by the emergence of leftist fronts in Spain and France, must have exerted influence upon the forming of the Chilean counterpart. It seems true, however, that local conditions were the chief inducement. Resisted at first by the more conservative leadership of the Radical

Party, a proposal of the Socialists to form a block of the Left was eventually accepted. Representatives of the Radicals, Communists, Democrats, Socialists, Radical- Socialists, and the Chilean Labor Federation organized a directorate for this political alliance.[49]

The Popular Front was first tested in the 1937 congressional elections, where it made a surprising show of strength. The rightist parties managed to preserve their majority in Congress, but thanks only to systematic bribery and wholesale vote buying. It was after this election that Radical Party leaders realized the political wisdom of throwing in their lot with an alliance which was beginning to awaken a mystical devotion among the masses. Being the largest party in the Popular Front combination as well as the most experienced and best organized, no other could dispute its right to have the controlling voice and to lead the alliance on the road to power. The parties of the Front, realizing the importance of nominating a candidate who could appeal to a broad range of voters, both in the working and the middle classes, chose Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a member of the moderate wing of the Radical Party, to represent the coalition. The Conservatives and Liberals failed to follow a similar course of wisdom and nominated the widely despised extreme-rightist, Gustavo Ross.

In the 1938 election, for the first time in Chilean political history, middle-class and proletarian groups were challenging the traditional parties that had governed the country for more than a century. This was no desperate attempt of the undisciplined masses, but a well-concerted effort of mature, well-organized political forces pledged to basic ideological principles. It was a closely fought contest because it afforded the electorate the opportunity of choosing between two different conceptions of government, and was, to a large extent, a national trial of the existing political systems. "The horizontal divisions of [Chile's] social and political map were never more in evidence than on this occasion."[50]

The Front's victory in the presidential race was not clear-cut, for both houses of Congress were lost to the rightist bloc and its presidential candidate was defeated by only a few thousand votes. But the leftist presidential victory did mean that Chile was to have its first President elected predominantly by the middle and lower groups of society.[51]

After the Popular Front (1941-1961)

The withdrawal of the Socialists from the Popular Front in 1940 brought the formal dissolution of the alliance early in 1941. The Popular Front had been weakened by an effective campaign of legislative obstructionism conducted by the Right and by the intra-governmental rivalry brought about by the contest for control over patronage and policy between the Radicals and the Socialists. Harmony among the government parties was further threatened by the acrid controversy between Socialists and Communists arising from early events of the Second World War and from their natural competition for control of the

labor movement. The Communists chose to remain outside the government, criticizing it when criticism seemed advantageous, but at the same time claiming credit for its accomplishments. In terms of party interests, the Popular Front benefited two parties in particular, the Radicals and the Communists. The first enjoyed control of the government with the consequent consolidation of its political strength. The second, given an unprecedented freedom of action, made greater gains in the struggle for control of the labor unions and the workers' vote and reaped substantial benefits from the weakening of their chief rivals, the Socialists.

Despite the dissolution of the Popular Front, one or another coalition of the Center and Left managed to hold power until the end of the decade. After the untimely death in office of Aguirre Cerda, another loose alliance elected Juan Antonio Ríos, a moderate Radical, who also died in office in 1946. Another Radical, Gabriel González Videla gained office with the support of a Radical-Communist-Liberal parliamentary coalition when the election was thrown into the Congress. His cabinet contained three Liberal ministers and three Radicals and three Communists -- strange bedfellows, indeed. González Videla remained in office until 1952, having first unburdened himself of the Communists in 1948.

By 1949, the Chilean political scene was characterized by an extraordinary multiplicity of parties. The political nomenclature was bewildering. Ten parties were represented in Congress. Another ten new parties had been duly registered for the congressional elections of that year. Of the new political forces, the most significant was the Agrarian Labor Party, which had apparently subsumed all the pro-Ibáñez votes and those of the defunct Nazi Party as well. As the 1952 presidential election approached and the political picture became more confused, ex-dictator Carlos Ibáñez, who was conducting a virulent campaign against the political organizations responsible for governing, began to acquire great popularity. The forces of Ibañismo, as it was called, were heterogeneous and included splinters of varied political coloration. During the campaign, Ibáñez promised to repeal the legislation enacted by González Videla outlawing the Communist party, and this pledge gained for him considerable Communist support. Ibáñez' major strength, however, came from the electorate's strong feeling of disillusionment in the existing parties and from the frustrations and hardships arising from the ever-increasing inflation. [52]

It had been in the presidential campaign of 1938 that a trend having its beginning in 1920 had finally crystallized into a definite alignment of Chile's political forces into three great blocs: the Right, the Center, and the Left. The Radical Party, numerically the largest political organization in the country and also the only one representing a wide range of social and economic interests, necessarily became the center of gravity of Chilean politics. The factors responsible for the central role of the Radicals were at the same time to make it exceedingly difficult for them to perform that role. There exist in the Radical Party, as we have seen, two divergent and even antagonistic currents. The numerical equilibrium of the two groups into which these currents divided the Party alternatively to select leaders, to make policy, and even to

modify ideological principles. One of these currents is definitely Marxist in orientation, and logically it seeks to place the party politically with the Left, even in alliance with the Communist Party. The other responds to traditional liberalism and rejects any contact with the extreme-leftist parties. According to this latter wing, the logical location for the Radical Party is precisely the center of the political spectrum, removed from extremism, and its logical role is to act as the nucleus of a moderate bloc capable of supporting a truly national government representing all Chileans. After the coalition of left-wing forces in 1938 grabbed political power from the aristocratic élite, the Radical Party dominated this coalition for 14 years, while within the ranks of the Party these two wings wrestled for supremacy.

The split personality of the Radicals served well to prevent dangerous extremisms. In affiliation with the leftist parties, it prevented a drift too far from center from approximately 1936 to 1950. When it linked itself to the rightist forces during the last two years of its administration, that split personality exerted the same restraining influence. However, Radical dependence on other political groups seriously jeopardized the party's future, for the cost of dependence on Right or Left for support in order to govern was hollow programs, full of generalities and born out of the "necessity to take color from coalition rather than from inner conviction directed outward in convincingly proposed policy."[53] The administrations of Radical presidents, Aguirre Cerda, Ríos, and González Videla, were often pushed to the left by their contact with Socialists and Communists only to veer later toward the right when confronted with the danger of the social upsets encouraged by the extremist forces. The effectiveness of government was bound to suffer.

Also significant in the years preceding 1952 was the disintegration of the once-great Chilean Socialist Party. In many ways this was inevitable, for the Socialist Party carried within itself the seeds of disintegration. There were in the Socialist Party pure Marzists, some of whom were Leninists and others Stalinists; there were anarcho-syndicalists, arch-enemies of Marxism; and there existed also a major group composed of those who could be called social-democrats, whose position corresponded to what is now sometimes referred to as "humanistic Socialism," as typified by certain currents of French Socialism and particularly by Leon Blum. Once victorious, the prerogatives of power, petty jealousies, and personal ambition prevailed over party interest and ideology, corrupting Socialist ranks. But also important in causing the Socialist decline was the tenacious and effective competion of the chief rivals of the Left, the homogeneous and highly disciplined Communist Party. With the splitting of the Socialist Party, the Communists became during this period the principal political force among Chile's workers. Even after enactment of the anti-Communist law by González Videla, the party managed to preserve its position, and when it gained relative freedom to operate after 1952, it continued to work for control of the labor movement. As regards its political role, it should be noted that throughout this period, the Communists, because of their efficient organization and agile and effective campaign techniques, were always eagerly sought out at election time by other political groups, especially the Radicals.

As regards the forces of the Right, both the Conservative and the Liberal Parties remained very strong. Their control of Congress throughout much of this period, as well as their domination of the nation's economic system, successfully prevented socio-economic reforms from being carried beyond a certain point. Periodic Radical dependence on rightist support permitted the Chilean plutocracy to recover at least part of the political power that it had lost in 1938. A key to the power of the rightist parties was the fact that their hold on the rural parts of Chile remained practically untouched. At no time during the years of leftist predominance did the leadership of the temporarily allied government parties attempt any program involving the partition, the expropriation, or even the increased taxation of the landed estates. Preservation of the latifundio system assured the rightist parties of a sizable representation in Congress, since the great fundo owners were skilled in using their influence in the rural districts to secure the election of the local Liberal or Conservative nominees.[54]

Of some significance was the change of mentality of the traditionally malleable Chilean Right, for although the Popular Front victories drove many of its members to an ultra-conservative and reactionary position, it is also true that those victories made the majority of the rightists start thinking in national terms, instead of exclusively in terms of class interest. Actually the term "oligarchy" could no longer be applied indiscriminately to the Right, and particularly to the land-owning class, for the latter had lost their monopoly of political power in 1925 "and increasingly since then had been taking their place as one of several economic groups, along side the industrialists, mining and metal interests, commercial associations, and the representatives of the labor unions, among others."[55]

The presidential election of 1952 resulted in a remarkable victory for Ibáñez, the candidate who counted himself above politics. The most significant thing about his victory is that for the first time the majority of the rural workers and tenant farmers defied the rightist land-owners in order to vote for Ibáñez. This overwhelming support, across regional party lines, of a man who later came to represent property, uprightness, and strength but who waged a demagogic campaign can be explained only as an expression of the national demand for what political parties had been unable to do, namely, putting an end to an ever-mounting inflation.[56]

By this time, left coalition politics had little to offer. "The economic development program was rolling along under its own power, and few new big and far-reaching ideas were being contributed. Population was going up at an increasing pace, urbanization was snowballing, agriculture was stagnant, prices were climbing inexorably, and economic desires far outstripped economic ability. The ultimate failure of the Left was that it did not know what to do with what it had helped build: its success, of course, is that it left Chile with much more economic power than it had before, contained within well-maintained democratic forms."[57]

Leftist coalition governments, however, failed to bring immediate and basic social changes and always fell short of their campaign pledges. No basic restructuring of society was ever attempted. However, if it is true that the social advances that the Left had been predicting failed to materialize, it is equally true that the Right's dark prophesies of chaos were just as wrong. The old keystone of the economic system, the latifundio, remained intact and unchallenged, and it is interesting to note that, under the Popular Front regime, an order was issued in 1939 that forbade the organization of rural workers into labor unions. This is more understandable when one considers the composition of the Radical Party and the fact that its leaders were, according to their socio-economic status, political anomalies, for most of them were men of considerable means. Leadership of the Left by this type of man served to keep socio-economic demands within certain bounds, with the result that the Conservative opposition never felt compelled to resort to revolution in order to defend its interests. The Radical presidents, all wealthy men, could sympathize well enough with the rightist leadership, and they were able to shape their policies so as not to drive the opposition to extremes.

It was in its efforts toward economic development and industrialization that the center-left coalition achieved its greater success. The crowning achievement was the creation of CORFO (Chilean Development Corporation), which marked the beginning of a state-directed program for economic development. In other fields of governmental authority, the period of leftist coalition politics witnessed the entrenchment and extension of the social welfare structure founded in the early regimes of Alessandri and Ibáñez, a considerable increase in trade union organization, a notable acceleration of educational programs, and tenacious adherence to constitutional procedure.

But whatever hopes the Chilean voters may have had, when, on the verge of desperation and doubting the efficacy of party government, they elected Ibáñez were not fulfilled. If in 1952 these voters tried to escape their responsibilities by electing a father-figure who would take upon himself all their worries, they were soon disappointed, for his administration turned out to be weak and ineffectual. The president was faced with the necessity of making frequent cabinet changes; in fact, he made 41 such changes in the first 33 months of his term. Eventually, he discarded the normal procedure of choosing ministers from the parties and formed cabinets of "non-partisan extras." Like his Radical predecessors, he began his administration with the support of left-wing parties but ended it with the support of the rightist parties. Toward the end of his term, his popularity dwindled, and, deserted by all the political groups that had been carried along with him to victory in 1952, he was a lonely figure. Strangely enough, the man who ruled as Chile's strong man from 1927 to 1931 and who had attempted to bring off a Fascist coup d'etat in 1938, this time, contrary to all expectations, made no effort to establish a dictatorship and presided over two exemplary elections.

Federico G. Gil

Genesis and Modernization of
Political Parties in Chile

Returns of the congressional elections of 1953, which occurred when the Chilean electorate's feelings against the traditional major parties were at their peak, reflected a high degree of political dispersion. All fourteen political organizations represented in the Congress at the time of the election managed to survive the test, although some saw their representation drastically reduced. Of the 24 newly registered parties, 8 elected members to the Congress and the remainder, having failed to do so, were automatically removed from the official registry.

Election returns in 1957 were in striking contrast to those in 1953. Eighteen political organizations participated in the contest. The losers of 1953 were this time the winners. It was obvious that another one of those great shifts in Chilean politics had taken place and that, after the Ibañista fiasco, the voters were willing to put their faith again in the long-established political organizations. The Radical Party recovered its position as Chile's major party. The Christian Democrats (Falange) made impressive gains. Among the rightist parties, the Liberal resurgence was indeed remarkable. The surprising vote rolled up by its candidates was evidence of some success in its bid for the labor vote. The Liberal Party, more flexible than its traditional Conservative ally, had for some time been trying to adjust its thinking to fit the interests of broader segments of the population. The Liberal efforts apparently were now being rewarded with support from sources other than the interest groups that had traditionally supported it.

During the Ibáñez administration, there were some important party developments. Prior to the 1957 elections, the parties of the Left entered into an alliance and called themselves the Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular, or FRAP). Included in this group were the two major factions of the Socialists, and the Labor Party (Partido del Trabajo)and the Democrats of the People (a splinter of the Democratic Party). Also included in the Front were the Communists, prevented as they were then from operating under their own banner. Before long the Socialists were able to bury their differences and to unify their forces into a single well-organized party, which soon emerged as a powerful political force.

As the presidential election of 1958 approached, four major groupings became the contenders. The Conservatives and Liberals, having found a strong champion in Jorge Alessandri, another member of the famous family, made what was clearly their strongest bid for the presidency since their defeat in 1938. The Christian Democrats, having in Eduardo Frei a figure of great appeal among intellectuals, technicians, and non-Marxist leftists, as well as Catholics, waged an active campaign after having attracted several of the small center parties. The Left, fortified by the unification of the Socialists, assumed an independent position, and, rejecting the possibilities of a new Radical-Left coalition, placed its hopes in its leader-candidate, Salvador Allende. As matters turned out, the

unified Left came close to winning the presidency, missing it only by the roughly 40,000 votes attracted by an independent candidate. The Radicals made some attempts to accommodate themselves once again to their leftist partners in so many past electoral battles. No longer able to make a strong appeal to independent elements of the Left and unwilling to make the necessary concessions to permit this rapprochement, they found themselves isolated for the first time, and fought a hopeless battle for their candidate, Luis Bossay. When the returns were counted, Alessandri had won.

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The process of Chilean political modernization cannot be analyzed without some reference to the socio-economic context out of which it has emerged, for here lie the roots of many of Chile's current political problems. The prolonged economic depression, characterized by the decline of industrial output mounting unemployment, is threatening to break up the delicately balanced coalition of Center and Right, which has until now safeguarded the institutional status quo. This danger was clearly brought home by the near victory of the Socialist-Communist coalition in the 1958 election and its impressive gains in the congressional elections of 1961. President Alessandri, in tacit alliance with the Radicals, proceeded after his victory to push a new program of economic expansion and "stabilization," but that program has so far resulted in a return to a 40 per cent rate of inflation and in the contracting of a large volume of intermediate-length foreign credits to finance an expanded program of public works. Some revival of industrial production has occurred, but the negligible increase in employment, the increased inflation, and the rapid rise of food prices have brought the wage-salary adjustment conflict once again to the political stage. That conflict may well break the Rightist-Radical alliance.[58]

The effects of inflation upon the Chilean society and body politic are incalculable. The inflationary process is causing important alterations in the political and economic patterns. The Chilean laboring mass, historically better off than its counterpart in other Latin American countries, is now being forced into social and economic regression and resents it bitterly. The middle class, like the workers, is itself also suffering from inflation and the current anti-inflationary measures. Since, as a key comsumer of domestic and imported goods, this social group plays the most important role in the economic life of the nation, its well-being is essential to the country's future industrial development. Inflation has seriously affected, if not arrested, the healthy evolvement of this middle class upon which Chile's political and economic stability so heavily depends. A new wealthy class has emerged, composed of importers and exporters who have profited through foreign-trade transactions and speculators who have managed to build considerable fortunes in the near chaos of the situation. And there are others who have been lulled into a false sense of prosperity by the constant influx of money, although their basic material position has not really been bettered.[59]

The most obvious conclusion to be derived from any sketch of Chile's contemporary economic pattern is that the country has embarked upon an economically nationalistic program of industrialization which is the result of a national consensus on the necessity for economic elaboration. But the lack of socio-economic coalescence in the structure of society, in turn reflected in a great diversity of organized political groups, is a typical feature of Chilean life. In the short run, the present administration may be able to reduce the economy's structural imbalances and ease social tension for a time, but in the long run there is little doubt that if Chile is ever going to attain a viable and dynamic economy it will depend principally on whether it can create a substantial balance between social means and social ends, something which has thus far been lacking. This situation has been accurately described in these words: "Rights and duties have not been equalized nor are they equally felt along the social scale, for there are vast differences of productive capacity, political power, and social acceptability among the various levels of society. The government must act in the interest of socio-economic sectors, some of which are semifeudal, others of which demand governmental intervention in the economic structure for a variety of reasons, and still others of which want an internal policy of laissez-faire that cowers behind a high tariff wall. No organized groups of importance press for a traditional Liberal political-economic policy. While the Chilean fundo, or hacienda, still makes use of a labor force strongly tied to the soil, the Chilean coal miner is a member of a vertical union and is conversant with all standard forms of political militancy, choosing his leaders from among such groups as the Christian Democrats, Communists or Anarchists."[60] But in spite of these divisions there do exist a series of accords, the most important of which are related to economic policies. The idea of active state participation in the industrial and social welfare of the republic dates back to the early 1920's. It was then that the first symptoms of a conflict between the institutional structure and national economic development appeared. The rudimentary beginnings of an economic development program crumbled during the world crisis of 1930. By 1938, however, an impressive new institutional structure for economic development had been constructed. Under the Popular Front government, the state for the first time was to take the initiative in economic activities other than the traditional ones, to channel its efforts directly toward industrial development. With their acceptance of CORFO (Chilean Development Corporation) came agreement throughout all sections of the population that Chile's problems required broad government planning.

Consensus had been reached on the question of political democracy years before, when the landed gentry, then no longer masters of the destiny of the nation, acquiesced in the matter, first, because they could not prevent the rise of competing groups, and second, because mere political participation by these groups did not essentially endanger their social and economic status. When the demand for governmental programs of social services and labor legislation became strong, consent was achieved again and the rightist forces acquiesced in these programs in return for assurances that there would be no attempts to

tax the land or to destroy the hacienda system. Now, all parties were again agreeing on the desirability of economic nationalism and state interventionism in some degree or other.[61]

There are many explanations of this agreement. All groups realize that, given the lack of available capital, the desire for economic expansion cannot possibly be achieved without government investments. For historical and traditional reasons, there exists no particular emotional apprehension against state intervention among most Chileans. A large number of those in control of the largest industrial enterprises started their careers as government officials and have, therefore, knowledge and appreciation of the state's role in economic development. Most groups realistically, although perhaps unwittingly in some cases, accept the need of outside assistance and with it the governmental intervention that permits the official guarantees generally required for inter-governmental or international loans. Lastly, both extremes of the political spectrum are characteristically malleable, and the Right especially has a long tradition of adaptability. The Chilean political atmosphere is traditionally one of sobriety and austerity, and the country is proud of its political sophistication and tolerance.

The question now, however, is not the transition from a traditional policy to a new one, for the change desired has already taken place and state-directed industrialization has been under way for twenty years. The issues today concern the question of organization and the problem of coping with new changes brought by economic expansion. Contemporary political debate concerns real policy differences about the means of expanding what already exists and of providing solutions to the fundamental public problems -- the high cost of living and inflation -- which are continuously widening the distance between the segments of society. The solution may require far-reaching modifications of the institutional structure, and political consent may collapse precisely on the question of economic democracy. The roots of the national economic problem, in the opinion of many, lie in the necessity of making the sacrifice of restricting living standards without restricting political democracy.

Party competition within the frame of political democracy seems to be failing to meet the demands of politically important segments of the population, and new lines of consent, involving deep changes, will have to be found by the parties if the governmental process based on party government is to function. The inability of organized political groups to meet these demands led a frustrated and angry electorate to turn its back to the parties in 1952 and to return General Ibáñez to power in hopes that a paternalistic authoritarianism would succeed where coalition politics of the Left had failed. It was also this popular discontent that was responsible for the senseless riots of 1957. Chile is at a crucial point in her economic and political development, and the present situation cannot long continue before producing serious social unrest. Given the tremendous appeal of the Cuban Revolution among the Latin American masses, even a country of such temperate political moods as Chile may turn to nationalistic totalitarianism as the counsel of desperation. After all, it is often

said with a certain justice that that half of Chile that is represented by groups which are able to defend themselves against the effects of inflation has been living off that other half which has been unable to so protect itself.

Chile is sliding backward, and what is worse, the economic indexes are showing no improvement at the same time that the demands of Chileans are more pressing. In recent years per capita income has changed little, unemployment has increased, food production is not keeping pace with population growth, and so on. The same old dilemmas have been producing the same old irresolution. Chile's development policy of the last twenty years has been an application of the mixed-economy approach. The Chilean experience may suggest to economists the need to determine the conditions for the success of this mixed approach more clearly. Japan is an example of the successful application of the mixed-economy approach to a backward society because Japan has been able to do what Chile has not, namely, to accumulate capital by heavy land taxes and by depressing wages and salaries. Another type of mixed-economy approach in India emphasizes public investment financed by heavy income and consumption taxes. But as one writer has pointed out, Chile has wavered between the two approaches. It has sought to encourage private accumulation of capital by low and regressive taxation and to protect the agricultural status quo in a setting where the actual consumption of the propertied classes has resulted in a low level of new private investment. But while adhering to these inducements and the requisite tax policy, it has sought to compensate for that low level with public investment and to appease egalitarian pressures with ambitious welfare measures. "Inflation has not succeeded in reconciling the inherent conflict of ends. As long as the political rigidity responsible for these inconsistencies prevails, Chilean development will probably continue to limp along...."[62] Industrialization in Chile has been hampered by inadequate governmental policies, and a further complication has been created by the constantly increasing gap between the middle and bottom layers of society. There is a greater distance today between classes in Chile than ever before in its modern history. It would seem that Chilean society is not sufficiently open to accomplish democratically the radical alterations now demanded. The question is whether this society is likely to become sufficiently pressed so as to be forced to undertake such changes along different channels.

At this point what may happen in Chile is not easy to predict. All that can be safely said is that conditions will not remain static and that an even greater readjustment among Chile's power groups will occur. If any range of possibilities is to be established by those who are fond of playing Cassandra's role, it may be useful to conclude by attempting to give an abstract of the position of each of the four major groups contending in Chilean politics today.

A distinction must be made between the two broad elements of the rightist forces, which have the current responsibility of governing (perhaps for the last time). The Conservative Party espouses economic doctrines of a curiously pre-capitalistic, paternalistic, entistatist nature. It offers not much more than the return to order and authority, to the sobriety and temperance of nostalgic years, at a time when the nation has become accustomed to adventure and danger and expects bold and imaginative thinking. The Conservative formula is clearly rejected by the electorate, as the returns of the 1961 election demonstrated: the defeat the Conservatives suffered then can be described as nothing less than a débacle. The Conservatives would have an "orderly" country, slowly and cautiously picking its way and always in danger of serious stagnation, rather than a nation with the vigor and ambition governments with a popular impetus customarily provide. The Liberal Party, on the other hand, has shown much greater flexibility, as evidenced by its success in attracting some of the new technicians and professionals. Contrary to what might have been expected, it accepts the concept of government intervention in economic affairs, being in favor of a modified form of economic liberalism and the Chilean version of free enterprise. Philosophically, the Liberal Party is the moderate wing of the Right and even shows symptoms of moving a little to the Center.

The Liberal-Conservative alliance emphasizes the authority and austerity personified in its leader, President Alessandri, an aloof and successful businessman who is unadorned by any political attributes except a magic family name and a reputation for ability and honesty. His economic program stresses the need to set an example of sacrifice and austerity to the nation by drastically eliminating all superfluities and introducing rigorous fiscal economies. The Liberal-Conservative bloc advocates the restriction of new state economic activities, no matter how advantageous they may be for the country's progress. That is, only those state enterprises that are already extant or may be regarded as indispensable are to be continued, while all others must be postponed until the country's economy has recovered its balance. In time, the savings derived from a rational administrative reorganization, a more effective tax collection system, and the increasing scope of private economic activities could be employed first in works that are traditionally within the state's economic province and, later, in industrialization plans which cannot be undertaken by private enterprise. Alessandri maintains that the nation was deceived into believing that it had sufficient means to accelerate economic development and simultaneously to improve the standard of living of wage earners, and that it was only selfishness on the part of the wealthy class which prevented it from achieving that end. Coupled with this belief, the government claims, came the erroneous notion that the wealthy class could assume greater responsibility in capital investments.

Since that is only an illusion, it is indispensable to create a favorable investment climate in order to attract foreign capital. Convinced that Chile's present dire economic difficulties have been brought about by an unrestrained urge for development, the Liberal-Conservative alliance desires for the country, in short, a plan of development which would not endanger its stability.[63]

The Radical Party, traditionally the major Center group, shared responsibility for the ultimate failure of the administrations of the period 1938-1952 to utilize to the country's advantage the new economic power that their accession had given Chile. Perhaps for this reason, the Radical plank lacks much definition. It regained favor with the electorate in 1957 chiefly by attacking the Ibáñez policies, but it did little to expound specific solutions. During the struggle for the presidency in 1958, the Radicals were only relatively more explicit. They put emphasis on the need for agrarian reform, based not on the elimination per se of the latifundio, but on the proper utilization of abandoned and unproductive land properties. They emphasized that an insufficient production of foodstuffs is one of the causes of the inflationary process, and found a partial solution in an adequate exploitation of the land. The party believes that capitalization can be increased by reducing superfluous consumption of the high-income groups and that moderate sacrifices by the latter would suffice to allow the economy to develop rapidly. It defends state intervention and participation in economic life as the greatest safeguard for the protection of the most vulnerable groups of society from monopolistic dangers during the present crucial stage of transition toward full industrialization. Now cooperating with the Alessandri administration, the Radicals continue to hold a precarious balance of power in Chilean politics.

The other great Center-Left force, the Christian Democratic Party, is the most articulate group in the expression of economic thinking. For the Christian Democrats, Chile within a democratic framework has only three ways to solve its economic and political ills. The first consists of a frontal attack against inflation through monetary, credit, and other fiscal means. If the tolerance of the country were not exceeded, the frontal approach might be a feasible way to stop the inflationary pressures, restrict consumption, and balance the economy, but at the same time, the Christian Democrats believe that when inflation was blocked, new investments would fall, poverty would become greater, and the dimensions of the economy would be reduced. This solution, which in general resembles that offered by the Right, would mean stability and stagnation, and would only be acceptable for brief periods of emergency and not as a permanent solution. The second way, which closely approximates the Radical Party position, would consist of allowing full freedom in consumption and the consequent race of profits, salaries, wages, and prices, with the hope that production some day would catch up with inflation. The country has had bitter experiences with this method, the Christian Democrats claim, and knows full well that although it may bring brief periods of deceptive prosperity, it

leads eventually to moral as well as economic bankruptcy. The third solution which they discuss -- and the one they have embraced -- is a strict and orderly policy of restriction and economy over a long term, clearly coordinated with a vast program of economic development based on priority investments that would give preference to activities which are basic and directly productive. The Christian Democrats claim that their economic development program would increase Chile's national income 70 per cent in 10 years, doubling the working-class standard of living and providing a 30 per cent increase in the income of the other social groups.[64] They would start with the acute question of urban housing, proceed to the reduction of public expenditures (including a thorough revision of the social security system), and then attempt to bring about monetary stability in conjunction with an increased program of industrialization. Considering that unless changes are made in the agricultural picture, programs of reforms in other areas may prove useless, this Christian Democratic approach accentuates the need for a rational agrarian reform which would contemplate long-term credits, transportation and refrigeration systems, irrigation projects, farm cooperatives, and colonization of state lands. As regards statism, the Christian Democrats maintain that it is unrealistic to create a conflict between state economic intervention and free enterprise. A governmental economic mechanism within a democratic framework and oriented toward basic activities, they claim, can (with the cooperation of private enterprise) achieve wonders in a period of 10 years. With respect to social conditions, Christian Democrats make an appeal for "a national offensive" against poverty and the wretched living conditions of three million Chileans. The wide gulf which separates social classes must be narrowed by achieving a juster distribution of income. Equalization cannot be accomplished by a futile redistribution of the present scarce income, but rather of an income that is constantly increasing by virtue of higher productivity. The Christian Democratic principles are to be applied by Chilean professionals applying Chilean-oriented techniques, for an impersonal nationalism seems to set the tone of Christian Democratic thinking. It is precisely this nationalism and the accompanying emphasis on a neutral government of technicians, together with the call for a national regeneration crusade, that have made such a strong appeal to all professionals and many other groups, as represented in the impressive gains of the Party in the 1961 elections.

The diagnosis of Chile's ills given by the fourth political coalition, the FRAP (Popular Action Front), a formidable alliance of the extreme Left, does not differ basically from the analyses of its antagonists except on the question of locating the blame for the illness. For the extreme Left, the fundamental ailments derive directly from a socio-economic backwardness proceeding from the country's antiquated semifeudal and semicolonial structure. That structure is sustained by the obstinacy of a privileged minority and by the moral decadence of all social levels, but particularly the upper groups. The FRAP's economic prescription, in contrast to those which have been already examined, calls for

drastic changes in the political as well as economic structure of the country. Its formula, chiefly elaborated by the key organizations in the coalition (the unified Socialist Party and the Communist Party), requires a political framework other than the existing one. Aiming towards a revolution for socialism, a step toward integral socialism rather than an immediate socialist revolution, the FRAP advocates what it calls a "workers'democratic revolution" and the creation of a "popular democracy."

The FRAP maintains that it would admit the participation of private enterprise in the economy "only in whatever measure it could contribute to the national effort in the establishment of an efficient, popular state." It also maintains that Chile should not depend, like a mendicant people, on foreign capital and ideas for its progress, and it proposes that the state establish a monopoly upon all basic production sources. Copper and nitrate must contribute larger sums to the government for industrial and agricultural development. These mining industries, if they are not nationalized, must allow the government this larger share of the profits, and all mineral exports should be controlled by the state. The FRAP considers urgent the expansion of Chile's commercial relations with all the Latin American countries, aiming at an eventual economic integration of the Southern Hemisphere and also at the re-establishment of trade relations with the Soviet Union and all other socialist states.

To the FRAP, the only solution to Chile's agricultural problem is a drastic agrarian reform which would put an end to the latifundio system, distributing land among the peasants and supplying them with modern equipment, as well as modern agricultural techniques. The FRAP would allow just compensation providing they do not oppose expropriation. Nationalization of all banks and insurance businesses, as well as the petroleum and sugar industries, is proposed. Both mixed and state-controlled enterprises would exist in heavy industry. Agricultural reform and industrial development are to be financed chiefly by revenues derived from the nationalized foreign companies and from foreign trade.

These postulates are part of a doctrinary platform which the FRAP parties proclaimed in 1958 in answer to those who argued that the Chilean Left had become stagnant and in a sense conservative, dependent on worn-out slogans and lacking in positive and appealing new formulas to capture the imagination of the people. This new Left, inspired mainly by Socialist-Communist alliance, proposed in that year, and again in 1961, a program frankly in opposition to traditional Chilean leftism, which had always been loyal to the prevailing institutional order and in these circumstances had often aligned itself with other political organizations of both the Right and the Left. For the first time, the coalition of the extreme Left agreed that a revolutionary change of the status quo is necessary which will put an end to the system it considers to be only formally or externally democratic.

The Chilean Socialist-Communist group represents what is called "the Marxist alternative," of recent appearance in Latin America. As is the case with Europe, the Latin American peoples will have to choose between creating a new socio-economic order within the principles and methods of Western democracy or achieving this end under Marxist ideas and formulas. Chile, because of its racial homogeneity, its long record of public participation in governmental affairs, the nature of its natural resources, and the irrestible internal pressures for fairer and more efficient forms of social and economic integration, will be one of the Latin American countries to which the "Marxist alternative" is sure to be vigorously offered. What Chile clearly cannot afford is to continue struggling ahead under a confused, defective, and ineffective political system which has failed to make the adjustment demanded by modern conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Adamantios Pepelasis, Leon Mears, and Irma Adelman, Economic Development: Analysis and Case Studies (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 322.

2. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 19.

3. Alberto Edwards, La fronda aristocrática (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1952), p. 51.

4. Ibid., p. 17.

5. Ibid., p. 15.

6. Since the constitution permitted reëlection for a second period of five years, all presidents availed themselves of the opportunity. Reëlection was always achieved without difficulty.

7. Domingo Amunátegui, El progreso intelectual y político de Chile (Santiago, Editorial Nascimento, 1936), p. 84.

8. Julio César Jobet, Ensayo crítico del desarrollo económico-social de Chile (Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1955), pp. 40-43.

9. Luis Galdames, A History of Chile (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 256.

10. Ibid., p. 303.

11. Julio Heise González, Historia Constitucional de Chile (Santiago, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1954), p. 77.

12. The right of the clergy to be judged by their own tribunals.

13. Galdames, op. cit., p. 317.

14. Alberto Edwards and Eduardo Frei, Historia de los partidos políticos chilenos (Santiago, Editorial del Pacífico, 1949), p. 78. This volume binds together Alberto Edwards, Bosquejo histórico de los partidos políticos chilenos, first published in 1936, and another study by Eduardo Frei, which covers the period 1891-1938.

15. Ibid., pp. 80, 82.

16. For a study of the Santa María administration see Humberto Alegría Reyes, Orientación política de la administración Santa María (Santiago, 1946).

17. Galdames, op. cit., p. 360.

18. Jobet, op. cit., pp. 60-63. See also Julio Valdés Cange (Alejandro Venegas), Sinceridad: Chile íntimo en 1910 (Santiago, Imprenta Universitaria, 1910).

19. John Reese Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942), p. 25.

20. Deputy Francisco Palma Tupper. Quoted in Jobet, op. cit., p. 226.

21. Edwards, op. cit., p. 179.

22. Jobet, op. cit., pp. 80-94. See also Edwards and Frei, op. cit., pp. 121-130; Frank W. Fetter, La inflación monetaria en Chile (Santiago, 1942). Hernán Ramirez Necochea, La guerra civil de 1891: antecedentes económicos (Santiago, 1943) throws much light on the influence of economic interests in the civil conflict of 1891.

23. Kalman H. Silvert, "A Political-Economic Sketch of Chilean History from 1879" (Santiago, American Universities Field Staff, January 27, 1957), p. 9.

24. Heise González, op. cit., p. 108.

25. These were: Jorge Montt (1891-1896); Federico Errázuriz Echaurren (1896-1901); Germán Riesco (1901-1906); Pedro Montt (1906-1910); Ramón Barros Luco (1910-1915) and Juan Luis Sanfuentes (1915-1920).

26. Silvert, op. cit., p. 10.

27. An example: the famous debates in 1915 between Luis E. Recabarren and Father Merino in a public square of Iquique.

28. Heise González, op. cit., pp. 124-217.

29. Jobet, op. cit., pp. 147-148.

30. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 212-213.

31. Jobet, op. cit., p. 133.

32. For some descriptions see Domingo Amunátegui Solar, El progreso intelectual y político de Chile (Santiago, Editorial Nascimento, 1936), pp. 146-149; Jobet, op. cit., pp. 131-140.

33. Life in the Santiago slums is vividly depicted in Joaquín Edwards Bello, El roto (Santiago, Imp. Universo, 1929).

34. Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

35. Alberto Cabero, Chile y los chilenos (Santiago, Editorial Lyceum, 1948), p. 339.

36. For the history of the Chilean labor movement see, among others, Hernán Ramírez Necochea, Historia del movimiento obrero en Chile--Antecedentes--Siglo XIX (Santiago, Talleres Gráficos Lautaro, 1956); Tulio Lagos Valenzuela, Bosquejo histórico del movimiento obrero en Chile (Santiago, 1941); and Moisés Poblete Troncoso, El movimiento de asociación profesional obrera en Chile (Mexico, 1945).

37. Edwards and Frei, op. cit., p. 162.

38. Ricardo Donoso, Desarrollo político y social de Chile (Santiago, 1943), p. 181.

39. Silvert, op. cit., p. 11.

40. Stevenson, op. cit., p. 35.

41. Ibid., p. 37.

42. Ibid., p. 40.

43. For a scathing treatment of the revolutionary movement of June 4, 1931, see Alfredo Guillermo Bravo, 4 de Junio: el festín de los audaces (Santiago, Empresa Letras, n.d.).

44. Ignacio Arteaga Undurraga, Partido Conservador--XIV Convención--1947, Notas para la historia política del Partido Conservador (Santiago, Imprenta Chile, 1947), pp. 272-273. See also Edwards and Frei, op. cit., pp. 223-226.

45. Edwards and Frei, op. cit., p. 222.

46. Jobet, op. cit., p. 183.

47. The literature of Chilean socialism is abundant. Some examples of this early period are Oscar Schnake, Política Socialista (Santiago, 1937); Julio César Jobet, Significado del Partido Socialista en la realidad nacional (Santiago, 1940); Luis Zúñiga, El Partido Socialista en la realidad nacional (Santiago, 1938). Also useful are Oscar Waiss, Presencia del socialismo en Chile (Santiago, Ediciones Espartaco, 1952) and Julio César Jobet, Socialismo y comunismo (Santiago, Ediciones Espartaco, 1952).

48. Silvert, op. cit., p. 4.

49. The best treatment of the birth, development and record of achievements of the Popular Front is John Reese Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942).

50. Edwards and Frei, op. cit., p. 247.

51. Aguirre Cerda received also support from many moderate rightists and independent voters. A man of humble rural origin he rose rapidly in the education and political worlds, and had also built up for himself a comfortable economic position. Thus, while he aroused the fierce devotion of the poor man who could identify himself with Aguirre, he also had a strong appeal for intellectuals. Being an essentially moderate Radical and a well-to-do man, he did not arouse violent dislike among Conservatives.

52. For an interesting psychological analysis of the "non-partisan" public reaction which swept Ibáñez into power, see Alfonso Stephens Freire, El irracionalismo politico en Chile (Santiago, 1957).

53. Silvert, op. cit., p. 16.

54. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 177-180.

55. Silvert, op. cit., p. 13.

56. See Stephens Freire, op. cit., pp. 27-33.

57. Silvert, op. cit., p. 19.

58. Pepelasis, Mears and Adelman, op. cit., p. 322.

59. Silvert, op. cit., p. 4.

60. Ibid., p. 2.

61. This does not necessarily mean that opposition is lacking. An example of adverse opinion is Luis Correa Prieto, Aspectos negativos de la intervención económica (Santiago, Zig Zag, 1955).

62. Pepelasis, Mears and Adelman, op. cit., p. 323.

63. For details on Alessandri's electoral program see "La acción de un mal gobierno gravita con más fuerza sobre los grupos más desamparados, dijo Jorge Alessandri," El Mercurio, October 27, 1957.

64. "Con Frei, Chile tiene la seguridad de alcanzar el gobierno que necesita," El Mercurio, December 20, 1957.

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SOME EISENHOWER IMPACTS ON THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE

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Hill and Knowlton, Inc.

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With no apologies for my partisanship I begin by acknowledging my inability to deal with today's subject in complete objectivity. You must realize that my prejudice is two-fold. First, because I was a member of the last administration the disection of whose cadavar justifies our meeting today. Secondly, because I am not a member of that administration's successor.

The realization that I was no longer among the "ins" was brought sharply home to me on the day following the inauguration. When I walked into my new office I found waiting for me the first batch of mail to be forwarded from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Stamped across each letter was this Post Office cancellation: "Notice--All aliens must register during January." While a participant in few of the major solutions, and, I trust a contributor to none of the major problems, my various assignments in the last administration in the White House did give me excellent opportunities for cognizance of the demands upon the Presidency and Eisenhower's impact on that office.

Historians who speculated on changes a Dewey victory in 1948 might have brought in our nation's domestic course will spend future moments contemplating the lasting effects of the Eisenhower smile on the Russian people had Khrushchev allowed them to meet. Press agents will want to join in the speculation to continue their search for the personality formula which knew neither race nor language barriers, which held a President above and beyond his Administration, and which won for Eisenhower more popular support by the numbers than any other man before him in recorded history.

Eisenhower's ability to adapt quickly to his new assignments aided him in his rise to five-star rank in the Army during his short experience as an academician and, finally, as President of the United States. Unlike other national military heroes of World War II, the public did not automatically think of Eisenhower as a soldier. He had been a soldier and a good one, that they knew, but in the minds of the men on the street, Eisenhower was a dedicated public servant who also happened to be a successful General. This subtle but important distinction accounts for the apparent inconsistency with which many citizens were reluctant to support General MacArthur for the Presidency -- because he was a military man -- yet supported Eisenhower's candidacy with no hesitation.

Eisenhower believed in slow but steady progress in civil rights; that the government should get out of competition with business, should not interfere in strikes except as a last resort, should take only limited steps of intervention during mild recessions, should not set up price controls.

Although he was a steady-as-you-go President, his military, space, science, education and highway budgets were the largest in the peacetime history of the nation. Still, people liked "Ike" because he was honest, because he was a religious man, and for a hundred other reasons they considered more important than a program or a policy.

In just those areas where the growth can be measured, the U.S. Presidency has developed into one of Gargantuan responsibilities, countless details, and a health-flailing schedule. The nation's population swelled twenty per cent during the Eisenhower years alone. Growing at a rate equivalent to adding a state the size of Kentucky to our population every twelve months, in 1959 we passed the net birth rate of India!

This growth brought with it an increase in the problems of our people and an increase in the pressures on the President to solve them. Added to this during the Eisenhower years were international problems brought on by recognized U.S. leadership of the free world.

Although President Eisenhower during his two terms in office reduced by a quarter of a million the federal employees on the government payroll, he was still head of a working organization of more than two million civilians. This organization operated on a budget of billions of dollars so carefully calculated and delicately balanced that an increase or cut of a single million could affect the lives and fortunes of a great number of citizens. In sheer terms of management this made his job the most demanding in the world.

It was Eisenhower's belief that no one man could direct himself to the major problems of the Presidency unless he organized his office for the best conservation of his time and developed a screening process which would prevent his being smothered by the chaff of unimportant details.

You, whose profession is the science of politics, are aware of the methods President Eisenhower used to accomplish these purposes -- the staff system, the Assistant to the President, the meetings of legislative leaders. Because of my personal involvement in the highly-organized Eisenhower cabinet system, however, you may consider it academically of interest to hear about it in greater detail.

American Presidents, pre-Eisenhower, have not always used their Cabinets as fully as they might. George Washington made little use of his Cabinet in the early, experimental days of the new democracy.

President Polk frankly stated he preferred to conduct the affairs of the government without the Cabinet's aid. Still, he set an all-time record of four hundred meetings in four years.

Harold Ickes wrote about the Roosevelt Cabinet: "The cold fact is that on important matters we are seldom called upon for advice. We never discuss exhaustively any policy of government or question of political strategy. The President makes all of his own decisions and so far at least as the Cabinet is concerned, without taking counsel with a group of advisers....it is fair to say

that the Cabinet is not a general council upon whose advice the President relies, or the opinions of which, on important matters, he calls for. Our Cabinet meetings are pleasant affairs, but we only skim the surface of routine affairs."

In administrations from Washington to Kennedy, U. S. Cabinet meetings have taken on varying degrees of importance. All too often they have been haphazard, carelessly planned conclaves, meeting in an atmosphere of indecision, aimless debate and even recrimination where the members discussed trivia. In contrast, Eisenhower used his Cabinet, relied on its advice, worked it hard, made it productive.

President Eisenhower's fuller use of the Cabinet system may be attributed in part to his unique pre-Presidential experience. First as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then as Supreme Allied Commander of SHAPE, he attended some of the Cabinet meetings of PresidentsRoosevelt and Truman. As a casual student of political science, "General" Eisenhower was surprised to see how little of the nation's business was transacted at the Cabinet table. Short meetings were held spasmodically and a considerable part of the sessions was spent in good-natured bantering over items of no consequence. When the President would ask if there were anything to come before the group, Cabinet members would say they knew of nothing and the meeting would adjourn.

This is not meant as an implication that the important affairs of government were not given attention. But they were not discussed at the Cabinet table. After adjournment, members would queue up outside the President's office to wait their individual turns to talk in private about the business of their departments.

A working Cabinet also fit more naturally into the staff type system under which Eisenhower had worked during his military career. On assuming his office he determined that the nation's growth and the complexities which that growth had brought with it, no longer permitted an American President the luxury of an inoperative Cabinet. He determined to select the best men he could obtain for his Cabinet and to utilize to the fullest the talents of those he selected.

As he viewed the problems of government, there were few of real importance to one department that did not affect other departments as well. One of his best examples was the area of Civil Defense planning. Here general Federal responsibility is focused in one Agency but cuts across several others: The Atomic Energy Commission with its data on weapons, the Department of Defense, for basic military assumptions, the Department of Commerce concerning use of roads, and its Weather Bureau for information on upper air winds for fallout calculation, the Interior Department concerning power and fuel resources, the Department of Labor concerning manpower, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, concerning medical supplies.

In President Wilson's time Secretary of War Garrison said to Secretary of the Navy Daniels, "I don't care a damn about the Navy and you don't care a damn about the Army. You run your machine and I'll run mine."

Eisenhower could not have worked under a system that permitted such petty sovereignities. To him modern government was one of programs -- each, like the Civil Defense program, involved a group of departments working together, submerging their individualities into comprehensive program aims. To Eisenhower tight coordination was no less important in the Executive Branch than he had considered it in the military when he wrote:

"The teams and staff through which the modern commander absorbs the information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind."

Particularly with Eisenhower's determination to hold the lid on government spending, new proposals in one field were in competition with and had to be weighed against new ideas in another. This gave the head of each department an interest in the Cabinet presentations of his colleagues, even if the proposals did not otherwise cut across the area of his responsibility.

Eisenhower used his Cabinet as a non-voting Board of Directors before which developing executive problems and future plans were presented. He did more than welcome the collective advice of these, his top appointees; he pulled them into the discussion and drew out their questions and comments. When the Secretary of Interior made a proposal, the Secretary of State might say, "Mr. President, this is how that proposal may affect foreign relations." The Secretary of Agriculture might add, "If you consider that for Interior, Mr. President, this is what we may be pressed into for Agriculture." And the Director of the Bureau of the Budget understandabley could be counted on to add, "Mr. President, if you do that for either of them, this is how much it will cost."

Eisenhower expected the members of his Cabinet to leave their departmental prejudices outside the Cabinet room and take their places at the table to advise him as a cross-section of senior citizens. As such, they represented a wide variety of America. In addition to ex-Governors, and Senators, there were lawyers, philantrophists, newspaper editors, former military officers, a former head of the world's largest Chevrolet dealership, a former labor consultant, a stockbroker, a college president, the head of a large accounting firm, the president of a soap company, a furniture manufacturing concern, an automotive and a steel corporation, a lay preacher and a ranch manager.

When this group assembled, Departmental boundaries became relatively insignificant. In the give and take of the discussion, with this variety of minds together in one room simultaneously considering a common problem, a cross-fertilization of viewpoints took place. I was constantly impressed with the sound and helpful advice which cropped up in Cabinet meetings from the most unexpected quarters, from Cabinet members with no jurisdictional responsibility for the problem under discussion.

While expanding its function in government, Eisenhower also expanded the number of those who regularly attended meetings and had assigned places at the table. In addition to the ten Department Heads authorized by law, he included

the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the Assistant to the President and the Secretary to the Cabinet.

What eventually became known as "the Eisenhower Cabinet system" was given given formal approval in a full Cabinet meeting. It was a system designed, at the President's request, by Carter L. Burgess, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and long-time Presidential friend, and Burgess' assistant, Bradley Patterson, Jr. who became a part of the new system. "The Eisenhower Cabinet" combined some of the strong points from the Army staff system, the National Security Council and the British Cabinet Secretariat. A major contribution to American political science, it made possible the most effective use of the Cabinet since its inception in 1791.

For coordination of the affairs of his Cabinet, President Eisenhower created the position of Cabinet Secretary. Contrary to the others who sat around the table and had their offices in the buildings which housed their departments, he located the Cabinet Secretariat quarters near his own in the White House.

To our office he assigned two principal functions. First, the preparation of the agenda for weekly Cabinet meetings. In working with the President and Members of the Cabinet and Congressional leaders, we would discuss which of the problems of government would be of concern to the President and to more than one Department official.

Initiative to place an item on the agenda came from several sources. Perhaps half of the items originated with the Cabinet officers and their subordinates. Some 25 per cent resulted from direct action on the part of Eisenhower. The remainder were generated by the Cabinet Secretariat through Congressional suggestion, follow-up on a previous item, investigation of a report in the press or the timely completion of a Committee's work. Whatever the source of the suggestion, the final approval of the agenda was the right of the President.

Cabinet officers, if the choice were theirs, generally would prefer to present their recommendations to the President in private, without specialists in other fields looking over their shoulder. While each appreciated his opportunities to be informed about and contribute to the plans of others, it was only natural he would hesitate to put his brain child on the table for all to attack. One Cabinet officer spoke for many when he once told me, "Putting a pet project on the Cabinet agenda is a good way to get it nibbled to death by ducks." As a consequence, Eisenhower's desire to have major proposals funneled to him through the Cabinet machinery would have fallen apart without an assist from his firm hand.

Occasionally the President would stop a Cabinet officer in the middle of a private presentation in his office to tell him he did not like to spend time twice on the same subject. He would point out that the item under discussion was the type of thing he wanted presented to him before his Cabinet colleagues and ordered it placed on the agenda.

Word of the Chief Executive's determination spread from Department Head to Department Head and admonitions were less necessary as the years of the administration rolled by.

Nevertheless, there was considerable fat and froth on the agendas, for the system encouraged Cabinet discussion of items that were not always worthy of Cabinet time. Each Cabinet officer was aware of the administration's responsibility to the country as a whole. His particular interest, however, his specialty and the problems with which he dealt hour after hour and day after day were peculiar to his Department and it was hard for some to see anything as important to the operations of the Government.

There were also some unavoidable errors of omission. Although Eisenhower brought his council together with every-Friday regularity, it was not always possible to bring important items to a climax by the meeting day. Too, some problems became overripe if held until the stated session, required a Presidential decision in the interim and became "informational" items on the agenda.

Despite these drawbacks, the system worked with smooth efficiency, putting the affairs of the "Board of Directors" of the biggest and most important organization in the world on a businesslike basis.

For nearly every item on the agenda, we worked with the Departments to prepare what we called an Advance Position Paper. These papers offered comprehensive examinations of the subject, presenting both historical and current significance. They presented an objective review of all sides of the issue and contained pertinent legislation existent or proposed.

These background papers made for more fruitful discussions. They served each Cabinet member as he discussed the problem within his own department and in advance of the meeting. At the table Cabinet officers then could speak to their Departments' reactions to the proposal. Their opinions could carry the weight of "My Department believes," not, "I think."

Further, the position papers provided all Cabinet members with a common level of background on every subject under discussion. No Cabinet time was wasted in bringing up to an acceptable norm the knowledge of others in the room who were less familiar with the area of the project proposed. The presenter would move immediately into a discussion of the problem and his recommended solution. The President expected his Cabinet members to follow the example he set in doing his homework on these papers.

Considering the comparative formality of the Eisenhower Cabinet meetings, it has been a surprise to many to learn that there were no complete transcripts or minutes kept. The President decided early in his term that there would be too much temptation for a Cabinet member to talk to the record, or equally bad, to refrain from saying something because of the recrod. The President reasoned it was better to have full and frank discussions on every side of the issues presented than to record some golden words for posterity.

While a member's comments were never recorded verbatim, the President's every word was taken down in shorthand by Brad Patterson, career civil servant and 1960 Flemming Award winner, who served as Assistant Cabinet Secretary under both Max Rabb and me. Brad attended all of the meetings and, from his place at the side of the room, carefully noted the Chief's comments and reactions to the proposals that were made. This record was an invaluable assist to us in performing our second principal function -- follow through.

After the meeting we would screen those Presidential utterances and prepare a Record of Action which contained a terse sentence or two about each item on the agenda, indicating the disposition that had been decided upon by Eisenhower. Since action at a Cabinet meeting can come only from the President, a record of the comments of others at the table -- historically interesting as those comments might be in showing the arguments and men who influenced the Presidential decision -- was not necessary for our action guidance. I would generally check our condensation of the President's comments and conclusions with the Cabinet officer who had made the presentation at the meeting. The final determination as to whether we had caught Eisenhower's intentions, however, came from him. I would send the Record of Action in to the President or, if his recommendations for action did not seem perfectly clear, take it in personally. He would study the Record, carefully, checking off the paragraphs with his pen as he read, make changes where he thought they were required, and initial the document. Once he had done so, we had both a timetable and a club of authority for seeing to the implementation of his decisions.

The President underscored the importance he attached to this side of the duties of his Cabinet Secretary in one of the first instructions he gave to Rabb when the job was created. "During my military career," he said, "and especially in times of battle, I worried, of course, that I might make a wrong decision. However, I also worried that a right decision, once made, might not be carried out."

Mimeographed copies of the Record of Action were sent around to each of the Cabinet participants. Additionally, we were assisted in following up Presidential action by the Special Assistants for Cabinet Coordination. The Cabinet Secretariat in the White House never grew in numbers from its original size -- the Secretary and his Assistant -- something of a record in government. In part this is a tribute to the aid we were given by the Special Assistants. "The Eisenhower system" wisely added this protection against the possibility that Cabinet officers at the conclusion of a meeting might leave the city for out-of-town speeches or overseas business. If they remained in the Capitol they might go from the meeting to the "Hill" to testify before a Congressional Committee. And even those who returned immediately to their Departments might find awaiting them a crisis that erased the urgency of the business just concluded in the Cabinet room.

Following each Cabinet meeting, the Assistants came in, took their boss' places at the table, and a rerun of the agenda was held for their benefit. When it was possible to do so, we had the presentation repeated by the man who had given it originally. When this could not be worked out, we would reconstruct the presentation, using the charts or slides that had been shown at the earlier meeting.

We relayed to the Assistants the President's reactions and conclusions and, where appropriate, we told an individual member of the group the comments or pledges of action made at the earlier meeting by the men he represented.

The Cabinet Assistants then had the responsibility of seeing that the Under and Assistant Secretaries in their Departments were apprised of developments that concerned their areas of authority and backed up the Cabinet officer's pledges with action.

"The Eisenhower System" assured follow-up with one final device. Periodically, the Secretary to the Cabinet would schedule himself on the agenda for presentation of the "Action Status Report." This document contained not only those action items assigned since the last Status Report, and on which our daily round of surveillances had kept us current, but covered every Cabinet decision made during the Eisenhower administration on which there had not been complete implementation.

Before its presentation to the Cabinet, I would break the list into Departmental headings and send each Cabinet officer the list of items charged to him which would be given to the President and his colleagues at the table. These reminders that their delinquent business was about to be reexposed caused the members of the Cabinet to reexamine the legitimacy of the delay and to bring the matter to a conclusion if possible. By the time it was presented to the President in Cabinet meeting, the report had served its major purpose.

Many items, particularly those presented by an officer of sub-Cabinet rank, were given a dry run before they were presented at the official meeting. In these practice sessions we would help the speaker tell his story in sharper detail, advise him when an idea was a repetition of one brought out in a previous meeting, point out if his charts contained letters or figures that were too small to be read down the length of the long table, help him aim his conclusions so he would obtain a definite decision from the President, one way or the other, and, consistently, we would counsel that the presentation was too long.

Generally, we were novices advising experts in the subjects to be presented. By the time we began the dry run, however, we would have read more about the area than some of the Cabinet members who would eventually hear the presentation, and our lack of greater depth gave us the advantage of judging whether a technical statement made sense to a layman's ear.

Perhaps the best endorsement of the machinery by which Dwight Eisenhower produced results in volume from his cabinet came not from the President, whom the system was designed to serve, or from those of us whose part in it gave reason for prejudice. This endorsement was a part of a speech given by a member of the Cabinet, by one of that group of men who critics predicted would try to render the system inoperative. After summarizing the advantages of the Eisenhower cabinet organization, he concluded: "At the same time, I would like to answer those critics who charge that the machinery is so inflexible that it limits the discussion to items chosen in advance by the staff. I, and I am sure none of my

colleagues, have never been discouraged from bringing any item to the Cabinet table without previous clearance from the Cabinet Secretary. And anyone who has anything to add to any discussion receives all the cue he needs when the President ends each meeting with the question, 'Gentlemen, anything else?'"

In the Eisenhower administration, no Department Head whether affected directly or indirectly, was denied his chance to be heard in major decisions. No one could claim "I was not consulted". Each member had a chance to make an honest dissent, to hear the arguments given on each side of each subject. Each heard the comments and questions and reasoning which went into the decision of his Chief. When the Presidential conclusion came, whether or not he agreed with it, he knew what had gone into it and understood it. And because he understood it and had participated in it, each Secretary was more firm in his support of the President's position.

Subject of course to the restraints of the Constitution, every Chief Executive is free to organize himself and his work however he wishes. Thirty-day intervals have passed between the meetings of President Kennedy and his Cabinet; more power is given to non-Cabinet advisers. In the first six months of his administration, the White House Staff he had planned "to keep very small" outgrew Eisenhower's.

Eisenhower found his Cabinet "system" an invaluable aid in increasing executive efficiency. He used his Cabinet, made it important as a body.

The formal Cabinet meetings which President Kennedy has referred to as "a waste of time," were the hub of coordination in President Eisenhower's administration. They were the forum for an interchange of Departmental ideas, problems and solutions, a forum of such value that the Kennedy Cabinet continues to hold regular meetings even though they are infrequently attended by the Chief Executive.

It is difficult to measure the lasting effects of the degree of Executive office organization which Eisenhower labored to achieve. Certainly it finds no champion in the present incumbent. Still, the results of actions a man does not take often provide lessons which influence others to choose opposite courses in the future. And Presidents, in the years ahead, who sense a need for channeling the efforts of their subordinates and themselves through adherance to a more formal organization pattern, will include the Eisenhower system among the alternatives from which they chose.

The Eisenhower Presidency has left an apparently indelible impact in other areas. Eisenhower's method of personal diplomacy, which he traveled nearly 300,000 miles to practice, established an awareness of the power of the Presidential presence abroad in invoking goodwill for the United States. As evidence of his concern for them and their problems, the present and future Chief Executives will emulate Eisenhower's successes and present themselves to great masses of foreign peoples, despite campaign oratory that "the job is in Washington and that is where I intend to stay."

President Eisenhower left his mark, too, on the office of Vice President.

When he held the nation's second highest office under George Washington, John Adams was referred to as "His Superfluous Excellency". In each succeeding administration the Vice President has been the target of jesters.

Thomas R. Marshall referred to himself as Woodrow Wilson's only vice. Marshall described the Vice President of the United States as "a man in a cataleptic state: he cannot speak; he cannot move; he suffers no pain, and yet he is perfectly conscious of everything that is going on about him."

Many, if not most, of America's Vice Presidents have been selected because their geography, stated philosophy or age added something to their party's ticket, not because their attributes could be useful following the campaign. Still, they have not been the unused extra thumbs by choice.

During the campaign of 1952, Eisenhower promised that, if elected, he would make an operating office of the Vice Presidency and would school his running mate in the complexities of the Presidency. When he followed through on this political promise, eager-teacher Eisenhower found he had an apt and equally-eager pupil.

It was Nixon's good fortune to serve under a president who believed in exercising his right hand, and he performed each assigned task with a skill that justified more of the same. By Presidential order, he attended all Cabinet, National Security, and Legislative meetings. There were no executive secrets between Eisenhower and Nixon. One of the President's first actions upon returning from an overseas trip was to send for the Vice President, brief him fully on the problems he had run into and give him an evaluation of the foreign leaders he had met. Nixon became the popular President's chief political spokesman. As he carried the Eisenhower standard over the nation, he built a grass roots organization that by 1960 precluded any other selection for the Republican nomination save his own.

To represent the President abroad, Vice President Nixon visited 54 nations, went to every continent and covered more than 160,000 miles outside the United States. He had extended discussions with 35 presidents, 9 prime ministers, 5 kings, and 2 emperors. At home, on the first time that the American public had had a seat at the bargaining table, he represented that body as the third party to the negotiations for settlement of the steel strike.

The degree of respectability to which Dwight Eisenhower permitted his hard-working and responsible assistant to elevate the office of the Vice Presidency is best evidenced by the high calibre of the man who accepted the post as his successor. Of significance, too, the Eisenhower agreement for Vice Presidential takeover in the event of the Chief Executive's incapacitation, has been adopted, almost verbatim, in the Kennedy-Johnson administration.

Future Vice Presidents will be used, will be drawn deep into the counsels of government and will be prepared for the eventuality for which they are elected.

It is right that this should be so. And Eisenhower deserves credit for the bit of political maturity to which it gives evidence.

Eisenhower also established, probably irrevocably, the practice of permitting unedited transcripts of press conferences for public use. In 193 sessions, he swung at the curves thrown him by some 250 reporters asking every conceivable question in the world. And he raised to a new standard the democracy's press cry of the "public's right to know."

Perhaps the best of the lasting contributions of the Eisenhower Presidency, was the eight year record of his personal integrity, honesty and sincerity. These were attributes which the public came to take for granted and which were challenged in no instance for two full terms.

Neither political party has a monopoly on men of such high personal standards. When a man with precious principles is elevated to our highest office, it helps to remove the odiousness from politics and the suspicion from the honest practioner. And at all levels of government, it sets a standard and gives a respectability to public office, encourages more capable citizens to allow their names to be placed on the official ballot to public office, and raises the expectations of those who elect them.

Since I have made no attempt to mask the subjectivity with which I have discussed my topic, it will be consistent for me to close with a reference to the Eisenhower characteristic which in close association made the greatest impression on me. I speak of the Eisenhower modesty. Perhaps it made such a strong impact on me because through five years of associating with him in various jobs and in an ever-increasing friendship, I never was able to forget that he was the President of the United States. My awe of him and of his title was contrasted with the fact that he was not the least impressed with Dwight David Eisenhower. He demanded high standards of respect for the Presidency of the United States. He was proud of his family and of his nation. Yet he carried an almost unbelievably modest appraisal of his personal accomplishments and power.

He won the hearts of his countrymen but their admiration failed to turn his head, despite the contrast between the acclaim and power they gave him and his humble origins and early career. Eisenhower was so completely unknown when he received his promotion to Colonel that a Fort Lewis, Washington newspaper captioned a picture of him "Lt. Col. D. D. Ersenbeing". After this promotion, the unassuming future President in giving vocational counsel to his son, John, told him he didn't expect to go much farther in his own career.

On the GOP campaign train in 1952 conditions were crowded and uncomfortable, the participants hot and tired. One of the advisers shared his small bedroom with a file cabinet and boxes of campaign materials which were stored on his bed and had to be moved out into the hall before he could turn in. He had just fallen to sleep, one steamy night around 1:30 a.m., when somebody knocked. "Who in hell is at that door?" he shouted. A voice answered, almost apologetically,

"It's Ike. I thought maybe I could see you for a minute." Eight years in the Presidency did nothing to change this unassuming air of candidate Ike.

In many instances, Eisenhower's modesty coupled with a determination not to push the will of the people or exceed the bounds of the authority granted the executive branch kept him from greater accomplishments. Speaking of the Presidency, Woodrow Wilson said, "Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country and no other single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him." Eisenhower had the strength of great public support added to the constitutional and political power which culminates in a President, and could have wielded unprecedented executive authority. It was frustrating to men who knew so fully of his noble purposes and high ideals that he did not always exercise his power to implement them. More wisely than many of us around him, however, he realized that the gain which seemed so important to us at the moment could not offset the long-range consequences of a Chief Executive who warped the definitions of the system that empowered him.

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CIVIL-SCIENCE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: The Example of the President's Science Advisory Committee

CIVIL-SCIENCE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: The Example of the President's Science Advisory Committee

In undertaking an analysis of civil-science relations in the United States today one finds himself raising far more questions than he can hope to answer. Like the subject of civil-military relations, which is only in part analogous to the one under discussion here, the problems of understanding the contemporary relationship of science and civil society will require extensive investigations carried out by many scholars.

Although there have been excellent studies of some aspects of the subject of civil-science relations, such as Don K. Price's Government and Science, large areas of concern remain relatively untouched. Wallace Sayre, for example, in a provocative article in Science raises a number of the questions which must be asked in defining the subject matter of civil-science relations: Who are the scientists? Who speaks for the scientists? What is meant by an American science policy?[1]

The most striking aspect of contemporary civil-science relations is the variety of public roles played by the scientist. While the scientist in American government has never been solely a researcher divorced from the policy realm, the multiplicity of tasks and the extensiveness of the scientist's participation in the national government today is a development which approaches a revolution in the relationship of scientist and government.

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1. Wallace Sayre, "Scientists and American Science Policy", Science, Vol. 133, No. 3456 (March 24, 1961), pp. 859-864.

As researcher the scientist is no longer laboring solely in traditional fields such as chemistry or geology but he is now bringing his analytical tools to bear on policy matters as well, especially in the realm of national security policy. Whether he works directly for a federal agency such as the Department of Defense or in a contract organization such as RAND Corporation, the natural scientist is doing research on questions of public policy and not simply on technical questions.

Increasingly the scientist's participation in government-sponsored research and his consequent intimate knowledge of the government's problems have become stepping stones taking scientists to positions of major political significance. Today one finds the scientist in the bureaucracy as policy advisor, public administrator and technological entrepreneur. In each of these roles, and others as well, the scientist exerts a considerable influence in the formulation of public policy.

The scientist as advisor can be found at practically every level of government, and as time passes he appears in increasing numbers of agencies of government. Without doubt, however, the most significant scientific advisory group is that which advises the President of the United States. These spokesmen for science who include the President's Special Assistant on Science and Technology and the Science Advisory Committee have had a profound influence on the processes of American government and the policies of two successive Administrations through nearly four

years of activity in the top echelon of the Executive. Of these men more will be said later in this paper.

The scientist as administrator, like the scientist as advisor, is not novel in kind, but he is a radical innovation in degree. For whereas in the past the scientist as administrator tended to be restricted to the scientific service agencies, such as the Weather Bureau and the National Bureau of Standards, the scientist today has administrative positions which cover broad policy areas. In this connection, two notable examples stand out. The first is the position of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense. This highly strategic position in the formulation of national security policy appears to have become one reserved for scientific weaponeers. Another significant contemporary example of the scientist as administrator is the emergence of a pattern of the appointment of a majority of scientists to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Although, as A. Hunter Dupree points out, the scientist in American government has always been an entrepreneur, once again the recent change in degree has profound implications.[1] The scientist at the frontier of knowledge has become a major entrepreneur in the area of technological advance. This function of the scientist as technological entrepreneur is most clearly seen in the area of weaponry, but the pattern appears to be one which will

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1. A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957)

spread to other areas of public policy. A few examples of such technological entrepreneurship will suffice: Robert Oppenheimer's leadership of the Manhattan District Project and the post-war development of tactical nuclear weapons; Edward Teller's successful campaign for a thermonuclear weapon; and John von Neumann's powerful impetus to the Air Force's missile program. While these examples could be multiplied, they serve to point out that on occasion the scientist has staked his own capital - his scientific reputation - against serious opposition on a risky technological venture and has succeeded in his entrepreneurship.

A curious new role of the scientist in government is that of the scientist as intelligence evaluator. Since the early post-war period, scientists on both a relatively permanent and an ad hoc basis have evaluated information on Russian technological activities for political leadership. In 1949, for example, it was an ad hoc panel under Robert Oppenheimer which was called upon to evaluate and to report on evidence that the Russians had exploded an atomic bomb. And most recently it was to an ad hoc panel of scientists that President Kennedy assigned the task of evaluating all available evidence concerning whether or not the Russians had violated the nuclear test ban moratorium which had been in effect since the fall of 1958.

Lastly, the scientist in government service has become in fact a diplomatic negotiator. Again there are numerous examples of this responsibility of the scientist as diplomat, but one out-

standing example will do nicely. In the summer of 1958 the United States sent a scientific delegation to Geneva to negotiate the first part of an international treaty outlawing future nuclear weapons tests. Although ostensibly solely technical in nature, the Geneva "Conference on Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests" was actually very political in nature. Whether either the scientist-diplomats or the government appreciated this fact is, of course, another matter.[1]

The variety of tasks performed by scientists in the government today has elicited a number of analogies by means of which various individuals comprehend and explain the new role of the scientist in public life and his relationship to American political leadership. Although to this writer none suggested thus far seems to be sufficient to a thorough understanding of civil-science relations, each does contribute to that understanding. And recognition of the weaknesses of each analogy leads to awareness of issues which ought to be studied.

For some analysts the appropriate analogy is that of the relationship of the military officer to civilian leadership. Like the military officer, the scientist has a special set of skills which make him supreme in the restricted realm of his competence.

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1. The writer discusses this matter elsewhere. American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons From Hiroshima to the Nuclear Test Ban (To be published by Princeton University Press in early 1962)

From this point of view the primary problem of civil-science relations is the maintenance of "civilian control" over science. How, in other words, given the increasingly complex technical nature of the public's problems and the consequent dependence upon scientific advice, can publicly elected officials continue to retain the competence to decide what ought to be done and retain control of such decisions?

A noteworthy weakness of this analogy is that, unlike the military officer, the scientist who is most important to the subject of civil-science relationship fulfills the greatest part of his career outside the federal bureaucracy. Most likely he is a university professor, a scientist in a government laboratory administered under a university contract, or an industrial scientist-administrator. As such, he is a private citizen who advises the government on a part-time basis. Or in some cases the time the scientist serves as a full-time member of the bureaucracy is a rather short one in comparison with the total length of his career. Also unlike the military officer, he is usually not directly responsible for the carrying out of his advice and ideas. This peculiar situation where the scientist is influential within the government bureaucracy yet at the same time is outside of it, gives the scientist an anomalous status which may have enormous political implications.

The second analogy applied to civil-science relations is

that of the relationship between the lawyer and government.[1] As the many roles played today by the scientist indicate, scientific matters, like legal matters, now pervade all aspects of public policy, and, like the lawyer, the scientist has a general competence for dealing with these matters. Just as each agency head needs his legal officers, so does he increasingly need his own scientific advisors if he is to understand the complex technical problems facing the agency and - not inconsequentially - if he is to muster the technical arguments to defend his position in the councils of government.

Again, however, the analogy of the lawyer and scientist in government is perhaps misleading. The scientist comes into government from a tradition far different from that of politics; the lawyer, on the other hand, is more attuned to the political process. The probability that the scientist in government has a clouded image of what politics is all about and how it works is further complicated by a serious problem in communications which the lawyer does not experience. If the scientist's esoteric knowledge is to be meaningful to the decision-maker, the scientist himself must give it meaning; as shall be shown, this task of translating a highly complex technical subject into layman's language gives rise to some serious problems.

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1. Robert Wood of M.I.T., who brought this analogy to the writer's attention, has written an excellent unpublished paper on the analogy of the scientist and the lawyer.

The scientist is also unlike the lawyer in that he participates in government as a member - and often as the representative - of a highly self-conscious professional community. Whereas the lawyer's first loyalty is to his client, the scientist's first loyalty is to his profession. In government the scientist often speaks for science or scientific "truth" in a manner which the lawyer does not for the legal profession or jurisprudence. This professional orientation of the scientist has profound implications for civil-science relations as indicated below.

The third analogy frequently used to describe civil-science relations is that of the scientific community as a pressure group which utilizes the traditional strategies of pressure groups in its relations with the national government. The scientific community, as this analogy leads one to realize, has become almost totally dependent upon federal research funds in carrying out its projects. Increasingly, the decisions which seriously affect the welfare of science are being made by public officials. For this reason, scientists themselves must be willing to take on positions within the government as the representatives of the scientific community if science is to be protected. Their task as such is to protect the interests of science as conceived by the scientists themselves.

This analogy of the scientific community as pressure group is incomplete in two significant ways. In the first place, the relationship of the scientific community and the government is far

more intimate than it is between the government and most other, if not all other, interest groups. Although government decisions affect all interest groups in the society, such decisions in the field of science are more far-reaching, extensive and detailed. Whereas, for example, in national economic policy the government acts as regulator, and as a referee whose task it is to provide a beneficial environment for individual autonomous firms, in national science policy the analogous decisions to those which a firm would make itself, such as those on allocation of resources, are often made within the government itself. In a half dozen federal agencies such as the Department of Defence, the National Institutes of Health and the Atomic Energy Commission the important decisions affecting the course of American science are made: How much money for basic vs. applied research? How much money for chemistry, physics and biology? Which research projects should be supported? For this reason each of these agencies now includes representatives of the scientific community as advisors to participate in these decisions, and in most cases even to make the most significant decisions affecting the welfare of science.

The analogy of the scientific community as traditional pressure group is perhaps inappropriate for yet another reason. As indicated above, the scientist in government who speaks as a scientist is more than the spokesman for a parochial pressure group. Unlike the usual member of a pressure group, the scientist is most often believed by others and by himself to be speaking for

the "truth". In fact this apparent function of the scientist in government as the definer of technical reality has led some commentators to suggest, not always facetiously, a fourth analogy: the scientist as a member of a priesthood with a monopolistic control over an esoteric body of knowledge upon which the salvation of the society depends.

Each of these attempts to define by analogy the role of the natural scientist in government and to conceptualize the nature of civil-science relations contains an element of truth. And although each analogy may be somewhat misleading, each illustrates the interdependence of government and the scientific community. Scientists as scientists are increasingly coming to share in the formulation of broad areas of public policy as advisors on the nature of technical reality, as administrators of technically-oriented programs, and as technological entrepreneurs in numerous areas of government interest. At the same time, the decisions taken by government officials, with or without the advice of scientists in the area of national science policy, increasingly affect the welfare of the American scientific enterprise.

Because of this intimacy between science and government, science in the United States has taken on the character of a quasi-public enterprise. At the same time that representatives of the scientific community have come to perform a variety of functions of a public nature, government agencies have become the major

participants in the governance of the scientific community. This quasi-public status of the scientific enterprise which gives to civil-science relations its distinctive character is most strikingly illustrated by the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). However, if one is to understand this institution, one must have some knowledge of its history.

The origin of what was to become PSAC was the establishment of a Science Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War. Initiated primarily as a result of prodding by scientists, and especially by physicists who were disturbed by the course of American national security policy, the committee was to remain relatively inactive during the next few years. Its major accomplishment prior to its elevation to the White House level after the advent of Sputnik, was an extraordinarily thorough review of American national security policy by its Technical Capabilities Panel under the chairmanship of James Killian.

However, the subordinate and relatively inactive position of the Committee during this pre-Sputnik period had a profound influence on its character. In the first place, it became the domain of those scientists who were increasingly disturbed with the direction of American nuclear policy during the early Eisenhower years. Expert in nuclear affairs, and with strong views on the subject, they disliked the influence exerted on American military policy by such persons as Lewis Strauss, Edward Teller, and Ernest Lawrence. In the second place, the inefficacy of the Committee

and its lack of prestige made it attractive - if that is the word - only to scientists with a strong sense of social responsibility. In effect, this meant primarily the physicists who had served on the Manhattan District Project. The Committee was thus largely one composed of university nuclear physicists, with little representation from other fields or institutions.

Of considerable importance to the development of the character of the Committee was its relative political obscurity. Its scientific members were able, within proscribed limits, to exercise a high degree of political and administrative autonomy. They initiated study projects on problems which interested them, and made it a point to inform themselves thoroughly concerning governmental problems which touched upon science. On at least one occasion it appears that the Committee even sought out those persons in the Administration whom it desired to advise on a particular problem in which its members were interested.[1] Most significantly, however, the committee maintained itself as a self-perpetuating body with its own set of procedures: the scientist-members themselves decided who would sit on the Committee, and what would guide and/or limit its operational procedures.

With only one possible exception, the scientists operated judiciously in their position of semi-autonomy within the bu-

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1. The writer is referring to the role of the Committee in the intra-administration conflict over continental defense during 1952-53. Unfortunately the information on the role of the Committee in this struggle is quite scanty.

reaucracy. And when called upon to assist political leadership, as they were on occasion, they did so very conscientiously. As a consequence, when governmental innovations were called for after Sputnik, in October 1957, one of President Eisenhower's first moves was to elevate the Committee to the White House level as his Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and to appoint one of its outstanding members, James Killian, as his Special Assistant for Science and Technology. In doing so, the President brought into the center of national policy-making a semi-autonomous body of scientists with particular characteristics developed when the Committee had been on the sidelines of national policy-making.

Since the fall of 1957 the nature of PSAC has been modified in a number of particulars, yet it remains essentially a unique institution in the American body politic. [redacted] It has been increased in size and the predominance of physicists has been reduced, but it continues to be a self-perpetuating body even though its membership is theoretically approved by the President. Furthermore, although it <u>is</u> an advisory body to the President, it exercises an extraordinary latitude of operations and also advises other agencies such as the Department of State; furthermore, it has issued in its own name public statements on education, science policy and space research. It is rumored as well that its Chairman, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, has initiated study projects on technical matters whose results have had considerable political impact within the Administration.

As a consequence, PSAC and its Chairman have, unlike - for example - the business advisory committee to the Department of Commerce and the Council of Economic Advisors, a significant degree of political influence. Furthermore, and this is of decisive importance, in contrast to the economists on the Council of Economic Advisors, these scientists exercise their power free from Congressional scrutiny. As members of the President's personal staff they enjoy executive privilege. This privilege has, it may be added, been invoked on a number of occasions when Congress has been displeased with the advice of PSAC to the President and has desired to call the scientists before one of its committees.

Although the activities of the President's Special Assistant and PSAC within the Administration are highly classified, there is sufficient public information available for one to appreciate the specific political roles played by these scientists. In discussing these activities of the scientists, the political implications of each will be quite obvious. In most cases when the writer speaks of PSAC he includes the Special Assistant as well.

In the area of governmental reorganization these scientists were largely responsible for the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with its built-in principle of civilian supremacy in space exploration. In addition, PSAC was largely instrumental in the reorganization of research and development in the Department of Defense, and the appointment of one of its own members, Herbert York, as the first Director of

Defense Research and Engineering. Thirdly, these scientists were responsible for the reactivation of the scientific attaché program in the Department of State.

With respect to national policy, these scientists played an important, although immeasureable, role in the decision of the United States to seek a nuclear test ban. PSAC sponsored the intra-agency panel under Hans Bethe which determined that a nuclear test ban control system was technically feasible. Other ad hoc panels of PSAC have studied various aspects of this policy area since 1958, and have advised the President and other agencies of government. In addition, Killian served on an ad hoc Committee of Principals which was established to advise President Eisenhower on the test-ban negotiations.

A third area of PSAC operations has been to advise the President on various technical proposals made by executive agencies. In effect, it is becoming the principal body for budgetary review in the technical realm; the fact that the Bureau of the Budget lacks a staff of technically competent experts has meant that the President has turned to PSAC as an alternative source of budgetary advice in the technical area. In this capacity PSAC has exercised a strong influence in the retardation or cancellation of a number of programs such as the B-70 bomber, the nuclear-powered aircraft, and the Nike Zeus anti-missile missile programs.

In addition to these essentially public functions, PSAC has become one of the primary groups - and perhaps the most impor-

tant one - in the leadership of American science. This body, then, is not simply advisory to the President but it also has substantial powers in the governance of the American scientific community. It is because of this influential position of a public agency in the leadership of an otherwise private, voluntaristic enterprise that the scientific enterprise has been described in this paper as occupying a quasi-public status. What, then, are the functions of PSAC in the governing of American science?

In the first place, PSAC has become the leading spokesman to the public for American science. In part this is due to its prestige as the President's advisory committee on scientific matters, but it is also because, unlike other scientific institutions, such as the National Academy of Science, it has been able to reach a unified position and has overcome the reluctance of scientific organizations to speak on public issues as organizations. As a result its reports, such as the one it released on space research, have assumed the character of the official position of the scientific community.[1]

A second role of PSAC [redacted] in the governance of American science, is the position it has come to occupy as the primary representative of the scientific community to the government. This position has been as-

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1. The President's Science Advisory Committee Introduction to Outer Space. The White House (March 26, 1958).

sured by the quality and prestige of its members and also by the access these scientists enjoy to the President and his chief political advisors. As a result it has, for example, become possible for a scientist with an important project requiring government support to go directly to PSAC for support rather than through a cumbersome chain of command.

Thus it was that PSAC was able to sponsor successfully the suggestion of Nicholas Christofilos of the Livermore Radiation Laboratory that the United States explode an atomic bomb in space in order to determine among other things whether or not the resulting radiation field would provide a defense against inter-continental rockets. Although Project Argus proved to have [redacted] less significance than originally anticipated, it might have been of decisive importance to national security. The important thing, however, is that PSAC, which took the suggestion to the top leadership in DOD, was able to have this project accomplished far faster than if Christofilos had had to utilize the administrative chain of command.[1]

The third role of PSAC in the governance of American science is one that will expand considerably over time. The ever increasing cost of scientific research and the consequently increasing dependence of the scientific community upon federal financial

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1. For this history see U. S. House of Representative Committee on Science and Astronautics, Nuclear Explosions in Space Hearings before the Committee, 86th Congress; 1st Session. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 1-10.

support is leading to a situation where the major decisions affecting American scientific research will be made in the federal bureaucracy. Thus far, these decisions have been relatively decentralized and the leadership of each discipline, such as physics or biology, has largely controlled the allocation of funds. As the demands of research on the budget have increased there has, however, been a perceptible trend toward centralized decision-making and the establishment of overall research priorities.[1]

Although the National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences are participating more actively than they have before in the determination of these priorities, such as the emphasis on oceanography and radioastronomy, the responsibility for actually establishing these priorities will undoubtedly come to rest ultimately with PSAC. Its members have both the stature as scientists and the political position in the Executive to fulfill this leadership function. In this connection it is easy to believe that the extremely active role of PSAC in the decision of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to support a very costly electron linear accelerator at Stanford University presages the shape of the future organization of decision-making in the American scientific community.

The implications of this position of PSAC within the

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1. For a discussion of this subject see William Carey "Budgeting for Science: Presidential Responsibility" Perspectives on Government and Science. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Service, vol. 327, January 1960, pp. 83

government and within the scientific community can only be fully appreciated in terms of its mode of operation. In this connection mention has already been made of the latitude of its advisory powers, of its enjoyment of executive privilege, and of the fact it is a self-perpetuating body. In addition, one must understand the place of PSAC and the President's Science Advisor in the network of scientific advisory mechanisms that advise the government.

Although PSAC and the Special Assistant may pursue a study project themselves, with the aid of only their immediate staff, the most frequently employed device is to assign a problem or project to a panel of experts with a member of PSAC as Chairman. On some occasions these panels have been selected by PSAC to be representative of the government agencies concerned with the problem; this was the case, for example, of the Bethe Panel which studied the technical feasibility of a nuclear test ban. On other occasions, such as the study of the Stanford linear accelerator, [redacted] panels have been composed of private scientists.

The scientists chosen as members of these panels are usually themselves advisors to government agencies, participants in agency programs, or otherwise knowledgeable of the subject under investigation. This fact causes one to venture a number of speculations which, if correct, could have very important implications for the American system of government. Yet they remain speculations although hopefully they are in the nature of educated

guesses.

Perhaps the most important question to be asked about the PSAC panel system is whether or not the scientists on the panels who also serve as advisors to other agencies of government will [redacted] exhibit a loyalty to the agency or to their profession. In other words, will a scientist who serves on the scientific advisory board to the Department of the Army and who is called upon by PSAC to serve on a panel to evaluate the Nike Zeus program believe his function is to defend the Army's case? Or will he make available to his scientific colleagues on the panel his intimate knowledge of the technical weaknesses in the Army project?

If, as the writer believes, the latter situation would tend to be the case, PSAC becomes an invaluable instrument in the President's continual battle to maintain control over the federal bureaucracy. In this technological age knowledge truly is power and PSAC, through the panel system, does and will function as an important weapons-system of the President. It enables the President to counter the parochial claims of various agencies for one technological project or another. As a consequence, the President can be strengthened in his constant battle to maintain hegemony over the executive agencies.

The assumption that the loyalty of the scientists on the PSAC panels would be to their profession and not to a govermental agency is based on a number of considerations. In the first place,

the professional code of the scientist is a real force in his life; this is especially true for those scientists who are competent enough to advise the government and to be chosen by PSAC to serve on one of its panels. For example, the commitment of scientists to "truth" is sufficiently strong to have prevented the scientists who have engaged in the passionate debate over nuclear weapons testing from wilfully distorting the facts relating to radioactive fallout, "clean" weapons, and feasibility of test detection, regardless of how their interpretations of these facts may have varied.[1]

A second and potent factor which favors professional loyalty is that for the most part these scientist-advisors serve the government as private citizens and as such their careers are not dependent upon the agency they are serving. To the contrary, the hunger of agencies for the most competent scientific advisors they can find may give these scientists a favorable bargaining position with respect to the agencies. Furthermore, these scientists are often working on the panels with professional colleagues whose good opinion they may be anxious to obtain.

The last reason why this paper argues that professional loyalty will supersede agency loyalty is highly speculative but may in itself be of some significance. This is the notion that

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1. The writer has discussed this in some detail in his unpublished manuscript American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons op cit.

there has developed in the United States an alternative or perhaps auxiliary career pattern for scientists as government advisors. The scientist interested in serving his country, saving the world, or simply enjoying political influence, can enter this profession at any number of points: in research at a government-owned, university-administered laboratory, on an advisory committee to a government agency, or as a policy researcher in an organization such as the RAND Corporation. It would appear that an increasingly important stepping stone in such a career for scientists will be satisfactory service on one of the panels of PSAC. From these panels one can advance to positions of higher responsibility, including membership on PSAC itself. From PSAC, the ambitious scientist can advance to positions of the highest national responsibility: President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (James Killian, George Kistiakowsky, and Jerome Wiesner); Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Glenn Seaborg); and Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense (Herbert York, Harold Brown). Since PSAC and the President's Special Assistant would occupy a central position in this emergent professionalization of the scientific advisory function, they would have at least a subtle influence over scientists who entered the advisory profession. And although such a situation would be far from the creation of a governing scientific elite, its implications for the scientific community are worthy of thoughtful consideration. [redacted] At the least an appreciation of the professional

loyalties of the scientist is essential to an understanding of the real power of PSAC.

The importance of PSAC in the American political system stems most directly, however, from the fact that the scientist-advisor is not solely the definer of technical reality who makes known to the decision-maker the technical feasibility of various policy alternatives; instead the scientist-advisor frequently may even share with public officials political responsibility for selecting among policy alternatives.

While the advice given by the scientist to the policy-maker generally appears quite technical, careful analysis of its substance or effect will reveal it to have a political nature. This is to say that even though the expert may present his advice in terms of the technical <u>what is</u>, the advice may be important politically because explicit or implicit in the reported technical data are numerous non-technical assumptions including political assumptions concerning <u>what ought to be done</u>. These non-technical assumptions influence, and sometimes determine, the problems selected by the expert for emphasis, the facts he believes relevant, and the implications for public policy he may draw from the selected facts. As a consequence the non-technical assumptions which influence the technical advice of the advisor to the executive branch of government are important factors in the formulation of public policy.

Although in most cases these non-technical assumptions

are provided for the expert by political leadership and are obvious enough in the expert's advice to be available for review by the person being advised, there are important exceptions to this situation. The degree to which the expert himself implicitly supplies the political assumptions underlying his advice depends upon a number of factors. It depends first of all on the level of the government hierarchy at which the expert advises: the higher the level, the more likely it is that the expert will be important not just in providing technical data but in participating in the selection of the political goals to be achieved. Similarly, as the technical complexity of the subject matter or the political indecisiveness of the persons advised increases, the expert's role in policy determination is also enlarged, and his own non-technical assumptions become important ingredients in policy formation.

As a matter of fact the situation in which the scientist advisor to political leadership finds himself makes the introduction of non-technical views into his advice quite inevitable. This inevitability arises out of the vast gap in communications between the technical expert and the political generalist. Whereas the knowledge possessed by the expert is complex, abstruse, and often quantitative, the political decision-maker pressed by many problems requires qualitative advice: Ought he or ought he not make a particular decision? Under these circumstances, if the expert's knowledge is to be meaningful to the decision-maker, the expert him-

self must make it meaningful. He must select those facts which he believes are relevant to the problem under consideration and interpret their significance for public policy. Under the circumstances it would appear inevitable that the scientist's advice on technical matters be based in part on the scientist's non-technical assumptions about the problems at hand.

Thus in a policy area such as national policy toward nuclear weapons, all the conditions exist to permit and even encourage the expert to supply his own non-technical assumptions concerning policy goals, and thus to exert a strong influence on the formulation of policy. Firstly, the scientists advise at the highest level of governmental hierarchy. Secondly, the subject matter of atomic weaponry is highly complex, and thirdly, American political leadership has been extremely indecisive over the goals of its nuclear policy.

The advice of the scientist-expert, then, very often occupies a middle category between the realm of science or <u>what is</u> and the realm of politics or <u>what ought to be done</u>, and therefore the scientist who advises in an area such as nuclear weapons policy must combine both his science and his political judgment. The scientific advisor to the President or to his top aides does not simply provide the advisee with an objective analysis of the facts, but also with his judgment concerning <u>what ought to be done</u>, given the scientific facts as seen and interpreted by the experts. The necessity for such a combining of technical and political judgment

gives to the scientist as advisor his very special status and power.

This characterization of the expert's advice as part technical and part political is well recognized in some areas of public policy and is only just becoming appreciated in others. It is now commonplace, for example, to view with a critical eye the advice of experts from business or labor who appear before a Congressional committee. Increasingly too it is appreciated that there is no purely military advice; President Eisenhower himself typified this new attitude with his reference to "parochial generals". As a matter of fact, it was concern resulting from this recognition which led President Eisenhower to elevate the Science Advisory Committee to the White House level so that it could provide him with an alternative source of advice to that of the military and of other special interests in the government.

Despite the fact that scientific advice has thus been purposely sought as a balance to advice from other sources which are recognized as prejudiced and/or limited in their perspective, scientific advice has not in general been evaluated in similarly critical terms. On the contrary, the history of certain American policies in the formation of which scientists have been involved, such as that toward nuclear weapons, leads one to conclude that both scientists and political leadership have acted as if it were possible to make a clear delineation in policy formulation between the political and technical realms. And, according to this generally accepted view, the task of the scientist is to supply only the

objective, technical facts which the decision-maker then combines with the non-technical components of policy supplied by himself or some other expert.

This simplistic view of the scientist's role as advisor has created expectations of the scientist which by the very nature of things the scientist cannot fulfill. At the same time that he is continuously being put into a position by political leadership where he is forced to make judgments of an essentially political-technical nature, political leadership, fellow scientists, and his own conscience expect him to render only objective, technical advice. As a consequence of the failure to appreciate the necessary intertwining of the technical and political, three things have happened. In the first place, scientists have been assigned apparently "technical" tasks, whose performance required a political skill far beyond their competence. In the second, there has been a failure on the part of scientists and political leaders to realize the nature of the non-technical assumptions underlying the scientist's advice. And thirdly, the belief of scientists that advice is and must be "objective" has led to charges of intellectual dishonesty when one scientist has disagreed strongly with the advice given by another.

The scientist's own failure to appreciate the complexities of the special role of the scientist as advisor has allowed him to apply the same criteria to that role that he does to the professional behavior of scientists. The scientist, with few

exceptions, expects the advice of fellow scientists to be true and objective in the same sense that any scientific statement is true. He forgets that the scientist as advisor is not seeking the "truth" but is seeking "wisdom". The advisor's task is to combine [redacted] technical expertise with his overall understanding and good sense. He has moved out of the realm where the scientific method and the scientist's canons of criticism are the most relevant guides for judgment. His primary responsibility is to be wise, and of this neither scientists nor [redacted] other groups have objective standards of evaluation.

Although the following statement from Hans Bethe, a former member of PSAC, indicates partial recognition of the fact that the advice of scientists is not purely factual, even it fails to appreciate the real nature of this advice. Bethe writes:

> "The only other group of people [besides the military] who are fully informed [on national defense] are the scientists working on the weapons. Since they don't have, a priori, a professional interest one way or the other, they should be able to consider nonmilitary factors, political as well as ethical ones. Their opinion is therefore valuable in arriving at the balanced decision." 1

Even as he recognizes the introduction of nonscientific factors into the scientist's advice, Bethe assumes that this advice is still somehow less prejudiced, less affected by "professional interest", and more valid and balanced than that of other advisors. And

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1. Hans Bethe, "Review of Robert Jungk's Brighter Than a Thousand Suns", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 14, No. 10, (December 1958), p. 427.

Bethe himself, as this study will show, has not appreciated the extent to which his own nontechnical assumptions have influenced his "technical" advice concerning the feasibility of a nuclear test ban.

The failure of scientists and others to view the scientific advisor according to standards similar to those applied to other advisors, or as wisdom-seekers rather than as spokesmen for scientific truth accounts for the constant recrimination and antagonism within the scientific community. Apparent scientific differences among scientists which have actually been differences over the political significance of agreed-upon scientific facts have resulted in charges and counter-charges of intellectual dishonesty. Upon close examination, however, one discovers that no scientist in the bitter history of the intra-scientific conflict over nuclear policy has actually distorted the scientific facts, and that the scientists at all times have been in general agreement on the facts, even though their conclusions have frequently been radically different from one another. Differences have been due to the fact that scientists have selected, emphasized, and interpreted those specific scientific facts which they have felt supported their own political position regarding the wisest course for American nuclear policy.

The scientist is, of course, aware of the danger that his personal views may influence his presentation to the public and its officials of advice on technical matters. However he believes that he can effectively guard against this possibility and keep

separate his presentation of the technical facts and his personal views on the implications of the facts for public policy. Unfortunately the scientist, with rare exceptions, fails to realize that under the circumstances which characterize his participation in government this is impossible. In fact, the extent of the conflict between the scientist's belief in his own objectivity and his actual role as advisor is due in large part to the subtlety of the problem. It is best understood in terms of the advice given to literary critics by D. H. Lawrence in the preface to his Studies of Classic American Literature, where he states that the task of the critic is to compare the "tale's moral" with the "author's moral". [1] How often, Lawrence points out, the moral which the author says he wishes to make is contradicted by the author's use of character, description and narrative. The same inconsistency between profession and performance is often true of the scientist as advisor.

Time after time a scientist will preface a statement with the assertion that his intention is only to make an objective presentation of the facts and that the implications of these facts for public policy will be left to his audience. However, with few exceptions in this writer's experience, the conclusion or moral which the scientist himself has reached becomes very obvious in

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1. (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1951), p. 13. The writer is indebted to Norman Jacobson for making him aware of the applicability of this contrast to the present discussion.

the scientist's narrative.

An excellent example of the contrast between the scientist's stated "moral" and his "tale's moral" is found in a study entitled Fallout edited by John Fowler.[1] The moral of the study according to Fowler is "... to inform, not to mold opinion...to present to the public the raw material from which this opinion can be forged is both the privilege and the duty of the scientist." This objective presentation of the facts, and only this, is to be the "moral" of the author. However, by the end of the book, the tale's moral has asserted itself. Its conclusion is a passionate argument for disarmament, including a nuclear test ban. "The road to disarmament is certainly not easy," the author tells us, but it is, he continues, "more ennobling than the perfection of weapons of man's destruction."[2] Perhaps this is so, but these sentiments are hardly the objective presentation of facts without any intention to mold opinion.

In a manner very similar to this, the scientist's "technical" presentation very often unwittingly becomes transformed into political advice. A paper or document whose stated purpose is to lay out the relevant scientific facts frequently concludes with a statement concerning what ought to be done, as indicated by the facts selected for presentation. Seldom does the scientist

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1. John Fowler, Fallout. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960)
2. Ibid, p. 187.

appreciate that his views on what ought to be done are in large part responsible for his original selection of the facts themselves.

The fact that the scientist either cannot or can seldom free himself from his underlying non-technical assumptions is quite understandable, although inadequately appreciated. Even in scientific research, where rigorous conditions exist to encourage objectivity, it is impossible for the scientist to free himself from his implicit assumptions of a non-technical or non-scientific nature. The values of the scientist are an integral part of his research.[1] These values affect the problems he selects for study, the facts which he believes are relevant, and the implications or hypotheses he draws from the facts.

Truly it can be said that without the scientist's emotional and normative commitments there could be no science. They are the impetus as to the dynamism of scientific research. "The notion that a scientist is a cool, impartial, detached individual is," James Conant tells us, "of course, absurd. The vehemence of conviction, the pride of authorship burn as fiercely among scientists as among any creative workers. Indeed, if they did not, there would be no advance in science."[2]

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1. For an excellent discussion of the relationship of the scientist's values and scientific research, see Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961, pp. 485-502.

2. James Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952, p. 67.

Similarly, without the commitments of the scientist to certain political goals, a high level of competence, vitality, and dedication amongthe government's scientific advisors could not exist. However, rigorous conditions similar to those which are applied to the scientist in his laboratory and which make explicit the scientist's underlying assumptions that are an integral part of his research or advice are not found within the advisory mechanism of government.

Thus, Conant's caution that "...this emotional attachment to one's own point of view is particularly insidious in science because it is so easy for the proponent of a project to clothe his convictions in technical language," becomes especially meaningful with regard to the scientist in government.[1] Without accepting Conant's apparent implication that this clothing of convictions in technical language is deliberate, it should at least be understood that the scientist as expert advisor operates as much on the basis of his non-technical assumptions as he does on his command of a body of scientific knowledge.

As a consequence of the fact that scientists may have differing non-technical assumptions on a matter such as nuclear weapons, there has arisen the problem of conflicting expertise. Even though the scientists agree on the technical facts, their interpretation of the significance of these facts for public policy can be at great variance. This situation is well illustrated by

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1. Ibid.

the following juxtaposition of conflicting advice of two equally eminent scientists, Hans Bethe and Edward Teller, on the technical feasibility of a control system to monitor a nuclear test ban:

> Hans Bethe: "I believe, therefore, that it is technically feasible to devise a system of detection stations and inspections which give reasonable assurance against clandestine testing, with the possible exception of very small, decoupled tests." 1
>
> Edward Teller: "This is the impasse at which we find ourselves today. We can say simply, surely, and clearly that if we agree on test cessation today, we have no way of knowing whether the Russians are testing or not. There are no technical methods to police a test ban." 2

Each scientist has interpreted the scientific facts according to his own political predispositions. To Bethe, a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and a disbeliever in the strategy of limited nuclear war, the facts mean that the United States could have "reasonable assurance" Russia is not cheating. To Teller, a strong advocate of a strategy of limited nuclear war and an opponent of nuclear disarmament, the facts indicate that there are no "technical methods to police a test ban."

It is impossible to speak of either scientist as being

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1. Hans Bethe, "The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests", The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 206, No. 2 (August 1960), p. 48. [Italics mine]

2. Edward Teller, The Issue of Peace (Unpublished and undated manuscript) [Italics mine]

correct, because although each speaks as if the issue were solely a technical one, the questions dividing them are actually non-technical in nature. What constitutes "reasonable assurance" for Bethe does not do so for Teller. The significance of small, de-coupled tests for Teller is not the same as it is for Bethe. The probable efficacy of the"technical methods" in deterring Russian cheating, as Teller sees it, contrasts with Bethe's expectations of their efficacy.

Such differences in opinion cannot be settled by the methods of science. They rest on assumptions which are outside the scientific realm and which concern the military value of tactical nuclear weapons, the technological intentions of the Soviet Union and the political desirability of disarmament. Yet these assumptions cannot be separated from the content of the scientist's advice; rather these non-technical factors are an integral part of his seemingly technical advice. Thus, the scientist-advisor, like the military-advisor, is not simply a technical specialist but truly determines public policy through the political content of his advice; and through the existence of PSAC and other advisory bodies as well the scientist has become a man of political power. Yet, unlike that of the military officer, the scientist's proper status within the government remains largely undefined. There are no standards by which the appropriateness of his behavior under various circumstances can be judged. Owing to the lack of appreciation of the scientist's political power, the nation has

not decided what the scientist's rights and responsibilities as an advisor are with respect to his advisee, the President (if different from the advisee) and Congress.[1] In other words, the following question has not been answered: What does or should constitute "civilian control" in the realm of civil-science relations?

This problem of "civilian control" in civil-science affairs cannot be ignored much longer. The fact that there is political significance in the question of who speaks for science is becoming increasingly evident. This fact is coming to be recognized by military officers, public administrators and Congressmen who have seen scientific advisors contribute to the defeat of projects they have held dear. Such persons are realizing as well that the scientist's advice on such matters as a B-70 bomber, a Nike Zeus anti-missile missile or an atomic powered aircraft is not solely technical but may reflect as well the strategic and political attitudes of the scientists. In large part it will be remembered this situation underlay the Oppenheimer security trial.

One Congressman who has a strong desire to see the United States produce a nuclear-powered aircraft and who realizes that the defeat of this project was due primarily to the negative advice of PSAC has already made the observation that there is a "failure of many scientific advisors in the United States to distinguish between scientific and technical advice on the one hand

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1. Don Price has discussed this problem in his Government and Science (New York: New York U. Press, 1954), pp.138ff.

and national and international political policy and budgetary matters on the other."[1]

The fact that scientists are apparently able to exercise such political power within the Executive branch and in society in general without at the same time being responsible to Congress, as are military officers, is equally disturbing to this particular Congressman:

> "The doctrine of executive privilege which the President's Science Advisory Committee has wrapped around itself [sic]. The members of this committee can go out and make speeches and appearances of various sorts to create a favorable image for their views. But their reports are kept secret - not on grounds of security but on grounds of privilege." 2

Congressman Melvin Price's criticisms of PSAC point out only one aspect of the problem of "civilian control" in the realm of civil-science relations: the responsibility of PSAC to Congress and, by implication, to the President himself. These and other problems of civil-science relations must be faced soon, and the fact that there is presently before Congress a bill which would make PSAC a statutory body, such as the Council of Economic Advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, makes this very obvious.

The motivation behind Senator Henry Jackson's bill is to give PSAC a secure status within the Executive branch of government and to enable it to make available to Congress the advantage

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1. Melvin Price, "Critique on Scientific Advice", Forum Memo, Vol. 8, No. 7 (July 1961), p.6. Published by the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., New York, N.Y.

2. Ibid.

of its first-rate scientific minds.[1] However, a critic of PSAC such as Congressman Price might add that this new status would also eliminate the cloak of executive privilege from PSAC which at present shields PSAC from Congressional scrutiny. As a statutory body, PSAC would be accountable to Congress for its actions in the same manner that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Council of Economic Advisors are responsible to Congress.

Even if one is to ignore the question of what this proposed arrangement might do to the existing valuable relationship between the President and PSAC, Senator Jackson's proposal appears to overlook and even to run counter to the essential characteristic of civil-science relations, i.e. the quasi-public nature of the scientific community. In contrast to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have operational responsibilities within the bureaucracy and are therefore responsible to Congress, PSAC is an advisory committee only, composed of representatives of a private voluntaristic enterprise. Yet, in contrast to the Council of Economic Advisors, PSAC wields considerable power not only within the government but also within the private enterprise it represents. Consequently, a PSAC whose members were appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate rather than a continuing self-perpetuating body might have profound consequences for the

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1. See the excellent staff report by Senator Jackson's Committee - U. S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations. Organizing for National Security - Science Organization and the President's Office, A Study Submitted by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: U.S.Govt. Printing Office, 1961)

status of American Science.

It is difficult to believe that if the Jackson proposal were enacted given the importance today of scientific advice in all areas of public policy, the temptation to establish political criteria for membership on the proposed Council of Scientific Advisors could be resisted. Unlike the Council of Economic Advisors, who exercise little power, the proposed Council of Scientific Advisors would have sufficient influence in policy determination to warrant careful scrutiny. Do individual scientists, for example, exhibit the proper attitudes toward nuclear weapons, agricultural research and patent policy so that they can be entrusted with public responsibility?

Significantly, however, not only would the President and the Congress be selecting the government's science advisors but they would, in effect, be selecting the men who would play the dominant roles in the leadership of American science. Such a situation would be an unfortunate and significant move toward the political control of American science. In addition, it is doubtful whether the most competent scientists would submit to Congressional interrogation as a precondition for service on PSAC. As a consequence, the calibre of PSAC membership would surely deteriorate over time.

Yet, as this study has indicated, the present status of civil-science relations leaves much to be desired. In the first place, the issue of the responsibilities and rights of the scientist-advisor as the representative of the scientific community in

government and as part of the Administration in power has not been resolved. In the second place, no satisfactory answer to the question of who ought to speak for science has been found. Nor, in the third place, has proper account been taken in government advisory mechanisms of the political nature of scientific advice.

The writer's conviction is that these issues ought to be resolved within the context of the present institutional framework. We must either accept the situation whereby a self-perpetuating body of scientists speaks for science in government, or else take measures which could result in the political control of American science. To accept the former, however, means that new steps must be taken to resolve the outstanding issues of civil-science relations.

Obviously this paper itself cannot provide the solutions to these problems, but three modifications in present perspectives and procedures will be suggested. Failure to take some action now can only lead to a situation where serious damage may be done to the developing relationship of science and government which is presently mutually beneficial.

The first need is for scientists and political leadership to appreciate the fact that these issues of responsibilities and rights emanating from the quasi-public nature of the scientific enterprise do exist. They must appreciate more fully than they have that it is of grave significance who speaks for science, and that the advice of scientists is by necessity political advice.

Both advisee and advisor must appreciate as well that the scientist as advisor is forever faced with the dilemma that he is both the spokesman in government for the scientific community, and a member of the Administration team then in power.

Ultimately this dilemma can only be resolved by the evolution of a professional code for the scientist-advisor. Such a code, enforced by the scientists themselves with the advice and consent of political leadership, must spell out the rules of the game. For example, it might be appropriate to remove the cloak of executive privilege from PSAC when it issues public statements in its own name. Or it might be wise to formalize the selection process so that the major estates, disciplines and organizations of science are represented on PSAC.

Actually such professional traditions have already begun to develop (due especially to the foresight of James Killian). It is understood, for example, that the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology will not return to membership in PSAC after serving his tour of duty but will become a consultant-at-large; members of PSAC will themselves also move into this status after a period of service. To the credit of President Eisenhower, it has further been established that partisan political affiliations will not be a consideration in the selection of PSAC members. Accordingly, one may hope that this type of understanding will bring into existence a professional code which will define the proper behavior for scientific advisors.

Closely related to the need for the development of a professional code to define the meaning of "civilian control" in the realm of civil-science relations is the necessity to come to grips with the problems created by the political nature of the scientists' advice. These problems are illustrated by the example of the conflicting expert advice of Edward Teller and Hans Bethe on the technical feasibility of a nuclear test ban which has already been presented. This juxtaposition of conflicting expertise indicates how important it may be for public policy which scientist speaks for science even on a matter which appears to be technical in nature.

One proposed solution is that the scientist-advisor ought to be educated to the necessity of maintaining a strict separation between his technical knowledge and his political opinion. In essence, the notion that this solution is feasible underlay the security trial of Robert Oppenheimer. In part Oppenheimer was on trial because in the H-bomb controversy his views on American strategy had influenced his advice on the advisability of a crash program to develop the hydrogen bomb. However, this position that the scientist must be educated to maintain a strict distinction between his scientific and political ideas rests on the simplistic notion to which this discussion takes exception. This notion is that the technical and political realms can be kept separated in the scientist's advice. Indeed they cannot; it is not as if a Teller or a Bethe were deliberately inserting political

opinion into their views on the technical feasibility of a nuclear test ban. Each of them does believe that his position is the scientifically correct and objective one; he believes his opponent is the only one who has interjected political considerations into his advice. Compounding the inability of the scientist on many occasions to draw a distinction between his technical knowledge and his political views, there is the problem of scientist-layman communications. In the selective and interpretive process which the scientist must therefore follow, the scientist's own normative and political views unavoidably become an integral part of his advice to political leadership.

The writer believes that such considerations as these make the suggestion that the solution to the problem of the political nature of the scientists' advice should lie with the scientist himself quite impractical. While objectivity should continue to be a goal of the scientist-advisor, the necessary inseparability of the technical and political aspects of the scientist's advice makes this a goal which is seldom attained.

A second proposed solution to this problem of conflicting expertise is the notion often expressed by scientists that political leadership ought to be educated sufficiently in science to be able to ask meaningful, strictly technical questions of the scientists. These scientists point out that throughout the postwar period scientists have been asked questions and assigned tasks by political leadership which go beyond their scientific competence.

This placing of responsibility upon scientists and the scientist's acceptance of it have led to unfortunate situations such as the Oppenheimer security trial, which followed unpopular advice on the H-bomb.

Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, has spoken for many scientists on the need to educate political leadership in science. Rabinowitch writes:

> "...if the questions put to scientists were adequately formulated and the answers received properly understood, the public and political leadership would have easily found out that the two groups of experts [on radioactive fallout] had nearly the same answers ... The important thing is how to ask scientists questions which science can answer, to appreciate the authority with which science can speak under certain circumstances and its limitations in others." 1

Unfortunately Rabinowitch begs the question, for it is in large part because political leadership is unable to ask scientists the right questions that the problem exists. To be able to ask the right questions is itself the mark of competence which often only extensive scientific training brings. Thus with respect to the matter of the technical feasibility of a nuclear test ban, it required a highly competent scientist, Edward Teller, to inquire of his colleagues whether or not the detonation of nuclear explosions in large underground cavities could make the explosions undetectable. The affirmative answer to this question did much to

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1. Eugene Rabinowitch, "Decision-Making in the Scientific Age", The Scientific Revolution. Edited by Gerald W. Elbers and Paul Duncan. (Washington, D.C.: The Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 24-25.

change the minds of many politicians on the technical feasibility of a nuclear test ban. Thus, while it is imperative that public officials educate themselves in science, this in itself is no solution to the problem.

Teller's role with respect to the discovery of the fact that nuclear explosions could be hidden in deep underground cavities illustrates the third suggestion for the solution of the problem of the political nature of scientific advice which has been advocated by James Conant. Conant has written that because it is so easy for the proponent of a project to clothe his convictions in technical language,"[1] the government's advisory mechanisms should adopt "quasi-judicial procedures."[2] There should be, Conant elaborated, conscious attention given in the scientific advisory committees to "forced opposition" to each project. If this were done competent scientists would be assigned the role of Devil's Advocate, while others would assume the role for the defense. Together they should debate their respective cases in front of administrative and political decision-makers. This balancing of the biases of the experts would create the same type of give and take of opposed views which has given to science its objective character. Under this system the decision-maker could evaluate the wisdom of the cases of the competing scientists.

In addition to the emergence of a professional code for

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1. James Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 67.

2. Ibid.

scientific advisors, then, this type of political balancing would seem advisable as another change in the present situation. On all issues assigned to PSAC provision for forced opposition would be very beneficial. And on those issues of great importance, complexity, and political division among scientists - such as national policy toward nuclear weapons - it would seem that the opposing factions of scientists ought to be represented on PSAC.

The third change to be suggested here is that the President's Special Assistant on Science and Technology ought to be a non-scientist. This is proposed in the interest of "civilian control" over science, and not as a reflection upon the excellency of past or present incumbents of that office. Just as the Secretary of Defense is a generalist in military matters, so ought the President's chief advisor on science to be a non-specialist.

Thus far, of the three incumbants, only Killian can qualify as a generalist. Yet even he was strongly identified with one school of scientists on matters of national defense, and through intimate associations with scientists over the years had come to share in large measure their perspective on issues of public policy. Although he was, due to background, position and temperament, an excellent choice to establish the office, the issue is whether or not the Special Assistant ought to be, as a matter of public policy, a person less identifiable with the scientific community.

As Don Price has pointed out, the greatest weakness of

the scientist as the President's chief advisor in science is his "professional conscience, his feeling that he must be the spokesman for his scientific colleagues and for science generally." 1 This dual allegiance causes problems for the scientist-advisor, for when he advises the President contrary to the wishes of his scientific colleagues he calls down their wrath upon himself. Such has been the fate of Robert Oppenheimer, Vannevar Bush, and George Kistiakowsky. The temptation exists, therefore, to speak as one's colleagues would wish, and to be placed in the position of representing yet another parochial interest.

On the other hand, a generalist as Special Assistant for Science and Technology would be free from any commitments to the scientific community and could serve the President in a more detached fashion. The representatives of science on PSAC would still be able to speak through him to the highest echelons; they would also have a right of appeal in the event of conflict.

The appeal of this arrangement is that it makes more palatable the anomaly of a self-perpetuating advisory body in the Executive Office of the President. Despite the fact that PSAC would continue to exercise considerable powers, a non-scientist as Special Assistant would represent and would make secure the principle of "civilian control." At the same time, PSAC could maintain its status of freedom from partisan politics.

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1. Don K. Price, Government and Science. New York: New York University Press, 1954, p. 181.

Admittedly there are two serious arguments against a generalist as science advisor. In the first place, such a man would encounter a feeling of non-acceptance by many, if not the majority, of scientists. There is a strong belief among scientists that only a scientist can speak for science. In the second place, it is argued, a generalist would lack sufficient technical competence to understand the subjects under review. That this lack of expertise would be a handicap for a generalist is without doubt correct. On the other hand, whoever the scientist-advisor may be there is a strict limit to his expertise. The range of problems and the vastness of knowledge are now such that any specialist will be handicapped when certain issues are raised. This will become more true as the concerns of the science advisor broaden. Thus far, his assignments have been restricted mainly to questions requiring the expertise of military weaponeers. It may well be that as the functions of the science advisor increase his specialization will turn out to be a source of trained incapacity.

Furthermore, the fact that the advice of scientists at the Presidential level is usually political in nature argues for a generalist. As such, the advisor must combine his political judgment with the available technical facts. The writer would suggest that the generalist is apt consciously to perform this uniting of the political and the technical in a manner superior to that of the specialist. It seems more likely that the political generalist will acquaint himself with the technical facts

than that the technical specialist will do his homework on the political issues involved.

Closely related to the previous argument for a generalist as Special Assistant for Science and Technology is the fact that many questions upon which he must advise the President are, paradoxically, matters outside the competence of the natural scientist. For example, national science policy is largely an amalgam of many economic, social and political policies, such as taxation, educational and patent policies. Thus it does not necessarily follow that a physicist is most competent to judge the significance of alternative policies for the welfare of American science.

Finally, if the science advisor were not a scientist the translation of scientific knowledge into meaningful advice would have to be moved back one step in the advisory process. The members of PSAC would be required to make their knowledge meaningful to the science advisor, just as they are now required to translate their otherwise inaccessible knowledge into a form intelligible to the Chief Executive. The task of the science advisor would be to chairman the quasi-judicial procedures suggested by Conant. On the basis of this forced opposition and defense of various projects, he would synthesize PSAC's agreement on the technical what is, would note its technical disagreements, and would be aware of the sources of the scientists' disagreement over which alternatives ought to be pursued. In addition, he could advise the President on what he believed to be the wisest course of American policy.

In this paper the writer has indicated some of the novel problems which have arisen in American government and within the scientific enterprise due to the post-war interaction of science and government. In doing so he selected for emphasis the group most central to the problems of civil-science relations, namely the scientific advisory mechanism which has developed around the President. For not only is the President's Science Advisory Committee of intrinsic importance, but its characteristics and place in the American political system make us aware of the need to appreciate a whole new phenomenon in American political life.

As the writer stated in the beginning, it is beyond the competence and the scope of this paper to comprehend fully the implications for the American political scene of the emergence of the natural scientist as an active participant in political life. In fact political science must confess its ignorance about the scientist as a political animal. Here he is, an individual whose activities and ideas are of increasingly grave consequence to the survival of our culture, yet we know little about his politically-relevant behavior, attitudes and ideas. "We have," Robert Merton, the great sociologist of science, admonishes us, "empirical monographs concerning the professional thief and the professional beggar, but, until recently, none which deals with the role of the professional intellectual in our society."[1] Here, then, is a challenge for political science.

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1. Robert Merton, "Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy", Social Forces, Vol. 23, No. 4 (May 1945), p. 405.

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DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENT AND STATIC SYSTEM:

Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations

by

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So many worlds, so much to do,
So little done, such things to be.

The words were written by Tennyson. Today they not only represent Ayatollah Khomeini's leitmotif but they seem to have become the theme of all contemporary revolutionary leaders. Many of us see, in the crest of violent and impatient doctrines which flood the scene, persuasive evidence of anxiety everywhere. Outcroppings of fear and hatred in politics are paired with distasteful self-awareness and self-loathing. Revolutionary politics and the politics of despair are often coupled in one syndrome. Political extremism and personal insecurity appear as inseparable twins. But to argue thus is to introduce a non-political, and therefore irrelevant, consideration into the dissection of a decidedly political phenomenon.

No doubt the revolutionary leader violently rejects the present world, but the content of his dogma exudes self-confidence rather than self-fear; the assurance of security rather than the ambiguity of perpetual anxiety. The revolutionary leader is impelled by a vision which, despite its violence and destructiveness, is invariably geared to a utopia which is held to be attainable by rational political means, means which include the systematic dissemination of fear. Far from sharing the nihilism of the mere terrorist or the verbally precocious beat, extremism in words and deeds is part of a political program, and politics implies structure, order, and formal relations -- if only for playing out conflicts. The revolutionary leader does not want to abolish politics; his aim is the same as any other political leader: to fashion and maintain the kind of order which is consonant with his values. In what way, then, can the revolutionary leader and his state be distinguished from any state which participates in the life of the United Nations?

I

Revolutionary regimes, for our purposes, possess two central attributes. They are committed to the complete reordering of their own societies, to the creation of a new order or the restoration of an old order radically different from

the present. Dogmatic modernism and fanatical nativism are equally acceptable as criteria. Further, a revolutionary regime typically sees itself as struggling against some kind of international "conspiracy" or fighting a global "historic force"; this implies an external dimension in the revolution, since the regime must cooperate with kindred movements in other countries. A few examples will illustrate this combination.

In the words of two students of modern Africa, revolutionary leadership "being exclusivist...lives in a world of friends and enemies. Moreover it finds itself uneasy in negotiating on other than on its own terms." It seeks to "combine the skills and talents of a community and mobilize them for a wholesale assault on the problems that lie ahead." While this state of mind suggests a rigid ideological commitment, ideology is no more than the servant of task-oriented expediency. "The immediate tasks of the day, whether to build a dam, change the tax structure or modify the political arrangements in government, will be put in the context of ideological slogans as a form of communication, but opportunism is more compelling than ideology."[1]

At the same time, a peculiar variety of charismatic leadership is often associated with this type of regime. While its local cultural attributes may differ and while the institutionalization of revolutionary progress may attenuate its features, the Latin American admiration for a personalist *jefe* who is also a *macho* (male) is widely repeated, a leader who "is expected to show sexual prowess, zest for action, including verbal 'action,' daring, and, above all, absolute self-confidence....In politics, a man is not commonly elected or acclaimed to office because he represents the social, economic and political position of his followers, but because he embodies in his own personality those inner qualities that they feel in themselves and they would like to manifest, had they but the talent to do so, in their own actions."[2] If Fidel Castro fits this bill, so do Kwame Nkrumah,

Sukarno, Sekou Toure, Gamal Abdul Nasser, and perhaps even Nikita Khrushchev.

Perhaps the most direct way to spell out the external aspect of revolutionary leadership is to furnish an example of post-colonial statecraft which self-consciously eschews Pan-Africanism. As Felix Houphouet-Boigny put it just one year before the Ivory Coast became independent:

> Why do we not demand independence? To answer this question I can only ask another: what is independence? Industrial and technical revolutions are making peoples more and more dependent on one another....Indeed, the countries of Europe... are prepared to relinquish a part for their sovereignty.... Why, if not to bring about, by association and mutual aid, a more fully elaborated form of civilisation which is more advantageous for their peoples and which transcends a nationalism that is too cramped, too dogmatic and by now out of date?[3]

Note in contrast, Kwame Nkrumah's thoughts on revolutionary statecraft:

> My first advice to you who are struggling to be free is to aim for the attainment of the Political Kingdom -- that is to say, the complete independence and self-determination of your territories. When you have achieved the Political Kingdom all else will follow. Only with the acquisition of political power -- real power through the attainment of sovereign independence -- will you be in a position to reshape your lives and destiny, only then will you be able to resolve the vexatious problems which harass our Continent.[4]

To what use should the Political Kingdom be put? To consolidate freedom, to create unity and community among African states, and finally, to achieve the economic and social "reconstruction" of Africa by undoing the damage wrought by colonialism and tribalism. Pan-Africanism is an integral part of the program because only through African unity can the "African Personality" be called to life. Political boundaries and tribal divisions are the hallmarks of reaction; an African Personality able to demonstrate the black man's cultural equality with other races will arise only with their suppression. Cultural renaissance, economic progress, territorial revisionism, strong political leadership and the Political Kingdom are one and inseparable.[5]

So much for the syndrome of factors making up the substance of the doctrine. They necessarily presuppose totalitarian national institutions, in embryo or in

full bloom. In the Soviet case and in Cuba such institutions are clearly flowering; in Ghana and Guinea the buds are shooting out. If the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, and Bolivia appear merely as one-party or no-party states, it is because their authoritarian way has not advanced to full totalitarianism for reasons associated with underdevelopment rather than from lack of intent.

But it is important not to equate revolutionary regimes with a number of closely related categories. Not every totalitarian state is also a revolutionary state, as shown by modern Spain, Portugal, and Yugoslavia. Policies of imperialism may well be pursued in the modern world without being linked with an intention to transform society. Thus, Egypt followed a pan-Arab course, often interpreted as simple Egyptian imperialism, under Farouk as well as under Nasser.[6] But this does not make the pre-1952 oligarchical regime a revolutionary one. Nor is every nationalist regime specifically revolutionary. Indian or Burmese nationalism are not revolutionary because they have no articulate external referents. But Ghana's nationalism is identifiable as revolutionary because of the pan-African strain; Indonesia's is equally so because it holds "that God Almighty created the map of the world in such a fashion that even a child can tell that the British Isles are one entity...and that a child can see that the Indonesian Archipelago is a single entity, stretching between the Pacific and Indian oceans and the Asian and Australian continents, from the north tip of Sumatra to Papua."[7]

Soviet behavior offers a still finer point. While the Soviet Union is clearly a revolutionary state whose foreign policy fits the requirements of our purpose, it does not follow that every Soviet move is part of a "necessary" and "planned" revolutionary behavior pattern. One careful study, for instance, casts doubt on the "inevitable" character of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia.[8] We are, therefore, concerned with the attitudes and poses, the demands and expectations, the style and doctrines, of specifically revolutionary regimes rather than with every detail of their foreign policy moves.

Our concern can be pinpointed in another way. If we ask what type of political system constrains and limits a policy of self-assertion abroad because the enunciation of such a course encounters well-entrenched domestic opposition or runs afoul of domestic weakness and disorganization, we come across a number of types which cannot be revolutionary in our sense. To use the typology of Edward Shils, political democracies, traditional and traditionalistic oligarchies do not fit;[9] modernizing oligarchies may, and totalitarian oligarchies, as well as tutelary democracies most certainly do. The picture becomes clearer if we ask what type of domestic policy requires a foreign policy of self-assertion; or, under what circumstances does a domestic policy aiming at the creation of a new society perforce become revolutionary in the outside world as well? Put in these terms, we arrive at two varieties of revolutionary regimes, without having to commit ourselves to a specific typology of systems.

A revolutionary elite which is committed to a doctrine of historical struggle represents the first variety. It includes, of course, the major countries of the Communist bloc. The foreign policies of China and the Soviet Union may be interpreted merely as the international application of the inevitable rise to power of the proletariat through the establishment of Socialism and eventually Communism, first in certain countries and finally everywhere. While this implies neither commitment to the notion that war is inevitable, nor to the proposition that all Soviet bloc moves are part of a "Communist conspiracy," it does locate the Communist bloc within a revolutionary syndrome based on class struggle. In it, the security and survival of communist states is the minimal, but only the minimal, motive of a foreign policy organizationally and doctrinally linked to drastic domestic change. In the mind of Fidel Castro, this class struggle is "nationalized" in the sense that underdeveloped countries living at the mercy of monopoly imperialism become the equivalent of the proletariat. The international class struggle now is identical with the struggle for freedom and progress on the part of all underdeveloped

countries.[10] Agrarian reform in Cuba, for example, is held out as an internationally valid example of inevitable revolutionary transformation. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Cuba had identified herself publicly with Egypt, Guinea, and Ghana.

Africa, however, offers a different example of thinking along lines of an international revolutionary struggle. As our examples of pan-African doctrines have shown, the creation of the African Personality ranks high among the goals of the revolutionary leaders. Class is here replaced by race. The fight against the racism of the imperialists includes the new self-assertion of "the African," suspicious, if not impatient, of all white institutions and practices. The salvation of Africa becomes the redemption of the black man, with the practical international consequence of giving a reverse racist character to the foreign policy of Ghana and Guinea. To sum up: the Soviet Union, Cuba, Ghana, and Guinea represent a variety of revolutionary leaderships in which international policy follows from a "historical struggle" doctrine which is initially and predominantly applied to the domestic plans of these nations.

No similar central theme is present in the variety of revolutionary leadership displayed by contemporary Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Bolivia, and Perhaps Iraq or Morocco. To be sure, the internal reformist emphasis is present here too, but it is by no means simply or dialectically translated into foreign policy. Instead, the linkage occurs through the strains and tensions set up by the disassociation between modernizing and traditional political structures and policies, by the vagaries of the so-called non-western political process. At the simplest level of explanation, self-assertion and even aggressive attitudes on foreign policy are related to the familiar scapegoat, or displacement, device. "When the raison d'être of nationalism -- the attainment of political independence -- has no longer existed, leaders have endeavored in various ways to perpetuate nationalism as an active and unifying force: by demanding a positive role for their new state in world affairs, by creating new external enemies or threats, and by dramatizing the vision of a new society through monumental public works and other such symbols."[11]

Opposition groups have found it easiest to challenge authoritarian-reformist governments by merging their specific grievances with a global appeal for drastic external and internal change, a challenge the government leaders then tend to take up by making equally sweeping demands.

But aggressive foreign policy attitudes may well serve a more fundamental functional role than scapegoating in these countries. The achievement of independence often causes rifts in the national movement. In Indonesia, segments of the urbanized Indonesian bourgeoisie, in alliance with segments of the nobility, had no interest in turning the political revolution into a social upheaval. Hence, they try to divert the continuing revolutionary fervor into external channels, whether directed at the Chinese or the Europeans. At the same time, as rural discontent grows and the demand for further socio-economic reform continues, the fight for change is seen by rural leaders as a continuation of the struggle for political freedom, especially if the obvious "monopolist-imperialist" targets are also foreign corporations, aid missions, plantation owners, and the like. The struggle for industrialization thus acquires a xenophobic quality despite, or perhaps because of, its dependence on the foreigner. No wonder that the Indonesian Army was able to use the West Irian issue as a device to channel and direct mass discontent in the direction of seizing control over Dutch property.[12] In addition, xenophobic nationalism has the functional role of taking the place of traditional religion. It is suggestive that in Indonesia the Panja Sila are often put forward as a secular-universal reformist creed and that Indonesians tend to invoke the hallowed principles of Bandung far more frequently as an international doctrine than do other Asian nations.[13] Much the same applies in contemporary Bolivia, in which the dispossessed urban middle class and the ascendant Indian peasantry vie with each other in aggressive anti-American sentiments while seeking to maximize an only partly successful economic upheaval.

Nor is scapegoating a complete explanation of Nasser's self-assertive foreign

policy. The policy is clearly revolutionary since it claims a "civilizing mission" for Egypt in Black Africa and is committed to pan-Arabism. It is linked to domestic reform in Nasser's explicit recognition that the social and the political revolutions are proceeding simultaneously and that it is the duty of the Army to advance both.[14] But it appears that this doctrinal commitment was put to the test of policy in 1955, when the domestic revolution ran into difficulties. It then acquired substance in what appears as a self-conscious effort to divert public attention from domestic failure. But it is also true that the turn to foreign adventure coincided with restlessness in the Army, with the ambitious Aswan Dam project and with the announcement, in 1957, of the plan to create a "socialist, democratic and cooperative society, free from political, social and economic exploitation."[15] A reinvigoration of the program to remake Egyptian society under the tutelary auspices of the National Union and the Army would imply an intensification of the tensions common to non-western contexts. A glorious role in international affairs would thus serve the same function as in Indonesia.

To sum up again: certain revolutionary regimes are compelled by the tension and crisis-ridden nature of their internal reform programs, suffering from the hiatus between modernizing and traditional political processes, to turn to foreign poses of self-assertion. The changes they thus come to demand in the international scene are every bit as revolutionary as their domestic aims, and often dovetail neatly with those advanced by revolutionary regimes impelled by doctrines of class and race.

So far we have concerned ourselves only with the substance of policy pursued by revolutionary regimes. But shoe-thumping, name-calling, unbearably long harangues by bearded heroes dressed in green fatigues, uncompromising language, appeals to some universal brotherhood, whether of the black, the downtrodden, or the victims of various conspiracies, are aspects of style rather than of policy. Because of the danger of confusing substance with style, and the possibility that unconventionality of style is not necessarily and always perfectly correlated with an

inherently aggressive policy, an effort will now be made to isolate certain recurring stylistic aspects in the international behavior of revolutionary regimes.

It is a commonplace that the more rationally oriented among revolutionary regimes, i.e., the Communist, rigorously subordinate means to the achievement of postulated ends. Hence, conventional and perverse styles of behavior alternate freely, depending on the immediate definition of ends. In the case of Fascist regimes, the case is otherwise. Here the means themselves reflect certain end-values, such as the glorification of violence. Hence their international style is less flexible than the Communists' and more consistently at odds with the canons of "bourgeois" diplomacy. All revolutionary regimes share an affinity for "dual" diplomacy: the simultaneous conduct of their foreign policy through the medium of conventional channels, with their rules and decorum, and through various non-official channels. The search for allies among "the people," "the peace partisans," or "the freedom fighters" among the citizens of enemy states leads to the widespread use of revolutionary political parties and movements, front organizations and other "progressive" elements as carriers of the revolutionary regime's policy. Since these non-official allies can be mobilized and disbanded at will, can be made to dovetail with conventional gambits or deemphasized completely, they are aspects of revolutionary style rather than inherent attributes of doctrine or policy.[16]

Revolutionary style thrives on apocalyptic language, immoderate threats, and manufactured international crises. But it would be a mistake to dismiss these manifestations as evidences of infantilism or of irresponsibility. Like the practice of scapegoating, such techniques may well possess a functional role in the political processes of non-western countries. The absence of stable, representative, and functionally specific interest groups and of well-organized political parties aggregating their demands, results in national policies being divorced from any sort of structured upward flow of communication. National leaders tend

to act in isolation from popular concerns simply because they do not always know what important segments of the public may wish, and consequently feel compelled to appeal in vague and total terms to an undifferentiated public. At the same time, the very absence of specific policy impulses from below enables the leadership to take more clearly defined positions in the international than in the domestic field. To the extent that such positions, couched in the most undiplomatic terms of a Nasser, a Sukarno, and a Castro, reflect an apocalyptic vision, they may be aimed at unifying their own divided societies while staking out a claim for it in the United Nations.[17]

Immoderate style tends to carry with it an impatience for traditional, legal, as well as diplomatic, techniques. Modes of dealing with international conflict by peaceful means frequently imply the open or tacit acceptance of certain principles of law. Revolutionary leaders are always impelled, at least initially, to deny the legitimacy of aspects of international law which hinder their aims and in the evolution of which they had no part. The practical reasons for this attitude are obvious. It may be suggested, however, that the very qualities of charismatic leadership, which are a recurring feature in revolutionary regimes are connected with this impatience. In many non-western countries the advent of the urban-industrial society implies the erosion of the uprooted villager's reliance on the rural patron, or the tribal chief. In the unfamiliar urban environment he turns to a demagogic national leader as a substitute, identifies with him, relies on him, supports him unthinkingly.[18] The leader, thus supported, feels free to indulge his freedom of maneuver so as to make claims upon and embarrass foreign countries, to indulge his charismatic role by denying the validity of international law and diplomatic protocol.

Clearly, the nationalism of revolutionary countries is always integral in character. It brooks no qualifications, no nuances, and no considerations which would destroy the image, however unreal upon inspection, of an organically unified

people yearning for "justice." Integral nationalism is as much a part of the revolutionary international style as neutralism is a minimal foreign policy attitude. Certainly, as Robert A. Scalapino has demonstrated, a rational basis for neutralism can be found in the realities of contemporary world politics; there is no doubt that it also represents a curious mixture of ambivalence, distrust, and disinterested tolerance for the competing western doctrines of Marxism and Liberal Democracy.[19] But a neutralist pose also serves the functional role of confident self-assertion for the impatient and emergent charismatic leader in legitimating his own arrival upon the world scene and effectively juxtaposing himself to the "vested interests" -- barricaded behind power politics and traditional international law -- of the older successful nations.[20] The new regimes, whether in Africa, Latin America, or Asia, represent the advent to power of social groupings not conspicuously successful in terms of wealth and prestige as long as the countries in question were under western rule or influence. There is no reason now to expect the new classes to display any great respect of affection for western policy or its international tradition. The very eclecticism offered by a neutralist pose is a much more convincing way of demonstrating self-confidence.

Having thus pinpointed the characteristics of revolutionary regimes, in domestic politics, in substantive foreign policy, and in international style, we must put this force into the context of institutionalized world politics -- the United Nations. And we must ask ourselves whether the success and multiplication of such regimes makes doubtful the survival of the kind of international system represented by the UN.

II

In assessing the responsiveness of revolutionary leaders to influences emanating from the international scene, we must posit the characteristics of the

central international institution, the United Nations. In doing this, care must be taken to avoid the analytical extremes of assuming a completely structured and fully deterministic UN "system" or of complete freedom of the will for national actors to fashion a cooperative international commonwealth. Abstraction from reality is certainly a necessity but the system we abstract must remain faithful to what we know to be true in the conduct of the actors. Hence the recurring patterns and the structured relationships of UN life must be thrown into relief without reification, i.e., without sinning on the side of determinism to the extent of not being able to accommodate the organizational evolution, which is not "instability," we know to have taken place. The "system" must permit the "free will" of the national actors to impinge on the totality of relations while retaining the necessarily deterministic properties of any system.

Hence the category called "loose bipolar system," made popular by Morton Kaplan, cannot be used as our point of reference. We sacrifice aesthetic neatness by not using this type of system and no claim for an equally cleanly structured approach can be advanced.[21] The desire to remain close to the data saddles us with a more ragged scheme which does not assume as regularly applicable to the UN the systemic rules abstracted by Kaplan. Further, the kind of "systems" approach here used deliberately avoids the unnecessary and misleading "balance" and "structure" hypotheses offered by some social psychologists.[22]

But it is equally easy to sin on the side of free will. Some of the ablest commentators on the UN interpret the world organization as an attempt at international institutionalization of western parliamentary deliberation, based "upon the conviction of the reality of freedom of man in the social universe."[23] International organizations are held to fall squarely into the liberal thought pattern, in the sense that they presuppose sufficient freedom of the will for statesmen to alter the international environment by means of rational discussion, negotiation,

and voting. Since the institutions of most of the founding states are held to conform to this view of things, the UN could be expected to reflect these influences and thereby gradually "civilize" international politics, if not reform the national political processes of new states. Gradually, a concept of "universal public interest" will come to inform UN deliberations.[24] It is unfortunate for this approach that we already possess convincing evidence from the mouths of western statesmen that the UN has come under the anti-parliamentary influences of the non-western world, as the membership has grown more universal; the changing environment has influenced the system more than the liberal school is able to concede and it makes little sense to speak of the UN as a "western system."[25] A universal public interest could be demonstrated only if members of the UN consistently practiced the kind of "wise statesmanship" which Arnold Wolfers advocated in his reconciliation between determinism and free will, his prescription for following the minimal national interest of self-preservation in such a way as to retain a maximum fidelity to universal values.[26] In the absence of such a demonstration, recourse to the liberal yardstick would saddle us with an approach too hortatory and too effervescent to yield more than disappointment.

Comparative historical-sociological analysis, as in Stanley Hoffmann's study of the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations is close to an appropriate system. Assessments are made on the basis of typologies of conflict situations correlated with the characteristics of the states which were prominent participants. And the conclusion:

> With respect to relations among the big powers, the record of the three organizations is this: when solidarity existed the organizations were unnecessary. When it did not exist, they were powerless. The remedy cannot be found in the formal association of these states, whose nature makes a real association impossible. In relations among the great powers, decisive for the maintenance of world peace, international organizations stand exposed to perpetual defeat.[27]

While Hoffmann grants that in disputes among a minor power not allied with a great

power, the methods of collective security have worked and while he credits the League with advancing a concept of international legitimacy in compelling discussion of national aggressive designs, no fundamental change in international relations should be attributed to these trends. My own reading of history differs in not assuming the category of "great power" to possess the same implications at all times. Put another way, the application of trend analysis to international systems requires equal, if not more, attention to the various environments in which they function. Patterned relationships between inputs and outputs in international systems compel attention to the source of the inputs. These remain rooted in the national policies of member states, but, as the advent of revolutionary regimes makes plain, these policies constantly change so as to produce a variety of environments. Hence historical conclusions making no allowance for shifting environmental influences are not convincing.

Therefore, the UN must be described as a multi-phase system, whose characteristics and evolutionary potential must be specified in terms of the changing environment in which it functions. Environments, in turn, are made up of the totality of policies, aims, expectations, fears, hopes, and hatreds funnelled into the institutional structure and its political processes, the "system" proper. If the outputs can be demonstrated to change the environment, including the part contributed by the revolutionary regimes, perhaps systemic growth at the expense of the member units can be established. It is important here to distinguish between a "static" system and a "dynamic" one. In a static system, the actors channel policies and demands through it and use it as a medium of communication as well as a forum for resolving some conflicts, but they do not necessarily increase the powers and functions of the system in so doing. No growth then takes place. In a dynamic setting, however, some of these efforts carry with them an accretion of new functions and powers for the system, implying the kind of growth we wish to examine in connection with the inputs provided by revolutionary regimes.[28]

The variety of inputs contributed by member states can be easily grouped along the recurrent lines of discussion which prevail in the UN. They entail (1) collective security, including both enforcement and pacific settlement functions; (2) peaceful change, including the substantive aspects of such areas as the dissolution of colonial empires and disarmament, and the procedural concern with perfecting mediatory and arbitral methods; (3) economic development, technical assistance and world economic policy; (4) the definition and implementation of human rights. General as well as highly specific issues arise in each meeting of UN bodies under each of these headings. But the manner of resolving the issues differs in each phase of the UN System and no issue has so far ever been settled in principle and in perpetuity.

Why is this the case? Formal as well as informal resolutions of issues always take place on the basis of bloc politics; member states never yield a position in its entirety and compromise their differences -- at various levels of meaningfulness -- by a mixture of negotiation and voting. But issues are rarely discussed with sole reference to the category in which a functionally specific analysis would place them. Foreign policy being a web of inter-locking aims, the totality of state objectives is fed into the UN System, resulting in an output pattern which features inter-functional as well as inter-bloc compromise. The character of the environment seems to determine the nature of this compromise, and the environment is unstable with reference to the predominance of this or that functional aim. A further environmental instability is introduced by the enlargement of the membership and the resultant quantitative change in the relations among the blocs.

During the first phase of the UN System (1945-1947), the honeymoon period among the great powers prevented these functional strains from impinging on one another. Collective security was the dominant concern and it hinged around skirmishing in the Security Council, and at times it looked as if the Churchillian notion of the post-war status quo might achieve institutionalization by virtue

of the UN. But the real onset of the Cold War proved this suspicion wrong, and by 1948 the second phase of the System got underway, characterized by the dominance of the United States and its successful enlisting of the UN on its behalf.

During the second phase, the dominant motif was the identification of collective security with the military-political aims of the western bloc, successfully asserted in Korea and in the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Demands for a world economic policy and far more ambitious economic aid measures than actively championed by the West were put forward by Afro-Asian and Latin American states, but not implemented in full. Discussion of human rights was initiated and championed by the West so long as it fitted in with Cold War policy, though non-western blocs advanced demands in this area for quite different reasons. Peaceful change inputs intruded in a variety of anti-colonial aims, but found implementation only in the case of the former Italian colonies. While the Soviet bloc placed itself in a non-bargaining position by completely disputing the legitimacy of all UN discussion and steps not in line with Soviet policy, the western bloc dominated the System by successfully obtaining the support of the Latin American and part of the Afro-Asian blocs on collective security issues and "paying" for this by occasional concessions in the economic and colonial fields.

By 1954 the second phase came to its end with important changes in the environment. The number of Afro-Asian members increased, especially after 1955. The European members of the western bloc grew disenchanted with a policy of collective security which seemed too close to general warfare. The colonial and human rights issues were linked ever more closely in the demands of the Latin American and Afro-Asian blocs, and the crescendo of economic demands rose as American security policy grew more and more dependent on general support. And most importantly, Joseph Stalin died. With his demise the role of the Soviet Union in international organizations underwent such an important -- if tactical -- change

as to destroy the environment of the second phase.

Since that time, the third phase has prevailed, involving institutionalized inter-regional and inter-functional bargaining in a setting in which the colonial and human rights issues have furnished the dominant motif, and the practice of collective security has been increasingly subordinated to it in terms of the kind of support forthcoming for western bloc demands. Peaceful change, of sorts, has prevailed along with intensified international economic development efforts, in the relatively amicable way in which colonial empires have dissolved under UN prodding. Neutralism has come into its own quantitatively, and the "balancing" pattern of collective security holds sway, featuring conciliation rather than enforcement.

Shortly, however, a fourth phase will arise. Functionally, it will be marked by the end of the colonial issue as a dominant theme. The human rights issue may well be eliminated from the inputs of the very Afro-Asian and Latin American states which have featured it in connection with their anti-colonial campaign and may reacquire value for western nations freed from a variety of skeletons in their closets. Economic demands will increase, and collective security inputs by the West will have to be paid for exclusively in this area now. Further, if the alliance between the Soviet and certain underdeveloped nations continues, the Soviet bloc may funnel its particular variety of collective security into the UN, and may be expected to pay for it in economic aid. Whatever the precise outline of the pattern of inter-functional and inter-bloc politics may be, a behavior pattern discerned for the revolutionary regimes during the second and third phases cannot a priori be expected to continue with the sharp change in the environment introduced by the end of colonialism.

The UN System is hyperdependent on its environment. Precedents set in one phase, therefore, do not necessarily predetermine action in the next. Unless a great deal of "internalization" of "rules" can be demonstrated, the very multi-phase character of the System militates against substantial growth. All issues

are resolved ad hoc, stable alliances among interests cannot develop, compromises and related communication patterns among participants can generate no fixed institutional characteristics. Even the "non-resolution consequences" of UN activity display no cumulative pattern.[29] Substituting debate and voting for fighting, in the sense of using the UN as a litmus paper for determining the strength of the opponent, wanes with the change in functional preoccupation. While communication among members may narrow differences in the perception of reality, in one phase, the process may have to start all over in the next. There is evidence that the United States has "learned" the lesson of Korea in no longer expecting the kind of collective security operation which it mounted in 1950 and is now seeking security through balancing; but there is less evidence that Nasser and Nkrumah have learned the same thing.[30]

How can we assess the impact of a multi-phase system on its environment? Granting the variation of inputs and the changes in the political process which convert them into outputs, how do we relate the output pattern to the environment so as to determine whether the United Nations is having any kind of influence? One way of assessing the impact is merely to study the behavior patterns of the member states, specifically the revolutionary states. Do they respond to UN resolutions? To what kind of resolutions, in what functional contexts? In other words, does the authority of the UN System increase as determined by the fidelity of its revolutionary members in carrying out resolutions? Does the legitimacy of the UN System increase as revolutionary states invoke the Charter and past resolutions so as to link these with an increase in the institutional power and autonomy of the organization?

Another way of obtaining answers is to study the system itself rather than the effects on the conduct of its members. Here it would be tempting to profit from general organization theory, if this discipline were not so dependent on hierarchical models with firm boundaries, and predisposed toward identifying rationality

with functionally-oriented behavior. In terms of such standards the UN System is not an "organization" at all. "The prevalence of bargaining," say March and Simon, "is a symptom either that goals are not operational or that they are not shared."[21] In the case of UN decision-making, they are neither one nor the other; operational goals are not rationally contrasted in policy making, there is no hierarchy, and problem-solving does not predominate as a technique of deciding issues. This has been true in all phases of the system, which would come close to being identified as almost entirely dysfunctional in its behavior.[22] Yet the UN System has survived, and if membership, finance, and scope of operations are the yardsticks of evaluation, even prospered. Hence, formal organization theory is unlikely to yield answers to our question.

In fact, it must be stressed that in a different focus the UN is a successful, if phase-ridden and politics-dominated, international institution. It has served to channel aspects of national foreign policy never before submitted to any collective scrutiny. It has tamed and civilized national policies by serving as an approximation to an institutionalized process of interest politics, and thereby containing the interests. If the western political process be conceived, not as dispassionate debate, capped by voting and subject to judicial review, but as the articulate defense of rival group interests in permanent confrontation and subject to cumulative compromises, the UN process is not so very different. The study of outputs during the various phases of the system could thus become a study of the methods used to achieve various types of compromises. Systemic development or growth could be evaluated by the role of the organization itself, as distinguished from components contributed by the environment, in advancing compromises.

We already possess a good deal of evidence permitting such evaluations for the period 1945-1955.[23] It permits the conclusion that the UN System did not increase the legitimacy it enjoys in the eyes of its members. Demands for UN action and invocation of the UN Charter were not accompanied by cumulative claims for a

greater autonomous institutional role for the System. This was true for revolutionary as well as non-revolutionary states. However, the authority of the System did increase, for all types of member states, in the sense that many of them increasingly heeded resolutions and decisions addressed to them.[33] In fact, authority tended to increase as many of the member states grew more and more dissatisfied with the style of debate and the quality of the decisions. Growing dissatisfaction, then, did not engender loss of authority. Whether a similar picture obtains in more recent years and whether it will be true in the next phase of the UN's life remains to be investigated.

Clearly, then, an effort must be made to assess changes produced on the environment, as reflected in the policies and attitudes of member states. But an effort must also be made to specify possible systemic changes after 1955, and the attitudes of revolutionary states with reference to accretions of autonomous UN powers is here a particularly sensitive yardstick.

Relationships developed in resolving conflicts peacefully also furnish a useful index at the level of the System itself. They may hinge around the degree to which member states have internalized the purposes and procedures used to resolve one conflict, and are then prepared to apply them to new ones. Since this would vary with the importance attached to the conflict, with the satisfaction derived from the solution, the adequacy of the attendent communications network and the number of roles served by the relationship, different patterns most likely can be found during various phases. An overall increase in involvement, irrespective of phase and type of state involved would provide excellent evidence of systemic growth.[34] But Robert North, the author of this approach, also cautions that the extent to which a member state relies on the notion of the external and internal "enemy" to resolve or channel domestic conflict, is likely to determine his responsiveness to the international modes of resolving conflicts. Dependence on "enemies" is a typical feature of revolutionary regimes; would this imply declining responsiveness to the peaceful solution of conflicts in the next phase of the UN's life?

It should be remembered that the history of the League of Nations and of the 19th century Concert of Europe indicates that revolutionary regimes are insensitive to the pressures of the international environment in their preoccupation with domestic change. In contrast to conservative and status quo oriented regimes, external regulative mechanisms were not accepted in the value systems of revolutionary elites and therefore had to be imposed by the use or the threat of force.

Dag Hammarskjöld once described the UN as an "institutional system of co-existence" which might evolve toward a federative social system with its own public law if it is entrusted with new tasks which it alone can carry out, if new environmental challenges are met by growing autonomy and delegated power, including the revitalization of portions of the Charter which have not yet been used.[35] One way of testing the evolutionary strength of the UN is to apply these yardsticks of development to the portion of the environment contributed by revolutionary regimes. If they prove responsive to the System's stimulus, growth is likely. The alternatives might be stated as three developmental constructs:

1. Successful institutionalization of interest politics will enhance the authority of the UN System and transform the environment by toning down the international aspects of the revolutionary behavior of certain member states. A growth in legitimacy would also follow.
2. The growing number and extreme demands of revolutionary member states will substantially change the UN System during its next phase, and perhaps destroy it.
3. New functional relationships will have the result of transforming the environment in toning down aspects of revolutionary behavior without concurrently contributing to the authority and legitimacy of the System itself.

III

Revolutionary states were exposed to the influence of international organization since 1919. If the revolutionary state simply withdraws from the system when national aims are in danger of being blunted by its rules, the problem of

. the system's transforming the environment can be simply dismissed. This, indeed, is what occurred in the League of Nations in relation to Japan, Italy, and Germany. Each pursued aims inconsistent with the rules of the system, and upon being stigmatized -- however ineffectually -- simply pursued the same aims outside the system. Withdrawal barely caused any soul-searching; the ideology and style of the revolutionary leadership in question was inconsistent with "international cooperation" in any case because of its insistence on national strength and self-sufficiency. The League's impact on the revolutionary environment was nil.

The same is true of the Soviet Union even though its role in the League was far more complex. Dallin interprets the Soviet role in Geneva as a species of popular front diplomacy designed to dovetail with the concomitant anti-Fascist work of the Comintern and aimed at maximizing Soviet security. While it certainly involved no doctrinal commitment to the rules of the Covenant Soviet participation had the incidental consequence of seeking to strengthen the universal system. Not only did Moscow carry out the sanctions voted against Italy and Paraguay but it actually sought to strengthen the legal powers of the League in the field of enforcement.[36] When contrasted with the earlier sweeping Russian denunciations of the League as "an alliance of world bandits against the proletariat," the Soviets then as now seem to demonstrate a fine appreciation of systemic possibilities in one set of environmental circumstances. But the events of 1939 demonstrate that no internalization of rules was involved.

Since 1945 the international environment has undergone such drastic changes that a more functionally complex analysis is required to do it justice. The field of collective security will be examined first as a source of revolutionary initiatives, including the enforcement as well as the pacific settlement aspects.

Neutralism, not a specific revolutionary content, is responsible for the policy expectations regarding collective security put forth by Indonesia, Egypt, and Ghana. The monarchist regime in Egypt entertained great expectations of UN

mediatory and armed help in its struggles with Britain and Israel, until it realized that the great power balance in the Security Council would give its policy little solace. At that point it turned to neutralism even before the advent of the Nasser regime and denounced UN collective security as "unjust power politics."[37] Whenever the East-West conflict dominates, these regimes seek to conciliate Moscow and Washington, and failing in this, abstain from endorsing any kind of collective action. Indonesia and Egypt gave no assistance to UN forces in Korea, opposed the crossing of the 38th parallel and abstained on votes concerned with alleged atrocities by UN forces in Korea. Both abstained in the vote on the Assembly's critical report on Hungary, even though Indonesia had supported the creation of the Special Commission on Hungary. "The problem we have to solve here now," said the Indonesian delegate, "is how to diminish and if possible how to dissipate the distrust that exists among the opposing parties." But Indonesia was active in persuading Syria and Turkey not to press their differences to a vote in the Assembly in 1957. In cold war disputes, collective security implies exclusive dedication to conciliation by uncommitted powers and abstinence from any enforcement or investigatory action which would favor one side or the other. In disputes involving the colonial issue, however, energetic action is advocated, provided it can be carried out in such a way as to exclude the East-West conflict. The full panoply of UN techniques is then to be thrown into the fray, including troops and neutralization agreements negotiated under the auspices of the General Assembly, as indicated by Ghana's role in the settlement of the Lebanese-Jordanian crisis of 1958. The prejudice against armed action or energetic peaceful settlement, in short, is not applied to the type of dispute which concerns revolutionary nations most intimately.[38]

Soviet policy in the UN conforms more closely to specifically revolutionary expectations. In the early years of the UN the Soviet regime still regarded the Charter and its rules as legitimating the post-war status quo of big power dominance, institutionalized through a concert in which each major power wielded a veto and

collective security was to be practiced at the expense of smaller powers. Even though the Soviet Union took a very conservative position with respect to the powers of the UN and the absolute sway of the principle of national sovereignty it relaxed these opinions in practice to permit the peaceful solution of the Corfu Channel and Iranian disputes in such a manner as to strengthen the authority of UN organs. The system seemed to assert itself even over revolutionary members.

This trend was reversed with the announcement in 1948 of the "two camps" doctrine. No concessions to systemic authority were permitted in the Greek, Korean, Berlin and satellite peace treaty cases. The UN became a holding operation in which the Soviets sought merely to protect the position of the "socialist camp" by blocking American action and by propaganda attacks, buttressed with constitutional arguments opposing majority decision-making, functional expansion and neutrality in administration. But the exceptions are vital: whenever the interests of the Soviet Union happened to converge with those of the West (as in Palestine, Kashmir, Indonesia), the ad hoc concept produced by the international environment resulted in UN mediatory and enforcement action in which the Soviets ignored their own opposition to third-party intercession, commissions of investigation, Secretariat participation, and teams of military observers. But the outbreak of the Korean War proves that this pragmatic attitude of the Soviet Union involved no acceptance of the intrinsic legitimacy of the norms of the Charter.[39]

There are those who insist that the more recent active participation of the post-Stalinist Soviet leadership in the UN marks merely a tactical shift and no change in ultimate objectives: weakness forced Stalin into an isolationist position toward the universal system while strength and self-confidence propel Khrushchev into using the UN as a vehicle for actively advancing revolutionary aims.[40] While this may be true, it is not of direct importance to the problem of assessing a systemic impact on the environment; an upgrading of the UN in Soviet policy may bring with it unexpected consequences which must be accepted even by a revolutionary

leadership if more basic Soviet aims are to be advanced. In any case, the settlement of the Korean crisis demonstrated for the first time Soviet responsiveness to the balancing efforts of the uncommitted Afro-Asian bloc, to be followed soon by the scrapping of the "two camps" theory. By granting the existence of an uncommitted bloc, a "zone of peace" was now interposed between East and West which had to be wooed in non-aggressive ways in order to assure the demise of capitalism without setting off nuclear war. In the process the UN was found useful for the propagation of the doctrine of competitive peaceful coexistence. In instances of outright challenge to the Soviet bloc, as in Hungary, the Stalinist tactics are revived; but in all other situations the new assessment has produced a thoroughly expediential attitude with respect to collective security in which balancing operations, involving conciliation, armed forces recruited from neutrals, and the intercession of the Secretary-General, are tolerated, even if not lauded. Korovin aptly summed up the current attitude with its invocation of the Charter on behalf of the new Soviet world view:

> ...the constant growth of Soviet economic and defensive might, of the moral authority of the USSR, of the merger of the entire socialist camp on the basis of proletarian internationalism and its growing strength, the support of its international policy by the partisans of peace throughout the world vividly testify to the fact that the realization of the democratic principles of the UN Charter becomes increasingly the unanimous demand of all peaceloving humanity.[41]

It is in this vein that the invocation of UN principles by the revolutionary government of Cuba must be understood. Its appeals to the Security Council and the General Assembly are devices of the cold war, to equate the policies of the United States with colonialism, and to rally the "democratic principles of the UN Charter" to the side of socialist and anti-colonial revolt. While the revolutionary government of Bolivia has supported the western conception of collective security, the growing link between Havana and Moscow has been accompanied by a Cuban attitude toward collective security which is identical with the Soviet position. The change in the international environment, which was ratified by the package deal on

admission to UN membership in 1955, has been a source of self-confidence to the Communist bloc, inducing it to use UN institutions as a means for exacting recognition from the West of the legitimacy of the new status quo. In disputes not immediately invested with the aura of the cold war, at least, this change in the environment has facilitated continuation of balancing as a mode of maintaining collective security, at the expense of concerted big power action and of permissive enforcement by one of them.

Policy aims in the context of collective security test the capacity of the UN system to deal with violent challenges to its norms. More commonly, however, demands for a change in international relations correspond to national policies falling short of recourse to war. Another test of the system's capacity, then, lies in its ability to facilitate peaceful change, especially the drastic demands put forward by revolutionary member states. Peaceful change, as distinguished from collective security, is any successful adjustment in the international status quo brought about before a specific "dispute" involving force or the threat of it arises; this adjustment is always made at the expense of certain reluctant member states and is due to pressure organized through the medium of parliamentary diplomacy.[42] Peaceful change so defined does not imply the complete absence of violence; it merely covers situations in which no formal interstate hostilities take place but in which the bone of contention does arouse competing state postures.

The contrast between Suez and the Congo provides an example. In the Suez case, previously unsuccessful efforts to change the status quo non-violently (Nasser's unwillingness to satisfy France on Algeria and Britain on the continued neutrality of the Canal) resulted in an act of war, followed by pacific settlement and threatened enforcement measures voted and implemented by the General Assembly, thus restoring the status quo ante bellum by means of a balancing operation. The Congo, on the other hand, is an example of "preventive diplomacy," in which the UN, acting through the Secretary-General, sought to anticipate inter-

state rivalry by insulating the troublespot, and in so doing, "peacefully changing" the bubbling cauldron into a gently seething potion.[43]

This definition of peaceful change corresponds to the actual experience of international organizations and thus conflicts with generally held legal conceptions. It takes for granted that there is no international judicial order which can induce major political change by legal techniques. As Brierly put it:

> When a state claims...something which is not its legal right, something even which it knows it can have only by an alteration of the legal position, it is useless to suggest that it should submit the determination of its claim to legal decision. It knows beforehand that the answer of the law will be adverse; and that answer is precisely what it claims to have altered.[44]

Nor does it assume the existence of an international legislative order which might give substance to Article 14 of the UN Charter. Legislating territorial change would imply the willingness of the drafters of the Charter to forego the very status quo they wished to institutionalize in writing the norms. Only when the territorial change corresponds to a new generally held consensus, or when it follows from a previous decision by the large powers to wash their hands of an unresolvable issue not vital to them, can the UN successfully perform a legislative task. This happened only in the case of the Italian colonies.[45]

So defined, the most conspicuously successful area of peaceful change has been the disengagement of the western powers from colonial responsibilities. The shrinking number of trust territories, the ever more intense examination by the General Assembly of colonial policy in other dependent areas, and the instituting of colonial reform by Britain, France, Holland, the United States and New Zealand in anticipation of UN criticism are a matter of record. Belgium and Portugal, less responsive in the past to parliamentary diplomacy, are now being subjected to its possibilities. In general, all Afro-Asian, Soviet bloc and most Latin American countries have made up the UN majorities providing the necessary pressure, whether the regimes were revolutionary or not. Yet it is instructive to single out certain countries and the Congo crisis in order to discover whether anti-colonial

demands emanating from revolutionary regimes were exceptionally extreme.

The Soviets have taken the most extreme position in consistently putting forward measures aiming at immediate independence for all dependent territories and blaming the western powers for failing to cooperate. They have used the debates of the Trusteeship Council for this purpose alone; they justify their acceptance of the principle of trusteeship only because it "contributes to the struggle of the colonial peoples for freedom," and continue to stand "for the revolutionary method of solving the national-colonial question."[46] The African and Asian revolutionary regimes sympathize, as do Cuba and Mexico, but they are willing to tone down specific resolutions on concrete issues to permit gradualist compromises. Nkrumah is candid about his disregard for the legitimacy of the boundaries of UN trust territories when these stand in the way of pan-African aims. He and other revolutionary African leaders only invoke the principles of the Charter in support of specific demands for ejecting European influence, but play them down when it comes to future programs. For the coming years they stress sealing off the African continent and creating a regional system of pacific settlement, non-intervention and economic development.[47] In the meantime they argue in favor of strengthening all conceivable agencies of the UN System which might bring closer the day when colonies will cease to exist: the constant use of UN-supervised plebiscites, UN inspections of progress toward independence, more UN follow-up on petitions, strengthening the Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories and requiring more and more detailed reports from the colonial powers under Article 73e of the Charter. Interestingly enough, this integrative aspect of the anti-colonial demands is supported by the Soviet Union, which otherwise opposes the creation of new UN institutions. It also has more support from Bolivia, Mexico and Cuba than from traditional Latin American regimes.

The history of the Congo imbroglio, however, demonstrates the selectivity observed by revolutionary regimes in seeking to obtain satisfaction for national policy through UN action. The extreme of unilateralism is represented by the

Soviet bloc. The Communist nations supported UN intervention, as long as such action unambiguously opposed Belgium and seemed to aid Lumumba. Soviet opposition to UN operations, which culminated in the attacks on the person and the institution of the Secretary-General, did not formally arise until the balance had shifted to Kasavubu. But approval of the early UN action had never precluded unilateral Soviet assistance to Congo factions. After the death of Lumumba, Moscow considered the Stanleyville regime of Antoine Gizenga as the only legitimate Congo government, even though the Leopoldville delegation had been seated in New York; drastic action against Belgium, the autonomous Katanga regime, and the Mobutu "mercenaries" were demanded. The failure of the UN to adopt sufficiently stringent resolutions was met by a Soviet refusal to participate in the financing of the Congo Operation. At the end of the 15th Session of the General Assembly, the Soviet bloc, alone among the revolutionary regimes, opposed the creation of the second Conciliation Commission, which, unlike the first, was to include European and American representatives; the Soviets also opposed the prompt convening of the Congo Parliament under UN protection and the UN-aided inter-factional negotiations leading to a shoring up of the Kasavubu government.

Of the other revolutionary regimes, only Cuba and Guinea supported the Soviet extreme at all times. But up to March of 1961, Ghana, Mali, Indonesia, Morocco and the United Arab Republic had taken the same qualified position in favor of UN intervention: they went along with it as long as it seemed to serve the pan-African end of creating a united Congo under Lumumbist rule and opposed it when the balance swung to the Kasavubu forces. At that point these leaders withdrew their contingents from the Congo or resigned from the first Conciliation Commission, thus demonstrating their displeasure with the policy of the Secretary-General. The UAR gave unilateral support to Gizenga and Ghana openly intrigued against Mobutu.

Second thoughts seemed to arise among these governments when Hammarskjöld continued to take an uncompromising position in favor of following a patient policy

of supporting whatever regime in the Congo seemed to offer the greatest promise of unifying the country in such a manner as to exclude Cold War rivalries. Despite its threats, Ghana never withdrew its sizeable forces and the UAR sought to act as a conciliator (together with Ceylon) in the Security Council debate between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the 15th Session drew to its close, all the non-Communist revolutionary regimes went along with the creation of the second Conciliation Commission -- which they no longer control -- and thus separated themselves publicly from Soviet Congo policy.[48] The peculiar international role played by Guinea, Mali, Ghana and the UAR in the deliberations of the UN concerning the Congo and the three Cameroons suggests that the utilization of these potentially integrative techniques remained, at first, rigidly subordinated to the achievement of pan-African goals.[49] But when the dangers of such a course became apparent, they supported the continuation of the UN effort even as hopes for achieving the maximal program had to be abandoned.

Disarmament negotiations exemplify attempts at peacefully changing a serious international irritant which have so far been unsuccessful. Most of the recent substantive negotiations have been carried on outside the UN framework, with General Assembly debate merely creating a "moral climate" and concentrating on procedural aspects. The superpowers themselves have sharply narrowed the areas of difference between them, but this must be attributed to the nature and perception of warfare rather than to any specific systemic impulse which can be credited to the UN.[50] On the procedural question of whether the Soviet or the western proposals for various disarmament commissions should be followed, the bulk of the revolutionary states has sided with the Soviet Union or abstained. Bolivia, however, regularly supports the United States; Mexico seeks to mediate and the Cuban position shifted in 1960 from unswerving support for the West to equally fervid alignment with Moscow. All revolutionary states greeted Khrushchev's general disarmament plan with favor whereas in previous years they had studiously avoided taking sides on

the merits of rival proposals and had merely prodded the superpowers to continue negotiating, though Ghana, Morocco, Mali and the UAR moderated their stance by stressing the mediation of uncommitted nations. Again, on the matter of suspending nuclear tests in general and preventing the French from going ahead with their plans in particular, most revolutionary states espoused the extreme disarmament position also taken by the Soviet Union. To the extent that disarmament negotiations are at all influenced by the process of parliamentary diplomacy, the pressure of the revolutionary countries bolsters any proposal which looks promising even if the inspection provisions do not meet with Washington's approval. An eventual softening of the western position on this point is likely, without implying an accretion of new powers of inspection and supervision to the UN.

The UN may gain nothing from disarmament and it will soon lose the field of action represented by the dissolution of colonial empires. What areas for potential peaceful change through the medium of parliamentary diplomacy remain which may prevent the system from losing its scope? Controls in outer space, supervision of space exploration, sovereignty over the moon, or at least, the preparation of legal rules for national space activity are obvious examples, even though little progress has been made so far. The preparation of an international investment code and a multipartite system for protecting foreign property in newly independent territories come to mind. The permanent neutralization and administration of inclement but vital territories, such as Antarctica, is such an activity. Whenever a common sense of danger or uncertainty inhibits national action the systemic ground rules of UN diplomacy are given the environmental scope for introducing change. Science and technology are more likely to furnish the stimulus in the future than are national self-determination and boundary disputes.[51]

Multilateral action for technical assistance and economic development comes closest to meeting rigorous criteria for a general UN "consensus," as constituting a recognized "universal interest." It has not always been so. Prior to the period of Afro-Asian ascendancy in the UN the economic development issue had split

the membership into three blocs; but by 1955 a cumulative train of events had been unleashed which has resulted in ever growing accretions of institutional and financial authority in UN hands. Expansion of the System's task was due to the fact that the Western developed nations gave in, up to a point, to the demands of the underdeveloped nations and that the Soviet bloc dropped its absolute condemnation of UN assistance.

Yet, with the exception of changing Soviet policy, little can be demonstrated about specific concerns of revolutionary regimes in policy aims relating to economic development. All underdeveloped member states stood for a maximum of multilateral aid, free from strings, and dispensed by international agencies which would be dominated by their votes. Revolutionary as well as traditional oligarchies, socialist and conservative regimes, called for the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, SUNFED, the International Finance Corporation and the Special Fund. Indeed the striking feature is the willingness of revolutionary regimes to give up certain cherished aims in the process of finding compromises acceptable to the developed nations.[52]

Mexico, despite its intense nationalist suspicion of foreign capital, strongly supported IFC. The same is true of Egypt, Indonesia, and Bolivia. The same revolutionary nations took the initiative in proposing the creation of the Special Fund, and expressed their willingness to subordinate themselves to a strong managing director and a qualified majority voting formula in the Governing Council.[53]

Soviet conduct is more complex. Until 1954 the policy of the Soviet Union in UN economic agencies was entirely negative: it blamed underdevelopment on imperialism and opposed multilateral aid as a camouflaged device for perpetuating colonial dependence, insisting instead on the wholesale application of socialist techniques; Soviet speeches and resolutions were confined to attacking Western economic moves, especially the strategic embargo, and to make propaganda charges. Stalin's death changed all this. With the offer of Soviet contributions to EPTA came the recognition of the propriety of multilateral aid. Suggestions for the

creation of a new universal trade organization were made while some of the satellites offered to join GATT. Soviet participation in the work of the economic commissions for Europe and for Asia and the Far East grew cooperative, so much so that the USSR offered to contribute to the Mekong River Project. Consistent with this change, Moscow then proceeded to support the creation of SUNFED, IFC, and the Special Fund. In procedural and administrative disputes with the Technical Assistance Board and the Secretariat over the degree of bilateralism to be permitted in the distribution of the Soviet contributions to these agencies, the Soviet position was invariably overruled -- and yet the USSR continued to participate on a modest scale. Bilateral aid is also offered by the Soviets within the confines of UN discussions and some commentators suspect that it is the long-range policy of Moscow to maneuver the UN aid effort into a universal bilateralist scheme. But in failing to achieve this, the Soviets as well as other revolutionary regimes have so far accommodated themselves to the evolving rules of the UN System.[54]

Aspirations concerning economic development are common to all types of regimes and even revolutionary governments will swallow aspects of international control in this realm which would otherwise be an anathema. Hence it is instructive to contrast the policy aims of revolutionary regimes in the field of the international protection of human rights with economic development. The USSR, prior to 1953, strongly supported all general declarations and specific legal texts affirming and defining human rights, especially the rights to national self-determination and protection of natural resources against alien control. But it equally strongly opposed all efforts to provide even a minimal UN machinery for enforcing these rights or reporting on their implementation. A subtle change crept into this position after 1953, when Soviet delegates proved quite willing to approve the creation of commissions of inquiry to probe into situations damaging to the West, but continued to oppose these when they were to deal with allegations relating to the Soviet bloc. The mellowing of opposition to UN institutional competence in the human rights field went hand in hand with some disagreement among Soviet

jurists as to the degree of jurisdiction international judicial bodies might enjoy over national sovereignty. At the same time the Soviet Union consented to participation in several efforts by the International Labor Organization to probe the existence of trade union rights in Russia.[55]

Other revolutionary nations show little evidence of an increasing willingness to submit to UN jurisdiction. To be sure, they all espouse the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and have supported the drafting of some of the most far-reaching clauses of the two Covenants. Yet the emphasis is uniformly, not on civil and political rights of individuals, but on the collective right of national self-determination, in its political and economic aspects. The African states use the Declaration to legitimize national freedom but ignore its provisions when it comes to the rights of tribal groups. Universal rights are invoked against present colonialism but untrammelled national sovereignty or regional cohesion is held out for future developments. UN commissions are created to inquire into the colonial aspect, but the revolutionary states vote against the establishment of commissions to define terms carefully, to investigate conditions of national development, or to protect tribal populations living within metropolitan territories. The very intensification of the attachment to non-intervention implies a hardening of opposition among revolutionary nations to international supervision of private and group rights, while the economic and social programs of these regimes make respect for such rights a matter of considerable doubt. When, in 1959, the General Assembly voted to condemn the Peking regime for a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Tibet, the bulk of the revolutionary states abstained, the Soviet Union voted "no," Indonesia opposed the inclusion of the item on the agenda, whereas Bolivia, Mexico, and Cuba voted in the affirmative.[56] While policy expectations of the UN System correspond to permanent national aims in the field of economic development, they merely mirror a temporary concern in the area of human rights, thus being only a function of the current phase in the history of the System.

This survey of the policy aims of revolutionary states has demonstrated only that inputs are neither rigid nor uniform, that they respond to the give-and-take of parliamentary diplomacy and that many of their demands do not differ from those of conservative regimes. Therefore, the emergence of new common interests in the realms of outer space and prevention of limited wars among uncommitted states may yet give the UN new policy inputs in the next phase of its life, which may facilitate a balancing process involving different functions and different balancers than the current pattern.

IV

The present phase in the life of the UN System, which began in 1955, is earmarked by an inter-regional and inter-functional balancing process. The outputs of the System were produced as a result of continuous compromises among regional blocs which differ in internal cohesion with respect to specific UN functions. Functional differentiation, in turn, explains how the mediating role can be assumed by varying balancers and how stalemates can be avoided by shifting majorities. In some situations the mediating role is played so well and the policy inputs are so inter-related that significant outputs can be produced by almost unanimous votes. Compromises involve not only concessions by one bloc to another, but also feature bargaining on the basis of concessions among functions: increasing economic assistance and support for decolonization efforts is demanded in return for support on questions relating to collective security and peaceful change. Typical outputs of the current phase, then, have included the cumulative creation of new UN economic aid institutions and procedures, a growing commitment to peaceful decolonization and the protection of human rights in Africa and Asia, as well as institutionalized balancing, in crises involving an immediate threat to peace, through conciliation, police forces, and Secretariat intercession.

Policy inputs contributed by revolutionary regimes in this pattern were examined above. While the imperatives of symmetry would be neatly satisfied if all the non-Communist revolutionary regimes were to be grouped as "balancing" states, this is obviously not the situation. If the Western bloc represents the "thesis" of the status quo and the Soviets the "antithesis" of change, revolutionary regimes may be found on both dialectical extremes as well as in the neutralist "synthesizing" force. We must now assess the impact of the System's output pattern on the revolutionary environment but we must let the chips fall where they belong. Our question is simply: has the balancing process resulted in a change in the demands and expectations of revolutionary states so as to demonstrate responsiveness to the System? If so, a revolutionary environment clearly need not destroy an institutionally static system based on imperfectly internalized norms.

Soviet conduct in relation to the collective security issue illustrates this conclusion. It is impossible to demonstrate that the basic Soviet policy of advancing a gradual world revolution toward an international Socialist and Communist society has been abandoned; therefore, the UN has not influenced the substance of Moscow's policy aims. On the contrary, a careful study of Soviet attitudes toward international relations and systems makes clear that a policy of peaceful but competitive coexistence, conceived as a means of combat, has always been favored at least by some of Russia's leaders. Soviet participation in a variety of international systems, some of them hostile to Soviet aims, was always considered feasible in an international environment felt to be transitional on the road to Socialist internationalism.[57]

Membership in the UN System, however, has definitely influenced the tactical manner in which the Soviet Union participates in world affairs. All the early pronouncements concerning the sacrosanct nature of national sovereignty, big power unanimity and the dominance of the Security Council have been downgraded during the current phase of UN life. Despite Soviet hostility to international police

and enforcement measures, the Soviet delegate merely abstained on votes creating such forces for Suez and the Congo; even though the veto is still cherished, little effort was made to protest the Security Council's brushing aside of the double veto cast in the Laotian crisis of 1959; when it suited the Soviet purpose, the delegation was quite willing to make use of the General Assembly and the Secretariat; finally, whenever the immediate military security of the Soviet bloc itself was not at stake, the Soviet Union seemed eager to mobilize the UN for collective security operations.[58]

There has been no internalization of norms. The quality of Soviet UN diplomacy has become more sophisticated and self-reliant; its style of participation, far from being defensive, is now self-confident. To that extent, the rigid rejection of institutional evolution has been abandoned and a tactical responsiveness to systemic forces is evident now. But this has been true of a period when the peaceful coexistence phase of Soviet thought happens to coincide with the decolonization phase of the UN. Certainly, a responsiveness to systemic influences is suggested by the continued membership of the Soviet Union in the UN even during the height of the phase of American dominance, even though Zhdanov and his supporters seem to have advocated withdrawal.[59] Reciprocal converging interests with the West and with the uncommitted nations have clearly been experienced, thus explaining the continued stability of the System during the current phase. But the evaporation of the convergences may also imply a passing of the phase. As long as systemic rules have not been internalized, but merely "learned" for short-range tactical purposes, the revolutionary environment remains as volatile as before.

Ghana, Indonesia and Morocco have shown themselves to be far more responsive to systemic influences on matters connected with peace and security. Even the UAR has complied with the bulk of the UN decisions connected with the liquidation of the Suez crisis, though not without hard bargaining and at little cost to

Egypt. They have appreciated that collective security operations conducted by balancing states can stop local wars and confine the East-West conflict. Again, we cannot claim that long-range objectives have been abandoned, but short-range responsiveness to systemic pressure is pronounced enough to promise its outliving the current phase.

The difference in responsiveness between communist and non-communist revolutionary regimes is equally patent in activities relating to peaceful change. Soviet policy has been unflinching in opposing all formal procedural steps for strengthening the executive, legislative or judicial competence of the UN in providing centralized, third-party dominated solutions. Verbal demands for UN measures in South Africa or Spain have not been accompanied with institutional suggestions. Operations in the Congo were denounced as soon as they turned against the Soviet-sponsored regime. UN activities in the realms of disarmament, outer space and other "frontier" areas of possibly converging interests were never supported unless the Soviet substantive position was also accepted. In short, there has been no increasing responsiveness to the possibilities of peaceful change offered by the UN System.

Other revolutionary regimes have been perfectly willing to respond to and initiate measures of peaceful change in problem areas in which they had as yet no direct interest. With respect to disarmament and UN controls in space roadblocks to international agreement came from the nations with an established interest or policy, but not from Asia, Africa and Latin America. But it should be noted that much less responsiveness was in evidence in the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to establish rules for inspecting the utilization by revolutionary regimes of fissile materials. Here, after all, is an area in which even underdeveloped nations have already acquired a rudimentary vested interest. If systemic expansion through peaceful change is to take place in these frontier fields the current phase must be exploited before a changed international environment will make task expansion impossible here too.

Decolonization, it would appear at first blush, is the prime field of peaceful change commanding the responsiveness of revolutionary regimes. This is an accurate impression insofar as they invoke the phrases of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to dislodge the colonial powers, and to make use of international debate and supervision to implement the provisions of the trusteeship system. But the manipulative inspiration of this attitude stands revealed in the limelight of the Congo crisis, leading to the conclusion that the dominance of instrumental motives has led to no internalization of systemic rules. Ghana, for example, joined the other African revolutionary regimes in threatening, at the Casablanca Conference, to take "appropriate action" unilaterally unless the UN supported the Lumumbist forces. Nkrumah softened this position later to the extent of seeking to channel the same demands through the UN Operation, provided the Congo were made an All-African responsibility, with the independent African states acting as the "agent" of the UN, much as the United States did in Korea.[60] This still implied a reduction in the powers of the Secretary-General and an indirect endorsement of the Soviet position with respect to supporting the Gizenga regime. Far from acting as neutral balancers, the Casablanca powers made themselves the mouthpiece, under "African" auspices, of the Soviet extreme position; Liberia, Tunisia, and Ceylon -- none of them revolutionary nations -- acted as the classical balancers. If the search for an African Personality persuaded Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Morocco to subordinate the processes of the world organization to their specific aims, Ghana at least did not carry its regional focus to the extreme of withdrawing its forces from the Congo. Nasser's UAR, however, did precisely that, while undertaking unilateral assistance to Gizenga. Egyptian support for UN operations aiming at peaceful change was strictly calculated on the basis of its convergence with Cairo's policy of penetrating Africa. Nasser was far less inclined to assume a balancing role in the Congo, as compared to Nkrumah, and has shown no interest in maximizing the peaceful change capacity of the UN. The policy of revolutionary Egypt in relation to international institutions is as inconsistently imperialistic as its general foreign policy.[61]

Clearly, not all revolutionary regimes are equally unresponsive to the possibilities of institutionalized peaceful change procedures. Few of them approach the extreme of the Soviet Union, as even Indonesia might accept a temporary trusteeship status for West Irian. But, as we can demonstrate no change in national policy, responsiveness is an ad hoc phenomenon which has not predictably stabilized the environment.

While expediential considerations have imposed a certain amount of responsiveness upon most revolutionary regimes in the realms of collective security and peaceful change, the impact of the UN is much more striking when we deal with economic development. There the very conditions of the revolutionary environment, when impinging upon one another in the context of multi-functional demands, have produced a massive systemic response in which almost all member states have acquiesced, even the Soviet bloc. The impropriety of indefinitely and irrevocably opposing demands for dealing with the revolution of rising expectations has been recognized by all types of nations at the UN, with the result that parliamentary diplomacy has here produced a genuine new consensus, with an expanded organizational task. To judge by the policy of Bolivia, Egypt, and Indonesia, new nations find it much easier to respond to "capitalistic" development concepts when advanced by international agencies than under other auspices, and consequently tone down earlier policy aims in the field of development. The impact on the Soviet Union, though less marked, is still considerable if we keep in mind the unqualified insistence on "socialism" as recently as 1953.

If we are to believe speeches and conference declarations, the devotion to the universal protection of human rights felt by revolutionary regimes is much greater than such devotion elsewhere. The context in which such sentiments are expressed was explored above; here responsiveness and internalization of the procedures and values involved are under scrutiny. The Soviet Union has flatly asserted that the rights envisaged in the Covenants exist already on its territory so that no special enforcement machinery is necessary. Guinea's Constitution endorses

the Universal Declaration by name and enumerates as binding on herself the rights there defined. Apparently, this example is followed only by those African territories which owe their status to UN action, but not by Ghana, Mali or Morocco.[62] Dedication to the UN as the instrument for effectively enforcing human rights cannot be assumed any more than devotion to institutionalized processes of peaceful change controlled by third parties. Mere repetition of verbal sincerity has had no discernible impact on the environment.

As for the international style of revolutionary regimes is concerned, the balancing politics of the UN's third phase can hardly be credited with having toned down manifestations of truculence and impatience. The fifteenth session of the General Assembly would seem to represent a high-point in overt instances of revolutionary style. But to view the systemic impact on style purely in terms of parliamentary behavior is to miss another possible pattern of responsiveness to institutionalized diplomacy, the attitude toward international law as a means of peaceful change.[63] Assuming, at least for the sake of argument, that the western powers -- as the representatives of the international status quo -- took literally in 1945 the provisions of the Charter with respect to legal means of peacefully changing the norms of the international system, it is easy to demonstrate that certain key revolutionary regimes did not. Communist unwillingness to submit to any kind of UN judicial process is well known, an attitude shared quite obviously by Nasser.[64]

But just as the western powers, in their inability to mobilize the law consistently in support of the old status quo, have displayed a more and more instrumental attitude toward UN judicial institutions, the doctrinal opposition of revolutionary regimes to this aspect of the System has weakened.[65] This is especially true of the Soviets. The sharp contrast between communist and western attitudes toward international law, which is so often pointed out, applies only if we compare Soviet practice with Western doctrine, a facile and meaningless

juxtaposition. If Soviet practice is compared with that of the West, the differences are much less pronounced. The "law habit" of the West -- in international relations -- is not much better developed than the Soviets': both sides observe and violate their treaty and customary obligations when it suits their policy purposes. More striking still, when we examine lower-level legal habits with reference to very specific fields, rather than focussing on central points of legal doctrine, the Soviet practice has increasingly approached that of most states in the last decade.[66]

Differences are narrowed further if we compare Soviet doctrine with Western practice. The early Soviet insistence on the role of treaties as the sole source of international obligations has given way to an instrumentally motivated recognition of custom and general principles of law as sometimes useful, just as the West has increasingly turned to treaties: by now both postures have met midway between these extremes. Western legal doctrine is increasingly moving in the direction of a less absolute and more instrumentally-oriented view of the origin and purpose of norms.[67] And as William Welch has shown in an admirable survey of Soviet legal doctrine concerning the position of regional arrangements, these are viewed essentially as the West interprets its military pacts: both postures are explicable easily on the basis of the search for immediate military security and the desire to manipulate the rules of the UN Charter so as to sanctify one's own treaties and castigate the opponent's. In the process, the arguments have become very much alike.[68] To the extent, then, that revolutionary and status quo powers have turned to the UN to legitimate their national policies they have responded to the systemic forces they invoke by relaxing their earlier legal styles.

Observations of the impact of the System on the revolutionary environment and assessments of changes in revolutionary style do not exhaust the analytic means at our disposal for determining whether the universal System is mastering its impatient members or whether they are destroying the System. The evidence is

uneven with respect to the moderation of revolutionary inputs and it may be doubted that the rapprochement of legal styles is of permanent significance. But if we can establish that the System itself has grown in the legitimacy it enjoys in the eyes of its members and in the authority it exercises over them then the inconsistent impact of UN decisions on member state expectations is not a fatal blow to the survival of the organization.

We may conclude that the System proper has increased in importance, at the expense of the states which make up the environment, if cumulative institutional decisions continue to be regarded as "legitimate" even by revolutionary regimes. The criterion of legitimacy is the regular invocation of UN Charter principles in advocacy and debate, by those holding out for more UN action as well by those who seek to block such action (the balancer and the aggressor both invoke the Charter regularly), plus the demonstrated willingness to expand the UN's task in order to implement the Charter principles put forward. What is especially significant here, of course, is the willingness of states to support new organizational tasks which they had initially opposed. "Authority," by contrast, implies no acceptance of the rightness of specific organizational action. The "authority" of the System might be said to increase if member states carry out decisions even if they did not advocate them, continue to oppose them in principle, and do not link the continued exercise of the task to the invocation of Charter principles.

The growth in legitimacy enjoyed by the UN should be observable in the utterances of prominent statesmen associated with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, a grouping particularly useful for the study of revolutionary leadership since it tends to serve as an international front organization for the United Arab Republic as well as for the Communist bloc. Indeed there seems to have been a considerable amount of tugging between Cairo and Moscow as to who should manipulate the Conference.[69] Typical causes which the Conference espouses, apart from a general condemnation of "imperialism" and "colonialism" in terms which conform to the Communist

line, include the banning of nuclear weapons testing in Africa, complete disarmament, the Stockholm World Peace Council, the Japanese drive against the U. S. Security Treaty, the return of Okinawa to Japan, the elimination of all foreign military bases everywhere, Castro's Cuba, and the complete rejection of any western influence whatsoever in recently "liberated" countries, including economic and military ties voluntarily accepted by the new governments. Indeed, the Conference shows a marked consistency in serving as the mouthpiece of the most extreme anti-western strands of opinions to be found in Africa and Asia: the UPC in the Cameroons as opposed to the Ahidjo government, the FLN in Algeria, the opposition parties in Somalia against the Somali Youth League government, Lumumba against Kasavubu, etc.[70]

Legitimacy appears to receive a strong prop when the demands of states and of independence movements invoke the phraseology of the Charter in connection with the drive against colonialism. To be sure, such invocations are heard ad nauseam when they are useful in supporting the argument for inddpendence. But the Charter principles are held to be violated unless "freedom" conforms to the international revolutionary mystique:

> A nation cannot attain real independence if there are foreign troops stationed in its independant territory and if it is a member of an organization controlled by an imperialist State if it joins military pacts within imperialist power. [sic][71]

Therefore, the legitimacy of the UN operation in the Congo was vehemently denied when it appeared that the "unlawful activity of Mr. Hammarjoeld" [sic] proved unsuccessful in bolstering Lumumba.[72] On the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the UN the Conference Secretariat again "hails all the efforts aiming at the application of the principles of the Charter, such as for example, those of the neutralist and Afro-Asian countries," but also noted that "the enchantment vanished. The cases are in fact very rare when the UN served the cause of peace and the liberty of peoples."[73] One African spokesman flatly asserted that whenever the pan-African variety of nationalism failed to win endorsement in New York, the

American imperialists succeed in subverting the organization and its Secretary-General. He also argued that multilateral economic aid under UN auspices is to be resisted in such circumstances because "this would only help perpetuating economical neo-colonialism [sic]"[74] Yet it should be noted that the Conference Secretary-General, Youssef El Sebai, urged that:

> ...because of the pressing need for the United Nations in the present circumstances, Afro-Asian peoples are determined to see that the World Organization does not collapse. It is our duty to consolidate it by every possible means, and to endeavour to enable it to play its great role in World affairs, uninfluenced by pressure or intimidation, for the sole benefit of all peoples of the world, for Justice and for Peace.[75]

Clearly, the failure to achieve full endorsement for revolutionary objectives in New York is reflected in a continued overt denial of legitimacy. But the ambivalence of El Sebai's statement and the support Ghana still gives the UN in the Congo warrants the conclusion that eventual legitimacy may still develop either because the UN may be a useful Soviet front in some future crisis or because it may still offer the safest way out of a dangerous situation. But it should be noted that the second part of the criterion of legitimacy, consent to an expanded UN task, has been lacking as far as the Soviet bloc and several African revolutionary regimes are concerned.

Some functional precision is needed at this point. The two criteria of legitimacy have clearly been satisfied in the case of the exponded UN task in economic development. Charter invocation, equally clearly, has not been accompanied by task expansion with respect to collective security, human rights and most aspects of peaceful change. Decolonization, however, has conferred increasing legitimacy on the UN even if the reservations explicit in the activities of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference are borne in mind. Plebiscites have been held and their results implemented; Trusteeship Council and General Assembly injunctions concerning steps for achieving self-government and independence have been carried out; groups and individuals persecuted by the colonial administrations have

achieved respectability and even power as a result of UN intervention. While the Soviet Union, Cuba, Guinea and Mali have denied the UN full legitimacy over the Congo, they have acquiesced in it with respect to other colonial episodes, thus altering an earlier, more intransigent position. But even if decolonization has conferred increasing legitimacy on the world organization, the passing of the colonial phase makes it doubtful that this acquisition will be readily transferred to new functions.

Growth in authority, rather than in legitimacy, is the most striking aspect of UN history in its current phase -- even at the expense of certain revolutionary regimes. This growth is demonstrable by observing the accretions of power of certain UN institutions and the implementation of their decisions by revolutionary member nations in the face of declared indifference or opposition, following the adoption of appropriate resolutions in the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Even though a general consensus embracing almost the entire membership has developed with respect to the increased institutional role of the UN System in economic development, the revolutionary states had been among those who were most anxious to retain a maximum of national freedom of action in the preparation and execution of development projects. The Soviet Union, in fact, had made a fetish of the need for absolute national autonomy in economic planning. Notwithstanding these commitments of principle, the evolution of UN techniques shows a growth of power on the part of international officials and willingness of revolutionary regimes to carry out their proposals. The Special Fund exercises much more detailed supervision over national development projects enjoying UN support than did the Technical Assistance Board in earlier years, and the TAB is now adopting more stringent measures. The recommendations of survey teams and inspectors dispatched by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are readily implemented by borrowing nations, despite the "Wall Street connections" of that institution. Bolivia has agreed to comply with the drastic deflationary "recommendations" of the International Monetary Fund as a price for receiving further loans in the face

of strong domestic resentment. The mediating role of the Bank, when sweetened with appropriate financial sugar, has been a significant one in resolving such crises as restitution to the Universal Suez Canal Company and development of the Indus River Basin. The most capitalistic of aid-giving institutions receives cooperation from revolutionary (but non-Communist) nations when systematic economic development is at stake.[76]

A similar conclusion is made possible by the experience of the rapidly growing system of UN Resident Representatives in aid-receiving countries, an institution not initially proposed by the underdeveloped nations. Almost fifty such officials now reside in member states receiving technical assistance, proposing and channelling projects, coordinating and supervising their execution. On their impact, one UN official writes:

> It is an administrative maxim that power should equal responsibility. The role of resident representative violates the precept; its responsibilities are endless, its powers nil. The resident representative knows that in whatever direction he looks -- at the [Technical Assistance] Board, the participating organizations, the government, or the experts -- he can order no one. For the essence of the post is that the person holding it achieves results not by commanding and ordering, but by persuasion and giving good counsel.[77]

Obviously, the actual influence of these officials varies from country to country. But since increasingly the flow of new grants, loans, experts and fellowships depends in no small measure on the confidential reports submitted by the resident representatives to the authorities at UN headquarters and to the specialized agencies, their counsel on the spot is unlikely to be disregarded. Burma was anxious to receive assistance in this form and turned to the Soviet bloc only when the UN was unprepared to meet hurried requests; Bolivia accommodated itself to it despite a nationalist revolution.[78]

Undoubtedly the most convincing item in an argument for assessing the growth of UN authority is the development of the office of the Secretary-General. Compared to the ineffectual groping for autonomous influence displayed by Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjöld has some right to claim that his stand on actual or emerging

conflicts "to the extent that such stands can be firmly based on the Charter and its principles and thus express what may be called the independent judgment of the Organization."[79] The Secretary-General, thus, can speak and act as if he, rather than the member states, represent the System if he is able to practice "quiet diplomacy" and enjoy the support of governments as a truly independent agent. If these conditions are not met, admitted Hammarskjøld, "he must be prepared to see his future value as a negotiator endangered or even lost. In the latter case, he ought, naturally, to resign from his post."[80] To what extent, then, has this claim to a new autonomous status withstood the test of international politics?

One aspect of the Secretary-General's quiet diplomacy has unfolded in efforts to warn, admonish and encourage the major powers with respect to disarmament negotiations, test bans and protection against surprise attack. This, of course, implies direct intervention in a cold war issue and the results are common knowledge. While this type of effort has contributed little to strengthening the authority of the System, another type of quiet diplomacy has prevailed in Hammarskjøld's attempts to maintain peace in regions at the periphery of the Cold War. In fact, the major justification advanced for intervening in Arab-Israeli crises, in Suez, the Congo and Laos has been the exclusion of these troublespots from the Cold War. In these cases the Secretary-General undertook personal mediation, appointed UN personnel to take charge of specific jobs, such as establishing and supervising cease-fire agreements and clearing the Suez Canal, or created a "UN presence" in the person of delegates to watch and report on implementations of earlier agreements. Success was rarely complete. Israeli-Arab tensions flared up despite mediation; the Laotian crisis was not stabilized; it is too early to predict the attainment of the economic and military objectives of the Congo Operation. Yet, quiet diplomacy did, apparently, succeed in liquidating the Suez Crisis and in stabilizing the relations between the UAR on the one hand and Jordan and Lebanon on the other. What is the explanation for the differences in impact?[81]

Quiet diplomacy, far from being separable from parliamentary diplomacy, functions best as an arm of some consensus, however limited temporally or functionally among the member governments. This consensus must include the major revolutionary regimes, if only because most of the tensions have arisen in their areas of the world.[82] In the Arab-Israeli and Laotian crises this condition was not met, since mediation was not preceded by unambiguous Security Council or General Assembly resolutions or *ad hoc* meetings of the mind. But in the Suez Canal crisis, the General Assembly did furnish the Secretary-General with explicit authorization born from the process of parliamentary diplomacy and in the resolution of the Lebanese-Jordanian civil war of 1958 the governments again welcomed a balancing operation which would free the area from the danger of American, Soviet, and Egyptian armed action. In all these situations the Soviet Union and the UAR, as the major revolutionary regimes concerned, deferred to UN authority even though they did not welcome or advocate it. Whether the same principle is established by the example of the Congo Operation is still uncertain. To be sure, a consensus produced by parliamentary diplomacy accompanied the actions of the Secretary-General in recruiting and deploying armed forces and in running the Congo economy; but the consensus proved to be ephemeral and had to be bolstered by repeated threats on the part of Hammarskjöld to tender his resignation. While the endorsement given to the Secretary-General's authority in the Congo in the resolution of April 15, 1961 was a sweeping one, the revolutionary regimes did not join in it.[83] In the Suez Crisis, the General Assembly created an Advisory Committee on the UN Emergency Force which functioned peacefully, without voting, in backing up the Secretary-General.[84] In the Congo Crisis, the Advisory Committee created for similar purposes led a less harmonious existence. The success of the Secretary-General in asserting the authority of the System depends on the mobilization of a majority of member states -- including the revolutionary governments -- in favor of a balancing operation for the maintenance of peace. It remains linked to the

environment and has not yet attained the force of an autonomous agency superimposed over it.

However subtle its manifestations and inconsistent its public assertions, there has been an increase in systemic authority during the third phase of the UN's life. But this increase has not been accompanied by an equal growth in the acceptance as right and proper of these manifestations; there has been no parallel growth in the System's legitimacy. Member states, and especially the revolutionary regimes among them, acquiesce very reluctantly in the assertions of systemic autonomy. They do so only because policy aims of primary importance to them cannot be satisfied in any other way without grave danger to their hopes for peace, independence, and economic modernization. But their acquiescence is thus generated by the environment and is not yet based on an internalization of systemic rules. As long as this is the case the current phase determines behavior patterns. With a shift in national policy and a reorientation of national expectations the current environmental phase will come to an end, and with it the newly triumphant authority of the UN System may pass into history. Systemic growth at the expense of a fluid environment demands concurrent growth of authority and legitimacy. With one but without the other the survival of a stable System into the next phase of its life is all that can be expected.

This, as yet non-existent, unity of authority and legitimacy can also be regarded as the global consensus which must inhere in any system which is supreme over its environment. It is at this level that those who speak of an international public interest can make a conceptually meaningful contribution. The objective existence of such an "interest," some basic values and associated policies experienced in common by the membership, could be demonstrated if there is a reliable substantive consensus in the organization. To be sure, each phase in the System's history exhibited substantive areas of agreement among and within many of the blocs but a shift in environment caused this substantive agreement to be dissipated. A

pervasive substantive consensus, an agreement on an interest of mankind transcending short periods of almost accidental convergences of national inputs, has emerged neither with respect to the imperative of preserving peace, nor with reference to peaceful and orderly changes in troublesome conditions, nor yet on the issue of exalting and protecting the individual as a subject of international law. But substantive consensus, so defined, has come about with reference to meeting the revolution of rising expectations. Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that this would have happened without the political pressures and avenues of accommodation opened up by the UN System. And so the Marxist as well as the Liberal who fashions policy on the basis of some kind of economic determinism has come into his own in the machinery of international organizations. His efforts, not those of the direct advocate of peace, order and human rights, have carried the day in fashioning a genuine international interest.[85]

But there is also a procedural dimension to consensus, the dimension held basic to the life of democratic systems. If procedural uniformities transcending the phases of the UN's history can be isolated, systemic growth could again be demonstrated to have occurred. The role of majoritarian as against unanimous voting, provided whatever trend exists outlives a given phase, would furnish an indicator here. Thus we find that voting in the Security Council has in effect been gradually emancipated from dependence on an absolute unanimity rule on substantive matters, and that this development has not been obliterated by changes in national policy. The admission that abstention by a permanent member does not constitute a veto originated in the early "honeymoon" phase of the System; but it has survived. More striking still, the "consensus" procedure of issuing directives or recommendations without formal vote and the liberalization of the rules regarding the participation of the Secretary-General in Council meetings evolved during the western-dominated second phase; not only did the Soviet Union acquiesce but the procedure has been carried over into the third phase in situations not requiring a new basic decision of the Security Council.

Yet no such conclusion can be stated for the General Assembly. The rules of procedure are notoriously permissive and presiding officers are very inconsistent in holding member governments to them. Permanent agreement has not emerged as to whether votes on certain questions involving decolonization demand a simple or a two-thirds majority; the First Committee makes all its decisions on a two-thirds vote even though some of the issues before it could be considered as "unimportant" under the Charter and the Rules of Procedure. No discernible evolution seems to have occurred.[86] And so consensus remains as changeable as the environment which it might stabilize.

V

Let us assume that within the next two or three years the current phase of inter-regional and inter-functional balancing will come to an end -- at least in its present form. This will occur because the policy inputs uniting the Afro-Asians will begin to diverge as the colonial issue ceases to be relevant. Even now the internal cohesion of the Afro-Asian caucussing groups, like that of the Latin American caucus, is among the weakest of any of the Assembly groups.[87] The elimination of the colonial issue will probably imply the further splitting of both groups, who will remain united only on questions of economic development. As concerns human rights, the revolutionary states in all regions will factor themselves out from status quo powers in opposing an expansion of the systemic task. Hence it will become much more difficult for the Western and Soviet blocs to attract uncommitted and underdeveloped nations to their respective positions on collective security because the functional fields in which concessions can be offered will shrink in scope. Under these circumstances it is difficult to predict whether the Latin American and Afro-Asian nations will unite on the issue of mediating in the Cold War, or will begin to choose sides in that conflict to a greater extent than heretofore.

In any case if the current phase, with its great opportunities for bargaining, has been unable to transform the UN System into an organization in which institutionalized interest politics brings about increasing consensus, authority and legitimacy, a future phase which reduces the scope for bargaining is unlikely to succeed. Hence we cannot predict that the System will increasingly control that portion of the environment which is due to the aims of revolutionary regimes. But the opposite conclusion, that the revolutionary environment will destroy the System, is equally unlikely. Legitimate authority, if we argue on the analogy of administrative behavior in democratic states, follows the successful coordination of separate group and institutional efforts, achieved by means of continuous bargaining which results in a revolution of attitudes, a "breakthrough." In the UN we have merely had compromises based on quantitative bargaining and rigid insistence on concessions of equal value, with a failure to yield "integration" in the sense of the visualization by the parties of new alternatives for common action in which no state "gives up" anything.[88] But we have had continuous bargaining in which the revolutionary states have fully participated. There is no reason for thinking that even an environment offering fewer opportunities for the exchange of concessions will eliminate the incentives for retaining such stability as the System now possesses. And if the UN task does expand to the "new frontier" of space and science, the level of negotiation which results in integration may yet be achieved during the next phase.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that revolutionary regimes may be deterred into truculent inactivity by their participation in the United Nations, but not thereby be socialized into the gentle arts of accommodation, leading to ever higher planes of universal progress under the benevolent aegis of the hundred-odd flags displayed at the East River. "We tend to identify peace, stability, and the quiescence of conflict with notions like trust, good faith, and mutual respect," wrote T. C. Schelling. "This is splendid to the extent that this point of view

actually encourages trust and faith. But where trust and good faith do not exist and cannot be made to by our acting as though it did, we may wish to solicit advice from the underworld, or from ancient despotisms, on how to make agreements work when trust and good faith are lacking and there is no legal recourse for breach of contract. The ancients had devices like the exchange of hostages, drinking wine from the same glass to demonstrate the absence of poison, meeting in public places to inhibit the murder of one party by the other, and even the deliberate exchange of spies to facilitate the transmittal of authentic information."[89] If we add that participation in the politics of the UN acts as a channel for the transmission of blackmail threats, even if it be multilateral and multifunctional blackmail, the civilizing impact of the United Nations System on the revolutionary component of its environment will have been established. The environment is changed even if the system itself sustains no growth in task and receives no shining new mantle of legitimate authority.

This relationship bears a marked -- if grim -- resemblance to the notion of "mutual recognition" of the limit on violence in the theory of limited war. The Yalu River was so perceived by the belligerents, but "not as something that we and the Chinese recognized unilaterally and simultaneously:...We recognized that they recognized it, they recognized that we recognized it, we recognized that they recognized that we recognized it, and so on....In that sense, limits and precedents and traditions of this kind have an authority that is not exactly granted to them voluntarily by the participants in a conflict; they acquire a magnetism or focal power of their own."[90] So do debates and votes in United Nations bodies, without directly and self-consciously motivating those who debate and vote to behave differently than they rationally wish to do, but deterring them just the same.

Table 1

Cohesion of Regional Caucus Groups in the United Nations General Assembly, 1946-1958

COHESION OF MEMBER STATES

Caucus	Before Creation of Caucus %			After Creation of Caucus %			During the Whole Period % *		
	Identical	Solidarity	Divided	Identical	Solidarity	Divided	Identical	Solidarity	Divide
African**	---	---	---	46.7	33.3	20.0			
Western European	65.0	23.8	11.2	82.4	11.0	6.6			
Asian-African	11.4	36.4	53.9	34.4	42.2	23.4			
Benelux							77.5	11.0	5.5
Scandinavian							68.3	23.9	7.8
Commonwealth							13.0	27.7	59.3
Arab							63.4	27.2	9.4
Latin American							28.8	33.2	38.0
Soviet							96.0	3.9	0.1

Source: Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958, pp. 64-65, 88, 98, 111, 121-122, 131, 155, 172, 187.

* The caucusing groups listed for "the whole period" were formed before or at the time of the first meeting of the General Assembly.

** The African Caucus had functioned for only two sessions at the time these computations were made, thus precluding firm conclusions. Prior to the formation of the Caucus there were not enough African member states to create a meaningful statistical pattern.

Hovet's study is based on the counting of an "adjusted gross" number of roll-call votes. For the meaning of this device, see Hovet, pp. 249 ff. On an "identical" vote the frequency of members voting the same way, not considering abstentions, is counted; on a "solidarity" vote, the frequency of members of a caucusing group abstaining rather than voting against their colleagues is determined; a "divided" vote covers the situations of direct opposition among members of a group.

FOOTNOTES

1 David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, "Some Models of Political Change in Contemporary Africa," unpublished manuscript.

2 John P. Gillin, "Some Aspects for Policy," in Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 31.

3 Félix Houphouet-Boigny, "Black Africa and the French Union," Foreign Affairs, (July 1957), p. 594.

4 Speech by the Prime Minister of Ghana at the Opening Session, December 8, 1958, All-African People's Conference, Accra. The same point was made by the Tunisian delegate to the First Conference of Independent African States, Accra, April 22, 1958.

5 Ibid., for this train of thought. See also the similar remarks of Sékou Touréeas reported in Afro-Asian Bulletin (Monthly Journal of the Permanent Secretariat of Afro-Asian Solidarity, Cairo) October-November, 1959, p. 6. The argument that "national" independence of single ex-colonial territories whose boundaries were fixed by Europeans is meaningless as long as any colonial situations survive is common to Pan-African thought in English-speaking West Africa and the Cameroons. See George Padmore, A Guide to Pan-African Socialism. The same doctrine is expressed unblushingly in the Constitution of the Convention People's Party. See K. Nkrumah, Ghana (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957), pp. 289-290.

6 See Farouk's use of the Arab League and of the caliphate in Elie Kedourie "Pan-Arabism and British Policy," in W. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. 102-103. On Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism see Jean Vigneau, "The Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution," in Ibid., pp. 136-138.

7 Quoted in R. Emerson, "Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism," Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. XIII, no. 2 (February 1954), p. 132.

8 Morton A. Kaplan, The Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia, Princeton Center of International Studies (January 1960).

9 As cited in G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 52-55.

10 For Castro's views see the revealing marathon speech delivered to the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 1960. A similar doctrine was developed as early as 1918 by Sultan Galiev. See A. Bennigsen, "Sultan Galiev," in Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 398 ff. Peronista nationalism and policy often used the same arguments and conformed to similar social pressures. See John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), chapter 6.

11 James S. Coleman, in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 554. See the similar points made by Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 29 (1958), pp. 473, 480. For the identification of such tensions in an African setting involving the danger of disintegration on the part of a pyramidal social structure, merging notions of legitimacy, kinship, religion, land ownership, and chieftaincy (Ashanti), see David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," World Politics, vol. XIII, no. 1 (October 1960).

12 This thesis is developed by W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1959), pp. 327-334.

13 See Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesian Images of their National Self," Rand Corporation Report No. P-1452-RC, August 1, 1958.

14 Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 43-44, 69-71, 84-85, 110-114. Anwar El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile (London: Wingate, 1957). And especially, Morroe Berger, Military Elite and Social Change: Egypt since Napoleon (Princeton: Center of International Studies, February 1, 1960).

15 Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 51, 69-70, 134.

16 This judgment is not accepted by all observers. Michael Lindsay, for example, found that the Chinese Communists see no contradiction in professed allegiance to the Panch Shila and the simultaneous commitment to intervention in other countries through the medium of national liberation movements. If Lindsay is correct, the dualistic commitment is not a matter of style, but of doctrine. See his "China and Her Neighbors,"

in The Challenge of Communist China, (Proceedings of a Conference held at the University of Minnesota, April 4 and 5, 1960), pp. 21-22.

17 This point is developed in detail in Pye, op. cit., pp. 480, 482, 484, and in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 150 ff.

18 In the case of Brazil, this relationship is developed with respect to Vargas by Charles Wagley, in Social Change in Latin America Today, op. cit., p. 220 ff. A similar point is made by David Apter in his The Gold Coast in Transition.

19 Robert A. Scalapino, "'Neutralism' in Asia," American Political Science Review, vol. XLVIII, no. 1 (March 1954).

20 On this point, the particular form of "active neutralism" sponsored by the UAR should be kept in mind. As distinguished from the Indian prototype, this attitude frankly equates the advancing of pan-Arab interests with the organization of a neutralist bloc which would maneuver permanently between the two military camps and thereby compel them to inaction, without expecting necessarily to dismantle them or to eliminate the Cold War, though this eventuality would be welcomed. Since the United States has the reputation of opposing pan-Arab aims, with the Soviet Union at least neutral on this point, "active neutralism" in practice is bound to work itself out in a pro-Soviet direction. For Egyptian thought on this subject see the literature analyzed by Leonard Binder, "Nasserism: The Protest Movement in the Middle East," mimeographed and unpublished paper, May 1961.

21 Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1957), pp. 36-43, 56-64, 83-85, 117-120.

22 For an example of a nonsensical systems approach to international relations, derived in simplistic fashion from Freudian theory, see Frank Harary, "A Structural Analysis of the Situation in the Middle East in 1956," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. V, no. 2 (June 1961).

23 Inis L. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1959, 2nd ed.), p. 15. This work is the most incisive in treating the United Nations from this vantage point, as well as the most judicious.

24 This idea is developed in some detail by Arthur N. Holcombe, "The United Nations and American Foreign Policy," University of Illinois Bulletin (October 1957). See also the reports of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace for specific proposals for strengthening the UN in line with this conceptual commitment.

25 See, e.g., the blunt statement on this score by P. H. Spaak, "The Experiment of Collective Security," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Perspectives on Peace, 1910-1960 (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 85. Further evidence for increasing disappointment with the liberal-parliamentary aspect of the UN can be found in the Carnegie Endowment's series National Studies on International Organization, notably the volumes on Belgium, Australia, Canada, Sweden, and Britain. George Modelski treats the UN as a "western universal system" in The Communist International System (Princeton: Center of International Studies, December 1, 1960).

26 Arnold Wolfers and Laurence Martin (eds.), The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), pp. xxvi-xxvii.

27 Stanley Hoffmann, Organisations Internationales et Pouvoirs Politiques des Etats (Paris: Armand Colin, 1954), p. 412.

28 For the distinction between static and dynamic systems see Kenneth E. Boulding, "Organization and Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. I (1957), pp. 122-123.

29 Chadwick F. Alger, "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict," Ibid., vol. V, no. 2 (June 1961).

30 For such evidence see Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959).

31 James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 196 (italics in original).

32 See the seven-volume study of the Brookings Institution, published between 1956 and 1958, as well as the twenty-odd volumes which make up the study of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, previously cited.

33 This argument is developed in detail in E. B. Haas, "The Comparative Study of the United Nations," World Politics, vol. XII, no. 2 (January 1960).

34 Robert G. North, Howard E. Koch, Jr., and Dina A. Zinnes, "The Integrative Functions of Conflict," mimeographed paper delivered at the Symposium on the Place of Theory in the Conduct and Study of International Relations, University of Michigan, May 12, 1960, pp. 28 and 33.

35 Dag Hammarskjöld, "Towards a Constitutional Order," in Perspectives on Peace, op. cit., pp. 66-75.

36 Alexander Dallin, The Soviet View of the United Nations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, August 1959), pp. 10-12, 18-19. Elliott Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 383-385. Kathryn Davis, The Soviets at Geneva (Geneva: Librairie Kundig, 1934), p. 21.

37 Egypt and the United Nations, Report of a Study Group Set up by the Egyptian Society of International Law (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957). However, the passage to "active" or "positive" neutralism was an innovation of the military regime. While no doubt produced by the internal needs for status and prestige of Nasser, both in Egypt and in the Arab world, this concept implies an enhanced role for the UN in collective security and in disarmament negotiations as a means to prevent superpower summitry and to institutionalize the balancing role of uncommitted nations. For an explicit argument along these lines see Clovis Maqsud, The Meaning of Positive Neutrality (in Arabic) (Beirut: 1960), pp. 128, 135, 137, as quoted in Binder, op. cit. Possible relationships between African neutralism and anomic conceptions of authority in new nations are explored by Francis X. Sutton, "Authority and Authoritarianism in the New Africa," Journal of International Affairs, vol. XV, no. 1 (1961).

38 Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch, "The Afro-Asian Nations and International Organization," The Review of Politics, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 1959), pp. 450-451. Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 158. Consulate of Indonesia (San Francisco), Indonesia's Voting Record in the United Nations. Where

Nkrumah, "African Prospect," Foreign Affairs, vol. 37, no. 1 (October 1958), pp. 49-50.

39 On this period see Alexander W. Rudzinski, "The Influence of the United Nations on Soviet Policy," International Organization, vol. V, no. 2 (May 1951), and Rupert Emerson and Inis L. Claude, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations," ibid., vol. VI, no. 1 (February 1952). Subsequent events have done nothing to change the validity of these interpretations.

40 Especially, Goodman, op. cit., pp. 128-152.

41 Quoted in Dallin, op. cit., p. 43. My interpretation owes much to Dallin's analysis of the post-1955 period. Dallin offers convincing evidence that the Soviet leadership made a reasoned decision in 1955 to profit from the tripolarization of power in the UN to upgrade the organization as a vehicle of national policy.

42 I follow the definition of parliamentary diplomacy invented by Dean Rusk and applied by Philip C. Jessup in "Parliamentary Diplomacy: An Examination of the Legal Quality of the Rules of Procedure of Organs of the United Nations," Recueil des Cours, Academie de Droit International, vol. 89 (Leyden, 1956).

43 The difference is well developed by Inis L. Claude, "The United Nations and the Use of Force," International Conciliation, no. 532 (March 1961), p. 383.

44 As quoted in Lincoln Bloomfield, "Law, Politics and International Disputes," ibid., no. 516, (January 1958), p. 284.

45 For interesting information concerning the lack of success of attempted UN legislative change in the peaceful reunification of Korea prior to 1950, see Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959). The same conclusion could be drawn from efforts "legislatively" to solve the Palestine issue prior to the outbreak of hostilities since the resolution permitting partition was never implemented in its official form. But it should be noted that unwillingness to agree to attempted peaceful change is not the exclusive privilege of revolutionary regimes. The Egyptian monarchy

initiated the policy of closing the Suez Canal to Israel-bound ships. See Leo Gross, "Passage through the Suez Canal of Israel-Bound Cargo and Israel Ships," American Journal of International Law, vol. 51, no. 3 (July 1957).

46 B. M. Shurshalov, as quoted in Dallin, op. cit., p. 60.

47 K. Nkrumah, Ghana (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1957), pp. 258 and 261. See also Nkrumah's speech and the final Declaration of the Conference of Independent African States, Accra, April 22, 1958, especially Resolutions 1 and 5. All revolutionary regimes sought to influence the plebiscite in British Cameroons so as to result in union with a radical independent Cameroons rather than with a moderate Nigeria. They also favored the attainment of independence by French Cameroons under such conditions as to strengthen the outlawed opposition groups.

48 This summary is based on the debates concerning the following resolutions: S/4369, S/4383, S/4386, S/4404, S/4426, S/4425, S/4453, S/4494, S/4519, S/4523, S/4525, A/L.292/rev 1, A/L.294, A/L.293, A/L.319 Rev 2, A/L.322 Rev 1, S/4578, S/4579, A/L.331 Rev 1, A/L.332, S/4625, S/4741, S/4733 Rev 1, S/4740. I have also drawn heavily on the Secretary-General's statement of December 7, 1960, embodying his comments on docs. S/4573 and S/4571.

49 See Immanuel Wallenstein, "Pan-Africanism as Protest," unpublished paper, 1961, for the explanation of how territorial pan-African goals fit into the revolutionary ideology of negritude and independent national modernization.

50 For a thoughtful analysis of the growth of agreement, see Philip E. Jacob, "The Disarmament Consensus," International Organization, vol. XIV, no 2 (Spring 1960). My summary of UN discussions is based on General Assembly disarmament debates since 1955.

51 Examples for fields of action offering opportunities for peaceful change by quasi-legislative action are given in C. Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (London: Stevens, 1958), chapters 7, 8, and 9. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace

Developing the United Nations, 13th Report (January 1961), pp. 35-40. Lincoln Bloomfield, The United Nations and U. S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), pp. 157-186.

52 Benjamin Higgins and Guy Pauker, "Economic Aspects of the Asian-African Conference and its Aftermath," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia (no. 5/6, 1955), pp. 16-17. Oscar Lewis, "Mexico Since Cardenas," in Social Change in Latin America Today, op. cit., pp. 306-307. B. E. Matecki, "Establishment of the International Finance Corporation: A Case Study," International Organization, vol. X, no. 2 (May 1956). Robert E. Elder and Forrest D. Murden, "Economic Co-Operation: Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development," (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1954).

53 See the revealing case study on SUNFED and the Special Fund in John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, How United Nations Decisions Are Made (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1960), pp. 85-122.

54 Dallin, op. cit., p. 63. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy Toward Underdeveloped Areas in the Economic and Social Council," International Organization, vol. IX, no. 2 (May 1955); "Soviet Policy in ECAFE: A Case Study of Soviet Behavior in International Economic Organizations," ibid., vol. XII, no. 4 (Autumn 1958). R. L. Allen, "United Nations Technical Assistance: Soviet and East European Participation," ibid., vol. XI, no. 4 (Autumn 1957). Harold K. Jacobson, "The Soviet Union, the UN and World Trade," Western Political Quarterly, vol. XI, no. 3 (September 1958).

55 E. R. Goodman, "The Cry of National Liberation: Recent Soviet Attitudes Toward National Self-Determination," International Organization, vol. XIV, no. 1 (Winter 1960). J. A. Armstrong, "The Soviet Attitude Toward UNESCO," ibid., vol. VIII, no. 2 (May 1954). Dallin, op. cit., pp. 45-47. Dallin and Armstrong suggest that the post-1953 Soviet interest in human rights and international intellectual contacts is connected with the Soviet hope of turning all UN agencies into a pro-Communist front organization.

56 See the resolutions of the All-African People's Conference, Accra, op. cit., for the contrast between domestic exclusiveness and UN legitimacy for anti-colonialism alone. A similar case for Latin America is made by Martin Travis, "The Political and Social Basis for the Latin American Doctrine of Non-Intervention," Proceedings of the American Society for International Law, vol. 53 (1959). The Tibetan case is discussed in Bailey, op. cit., p. 248 ff. The fact that a number of western democracies and Latin American oligarchical regimes with minority and human rights problems also abstained indicates that many members were unwilling to set a precedent.

57 Julian Towster, "The Dogma of Communist Victory," Current History (November 1959). For a collection of statements supporting this conclusion see also Khrushchev on the Shifting Balance of World Forces, U. S. Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. No. 57 (September 1959).

58 On Laos see Leo Gross in American Journal of International Law, vol. 53, no. 1 (January 1960), pp. 118-130. The other examples are discussed in Dallin, op. cit., pp. 49-51, 84, 90-94, 99-100. But it should be noted that the Soviet Union refused to contribute to the maintenance of these forces. Other revolutionary regimes declining to support UNEF include Bolivia, Cuba, Iraq, Mexico, and the UAR. All the other African and Asian revolutionary regimes have faithfully paid their contributions. Details in Bailey, op. cit., p. 216 ff.

59 Dallin, op. cit., pp. 33-38.

60 On the Casablanca Conference see Conference of Heads of African States, Casablanca, 3-7 January 1961, "Declaration Concerning the Situation in the Congo." Also Kwame Nkrumah, speech at General Assembly session, 7 March 1961. When the Osagyefo took the oath of office as President of Ghana, he swore "that the union of Africa should be striven for by every lawful means and, when attained, should be faithfully preserved..." External Affairs (September 1960), p. 221.

61 My assessment of UAR foreign policy objectives and their "inconsistent imperialism" is based on Wheelock, op. cit., especially pp. 223-257, 270-282.

62 For details see Egon Schwelb, "The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and National Law," Proceedings..., op. cit., pp. 221-228. Court decisions citing the Declaration were handed down in West Germany, Belgium, Italy, United States, and the Philippines.

63 Attitudes toward international law are deliberately treated as aspects of "style" rather than as a rubric of peaceful change because of the predominantly verbal role of UN legal discussion. Thus far, at any rate, judicial considerations have figured more as an aspect of propaganda inputs than as a constituent of an institutionalized pattern of outputs.

64 Nasser, when asked why he did not wait until 1956 for the natural expiration of the 1936 treaty on the Suez Canal, maintained: "We are quite aware that this treaty wouldn't just expire. The British would take it before some international tribunal and obtain permission for prolonging it. We smaller nations haven't much confidence in these tribunals, which we know full well to be nothing more than courts run by and for the big nations." J. and S. Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (London: Methuen, 1958), p. 459.

65 The limited role of the International Court of Justice is reviewed and explained by Shabtai Rosenne, The International Court of Justice (New York: Central Book Company, 1957) and Max Sorensen, "The International Court of Justice: Its Role in Contemporary International Relations," International Organization, vol. XIV, no 2 (Spring 1960).

66 On this point see the articles by Oliver J. Lissitzyn and John N. Hazard, in Proceedings..., op. cit.

67 On the evolution of Soviet thought on the sources of international law, see Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, "Treaties and Other Sources of Order in International Relations: The Soviet View," American Journal of International Law, vol. 52, no. 4

(October 1958), especially pp. 724-726. An Egyptian lawyer has argued that the revolutionary regime in Cairo has abandoned the doctrine of the two dars in Islamic legal thought, including the concept of the jihad, and thus reapproached a universal law which recognizes an identity of norms governing the relations among Muslims and non-Muslims. Saba Habachy, in Proceedings, op. cit., p. 61. The Western position on the reorientation of international law is prominently represented by Myres McDougal and his associates.

68 William Welch, "Soviet Commitments to Collective Action," in A. Wolfers, (ed.), Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1959).

69 Wheelock, op. cit., pp. 266-268.

70 For a complete survey of such causes see Afro-Asian Bulletin, vol. II, nos. 11-12 (September-October, 1960).

71 Ibid., p. 32.

72 Ibid., p. 60.

73 Ibid., p. 61.

74 Osende Afana, "Consolidating Afro-Asian Solidarity," ibid., p. 7.

75 Youssef El-Sebai, "Afro-Asian Solidarity Marches On," ibid., pp. 4-5.

76 On Egypt's relations with the TAB and specialized agency programs see Walter R. Sharp, The United Nations System in Egypt," International Organization, vol. X, no. 2, (May 1956). On the Special Fund see Hadwen and Kaufmann, op. cit., and UN Special Fund, Doc. SF 1 (January 1, 1959). On the Bank see Eugene Black, "The Indus: Moral for Nations," New York Times Magazine, December 11, 1960, p. 51. Wheelock, op. cit., pp. 190-197. Conditions imposed by the IMF in Bolivia were widely disregarded in 1957-58, but a new IMF effort in 1960 was apparently accompanied by firm assurances on the part of the Bolivian regime. The left-wing of the MNR continued to oppose cooperation with the IMF and equated UN "imperialism" with that of the International Cooperation Administration. For details see, Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian

National Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), chapt. 13. Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: Decision or Debacle," American Universities Field Staff, Latin America (Bolivia) RWP-3-'59, (April 18, 1959).

77 C. Hart Schaaf, "The Role of Resident Representatives of the UN Technical Assistance Board," International Organization, vol. XIV, no. 4 (Autumn 1960), p. 556.

78 See Alexander, op. cit., pp. 245-246. Carter Goodrich, The Economic Transformation of Bolivia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955). Albert Lepawsky, "The Bolivian Operation," International Conciliation, no. 479 (March 1952). This, of course, is not to deny that many governments -- though not necessarily revolutionary ones -- disregard the advice tendered by technical assistance personnel and that resident representatives vary a good deal in the measure of their influence in proportion to their own personalities. While some, in effect, act as key advisers on economic development plans to governments, others are content to play a modest "clearing house" role. For a wealth of information on the degree of control exercised on behalf of the UN System by field personnel and headquarters review procedure, see Walter R. Sharp, Field Administration in the United Nations System (New York: Praeger, 1961), especially pp. 376-401, 405-417, 449-463, 494-503. On the discreet controls exercised by international financial institutions see Henry Bloch, "The Fiscal Advisory Functions of United Nations Technical Assistance," International Organization, (Spring 1957). International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank: Policies and Operations (Washington, D. C., 1957). R. G. A. Jackson, The Case for an International Development Authority (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959).

79 Address in Copenhagen, UN Doc. SG/812, (3 May 1959), p. 9. Italics mine.

80 Ibid.

81 The major instances in which the Secretary-General intervened are enumerated, but not evaluated and analysed, in Bailey, op. cit., pp. 22-25.

82 The success of the Beck-Friis Mission in mediating the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia is an exception. It was a very minor affair which remained outside the policy aims of all other member states.

83 Conclusions were drawn from the debate and vote on the 17-power resolution A/L.340 and Adds. 1-4, Add. 3/Corr. 1, as well as draft amendments A/L.348 and A/L.342. The overall tenor of the resolution was to "balance" various Congo factions while strengthening the authority of the Secretary-General and of UN conciliation in stabilizing the broadened Leopoldville regime. It was sponsored by non-revolutionary Afro-Asian states. The unsuccessful amendments seeking to limit the UN role were introduced by Guinea. On the final vote, the Soviet bloc and some of the French Community African states voted in opposition; all the other revolutionary regimes (except Bolivia) abstained. United Nations Review, vol. 8, no. 5 (May 1961), pp. 35-37.

84 Details on the Committee in Bailey, op. cit., p. 25. A judicious evaluation of the independent role of the Secretary-General and of ways of reducing the impact of some kind of "troika" system on the Secretariat can be found in Michel Virally, "Vers Une Réforme du Secrétariat des Nations Unies?," International Organization, vol. XV, no. 2 (Spring 1961).

85 Francis Canavan, S. J., in "The Levels of Consensus," unpublished paper read at the American Political Science Association Convention, September 8-10, 1960, argued that "consensus" in a democratic society can never mean more than pragmatic, mundane, task-oriented agreement that certain governmental functions of a non-controversial character should be carried out. While he also suggests that this kind of consensus is probably inadequate to legitimate the activities of a strong welfare state, his formulation goes a long way toward accurately identifying the international consensus.

86 I do not mean to suggest, in my analysis of voting rules, that "voting" should be considered as the supreme integrative device which explains consensus in the sense of telling us why minorities submit to majorities. Demonstrably, consensus comes about in certain situations without voting and may fare better if voting is avoided. But the history of decision-making on certain issues in the UN also suggests that cumulative votes do create a new consensus, though this consensus does not carry over to other functional contexts. I would argue as a general proposition, however, that voting

is an integral constituent of the process of parliamentary diplomacy -- which is basic to UN decision-making -- and that an evolution of voting rules is a meaningful indicator of systemic development.

87 See Table 1.

88 The distinction between accommodation based on "compromise" and "integration" is elaborated in North, Koch, and Zinnes, op. cit., pp. 44-48. They, in turn, draw heavily on the definitions of Lasswell, Mary Follett and Chester Barnard.

89 T. C. Schelling, Toward a General Theory of Conflict Applicable to International Relations (The Rand Corporation, doc. P-1648, March 19, 1959), p. 25.

90 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

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THE CORPORATION AND CAMPAIGN POLITICS: POWER AND LEGITIMACY

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THE POLITICAL MACHINE -- A PARABLE

By 1972 American Electric had completed its last stages of automation: employees were no longer necessary. Raw materials left on the loading platform were automatically transferred from machine to machine and the finished products were deposited at the other end of the factory ready for shipment. AE's purchasing, marketing, and general management functions could be handled by ten directors with the occasional help of outside consultants and contractors. Beginning in 1960 AE's employee pension fund had started investing its capital in AE stock. Gradually it bought more and more of the company's shares on the open market, and by 1968 it was the sole owner of AE. As employees became eligible for retirement -- some of them prematurely due to the introduction of automation -- the fund naturally liquidated its capital to provide pensions. But instead of reselling its AE shares on the open market, the fund sold the stock to AE itself which provided the money for pensions out of current income. By 1981 the last AE employee had died and the pension fund was dissolved: at this time, too, AE was now the sole owner of its outstanding shares. It had floated no new issues, preferring to engage in self-financing through earnings.

In 1982 the ten directors decided that AE would be well served by the passage of legislation restricting the imports of certain electrical equipment from abroad. They therefore hired the services of a public relations firm specializing in political campaigns. The objective was so to educate the public and sway grassroots sentiment that the Congress would respond to this popular opinion by passing the required bill. The public relations firm was given a retainer of $500,000 and was told to spend up to five times that amount on advertising and related activities. Within several months the public began to hear about the dire consequences which would follow the importation of alien generators. National security, national prosperity, and the nation's way of life were apparently threatened by a flood of foreign goods. The public relations firm placed several hundred advertisements in newspapers and magazines, and almost a thousand spot announcements on television. At least fifty citizens' committees spontaneously arose to favor the legislation, and over two hundred existing groups passed resolutions in its support. Lectures were given to women's clubs and films were shown in high schools. By the end of the year -- an election year -- public sentiment had been aroused and hardly a Congressman was unaware of the existence of this ferment. The bill was introduced in both chambers and a good majority of Senators and Representatives, abiding by the wishes of their constituents, voted in its favor. The President signed the bill and it became law. AE's profits were substantially higher the following year.

A group of Senators, however, were curious about what had been going on and they decided to investigate AE's foray into the political arena. One of the directors was happy to testify for he knew that no law had been broken. No bribes had been offered, certainly, and no contributions to legislators' campaigns had been made. Towards the end of the inquiry, after all of the techniques employed by the company and the public relations firm had been brought out, the following colloquy took place:

Director: ...and if we undertook these educational and political activities, it was our view that they were dictated by the company's best interests.

Senator: Now when you say that these campaigns were on behalf of the"company's" interest, I am not clear what you mean. Were you acting for your stockholders here?

Director: I am afraid, Senator, that I cannot say that we were. You see, American Electric has no stockholders. The company now owns all its stock itself. We bought the last of it up several years ago.

Senator: Well if not stockholders, then were you acting as a spokesman for American Electric's employees -- say, whose jobs might be endanged if foreign competition got too severe.

Director: No sir, I can't say that either. American Electric is a fully automated company and we have no employees.

Senator: Are you saying that this company of yours is really no more than a gigantic machine? A machine which needs no operators and which appears to own itself?

Director: I suppose that is one way of putting it. I've never thought much about it.

Senator: Then so far as I can see all of this political pressure that you applied was really in the interests of yourself and your nine fellow directors. You spent over three million dollars of this company's money following your personal political predilections.

Director: I am afraid, Senator, that I must disagree with you now. The ten of us pay ourselves an annual salary of $100,000 year in and year out, and none of us receive any bonuses or raises if profits happen to be higher than usual in a given year. All earnings are ploughed back into the company. We feel very strongly about this. In fact we look on ourselves as kind of civil servants. Secondly, I could not say that the decision to get into politics was a personal one in any real way. At least eight of the ten of us, as private citizens that is, did not favor the legislation we were supporting. As individuals eight of us thought it was wrong, was not in the national interest. But we were acting in the company's interest and in this case we knew that it was the right thing to do.

Senator: And by the "company" you do not mean stockholders or employees because you don't have any. And you don't mean the ten directors because you

just seem to be salaried managers which the machine hires to run its affairs. In fact when this machine gets into politics, when it becomes a political machine, it has interests of its own which can be quite dirrerent from the personal opinions of its managers. I am afraid that I find all of this rather confusing.

Director: It may be confusing to you, Senator, but I may say that it has been all quite straightforward to us at American Electric. We were just doing the job for which we were hired -- to look out for the company's interests.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND CORPORATE ECONOMICS

Among the conversation pieces of current interest to social scientists none is more tantalizing than the large industrial corporation. Everyone knows something about it and feels obliged to make some comment. But no one is quite clear on what he ought to say. The corporation is both significant and powerful. It is both secretive and public. It is social and political. Yet there soon comes a lull in the conversation; for while the major outlines of corporate structure and behavior are known it is extremely difficult to make evaluations. In large measure this problem is ideological in character. The corporation is a capitalist institution, it is private property. Social scientists no less than other Americans eschew socialist doctrine and they forbear from flirting with the notion of public ownership. While this stance deserves praise for its down-to-earth realism, it can be debilitating from an intellectual standpoint. How does one evaluate corporate behavior in a serious way if you yourself have no place to stand? Lilliputian darts are hurled at Gulliver ("advertising is in poor taste" "organizations promote conformity" "companies are hypocritical about competition" "the profit motive obscures non-economic values") but they are cast half-heartedly because the critics themselves sense that they cannot or will not say anything that amounts to real criticism.[1] We live in an age of affirmation, of constructive thinking, and it is considered bad form to attack institutions without offering some alternative. Committed to capitalism, we are committed to the corporation. Accepting of private ownership, we must accept the power and the values of business.

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[1] The literature in this field is now familiar, and only a few titles need be cited: A. A. Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1954) and Power Without Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959); Walton Hamilton, The Politics of Industry (New York: Knopf, 1957); Edward Mason, ed., The Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1960). Even openly sympathetic writers such as C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) and Floyd Hunter, Top Leadership U.S.A. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959) have not developed coherent critical positions.

That is why the conversation meanders. Still and all, social scientists are men of reason. Down deep they wish to see America a rational society. While specific objectives are vague and usually unstated, the typical sociologist or economist or political scientist is a man of liberal temper. This liberalism, while not doctrinaire, quests after greater equality in society: it embraces the redistribution of wealth, but it also lloks to the redistribution of power. Even as poverty is erased and opulence toned down, the emerging institutional structure of American life shows that power is as concentrated as it ever was. The corporation is, of course, the most characteristic of these institutions. The pluralist mood, an accompaniment of modern liberalism, demands that one couple the corporation with analogous institutions. If one says General Motors, one must also say United Automobile Workers. If one says United States Steel, one must add the Atomic Energy Commission. If one says du Pont, one must quickly insert the Ford Foundation. Pluralism also requires that one point out that there are many corporations, often in competition with each other, that the "business community" is neither monolithic nor coherently organized.[2] The five hundred or two hundred or fifty largest firms do not act in concert, and any suggestion of corporate conspiracy must be quickly quashed. At the same time the social scientist, despite his partiality to pluralism, feels uneasy about the power concentrated in corporate forms. His liberal instincts tell him that all men should have the power to shape their own lives and to contribute to the development of society; and he knows that so long as corporations exist there will be an unequal distribution of power. In politics especially, the influence of a corporation on the legislative process inevitably stands in marked contrast to the small and often unheard voice of the ordinary citizen. And here, of course, comes the point where capitalism and democracy meet head on. Is it right that Pacific Gas and Electric and Schenley Distilleries be weighed in the same political balance with John Jones and Mary Smith? If corporations and individuals are both constituents, then the system itslef becomes strangely asymmetrical. The social scientist, rational liberal and equalitarian democrat that he is, frequently suspects that corporate power is not rightful. He is not quite clear on how to phrase his objection, but he senses that the arrangements which make up the status-quo have not been sufficiently justified. His problem is a serious one, for suspicions based on personal predilections are no substitute for a theory. And a theory of corporate institutions, as was pointed out, will only emerge from those who have ground of their own on which to stand. Most of us, at this point, are trying to find our feet.

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2 Recent critiques of C. Wright Mills display this tendency. See Robert Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, June 1958. Vol. 52, pp.463-469; Daniel Bell, "The Power Elite Reconsidered," American Journal of Sociology, November, 1958. Vol. 64, pp. 238-250; Talcott Parsons, "Distribution of Power in American Society," World Politics, October, 1957. Vol. 10, pp. 123-143.

THE VARIETIES OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The political activities of corporations may be summarized quite briefly. Broadly speaking, they fall under two broad heads: partisan and legislative. The former are efforts, through campaign contributions or personal participation, to help elect particular candidates to public office. The latter are attempts, through direct lobbying or grassroots campaigns, to secure the sympathies of men already elected to office.

Partisan Activities: Campaign Contributions. With the detailed breakdowns and cross-referencing of campaign contributions in recent years, we have a working knowledge of the ways in which large firms provide aid and comfort to their partisan friends. In the 1956 elections, for example, 199 executives and directors of the 225 largest corporations gave a total of $1,936,847 to campaign committees -- 94% of it, of course, to Republican groups.[3] Was this "corporate money"? Of course it was. It came out of the high salaries and bountiful dividends which corporations pay to their top men. So far as these men are concerned, their corporate roles are the dominant ones in their lives: one of the reasons they are paid so well is that it is expected that they will use this money for political purposes. No one assumes that executive compensation is intended wholly for personal needs. Yet the total reported receipts by Republican committees in 1956 amounted to $32,430,587.[4] This means that the $1,816,597 contributed by the corporation executives and directors to the Republican cause amounted to only 5.6% of the party's warchest. Small businessmen, who are locally based, play a far greater role when it comes to campaign contributions.

There are, to be sure, instances of corporation executives' drawing on their companies' resources in unofficial and unreported ways. "A lot of corporation presidents just reach in the till and get $25,000 to contribute to political campaigns," a board chairman told Fortune magazine several years ago.[5] A case such as this occurred in 1955 when Howard B. Keck, the President of Superior Oil Company did verily "reach in the till" and offer $2500 of Superior Oil's money to Senator

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[3] Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 115.

[4] "Campaign Spending," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, February 8, 1957. No. 6, p. 156.

[5] Duncan Norton-Taylor, "How to Give Money to Politicians," Fortune, May, 1956, p. 238. Mr. Norton-Taylor was later questioned about this report, but no attempt was made to discover the names of the executives or the extent of their munificence. U.S. Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. 84th Congress, 2nd Session. Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956). Hereinafter this will be cited as the Gore Committee.

Francis Case of South Dakota, a supporter of the Fulbright-Harris bill. For this patently illegal act, clearly in violation of Section 610, Mr. Keck's bagman went to jail.[6] But Superior Oil is a closely held corporation, and Mr. Keck is not typical in being in a position where unilateral action of this kind is possible. The larger corporations are chary of any such underhandedness, cherishing the purity of their public image more than the fruits of political conquest. All in all, corporate contributions to partisan campaigns are neither substantial nor decisive. There need be no fear that large firms will name their hirelings to the Republican ticket, nor need Democrats worry that it was big business money that defeated them.

Corporation executives themselves are divided on this question. Not a few of them lose sleep fretting over their political powerlessness. "Corporations as such are disenfranchised and are without political identity," complained Crawford H. Greenewalt, the President of du Pont.[7] To remedy this defect, Leland Hazard, former Vice President and General Counsel of Pittsburg Plate Glass, suggests the repeal of Section 610. "In a democratic society which asserts the right to determine the conditions under which enterprise may function, enterprise must have the right to say its piece about what those conditions are to be," he said. "This means political action, and political action costs money ... Why is it not as much the duty of a corporation to invest in good political environment as in plants or raw materials?"[8] By political action, Mr. Hazard means partisan action; by a good political environment, he means direct campaign aid to candidates sympathetic to corporate interests. Even more ambitious is the scheme of Mr. Ernest Henderson, President of the Sheraton Hotel Corporation: "Give corporations the right to cast ballots in elections on the basis perhaps of one vote for every five or ten jobs maintained, so that economic merit may carry more weight in national elections."[9]

While many corporation executives may share the feelings of Mr. Greenewalt, few are willing to embrace the programs of Messrs. Hazard and Henderson. Some rule out political participation as a matter of principle. "A corporation is a consensus of a great many personalities, divided into categories of importance,

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6 Section 610 of the Criminal Code reads: "It is unlawful for any....corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office..." This section of the Hatch Act, of course, applies only to federal elections. About half the states have similar restrictions on corporations.

7 Crawford H. Greenewalt, "A Political Role for Businessmen." Speech delivered before the North Carolina Citizens Association. March 25, 1959.

8 Leland Hazard, "It Takes Money to Get Elected," Atlantic Monthly, February, 1960, p. 96.

9 Ernest Henderson, The World of "Mr. Sheraton" (New York; David McKay, 1960), p. 190.

directed from the top by persons who have prejudices as violent as you will meet anywhere," said Arnold Maremont, Chairman of the Board of Allied Paper Corporation. These executives, he went on, "have absolutely no right to use corporation machinery, corporation money, and corporation personnel to inflict their views upon other individuals or upon the community."[10] Another executive has said: "We have many stockholders, and although I have not spoken with any of them concerning political affiliation, it would probably be accurate to suggest that their political views are many and varied. Any position taken by the company would probably be in conflict with that favored by some of our owners."[11] But most executives have more practical doubts. They fear that taking partisan positions on candidates -- assuming the repeal of Section 610 -- would alienate customers and the general public. They might suffer if candidates they opposed were the ones elected to office, and the pains of legislative retaliation would outweigh the pleasures experienced by having their own men in power. And they also suspect, quite rightly, that corporate contributions to one party or candidate might well prove the kiss of death in the minds of the independent or undecided voters.[12]

Partisan Activities: Personal Participation. With the Congressional sweep by the Democrats in 1958, corporation executives throughout the country foresaw two or more years of undisputed rule by labor unions and liberal ideologues. Perhaps not all were so gloomy as Archie Gray, Senior Vice President of Gulf Oil, who anticipated the hegemony of "labor gangsters and socialist politicians," but enough were aroused so that action was the order of the day.[13] Thus was born the "businessman in politics" movement, a program more significant for the anxieties which fathered it than for its ultimate success. The rationale was quite simple.

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[10] Arnold Maremont, "The Dangers of Corporate Activity in Politics," Speech delivered before the Town Hall of Los Angeles. August 4, 1959.

[11] Quoted in "Business and the Political Process," The Conference Board Business Record, September, 1959. Vol. 16, p. 3.

[12] Some evidence for this is to be found in the reaction of California voters to General Electric's frank endorsement of a "right-to-work" law which was on the referendum ballot in 1958. General Electric spent over $30,000 advertising its support for the proposal throughout the state, and this intervention of theirs appears to have been taken amiss even by voters with no union connections. In other words, while Americans are not anti-business they have some feeling that intrusions by corporations into political matters are improper.

[13] Quoted in the Washington Post and Times Herald, September 23, 1956, p. 26.

Labor unions had mobilized their members not only into active voters but also as party workers. While it was never clear how many of the seventeen million AFL-CIO members were induced by COPE to contribute their time and money to partisan activity, many executives believed that labor politicals were instrumental in deciding who were to be the nominees of the Northern wing of the Democratic Party and that the labor vote was turned out to elect that party's candidates.[14] If this force was to be countered, a new group of citizens would have to enter the partisan arena in an organized and purposeful way. Prior to 1945 such a constituency probably did not exist. However since the end of World War II, America's large corporations had been augmenting their white-collar labor force in an unprecedented way. While technological developments slackened the need for production employees, millions of new jobs were created for clerical, professionsl, and managerial people. These individuals were on salaries rather than wages, they came to work at 9:00 A.M. rather than 8:00 A.M., they thought of themselves as middle-class. They were impervious to unionization and not a few thought of themselves as businessmen -- albeit of the managerial rather than the entreprenurial variety. If these citizens, hitherto indifferent to politics, could be drawn into the parties then a mighty conservative influence would be brought to bear.[15]

The central theme of the "businessmen in politics" programs was to motivate middle-management employees to become part-time politicians. Corporations offered classes, seminars, and workshops which imparted fundamental political lore: the most important fact being that parties are local in their base. To become influential within a party an individual must gain power at the level of the ward or precinct. Students in the corporations' practical politics courses were advised to seek out their precinct leaders and volunteer their services. By virtue of hard work and expenditure of time they would achieve a place for themselves in the local party hierarchy.[16] As they labored longer in the vineyard, so would they eventually rise to positions where nominations for public office were decided.

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[14] This is the general tenor of J. J. Wuerthner's The Businessman's Guide to Practical Politics (Chicago: Regnery, 1959). Wuerthner, a General Electric executive, suggests that all too many Congressmen have become "COPE-tivated." p. 21.

[15] The non-political character of white-collar employees is analyzed in Andrew Hacker, Politics and The Corporation (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1958). Over 40,000 copies of this pamphlet were ordered by companies and trade associations, presumably in the hope that they might obtain some clues on how to politicize their people.

[16] This was the emphasis in the most widely used textbook, a series of eight pamphlets entitled "Action Course in Practical Politics" which was prepared by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce. In a report dated November, 1959, the Chamber indicated that the textbook had been used by 107 corporations.

The theory, in short, was one of infiltration. If businessmen applied themselves to party work they would ultimately gain party power. If tens of thousands of loyal corporation people did this throughout the country, then both major parties would be induced to nominate men sympathetic to business. Not only was this corps of potential infiltrators available, but it was equipped with middle-class talent and middle-management skills. With the expectation that such an injection of party workers into the political system would pay off, hundreds of corporations gave their white-collar employees released time to take the courses. Among the enthusiastic firms were General Electric, Ford, Alcoa, A. T. & T., American Can, Gulf, Johnson and Johnson, Republic Steel, Chrysler, Dow Chemical, Equitable Life, General Dynamics, Inland Steel, International Harvester, General Foods, Shell Oil, U.S. Rubber, Jones & Loughlin, Richfield Oil, New York Central, Eli Lilly, Kimberly Clark, Standard Oil of California, Carier, and Olin Mathieson.[17] If not an army, at least a brigade, of politically-involved businessmen should have been produced by these corporate programs.

So far only one serious study has been done to follow up the businessmen in politics courses. In the Syracuse area in Upstate New York over 1500 managerial and professional employees attended the practical politics classes given by their corporations between 1958 and 1960. All of these individuals were sent mail questionnairs early in 1961, and 578 or something over one-third took the time to reply.[18] The survey showed that 479 were Republicans and 74 were Democrats. It was clear, in purely educational terms, that the classes had taught the participants a good deal about politics, especially at the local level. But how many were motivated to join a party and work inside the organization in a dedicated way? Of the 578 graduates who reported, only 34 put in more than 50 hours of work with a party after having taken the course. The sad conclusion was that the others had neither the time nor the inclination nor the temperament for precinct politics. The program's signal accomplishment was the election of twenty-two businessmen as party district committeemen and twelve to town or county offices. If Syracuse is typical -- and it is better than typical because it is where the "businessmen in politics" movement originated -- then the idea of infiltrating white-collar employees into the parties cannot be termed a success. The Syracuse

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17 In a report dated August, 1959, the Effective Citizens Organization listed 87 corporations which had set up political training programs for white-collar employees. The Effective Citizens Organization, which is supported mainly by large companies, runs periodic workshops at which corporation representatives are taught how to teach practical politics.

18 Joel Aberbach, "Businessmen in Politics: A Syracuse Study." Senior Honors Thesis in the Department of Government, Cornell University, 1961. There have been many reports on the businessmen-in-politics programs in general magazines. See: Oscar Schisgall, "How to Become a Politician," Saturday Evening Post, October 1, 1960, pp. 30, 112-114; "Corporations Make Politics their Business," Fortune, December 1959, pp. 100-103, 223-228; "Business Gets Political Urge," Business Week, October 11, 1958, pp. 125-129.

program not only started earlier than the others, but it was sponsored by significant corporations like General Electric, Carrier, and Chrysler. One participant summed up the reaction of most when he said: "If a businessman spends much time in politics, he cannot do his job adequately...I have been encouraged to take part, but this will not help me get promoted." Another seconded this sentiment: "My job comes first. All one gets for serving on the County Board is $6.00 per day. I recently got a salary promotion for hard wok outside company hours. If I had spent this time in politics, I would not have gotten the raise."

The conclusion must be that partisan activities on the part of corporations, either through campaign contributions by top executives or personal participation by middle-management, have not played a significant role in recent times. Executives' donations to party coffers have added up to only a small part of the total money received by the Republicans during campaing periods, and the number or corporation employees who have infiltrated the party ranks has been of little consequence. This is no surprise to the men who run the large corporations, and they have found more effective ways to direct their political energies and protect their political interests. On the whole, corporations are willing to work with whichever officeholders the electorate puts into power. One lobbyist representing a large company puts it succinctly: "Our job is to work with the elected officials after they are elected, whether they are Communists or Democrats or Republicans or Progressives. If they represent distircts in which we have operations, it is our duty to work with them."[19] In this sense corporations are non-partisan: they have discovered that both Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, are willing to give them a hearing. The important political activities of corporations are more properly called legislative than partisan. And these may be considered first as traditional lobbying and second as the more recent use of public relations methods.

Legislative Activities: Lobbying. Why does a Congressman listen to a lobbyist? The traditional explanation is that a spokesman for an organization represents constitutents in the lawmaker's district, that he speaks for voters who may rise up and punish a legislator who fails to support their interests. On this assumption Congressmen give an attentive hearing to lobbyists claiming to voice the sentiments of farmers, veterans, and members of racial and religious groups.[20]

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[19] Quoted in Paul W. Cherington and Ralph L. Gillen, "The Company Representative in Washington," Harvard Business Review, May-June, 1961. Vol. 39, p. 112.

[20] This is not, of course, to say that the assumption is a correct one. See E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt-Rinehart-Winston, 1960) for an analysis of trade union power. And see V. O. Key, "The Veterans and the House of Representatives," The Journal of Politics, February, 1943, Vol. 5, pp. 27-40 for a study of the influence of veterans' groups.

Other lobbyists are given a sympathetic audience not because they represent a numerous element back home but because they speak of a wealthy and influential local elite. Professional and small businessmen are notable campaign contributors and not a few of them are active in party circles. Considering the localism which pervades the Congress it follows that locally-owned business enterprises are given preferential treatment. A company situated within a Congressional district, one owned and operated by actual constituents, is clearly going to command the attention of a Congressman. Corporations, however, are not in as advantageous a position. A large corporation is national in its operations and it will have branch plants in many Congressional districts. It may be argued that each of these installations will have a claim to the sympathies of their particular Congressman and that together they will be able to muster an effective bloc in the legilature. For example: American Can Corporation operates in 153 districts in 26 states. Several years ago the President circularized the top management people throughout the company, telling them that they would henceforward have political as well as industrial duties: "We asked 153 of these men -- managers in plants and offices throughout the country -- to act as official spokesman for our company and establish direct relationships with the 153 Congressmen and 52 Senators representing the areas in which our facilities are located."[21] But a problem arises here. The political policies of American Can, or any other large corporation, are made in the company headquarters in New York, and if the local branch manager in the 15th District of Ohio approaches his Congressman, both of them know that the sentiments being expressed did not originate in the constituency. Furthermore, the Congressman knows that the management people in his district are not importatnt campaign contributors and he knows that they are not active in the district party organization. On the other hand, the owner of a local small business will play an important role in party finance and often as a party officeholder.

In the past, corporations usually retained a Washington law firm to act as their legislative spokesman. This was done quietly and it was hoped that an intimate relationship would be established between an experienced lawyer and the lawmakers. In recent years, however, more and more corporations have decided to register as open lobbies and to have their spokesmen declare themselves as lobbyists. openly as

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[21] William Stolk, "The Responsibility of Business in Public Affairs," Speech delivered before the Chemical Specialities Manufactures Association. May 20, 1959.

In 1959 and 1960 alone, dozens of large companies registered under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. Some of these were: The Alleghany Corporation, American Airlines, American Broadcasting Company, American Can, American Smelting, and Refining, A. T. & T., Anaconda, Atlantic Refining, Bendix Aviation, Cities Service, du Pont, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, Gulf, Hilton Hotels, Monsanto Chemical, Pacific Gas and Electric, Phillips Petroleum, RCA, Smith-Corona Marchant, Southern Pacific Railroad, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Westinghouse.[22] However of this group, only two reported expenditures in connection with lobbying during 1960: Atlantic Refining spent $3000 and Cities Service $118.[23] Whether this means that corporation lobbists are relatively inactive is difficult to say. What can be said is that the large companies are not satisfied to work through the customary trade associations and they prefer to strike out on their own. Most such associations tend to be dominated by the small and medium-sized firms -- the N.A. M. has well over 20,000 member companies -- and their orientation is often a provincial one.[24] Large corporations are understandably chary of setting up an association limited to the top 100 or 200 companies in the country, for any lobbying by such a group would be bound to attract public attention.[25]

What can be said of corporate power in the legislative realm? The answer, quite simply, is: very little. But one or two examples of effective corporation lobbying may be cited. Prior to the Spring of 1950 the Congress had been considering raising the Social Security retirement benefits. While the House of Representatives had approved such a bill in the Fall of 1949, the Senate Finance Committee was displaying no great enthusiasm for acting on the matter. Indeed, informed opinion was that H. R. 6000, which had been lingering in committee for five months, would die and be buried at a funeral presided over by Senator Harry

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22 "Lobby Round-Up," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1959, pp. 690-703; and 1960, pp. 667-677. It should be noted that corporations are not required by law to register; for, as organizations, their principal purpose is not influencing legislation -- it is producing goods and making profits.

23 Ibid., 1960, pp. 655-657. However in the three-and-a-half year period ending in June, 1950, 38 large corporations reported spending at total of $776,000 -- or an average of $5800 per year per corporation. U. S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Lobbying Activities. 81st Congress, 2nd Session. House Report No. 3137. (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950). Hereinafter to be cited as the Buchanan Committee.

24 See Arthur S. Cleveland, "NAM: Spokesman for Industry," Harvard Business Review, May, 1948. Vol. 26, pp. 353-371; and Richard W. Gable, "NAM: Influential Lobby or Kiss of Death?" Journal of Politics, May, 1953, Vol. 15, pp. 254-273.

25 The National Industrial Conference Board and the Committee on Economic Development are groups which limit their memberships to larger corporations. However neither of these can be said to engage in legislative lobbying.

Byrd and his allies. On March 29th, however, the United Automobile Workers union and General Motors commenced their contract negotiations in Detroit. The chief issue there was pensions for retired auto workers, and throughout April the two sides were deadlocked. In early May Walter Reuther threatened to strike General Motors and the company began to look around for a way to avoid a shutdown. It was unwilling to capitulate to the union's pension demands as they stood, for the cost would be exorbitant. At this point, it is reported, General Motors executives began approaching various Senators suggesting that the bill to raise social security pensions be reported out of committee within a matter of days and sent to the Senate floor for a vote. General Motors explained that an immediate and favorable report was required, and apparently the lawmakers concurred despite their previous coolness to the bill. With this assurance General Motors returned to the bargaining table and signed a five-year contract with the U.A.W., the terms of which were announced on May 23rd. Why did General Motors suddenly become a proponent of Social Security? The U.A.W.'s proposed pension scheme had called for $100 per month benefits for retired workers; but this $100 was to include the Social Security pension. Prior to mid-May the Social Security pensions came to an average of $26 per month, meaning that General Motors would have to pay the additional $74. With the new bill, the Social Security pensions were raised to $49 per month, with General Motors only having to add $51. Multiplied by the number of workers entering retirement over the next several decades, passage of the bill was clearly going to save General Motors hundreds of millions of dollars. But what happened during that second week of May--between May 7th when Reuther made a serious strike threat and May 17th when the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee? All that can be said is that General Motors put on an effective lobbying campaign. There are no records to establish a causal relationship between the pressures it exerted and the sudden action of the Senators.[26] But the timing of the events establishes a persuasive correlation.

The best-known corporations in the legislative arena are the large oil companies. Not only have they obtained and maintained their famous 27½% depletion allowance, but they are constantly active in seeking new benefits for themselves. As firm allies they have a bloc of Congressmen who see it as their obligation to promote the interests of oil and natural gas. "No industry has ever found itself in a more advantageous position for getting what it wants from legislators," Richard Rovere has written. He goes on:

> There is not much in the industrial or mineral line in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas except oil and natural gas. If there were any real diversity of interests in those states, it would be possible for Senators and Congressmen -- and perhaps even state legislators -- to oppose the oil interests, if they happened to feel that that was the proper thing to do. But as

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[26] The writer was in Detroit in the Summer of 1950 and this is the story as he heard it from some well-situated U.A.W. officials. Needless to say, they welcomed General Motors as an ally in their own campaign for extending Social Security.

> matters now stand, the legislators have no one else they can turn to. The history of opposition to the oil interests has been a melancholy one ...
>
> It is axiomatic among members of Congress from the oil states -- apart from California, where the diversity of economic interests permits diversity of opinions --that political survival is impossible in the face of oil hostility. And in recent years it has become fairly plain that the industry wishes to extend its power far beyond the states it has controlled right along. It has been estimated that oil money found its way into half the country's Congressional districts in 1954.[27]

While much of this money and political activity comes from Southwestern entrepreneurs who own their own businesses, a large share of it is contributed by Northern and Eastern-based corporations with national operations. The oil companies are of course fortunate in having the unquestioning support of lawmakers from half-a-dozen states: other corporations must compete with other business and non-business interests for the sympathies of legislators. But it has also been pointed out that the oil companies go far beyond their Southwestern fiefs, and, by means of reported or unreported campaign contributions, are successful in enlisting Congressional support throughout the country.

Corporate lobbying is clearly extensive and well-financed, and the ultimate question is how much of an impact is made in terms of legislation. The cases of General Motors and the oil companies suggest that corporations are able to obtain preferential access on questions which affect them specifically and significantly. But many of these matters are, when looked at in another light, issues of public policy. And it is not at all clear that the interests of corporations should weigh heavily in the scales when policies of this moment are being decided.

Legislative Activities: Public Relations. "Our conception of practical politics is that if you have a sound enough case to convince the folks back home, you don't have to buttonhole the Senator. He will hear from home, and he will respect very highly the opinions he gets from that quarter." Thus did Leone Baxter, counselor in public relations to West Coast corporations, define grass-roots lobbying.[28]

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[27] Richard H. Rovere, "Letter from Washington," The New Yorker, February 26, 1956, pp. 127-129. See also Robert Engler's six-part series, "Oil and Politics," New Republic, August 29 through October 3, 1955 for accounts of oil industry lobbying in individual states.

[28] Leone Baxter, "How the Story was Presented to the People." Speech delivered before the Southern Public Relations Conference. May 8, 1951.

To be sure, a "sound case" is not sufficient. That case must be communicated to the "folks back home" in a persuasive way, and such an endeavor is quite costly. However an increasing number of corporations are now taking their cases direct to the public, on the assumption that lawmakers in the capitol will hear the grass-roots tingling.

The traditional trade association, for example the National Association of Real Estate Boards, will have affiliated societies and local members dotted all over the country. When the national governing body decides that certain legislation is relevant to the group's interests, it informs the membership about the particular bill and then asks the individual local members to communicate with their Congressmen. As has been pointed out, business and professional men such as realtors, doctors, automobile dealers and funeral directors are influential in their home communities and their words carry weight in Washington. A corporation, it was noted, has no such corps of volunteer groundtroops. Top management might ask salesmen, technicians, and junior executives to contact Congressmen, but on the whole they understand that this is relatively ineffective. It is futile because, on the one hand, few corporations are willing to ask their employees to become their political agents; and even if those individuals were activated they would carry comparatively little weight with the legislators in Washington.[29] For this reason corporations prefer to use their resources to create a general body of public opinion in the country which will be supportive of the company's legislative objectives.

Forays into the public relations field by corporations are easy enough to detect: after all, if a message is intended to reach the general public then it should not be hard for a student of the political process to place himself on the receiving end as well. In 1950 the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities polled 173 corporations to determine the extent of their efforts to influence legislation.[30] Sixty-five of these companies indicated that they sought to create public sentiment favorable to their own legislative objectives. General Motors, for example, distributed 630,000 copies of President Charles E. Wilson's testimony on the proposed Taft-Hartley bill. New York Central included 2,000,000 slips in its ticket envelopes seeking to enlist their riders' opposition to the federal transportation tax. Schenley Distilleries, aided by the Carl Byoir public relations firm, gave away over 11 million leaflets asking their customers to write their Congressmen for a reduction in liquor taxes. Pacific Gas and Electric, a client of Whitaker and Baxter, sent out 28 mailings to its million-odd customers attacking the tax-free status of public power projects.

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[29] For an account of what happened when Standard Oil of Indiana sought to use its salesmen in Minnesota as local political agents, see U. S. Senate Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions. 84th Congress, 2nd Session. Hearings. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), especially the testimony at pp. 310-413. Hereinafter to be cited as the McClellan Committee.

[30] Buchanan Committee, House Report No. 3137.

These flyers included reprints of articles and editorials ranging from the Wall Street Journal to the Woodford (California) Record, from the Readers Digest to the Hamilton (Illinois) Press. The theory was that if millions of train riders, liquor drinkers, and power users were led to an understanding of the issues at hand, they would contribute to a public ferment which would eventually attract Congressional attention. On this assumption the corporations spent generous sums to reach and persuade the man-in-the-street -- or, more precisely, the man-on-the-commuter-train, the-man-in-the-bar, and the-man-in-front-of-the-television-set.

While these efforts by New York Central, Schenley, and the Pacific Gas and Electric were among the most ambitious reported to the Buchanan Committee, it is necessary to add that they were hardly the most successful. For over a decade later the transportation and liquor taxes continue to remain at their wartime levels, and the public power authorities remain exempt from taxation. Some questions must consequently be raised about the effectiveness of such public relations campaigns. There is, for one thing, a strong element of competition at work. Reaching, persuading, and motivating the public to action is more easily said than done. Advertisers and employers, friends and neighbors, family and personal concerns all make demands on individuals; and the typical citizen has little time or energy left over to worry about other people's legislative problems. It is difficult to imagine the average American becoming disturbed over transportation taxes, liquor taxes, and tax-exempt power authorities just because New York Central, Schenley, and Pacific Gas and Electic tell him that it is in his interest to be disturbed. If such campaigns are to have influence they must be subtler in technique and broader in scope. Two examples of successful programs can be cited in this connection.

The best form of political public relations appears to have no political content at all. An example of this is the subdued but persuasive campaign of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. For many years A. T. & T. has been placing institutional advertising in local and national mass media. The general message of these advertisements is that A. T. & T. is a public service agency, that it is devoted to no other end than making America a better place in which to live. No attempt is made here to sell telephone service as a commodity, nor is an effort made to discuss legislation or public policy. Some of the themes, culled from recent presentations, are:

> The Deluge of Diane: Hurrican floods emphasized the value of the telephone and the teamwork of telephone people in emergencies.
>
> Bell System Teletypewriter Exchange Service Plays New Role in War Against Crime: Fast, low-cost, two-way communication plan developed by Associated Police Communications Officers, adopted by law enforcement agencies in 30 states.
>
> More People for a Growing Business: Bell telephone companies offer good opportunities for capable men and women.

> This is the Mighty Mite of Electronics: Many good things for many people are coming from the Bell Telephone Laboratories invention of the Transistor -- a tiny device that can do many things a vacuum tube can do and more besides!
>
> "Not a man in sight...": As I was driving along a country road with four other women as my guests a tire went flat. My heart sank with it, for my tire-changing experience was nil and the road was empty of aid. Pulling to the side, I hunted out the tools, remarking as I did so: "Not a man in sight of course. What we need is an angel from heaven!" Imagine our astonishment when a cheery voice above our heads said, "I'll be down in a minute, lady." Unknowingly, I had stopped beside a telephone pole at the top of which sat our "angel"--a line repairman.

Thus over a period of time the citizen comes to understand that A. T. & T. provides disaster relief, crime protection, full employment, scientific advance, and roadside repair service. The inescapable conclusion is that life would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short without the existence of the telephone company as presently constituted. The result is that there is built up in the public mind a fund of good will favorable to the corporation. This advertising and public relations campaign of A. T. & T. is frankly political in its objectives, even though politics and legislation are never mentioned. The good will which is secured provides the company with advantages and immunities at such time as its legislative interests are being considered. For example, several years ago, Senator Estes Kefauver,an inveterate and intrepid investigator of corporations, sough to throw some light on a $5 billion radar defense contract which A.T. & T. had obtained from the Department of Defense It was Kefauver's suspicion that this might well harbor the seeds of another Dixon-Yates scandal.[31] But he could gain no support for such an investigation from either his fellow Senators or the public at large. The fund of good will which A. T. & T. had assiduously built up was now stolidly ranged in its political defense.

A more explicit instance of the public relations approach to legislation can be found by turning once again to the 1955 activities of the large oil companies at the time the Fulbright-Harris bill was being considered.[32] This act would have exempted "independent" natural gas producers from rate regulation by the Federal Power Commission, and its passage was as earnestly desired by the major corporations in the oil and gas industry as it was by their smaller brothers. For reasons of their own these companies decided that it

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31 New York Times,

32 The full story is told in the Hearings before the McClellan Committee. Additional background and several of the quotations used here are to be found in Irwin Ross, The Image Merchants (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 183-190.

would be imprudent for them to approach the public in their own names. The campaign was carried out by the innocuous sounding (if rather pretentious) "Natural Gas and Oil Resources Committee," and the statement was issued that this body was supported by over 1200 individual and corporate contributors. What was not publicized was that of the almost $2,000,000 raised by the NGORC, 80% of the money came from 26 large corporations. Humble Oil and Refining (88% of which is owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey) gave $175,000; the Texas Company gave $153,000; Shell Oil gave $138,000; Standard Oil of California gave $119,000; Socony-Mobil Oil gave $114,000; and Stanolind Oil and Gas (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana) gave $100,000. The campaign was not partisan in that it offered no contributions to the candidates of either party; nor did it engage in the direct legislative contacts commonly defined as lobbying. The sole purpose of the NGORC program was to influence public opinion. "Not one cent of our funds has been spent for campaign contributions or legislative contact work," its chairman, President of Continental Oil, was able to point out. Instead, the NGORC retained a professional public relations firm to take the oil companies' story direct to the American people.

Hill and Knowlton, Inc., the public relations firm, spent $800,000 on advertising alone. By the end of a year they could report that an educational film produced by them called "You, the People" had been shown 230 times on television and the companies' case was aired on 475 radio broadcasts as well. On these shows a housewifely-looking actress would be told the facts of life under government regulation and by the end of the recital she had become an enthusiastic convert to the NGORC side. "You know something," she would declaim. "I find this so interesting I'm going to quiz my husband about it this evening. I'll bet he doesn't know anything -- even less than I -- because he doesn't do the house-keeping!" Contacts were made, in addition, with 3400 daily and 4300 weekly newspapers, resulting in over 1700 editorials favorable to the companies' cause. Over 120 business and civic groups in 34 states were induced to pass favorable resolutions on the Fulbright-Harris bill. All of these efforts were aided by recruiting 2100 field-workers from the oil and gas companies, who were given released time from their jobs to cultivate editors and local organizations. Assuming that these employees, mainly salesmen and middle-management people, earned salaries averaging $8000 a year, this meant that the corporations were giving the campaign $67,200 each working day that the program was in operation. Hill and Knowlton planned and organized the entire operation, but they insisted that a different image be presented to the public. "The program should reflect that it is being conducted on behalf of thousands of producers, large and small, and not just a few 'big companies'...," one of their bulletins said. "There should be a conscious effort to subordinate the New York headquarters and to reflect the grass roots support for the program.

It is, of course, impossible to estimate how many people were reached by the NGORC campaign. Nor of those who were reached in one way or another, can it be ascertained how deep was the penetration of the message or how far the public's mind was persuaded to a new way of thinking. Even the Hill and Knowlton executives who directed the campaign had to admit that, in purely scientific terms, " we wouldn't tell you that we had changed opinions two points or ten points or thirty points." Yet in terms of legislative resuts, the formation of the NGORC and the retention

and the retention of Hill and Knowlton seem to have been worth the investment of time and money. A bill liberating "independent" natural gas producers from federal rate regulation was passed by the House of Representatives in 1955 and by the Senate the following year. The vote in the Senate was 53-38, a margin sufficiently ample to suggest that it would probably have passed even without the help of the public relations campaign. But the House presented an altogether different story: there the vote was 209-203. Had but four Congressmen voted the other way the bill would not have been passed. While a wide variety of pressures were at work on the Congress in connection with this legislation, it is not too much to credit the NGORC-Hill and Knowlton campaign with being the factor that persuaded any four of the 209 Representatives who supplied the crucial votes.[33] At all events, Senator John McClellen voiced the feelings of many of his colleagues when he concluded that the legislative activities of the oil industry "might well be calculated to wield more influence on Congress than direct lobbying."

CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS: THE MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS

It would be a mistake to overemphasize the influence of advertising and public relations in American political life. A television spot announcement, a four-color magazine layout, a billboard on a highway -- a glance at any of these is but a passing moment in the busy life of a citizen. The messages of the mass media are designed for the consumption of tens of millions, and this means that the experience and predispositions of each individual can be appealed to in only the most generalized way.[34] The problem of the mass media is that it treats its audience as a mass: it is necessary to suppose that all readers and listeners perceive reality in much the same way and are motivated by much the same stimuli. This assumption may work in the field of marketing, where soap or automobiles or frozen orange juice are being sold. But political tastes are more diverse, and an appeal directed at one section of the population will be ineffective when aimed at others. There is good reason to believe that most corporation expenditures on mass media advertising for legislative purposes are -- to put it plainly -- a waste of company money. Not only is it impossible to tailor the messages to the experience and expectations of a mass audience, but that public is so accustomed to being besieged by the media that it retreats into apathy, cynicism, and indifference.

Public relations firms will tell their clients that an advertising campaign is but one part of an integrated effort. Professional public relations practi-

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[33] President Eisenhower, who was planning to sign the bill, felt obliged to veto it because of the overzealous lobbying of the Superior Oil Company. That corporation sought to extend campaign contributions to various legislators, but not as a part of the NGORC campaign of grassroots education. See Rovere, op. cit., for a discussion of Superior Oil and its President, Mr. Howard Keck.

[34] See Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955) for an elaboration of this general theme.

tioners are well aware of the variety of outlooks in society and they understand that any political campaign must appeal to millions of individuals through the disparate roles which are dominant in their lives. In other words, an ancient principle of marketing is brought to bear: mass media advertising is helpful, but it is then necessary to reach the individual cutomer at the point-of-sale. For this reason members of the public must be addressed not in the mass but at those points where a message can be interpreted to them in light of their particular needs and experience. The principle was spelled out by Carl B yoir for a group of Eastern railroads which sought to influence legislation in the long-haul transportation field:

> The public is only a collective name for countless groups of people, many of whom have bonds of common interest. In terms of our objectives, our subsidiary goals indlude informing, organizaing and activating as many legitimate, strong and politically aggressive groups as already exist or that can be brought into existence for their own self interest.
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> The public and its separate parts must be informed by a purposeful barrage of continuing publicity. Our men in the field must organize the individual groups. Together, the publicity given the subject and the actions of the groups must be directed toward the legislators so that they will act in accordance with the demands of the voters.[35]

To approach the public through the countless groups -- community, occupational, fraternal, religious -- which differentiate the social scene is an expensive endeavor. If advertising in the mass media is costly, a public relations campaign geared to the group life of the public is even more so. Only a wealthy organization like a corporation can afford to retain a Hill and Knowlton or a Carl Byoir who will provide a large field staff that will visit and seek to persuade groups throughout the country. To take one's legislative message to every Rotary and Women's Club, to every Veterans' Post and Merchants' Association, demands men and money beyond the reach of all but the richest organizations. Some groups are able to call on their own local members to act in the capacity of

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35 Quoted in Andrew Hacker, "Pressure Politics in Pennsylvania," in Alan Westin, ed., Cases in American Government (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962).

missionaries: doctors, realtors, funeral directors, have willingly done this job without compensation or coercion.[36] But, as has been pointed out, corporations must pay to get the job done: they must either release their own employees from company work or hire professional public relations men. The important point is that mass media advertising must be underpinned by public relations efforts through groups at the community level. Only in this way can a political message be brought home in a realistic way to the millions of citizens who make up one's potential audience and who comprise a likely body of supporters.

At the same time a political campaign must have a specific goal: reducing the taxes on liquor or railroad tickets, freeing natural gas from rate regulation, limiting the weights for long-haul trucks. The objective may be a general one, such as the A. T. & T.'s effort to build up good will for itself as a public service institution. However it is important to add that it is not possible to sell see a philosophy or an ideology to the public, for American citizens are neither philosohpers nor ideologues. It seems that every other corporation president has in the back of his mind the fervent desire to instill the principles of free enterprise, economic individualism, and the limited state in the minds of a misguided public. Not a few such executives spend company money on institutional advertising, employee education programs, and independent foundations devoted to this end. The point, of course, is that no one listens -- other than the already persuaded -- for the terms are too abstract and the ends too remote from the experience of the average citizen.[37] Such exercises in the rhetoric of free enterprise do, to be sure, give some top executives the feeling that they are doing something for the cause. Insofar as they serve to vitiate a sense of political frustration they probably perform a useful function.

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[36] Even this assumption bears some examination. It is generally assumed that in 1950, under the guidance of Whitaker and Baxter, tens of thousands of doctors dropped their stethoscopes and took the anti-socialized medicine message to the American people. However William A. Glaser reports: "A principle area of these nationwide efforts was Colorado, where medical organizations urged all physicians to electioneer among all their patients on behalf of the Republican slate by means of conversations, pamphlets, and letters. In a statewide survey after the election, 87 per cent of the 337 respondents said they had never been contacted by a doctor or dentist in any way." "Doctors and Politics," American Journal of Sociology, November, 1960. Vol. 66, p. 244.

[37] The classic description of the "free enterprise" campaign is William H. Whyte, Is Anybody Listening? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952). Nevertheless, some social scientists that these outpourings very seriously. See Francis X. Sutton, et al, The American Business Creed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956)

Of the four heads which have been considered here -- campaign contributions, personal participation, lobbying, public relations -- it is probably best to conclude that corporation power is most effective in the lobbying realm. Campaign contributions are sporadic, personal participation is slight, and public relations campaigns are infrequent. But spokesmen for large corporations are given some kind of hearing by legislators, and the unspoken assumption is that a corporation is a constituent with a right to be heard. The freedoms of speech and petition are granted to business firms, whether in capitol lobbies or in stirring up the grassroots, for it is supposed that they have interests at stake and are entitled to promote them in the political process. While corporate power is neither as extensive or effective as many critics make out, it is pervasive enough to warrant raising some philosophical questions. How, it may be asked, can the legitimacy of political participation on the part of corporations be established? By what right is a corporation entitled to claim the constitutional protections of a citizen?

THE CORPORATION AS A REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTION

Prior to embraking on legislative campaigns corporations must decide on their political positions. To favor or to oppose a particular bill, to demand that certain legislative policies be initiated, to support the candidacy of one or another individual -- these are decisions that men must make. When a corporation takes a stand it should not be necessary to point out that that stand is decided upon by a handful of individuals in its top management. A corporation is hierarchical and oligarchical, and policy is made by the policy-makers. However if corporations are to claim the political freedoms of speech and petition, they must also establish that they are representative institutions.[38] The political legitimacy of the American Medical Association and the National Association of Real Estate Boards is gained by demonstrating that they voice the sentiments of the individual citizens who comprise their memberships. It is with the active or tacit consent of several hundred thousand doctors or realtors that these organizations petition legislators and address the public. The internal structure of associations such as these are democratic in theory and federative in constitution. If this is true more in principle than in practice, the fact remains that the vast majority of the memberships concur in what is said in their names. Furthermore, an interested and energetic realtor

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[38] To be sure, the Courts construe a corporation as a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. However this means that it is an economic and legal person, able to make contracts and sue and be sued. But a corporation cannot, by virtue of its economic and legal personality, claim the political and constitutional rights of a citizen. Senator Albert Gore put it this way: "A corporation, as such, is a legal entity, carrying with it many benefits and privileges under the law, and in economic and business transactions. I doubt, however, if the law should ever permit corporations to exercise any of the rights and functions of citizenship. It is a legal fiction. A corporation is not a citizen." Hearings before the Gore Committee.

or physician can rise in the organization structure to a place where he can participate in the councils where associate policy is made. Opportunities for democracy are generally present, and in internal government the vote of any one member counts as much as any other. In these ways, then, voluntary and even quasi-voluntary associations of citizens serve as extensions of the personalities of their members. Such associations have political rights because they speak and act on behalf of discrete individuals. They are, in short, representative institutions even if the decision-making powers on political matters are delegated to full-time bureaucrats or part-time officers.

A corporation has no such basis for political legitimacy, and the reasons for this need be only briefly outlined at this juncture.

Does a Corporation Represent its Employees? Corporation political activities do not represent the views or sentiments of a majority of employees. There are some occasions, when the survival of a company or an industry seems at stake, when management and workers will agree on a legislative position. However in most cases political policy has to do with the distribution of wealth and power, and here one usually suspects that most employees are less than sympathetic to the outlook of top management. At all events, no corporation thinks to poll its labor force before taking a position on legislation, for management has no inclination to be outvoted. Furthermore there is every reason to believe that a corporation would dispense with employees if it possibly could. Workers are, after all, no more than an additional cost of production, and corporations have taken every advantage of opportunities to replace obstreperous men with obedient machines. It is true that a corporation can claim that it provides jobs and that its well-being must be promoted if employment is to be continued. But it is also the case that it would welcome the chance to operate with no employees at all. At all events, until internal mechanisms for consultation and consent are established for the labor force, a corporation cannot claim that its political activities represent the views of those who work for it. As matters now stand it is best to assume that most workers do not think of themselves as working for the company: they are working for a living.

Does a Corporation Represent its Stockholders? Nor can it be claimed that a corporation represents its stockholders. This proposition should need little explanation at this late date.[39] Legal ownership and effective management have little or nothing to do with one another in the current stage of corporate development. Managers recruit and promote themselves with no interference from stockholders, and company policy is made by the men who will carry it out. A large corporation will have over a hundred million shares of stock outstanding and will have upwards to a million owners. Such a dispersion of ownership,

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[39] A sensible and well-informed picture is given by Joseph Livingston, The American Stockholder (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1958).

it is now acknowledged, means that power gravitates to the full-time executives who not only run the company but also make up the agendas for the board of directors' and stockholders' meetings. Furthermore the individual stockholder attending the annual meeting -- few do -- has power not as a person but in proportion to the number of shares he holds. When votes are cast, each stockholder throws an unequal weight into the balance, depending on the breadth of his portfolio. In addition, almost half of the stockholdings in American corporations are held not by people at all but by other corporate entities. According to a 1959 survey taken by the New York Stock Exchange, 47.4% of the outstanding shares were held by fiduciaries, stockbrokers, security dealers, nominees, and institutions.[40] This means that when a vote is taken at an annual meeting the ballots of the myriad Smiths and Jones and Browns are joined by those of Merrill Lynch and Metropolitan Life and Ford Foundation. The reality is that while if individual stockholders support the existing management as an act of habit or inertia, institutional stockholders do so as a matter of considered policy. "We believe in investing in management," a vice president of a large insurance company said. "If the management is sound, we believe in supporting management. If the management should not prove to be capable, we try to be out of the situation before it becomes evident publicly."[41] The upshot is that the acquiescence of individual stockholders coupled with the interest of institutional stockholders gives management a free hand.

One illustration may make the functioning of this process clear. The 1959 annual meeting of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was a model affair. The event was well-publicized and almost 4000 people made the trip to Lawrenceville, New Jersey, where they foregathered in the prep school's field house. The proceedings were amicable enough until someone rose to attack Jersey Standard's decision to contribute $175,000 to Radio Free Europe the previous year. This individual disagreed with the political tone of Radio Free Europe, and he felt that the corporation's donation represented neither his sentiments nor the best interests of the United States. After a reply from the rostrum and a desultory discussion the question was put to a vote. The result: 168 million for continuing contributions to Radio Free Europe, 5 million against.[42] The balloting was, of course, by shares rather than by counting the heads of the shareholders. (Were it by stockholders as individuals, management would still have won but the strength of the opposition would have doubled.) A point to remember is that standing quietly at the back of the Lawrenceville fieldhouse, were several men from the larger brokerage houses, insurance companies, and banks. And these men, while not stockholders in Jersey Standard themselves, put an end to the nonsense by voting the institutional shares on management's side. But it is of little value to suggest that the frankly political decision to support Radio Free Europe is "representative" in the sense that it echoes the sentiments of the institutions which hold Jersey standard shares. For Lehman

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40 New York Stock Exchange, Shareownership in America: 1959, p. 33.

41 Quoted in Livingston, op. cit., p. 156.

42 Report of the 77th Annual Meeting, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), May 27, 1959, pp. 18-21.

Brothers, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and even the Sears Roebuck Pension Fund are constituted along much the same lines as Jersey Standard itself.

If a corporation wishes to claim that its political activities are legitimate, that they represent the views of the citizens who hold stock in the company, then it may achieve such a status for itself by taking the following steps: (1) Individual stockholders must be polled to discover whether they consent to the company's taking a particular political position, and the company may embark on its activities if it secures the consent of a majority. (2) In such a balloting, votes must be counted on the arithmetical basis of each stockholder having one vote rather than on the geometric basis of shareholding. (3) Each stockholder who agrees with the political postion and activities the company intends to take must expressly agree that his pro-rated share of the campaign costs for that year be subtracted from his dividend check. (4) Institutions must be excluded from voting. It is quite clear that no corporation will adopt a program even remotely like this. But in refusing to do so they forfeit their claim to be speaking on behalf of the citizens who are their stockholders.[43] They can no longer regard themselves as extensions of the political personalities of their owners, and this means that they have no right to the constitutional freedoms of speech and petition.

Does a Corporation Represent Social Values? A corporation might agree that its political activities are engaged in without the consent of its employees or stockholders, but that it is nevertheless a "representative" institution because it embodies and upholds the values of the society of which it is a part. "The modern large industrial corporation is in some respects a public institution," intones William T. Gossett, Vice President and General Counsel of Ford. "It is a key economic unit in our society: it holds power in trust for the whole community."[44] The theory here is that corporate power is conjoined with social responsibility, that economic function is guided by a moral conscience. This notion of representation is aristocratic rather than democratic; it suggests that an institution need not speak only for a living constituency but for the interests of those dead, those now living, and those yet to be born. The test of rhetoric such as this is not whether A. T. & T. collects Christmas presents for poor children or whether General Motors gives scholarship funds to M.I.T. If a corporation is going to enter the political arena, then it must -- if it seeks to

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[43] Michael Reagen puts the point well: "We think of the corporation as an association of capital rather than of people. This is formally true of the only elections held in a corporation, those of the board of directors, where the balloting is on a basis of one share of stock, one vote -- not one man, one vote." "The Seven Fallacies of Business in Politics," Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1960, p. 60.

[44] William T. Gossett, "The Role of the Corporation in Public Affairs," The Business Lawyer, November, 1959, p. 97.

gain legitimacy as a representative institution -- demonstrate that its involvements do not end with the defense of its own interests. To be representative of social values in a meaningful sense a corporation should use its power to promote ideas and practices which transcend production and profits.

In this sphere, however, the large companies of our economy have been strangely silent. Two examples will have to suffice here, the first encompassing civil liberties and the second civil rights.

The freedom of individuals to pursue their livlihoods despite the unpopularity of their political views has clearly suffered some dilution in recent years. Whatever the causes of the attacks on civil liberties, the prominent corporations have done nothing to oppose them and much to acquiesce to their demands. General Electric, for instance, publicly announced that it would dismiss any employee who failed to cooperate with a legislative investigating committee no matter what constitutional claims to silence that person might invoke. A private organization which offered to run loyalty checks on company personnel was able to sell its services to such corporations as General Motors, du Pont, F. W. Woolworth, Metropolitan Life, Reynolds Tobacco, and Bendix Aviation.[45] A notorious instance of corporate acquiescence to what was presumed to be public outcry occurred when General Foods dismissed Miss Jean Muir, an actress on a television program sponsored by one of the company's products. Miss Muir was "listed" in a pamphlet entitled Red Channels as belonging to several suspect organization.[46] The fact that she was and is a loyal American and that the insinuations were groundless carried no weight with General Foods. She had become controversial and therefore she had to go. General Foods put it this way:

> The use of controversial personalities or the discussion of controversial subjects in our advertising may provide un favorable criticism and even antagonism among sizable groups of customers. Such reaction injures both acceptance of our produce and our public relations, General Foods advertising, therefore, avoids the use of material and personalities which in its judgment are controversial....[46]

All in all, the corporate record on civil liberties has been a less than aristocratic one. It was a small businessman who gave Alger Hiss a job on his release from prison; and it has been independent producers, not the major companies, who have hired blacklisted screenwriters. No corporation has come to the public defense of a victimized employee, and certainly none has offered financial support to one in his time of difficulties. The United Automobile

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[45] Merle Miller, The Judges and the Judged (Garden City: Doubleday, 1950) p. 92.

[46] Ibid., p. 45.

Workers union, by way of contrast, not only kept on one of its organizers who had been cited for contempt of a legislative committee, but it also paid his legal expenses all the way up to the Supreme Court -- which acquitted him in the now, famous Watkins case. It is of some interest that the U. A. W., which is far more susceptible to democratic pressures than is a corporation like General Foods, should have expressed a concern for the civil liberties of one of its employees.

The freedom of Americans belonging to minority groups to live on an equal footing with their fellow citizens is hampered by entrenched forces which are satisfied with things as they are. While the problem of civil rights is national in scope, attention is usually focussed on the Southern states where the condition of inequality is rampant. Since the end of World War II Northern-based corporations have been opening many branch plants in the South. In return for tax concessions and a docile labor force, these companies have agreed to accept the racial patterns of the region. In some areas the branch plants of corporations do not hire Negroes at all, in others they are kept in custodial positions.[47] More than this, the metropolitan corporations strike up an alliance with the provincial legislatures, the one accepting white supremacy and the other keeping public expenditures to a minimum. This is particularly true in a state like Alabama:

> ...the Black Belt countries would not be able to maintain their stranglehold and their retrograde influence on state policy were it not for a powerful ally, the big industry of Birmingham. The biggest of Birmingham's "big mules" is United States Steel, whose subsidiary Tenessee Coal and Iron, dominate the city economically and, to a considerable extent, politically. The "big mules" and the Black Belt cooperate and, together, usually run the state....[48]

Corporations have the power to enforce the principle of equality in hiring and upgrading, but with one or two exceptions they have decided to play along with the practice of white supremacy.[49] To be sure, as in the case of civil liberties, company policies guaranteeing civil rights would encounter local opposition. But if, as Mr. Gossett of Ford claimed, a large corporation "holds power in trust for the whole community" then it is reasonable to expect that such power will be used to promote the values inherent in the nation's Constitu-

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47 See Herbert Hill, "The Negro in Industry," The New Leader, May 6, 1957, pp. 3-5. There is no evidence that matters have changed appreciably since Hill's article appeared; nor is there much reason to believe that the Kennedy administration's intervention at the Lockheed Aircraft plant in Georgia will have a widespread impact among other corporations located in the South.

48 The New York Times, April 13, 1960, p. 33.

49 For an account of how one conscientious management used its authority to integrate its labor force, see the story on International Harvester's policies at its Louisville and Memphis plants in the Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1956.

tion. However the rhetoric is vapid, and there is some suspicion that the men who utter the aristocratic words know that this is the case. A corporation is, by construction and temperament, unfitted to represent the fundamental values of a free society.

Were it to don the mantle of public trustee, the assumption of this role might impart political legitimacy to the corporation. It might then, even without a democratic constituency, stake a rightful claim to the freedoms of speech and petition. For its political activities would, in part at least, be directed toward promoting the basic values of the society. There is small sign that this is the case, and corporate claims for the right of free speech are even further vitiated by their unwillingness to speak up openly and boldly in their own name. Companies like Shell and Standard Oil of California do not address the public in their own names but hide behind a "Natural Gas and Oil Resources Committee." The publicity released to the public supporting the Fulbright-Harris bill never once listed the names of the corporations which financed the campaign. Montgomery Ward and Sears Roebuck, in their efforts to have Congress maintain a cheap and subsidized parcel post service, do not sign their messages but rather let a "National Council on Business Mail" do their talking for them. This group, it should be added,[50] refuses to tell either who its members are or what are the sources of its funds. And the Pennsylvania Railroad, in its campaign to impose weight-limits on long-haul trucks, joined with other Eastern railroads in hiring Carl Byoir public relations agency which made sure that railroad backing was never attributed to its anti-truck attacks.[51] Indeed, the Pennsylvania carefully refrained from informing its stockholders that $300,000 of company money was spent on that legislative campaign. In short, it is hard to see how corporations can ask for the right to free speech if they are so lacking in courage or self-confidence that they are unwilling to speak in their own names when addressing the public.[52]

The American corporation is in politics: its resources and its power are used to influence the course of legislation and public policy, to give shape to the public mind. But the corporation cannot be conceived of as a representative institution: it speaks for no identifiable constituency and it cannot claim to promote the values of society as a whole. The corporation is not a citizen, and yet it takes full advantage of the Constitutional protections for free speech and the right of petition. It is the burden of this argument that the corporation

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50 Personal communication from S. F. Kirby, Executive Vice President of the National Council on Business Mail, December 22, 1959.

51 See Robert Bendiner, "The 'Engineer of Consent" -- A Case Study", The Reporter, August 11, 1955, pp. 14-23.

52 See the testimony of Earl Latham before the McClellan Committee, Hearings, p. 575.

is not entitled to these political rights: it is not an individual with mind or tongue, it is not a citizen with liberty to gain or lose. Corporation power is real and its political expressions have had a demonstrable impact on public policy. This power, as currently exercised, is illegitimate. It may only be made rightful if certain stringent conditions, all of them outlined here, are met. As of this date there is no sign that corporations are willing or able to meet those requirements.

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S DEMANDS ON THE WORLD

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S DEMANDS ON THE WORLD

As the title of this paper suggests, the whole world posture of the People's Republic of China since the accession to power of the present regime has been oriented toward alteration of the international environment. Choosing the right term to describe this alterative posture more narrowly is not simply an exercise in pedantry. To call it the attitude of a "have-not" nation is misleading, at least insofar as there are "have-not" nations whose basic foreign orientation is isolationist. Among these are some neutralist countries whose policies are consistently directed toward maintenance of the contemporary status quo. The term "unsatisfied" implies that the granting of certain claims, most typically territorial claims, will result in a nation's approval of and future protection of a foreseen status quo only slightly different from the existing one. This does not seem applicable to China. Nor does the term "manipulative," implying the preservation or enhancement of one's own position by procuring minor adjustments in the positions of one or more others, quite fit the Chinese posture.

In short, the alteration of the international environment that the Chinese seek is a revolutionary one, and they conceive of the total pattern of international relations as embodying class struggle. In testimony of the general validity of this point, one can cite the standard Chinese formulation of the significance of their revolution. With some variations in detail,

the Chinese have consistently described their revolution as a continuation of the Soviet October Revolution and as a major accretion of strength to the socialist camp. With equal consistency and frequency they have proclaimed their historic mission to be assistance of national liberation movements, participation in struggle against and ultimate liquidation of imperialism, and hastening the establishment of communism as the universal form of human society.

Such sentiments, stated as broadly as has been done here, I take to be not merely ritualistic formulas, but affirmations of consciously recognized predispositions. It is not, however, to be taken for granted that these formulas, as real as their directive effect may be, provide a sufficient statement of Chinese Communist motives so that one can deduce probable behavior from them. This paper is devoted to an attempt to formulate a more detailed statement which hopefully will serve that purpose. For lack of intensive studies of Chinese Communist foreign operations, a number of the propositions to be advanced will necessarily be statements of postulates rather than conclusions, and the end result as a whole is designed to guide and be tested by research rather than to enunciate conclusions.

A distinction will be drawn here between the goals (or ends) of Chinese foreign policy and the methods (or means) adopted to pursue those goals. A parallel distinction will be made between strategy and tactics. Though there is no implication

that strategy concerns only goals and tactics only methods, most of the discussion will deal with strategic goals and tactical methods. Regarding goals, the approach is: first, to try to establish a hierachy of goals; second, to examine the relation of variations in the operational relevance of certain apparent goals to variations in the environment; and third, to examine the relationships, including conflict, between goals and the factors affecting relative priorities as between goals. The treatment of methods necessarily involves the possibility of circular argument. Because of what appears to be a felt need on the part of the leadership for self-conscious direction of its activities, it is often possible to derive a set of goals from official statements and, in a comparatively straightforward manner, review the contemporary tactical pattern for consistency with these declared goals. The results on occasion are more interesting than one might expect. In other cases, the goal is inferred from tactical practice and one can only apply the test of coherence to the proposed relationship without falling into circularity. When a given tactical pattern can be more or less reliably identified as a choice among patterns known by precedent to have been employed in comparable contexts of events, the inferred relationship gains plausibility.

INVARIANT GOALS

Given the basic orientation outlined above, if there are definable goals which the Chinese Communist regime has exposed

consistently without reference to environmental changes, these should belong to the highest level of the hierachy. They would constitute, as it were, the regime's unconditional high strategy. By definition, the constituent goals are very long range, though less than ultimate. Their other defining characteristics are better specified after they have been described.

Of the Chinese demands relating to her position as a separate national entity, two in particular appear to be independent of environmental conditions and to carry great emotional weight. There is nothing in principle remarkable about China's insistence on territorial integrity and full sovereignty within what she regards as her legal limits. In some cases China has been willing to barter land for land. In the Sino-Burmese negotiations of 1956, the Chinese defined the factors in the problem as the historical facts, the concrete legal data, and calculations of practical advantage. The final settlement of 1960 had somehow become, at least as represented by the Chinese, an act of grace on their part and a joint political demonstration whose significance transcended its immediate content.

Taiwan and Tibet particularly are of more than practical significance to the Chinese. The Tibetan rebellion of 1959 was not simply a revolt against authority, but a "monstrous crime... undermining national unity," and its suppression was justified in the name of social revolutionary ideals. Both Taiwan and Tibet are regularly designated as "inalienable" or "inviolable"

Chinese territory, and the "liberation" of the former is never mentioned as anything less than a "sacred duty" of the "Chinese people." Full Chinese sovereignty in both areas has been called a question of "great right and great wrong," that is, a matter of principle on which no compromise is possible.

What attracts notice about Chinese Irredentism is not that it exists, not even that it is uncompromising or loaded with symbolic meanings. It is that its spokesmen think of themselves as servants of destiny. This destiny, furthermore, does not have the same shape as that dreamt of by "bourgeois nationalists."

Similar symbolic values attach to the Chinese drive toward recognized great power status. Situations which compromise this status do not often arise, but when they do there is sure to be a reiteration of the Chinese claim that no problem in Asia (latterly, it would appear, in the world) can be settled without Chinese participation. The drive manifests itself in a tendency to issue pronouncements on all world events, of great or small moment. What is more serious, however, is that the Chinese may interpret certain situations as impinging on their world status when to others much less appears at stake. There is not conclusive evidence, but there is sufficient evidence to suggest, for example, that one compelling reason for China's intervention in the Korean War was the conviction that not intervening would be abnegation of the status of a great power.

The Chinese apparently do not regard U.N. membership as a criterion of great power status, but believe it to be a

natural perquisite of that status. Denied access to the United Nations, but occasionally requiring an international forum, they have promoted the convening of substitute international bodies, like the Geneva Conference powers or the Bandung conference. Success on each such occasion seems to have strengthened their pretensions. These define the role of a great power not in terms of diplomatic weight or material power alone. Besides these, a great power displays self-respect, as in the slogan "China has stood up," and demands the respect of others. It also exercises leadership by example. The claim the Chinese make to fulfill this latter role in relation to former colonies is by now well known, though not undisputed.

The Chinese themselves recognize no conflict between their aspirations as a nation and their whole-hearted commitment to the Communist bloc. In spite of the severe disagreements of the past two years concerning middle-run strategy, it remains true that maintenance of bloc solidarity is an overriding consideration in Chinese policy. Much in Sino-Soviet relations remains obscure. It appears, if one accepts the information provided by Crankshaw and Deutscher, that the Chinese Communists came very close to splitting the international movement in December, 1960, and that they have not ceased agitation in party circles since then. But the basic position of the Chinese Communist Party in the recent dispute never involved the possibility of defection from the "communist camp" to the "imperialist camp." Their dissatisfactions were a product in

part of the fear of long-term encirclement, in part of the fear that the whole of world communist strategy was tending toward a position that would retard revolutionary processes. Their problem, then, was not whether or not to break from the Communist camp but how to prevent the camp as a whole from drifting away rightwards from the Chinese position.

It is worth recalling that the Chinese position on Hungary in 1956 was clearcut and unhesitant, contrary to some expectations at the time. The position on Hungary, furthermore, was taken at a time when Chinese policy as a whole was in the extreme moderate phase. The major document stating the position reaffirmed the special nature of communist countries exactly at a time when the declared Chinese line was at the height of emphasis on the common characteristics of China and the non-communist nations of Asia. The same document is now read by many people as one of the early portents of the later "dogmatist" position taken in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In a related sequence of events, the Chinese Communist leadership swung sharply to the left in domestic affairs, partly in reaction to one of the rare displays of public dissent from the regime's foreign policy, relating exactly to overcommitment to the Russian alliance.

If we take the above as some of the fixed principles of Chinese foreign policy, certain of their characteristics deserve noting. They appear as absolutes, as not depending on the contemporary shape of the environment. While often stated in

Chinese declarations, they are not consistently declared but are implicitly constant. They are not, it would appear, to be questioned or discussed among the ranks of the "people." Anyone who does question them loses his standing as a member of the "people." The reaction to any event that appears to threaten these goals is swift, virtually automatic, and expressed in terms of symbolic values.

By the same token, these goals bear only indirectly on those processes of foreign policy formulation and execution which require decisions to be made. These absolutes are outside the realm to which choice applies. There are, indeed, some other Chinese goals that can be stated in general form and are as absolute as those discussed above. Such are, for instance, assuring national security, maximizing Chinese influence abroad, and promoting the development of Communist influence and control throughout the world. These are absolutes in the sense that the Chinese would resist, automatically and with emotion, any efforts to impede them. But they are so much, in terms of observable events, tied to environmental conditions and to the making of decisions that they are better discussed at a lower level of strategy.

GRAND STRATEGIC DESIGNS

At the level of middle- to long-run strategic policy formulation, the Chinese Communist method of operation seems to require, beyond what is necessary for operations, the articulation of a grand design. It is hard to imagine Chou En-lai

or Ch'en Yi entertaining for a moment the idea of muddling through. Recurrent foreign policy reports follow a standard form, in which a statement of basic principles (like devotion to world peace) is followed by a description of the state of the world, and this in turn is followed by an outline of current strategic goals. The last is so stated as to appear as a logical derivation from the description of the world.

The description of the world, if judged as an account of facts, is normally distorted in a degree that cannot be accounted for by differences in observational standpoint alone. The Chinese Communist perception of the world has its special characteristics, being ideologically conditioned and displaying a tendency to describe the impending future as the present. Additionally, the Chinese Communists regularly suppress important facts. The outline of the current grand design in Chinese foreign policy reports often turns out to be a frank statement of intentions.

Since 1949 there have been three major over-all patterns of strategy, with some minor variations by way either of development or adjustment to new opportunities and setbacks. The dates of major shifts of line can be set, a little arbitrarily, in the summer of 1951 and the autumn of 1957, and the general trend of shift can be designated as from hard to soft (1951) and from soft to hard (1957). Each of these shifts can be correlated with important changes in Chinese estimates of the total world (not the local) balance of power. Other

Communist parties concurrently revised their perspectives at about the same times, but our interest here is in the Chinese shifts, which have not always been consonant with those of other Communist parties.

The components of the grand design, then, are not absolutes. The included strategic goals are those consciously decided on as appropriate to the over-all "correlation of international forces" as it is supposed to exist or as it is foreseen to take shape so long as the perceived dominant characteristics of the period last. These strategic goals, then, are chosen, not given. They are consequently discussable, either among members of the bloc or within China, and are potential occasions for ideological deviation.

For the Chinese, the distribution of world power is unavoidably bipolar. The problem of designing an operating strategy is to make the effective (or "correct") determination of goals and methods for achieving desired changes in this balance.

Between 1949 and 1951, the balance seems to have been apperceived in simple, categoric terms. The West had military strength in the material sense, but the prospects for revolutionary seizure of power, especially in Asia, were favorable. The bipolar conflict was seen as clearcut. The chosen strategy was to support exclusively orthodox revolutionary movements and to attack all others. There was, then, no room for neutrality or for third powers. This perspective in part

reflected the neophyte status of Communist China on the world scene, in part reflected the limits of China's capabilities for exerting influence. In terms of major tactical patterns directly related to the chosen goals and perspective, propaganda in this phase occupied an especially important place. There appears to have been great faith in its efficacy. This valuation of propaganda persisted into the following period, but after the bacteriological warfare propaganda campaign of 1952 it was significantly devalued and has never since played quite the same role.

The soft line of 1951-1957 developed not as a dramatic break with past strategy, but as a sort of gradual retooling process. Throughout the period, the bipolar power balance was seen as unfavorable from the Communist viewpoint. In effect the Communist camp was deterred and the Western camp was not. The main variation in this perspective was that in its earlier half the Communist disadvantage was seen as increasing, in its latter half as decreasing. The strategic goal of the period shifted from undermining Western strength by revolutionary takeover of peoples and territories to preventing the extension of Western strength into the peripheries of China and decreasing its potential where it could not be denied access--in short, the strategy of denial, of the "area of collective peace." Prestige as an objective acquired new importance. Gradually the Chinese attitude toward neutralism developed from grudging acceptance to enthusiastic endorsement, so that the promotion

of the foreign policy objectives of Asian neutrals became a declared Chinese strategic goal. In the course of time, however, this strategy turned back on itself by freeing Asian neutralism from bondage to its own fears. With the easing of tension in the area as a whole, the altruistic-preventive motive-pattern of Asian neutralism lost its relevance. Energies could be redirected to domestic tasks, and in the international sphere the neutralists came increasingly to prefer the role of bridge to that of buffer. In the succeeding period, with the return to a hard line, the improved prospects for the emergence of a third force playing an independent role came once more to constitute a strategic problem in connection with which China had to arrive at new decisions. The Chinese, it appears, still prefer a bipolar world.

The post-1957 phase of Chinese strategy was initiated dramatically by the revelation of the Soviet breakthrough in missiles. For the Chinese, an entirely new balance of power pattern seemed to come into existence. The pre-1951 balance had been more or less equal as between different types of power --political vs. military. The 1951-1957 situation was one of unbalance, which, however, could be contained. With the advent of nuclear parity, that is to say a balance in respect to the ultimate resort with both sides possessing comparable resources of the same types--military vs. military--the Chinese reading of the situation was that the deterrence positions were dramatically reversed.

Besides the radically new pattern of resources affecting the power balance, China's internal development, her world status, and the established pattern of her foreign relations were all of a different order from 1949. There could not be a complete reversion to the pre-1951 strategy, but the new situation permitted a re-examination of the strategic goals of the soft line. In many respects the Chinese, if it were within their power to decide, would apparently want to revive the pre-1951 strategy in all its essentials--direct confrontation with the West, support of orthodox revolutionary movements, denial of the legitimacy of the "third road," the full pattern of the strategy of revolutionary advance, and this time with the added advantage on their side of deterrent capability.

The present situation does not, however, lend itself any longer to such simplistic strategies. The environment has not been static. In the Asian periphery of China, there are many sources of instability, but no longer the crying weakness of 1949. Chou En-lai in 1954 apparently counted on the ultimate development of an imbalance of economic, military and political power as between China and her periphery which would secure China's dominance in the area. This imbalance, despite the "revolutionary optimism" of China's "native radical" leadership, has not arrived at the point hoped for. The soft line produced some successes, and there probably is a wing of the Chinese leadership that has a vested interest in living with this legacy. Above all, whereas the earlier grand designs were

almost wholly in consonance with contemporary Soviet strategy, since 1957 discrepancies in the respective analyses of the "correlation of international forces" and in respect to middle-run goals and methods have been obvious.

Two ironies have been born. In an era when the Chinese believe that a "decisive shift" in the world balance of power has occurred, Chinese strategy has not been clear and confident, but has vacillated, expressed itself in abortive actions, and retreated from untenable demands made on some target countries at the cost of conciliatory gestures made toward other target countries--not, it must be admitted, a very high price in most cases. The outcome of this backing and filling seems for the immediate future to be an agreement with the Soviet Union to restrict the application of the hard line strategy to the U.S. base system and those countries which play host to it. The second irony is that the Soviet Union has found it necessary to intervene directly in areas where Chinese interests are significantly involved. Thus the accretion of power to the Soviet camp has brought about a restriction not only of China's range but of her freedom of maneuver--subject to protest.

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF GOALS AND METHODS

Strategic goals and even more the patterns of tactics developed for reaching recognized goals depend not only on estimates of relative capability, but on the way power is perceived to be distributed in space. Here is the most obscure facet of Chinese strategic thinking. Of the few judgments one

can make with any confidence, it appears that the Chinese regime has consistently regarded itself as encircled. Both its hard and its soft strategies can be read as approaches to breaking out of encirclement. It is probable also that in both hard and soft strategies, Korea and Vietnam occupy the position of primary security zones. The difference appears in Chinese willingness to refrain from demanding an end to partition in the soft line period and their almost instinctive demands for unification in hard line periods. It is not lightly to be concluded that China demands armament equal to the highest world level either as a permanent goal or as a goal of especial saliency in the hard line period. The regime has for years accepted a military structure which does not admit it to the ranks of powers capable of waging strategic war. There is evidence that the adequacy of this structure has been the subject of controversy inside the regime, perhaps of such dimensions that the proponents of an "incorrect" line qualify as deviationists. One can also suspect a parallel controversy on whether the regime's posture should be basically offensive or defensive.

It is implied in what has been said above that any Chinese grand design, whether hard or soft, requires China to move given target countries in ways that they might not move of their own accord. The Chinese policy-maker, then, must estimate the real-world feasibility both of the results he intends to produce and of the primary tactical patterns he is to employ. There

is great difficulty in estimating the amount and kind of information on which decisions are based. In a few rare instances, as for example when the Chinese publish a detailed statement concerning the fire-power of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces or of Japan's capacity for future production of missiles, or when a Japanese military commentator returning from China specifically states that the Chinese carefully read and analyze everything printed in Japan, we get a hint of the depth of the information available. But this does not provide assurance that the Chinese Foreign Ministry achieves the same depth or detail in regard to all countries. There have also been startling revelations of basic ignorance on the part of both high-ranking leaders and Foreign Ministry technicians.

The full impact of internal revolutionary history on Chinese images of target countries is also difficult to analyze. There are a few intriguing points of detail which are somewhat indicative. In statements over the past year, Chinese spokesmen, by an obscure method of calculation, arrived at the statement that 90 percent of the world's population favored the cause of the socialist camp. The origin of the figure is probably indicated by publiction at about the same time of Volume IV of the works of Mao Tse-tung, in which it appears that by a similar process of calculation Mao had concluded at the end of World War II that exactly the same proportion of the Chinese population, notwithstanding appearances, favored the cause of the Chinese Communist Party. Coincidences of this sort, and

there have been several, justify the conclusion that domestic example predisposes the Chinese leadership to interpret events abroad in stereotyped ways. This predisposition, however, conflicts with a self-imposed requirement for factual knowledge and objective analysis. The result is a persistent ambivalence in China's demands on the world.

The Chinese policy-maker's dilemma rests in his uncertainty as to whether any country outside the Communist bloc can be relied on coupled with the certain knowledge that allies must be made and kept. The permanent enemy is of course the "imperialist camp," more specifically and concretely the United States. Whether any Asian country is treated as friend or enemy depends less on that country's posture than on the requirements of Chinese strategy.

In the phase of the simplistic hard line, up to 1951, there was no problem. The division between the two worlds was taken as absolute, and all who were not for the socialist camp were against it. With the initiation of the soft line came the search for friends and allies. The methods used developed step by step over several years. The relative emphasis given by the Chinese to various kinds of allies serves to define secondary strategic phases.

At the beginning, allies were defined as social strata within various Asian countries rather than as national entities. The term "people's diplomacy" is an apt one. A kind of bargain was struck whereby China supported left-wing social and political

protest in other countries in return for the support of "people's" organizations for China's national demands. This created a capability on the part of the Chinese to manipulate the internal politics of other countries in a more diversified way than could be done through dogmatic support of orthodox revolutionary groups alone, but it was hardly the road to international amity.

The transition from "people's"diplomacy" to a more normal style of conducting international relations on the state-to-state level came after the Korean armistice and the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina. The latter was particularly important in that it ratified China's great power status and made state-to-state dealings possible without conpromising Chinese dignity. The conference and its consequences for the pattern of Asian relations has never been sufficiently studied in the West. Its repercussions, I believe, went very deep and considerably modified international orientations and the domestic positions of political bodies throughout the area. The final step, for the Chinese, was achieved at Bandung. Reduced to the essentials, it was here that the Chinese completed the transfer from identifying their national interests with those of the political opposition in other Asian countries to identifying with the international demands of incumbent regimes. In short, China now tried to ally herself not only with the neutralists of Asia, but with the neutral states of Asia, and raised the possibility of mutually profitable dealings even with states which were

only potentially neutral. Concerning the exact content of neutralism, no questions were asked.

In the course of elaborating her pattern of strategic methods, the Chinese did not wholly abandon any lines of communication, but tried to keep them all open. The activities of local communist parties were de-emphasized. There is, however, no accurate measurement of the extent to which the Chinese exerted themselves to preserve communist cadres against future need. Slow and patient subversion is not easy to identify from normal public information. In some countries--Thailand and the Philippines, for instance--the Chinese through lack of opportunity have never gotten much beyond the tactics of "people's diplomacy" except by way of verbal gestures. In others, of which Japan is the best example, secondary hard and soft phases in China's approach depend on the contemporary location of power in the target country. There is an observable rhythm in China's dealings with Japan whereby when a narrow conservative coalition, like the Yoshida or Kishi cabinets, is in power, the Chinese act in the way best calculated to promote polarization of local politics; when a broad conservative coalition, like the Hatoyama cabinet, is in power, the Chinese try to find points of negotiation. Manipulation of the target country's internal political balance is a more prominent aspect of China's approach to Japan than to other countries, but observable in dealings with all. The rhythm just described is, furthermore, not mechanically dictated by the nature of China's grand design,

but represents an adjustment which may occur in hard as well as soft periods.

Apart from calculations of the payoff to China of a particular pattern of strategy, there are certain sources of ambivalence affecting the Chinese policy-maker. In regard to Japan, the Chinese seem to vacillate between the hope that Japan can be induced to reverse her alliances and the fear that she will necessarily become a dangerous competitor. Judgment is not simplified by the existence of a similarly ambivalent set of expectations on the part of Japan. In regard to the Asian neutrals, China's ambivalent judgment of the reliability of the "national bourgeoisie" is a case of projection, by which the Chinese regard two-facedness as an attribute of the object rather than as a facet of their own process of perception, and do not perceive those attributes which are objectively present.

In both hard and soft periods, the Chinese policy-maker believes in avoiding conflict on two fronts at once. This self-imposed requirement, besides being articulated in standard ideological statements, can be inferred from Chinese actions. There is also affirmative evidence of its operational relevance. Given the distribution of military strength in Asia, the "direction of the main blow" for the Chinese policy-maker is of necessity to the East. Correlatively, on the alternative front, which happens to be in the South, the strategy and tactics of "neutralizing" and "winning over" are indicated.

In the post-1957 hard line period, appropriate changes in operating strategy and tactics were initiated. From an early point in this period, the distinction between "peoples" and incumbent governments and the "vanguard" role of the "proletariat" regained something close to their former prominence in Chinese formulations of the state of the world. With the renewed feeling of strength, the negative side of ambivalent views of others again emerged. Japan could be openly dealt with as an enemy. Suppressed hostility to the "national bourgeoisie" again came out into the open. All measures designed to make positive use of the initiative, including resort to war, regained their attractiveness.

Revival of the perspective of revolutionary advance, however, created self-frustrating real-world obstacles. The rest of the Communist world, especially the Russians, did not concur in the "correctness" of the new Chinese hard line, but developed a different hard line conflicting at specific points. The details of the resulting dispute have been analyzed by several students, and a fairly clear picture has emerged of the points of conflict and some of the resolutions thereof.

What is not so often stressed is that by the time the ideological dispute emerged into the open, Chinese operating strategy had lost internal consistency and appropriateness to real-world problems. As noted earlier, there was a legacy of success as well as failure from the soft line. If the failures could not be expunged by apology, neither did it make sense to abandon the successes, as the "native radical" leadership seemed

prepared to do. Confusion developed concerning the "direction of the main blow": partly because the leadership designated too many enemies; partly because of rising apprehensions on the part of the leadership that the distribution of military power in Asia was proceeding toward the creation of an enlarged threat from more than one direction--the so-called "three-pronged attack." Thus Chinese operations during 1959 followed an aberrant, excessively offensive course. It required all of 1960 to readjust China's posture.

In the course of this readjustment, as earlier noted, the pattern of identification of allies and enemies was once more redrawn. The source of insecurity in the present design is relatively restricted and follows a different topographic concept. It is defined not as a continuous geographic area, but in relation to the U.S. base system. The Chinese stick to the distinction between peoples and governments and have even apparently achieved some acceptance of their recommended united front policy. Since the points of conflict have apparently not been fully resolved, one cannot accurately estimate what China has gained or lost. A partial cost to the Chinese has been some loss of freedom of maneuver, to some extent offsetting the growth of a polycentric pattern of intra-bloc relations.

SIMPLE TACTICS

The focus of attention of this paper has been so much on Chinese high policy as to create the impression that all China's foreign operations fit into and serve a coherent pattern of

middle- to long-run goals. There are, of course, some operations and some aspects of Chinese methods which are purely tactical. Further, some aspects of the operating pattern have strategic significance in one phase and only tactical significance in another.

As noted earlier, propaganda was a strategic instrument in the early simplistic hard line period and subsequently declined in significance if not in volume. In the nuclear parity hard line phase, especially as directed toward Africa, it appears to have reacquired some strategic import. Prestige as an Asian nation was a strategic goal in the soft line period, but yielded in importance to the necessity for adopting a clear position on the Hungarian incident. The sacrifice of the favorable image of China in Indian and other eyes at the time of the Tibetan incident may or may not have been deliberate. Such incidents, however, indicate that to the Chinese, prestige is on the whole of merely tactical value, though a sacrifice of prestige may at times create issues which compromise strategic success.

Certain groups, treated as instruments of Chinese policy, tend to be handled as expendable. As long as local Communist parties, front groups, and sympathizers exist, the Chinese will use them, often as a matter of routine. But the Chinese, no less than the Russians, will sacrifice the local interests of such groups with apparently little compunction for their own advantage. What is more surprising is that the Chinese Communists

handle the Overseas Chinese as if they were an expendable commodity.

With some reservations, the author being ignorant in the economic field, trade and financial operations outside the Communist bloc, in spite of the prominence given them in propaganda, are here regarded as for the most part, tactical operations. Allowing for a few exceptional cases, such as the cutting off of economic exchange with Japan in 1958, China's foreign economic activities, where not straight commercial activities, involve the casual practice of economic warfare and much personal intrigue, neither of which appears to serve directly the high priority goals of the contemporary grand design. Perhaps the same can be said of economic aid outside the Communist bloc.

Publicly, the most obvious manifestation of Chinese diplomacy is the state visit. A trip abroad by Chou En-lai or Ch'en Yi is likely to be undertaken only for serious substantive purposes, and the traveller is always well briefed, even though stops en route sometimes are included apparently only for reasons of protocol. The visits of foreign dignitaries to China are similarly carefully prepared, and in a high proportion of cases seem to be carried off with insight and to great effect insofar as incidental details are concerned. This attentiveness applies surprisingly far down on the prestige ladder, though not down to the level of the semipermanent resident, like lower-ranking foreign diplomatic personnel and students. The joint communiques and ceremonial speeches which usually emerge in the course of a

state visit would repay study. Contrary to the fanfare and display of amity and harmony trumpeted by the Chinese press, comparison of statements often reveals most surprising discrepancies between the accounts from either side of what the harmony is about.

SUMMARY

The attempt has been made in this paper to identify goals and methods of Chinese foreign policy insofar as there is evidence to justify the identification. It is argued that there is a hierarchy of goals and that the methods in practice at a given time are consciously chosen as means to statable ends; that is to say, that the methods tend to form patterns whose variations through time correlate with changes in the goals pursued.

Within the limits of and ultimately determined by a basic revolutionary drive, there are certain goals which are invariant and independent of the shape of the environment. It is asserted that these goals are, within China, outside the realm of discussion, that they are, in anthropological terminology, sacred values. Dissent in respect to them would disqualify an individual from membership in "the people." These are Communist China's high strategic goals.

At a lower level, but still belonging to the sphere of strategy, are those goals which are formulated by a process of conscious decision. In terms of time, they apply to the middle- or long-run. They derive from an analysis of the shape

of the environment. The true form of this analysis is presented, but incompletely, in periodic statements. The goals are intended to remain valid for the duration of the world situation in consideration of which they are formulated. These goals are discussable, but are part of the official line, so that open dissent from them may constitute ideological deviation.

For any given period, strategic goals of the order just described, together with a pattern of methods selected primarily for the purpose of promoting the attainment of these goals, constitute a grand strategic design. It is observed that the Chinese Communist leadership apparently requires a high degree of consciousness and of self-guidance in terms of declared policy for satisfactory conduct of operations. The grand design at any given time is also part of the official line, and dissent may be treated as deviation.

Major changes in the grand design since 1949 have occurred twice--in 1951 and 1957--from hard to soft and back to hard. The controlling factor in such shifts has been the perception of the world distribution of power. The Chinese Communists view the distribution of power basically as bipolar. Depending on their analysis of the bipolar power balance, their grand design may identify only enemies outside the Communist bloc or may identify some non-Communist countries as potential temporary allies, but ultimately does not tolerate an independent third power factor.

Within a major period, the grand design is adjusted to exploit opportunities or accommodate setbacks provided by the

environment, resulting in varying identifications of enemies and potential allies and in new decisions, both strategic and tactical. A number of variables, including China's international status, the degree of international tension, and the local topography of power in the Asian area, affect these decisions. Further, the information available to the decision-maker is probably not uniform in quality and quantity, and his estimate of others is likely to be affected by his own ambivalence regarding them.

Within a major period there can be phases. Historically, some of these have derived from environmental developments permitting the elaboration of the pattern of operations in a consistent direction, incorporation of new patterns of operation and change of emphasis on patterns already being employed. In the present period, there has been a phase which, in terms of the major goals of Chinese policy, is here described as aberrant and which has apparently been revised. The current grand design seems to have been brought into a state of stability, but it may not entirely satisfy the demands of the Chinese.

Certain patterns of tactics seem to vary within the limits of or without being determined by the grand design. In some cases there is a tactical rhythm corresponding to events occurring within a single country. Other tactical operations are carried on for their own sake, apparently at a low level of priority. A pattern of operations may in one phase or period be strategically significant, in another only tactically significant. Tactical

operations are characteristically short-run and intended for limited effect. Mistakes made in conducting them are not ideological deviations.

The propositions advanced here do not necessarily constitute a method of analysis applicable in its entirety to any specific sequence of events. It is the author's hope that they indicate the shape of a frame of reference within which the questions appropriate to such analyses can be formulated. Some of the propositions may, hopefully, turn out to have predictive value, but not directly in relation to problems--which may be of considerable practical import--for whose understanding a much more refined analysis is necessary.

What has been advanced here is intended as a general schema for the determination of what it is the Chinese Communists are trying to achieve in their relations with the non-Communist world. Beyond this loom the questions of how likely they are to succeed, at what points their efforts impinge on the aspirations of others, and of what events within the range from conflict to conciliation are foreseeable or desirable as various patterns of international relations develop.

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DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION

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Prepared for delivery at the 1961 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Mo., Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, September 6-9, 1961

The evidences of a growing interest in comparative studies in political science and public administration are many and obvious. Bibliographies show that the literature of the subject is increasing at a rapid rate. Courses in comparative administration, mostly at the graduate level, are being offered at well over a dozen colleges and universities. Institutes and centers for teaching and research in public administration have been established in a score of countries. The Inter-University Case Program has an ambitious project for producing cases dealing with technical assistance problems and with administration in foreign governments. Through collaborative efforts with individual scholars and with institutes of public administration abroad, approximately fifty cases of this kind have been written or are in preparation, with more to be expected.

Beginning with the Conference on Comparative Administration held at Princeton in 1952 under sponsorship of the Public Administration Clearing House, a number of conferences and meetings have been devoted exclusively or partially to comparative administration. The American Political Science Association in 1953 set up an ad hoc committee on comparative administration. After this committee had been discontinued, the American Society for Public Administration established what is now known as the Society's "Comparative Administration Group." Members of this group, under the chairmanship earlier of Rowland Egger and now of Fred Riggs, have taken an active part in efforts to advance the theory and practice of comparative public administration.

I have mentioned only a few items in what could be a long catalogue of events in the development of comparative studies. Perhaps the best single indication that comparative administration has acquired status and has "arrived" is the attention which the subject is scheduled to receive at this annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, where all of the panels in the public administration group and one in the comparative politics category are on this theme. Another interpretation might be that the current state of affairs in comparative studies must be poor indeed to require such an unusual if not unprecedented program emphasis. There is some truth in each explanation.

Dwight Waldo, who planned and organized this series of panels and then perhaps wisely retreated to Italy for a year, intended this paper and panel discussion to serve as a background for those to follow. He described the plan for ordering the panels as one which had in view "the strategy of proceeding from history through methodology and on to substance." Our objective, then, is a rather modest one of indicating where we are now in comparative administration studies and giving some idea as to how we got here. The other papers prepared for this annual meeting should take us farther along the road. They have not been available to me in preparing these remarks. Probably a survey of the development and status of comparative studies made after these papers can be taken into account would be substantially different. At any rate, any reference which I may make to the contributions of my colleagues on these panels must be highly speculative and tentative.

We do not lack analyses of trends in comparative studies, even at this early stage. In fact, there is a growing collection of them. Siffin, Presthus, Tickner, Diamant, Weidner, Riggs, and I, among others, have surveyed the existing literature, traced out patterns of development, and speculated about the future.[1] We are almost ready for a paper on trends in papers on trends. However, I will not attempt this, but only express my thanks for the help I have received from these sources. I will refer specifically only to the report on trends in the comparative study of public administration by Fred W. Riggs, prepared for a panel in April of this year at the annual meeting of the American Society for Public Administration. He discerns three trends. The first is a trend from normative toward more empirical approaches. The second is a shift from what he chooses to call idiographic toward nomothetic approaches. Essentially this is a distinction between case studies and studies which seek explicitly to formulate and test general propositions. The third is a shift from a predominantly non-ecological to an ecological basis for comparative study. He

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[1] Siffin, William J., introductory essay in Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration, Department of Government, Indiana University, 1957; Presthus, Robert V., "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," P.A.R., XIX (1959); Tickner, F.J., "A Survey and Evaluation of Comparative Research," P.A.R., XIX (1959); Diamant, Alfred, "The Relevance of Comparative Politics to the Study of Comparative Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, V (June, 1960); Weidner, Edward W., The Search for Priorities in Comparative Public Administration, Mimeo, 1959; Riggs, Fred W., Trends in the Study of Public Administration, Mimeo, 1961; Heady, Ferrel, "Recent Literature on Comparative Public Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, V (June, 1960).

describes the first trend as fairly clear by now and the second and third as "perhaps only just emerging." I am in agreement with Riggs as to the relevance and importance of these trends, and have only minor reservations on matters of substance and terminology which need not be developed here.

Rather than present another closely related set of trends, I will organize my comments around what I will call "motivating concerns" in comparative studies in administration up to now. The motivations which have resulted in comparative administration studies are complex and intermingled. In spite of this, perhaps there is utility in trying to sort them out and to analyze the effects of motivational differences on past developments and future prospects.

Five such avenues for advancement in comparative studies will be identified: (1) the search for theory, (2) the urge for practical application of knowledge to the problems of developing countries, (3) the incidental contribution to comparative administration of advances in the study of comparative politics generally, (4) the recent interest of scholars trained in the continental administrative law tradition, and (5) the intensified analysis on a comparative basis of perennial problems of public administration.

I

Before doing this, perhaps we should consider briefly a rather troublesome question. It is: What do we mean by comparative administration? In view of the general history of efforts to explain the scope of "administration" and "public administration," I hesitate to open up this matter of definition, and will try not to become enmeshed in it. However, there are two points upon which I want to comment. One is that there is competition for use of the phrase "comparative administration." The book Comparative Studies in Administration, published in 1959 by the University of Pittsburgh Press, compares the process of administration in different types of institutional settings, such as government agencies, business corporations, hospitals, and universities. The introductory essay, by James D. Thompson and others, contains this comment: "For reasons which are more accidental than logical, 'comparative public administration' has been synonymous with cross-cultural or cross-national studies of administration, and comparative business administration has referred to business outside of the United States, or to the foreign operations of American firms. While the cultural dimension undoubtedly is essential to our understanding of administration..., the comparative study of administration cannot be

limited to cultural comparison alone."[2] While acknowleding the validity of this last comment, it should be made clear that it is the cross-cultural aspect of comparison which concerns us here.

Another suggestion goes in the opposite direction. In his paper on trends, Fred Riggs expressed as his personal opinion that the term "comparative" should be "restricted, strictly speaking, for empirical, nomothetic studies." I prefer not to try to work toward conformity in such a limitation as to what cross-national studies deserve the adjective "comparative." So, I suggest as suitable for our purposes language used in a draft statement on basic research and training in this field by the Comparative Administration Group of ASPA. Here comparative public administration is described as "the theory of public administration as applied to diverse cultures and national settings" and "the body of factual data, by which it can be expanded and tested." This is a statement of scope less comprehensive than that used by Thompson but more inclusive than that suggested by Riggs.

II

The most remarkable and persistent motivating concern in comparative administration has been the heavy accent on theory and methodology. Writers in this field have felt strongly impelled to develop models, frameworks for analysis, criteria of relevance, and the like. These attempts at theory building have varied widely as to comprehensiveness and scope. Attention has been called frequently to this variety. Presthus has distinguished between theorists attempting broad, cross-cultural, all-encompassing formulations and those advancing more modest and restricted "middle-range" theories. Diamant discerns "general system" models and "political culture" models.

From the voluminous contributions over a span of just a few years, no clear pattern of theory for comparative studies has emerged. About a year ago I suggested that major tendencies among the more comprehensive theory building efforts could be labelled as the "modified traditional," the "equilibrium or input-output" and the "bureaucratic orientation" alternatives. This may still be a defensible grouping, but the rate of production is rapid

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[2] Thompson, James D., ed., Comparative Studies in Administration, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959, p. 9.

and the papers on "models" prepared for this conference will call for a reconsideration even if it is not already overdue.

The vicissitudes of an endeavor to keep up-to-date can be illustrated by reference to the output of just one scholar in this field - Fred W. Riggs. Mere acquaintance with all of his writings on comparative theory is in itself not an insignificant accomplishment. Also, we find here formulations and reformulations of closely related concepts, reflecting sustained efforts at refinement and precision. To illustrate, in his essay contribution to the Indiana University volume Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration, Riggs introduced the terms Agraria and Industria as models of societies of the intensive agricultural type and of the modern industrial type. Transitional societies in the process of rapid movement from Agraria toward Industria show a greater rate of change than societies nearer the equilibrium models. It may be assumed that such societies "will not be in equilibrium, that not all their elements are functionally related to a high degree, that many 'disfunctions' will exist."[3] These terms have had widespread use, despite objections that they imply a one-way-street with the transition always being from the agrarian toward the industrial type. For instance, at the 1960 conference of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics at Dobbs Ferry,[4] the term "transitional" was criticized as implying "a social Darwinian model of political development" which "would suggest that change is inevitable, that it proceeds in clearly identifiable stages, that subsequent evolutionary stages are necessarily more complex than those that preceded them, and that later stages are 'better' than their antecedents." To avoid these pitfalls, the suggestion was made that it might be more logical to speak of "amalgamate" than of transitional societies.

In a later essay on Models in the Comparative Study of Public Administration,[5] Riggs proposed the systematic use of deductive models rather than inductive models or images for the comparative study of public administration. He proposed building a set of deductive models in terms of structural-functional analysis. A society having many functionally specific structures could be called a refracted model. One having a single functionally diffuse structure could be called a fused model. A model with characteristics

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3 Riggs, Fred W., "Agraria and Industria," in Siffin, William J., ed., Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration, Department of Government, Indiana University, p. 99.

4 Joseph LaPalombara, "The Comparative Roles of Groups in Political Systems," SSRC Items, 15 (June, 1961).

5 Mimeo, 1959.

intermediate between fused and refracted could be called prismatic. These models, he explained, "would be ideal types, not to be found in any actual society, but perhaps approximated in some, and useful for heuristic purposes and as an aid in the organization of data."[6] These are considered by Riggs to be strictly deductive models, whereas Agraria, Industria and Transitia are inductive models or "images." There is obviously a close correlation between the Agraria-Transitia-Industria set of models on the one hand and the Fused-Prismatic-Refracted set on the other. The student of general systems theory must keep the relationships straight, while remembering that the models in neither set fit real societies exactly.

Riggs is representative of theorists who have cast a wide net and have formulated comprehensive societal theories. Others have stressed the need for middle-range theory and have doubted whether the theory required need be of "cosmic dimension," to use Presthus' phrase. He advises that social scientists working in comparative administration "bite off smaller chunks of reality and... research these intensively." A good example of such limited theory formulation would be the efforts of a number of persons to work out a theory of bureaucracy in developing countries. Morroe Berger attempted this in his monograph Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt[7] and in his article "Bureaucracy East and West."[8] Presthus has examined social values of Middle Eastern societies and the difficulties these impose on the adaptation of western bureaucratic norms.[9] He contrasts "Weberian" and "Welfare" bureaucracy, and examines the disparities resulting from the claims based on welfare factors, reflecting "essential differences in time, motivation, economic incentive, and educational values between western and traditional society." Such endeavors in the adaptation of bureaucratic theory for comparative purposes should assist in a better understanding of the behavioral patterns in bureaucracies which have similar structural components.

Whereas theory construction concerning both Western and underdeveloped administrative systems is relatively advanced, we have made little progress in theory designed for an understanding of communist administrative systems and their impact on the underdeveloped areas. Although there exist a few worthwhile single

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6 Ibid., p. 22.

7 Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957.

8 Administrative Science Quarterly, I (March, 1957).

9 "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," Social Forces, 38 (December, 1959), and "Weberian v. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society," Administrative Science Quarterly, VI (June, 1961).

country studies of communist bloc systems,[10] much more needs to be done not only in terms of an analysis of administrative structure and behavior but in terms of comparing communist bureaucracies, developed and underdeveloped, with bureaucracies in the West and in non-communist underdeveloped areas.

Although some theoretical attention is paid to "totalitarian" societies and administrative systems by Riggs and Shils,[11] there is a tendency to look on the communist systems as being outside the legitimate concern of comparative administration. This is an unfortunate tendency. For both technical and political reasons it would seem advisable to study the impact of communist administrative patterns on transitional societies. Technically some benefit could accrue to both the underdeveloped societies and the West. It is politically advisable, of course, because one major reason for Western technical assistance to transitional areas is the threat of competition from Russian and Chinese sources.

III

Another urgent and understandable concern responsible for much of our available literature has been the practical application of knowledge to the problems of developing countries. The technical assistance programs of the U.S., the U.N., and the private foundations have not only been the means of attracting many individuals to comparative studies, but have directly or indirectly produced an array of their products. Some of these are basic materials on the administrative systems of individual countries, such as have come from institutes or centers established in the Philippines, Viet Nam, India, Israel, Iran and elsewhere. Others are recommendations from the outside expert as to lines for administrative development in a particular country. An outstanding example is Paul Appleby's survey on India.[12] The United Nations and the International Institute

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10 See, for example: Fainsod, Merle, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953, Ch. 12; Lindsay of Berker, Lord, "The Public Service in China," Public Administration /Sydney/, XIV (1955), and Tickner, F.J., "Public Administration in Yugoslavia," Indian Journal of Public Administration, V (1959).

11 See Riggs, Fred W., "Agraria and Industria," op. cit. and Shils, Edward, "Political Development in the New States," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II (April and July, 1960).

12 Public Administration in India, Report of a Survey, Delhi: The Manager of Publications, 1953.

of Administrative Sciences have issued reports containing general guidelines for use in many countries, usually based upon questionnaire responses on topics dealt with in the report.[13] As Riggs has pointed out, comparative studies of this type have a normative approach and are prescriptive in tone. They may sometimes be hurried responses to deeply felt needs, with resulting deficiencies, but they do represent efforts which have long range value as well as immediate utility.

One of the common conclusions from technical assistance efforts in economic development programs is that administrative practice may be a crucial factor. This has been a frequent finding in the country reports prepared by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Redevelopment. Fred Riggs has called attention to public administration as a neglected factor in economic development.[14] Hugh Keenleyside has stated that "of all the characteristics of national under-development, administrative inadequacy is the most prevalent, the most difficult to overcome, and the least likely to be recognized or if recognized, to be admitted, by the governmental authorities concerned."[15]

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13 See, for example: United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Government Accounting and Budget Execution, New York, United Nations, 1952; United Nations Secretariat, Technical Assistance Administration, Report on the Technical Assistance Conference on Comparative Fiscal Administration, New York, United Nations, 1951; United Nations, Technical Assistance Programme, Public Administration Aspects of Community Development Programmes, New York, United Nations Office for Public Administration, 1959; Kingdom, Thomas D., Improvement of Organization and Management in Public Administration: A Comparative Study, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1951; Burton, Ralph J. and Strait, Edward B., The Central Machinery of Government: Its Role and Functioning, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1951; and Stone, Donald C. and Associates, National Organization for the Conduct of Economic Development Programs, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1954.

14 "Public Administration: A Neglected Factor in Economic Development," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 305 (May, 1956).

15 "Administrative Problems of Technical Assistance Administration," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, August, 1952, p. 345.

Recently we have had a series of preliminary attempts to examine more carefully the administrative environment in developing countries with reference particularly to the kind of civil service best designed to meet their needs. These closely parallel the inquiries into bureaucratic theory in such settings which have already been referred to. Several commentators have stressed the contrast between the tasks of the bureaucracy in a colonial area before independence and in a developing country afterward, and they have tried to identify the role of the bureaucrat in the emergent welfare state. For instance, Ralph Braibanti, in his "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis,"[16] concludes that even a superior colonial civil service, with ample opportunity for exercising leadership in a new state, may be ill-suited for the task because its orientation was to a different system with different problems.

Edward W. Weidner and others have used the phrase "development administration" to designate this complex of problems. In a paper prepared for the ASPA regional meeting in Pittsburgh late in 1959, Weidner stressed "an urgent policy need to focus on how national development can be accelerated by administrative means."[17] His paper, prepared for this 1961 meeting, on approaches and models for research in development administration, is further evidence of the current emphasis on and future promise of this merger of theory and practice in comparative studies.[18]

IV

Up to this point I have dealt with contributions which primarily reflect the work of specialists in public administration. Any consideration of developments in comparative administration

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16 "The Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis," South Atlantic Quarterly, LVIII (1959).

17 Op. cit., p. 22.

18 In this effort, much help can be found in the work of economists and others primarily concerned with the process of economic development. The journal Economic Development and Cultural Change, published by the Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change at the University of Chicago, is one source for numerous articles of interest and relevance to comparative administration.

must take into account, however, what has been happening in the field of comparative politics generally. Alfred Diamant has provided an admirable survey in his 1960 article on "The Relevance of Comparative Politics to the Study of Comparative Administration." As he says, "students of comparative public administration can find in comparative politics a considerable body of substantive materials directly related to their own concerns, as well as increasingly sophisticated and self-conscious efforts at methodological clarification."[19] Within the last decade, and particularly since the publication of the Evanston Summer Seminar Report in 1953,[20] there has been a major reorientation in the study of comparative politics. This is of concern to us for two reasons. In the first place, there is a close parallelism with what has happened in comparative administration studies. There has been strong dissatisfaction with existing approaches. There has been a dominating search for a "conceptual framework" and a consequent burgeoning of proposed models and schemes of analysis. There has been a willingness and indeed eagerness to borrow and adapt concepts from sociology, economics, and related disciplines. There has been an urgent desire to focus attention on the developing or emerging nations. There has been an obvious gap between the need for field research and the amount of it actually being carried on.

In addition to these general features, it is evident that any conceptual scheme for the comparative study of political systems must include in some fashion in the scheme a way of comparing the administrative elements in these political systems.

Diamant finds two broad categories of available models. One he calls "general system" models, "which set up a conceptual scheme for something called a political system or a society to apply to one or several societies." The second he terms a "political culture" scheme which "starts from the proposition that societies and political systems are so diverse that one must first classify them before one can establish methods for comparison." Diamant feels that there is a much closer connection between theory and practice in the "political culture" than in the "general system" approach.

I will comment briefly on each of these approaches, relating my comments primarily to the volume edited by Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman on The Politics of the Developing Areas,[21] which

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19 Op. cit., p. 87.

20 "Research in Comparative Politics: Report of the Inter-University Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council," American Political Science Review, XLVII (1953).

21 Princeton University Press, 1960.

utilizes both approaches and which was not available to Diamant for extensive treatment in his essay.

The first objective of this book, as described in the Foreword, is "to construct a theoretical framework that makes possible, for the first time, a comparative method of analysis for political systems of all kinds."[22] Almond's introductory chapter endeavors to do this. It outlines a functional approach to comparative politics, which is the most impressive attempt we have at a "general system" scheme of analysis. The functional categories proposed are of two types: political or input functions; and authoritative governmental, or output, functions. The input functions are (1) political socialization and recruitment, (2) interest articulation, (3) interest aggregation, and (4) political communication. The output functions are (1) rule-making, (2) rule application, and (3) rule adjudication. The seven functions are performed "in all societies regardless of scale, degree of differentiation, and culture."[23] They are offered as a basis for comparing political systems, with particular relevance to modern Western political systems on the one hand and non-Western primitive or traditional ones on the other.

Without in the least questioning the utility of these categories, a glance at the list is sufficient to make clear that the innovation is in the political functions rather than the governmental. As Almond admits, "the three authoritative governmental functions... are the old functions of 'separation of powers,' except that an effort has been made to free them of their structural overtones,"[24] and he goes on to say this threefold classification "will not carry us very far in our efforts at precise comparison of the performance of political systems."[25] The stress in this analysis is on the political rather than the governmental functions, and this detracts considerably from its usefulness to those principally interested in the administrative aspects of comparative study.

Almond's preference for the functional approach leads him to deprecate comparative studies with a structural emphasis. Although he believes that political systems can be compared with one another structurally, Almond argues that this approach is of limited utility. "It is like comparative anatomy without a comparative physiology."[26] Structural analysis, he says, can be misleading,

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22 Ibid., p. v.

23 Ibid., p. 5.

24 Ibid., p. 17.

25 Ibid., p. 55.

26 Ibid., p. 13.

because it may ignore the functional difference between two like structures. Thus Almond would appear to be opposed to comparative efforts which focus on a single structure, such as bureaucracy. In the area of comparative administration he would rather ask such questions as: how is the rule application function performed in various societies; what structures are involved; and, how do these structures apply rules?

Almond's major objection to a structural approach does not vitiate its utility in the comparative study of public administration, however. To focus on the public bureaucracy, for example, is not automatically to ignore the probability that it performs other functions than rule application. Indeed, if all structures are multi-functional, as Almond hypothesizes, it may be just as valuable for the study of comparative government and administration to focus on a universally existing structure and to investigate the differing functions it performs as it is to focus on one function and identify the structures which perform it. Tracing a given function through a multitude of structures would appear to present greater problems of conceptualization and research than singling out one structure and analyzing the functions which it performs. Riggs, in his essay Comparative Bureaucracy: A Focus for the Study of Comparative Politics,[27] has focused on bureaucratic structure and has traced the different functions performed by various bureaucracies. This approach has also been taken by Eisenstadt.[28]

Almond and Coleman have also furnished a set of helpful groupings for differentiating among existing political systems on a "political culture" basis. Several years ago Almond outlined four political cultures to be found in the world today: (1) the Anglo-American; (2) the Continental European; (3) the preindustrial and partially industrial; and (4) the totalitarian.[29] In the concluding chapter of The Politics of the Developing Areas, Coleman suggests a more refined system for classification of political systems in underdeveloped areas, according to the criteria of degree of competitiveness (competitive, semi-competitive, and authoritarian)

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27 Prepared for the Subcommittee on Comparative Bureaucracy, Committee on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, September, 1958, Mimeo.

28 See Eisenstadt, S.N., "Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization, A Trend Report and Bibliography," Current Sociology, VII (1958), and "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization and Debureaucratization," Administrative Science Quarterly, IV (December, 1959).

29 "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics, 18 (1956).

and degree of political modernity (modern, mixed, and traditional). Such a classification assumes certain properties of a modern political system, characterized particularly by "a fairly clear differentiation between governmental and political spheres and by a relatively high degree of functional specificity of structure, both governmental and political."[30] The African-Asian countries are grouped into six types, and a "functional profile" is presented for each type. These are political democracy, tutelary democracy, terminal colonial democracy, modernizing oligarchy, colonial and racial oligarchy, and traditional oligarchy. These types are adapted from the essay by Edward Shils on Political Development in the New States,[31] which also suggests a half dozen "alternatives of development" in the emerging states. The tentative nature of such typing is underlined not only by the differences between the Coleman and Shils typologies, but also by the interesting fact that the tabular presentation in the Coleman chapter includes a seventh category of "conservative oligarchy" under which six countries are listed (Jordan, Iran, Cambodia, Laos, Liberia, and Libya). This type is not referred to in the text and apparently is surplus to the six-fold classification set forth there.

Nevertheless, such classificatory schemes do promise to be helpful both in general comparisons of political systems and in comparisons of administrative aspects such as the role of bureaucracies in different countries. The types appear to be derived from existing states, and the functional profiles are a source for hypotheses about what to expect and what not to expect in a particular country which has been tentatively assigned to one of the types.

V

Another development which may result in fresh and different contributions to comparative public administration is the growing interest in the subject on the part of European scholars in administrative law and the administrative sciences. The gap in approach, in understanding and in communication between American students of administration and their counterparts in Europe, particularly on the continent, has often been commented upon. It has been evident in many ways - in the debate over the term public administration versus administrative science or administrative sciences, for example, and in the discussions at international meetings

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30 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 559.

31 Op. cit.

sponsored by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and in the pages of the journal published by the Institute. In recent years there have been signs of an increasing mutuality of interest, however. Comparative studies of Western administrative systems by Poul Meyer,[32] Fritz Morstein Marx,[33] and Brian Chapman[34] have contributed greatly. So has the study prepared for UNESCO by Andre Molitor on university teaching of public administration.[35]

A recent noteworthy illustration of European interest in problems of comparative studies in administration is the article by Dr. Roman Schnur published in the West German Verwaltungs Archiv in January of this year.[36] Schnur reviews for the German reader the relevant literature, primarily American, and makes some evaluative comments. These cannot be examined fully here, but they deserve attention.

A minor item of interest in Schnur's analysis is that he traces the current emphasis in the United States on comparative public administration back to three factors. The first two of these are (a) the influence of German immigrants since about 1933 and (b) the translation of the writings of Max Weber (which is connected to the first point). The third factor he mentions is the final entrance of the United States into world politics after 1945.

Of more importance is Schnur's treatment of such questions as the meaning of the term "comparison" in the social sciences, and the meaning of the concept "public administration." He concludes that ultimately the goal of comparison is comprehensive theory, and that this goal is recognized in American literature in comparative public administration. He argues that public administration is concerned both with understanding and with prescription for action, and he suggests a division of the field into Administrative Theory and Administrative Politics. The former has as its subject the phenomena of administration approached fundamentally

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32 Administrative Organization: A Comparative Study of the Organization of Public Administration, London, 1957.

33 The Administrative State, Chicago, 1957.

34 The Profession of Government, London, 1959.

35 The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Public Administration, Paris, UNESCO, 1959.

36 "Uber Vergleichende Verwaltungswissenschaft," Verwaltungs Archiv, 52 (January, 1961).

unrestricted in its questions and answers. The latter is a dogmatic discipline with its distinguishing mark being the assumption of obligation for administration. He points out that it is precisely this property of being a non-dogmatic social science that makes it difficult in Europe, in contrast to the United States, to get a proper understanding of Administrative Theory. He characterizes those trained in continental administrative law as given to an exclusively dogmatic habit of thinking, and this is the basis for his concluding observation that German and almost all European public administration has fallen behind.

We can expect a difference in perspective as our European colleagues turn their attention more toward comparative studies. One result may be a redress in the balance away from emphasis on the emerging countries. Another may be a more skeptical attitude toward the wider ranging types of theoretical formulations.

VI

A final contributory source for advances in comparative studies which I shall mention is research from a comparative perspective in the traditional subject matters areas in the general field of public administration. These include such standard topics as administrative organization and management, personnel administration, fiscal administration, field administration, administration of public enterprises, regulatory administration, and administrative responsibility and control.

The parochial interest in these matters in the past among American students of public administration is well known. We have tended to be fascinated by our own experiences and the lessons learned from them, and only mildly concerned about how similar problems have been dealt with elsewhere. When we have looked for comparative data, we have turned mostly to the countries of Western Europe. Until recently, little attention was paid to historical experience in other cultures, or to current developments in the amalgamate countries where new patterns are emerging.

This situation is changing fast. A trend analysis of the literature in most of these areas would show more emphasis on comparative studies in both the developed and underdeveloped parts of the world.[37] Two of the papers at the conference fall into

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37 For citations to this literature, see Heady and Stokes, Comparative Public Administration: A Selective Annotated Bibliography (2nd Ed.), Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1960.

this category - the one by Fesler on areal organization of administration and the one by Morstein Marx on problems of control and responsibility. The cumulative effect of such efforts will not only be increased knowledge in the specialized fields but also an enrichment of the data upon which more generalized comparative studies may be based.

At present, there is a wide variation among these subjects as to what has already been accomplished. In some the progress is already impressive, in others promising beginnings have been made, and in still others almost everything is still waiting to be done. For example, much comparative work has been done on public enterprises and national economic planning. The ubiquity of government corporations, the stress on public enterprise in the welfare economies of the developing countries, the extensive technical assistance programs devoted to aiding these programs, and the interest of the economists in problems of economic development have all contributed to the relatively advanced position which has been reached.

Comparative studies of civil service systems have also appeared in some profusion. Prominent recent examples dealing with Europe and the West are The Profession of Government by Chapman and The Administrative State by Morstein Marx. Non-Western personnel systems have also been the subject of technical assistance studies. Reference has already been made to investigations completed or in process of bureaucratic performance in transitional countries, and to the promise of a bureaucratic orientation for comparative purposes generally. In fiscal administration, the country economic surveys by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the tax system studies of the international program in taxation at Harvard have been valuable, as have several publications of the United Nations. In his article on "Prismatic Society and Financial Administration," Fred Riggs has formulated a general theory of fiscal administration for transitional countries which should be a stimulus to field research.[38] Although there are numerous surveys of administrative organization in individual underdeveloped countries, there is no study dealing with non-Western administrative systems comparatively.

One area which has been neglected, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, is regulatory administration. Administrative law of the continental variety and of the Anglo-Saxon type has produced an enormous literature in the Western countries using one or the other system. Almost nothing has been done, however, to study the regulatory process in underdeveloped areas. Scattered studies in Latin America and on rare occasions elsewhere are all

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38 Administrative Science Quarterly, V (June, 1960).

we have available. In view of the critical nature of regulatory programs in transitional countries, and the intriguing mixed regulatory systems which have developed in some of them (such as Israel, the Philippines, Turkey, and Mexico), this is research which deserves to be done. Similarly, we are badly in need of more attention to issues of administrative control and responsibility in emerging countries, particularly those that can be labeled as tutelary democracies. Our concepts on these issues are almost exclusively the product of experience in a few Western democratic systems.

VII

In conclusion, let me list in a summary fashion some suggestions as to lines of emphasis, and priorities among them, based upon this review of the past development of comparative studies in administration. These suggestions do not reflect a belief that there is any one "best way" to advance in comparative studies. On the contrary, experimentation and diversity are assumed to be highly desirable rather than otherwise. The items are listed roughly in order of importance.

1. We urgently need to step up the amount of field research which is being carried on. This will call for a much greater allocation of resources in manpower and money than in the past. As much reliance as possible should be placed on country and regional centers for public administration research in the emerging areas.

2. A systematic and extended effort should be made to explore alternative approaches to comparative studies and to advance the theory of comparative administration. The Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration has drawn up a program for basic research and training which will attack this problem if the necessary support can be found.

3. We should take advantage of opportunities to coordinate our research interests with those of our colleagues in comparative politics and other related fields. For example, comparative research on bureaucracies ties in closely with the comparative study of interest groups[39] and the comparative study of elites.[40]

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[39] See "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," American Political Science Review, 52 (1958).

[40] See Lasswell, Lerner, and Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952.

Jointly planned field research projects could be of mutual benefit. The Dobbs Ferry conference report recognizes this by stressing the importance of studying relations between interest groups and the bureaucracy, particularly in societies whree the policy-making role of bureaucracy has increased in recent years.

4. A continuing and broadened emphasis should be given to evaluation of the impact of technical assistance programs on the social, economic, and political behavior of developing countries, not only as a corrective for future technical assistance programs but for the comparative study of administration as well. Case studies are excellent vehicles for this purpose.

5. Relatively more attention should continue to be given to the administrative systems of the emerging nations. In addition, a start should be made toward filling the gaps in our knowledge of administration in the Communist-bloc countries.

6. Comparative studies of segments of administration should be encouraged. Even though such research does not pretend to provide direct comprehensive comparisons of whole systems of administration, it does indirectly assist such broader analysis while contributing to knowledge of the specialized field.

7. Teaching materials for courses in comparative administration are inadequate and hard to make available for student use. An introductory textbook treatment of the subject, or even a book of readings, would help to increase the number and improve the content of such courses.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND AMERICAN AID

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The goal of American foreign policy toward underdeveloped countries has been and still appears to be that of securing conditions within these countries which will induce them to remain in our political camp or, at a minimum, not join the communist camp. The conditions have been defined as those of political stability, economic health, and military security sufficient to withstand the appeal Communism holds for the hungry and to resist the threat of its incursion through external aggression. These conditions can be viewed alternatively as intermediate goals and as means toward the attainment of the ultimate goal of military-political security and economic welfare of the United States. Similarly, economic development can be viewed as a means toward the creation of conditions of political stability and economic health and the build-up of military forces as a deterrence to military aggression. And alternatively, they can be viewed as intermediate instrumental goals in the hierarchy of goals. Within this framework, economic aid becomes the means toward the achievement of economic development and military aid the means toward the build-up of military security. And specific programs and projects may in turn be viewed as intermediary means.

As these are set out in broad terms, it is apparent that those charged with making the linkages between the elements in this hierarchy of objectives can be faced with dilemmas of choice at any level. Intermediate goals may be conflicting rather than complementary, so that one can only be obtained at the sacrifice of the other. And some solution must be found to the problem of which is most likely to maximize the possibilities of attaining the ultimate overriding goal. Equally important goals may compete for allocation of limited means. When further specified in concrete terms at any level, alternatives increase and dilemmas of choice multiply.

It has become dramatically apparent in recent years that the outcomes American foreign aid was designed to help effect are further than ever from realization. And it is the contention of the authors, among many others, that this can be attributed in part to the failure of those who formulate and implement American policy to make decisions and take action consistent with the goals of that policy. When faced with the dilemmas of choice between alternative intermediate goals, alternative means, alternative instrumentalities through which and through whom to work, and alternative strategies, they have too often not resolved these dilemmas in favor of the alternatives likely to yield optimal results in terms of the chief objective. When the choice has been between progress toward a long-range

goal or immediate satisfaction of a short-run objective, they have too often given priority to the latter. And short-run gains have resulted in long-run losses when action taken to gain short-run objectives have obscured the long-range target and deflected energies away from it.

We have said that the gap between the aspirations of American policy toward the achievement of specified conditions in underdeveloped countries and the actual consequences can be only in part attributed to the decisions and actions of those who make and execute American policy. For we do not wish to fall into the fallacy, too often employed by those who cite the "failures" of foreign aid, of assuming that this country's actions are the major determinant of the direction of history elsewhere. It must not be forgotten that when we speak of the goals of foreign aid as outcomes, these are outcomes which we hope or expect to occur in other countries.

Intervening between the outcomes desired by us and their actual attainment are not only the measures taken by our policy-makers but to a far greater degree the decisions made and the actions taken by their counterparts in these countries. These counterparts, whether as individuals, groups, or institutions, serve as the instrumentalities through which part of the design and much of the flow of foreign aid must take place. Our measure of control over the decisions and actions of these counterparts is limited; and these may bear little relation to what may be needed to obtain the responses and consequences we aim at in these countries. This is one of the major operational risks of a policy designed in one country to produce results in another.

While those who originally framed our foreign aid program did not optimistically expect that loans, grants, technicians and advisors injected at one end of a funnel would rapidly produce visible economic development and political stability at the other end, they did anticipate that aid would have some catalytic effect. This expectation was based upon certain assumptions concerning relationships between policy-makers and populations, decisions, actions and responses in the recipient countries. And the logical model, briefly outlined above, was framed.

Subsequent developments, as we shall indicate, have demonstrated how wide of the mark some of these assumptions were. For policy-makers in other countries have not necessarily shared the goals, endeavored to select means, or employed the strategies which might have helped to put such a model into effect. Within the realities of their political contexts, they have evolved their own sets of goal hierarchies. And even where their allocation preferences, when faced with dilemmas of choice, bore some congruence with ours, they were often not in a position to make the requisite decisions and/or take the requisite actions.

The problem then becomes one of how to minimize the operational risks of a policy which ultimately depends for its effectiveness on the coices made by others as well as those made by us. Can we formulate the outlines of a pragmatic policy in which the decisions taken by others under certain

given conditions have some predictability and can thus be used as the basis for further decisions on our part?

We suggest that a first step is the examination of the political realities and economic necessities that have confronted policy-makers in these countries and the ways in which they have faced them. How have our policy-makers viewed these realities and aided them in surmounting problems? Have the approaches of either or both been realistic? What is a realistic approach in terms of our ultimate goals? What types of policy-makers seem to serve these goals best?

Political Realities and the Dilemmas of Choice

The failure to recognize that economic development and the growth of democratic political institutions are both closely associated with a total process of modernization, necessitating innovations in basic values and behavior patterns, resulted in a rather naive and widespread expectation that external assistance could be the major catalytic agent in the mobilization of resources, capital, and human energies in the newly-independent countries. Underlying this expectation were implicit assumptions whose weaknesses have only gradually become evident. These were in the nature of stereotypes concerning the leadership of new nations, the bulk of their populations and the relationship between them.

Because leaders had exhibited a unity of outlook and of goals in their nationalist struggle for political independence, it was anticipated that they would continue to share a similar unity of outlook on the more specific goals of maximization and distribution of the benefits of national independence and on the means to implement them. Since these nationalist elites had aroused their followers to political activity with the slogans of modernization and economic uplift and continued to support these goals on the level of rhetoric, they were assumed to be as strongly motivated toward their achievement on the levels of decision and action.

The bulk of the population was seen as sunk in poverty, illiteracy and provincialism, but as almost uniformly desirous of lifting itself beyond them once shown the way and given the means to do so. And the leadership was viewed as being able to exert the same charismatic influence upon its followers in stimulating behavior appropriate to change as had served to arouse them to political action for national independence. In short, a certain stable relationship was inferred as existing between the power-holders on the national governmental level and the people, such that aid given through the former to the latter would have a positive impact upon them. Here is visible an ethnocentric conception of social relation. The history of western nationalist movements and, even more strongly the history of economic aid under the Marshall plan, seemed to confirm this interpretation so strongly that its power became almost that of a stereotype.

But in reality, the conditions of ferment that had their inception in the nationalist movements for independence from colonial rule were only temporarily stilled by the attainment of political independence. When the satisfaction and euphoria at the achievement of this goal evaporated, signs of restlessness began to reemerge, manifesting dissatisfaction and protest analogous to those preceding the height of nationalist agitation in the later colonial period. In short, the post-independence period of most South and Southeast Asian countries is also one of latent or chronic revolutionary ferment.

What has changed in the main between the pre- and post-independence periods are the goals, the protagonists, their alignments, and their patterns of relationships. In the late colonial period, political independence served as the single dominant goal to unify many diverse groups. Now the goal can be generally defined as that of obtaining the benefits held out by nationalist leaders as the inevitable outcome of successful anti-colonialism.

But for different groups these benefits may take different forms in concrete or symbolic terms. It is far easier to obtain agreement over more general abstract principles on the level of rhetoric than it is with respect to decisions and actions. This undoubtedly explains also why the objectives pictured by Asian leaders are couched in such vague and general terms. Nevertheless, the peasant sees the abstraction as more land or higher income from market crops and the tenant-farmer as land for himself; workers and artisans look for higher wages or more purchasing power from their wages; petty entrepreneurs look for loans and subsidies and protection from foreign competition. Whether in the form of concrete items of consumption, more educational opportunities, increased status, or simply egalitarian treatment by those above them, those who were awakened to join the struggle for independence by slogans of democratic equality and economic opportunity increasingly demand the benefits held out to them. And those who were not awakened then have since joined their ranks as a result of the activities of political parties that have begun to penetrate even the remote villages.

In the independence struggle of the late colonial period, the main protagonists were divided into two camps, the nationalist leaders and their followers and the non-indigenous ruling group. The former, might be viewed as a unit making in effect a single demand upon the latter. At the present time, one might view them as consisting of several unities ranged along a vertical axis and many more on horizontal levels intersecting the vertical axis.

At the top of the vertical axis are those who comprise the dominant central or national ruling elite. Below them are the intermediary leaders or intervening elites. These may be regional leaders or leaders of specific ethnic groups or sub-cultures of the population. At the bottom of the pyramid is the bulk of the population which, for some countries, may in turn be divided into urban and semi-urban elements, on the one hand, and rural elements on the other. Along the horizontal axis is a plurality of groups with particularistic goals and orientations depending upon religious, ethnic, linguistic and occupational lines.

Depending upon the criteria employed and the particular social structure of any given country, a range of possible alignments and realignments among these groups is discernible. Over the past decade, they have been formed and reformed mainly in terms of a struggle for power and position among members of the national elite and increasingly also among members of the intermediate elites seeking entry into the national elites. Although many of these conflicts may have been motivated by personal political ambitions, by the desire to obtain or retain roles on the national scene with their accompanying emoluments, they were publicly waged in the name of benefits for the people at large or for some specific group of the population. Since the newly-independent governments initially assumed democratic forms and established, on the formal level at least, institutions such as parliaments, political parties, and elections, these provided public outlets for this articulation.

As a result, the traditionally passive elements of the population have begun to make themselves felt in the political arena. It is true that the establishment of nominally democratic government among peoples with little experience in expressing preferences, making political choices and exercising initiative did not lead to notable success in that the democratic forms of political action did not achieve substance. Nevertheless, these forms of political organization coming after the mobilization of people in mass actions against the colonial elite, have had the effect of loosening the norms of authoritarian rule in many developing nations.

Historically, the meaningful units for an analysis of the political process in these countries were two: the government or rulers and the people or the ruled. Governments were traditionally quasi-feudal or colonial bureacracies with authority and commands flowing down from the top and obedience expected and obtained from below. This has become less true with the change from non-indigenous rulers to those of national origin. No longer can those on the upper levels hold the easy expectation that the flow of authority downward will encounter a flow of acquiescence (or at most passive resistance) upward. The exercise of authority has been partially modified by the need to attain consensus. The flow has become to some extent reciprocal as leaders on each level must increasingly seek to pacify politically aware followers in order to retain a following that will continue to support them and their expressed goals.

What apparently resulted from the early years of independence was the development and articulation of a profusion of particularistic goals, reflecting the orientations of the pluralistic societies of these countries. They tend increasingly to be expressed in the form of specific demands, and to exhibit incongruity and contradiction. This has been accompanied by the broader diffusion of political roles and power as the ranks of the national elites were augmented from below. At the same time, the institutional structures were insufficiently developed to reconcile these claims fully and transform them into policy and performance.

Not only what nationalist leaders had sought from colonial rulers but often even more than they had demanded was now being asked of them in diluted and diverse forms by those under their political rule; from the intermediary leaders themselves, from the populace acting indirectly through intermediary leaders, or directly from the populace itself. And the weapons they have taught the latter to use can be used against them. Like the colonial rulers whom they supplanted, they sit on a potentially seething cauldron. For revolution, already a historical fact and thus recognized as an alternative to frustration, becomes a future possibility.

Seen in long-range perspective, the national power elite in such a situation has several alternatives open to it, each with its advantages, disadvantages and probable consequences. One is to inhibit the development of these pressures from below and to close off or repress the outlets for their expression and further dissemination. This is especially attractive to tradition-based elites intent on preserving, insofar as possible, traditionalistic structures. This has the advantage of preserving their power positions. But the cost of maintaining repressive mechanisms increases as the difficulties of insulating the populations from modernizing pressures increase. And the increasing costs are frequently met by diminishing the returns that have heretofore been expected by the population. Ultimately, when repressive measures go too far and frustration is strongly felt at some point in the society, an explosive situation leading to overt revolution results.

A second alternative is to permit or encourage minimal transformations by satisfying the most strongly felt and expressed demands. This has the advantage of draining off some of the potential revolutionary threat, but it only delays the inevitable outcome. It is a choice frequently made by what a compromising elite who sustains its power position by giving in at points of maximum pressure. Yet in long-range terms these elites are in a position analogous to that of former welfare colonial rulers and ultimately face a replication of the situations faced by the latter. For even the minimal modernization they permit in such a field as education, for example, produces potential rival leaders who will view them as a stumbling block to the promotion of the kind of modernization and change the training and new orientations of these newcomers leads them to believe necessary.

A third alternative is to attempt to satisfy the rising and ever widening circles of wants. But here again, as in the preceding alternative outlined, satisfactions are likely to result in further increasing pressures upon the center. As articulated wants press in accelerated fashion upon the limited resources of developing countries, satisfactions cannot continue to be provided simply by dividing the existing pie even on the most equitable basis. What is required is to increase the size of the pie as rapidly--or almost as rapidly--as wants grow. The only long-range defense compatible with accelerating demands lies in stimulating the sorts of structural modifications conducive to increasing supplies on a similarly accelerated basis. The elite which recognizes this necessity and directs its efforts toward plans, programs, and measures of implementation in conformity with it, i.e. a genuinely modernizing elite, stands the best chance of maintaining its leadership and promoting stability.

We have outlined here an abbreviated model of a process occurring over time in the Asian countries which may be applicable with slight variations to describe other new nations. Before illustrating the types of decisions actually taken by leaders facing the dilemmas inherent in this process, however, it might be well to make a few further distinctions. One is that between goals on the leadership level and goals on lower levels of the vertical axis. Another is that between the components of follower demand in terms of their implications for revolutionary activity.

We have already implied that national leadership faces a dilemma between the goals it sets for the country at large, which are long-range goals, and those of the followers which are essentially short-run and hence felt in concrete and immediate terms. The need to attain the intermediate goals necessitates the maintenance of a high degree of centralized power. Yet to prevent the goals of the masses from becoming means by which intermediary leaders can seek to unseat the central elites, these are forced to diffuse power. Again we have assumed here that the goals of elites for the maintenance of power and those of sub-elites for the attainment of power represent means toward the achievement of national or sub-group ends. But we can also distinguish this from the desire for power maintenance or acquisition simply for the economic, social, status and prestige perquisites to which it gives access.

What we have called, in the general sense, demand can be further classified typologically, and with reference to intensity, into expectation and aspiration. (Here we reverse the terminology and referents of Wolf, pp. 305-308). Expectations are a manifestation of the prevailing norms set by the immediate social and cultural environment. Whether defined in economic or social terms, the basis of its formation is that which is considered rightfully owing to one. The source of the sense of rightness may be what one's ancestors have enjoyed, or what one has had in the past, i.e., what is due by tradition or standing in relation to others. Aspiration, on the other hand, may be defined as that which one would like to have, a hope of future gain, an expectation projected into the future.

Whereas unrealized aspirations, result in a feeling of disappointment, unrealized expectations result in a sense of deprivation. The first may be tolerable; the second is intolerable. The deprived individual feels impelled to remedy the material and psychic frustrations brought about by the unrealized expectation by whatever means open to him. Whereas disappointment may breed the seeds of incipient revolution, deprivation serves as catalyst for revolutionary action.

The point of this distinction is to lay stress on the fact that the leaders of the new nations could not satisfy in many cases the immediate expectations of their populations, much less their aspirations for the future. In countries such as Burma, Vietnam, and Indonesia, wartime occupation and subsequent military activities in the independence struggles disrupted and destroyed a part of the prewar productive apparatus and installations. Reconstruction needs absorbed much of the available capital resources and foreign aid contributions. Additional problems of absorbing refugees, as in India, Pakistan, South Korea and South Vietnam made further demands upon limited resources. At the same time, the replacement on many levels of the bureaucracy of skilled or relatively skilled administrators by unskilled ones, especially where political reliability, party and faction loyalty were the criteria of appointment, meant that pre-independence norms of governmental performance became even more difficult to restore.

In the absence of coercive measures, incompatible with the newly achieved "democracy", to force further sacrifices for development upon populations whose aspirations were aroused but whose normal expectations could only with difficulty be satisfied, leaders were indeed on the horns of a dilemma. India was in the position of having unexpended sterling balances from her use as an Allied base in World War II which mitigated the problem somewhat. Other countries succeeded in staving off serious trouble for a few years as a result of windfalls from the Korean War. But as aspirations were internalized and became turned into expectations that could not be realized, except for the few, national leaders resorted to one or another or a combination of three strategies to maintain their power and retain the confidence of their followers.

The first might be termed the <u>scapegoat</u> strategy. Failures were attributed to external circumstances and/or projected upon external agents. The external circumstances might have been the need to protect the country against an outside threat, as in Korea or Vietnam, or to incorporate as yet unincorporated parts of the new national domain, as Kashmir for India and Pakistan and Irian for Indonesia. The external agent may have been the ex-colonial power, as the Netherlands in the case of Indonesia, or the British, with their insistence upon the maintenance of a base in Ceylon. We do not wish to imply that there may not have been some basis of reality in these explanations. Insofar as they provided the rationale for the allocation of resources to the defense sector, resources for consumption and investment in normal development projects were lessened. They served as scapegoat mechanisms, however, by repeatedly focusing public attention on a particular sore spot to which, by implication, all current ills were attributed. Thus they

deflected frustration away from the immediate economic ills, the maladministration and corruption within the bureacracy, the growing disparity between the groups favored by special privileges through access to government officials able to provide them and those on whom special privileges of others placed greater burdens.

This strategy had the double advantage of building upon an already existing nationalism which was easy to whip up to greater heights while providing an almost invulnerable defense for the national elite. Its symbolic content was such that other potential leaders dared disagree only at the risk of being accused of harboring unpatriotic, pro-colonial, and pro-enemy sentiments. It therefore served as a unifying element for diversely oriented and potentially conflicting intermediary leaders and as influence coordinating certain voiced demands, and support of the masses.

Another advantage was that a number of secondary effects were associated with this policy. Criticisms that resources were not being allocated to meet consumer needs could be defended on the grounds that maximum resource allocation was needed toward an objective of foreign policy designed to preserve or enhance national prestige. The objective need not even be seen as being near attainment. For the subsequent argument could be advanced that the task was now so difficult that more sacrifices were necessary. In Indonesia, for example, Sukarno's political opponents were wont to remark privately: "Prices have gone up again. It's about time for Bung Karno to give another speech about Irian." But they could not afford such statements in public.

The second strategy might be termed satisfaction of expectations on the symbolic level. This is in effect the rechanneling of what are fundamentally economic frustrations into seemingly meaningful, goal-directed, zeal-inspiring, energy-absorbing activities. The encouragement of the formation of associations, clubs and groups, such as unions, cooperatives, cultural organization, etc. was an example of this. Movements for the exclusive use of one language on the national level or in education, could be seen as serving this function. In actuality, such organizations only realized in a very limited sense the objectives they were set up to promote or reflected the actual needs of their members. Nevertheless, they gave the latter a sense of participation and achievement, without commensurate power, and an expectation of future gain. In one sense, this was the internal equivalent of the first strategy, for it set up attainment of rather artificial goals as a prerequisite to the dispersal of economic gains.

This strategy may have disadvantages, however, for the central elite. The encouragement of particularistic movements can lead to their being used as a vehicle of greater mobility and power by the leaders of these movements and groups. Many of the leaders of these special institutions were enabled to strive through them for a role on the national stage. And since the demands presented by them are frequently incompatible, some can only be satisfied by frustrating others, giving the leaders of the latter ammunition

to attack the national elite or putting them in a position to demand entry into it as a price for keeping their followers in line. What may have begun, therefore, as a national elite with fairly homogenous outlook and goals, becomes augmented by conflicting and competing sub-elite members with whom some compromises must be reached.

Both these strategies are essentially drain-off processes with only short-run possibilities of success. There comes a point at which the rate of support diminishes in comparison to the growth and consolidation of opposition. Some groups reach the point of refusing to accept the reasons given for the frustration of their long-delayed expectations and take action. Thus external dangers and the internal violence in South Vietnam did not prevent the attempted coup against the center in 1960. Rather, accusations that these dangers were not being effectively coped with were offered by the opposition in defense of the launching of the coup. The major campaign by the largely Javanese central Indonesian elite against the Dutch on behalf of the Irian objective did not deflect or prevent the already-developing insurrections of the economically-deprived outlying provinces.

An easier situation in terms of maintenance of power for the central elite exists when some economic progress does take place and economic and social gains do accrue to the population at large. Here there tends to be more solidarity on the vertical level between the national elite and the leaders of the next rank. The latter both participate in the benefits and disseminate them. And they in turn solidify their leadership positions among their followers by sharing the credit for the benefits obtained. This is best illustrated in India where sub-national Congress leaders have long derived power from and returned support to the central leadership.

However, while relatively successful in the short run, this too has its long-range drawbacks. For with increasing gains come increasing expectations. What once were aspirations become firm and specific expectations as the rise of education, literacy and income levels and the growth of urbanization extend the awareness of alternative possibilities not originally envisaged. Even limited mobility shatters traditional views of the necessary state of things as they are and breeds impulses to further gains and further mobility.

Thus, even when there is a level of overall progress, the benefits do not flow evenly to all the groups and all the particularist sectors whose members believe that they have some claim upon the new gains in wealth and power. The struggle to maintain the rate of growth is constantly disturbed by a struggle for the distribution of the spoils, as different leaders are forced by the pressures of their followers to contend on their behalf for larger respective slices of the pie. If the central elite is pushed into the position of making concessions at points of maximum pressure,

regardless of the rationality of demands, its ability to sustain growth is minimized. If these pressures result in intra-elite struggles at the center, this frequently leads to administrative paralysis and to further frustrations on levels below it.

The center can retain its power, despite such tensions, through the charismatic influence of a dominant leader, such as Nehru in India, or U Nu in Burma. Or it can be forced into an alliance with the major instrument of coercion, the military, as has happened in Indonesia and Burma, when dissatisfactions portend or produce outright rebellion. Or the military elite takes control temporarily, or at least ostensibly for an interregnum, in order to restore failing central direction, as occurred in Pakistan and Burma.

It must also be pointed out that the political tensions that inhibit the development of political stability and the opportunities for economic growth in underdeveloped countries come not only from the revolutionary or quasi-revolutionary movements on the left, but from traditionalistic or nativistic or near-totalitarian movements on the right. These often rely upon the support of the more traditional leaders, many of whom may have close personal relations with the modernizing elites who thus find it difficult to dispel their influence.

Depending upon the type of assistance provided, the direction in which it flows, and the groups which most clearly benefit from it, American assistance can and has served in many instances to exascerbate these political tensions rather than allay them. Most obvious examples are the cases in which funds, supplies and equipment have been diverted at the recipient end into private channels for private gain. This helps to accentuate the differences in levels of living between the members of urban elites who profit from their official positions or access to officialdom and the growing urban proletariats whose leaders are not unaware of the sources of sudden wealth on the part of corrupt leaders. Resistance on the recipient level to audit of counterpart funds, as in South Vietnam, may be based on more than the administrative difficulties involved. Counterpart financing through the sales of imported commodities, while of benefit to many consumers, can threaten local consumer industries, causing resentment both among local entrepreneurs and among newly unemployed if they are forced out of business.

A less obvious example is provided by the unanticipated side-effects of American-conceived and-sponsored training programs designed to provide better and more knowledgeable administrators for the bureacracies of these countries. These trainees return to their countries sparked by the desire to putinto effect their new notions of rational organization and their new techniques. They expect to be assigned more demanding, responsible

positions for which this training has equipped them. What frequently happens, however, is that they become a threat to their seniors in the bureaucracy, who either look with suspicion on their desires to innovate or see them as rivals. In self-defense, they shunt them off to positions and areas of minimum effectiveness. This in turn creates disillusionment and resentment among these officials and they too form a potentially revolutionary element.

We have outlined above just a few of the political variables that intervene between our goals and their possibility of realization. Also to be considered are the dilemmas of choice affecting the pattern and rate of economic development.

Economic Development Programming and the Dilemmas of Choice.

Like many of the political dilemmas which we have discussed in the preceding sections, those which confront decision makers in the economic realm for a long time have not been understood. There have been two naive interpretations representing ideologically extreme positions. On the one hand, there was the theory that imitation of the technological, organizational, and possibly value patterns of western societies would lead to the same result as in the western world. If only well functioning markets, free enterprise, motivation for private profit and a liberal nineteenth century style government could be instituted, capital formation, investment, and hence economic growth would automatically ensue. This position was held not only by the protagonists of free enterprise in the developed countries but was shared also by a small number of persons in Asia and other developing regions.

The opposite position was that of the planners. They looked toward the Soviet Union as the model which had achieved a surprising rate of economic growth. The socio-political details of the reality in the USSR were overlooked, perhaps a bit too comfortably, and primary attention was paid to planning. The drawing up of an internally consistent plan was regarded as the major prerequisite for rapid growth. The private sector was accused of having failed, of having misallocated resources, and of having put investment in useless or socially even detrimental structures -- such as luxury housing or night clubs for the rich, and the argument was advanced that a rigorous plan was the main instrumentality and, in fact, the only effective instrumentality through which economic advancement could be insured. This feeling was especially strong in some countries, such as India, and Indian economic intelligence missions were sent to Communist China in order to investigate the techniques and results of economic planning in a developing country exhibiting a level of economic performance roughly commensurate with that of India. The delegations returned and wrote accounts of their visit. In glowing terms the success of Chinese planning was described, and the reports ended in the almost unanimous recommendation that India's salvation lay in adopting similarly comprehensive plans to those of China. This bias in favor of planning led to some ludicrous interpretations. For example, in one case Chinese planning was considered responsible for the higher per acre yields in Chinese rice culture as compared with Indian rice culture. It was overlooked that even in the 1920's -- long before a communist movement of any note existed in China -- the differential between Chinese and Indian yields in certain agricultural products was of approximately the same magnitude as that found by the visiting delegation.

This dichotomy between reliance upon free enterprise and upon planning as the major economic instrumentality leading to rapid economic growth sets up the first dilemma. For in many developing countries certain entrepreneurs have proven themselves to be hardy, inventive, stubborn, and successful in pushing their industries forward, and others have been unresponsive, inclined to abuse monopoly power and dependent upon special privilege or subsidies. Similarly, we find instances in which rational planning has led to generally favorable results and others in which it has failed miserably and resulted in what may be termed a waste of resources which a poor developing country can ill afford.

One solution out of this dilemma was the stipulation of a mixed economy. Certain sectors of the economy were considered to be of such strategic importance as to be fit only for governmental control, and hence for full-scale planning. Other sectors could be left in private hands. But the boundaries between controlled and uncontrolled areas of economic activity have been fluid and changing, and any comprehensive rational "theory of mixed economies" has hardly been elaborated. Governments, therefore, proceed in semi-darkness, are torn between interventionism and a hands-off policy, and alter the scope and pattern of their programming not only from plan to plan, but even in mid-stream.

It has been one of the weaknesses of American aid programs that the United States also had no "theory" to offer. Ideologically the United States has favored free enterprise, but without the ability to show that this would really be the best policy for developing countries with little developed resources, widespread mass poverty, and political impotence of a large sector of the population. The American approach also has not always been pragmatic, there has been a vaccillation between support of certain plans and opposition to others and our performance has done much to add to the confusion created by the dilemma called forth by uncertainties about the proper degree of interventionism.

But this dilemma was relatively mild as compared with two others which confronted the economic decision-makers in developing countries and which are ultimately attributable to the conflicting demands made by short-run and long-run objectives. Here, as in the political field, the inadequacy of resources to meet short-run objectives reasonably fully without doing irreparable damage to the possibility of achieving long-run ends, has been at the source of the dilemma. In simple and non-technical terms the two dilemmas called forth by this situation can be designated as the consumption-versus-investment dilemma and the growth-versus-employment dilemma. They are closely related and it is difficult in actual policy-making to keep them strictly apart. This should be borne in mind even if in an abstract discussion they are being treated independently of one another.

The first conflict is provoked because of the different expectations of a development program by the elite and the popular masses. The former look at development as contributing to the overall aims of national aggrandizement and independence, to the strengthening of the military posture of the nation and to the inauguration of a period of economic self-sufficiency and higher production. It is true that welfare considerations, i.e., a raising of living standards of the masses also is desired. But this objective is much less important than the others, although the leaders of the elite for quite understandable reasons especially emphasize the objective of rising living standards in their public statements. Basically -- and this explains perhaps the predilection some economic leaders in developing countries have for Soviet style planning -- the overriding objectives of development programs consist in the build up of capital goods at the expense of any rapid expansion of consumption levels in the short-run. The objectives of the popular masses are the opposite. They have lived for a long time in conditions of misery and deprivation. They remember the promises of their leaders that independence would bring greater economic benefits and they want some new consumption goods which would make their lives more pleasant and more agreeable. As we have shown, there are second-level elites and leaders of various particularistic organizations who represent these demands on the political arena and who can often muster enough popular support to press these demands strongly with the central elite. Hence some responsiveness to these demands must be shown, and the great problem becomes to determine the extent to which well-thought-out investment programs shall be modified in order to meet the most urgent of these demands.

Much of the incessant debate on support of agricultural output versus support of rapid industrialization, on the extent to which social overhead investments need be made, on the controls to be imposed on certain imports, and on the freedom of private entrepreneurs to make their own production decisions free from government regulation, have their ultimate raison d'etre in this dilemma between more consumption goods and less capital accumulation versus its opposite.

This dilemma is clearly not soluble on the economic level alone. It is basically a political problem, though in discussion it is often represented as a question of optimum resource allocation or efficiency of programs for economic growth. It has again been one of the failures of American aid programs to have supported this interpretation and to have clothed the program of consumption-versus-investment in the sterile garb of a purely economic-technical problem. The reason for this appears understandable. It permitted to American aid administrators to appear "neutral" with respect to the domestic politics of the developing country. But ultimately such a policy of burying one's head in the sand is not conducive to fruitful outcomes.

Closely related to the consumption-investment dilemma is the conflict between growth and employment objectives. This dilemma is most clearly visible in densely populated countries, such as Java, India, Egypt, or Haiti. There the benefits of public health programs, of the massive application of certain measures of preventive medicine, have led to an unprecedented multiplication of the population, with the result that increasing numbers of persons enter the ranks of the labor force seeking work. The natural inclination would be to look for productive patterns which are heavily labor intensive and which use the scarce capital available in poor countries only sparingly. But many of the installations which tend to bring the most rapid advancements in productivity are capital-intensive and labor-saving. They were elaborated in a technological environment in which labor was relatively costly and they are now offered freely to developing countries in which the relative prices of capital and labor are the very reverse of what they are in economically and technologically advanced countries.

First, it should be pointed out that although this dilemma is most acute in the densely populated countries, it is not entirely absent in many of those developing nations where there appears to be still much more room. For there, also, population is growing at a high rate and in many instances similar needs to find more employment opportunities arise, though admittedly with less intensity than in the densely populated countries. Second, it should be mentioned that many of the solutions to this problem are only apparent solutions. For, on the whole, the employment-versus-growth dilemma is met by providing for highly capital-intensive plants and subsidizing the unemployed and unemployable members of the society by doles in various open or disguised forms. It is clear that this is at best a temporary solution. The reservoir of unemployed persons tends to deepen as time goes on and tends to embrace individuals with higher and higher levels of actual or potential skills. The problem of the "urban unemployed" is acute in many developing countries already, and among these urban unemployed are found persons with some education whose expectations are far beyond the levels of support with which a dole can provide them. Hence they tend to join various protest movements inaugurated by all sorts of local "Messianic" leaders. The more high-sounding and, indeed, irresponsible the promises of these leaders, the more likely will they be to gather a following. Even if such an association is only temporary, it may result in widespread instability and sometimes even violence.

It need not be specially stressed that all this contributes powerfully to political instability, especially in many of the urban areas of the new nations. And it must be said again that American aid programs have done little to help resolve this dilemma. Instead of urging new technological solutions which would combine labor-intensive devices with modern design, the foreign aid personnel on the whole, know only how to explain the functioning and proper use of American or other technologically highly advanced devices. Moreover, since of all forms

of productive activity, agriculture was the one which tended to absorb the relatively largest share of the working force, emphasis has been placed on programs of agricultural improvement. There is no doubt but that such a policy can be defended rationally. With growing numbers more food must be produced lest scarce foreign exchange would have to be used to import it. But in terms of the aspirations of the elite and the popular masses alike in developing countries this concentration on an art which they thought they knew perfectly well, led to stresses and disappointments. The dynamic sector of the economy was not supported sufficiently, and the more stable and staid branches of production were given the lion's share of technical and economic aid.

It is clear from the above that such dilemmas can be mitigated or resolved only by measures designed to lead to rapid economic growth. While the achievement of this would not guarantee an end to instability and eliminate the appeals of revolutionary action to all sectors of the population, the absence of real growth will ensure their continued existence.

The Dilemmas of Choice and the Direction of Aid

In the light of the political realities and the economic necessities outlined above, we return to the problem of an effective American aid policy. The problem can briefly be phrased in three questions. Toward what objectives in developing countries do we work with our ultimate objective, i.e., the ultimate interests of the United States as the guiding principle? With whom do we work? And in what terms and how do we work with them?

It is apparent that our ultimate objective is best advanced in the less developed countries by stress on maximum possible development consistent with the satisfaction of current demand sufficient to maintain stability and dissipating as far as possible revolutionary tensions. Or phrased somewhat differently, it is our objective to channel revolutionary fervor into economically constructive rather than politically destructive directions. This requires what we might call programs of "ultimate impact" and the harnessing of the efforts of populations toward their achievement.

The type of national leadership needed to effect this is what might generally be characterized as a "dynamic modernizing elite". More specifically, its characteristics would include: recognition of the need to focus on a long-range economic and social program on more than a rhetorical level; ability to plan in realistic terms, to mobilize requisite resources, and to organize efforts toward implementation; administrative ability or the recognition of the importance of efficient administration and the selection of sound administrative criteria for the appointment of personnel in preference to other criteria.

No less important is the ability to mobilize mass support within a pluralistic society. This means that one must have the knowledge and be prepared to use techniques that will arouse the imagination of different sub-groups with different cultural values and enlist them in a joint effort toward common goals. What is required is leadership on modernization but able to negotiate within and manipulate the symbols of traditional culture. Working within the existent cultural frameworks, they should make linkages between traditional values and the behavior needed to serve developmental ends.

A few brief examples should serve to illustrate this point. Nehru, perhaps more than most Indian leaders, has a rational outlook, a thoroughly Western education, and a modern orientation. Yet he does not hesitate to make use of darshan, the traditional means by which Indians derive sustenance from the presence of their leader as an instrument of solidifying popular support and communicating his ideas directly to the people. On the village level, the traditional veneration for cows could conceivably be employed to encourage measures that improve the quality of cattle. Before his disagreement with President Sukarno resulted in his relative inactivity, Muhammed Hatta, the Vice President of Indonesia, was active in encouraging the formation of producers' cooperatives in terms of the traditional institution of village cooperation, gotong rojong.

In many of the countries, the elites most realistically oriented to the needs and goals of a developmental economy are the Socialist or socialist-oriented elites. Although in some instances, Socialists have shown an inability to gain mass support, as in Indonesia, there are among them generally persons who can combine the qualities which we have described. Unfortunately our policy-makers in the past have too often feared the Socialist label and preferred to deal with those purely

nationalist elements who have been unwilling or unable to do more than reiterate time-worn nationalist symbols primarily as a means of retaining power.

Even if we can define the type of central elite which has motivation, ability, and can gain the mass support needed to push through what we have termed an "ultimate impact" approach, we are still faced on a practical level with the problem of whom to deal with. The United States has little say in placing regimes in power elsewhere. We are frequently faced with the dilemma of having to work through existent governments either unwilling or unable to take action requisite to the goals enunciated. The question here resolves itself into the choice of working with the group in power because it is in power and viewing with neutral detachment its inability to effect reforms or trying to promote our objectives and to work in ways that might result in accusations by the regime in power that we are intervening.

Too often in the past we have chosen the first alternative. We have allowed ourselves to be deflected away from our long-range goal by efforts to help a regime stay in power in order to secure limited stability or in order to be liked. We have allowed ourselves to be politely blackmailed by leaders who hold up to us the "communist menace" as a means of prying out aid for particularistic and little productive purposes. We have mistaken the receptions accorded our visiting officials and demonstrations organized to impress them as indicators of the popularity of these regimes and of our popularity.

The fallacy of seeming to give whole-hearted support to unpopular regimes because these comprise the officially constituted governments has been amply demonstrated in Cuba and Korea. Admittedly, we must deal with them; it is unnecessary to hug them to our breasts. For we cannot confuse official friendship and goodwill expressed on the parts of other governments with the development that is the real objective of our aid policy. Insofar as we must work through these regimes, we can utilize whatever influence we possess toward inducing them to take the measures necessary to advance our objectives. In instances, such as South Vietnam and South Korea, where the governments are dependent for much of their yearly budgets upon United States economic assistance, we undoubtedly have a position of strength to negotiate from, provided we are willing to use it.

Admittedly, should this be done too publicly, this would lay us open to charges of intervention. However, it is clear that whatever action we take, from providing advisors to providing cash and to participating in decisions involving the creation of new projects, we are in a very real sense intervening to affect in some way the status quo. The choice then is for what goal and on whose behalf we intervene. Intervention in the form of so-called "strings" designed to ensure that the aid we provide is expended on projects and people that attempt to promote development and general welfare in coherent and organized fashion, can be justified in terms of our goals and in terms of the people who are intended to be the ultimate recipients of this aid.

Similarly, goodwill, friendship and our "national image" are of little importance or, at best of peripheral value, in selecting the means and pressing their use upon those instrumental to the fulfillment of our objectives. It should not, in fact, surprise us if and when the leadership of other countries finds it useful and, perhaps necessary, to use this country as the official whipping boy for action that might be necessary but unpopular among the masses, so long as they are willing to take that action. For it is difficult to convey to the uneducated the necessity of present sacrifices designed to effectuate ultimate gains. And we must learn to bear with patience our being used as the object for the displacement of resentment and hostility incurred. For we must not lose sight of the fact that our long-run objective is the creation of conditions tending to negate the appeal of communism. Whether or not in the interim our Crosby or Hooper rating rises or falls is irrelevant.

The problem of selecting and evaluating the personalities or institutions with whom we work and the strategies we employ runs through the aid question from the top policy level down to the man in the field working on community development and rural agricultural programs. Very specifically, it resolves itself into questions of choice, such as the examples we cite: In the selection of a project and the negotiation of the agreement for it, does one agree to a dam or a road project in a particular spot or region because our counterparts are pushing it in terms of their personal following and particularist interests, when it would have greater economic utility elsewhere? Or does one exert all patience and tact, while maintaining a firm line to insure its placement at point of maximum utility? In selection of trainees for study in his country, does one insist upon the maintenance of minimal standards or accept the Minister's nephew who is obviously non-qualified? If a village council is clearly controlled by one group or a single official to the obvious exclusion of others from a particular project, does one accept the assurance that those who are excluded are not important? Or does one continue to negotiate with the officially constituted authorities, while unofficially ascertaining the needs and points of view of these others?

What we are suggesting here is that there are sophisticated strategies for dealing with apparent stumbling blocks, strategies which enable us to go far toward promoting our objectives while preserving the face of those who only reluctantly will acquiesce in them. This is perhaps a more realistic alternative than one which usually is termed realistic, but which we would rather call fatalistic, of accepting the stumbling blocks and hoping that somehow some good might result out of a hit-or-miss, or an <u>ad hoc</u> approach.

What we have suggested requires, as we have originally suggested, clarity and consistency in aligning our policy with our ultimate objective, and courage, tact and patience in the actions needed to implement this policy. It also requires the recruitment, and selection of personnel who are sufficiently committed to such a policy and sufficiently sophisticated to employ the strategies needed to implement it. But if we cannot do this, we cannot be surprised when dynamic but frustrated leaders and desperate masses are driven to extreme political movements because they have no other place to go.

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THE UNIVERSAL VS. PAROCHIAL IN JAPAN'S POLITICAL TRADITION

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1. Introduction

One may discern two opposing tendencies in the history of political theory in Japan in modern times. One tendency is to relate Japanese historical development to the great movements in world history. Japan, according to this school of thought, belongs in the main stream of world history, and hence must necessarily experience, in a broad sense, the same kind of historical growth common to most nations of the world. The other tendency is to assert the uniqueness of Japanese history and culture and to argue that the experience of other nations is essentially irrelevant to the Japanese case.

In the main, the liberals and the radicals have adhered to the universalistic point of view, while the conservatives have upheld the parochial approach. And, to anticipate our conclusions somewhat, a strong case, it seems to me, can be made for the argument that, at least until 1945, the parochial point of view managed to secure the upper hand.

A number of reasons may be put forward to show why the forces favoring parochialism have enjoyed certain advantages. First, there was the legacy of national isolation. In Europe the nation state developed at the end of the Middle Ages out of a universal community. The result was that although Europe became fragmented in modern times into separate nation states, there remained a residual sense of unity. All of the nations of Europe after all shared in the heritage of Greek and Roman civilization. Perhaps more important, all the nations of Europe adhered to a common religion--namely Christianity.

The countries of Asia, in contrast, lack this idea of unity. There the nation state did not emerge out of the dissolution of a universal community. It is true that in some parts of Asia the

influence of Chinese culture was great. There was also the factor of Buddhism as a common religion. Yet somehow the fact of relative isolation appears to be more pronounced in Asia than in Europe.

Moreover, because of her geographical position Japan was able to remain for extended periods cut off from cultural, to say nothing of political, contact with the rest of Asia. Indeed, Japan might be thought of as a kind of cul de sac of Asia in terms of migrations and cultural influences. The result was that Japanese cultural life developed a kind of ingrown quality about it.

It is noteworthy that the steady and in many ways massive flow of Western influences into Japan since the nineteenth century has not all together succeeded in overcoming the tradition hallowed impulse toward isolation. A rather persuasive bit of evidence along these lines is the reluctance of Japanese intellectuals to emigrate in times of persecution. The rise of fascism in Europe led to the exodus of innumerable European scholars who sought haven in other countries, especially America. Nothing like this occurred in Japan when the militarists came to power in the 1930's, leading to the suppression of academic freedom. Except for a handful of communists who went into exile, virtually no one tried to leave in search of a freer atmosphere in which to work. It is perhaps understandable, given these circumstances, that those who prefer to think in terms of a universalistic political theory should find themselves in a position of disadvantage.

2. The Conservative Position

The several decades following the opening of Japan represented an era of intellectual ferment and an era of marked receptivity to new ideas. The stifling atmosphere of the feudal regime had been cleared away, and with the importation of new and heady doctrines emanating from Mill, Bentham, Rousseau, and Spencer, the stage was set for a great national debate on the form of government the new Japan should have. For some years, those who, looking with suspicion on new fangled ideas, preferred the traditional notions of government, were put on the defensive; but the conservative forces eventually rallied until by 1880's, they had succeeded in fortifying themselves behind

some formidable ramparts. In the word, the conservative position was symbolized by the notion of kokutai (usually translated "national polity").

The concept of kokutai represented an amalgam of at least three inter-related ideas. First, and for our purposes perhaps the most important, was the assertion that Japan, of all the countries of the world, was unique. Other countries had what the conservatives called "seitai" or forms of government, but only Japan possessed kokutai.

Second, there was the claim that kokutai was eternal and never changing. Sovereignty was given to the first emperor, Jimmu, by the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu-o-mikami, and subsequently it had been handed down generation after generation through an unbroken line of emperors. One writer likened sovereigns in other countries to hats; that is they can be easily changed. The Japanese sovereign, in contrast, is like a head, it cannot be changed because if you cut off a person's head he dies.

Third, there was the notion that the Japanese state is like a large family. In Japan the emperor appeared on the scene first; and his children became his subjects. In other countries, it was said, the people came first and then they chose one of their number to become their ruler. In Japan this could not happen for a son cannot change places with his father. Since the Japanese state is nothing but a large family, the relation of ruler to subject was said to be like that of parent to children. Hence filial piety can be equated with political loyalty. We can see this kind of reasoning in the following quotation from the writings of Inouye Tetsujiro, a prominent conservative writer of that era:

> "In a family there is the family head, and the morality of submitting to the head must be taught. That is, it is necessary that members of a family all must submit to the orders of the family head. Without such a morality, the structure of such a family cannot be maintained. Thereupon, the morality of 'filial piety' is taught. Now, the spirit of rendering filial piety towards the head of the family is the same spirit as rendering loyalty towards the ruler....The reason is that families do not exist independently, but rather that each family in concert with other families makes

> up the national structure which is Japan; and the Japanese state is a large family. This large family also has a family head. He is none other than the sovereign, the Emperor. Thereupon, if the spirit of filial devotion to the head of the family is extended to the entire country, this would be loyalty toward the Emperor; but this loyalty is also, as it were, filial piety...."

In time the idea of kokutai became the officially sanctioned dogma of the Japanese state, and anyone who questioned it publicly was likely to find himself labelled a traitor to his country. Hence those who wished to espouse the cause of liberal democracy in Japan necessarily had to tread with care, lest they lay themselves open to attacks from self-appointed patriotic groups, to say nothing of the police.

3. The Liberal and Marxist Positions

One may get some insight into the difficulty inherent in the liberal position by taking the political theory of Yoshino Sakuzo, a noted liberal professor of the World War I era. In 1916 Yoshino published a celebrated essay called, "The Essentials of Constitutional Government and its Crowning Glory." Yoshino's objective, in this essay, was to urge his countrymen to adopt constitutional government. In arguing his case, he began by appealing to universal principles. All nations, he said, must proceed to constitutional government when despotism and feudalism become outmoded. This is an inevitable historical process, and no nation can consider itself modern until it has achieved constitutional government. Thus Professor Yoshino was in substance denying the claim of uniqueness by trying to relate the evolution of Japanese government to world-wide historical trends.

But it is worth noting that Yoshino made one important qualification. He was careful to stress that what he advocated was not minshushugi, the usual Japanese term for "democracy," but minponshugi, a term which he presumably made up. This was no doubt a tactical maneuver on his part to avoid the accusation that he was disregarding kokutai. According to Yoshino's explanation, the difference between minshushugi and his term

minponshugi was that the latter did not imply popular sovereignty. We might ask: How can you get constitutional government without popular sovereignty?

His answer would be that the object of government, irrespective of who may be sovereign, is the people's welfare. Yoshino claimed that his minponshugi differed from benevolent despotism in that he believed the people were best situated to judge what was in their welfare. Therefore, public opinion, by which he meant majority opinion growing out of free competition among different ideas, represented a vital element and those who exercised sovereign power were morally bound to obey it. As for concrete institutional devices to achieve minponshugi, Yoshino sought the strengthening of the House of Representatives. He wanted the suffrage, which at that time was limited, extended to all adult males, and he also wanted to have the lower house, whose power was greatly circumscribed, elevated to become the highest decision-making body within the state. In this way he was able to advocate the attainment of parliamentary democracy in Japan without seeming to deny the validity of kokutai.

Let us now turn to the Marxists, who would normally be expected to support universalistic principles. Marx never made very many explicit references to Japan, but Marxists, both Japanese and foreign, have proceeded on the assumption that Marxian principles are applicable to Japanese society as well as to European societies. This was certainly true of the Comintern theorists who in the 1920's tried to guide the Japanese Communists along the path of revolution. In applying Marxist-Leninist theory to Japan, theComintern, which was not particularly knowledgeable about the Japanese situation, often blundered; and although the Japanese Marxists had a tendency to accept Comintern pronouncements as "correct," there were limits beyond which they were not willing to go. Such a limit was apparently reached in 1933 when two communist leaders, who at that time were in prison for their political activities, issued jointly a public statement, urging their comrades to withdraw from the Comintern and to seek ways of achieving socialism within the context of historical and social conditions peculiar to Japan. Such a statement, coming from two prominent Communists, Manabu Sano and Sadachika Nabeyama, of course, had a profound effect on the Communist movement in Japan. It must have been for them a step which they took after much soul searching. One can cite several factors which no doubt were impinging of them and forcing them into this direction. One probably was the pressure put on

them by the police authorities; another must have been the effect of a wave of patriotic and nationalistic sentiment that swept over the country following the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese army in the fall of 1931. But probably a third factor was the conflict in their minds between adherence to universalistic principles here represented by Marxism as interpreted by the Comintern and their ideals and sentiments growing out of their membership in the Japanese nation. I would now like to turn to this latter point.

In their statement, Sano and Nabeyama took the Comintern to task for demanding that the Japanese Communists espouse the overthrow of the Emperor system. Ever since the founding of the Party in the early 1920's, the Japanese Communists, at the prodding of the Comintern, had given the abolition of the monarchy highest priority, a position which was bound to get them in constant trouble with the authorities. Now these two dissident Communists argued that overthrow of the monarchy was a bourgeois-democratic ideal and ought not be the objective of a socialist revolution. In their view, the Japanese emperor system was not like Czarism in Russia, in that it was neither oppressive nor given to exploitation. On the contrary, the Imperial House was a manifestation of the unity of the nation, it reduced the harshness of class conflict and brought harmony to social life, and in periods of social change, it facilitated the interchange of classes. They took the view that the Imperial House had been a "progressive" force in the Meiji Restoration and that it had played a central role in building up a new Japan in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the Japanese masses love and respect the Imperial House, for they feel that the Japanese nation is a large group unified by common blood, that is, it is a large family, at the head of which is the Imperial family. Such feelings, they asserted, could not be found in any other monarchical system and proves that the Imperial family is of the people. We, they continued, as one of the people must share these feelings of respect; and the Communist part, whose slogan is the abolition of the Emperor system is "anti-people," and hence has remained apart from the masses. Sano and Nabeyama then expressed their conviction that the form the revolution must take would differ from country to country depending on their peculiar characteristics and that those who lead a revolution must take into consideration the traditional, national, and socio-psychological factors. Their conclusion was that it was possible and indeed natural to have a "socialist revolution in one country with the Imperial family at the apex."

The authors of the statement next turned their attention to the question of Japan as a colonial power. The Comintern, of course, had always advocated the liberation of Japanese colonies but at this point these two leaders of the Japanese Communist party took exception to the Comintern position. They argued that independence of colonies and national determination were bourgeois ideas which were now outdated. As they saw it, there were leader nations and follower nations; and Japan was a leader nation for the following reasons: First, the Japanese nation was strongly unified and hence could ameliorate barbaric class conflict among classes. Second, because the Japanese nation had achieved social harmony, it could prevent the influx of European-type individualism. Third, its family system could serve as an antidote to capitalism. Fourth, Japan had achieved a high level of production, and possessed a history of independence. Since the Taiwanese, Manchus, and Koreans constitute weak nations, they should join a Japanese-Korean-Manchu, Taiwan Peoples' Government.

After having criticized the Comintern's policy of supporting independence movements in the colonial areas, Sano and Nabeyama then took up the question of the Manchurian invasion. In 1932 the Comintern had instructed the Japanese Communists to oppose the Japanese takeover of Manchuria which had begun in the fall of 1931. The response of these two communists was the argument that the working classes do not necessarily oppose all wars in general. As have been shown by the Comintern itself, national revolutionary wars against imperialism are "progressive" wars. In their view the war in Manchuria represented a war of liberation of the 400 million Chinese from the Nationalist warlords who are the agents of U.S.-European imperialism as well as the defenders of the old order. Therefore, they argued, the Manchurian war is historically progressive, in that it represents Japan's expansion into a country which is characterized by a culture and social order which is more backward than Japan's. They were somewhat prophetic in that they saw a war between the United States and Japan as a logical extension of the war in Manchuria and they expressed the belief that a Japanese-American war would also be a "progressive" war in that its objective would be to free Asian nations of the influence of U.S.-European capital.

At the same time, Sano and Nabeyama agreed that to the extent that the war in Manchuria was propelled by considerations of Japanese imperialism, it could not be regarded purely as a war of liberation. What was required, therefore, to change this to a war of liberation was an alteration in Japan's internal politics--

namely the emergence of a proletarian people's government in Japan. With such a government, they concluded, Japan, in concert with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Republic in China, could work for proletarian-based Pan-Asianism.

4. Conclusion

The foregoing account was intended to show the powerful attraction exerted by parochial political values. To be sure, the competition between universal and parochial ideas was not exactly a fair one, since the power of the government was openly used to support those who argued in favor of the view that the Japanese state was unique. But one ought not conclude from this that it was only coercion that maintained the supremacy of parochial values. Many Japanese, including Westernized intellectuals, must have believed that the notion of a state modeled after a family had symbolic value in strengthening social cohesion and national unity. Kokutai, in short, was not entirely the product of propaganda, but had roots in Japanese political tradition.

Before concluding this brief discussion, it might be useful to make a comment or two about the postwar scene. The dominant values today are fundamentally universal, so that those who would advocate a return to kokutai find themselves on the defensive. I think it would be safe to say that defeat and the Occupation have so weakened the old political traditions that like Humpty-Dumpty they cannot ever be put together again. The result is that against the challenge of the Left which seeks to apply a universal philosophy as expounded by Marx and Lenin, the Conservatives have no equally universal creed to offer. This situation could well turn out to be the Achilles heel of Japanese Conservatism.

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WHY MEN SEEK POLITICAL OFFICE

Motivation and Social Status in the Recruitment of Locally Elected Officials*

by

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The legion of elected officials governing American localities constitutes one of the distinguishing characteristics of our democracy. Every four years over 500,000 men and women are elected throughout the country to fill local policy-making and executive positions.

Election as a means of choosing local officials has come under frequent attack from reformers. The innumerable elected officials necessitated the long ballot which seemed to promote irresponsible government. Elections appeared to recruit men of dubious technical proficiency and moral fiber according to the reformers. Yet despite at least a half century of outcry, election remains the principal mode of manning key positions in local governments.

The locally elected official bulks large in the political system for still another reason. His experiences contribute greatly to the molding of the American political culture. Thousands like him hold local positions for a few years and then return to a "civilian" status. Such a flow of individuals in and out of official positions fosters a more acute familiarity with democratic politics among a broad segment of the population. For many, county and city elections allow the practice of politics as a hobby; for a few, politics becomes a profession which may eventually lead them to careers in the state and nation.

Perhaps because elected officials form such a natural part of the local scene and because political sociologists looking for an elite write them off as powerless, they have remained almost unexamined by academic explorers of politics. In this paper I shall deal with only a single aspect of the elected officialdom; I shall describe the local officials elected in two Louisiana parishes. Who are these men? What paths led them into politics? Why did they choose politics as a hobby or career?

I. Some Theoretical Considerations

As this paper is based on an investigation in two Louisiana parishes; it has little interest for us unless it can enlighten us about the general features of locally elected officials and the process which lures them into the political arena. The sample is not a random one, nor is it "significant" in any other statistical way. However, it becomes meaningful in terms of a theoretical model which seeks to explain the process by which individuals are recruited into public office.

Although political recruitment has become a fashionable sphere of study in recent years, little attention has been paid to integrating various findings into a theoretical model; nor have political scientists scrutinized the locally elected official. Matthews, for instance, in both his recent volumes describes national and state officials in fascinating but relatively

unsystematic terms.[1] E. C. Lee presents some interesting data about California officials but with relatively little concern for the process by which they were recruited (nor is that the focus of his book).[2] Schlesinger, in dealing with state governors, perhaps comes closest to dealing with the recruitment process is a systematic way but as his data are derived from biographical sketches, he cannot incorporate psychological as well as sociological considerations into his investigation.[3]

Our starting point is the obvious fact that anyone legally eligible may run for an office but very few do. What eliminates people from the race for office? It is my contention that the potential office holder must possess certain psychological traits and come from specific points in the social structure.

A man must first want an office. When he does, it is likely that he desires to wield power, to gain prestige, to help others, and to be in the spotlight of public attention. These traits are chosen because they are the ones that are peculiarly satisfied by holding public office. Power is an obvious attribute of a governmental official. However, it certainly is not the only motivation for seeking an office. As Lasswell has acutely observed, the power-hungry individual is likely to be too compulsive and inflexible to succeed in the democratic game.[4] Prestige is another recognized lure of public office. Even at the local level where the official may be unknown to much of the population, prestige gains may be considerable. For instance, when the official comes from a modest background, election will win new respect from his associates and will admit him to social circles which were closed before. The ability to help others likewise is a common attribute of a public position. As private individuals, most people neither know of the opportunity to help those in need nor are they in the position to offer succorance unless they also happen to be relatively wealthy. Once a man enters public office, however, he is deluged with requests for assistance and often has the means to satisfy them. Finally, the desire to be in the spotlight is probably a central one because public life thrusts the individual to the center of the stage. He must like to make public appearances, to hear his name on radio and TV, to take praise as well as criticism; if he doesn't, his tenure in office will surely constitute the most miserable years of his life.

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[1] Donald Matthews, The Social Backgrounds of Political Decision-Makers (New York, 1954) and U.S. Senators and their World (Chapel Hill, 1960).

[2] E. C. Lee, The Politics of Non-Partisanship (Berkeley, 1960), pp. 59-68.

[3] J. A. Schlesinger, How They Became Governor (East Lansing, Michigan, 1957).

[4] H. D. Lasswell, "The Effect of Personality on Political Participation," in R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Glencoe, 1954).

Two motivations are notably absent in those who seek office. Potential office-holders are unlikely to desire close friendships, for political activity often makes such associations untenable. Likewise, the prospective public official probably does not desire sudden wealth, for contrary to popular opinion public office is not the best springboard for enrichment. The public official lives in a gold fish bowl. The press subjects him to constant scrutiny while much of the general public regards him with near pathological distrust. If sudden riches are desired, one may achieve them far more readily and safely through shady or illegal business dealings than in public life.

The potential official, therefore, wants to help others and be in the spotlight as well as desiring power and prestige. But not all those who harbor such strong desires enter the race for public office. These desires can also be satisfied in private enterprise. Only those who occupy opportune positions in the social structure will seek office. This does not mean that they must be wealthy, upper-class, or even in contact with the "power elite." Rather it means that they must have contact with others who are politically active and be able to learn of the opportunities in public life. They must also possess those skills the elective official most frequently requires--the ability to mediate, bargain, and negotiate. Such skills are most readily learned by those who practice the occupations that require them. The realtor, salesman, independent merchant and farmer as well as the lawyer depend on these skills to earn their daily living. I shall call such occupations, "brokerage" occupations; it is from them that most elected officials are likely to be drawn.

All practitioners of brokerage occupations who have the necessary psychological motivations are "eligible" for public office. In some communities where the prestige of office is high and where upper-class individuals are traditionally expected to seek office, upper-class brokers will occupy local positions. In other communities, tradition relegates local offices to lower class groups and lower status brokers will compete for public positions. In still others, local offices may be distributed among all status groups. The point is that all status levels are likely to be found in elective posts. However, it is relatively unlikely that individuals from non-brokerage occupations will seek or win office.

In addition to skill in the political arts of negotiation and compromise, the potential office holder must know the opportunities available in public office and have access to those already active in politics who can help further his ambitions. These requirements may be fulfilled by long-term residence in the community, by being a member of a politically active family, by having friends who are active in local matters, or by participating in service clubs and fraternal organizations. "Brokers" have an advantage here, for their occupation brings them in contact with many people and often gives them the opportunity to seek office. We expect, however, that those officials who come from non-brokerage occupations will at least fulfill these other requirements.

In my description of the elected officials of the two Louisiana parishes, it is these hypotheses which I shall seek to test. If substantial support can be found for them, more thorough studies in other localities may be justified in our quest to understand the process which recruits individuals into public life.

II. Site and Methodology of this Study

To test these expectations, I held hour-long interviews with the elected officials of two Louisiana parishes. Both parishes border New Orleans. Jefferson Parish has a population of 208,000, almost twice its number of 1950. It houses many upper-middle class New Orleans suburbanites, most of whom live in unincorporated areas. The parish has long possessed a notorious reputation as a center of gambling and other vices although in recent years, most of these activities have disappeared or gone underground. At present the parish is ruled by a combination of civic reformers and old-style politicos who battle each other through highly fluid factional organizations. The second parish, St. Bernard, is located at the opposite end of New Orleans. It possesses 32,000 inhabitants, triple its population of 1950. One third of its inhabitants are still classified rural and are principally engaged in fishing and trapping. The remaining two-thirds, all of whom live in unincorporated areas, are principally middle or lower middle class suburbanites. St. Bernard Parish lacks Jefferson's reputation for gambling and vice. However, it has a tradition of rough politicking between well organized factions of the Democratic Party. At the present time, one faction has captured almost all elective offices and organized itself in a fashion reminiscent of Chicago's machines of the 1920's. As numerous respondents told the interviewer, people still take parish politics seriously in St. Bernard.

An effort was made to interview every elected official--excepting district court judges--in the two parishes (see Table 1). Each individual was first contacted by letter and then an interview was arranged through a telephone call. Most of the interviews took place in the evening at the official's home although some were held at his place of business. The interviews lasted about an hour. Fifty of the fifty-nine respondents were given the McClelland Test of Imagination which requires respondents to tell stories to ambiguous pictures.[1] These stories were then interpreted by a system of content analysis to yield scores reflecting the respondents need Achievement, need Affiliation, and need Power. In addition, the interview consisted of open-ended questions about the individual's life history, the circumstances which led him to run for office, the satisfactions he derived from campaigning and holding office, his dissatisfactions, and future plans. The entire interview was recorded by tape and later transcribed for analysis.

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[1]Actually the test was administered to several more respondents but the tape recorder broke down. Only women were intentionally excluded because the test does not yield comparable scores for both sexes.

III. Who are the local officials?

The elected officials under scrutiny in this study had decidedly deep roots in their communities. As Tables 2 and 3 show, 92% of the officials were born in the parish or in the state; 75% were parish residents of more than 20 years standing. Indeed, more than half the parents of present day officials were born in the parish or in the state (Table 4).

Table 1: Description of the Sample and Drop Out Rate in the Two Parishes.

	Parish-Wide Officials			Policy-Making Officials			Minor Officials		
	Total	Contacted	Interviewed	Total	Contacted	Interviewed	Total	Contacted	Interviewed
St. Bernard	4	4	3	18	18	14	14**	12	12
Jefferson	8*	4	4	21	20	16	12**	10	10
Drop out as % of those contacted		12.5%			21%			---	

*It seemed desirable not to contact 3 officials who had just been interviewed for another study. The fourth was involved in a court suit charging malfeance in office and, therefore, was unavailable.

**Two minor officials in each parish represented and lived in a remote portion of the parish which has an entirely different character than the remainder. For this reason, they were excluded from the sample.

Table 2: How Deep Are the Roots of Elected Officials--Length of Residence in the Parish.

Life-long	50.8%
20 years and longer	23.7
11-20 years	15.3
5-10 years	10.2
Less than 5 years	---
Total (N=59)	100.0%

Table 3: How Deep Are the Roots of Elected Officials--Birthplace

Same Parish	47.5%
Different Parish, Same State	49.2
Outside State,	3.4
Total (N=59)	100.1%

Table 4: How Deep are the Roots of Elected Officials--Their Parents' Birthplace.

	Father's Birthplace	Mother's Birthplace
Same Parish	25.4%	32.2%
Different Parish, Same State	44.1	47.5
Different State	11.9	8.5
Outside United States	15.3	8.5
NA	3.4	3.4
Total (N=59)	100.1%	100.1%

Yet despite the deep roots most officials had in their community, we cannot regard them as entrenched representatives of an old order, soon to be swept away by the onslaught of suburbanites. Quite to the contrary, almost half of them had just been elected for the first time. (Table 5).

These findings support our hypothesis. Yet the degree to which old-timers monopolize elective offices is somewhat surprising, for a majority of residents in both parishes have lived there less than 10 years. The data suggest that more is involved in winning an elective office than simply being known in the community and being recognized as a part of it. Closer examination of the social characteristics of the elected officials indicates not only that they are long term residents but they are well settled in their personal life.

Only one official in our sample was less than 30 years old; 90% of the office-holders were in the 30-60 year age bracket. Almost precisely the same distribution existed among the newly elected officials (Table 6). What seems to be the case is that men do not seek a public office until they are established in their community and are settled in their private life. This interpretation is reinforced by the job-history of the elected officials. One-third have held more than five full-time positions; half have held four or more. Yet two-thirds of them have occupied the same position for the past ten years or more (Tables 7 and 8). In short, the elected official is one who drifted through several jobs until he took occupational roots. Not until this occurred did he win a parish office. For most, this means that they are past the age of 30. In parishes like St. Bernard and Jefferson where new suburbanites constitute a majority of the population, age is a factor which excludes newcomers from public office, for many of them are comparatively young.[1]

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[1] According to the preliminary 1960 census data, these parishes possessed 8-10% more people under 18 than New Orleans and proportionately fewer inhabitants over 65. Bureau of the Census, Advance Reports, General Population Characteristics: Louisiana (Washington, March 30, 1961).

Table 5: How Long Had the Officials Been in Office as of March 1, 1961

Less than one year	42.4%
1-4 years	8.5
5-8 years	16.9
9-12 years	5.1
More than 12 years	27.1
Total (N=59)	100.0%

Table 6: Age of Elected Officials as of December, 1960

Age	Total Sample	First-Term Officials
20-29	1.7%	--
30-39	27.1	32.0%
40-49	35.6	44.0
50-59	27.1	24.0
60/	8.5	--
Totals	100.0% (N=59)	100.0% (N=25)

Table 7: How Deeply Rooted in their Occupation are the Elected Officials--
Number of Full-time Positions Held Since High School or College

No. of Positions	Per-cent of Sample
1	18.6%
2	13.6
3	11.9
4	16.9
5	1.7
More than 5	32.3
NA	5.1
Total (N=59)	100.0%

Table 8: How Deeply Rooted in their Occupation are the Elected Officials--
Length of Time on Present Job

Length of Time	Per-cent of Sample
1 year	6.8%
2 years	6.8
3-5 years	6.8
5-10 years	18.6
More than 10 years	45.8
NA	15.3
Total (N=59)	100.1%

The tendency to enter local politics after settling down is reinforced by the fact that most positions at the parish level in Louisiana are part-time. The pay must normally be supplemented with other income. Most men are simply not in a position to take time off from their jobs until they are financially established. Consequently, elected officials often report relatively high family incomes. (Table 9) Whereas only 7-10% of the general population earned more than $10,000 in 1960, 40% of the elected officials reported such incomes. At the other extreme, 40-50% of the general population earned less than $4,000 but only 3% of the officials did. (Table 9) Only the middle range included an equal proportion of citizens and officials. Yet, as this middle range included incomes which by any standards are modest, we are not mistaken in concluding that all but the very poor are substantially represented among the elected officials. The fact that their average income is higher than the general population's substantiates our finding that elected officials come from among the well-settled elements of the community.

Just as elected officials come from all income brackets, so they also come from all social strata. If we roughly classify elected officials into upper, middle, and lower class categories according to their occupation, 8.5% fall into the upper class, 32.2% in the middle class, and 28.9% into the lower class. (In addition, 13.6% are full-time officials, 13.6% are retired, and 3.4% are housewives.)

The officials come from a varied assortment of occupations. Only two of the fifty-nine officials are lawyers; far more numerous are the independent farmers, merchants and salesman, and clerical employees. Such standard occupational categories, however, do not pinpoint the peculiar characteristics of an occupation that promotes the seeking of political office. I have hypothesized that a principal requirement for political activity is the ability to bargain, compromise, and deal with others. Certain occupations demand such activities. The lawyer is the classical example, but the salesman, merchant, independent farmer (who buys his own supplies and sells his own crops), the contractor, and the real estate broker also engage in such activities.[1]

I have characterized such occupations as "brokerage" occupations, for they place the practitioner in the position of a broker between two other parties. When we dichotomize our sample of elected officials into brokerage and non-brokerage occupations, we find that 67.8% come to public positions from brokerage occupations while only 30.5% stem from non-brokerage occupations.[2]

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[1]See Appendix A for a complete list of occupations as used in this study.

[2]For one respondent (1.7%) this information is missing.

Thus a portion of our model is supported by the data. Most officials are long-term residents; they come from all levels of the social structure. The overwhelming majority enter the political arena after an apprenticeship in a brokerage occupation where they learned the skills necessary for the political game. However, the data also suggest a modification of our model, for most of the officials appear to regard politics as their hobby rather than their profession. They do not enter the political arena until they have settled down in an occupation, attained a relatively high income, and passed the age of 30. As we shall see later, this perception of politics as a hobby affects the motivations which appear to bring them into the race for office.

Such general conclusions, however, should not mislead us to characterize locally elected officials as a homogeneous group. Quite to the contrary, our data indicate wide variations from the norm. The variations assume a significant pattern when we examine the several kinds of officials included in this study.

The study examined three sorts of parish officials. There were parish-wide executive officials such as the sheriff, district attorney, and clerk of court. Without exception these positions pay well and demand almost full time attention. Secondly, there were members of policy-making boards: the Police Jury of St. Bernard, the Parish Council of Jefferson, and the school boards of each of the parishes. Their members--policy-makers I shall call them-- receive per-diem pay; their positions demand only part-time attention. Finally, Louisiana parishes elect minor judicial and executive officials in each ward, the Justice of the Peace and Constable. Their monthly pay ranges from $125 in one parish to $250 in the other; their duties are variable. Most incumbents devote only a few hours each week to their office although others--political entrepreneurs--have sought to enlarge their jurisdiction and busy themselves on a full-time basis. These officials are classified as minor officials.

Full-time officials appear more likely to come from the indigenous elements of the community than policy-makers or minor officials. The largest number of newcomers are found among policy-makers. (Table 10) These differences appear to be related to the individual's commitment to politics as a career. Most new suburbanites, it seems, are not attracted to full-time political office. They engage in politics more as a hobby. This attitude would direct newcomers who seek local office to the policy-making or minor positions. However, most newcomers appear to avoid the minor positions because of their relatively low standing as measured by the income and social status of incumbents, for minor officials come almost entirely from middle or low income groups (Table 11) and lower class occupations (Table 12).

Moreover, most minor officials came from non-brokerage occupations whereas other officials came predominantly from brokerage positions. These differences appear to reflect the duties of the minor officials. They require far less of the art of compromise than policy-makers or parish-wide officials. JP's deal with private complaints; they usually forward the

Table 9: Family Income of Officials and Household Income of the General Population, 1960

	Elected Officials Both Parishes	General Population Jefferson Parish*	General Population St. Bernard Parish*
Below $4,000	3.4%	40.3%	48.2%
$4,000-$10,000			
$4,000-5,999	16.9%		
6,000-7,999	18.6		
8,000-9,999	15.3		
	50.8	49.2	44.6
Above $10,000			
$10,000-11,999	6.8		
12,000-14,999	6.8		
15,000-24,999	13.6		
Above 25,000	11.9		
	39.1	10.5	7.2
NA	6.8	---	---
	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%

*Source: Sales Management Survey of Annual Buying Power, 1960, pp. 172-4.

Table 10: Length of Residence in Parish According to Type of Official

Length of Residence	Parish Wide Officials	Policy-Makers	Minor Officials
Life-long	62.5%	51.7%	47.5%
20 years & longer	25.0	17.2	28.6
11-20 years	12.5	17.2	14.3
5-10 years	--	13.8	9.5
Less than 5 years	--	--	--
Totals	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%
	(N=8)	(N=29)	(N=21)

Table 11: Family Income of Different Categories of Officials in 1960

	Parish Wide Officials	Policy-Makers	Minor Officials
Below $4,000	--	--	9.5%
$4,000-5,999	--	13.8	28.6
$6,000-7,999	--	20.7	28.6
$8,000-9,999	--	20.7	14.3
$10,000-11,999	--	10.3	--
$12,000-14,999	25.0%	3.4	4.8
$15,000-25,000	50.0	13.8	--
Above $25,000	12.5	13.8	4.8
NA	12.5	3.4	9.5
Totals	100.0%	99.9%	100.1%
	(N=8)	(N=29)	(N=21)

more serious ones to a district court. They never arbitrate differences between groups. The constables are simply executives with very little discretion to manouver or compromise. Thus the positions which demand the art of compromise least draw their personnel from occupations where compromise and negotiation are not practised every day. The positions which require such arts more draw most of their incumbents from brokerage occupations.

The data suggest that full-time positions attract old-time residents most. Moreover, such positions as well as policy-making posts are predominantly occupied by individuals who come from brokerage occupations and enjoy a relatively high family income. As suggested by our model, minor offices in these parishes appear reserved for lower-status, lower-income groups; they often do not require an aprenticeship in a brokerage occupation. Thus all status groups share in the experience of holding office. Local politics in these parishes is not the exclusive domain of any class or occupational category.

IV. What Avenue Lead Men into Politics?

Describing the general characteristics of the elected official only begins our task. What are the paths which lead men into office? Some seem to be born into political families where running for and holding an elective office is the traditional thing to do. Others drift into politics from organizational activities; still others appear to stumble into it as if by chance.

Popular folklore, particularly in Louisiana, assigns great importance to family tradition; political dynasties frequently hold the spotlight. In our sample, one man "inherited" his post from his father; another ran because his father had held the office before him and he thought it should stay in the family; the father of a third official won his elected post three years before the respondent was born and still holds it. Such political dynasties, however, over-emphasize the role of family background. As Table 13 shows, only 29% of our sample had fathers who were in any way active in politics.

Nor is contact with politics through relatives more significant. As Table 14 shows, only 32% of the officials had relatives who held a public office of any sort. Moreover, some of these undoubtedly gained their position through the patronage of our respondents rather than leading them into politics. Finally while the folklore of corporate politics often gives the ambitious wife a central role, our respondents were not so generous. Only 1/5 admitted that their wives enthusiastically participated in their political career and stimulated them to go further. The remainder of the wives--except the 10% who outright disliked their husband's political activity--helped out occasionally or tolerated it (Table 15).

Contrary to expectations, participation and leadership in civic organizations was not a means of gaining office for most of the elected officials in the two parishes. Only one third belonged to more than three groups whose meetings they attended monthly. Somewhat more reported

Table 12: Class Origin (by Occupation) of Elected Officials

	Parish Wide Officials	Policy-Makers	Minor Officials
Upper class	25.0%	10.3%	--
Middle class	--	48.2	19.0%
Lower class	--	20.7	47.6
Unclassified*	75.0	20.7	33.4
Totals	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%
	(N=8)	(N=29)	(N=21)

*Unclassified category consists of 16 officials who have been full-time officials or retired for more than 5 years and 2 housewives.

Table 13: Political Activity of Fathers of Elected Officials

Politically Active		
Held elective office	11.9%	
Held appointive office only	8.5	
Held no office but campaigned for others	8.5	
		28.9%
Politically Inactive		
Interest but never participated	8.5	
No interest	55.9	
		64.4
NA		6.8
Total (N=59)		100.1%

Table 14: Political Activity of Relatives of Elected Officials

Relatives Holding Public Office		
Brother/Sister	13.6%	
Father	1.7	
In-laws	8.5	
Others	8.5	
		32.3
Relatives Not Holding Public Office		33.9
NA		33.9
Total (N=59)		100.1%

Table 15: Wife's Attitude Toward Husband's Political Life

Wife enthusiastically participates	20.7%
Wife helps out on occasion	31.1
Wife tolerates husband's political activities	39.0
Wife dislikes politics	10.3
Total (N=29)	100.1%

belonging to only one group or none at all whose meetings they attended each month (Table 16). In addition, very few elected officials hold or ever held office in voluntary organizations. It is evident that at least in these localities, organizational activity did not serve as an important training ground for elected officials.

The fact that few entered the political arena as a result of family connections or group activity is reiterated by Table 17. Very few became active in childhood or as a result of the example of their father. Yet friends and acquaintances in politics played a significant role for they recruited the largest number of officials in our sample. Such officials began politicking by campaigning for school acquaintences or business associates before running for office themselves. Those who can be classified as self-starters entered the political arena through a policy interest; to ferret out corruption, to improve schools, to promote efficiency, or to accomplish a similar end (Table 18).

When we once more examine the different paths by which various officials enter politics, the data supports our conclusion that a family tradition of political activity is not an important factor in the recruitment of elected officials. If it were, we would expect more full-time officials to come from active families than hobbyists, for a full-time position demands a considerable commitment to politics as a way of life. The data show just the opposite (Table 20). Most full-time officials come from inactive families. Somewhat more policy-makers and minor officials--the hobbyists--come from families where the father was politically active.

The role of friends and office-holders as recruiters gains more importance when we examine Table 21. They recruit by far the largest number of full-time officials; only one of these officials can be termed a self-starter. Far more of the political hobbyists sought office on their own. This finding gains significance as political organizations dominated the scene in both parishes. In spite of such domination, the organizations apparently controlled only the recruitment of top officials. Many of the others presented themselves for endorsement.

The various positions apparently demand a different level of group activity. Policy-makers are the most active in civic clubs while none of the full-time officials are completely inactive. Minor officials remain the least active (Table 22). Likewise, full-time and policy-making officials hold organizational offices relatively frequently; minor officials are once more the least active (Table 23). These findings doubtlessly stem from our previous one that minor officials come from lower social strata where individuals generally join organizations less frequently. Their relative lack of group membership may also reflect their non-brokerage occupations. Brokerage occupations often require extensive group memberships for contacts which promote business success. Non-brokerage occupations do not require this sort of contact. Yet it is interesting that minor office-holders do not compensate for their lower status and lack of contacts by greater organizational activity. Rather they remain typical of the less active strata of the community from which they come.

Table 16: Participation in Voluntary Organizations by Elected Officials

	Organizations in which they attend monthly meetings	Organizations of which they are presently an officer	Organizations of which they ever were an officer
None	16.9%	61.0%	72.9%
1	18.6	23.7	13.6
2	10.2	6.8	3.4
3	15.3	1.7	3.4
4	10.2	3.4	---
5	13.6	---	1.7
6+	10.2	---	---
NA	5.1	3.4	5.1
Total (N=59)	100.2%	100.0%	100.1%

Table 17A:How Did Officials First Participate in Politics

Electioneering for others	40.7%
Running errands for politicians	1.7
Appointed to public office	1.7
Campaigning for oneself	28.8
As a boy at polling places	11.9
Through activity in civic clubs	8.5
NA	6.8
Total (N=59)	100.1%

17B: Why Did Officials First Participate in Politics

Asked by others		
Friends asked	8.5%	
Office-holders asked	22.0	
Appointed to office	11.9	
		42.4%
Self-starters		
Always wanted to run	15.3	
To get into politics	8.5	
To test popularity	5.1	
To promote policy objective	11.9	
		40.8
To emulate father		5.1
Other		5.1
NA		6.8
Total (N=59)		100.2%

Table 18: Cross Tabulation of Why Officials First Became Politically Active against How They First Participated in Politics

	How Officials First Participated in Politics					
Why First Active	As Boy at Polling Place	Campaigning for Others	Campaigning for Self	Through Civic Clubs	NA	Total
Asked by others	3	14	5	2	1	25
Self-starters	2	8	6	1	-	17
Idealistic reasons	-	1	5	1	-	7
To emulate father	2	1	-	-	-	3
Other	-	2	1	-	-	3
NA	-	-	-	1	3	4
Totals	7	26	17	5	4	59

Table 19: Have Elected Officials Advanced to Higher Posts Since Original Election

Level of Present Office as Compared to First Office	First Term Officials	Second Term Officials	Third Term Officials	Officials in Their Fourth Term Or More
Present Office=First	96.5%	80%	66.6%	87.5%
Present Office is Higher than First	3.5	20	33.3	12.5
Totals	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%
	(N=30)	(N=10)	(N=3)	(N=16)

Table 20: How Active were Fathers of Various Elected Officials

	Parish Wide Officials	Policy-Makers	Minor Officials
Held Elective Office	25.0%	10.3%	9.5%
Held Appointive Office	---	10.3	9.5
Held no Office But Campaigned for Others	---	10.3	9.5
Interested But Not Active	---	10.3	9.5
Inactive	75.0	55.2	47.6
NA	---	3.4	14.3
Totals	100.0%	99.8%	99.9%
	(N=8)	(N=29)	(N=21)

Once in office, local officials demonstrate little upward or downward mobility although half the sample was in their first term indicating considerable "outward" mobility. Few of those who served longer than one term have won higher positions (Table 19). Thus few of the minor officials have won policy-making posts; few of the policy makers have won full-time office. Political experience apparently is not an important asset in winning a local elective office.

In summary, the paths by which men entered local elective positions differ somewhat from those expected. Neither a family tradition of political activity nor participation in civic clubs played an important role in recruiting elected officials. Rather, most were lured into the political arena through acquaintences who already were active or through a commitment to a policy goal. Even those who entered public office from non-brokerage occupations were most frequently recruited in this manner.

V. Why do Men Run for Elective Office?

As long as we describe the social characteristics of elected officials and the paths which brought them into their public positions, we stand on the firm ground of easily observed and verified facts. Examination of the motivational structure of these men in order to explain why they went into politics is a far more difficult and uncertain venture. In this study, I combined two techniques. On the one hand, I administered the McClelland Test of Imagination, a projective test which produced measurements of three motives: n Achievement (the need to excel), n Affiliation (the need for friendship), and n Power (the need to control the means of influencing others). The scores for these motives are the result of a standardized system of content analysis applied to the stories respondents told to a set of six pictures.[1] The test has been used in a number of studies by psychologists and by several political scientists.[2] I was unable to obtain another scorer to check interjudge reliability of my scores. However, on a rescore of a random sample of the stories, a rank correlation coefficient (r_s) of .89 was obtained for n Achievement, .70 for n Affiliation, and .87 for n Power.

The second technique used in this study was to ask questions which could later be interpreted to indicate the presence or absence of certain motives. The questions were:

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[1]The scoring manuals may be found in John W. Atkinson, (ed.) Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society (Princeton, 1958), pp. 177-233.

[2]Several studies by psychologists using this test are published by Atkinson in the above cited volume. In political science, see R. P. Browning, Businessmen in Politics: Motivation and Circumstances in the Rise to Power, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale, 1960, and J. Guyot, Ph. D. dissertation in preparation, Yale, 1961.

Table 21: Do various Officials Enter Politics by Different Paths

Entered Politics Because--	Parish-Wide Officials	Policy-Makers	Minor Officials
NA	---	3.4%	14.3%
Asked by others	62.5%	44.8	33.3
Self-starter	---	35.5	28.6
Idealistic reasons	12.5	13.8	9.5
To emulate father	12.5	3.4	4.8
Other	12.5	---	9.5
Total	100.0%	100.9%	100.0%
	(N=8)	(N=29)	(N=21)

Table 22: Minor Officials are the Least Active in Civic Organizations

No. of Organizations in which Monthly Meeting is attended	Parish-Wide Officials	Policy Makers	Minor Officials
None	---	17.2%	23.8%
1-2	25.0%	20.7	38.0
3+	50.0	62.0	33.3
NA	25.0	---	4.8
	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%
	(N=8)	(N=29)	(N=21)

Table 23: Minor Officials Hold Office in Civic Organizations Least Frequently

No. of Organizations in which Official is an Officer	Parish-Wide Officials	Policy-makers	Minor Officials
None	37.5%	58.6%	71.5%
1	50.0	27.6	9.5
2	---	6.9	9.5
3+	---	6.9	4.8
NA	12.5	---	4.8
Totals	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%
	(N=8)	(N=29)	(N=21)

(1) Thinking back over your campaigns, what gave you the most satisfaction in campaigning? What left you least satisfied about the campaigning? Can you recall an incident in the last campaign to illustrate that?

(2) What has given you the most satisfaction since you have been in office? Can you recall an incident that would illustrate that? What aspect of your job has left you least satisfied?

(3) In what ways would you say holding public office has helped you? In what ways would you say it has hindered you?

The answers to these questions were recorded in full with a tape recorder and later analyzed to indicate what needs might have been satisfied by holding office. While the respondent was not asked to identify the motives himself, the assumption is that his satisfactions or dissatisfactions would reflect psychological needs which could be imputed to the individual.

The two measures are entirely independent. In coding answers to the questions, I did not know the respondent's test scores; likewise, on scoring the test, I remained unaware of the coded answers. As we shall see below, the measures obtained by the two techniques sometimes support each other while other times they appear to tap different levels of motivation.

The responses to the questions reveal a fairly clear pattern of the satisfactions perceived by the parish officials. Meeting other people appears to offer satisfaction to the largest number of officials in our sample (Table 24). This response seems to reflect none of the three projective measures. Rather it appears to indicate a combination of sociability (but not the need for friendship) and the desire to be among people--to be seen, heard, and spoken about. Indeed, another 12% of the sample specifically mentioned that they liked speaking to meetings or knocking on doors during their campaign. Perhaps the appropriate label for this characteristic is n Exhibition, the need to exhibit oneself.[1]

The joy of winning was also mentioned by another segment of the sample. Those giving this response apparently constituted the most highly motivated officials in our sample, for they also ranked high on n Power as shown by the McClelland Test (Table 25) and found helping others to constitute the principal satisfaction of holding office. Moreover, office-holding added to their prestige in the community. Only one of them felt that his public position had hindered him in any way. This cluster of traits--the only discernible one in the sample--apparently characterizes the most intensely motivated officials of the group.

The query, "What left you least satisfied during the campaign?" elicited a wide range of responses (Table 27). When we group those which indicate a

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[1]Cf. H. A. Murray, et al., Explorations in Personality (New York, 1938).

Table 24: What Did Officials Like Best About Campaigning

Meeting other people	45.8%
Speaking to meetings	11.9
Winning	16.9
Didn't like anything	11.9
Other	3.4
NA	10.2
Total (N-59)	100.1%

Table 25: Need Power is Positively Correlated with Liking to Win the Campaign

Liked Best About Campaigning	n Power High	n Power Low
Winning	7	2
Other responses	18	23

x^2 (test of independence) =5.81; significant at .05 level.

Table 26: Those Who Liked "Winning" Best and Had High n Power Score. Also Gain Satisfaction from Helping Others and from Gaining Prestige; They Feel Public Office Has Hindered Them in No Way

	Most Satisfying Aspect of Office	How Helped by Office	How Hindered by Office
Helping Others	4	---	---
Civic Accomp.	1	---	---
Salary	1	---	---
Prestige	---	5	---
In no way hindered			5
Hindered financially			1
	6*	5**	6**

*Seventh respondent failed to answer this question.

**Sixth and seventh respondent failed to answer this question.

Table 27: What Did Elected Officials Like Least About Campaigning

Inter-personal relations		
Conflicts with others	6.8%	
Mud slinging	23.7	
Knocking on Doors/making speeches	8.5	
Rebuffs from people	10.2	
		49.2%
Time away from family		3.4
Compromises involved		6.8
Hard work		13.6
Nothing Respondent didn't like		15.3
Other		1.7
NA		10.2
Total (N=59)		100.2%

Table 28: Those Who Mentioned "Conflict with Others" and "Mudslinging" Had High n Affiliation Scores

Liked least about campaigning	n Affiliation High	Low
Conflicts with others	3	1
Mudslinging	6	4
Other responses	16	20
Total	25	25

x^2 (test of independence) = 2.02; not significant at .05 level

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Table 29: What Did Elected Officials Cite as Most Satisfying Aspect of Office

Civic Accomplishment	35.6%
Helping Others	23.7
Being in on things	6.8
Recognition by superiors or community	6.8
Salary	5.1
Making Friends	1.7
Nothing	3.4
Other	11.9
NA	5.1
Total (N=59)	100.1%

sensitivity to personal relationships, we find that almost half the sample found compaigning a threat to their self-perception as likeable individuals. Only two of these items, however, are slightly related to the need for friendship as measured by the projective test: those who mentioned "Conflicts with others" and "mud-slinging" more often had high n Affiliation scores than low ones (Table 28). However, quite inexplicably those who cited "rebuffs from people" more frequently had low n Affiliation scores than high ones.

A wide range of activities described the satisfying aspects of office holding (Table 29). Officials named civic accomplishments of one sort or another most frequently; helping people was the second most frequent response. Surprisingly few mentioned recognition from others in the community or the making of friends and meeting people. Evidently, officials perceive themselves in office quite differently than during campaigns. The two activities satisfy different needs. Whereas campaigning permits exhibitionist behavior, office-holding allows the individual to achieve a record of accomplishments or to act as a benefactor to his constituents. Satisfaction in civic accomplishments appears positively related to the desire to excel, n Achievement, but helping people is not related to n Power even though the position of a benefactor sometimes implies the wielding of power (Table 30).

As with campaigning, the most disturbing feature of office holding was "conflict with others." Almost half the sample spontaneously mentioned incidents which could be so classified; the remaining responses were scattered over several other categories (Table 31). Those who mentioned conflict with others as a dissatisfying aspect of their work evidently were more sensitive to personal relationships than the rest of the sample, for most had high n Affiliation scores (Table 32).

When the respondents were asked how their public positions had helped or hindered them, the question once more elicited a broad variety of responses which tapped somewhat different dimensions than the other questions (Tables 33 & 34). For the first time, prestige became an important factor, even when not suggested by the interviewer's probe. Making friends and meeting people also was frequently mentioned although in some cases, such responses could well be classified under the "prestige" rubric, for the official meant that he met higher status people on an equal footing and was introduced to a hitherto closed sector of the community life. Finally, direct and indirect financial gains were admitted for the first time by almost 1/5 of the sample. In some cases, officials admitted that much of their business was the indirect result of their political activity. One insurance salesman, for instance, stated that all his customers came to him in return for favors he had done them while in office. For some others, the per diem pay constituted a welcome supplement to their income although the general income level of this sample of officials makes it dubious that salary constituted a principal inventive for holding office. Only 7% of the officials mentioned power gains as one of the benefits of office. Although the numbers are extremely small, 3/4 of those respondents also had high n Power scores on the McClelland test.

Table 30A: Satisfaction in Civic Improvement Is Positively Correlated with High n Achievement Score

Most Satisfying Aspect of Office	n Achievement High	Low
Civic Accomplishments	15	6
Other responses	10	19
	25	25

x^2 (test of independence) = 6.62; significant at .05 level

30B: Satisfaction in Helping People Is Not Correlated with High n Power Score

Most Satisfying Aspect of Office	n Power High	Low
Helping Others	7	9
Other Responses	18	16
	25	25

x^2 (test of Independence) = .91; not significant at .05 level

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Table 31: What Did Officials Cite as Least Satisfying Aspect of Office

Not being respected	1.7
Conflict with others	49.2%
Frustration of efforts	10.2
Being asked for help	10.2
Hard work	6.8
Being called names	1.7
Nothing cited	10.2
Other	1.7
NA	8.5
Total (N=59)	100.2%

Table 32: Conflict with Others is Positively Correlated with High n Affiliation Score

Least Satisfying Aspect of Office	n Affiliation High	Low
Conflict with others	18	8
Other responses	7	17
	25	25

x^2 (test of independence) = 8.00; significant at .01 level.

Table 33: How Were Officials Helped by Holding Office

Prestige Gains		
Spontaneous response	23.7%	
When suggested by interviewer's probe	6.8	
		30.5%
Financially		
Directly	6.8	
In business	10.2	
		17.0
Friends made		8.5
People met		13.6
Knowledge gained		8.5
Power gained		6.8
Sense of security		1.7
In no way Helped		3.4
Made respondent a happy man		1.7
NA		8.5
Total (N=59)		100.2%

Table 34: How Were Officials Hindered by Holding Office

Financially	10.2%
Business hurt	8.5
Time lost	11.9
Friends lost	1.7
Health harmed	1.7
Lost prestige	1.7
In no way hindered	54.2
NA	10.2
Total (N=59)	100.1%

Table 35: N Achievement and n Power Scores of Louisiana Officials and of Political and Civic Inactives in an Eastern City

	Median n Achievement Score	Median n Power Score
Louisiana Officials	8	6
Eastern Pol. Inactives*	6	4.5
Eastern Civic Inactives*	7	5

*Source: Browning, op cit., pp. 214-15.

Most officials felt that their holding a public office had hindered them in no way at all. Of those who felt that office-holding had hindered them in some way, financial loss was mentioned most frequently. Indeed, officials claimed financial loss more frequently than they admitted pecuniary gains. Far more surprising is the infrequency of responses which would indicate the same sensitivity to personal relationships displayed in the response to other questions. Officials evidently dread conflict with others and fear the loss of friendships far more frequently than they admit the occurrence of such consequences.

In this sample of officials few clusters of the traits revealed by the questions could be discerned. One must, therefore, limit the characterization of these locally elected officials to the frequency of certain responses. In summary, local officials seemed to derive most satisfaction during campaigns from meeting people and being seen in public; in office, they derived most satisfaction from civic accomplishments and helping people; in the long run they perceived prestige gains, gains in personal acquaintences, and financial gains. On the other hand, they disliked many of the personal contacts which campaigns necessitate and dreaded conflict with others. Most felt that holding office hindered them in no way; when it did, it was because of alleged financial losses and time losses rather than because of the loss of friendships.

The results of the projective test add comparatively little to this characterization. Because of faulty research design, the test was not administered to a control group which would allow comparison with political inactives. However, comparison is possible with the results of Browning's study of Eastern businessmen in politics. The Louisiana officials made about the same scores on the three motives as did the elected officials in Browning's sample.[1] As expected, the Louisiana officials scored higher in n Power than the civic and political inactives of Browning's sample, although the difference is only one point (Table 35). Louisiana politicians also made higher n Achievement scores than Browning's inactives. Furthermore, as in Browning's sample, those officials who ranked high in N Power ranked low in n Affiliation (Table 36); this finding then supports the hypothesis that those politicians motivated by power needs are not intensely interested in establishing close friendships. Perhaps the most striking result was the range of scores obtained from the test. Some of the sample were extremely highly motivated in seeking achievement, friendship, or power. But these were fully matched by office-holders who had zero scores on the three measures. Perhaps the testing procedure was faulty; I would rather suspect that the officials indeed represent all levels of these motivations. Other motives which the test did not tap appeared stronger among the office holders--particularly the desire to help others (n Succorance in Murray's terminology) and the desire to be known, seen, and heard (n Exhibition).

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[1]See Browning, op. cit., pp. 214-15.

Unfortunately the Louisiana scores cannot be compared to those resulting from Veroff's administration of the test to a national sample.[1] The raw scores of that study have not yet been published. Moreover, Veroff used different pictures thus making a direct comparison impossible. However, one of Veroff's reported results is supported by the present study. As in Veroff's research, the better educated respondents in Louisiana had high n Achievement scores; moreover, they also possessed low n Power scores. Thus, those officials occupying the most powerful positions usually had n Power scores below the median for our sample. One plausible explanation is that higher education and the general socialization process associated with it produces a more complex motivational structure in the individual. Such a person no longer overtly thinks in terms of power even though his actions indicate a desire to control others. A crude test of this hypothesis is presented in Table 37 where the mean number of motives scorable from the questions asked in the interview is listed according to the educational attainment of the respondents. As expected, those officials with the best education have the most scorable motives. However, the differences are not great enough to put much confidence in the results.

As with the sociological characteristics, the three kinds of officials differ systematically in regard to satisfactions derived from their public life. Satisfaction from civic accomplishments is unique to policy-making officials who are part-time politicians; 61.5% of such officials mentioned it as their principal satisfaction. Not one Justice of the Peace or Constable mentioned civic accomplishment as a principal satisfaction of holding office; only 25% of the top county officials did so. These answers do not merely reflect different opportunities in office, for a constable can take pride in local law enforcement and a JP can derive satisfaction from his efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency. Certainly county-wide officials like the sheriff, assessor, and clerk of court have innumerable opportunities for civic accomplishments in which they can later take pride. Rather than reflecting different opportunities, these responses appear to indicate different perspectives among the various officials. The top level officials and minor ones appear to derive greater satisfaction from personal dealings with constituents; 37.5% of the county-wide officials and 50% of the minor ones mentioned helping other people as their principal satisfaction. In contrast, only 3.2% of the policy-makers mentioned it. Policy-makers take a more impersonal view of their duties. They mention buildings, street improvements, sewerage projects as their satisfaction. Such concern with civic improvements is also directly related to n Achievement, the desire to excel. Of the 17 policy-makers who mentioned civic accomplishment and on whom we have an n Achievement score, 14 scored above the median while only 3 scored below it.[2] A general concern for doing something well seems, therefore, to be reflected in the desire of policy-makers to effect civic improvements.

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[1] Joseph Veroff, et al., "The Use of Thematic Apperception to Assess Motivation in a Nationwide Interview Study," Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 74 (1960).

[2] x^2 (test of independence) = 10.8; significant at .01 level.

Table 36: High Need for Friendship (n Affiliation) Is Negatively Correlated with High Need to Influence Others (n Power)

	n Affiliation	
n Power	High	Low
High	8	17
Low	17	8
	25	25

x^2 (test of independence) = 8.00; significant at .01 level.

Table 37: Mean Number of Scorable Motives by Education Attained

Grade School	3.14
High School	3.31
College	4.00

The more personal approach typical of minor officials is also reflected in their description of the least satisfying aspect of their office. Sixty per-cent of the lower officials disliked conflict with others; only 37.5% of the top officials and 39% of the policy-makers mentioned it. In every way, minor officials perceived their public role in personal rather than policy terms. The other elected officials chose a somewhat more impersonal interpretation.

VI. Conclusions

This investigation clearly supports important portions of our theoretical model. Most officials indeed come from brokerage occupations. While they do not necessarily come from political active families or participate in civic clubs to a significant degree, they do come from among the most deeply rooted members of the community and were frequently recruited into public life by friends or acquaintances who already were in politics. Moreover, the officials under study here were clearly motivated by a desire to be seen in public and to be able to help others. The desire for power and prestige is much weaker according to our evidence. Their sensitivity to personal conflicts reflects the dilemna resulting from the combination of exhibitionist behavior and relative disinterest in closer personal friendships. As far as this study could ascertain, the desire for wealth was not a central concern of these officials, nor was it likely to be, given their relative affluence in the community.

The study points to the need for a more careful examination of the motivational set which brings individuals to the political arena. The projective test used in this study was certainly not utilized to full advantage. Its more careful use may reveal more clearly the extent to which a relatively high desire for power and a relatively low desire for friendship distinguish public officials from the general population.

Another finding which can usefully direct future research is that many local officials do not engage in politics as an occupation as Weber would have it. Rather, they are hobbyists. Their commitment to public life is a partial one. They are professionals in no sense of the term. This means that their psychological motivation probably does not distinguish them as clearly from the general population as we hypothesized. It also means that more non-brokers may win office than we expected, for the skill requirements of local positions are not as high as with full-time ones and the opportunities to win such posts are abundant.

These conclusions may well form the working hypotheses of subsequent studies. They certainly cannot be canonized into broad generalizations, for the sample is by no means representative of the half million elected officials serving local governments. They point, I hope, to intriguing and important hypotheses which must be substantiated or displaced if we are to understand local politics more fully.

APPENDIX

Classification of Occupations into Brokerage & Non-Brokerage Categories

Brokerage	Non-Brokerage
Upper status	
Banker (in small town)	Ice-cream plant owner
Lawyer	
Middle status	
Supermarket owner	Factory foreman
Building contractor	Clerical employee
Merchant	Oil depot superintendent
Independent farmer	
Insurance salesman	
Small loan company owner	
Wholesale cattle dealer	
Realtor	
Wholesale liquor salesman	
Fur dealer	
Teacher--principal	
Newspaper reporter	
Lumber yard owner	
Sewing machine franchise owner	
Automobile salesman	
Lower status	
Corner grocer	Boiler-room worker
Glazier who owns own business	Pile-driver operator
Service Station owner	Tester at refinery
Barber	Packer
Butcher	Engineer at ice house
Bar tender/owner of bar	Barrel maker (Cooper)
Route salesman	Refrigeration Mechanic
Plumber working for himself	Farm Laborer
Radio repair shop owner	Telephone repairman
Electrical contractor (working for and by himself)	Fisherman
	Day Laborer
	Millwright
	Railroad watchman
	Packing plant butcher
	Carpenter in Factory
	Pipe-fitter
	House mover working for someone else
Unclassified as to status	Housewife

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THEORY AND PRACTICE IN AMERICAN POLITICS

(For presentation to a panel on the contribution of universities to political theory, at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, Missouri, Sept. 6, 1961)

Harry V. Jaffa

Our subject is a broad one. For convenience, I shall adopt the view that there has been no significant relation between American universities and political theory because there has not been any significant American theorizing about politics. I am aware, of course, that thousands of books of political theory have been written by Americans, including many members of universities. Some of them are very good books. Perhaps among them there may even be a great one. Whatever its excellence, however, I doubt that it stands in a similar relation to American political experience that the Republic of Plato or the Politics of Aristotle stands in relation to Hellenic political experience, or the Republic of Cicero to Roman experience. It is in this particular sense that I do not think we have had any American political theory. Yet the American experience ranks in some ways, in my opinion, with the Athens of Pericles and of Socrates, with the Rome of Brutus and of Cicero, with the empire-church of Dante and Aquinas, with the England of Elizabeth and of Shakespeare (as well as that of Macaulay and Churchill). The American form of government, in its failures as well as in its successes, reveals possibilities in the nature of man as a political animal as distinctive in their way as any revealed by any other regime in the great drama of western history, possibilities that may have gone unrevealed but for their American apocalypse.

It is true that there has been nothing to prevent anyone who, like Socrates in the Republic, set out to imagine forms of government, from imagining this

one. With some slight emendations, it would not be difficult to compound such a form from the political elements enumerated in the fourth book of Aristotle's Politics. And it would be a shallow presumptuousness to suppose that, because such a compound does not spring to the eye from the pages of Aristotle or his sucessors in a shape recognizable to a text-book writer in American government, that the idea of such a compound had escaped them. But if there is a characteristic theme in American political thought, it is that ours is a great experiment, and that no imagination of such a form of government, any more than any mere hypothesis, can reveal the truth about it. "It has frequently been remarked," wrote Hamilton in the first Federalist,

> that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force.

A generation later the young Abraham Lincoln spoke of the Founding Fathers thus:

> Their ambition aspired to display before an admiring world, a practical demonstration of the truth of a proposition, which had hitherto been considered at best no better, than problematical; namely, the capability of a people to govern themselves.

And still another generation later:

> Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.

Certainly the ideas of government by reflection and choice, or of free government, were not new under the sun. But that the validity of such ideas depended, not upon their own cogency, or upon their cogency when tested by experience anywhere, but upon the experience of the American people alone,

is novel. No Hebrew prophet sounded the theme of the holy nation with greater fervour than did American orators of the golden age. Here is Edward Everett, on the fiftieth anniversary of the great Declaration, the day also of the apotheosis of Adams and Jefferson.

> If we fail...not only do we defraud our children of the inheritance which we received from our fathers, but we blast the hopes of the friends of liberty throughout our continent, throughout Europe, throughout the world, to the end of time.

The genius of American politics* to borrow the title of Professor Boorstin's important book, is somehow connected with the uniqueness of the American experience. But what is unique cannot be the subject of generalization, and hence of theory. "We have traditionally held out to the world," writes Boorstein, "not our doctrine, but our example. The idea of America as the last best hope of mankind has not been the idea that America would outdo other ages and places with its philosophy. It was life, and not thought, which would excel here." I would only observe concerning the foregoing, that the dichotomy of life and thought is predicated upon the failure of philosophy as a guide to life. What would replace philosophy as such a guide, cannot be rightly called by the name of the thing it replaces. An American philosophy--in any but the loosest use of the latter term, to mean any American opinions whatever--can be regarded as a contradiction in terms. In this sense an American political theory would also be a contradiction, and this is why it can be said that there has not been any American theorizing about politics.

*The Genius of American Politics, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. All quotations from Boorstin are from this work.

That the United States is a kind of second Israel has been a powerful metaphor in both the acting and interpreting of American history. The exodus from Egypt (or the Old World), the trials in the Wilderness (or upon the Frontier), the expulsion of the Philistines (or Indians) from the Promised Land, the Punishment of the Suffering Servant for disobedience to the Law (the Civil War), all have confirmed the Messianic image upon the American mind and heart. The fact that most disagreements in American politics have been expressed as differences in the interpretation of the Constitution (the Torah or Law) has constantly re-confirmed this figure. From the battles between Hamilton and Jefferson as to whether the Constitution ought to be construed broadly or narrowly until the present dispute over federal aid to education and medical care for the aged, an amazing variety of substantive political questions have been assimilated to the identical questions of constitutional interpretation. Yet the primary cause of the messianic theme in American history has been the conviction supremely expressed in the Gettysburg Address, the consummation of a rhetorical tradition of fourscore and seven years, that the universal fate of mankind would be determined by what was done here by one people.

Professor Boorstin has argued forcefully that the American Revolution no less than the Civil War was a struggle over the interpretation of a constitution to which all parties paid allegiance, and which united them in matters of theory or principle even as they divided in practice. While agreeing with much of his argument, as far as it goes, I do not think it explains sufficiently why American political experience makes such claims to uniqueness or, still more, why Boorstin himself finds it to be so unique. Following Tocqueville, Boorstin notes that Americans are not only an untheoretical people, but in

many great matters unheretical as well. Their massive agreement on the dogmas central to their way of life has tended to put an end to serious controversy concerning them. What is not seriously disputed is eventually not even thought about. The absence of heresy leads to a drying up of the well-springs of conviction without any conviction being overturned. Opinions do indeed change, but they replace rather than displace each other. Boorstin has described brilliantly (particularly in The Americans: The Colonial Experience, Random House, New York, 1959) how the Puritan theology in New England, being unchallenged there (unlike its position in Old England), served its vital purpose in providing the imperatives that the Pilgrims obeyed in building their New Jerusalem. And he has further described how, having built that Jerusalem, the conditions were destroyed that made their theology believable. A vindictive deity was simply incredible amidst the prosperity and worldly success that the belief in a vindictive deity had created. It is an oversimplification of some convenience to say that the Puritan theology was scarcely doubted until the moment when it was no longer believed. Although Puritan theology was, in terms of its inherent logic, utterly incompatible with the idea of man's perfectibility, it served as the practical prologue to it. The evangelical reform movements of the nineteenth century--abolitionism, prison reform, temperance, the emancipation of women, and many others--all expressed the ancient Puritan drive for salvation. But this salvation was now to be achieved in this world, from which it was held that sin could, in practice, be finally expelled: ultimately by man's work rather than God's grace, if a distinction could in fact any longer be drawn between the two. Indeed, by the middle of the nineteenth century the descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers were quite certain as to

what they should do about the world, but they were at a loss what to do about God. This dilemma, however, and with it many others, was resolved by the Civil War, as Lincoln finally interpreted it.

According to Boorstin such American whig notions of government as a contract, and of the relation between property, representation, and personal liberty were also inheritances from Old England; but in this country they did not have to make their way in continuous conflict with contradictory ideas from a feudal, class structured, Tory past. The thematic text for Boorstin's work, as for that of Louis Hartz's Liberal Tradition in America, is Tocqueville's noted aphorism, "...the American...has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution...he is born equal without having to become so." According to Tocqueville, in France as elsewhere in Europe, new institutions evolved continually in a seven hundred years' providential march of the principle of equality. The victories of equality, however gradual, have been uninterrupted, but they have usually been the result of sharp and deadly conflict. In America, however, the progress of equality has been virtually uncontested. Boorstin also follows Tocqueville in holding that God and nature have conspired to provide in a virgin continent an environment which harmonized far better with equality than with the inegalitarianism of the Old World. I would mention in passing that it seems to me that Turner's frontier thesis is an adaptation of Tocqueville's, but it would be utterly absurd to derive the democratic notions of the American frontiersman from the American frontier without first observing the point to which the idea of equality had evolved in Europe when the Anglo-Americans crossed the Atlantic and came to inhabit a frontier. However, that these ideas should develop differently when placed in an American "state

of nature" than amidst the fleshpots of Europe's inegalitarian past is entirely intelligible. Still, the idea of the unique providential association of the idea of equality with the American wilderness, which became the promised land of the whole human race, owes as much to the pre-egalitarian Hebraic roots of European culture as to the Anglo-American whig tradition of political freedom. It is where these roots join that we must look for the specifically American idea of uniqueness, a uniqueness that, while obviously springing from theory, yet seems to reject and defy theory.

****

In his account of the American Revolution, Boorstin maintains that the Declaration of Independence, truly indicating the character of the entire event, is above all "technical, legalistic, and conservative" in character. He contrasts it with the later French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen which he quotes Tocqueville as describing as dealing "with the citizen in the abstract, independent of particular social organizations, just as religions deal with mankind in general*, independent of time and place. It inquired, not what were the particular rights of the French citizens, but what were the general rights and duties of mankind in reference to political concerns." It tended, said Tocqueville, "rather to the regeneration of the human race than to the reform of France alone." In contrast, says Boorstin, "our Declaration of Independence is essentially a list of specific historical instances...It is closely tied to time and place...it is concerned with the duties of a particular king and certain of his subjects." "Even if we took only the first two paragraphs or preamble," Boorstin continues, "...we could make a good case for their being merely a succinct restatement of the Whig theory of the British revolution of 1688."

*We will forego the questions of whether, e.g. the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob did in fact "deal with mankind in general".

Still further in this vein, Boorstin notes that the work of the ultra-conservative Blackstone was the bible of American lawyers of the revolutionary era, and he regards the legalism of the Declaration of Independence as very much in the spirit of Blackstone's exposition of the common law.

Let us first take up this last point. The law of nature, of which our Declaration speaks in its opening sentence, is also spoken of by Blackstone thus:

> This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

Blackstone, in accordance with that most conservative of English traditions, as set forth in the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, by Richard Hooker, the "judicious Hooker," whom John Locke quotes in the celebrated Second Treatise of Civil Government, regarded the liberties of Englishmen as things which must be observed and preserved by governments precisely because they were derived "mediately or immediately" from the law of nature. And this law in itself dealt with man and citizen "in the abstract...independent of time and place." Abraham Lincoln (whom Boorstin cites as a student of Blackstone) wrote upon the occasion of Jefferson's birthday in 1859:

> All honor to Jefferson--to the man who, in the concrete pressure of a struggle for national independence by a single people, had the coolness, forecast, and capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document, an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times...

Boorstin is quite correct, I think, in holding the preamble of our Declaration to be "a succinct restatement of the Whig theory of the revolution of 1688." But it would be wrong to believe it to be "conservative" for that reason, in

the sense that an appeal to mere prescriptive right is conservative. It is, however, conservative in the truer sense that it is founded upon the most ancient of all possible laws. Since the law of nature is "coeval with mankind" it is older than any British law as such, and if British law more accurately reflects nature than any other positive law, then it also better reflects the most ancient of laws. In this sense, to be peculiarly British is to be peculiarly conservative. I do not think Boorstin has sufficiently taken into account how profoundly the Whig revolution of 1688 assimilated the "ancient British constitution" to which it appealed, on one level of its rhetoric, to the dictates of the still more ancient law of nature. The compact between the king and his people, which James II was held to have violated was, as an historical fact, mostly a figment of Whig imaginations. The important thing about this supposed ancient constitution was that it was conceived in contractual terms, ultimately upon the contractual terms systematically set forth by John Locke, and succinctly summarized by Jefferson. With this summary in mind Lincoln wrote that "The principles of Jefferson are the definitions and axioms of free society;" and the contract which constitutes a free constitution (which may or may not be the British constitution) can be understood as the inferences and deductions made from those definitions and axioms. Although Jefferson, in common with most of the other colonists, appealed to British law and precedent as long as it was convenient to do so, and insofar as it was convenient to do so (which the Whigs of 1688 had also done), our Revolution, when it was finally decided upon, broke cleanly with the past. Nothing, except the Declaration, better expresses the spirit of 1776 than the young Hamilton's famous peroration:

> The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.

The quarrel of the American colonists with Great Britain, because it started as an intra-Whig, intra-British quarrel, did not at first fully reveal its natural law and natural right premises. This was because the colonists could for a time take the British constitution as an exemplification of the principles of nature and of nature's God. Boorstin says that our Declaration "is directed not to the regeneration but only the 'opinions' of mankind." More precisely, respect for the opinions of mankind required the American people to declare the causes of their separation from Great Britain. The legalistic indictment of the King, which Boorstin regards as the heart of the Declaration, declares only the "efficient" causes of that separation. The "formal" cause is "to institute new government" such as shall seem to the people "most likely to effect their safety and happiness." But the "final" cause is most assuredly to secure the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The new institution of government may not have been a "regeneration," but it was most certainly a "generation" if we are to believe what Lincoln said at Gettysburg.

Once the break with Britain was consummated ideas of natural law and natural right played a role altogether unprecedented in British whiggery. The American Revolution thereupon became something radically different from the English revolution of the preceding century. Boorstin follows the tradition of Edmund Burke, who held that the Americans in 1775 stood in the same relation to England as England stood in relation to James II in 1688. Mighty as the

authority of Burke, I believe Tom Paine, a lesser man, is a more authentic guide to American thought of the period. Paine's Rights of Man, a bitter attack upon Burke' Revolution in France, appeared in America under the patronage of Jefferson, who regarded Burke as a traitor to whig principles. "America was the only spot in the political world where the principles of universal reformation could begin," Paine wrote. But he believed, as did Jefferson, that the French Revolution was the natural consequence of the American, and that sooner or later the rest of the world would follow both. The right of revolution affirmed in the Declaration of Independence was, Lincoln said in 1848, "a most valuable, a most sacred right--a right which, we hope and believe, is to liberate the world." Even before the break with Great Britain Paine, expressing what was rapidly becoming the popular temper, denounced the British Constitution as a primitive relic of a barbarous past

> "The prejudice of Englishmen, in favor of their own government," he wrote in Common Sense, arises as much or more from national pride than reason. Individuals are undoubtedly safer in England than in some other countries: but the will of the king is as much the law of the land in Britain as in France, with this difference, that instead of proceeding directly from his mouth, it is handed to the people under the formidable shape of an act of parliament. For the fate of Charles I hath only made kings more subtle--not more just."

Paine conceded there were some elements of Freedom--some republican elements--in the British Constitution; but the monarchical elements overburdened the whole. As the American Revolution progressed, and as it later was renewed in the great popular movements led by Jefferson and Jackson, monarchy and aristocracy came to be detested by the American people. Paine was a radical in his own day, but his radicalism became the orthodoxy of a later day. Let us again consult that oracle of ultra-respectable American whiggery, Edward Everett:

> The whigs (of 16[illegible]3) maintained that the foundation of government was an 'original contract'; but of this contract the existing organization was the record and the evidence,

> and the obligation was perpetually binding...But to say that the form of government is matter of original compact with the people; that my ancestors, ages ago, agreed that they and their posterity, to the end of time, should give up to a certain line of princes the rule of state; that nothing but extreme necessity, a necessity which it is treasonable to define beforehand, justifies a departure from this compact, in which no provision is made that the will of the majority prevail... seems to me to be a use of language not in itself more rational (than that of the tories.)

Fifty years after independence no American statesman found much virtue in institutions older than the nation, unless they had been adopted on their merits by rational Americans. Jefferson's famous doctrine, that the earth belonged only to the living, and that no constitution or law should have a longer tenure than nineteen years (the approximate life of one generation), however impracticable, indicated an enduring bias in American thought a bias as hostile to the past and to precedent as the First Commandment.

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the slogan of the Revolution. But, as the Declaration correctly indicates, this is a deduction from the axiom of equality. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of equals who join in civil society to secure their inherent rights to life and to liberty. Property is a support of life, and the enlargement of property an enlargement of liberty. For this reason it is a duty of government to make property secure, and this in turn cannot be accomplished if government can take property for purposes not approved by the representatives of the people. For this reason, taxation without representation is illegitimate. But the principle of principles, to repeat, was "Mankind being originally equals in the order of creation" (Paine), "...all men are naturally in...a state of perfect freedom...[and] also of equality...there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species...should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection..." (Locke), and finally "All men are created equal."

On the Fourth of July, 1828, Edward Everett expressed the common conviction of the heirs of the Revolution when he declaimed:

> We celebrate the return of the day on which our separate national existence was declared; the day when the momentous experiment was commenced, by which the world, and posterity, and we ourselves were to be taught, how far a nation of men can be trusted with self-government--how far life, and liberty, and property are safe, and the progress of social improvement is secure, under the influence of laws made by those who are to obey them; the day when, for the first time in the world [italics added] a numerous people was ushered into the family of nations, organized on the principle of the political equality of all the citizens.

The experience of the American people with the principle of equality was unprecedented, and because the conditions were uniquely favorable to the experiment, it could be assumed that the relation of the principle of

equality to human government would be more completely disclosed now than it could be at any other place or time. The uniqueness of the American experience provides a theoretical justification, as we observed before, for the judgment that there cannot be a theory of that experience. In this I find myself in agreement with Boorstin, but I believe the idea of America's uniqueness requires as its corollary the rejection of the essential continuity of American and British experience. And it further requires I believe a correction of the view that Americans have traditionally agreed upon political ends or goals, and upon the fundamentals of the constitutional order. Boorstin observes that here we have not had the basic disagreements that plague European politics, disagreements as to the relation of church and state (although the latter have arisen lately in connection with federal aid to education), disagreements as to the merits of monarchy and republicanism, or of communism, fascism, and constitutional democracy. And he rightly says that we should not complain because our political scene lacks the intellectual wealth--and political poverty--generated by conflicts of this order. But it seems to me that he commits a species of the error he warns against--viz., judging American politics by European standards--when he infers from our lack of European-type disagreements that American disagreements have not been equally significant and profound. Yet the Civil War provides ample evidence that Americans have disagreed, and do disagree, as profoundly as Europeans. The disagreements of Americans do not fail of being disagreements concerning ends because they are not the kinds of disagreements that characterize European politics. "The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty," said Lincoln in the midst of the Civil War, "and the American people, just now, are much in

want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing." Commitment to the principle of equality (and of liberty as an implication of equality) did not terminate disagreements concerning ends, it only transformed them. American politics is unprecedented, and unique, in that in it alone all disagreements have ultimately been disagreements concerning the true import and meaning of equality. The theoretical homogeneity imposed upon American politics by the providential irresistability of the idea of equality has tended to conceal the very genuine heterogeneity within that homogeneity. In American politics alone do we have the genuine discovery, in action, of the antinomies contained within the idea of equality; in American politics we find therefore the problematic nature of the future of humanity—already irrevocably committed by providence, as Tocqueville said, to the principle of equality.

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In dedicating itself to the proposition that all men are created equal, the American republic became the first nation, in the history of the world, to enter upon the stage of independent existence, claiming independence not in virtue of its own particular qualities, but in virtue of a right that it shared with all men everywhere. Paradoxical though it seem, by being the first to raise the standard of universal rights as the ground for political action, America achieved that uniqueness which has set it apart among the nations. Other nations might follow us--if we succeeded--but for no other nation would the venture be unprecedented, and no other nation could claim the honor which the novelty of our situation made possible.

How novel the idea was, of founding a particular political order upon the idea of universal rights, may be indicated by comparing the Declaration of Independence with the most famous of all political books, Plato's Republic. In the Republic there is, you will recall, a myth, the "noble lie" upon which the education of the guardian class is based. In one part of that myth is the story that the birth and nurture of the guardians, their entire lives until maturity, have been underground, within the very earth of their native land. This is Plato's re-telling of the ancient Athenian myth of autocthony: that the first Athenians had sprung from the gound itself and, therefore, that the ground from which Athenians came was theirs in a sense which no other human beings could ever claim. The Athenian myth, immortalized in the Republic, expresses the meaning of the consciousness of a motherland with vivid literalness. With this it expresses the idea that the particular rights which are Athenian--even if Athens is a democracy--are rights which Athenians share with no one else. It meant that to be an Athenian was a more fundamental fact for the sharers of the myth than to be a human being. What divided them from all non-Athenians was paramount, what they had in common with others was, by comparison, trivial. Although I cannot here argue the matter in detail, I think it is no exaggeration to say that there was no great political community before 1776 which did not have at its psychological foundation a myth which performed for it substantially the functions of the Athenian myth. Indeed, paradoxical though it may seem, the very fact that the doctrine of the universal rights of man was the negation of the idea of patriotism as it had hitherto existed enabled it to act as the unifying and patriotic theme in American politics.

What has been the unifying and patriotic theme of American politics has not however always united the American people. Boorstin says that the Civil War

would have been inconceivable without the great differences "of soil, climate, and topography." It would also have been inconceivable without the Declaraction of Independence, which asserted as the basis of our politics principles which transcended local differences. The oneness of humanity, and its rights, amidst the multiplicity of nations, races, climates, and religions, being asserted in the Declaration, the American republic from its outset had to demonstrate the political relevance of that unity. This it could only do by demonstrating the viability of free political institutions embracing a wider variety of human conditions than had existed hitherto. The variety of "soil, climate, and topography" was a cause of the Civil War only because the American republic called for a different and far closer kind of political union than any previous federal system. As Professor Martin Diamond has shown ("The Founders' Idea of Federalism," Public Affairs Conference Center, January 1961), a federal union, in the accepted eighteenth century usage, meant a league of free and independent states. In the 39th Federalist Madison says plainly that "The proposed Constitution...is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both." According to the accepted notion of sovereignty, a national government would be one based upon the sovereignty of the nation, a federal government one based upon the sovereignty of the states. And sovereignty itself was something essentially indivisible! It was, as a wit has remarked, like chastity: it could not be surrendered in part. The Constitution is then an anomaly. Or, more accurately, it defies the terminology, and the logic, of pre-existing political experience. And it leaves it to the American people to discover in practice, what is an anomaly in theory, the oneness of the many.

The problem of the relation of the general to the particular, of the one to the many, is of the essence of American politics, deriving from the assertion of universal human equality. The differences which led to the Civil War were an essential test of the practicability of that politics. Boorstin says, entirely correctly, that the state-rights tradition was as strong in New England as in the South, and loyalty to the Union was--until the slavery controversy became acute--as strong in the South as in the North. It was, I believe, inherent in the ambiguity of a national-federal union that any state or section, when defending its particular interests, should raise the banner of state-rights. For the essence of the idea of state-rights is that the states created the Union--that the many created the one--as it is the essence of the idea of national supremacy that the Union created the states--that the One created Many. And the powers of the central government vis-a-vis the states are decided one way if one adopts one assumption, and another way if one adopts the other.

As the thirty-ninth Federalist indicates, the Constitution itself is completely equivocal with respect to the touchstone of its own interpretation. The tenth amendment, reserving to the states "and to the people" what it does not delegate to the United States, does not give so much as a hint as to how one can distinguish reserved from delegated powers. Behind the Constitution, however, we find in the Declaration of Independence itself precisely the same ambiguity. Who is it who declared independence?

> ...the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress, Assembled...do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies...declare That these United Colonies are...Free and Independent States...

But does the Declaration declare these states to be free and independent individually or collectively? That is, in achieving independence of Great Britain, did they simultaneously achieve independence of each other? The preamble of the Declaration speaks of the necessity "for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another." At the end, where the plural "states" is used, the "people" of the colonies are referred to in the singular. The expression "one people" could of course mean "any people," and the singular "people" could be a collective noun signifying "everyone." But in the indictment of the king it is said that "He has constrained our fellow-citizens taken captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country..." In this context there can be no doubt that the Signers regarded men of Massachusetts and men of Virginia to be members of a single political community. Still, they became "Free and Independent States," having "full power to levy war [and] conclude peace," and in the prevailing understanding of international law this in itself did imply the power to levy war upon, and conclude peace with, each other, however little this contingency may have been in the forefront of the Signers' consciousness in 1776. The relation of the One and the Many, in the Declaration of Independence, in theoretical terms represents a dilemma, whose resolution did indeed wait upon the practical revelation of the future.

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> The South would be in no more danger in this respect, than it was in the days of Washington. I suppose, however, this does not meet the case. You think slavery is right, and ought to be extended; while we think it is wrong and ought to be restricted. That I suppose is the rub. It certainly is the only substantial difference between us.

Both sides appealed to the doctrine of state-rights, and both to national supremacy, depending upon the question. In 1860 there were Republicans (e.g. Chase, but never Lincoln) who denied the power of the national government to provide for the rendition of fugitive slaves, asserting that the power so to do was among the powers reserved to the states. And the demand for a federal slave code for the territories, the demand that split the Democratic party at Charleston in 1860, and led directly to secession, was one which could never have been justified by the strict-constructionist thesis. Here is one of the supreme ironies of our history! Lincoln was certainly correct in assuming that the difference in opinion concerning the Negro, and the relation of his rights to the moral and constitutional rights upon which our political system was built, was the basic thing at stake. Not even Lincoln, in 1860, seemed to realize how substantial was the difference. The Constitution, we have maintained, is equivocal as to whether the American people is one people, who have ordained a system in which there shall be several states, or the people of the several states have ordained a federal union. Similarly, it was equivocal as to whether Negroes were chattels or human persons. For example, the Fifth amendment forbade depriving any person of life or liberty without due process of law. If a Negro was a person--and he was counted as three-fifths of one in determining representation in the lower House of Congress--then the Fifth amendment forbade any Negro to be deprived of liberty by any federal law. From this it followed that no Negro could be held in slavery in any federal territory. But the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution

although it too referred to Negroes as persons, gave sanction to state laws treating Negroes primarily as chattels. And the Fifth amendment forbade the national government to deprive any person of his property. This meant that a slaveowner taking his slave to a territory might not be deprived of him by any federal law. The imperatives of the Fifth amendment were in direct and irreducible contradiction.

Lincoln denied that he or his party had any intention to interfere with slavery in the states, but he did mean to see that it was excluded from all federal territories. And he was confident that, if it was excluded from all the territories, there would never be another slave state added to the Union. Lincoln never hesitated to characterize his restrictionist policy as one designed to place the institution of slavery "in course of ultimate extinction." Whether Lincoln meant by this nothing more than a prophecy, that slavery would wither and die when it lacked new outlets, or whether he contemplated using ever-growing free-state majorities to end the inter-state slave trade (which would have strangled the institution economically), is not clear. But both Lincoln and the South understood each other correctly in this: federal power would be fully employed, in one way or other, to end slavery. And whether that end was destined to come in ten, twenty, or forty years, the South believed that everything it held most dear was in danger. The purpose of government was, the South believed, as the Declaration of Independence proclaimed, to secure the rights to life and liberty. In their judgment, the fate of their lives and liberties, should their slaves be emancipated, was clearly proclaimed in the terrible slaughter of the whites in Haiti and Santo Domingo. Nat Turner and John Brown further convinced

them that they sat upon a powder-keg, and that emancipation in any form was a fire-brand. No less an anti-slavery thinker than Thomas Jefferson, let us remember, believed that emancipation could safely be accomplished only if it were accompanied by deportation. "...we have the wolf by the ears," he wrote in 1820, "and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other." Let us remember as well that Lincoln thoroughly accepted the Jefferson-Clay position that emancipation should be accompanied by colonization of American Negroes abroad, and promoted colonization with emancipation when he was President. But if we now judge, what many even then believed, that the wholesale emigration of American Negroes from this country was an impossibility, what justification can we find for Lincoln's policy of the "ultimate extinction" of slavery?

The radical anti-slavery view of the matter was, simply, that Negroes are men, and as all men have an equal right to liberty, it is contrary to natural right to enslave Negroes or anyone else. This is true in one sense, but the whole truth is far more complex. All men have an equal right to life, and yet some men may be justly killed. Any man whose life is threatened by another man--or who <u>believes</u> it is threatened by another man--has the right to kill him. The right to life implies the right to employ any means necessary to preserve one's life; it implies the right to judge for one's self what means are necessary for self-preservation. I cannot surrender to another man the right to judge what means are necessary to preserve <u>my</u> life, without surrendering to him my right to life. But the Declaration of Independence says that the right to life is <u>unalienable</u>. This means that, even in civil society, where the police and the courts take over the main functions of self preservation, I am obliged to obey

the law so long as, but only so long as, I judge that the law is in fact functioning to preserve my life. The moment I suspect, e.g., that the police are in league with my enemies, all obligation to obey them is at an end, just as I always have the right to kill an assailant if there is no police officer at hand to protect me. What is true of the right to life is, by equal reason, true of the right to liberty. Certainly if I can rightfully kill a man I can rightfully deprive him of his liberty. The South then judged, in full accordance with its rights, as proclaimed in the sacred charter, that the institution of chattel slavery must be preserved, and that any government which endangered the institution's perpetuity lost the very title to obedience proclaimed in the Declaration.

In his reply to Lincoln, Alexander Stephens said frankly that "We at the South do think African slavery, as it exists with us, both morally and politically right. This opinion is founded upon the inferiority of the black race." Stephens here reflects the general change of sentiment which he himself admitted had come over the South since Washington's and Jefferson's time. Still, it must be admitted, first of all, that the doctrine of equality does sanction slavery as a necessary evil in some circumstances, as Jefferson, Clay, and even Lincoln sometimes confessed. Secondly, the meaning of equality, even equality in those rights which master and slave equally possess by nature, is ambiguous. The Declaration of Independence makes a self-evident truth, not a myth or fiction, as in Plato's Republic, the basis of the citizens' consciousness of the origin of the just power of government. By making truth the basis of political powers, it enfranchises popular opinion to a degree never before contemplated. The just powers of government are grounded in the consent (i.e. opinion) of the governed, but only

because "all men are created equal." The self-evidence of this proposition, however, does not mean that it is known or apprehended by everyone. Only those who grasp the meaning of the terms of the proposition will realize that they contain internally the evidence of their own validity. The proposition means that there is no difference between man and man, as there is between man and any other animal, which indicates that one man is by nature the ruler of any other. No man is marked out by nature to be the ruler of any other man as any man is marked out to be the ruler of any dog. Or, as Jefferson put it, some men are not born with saddles on their backs, and others booted and spurred to ride them. To the generality of mankind, throughout history, however, the difference between, e.g. Greek and barbarian, Jew and Gentile, European settler and Red Indian, have been as significant, at least morally and politically, as the difference between man and dog, or rider and horse. To transcend these ancient superstitions was the mark of a civilized man in the age of the Enlightenment. But the Enlightenment did not, it could not, absolutely abolish distinctions of the order of importance of the ancient superstitions; it replaced them rather with the distinction between the Enlightened and the Unenlightened. Therefore was it necessary to know that all men are created equal, before one could begin to exercise in a rational way the rights to life and liberty. Only the Enlightened, in short, could logically form a community of self-governing men. From the point of view of the South--or, indeed, even of most Northerners who recognized the abstract rights of Negroes to life and liberty--the American Negroes of 1860 did form and could form no part of a community of self-governing men. And this judgment, in itself, cannot be denied its claims, if the opinion of the governed is to be the measure of the just powers of government.

The dilemmas of the Declaration of Independence are extraordinary, both with respect to the unity and plurality of the legal foundation of the Union, and with respect to the far more complex question of the unity or plurality of the classes of men whose rights create any political community. I have here done no more than barely indicate what their nature might be. To a degree these dilemmas justify Boorstin's thesis that it is America's example rather than its doctrine which may serve the rest of the world. Yet the Civil War cannot be understood except as an attempt to resolve in action dilemmas imposed upon American politics by the doctrines which gave birth to the nation. In the Declaration of Independence we see the first attempt in mankind's long history to base a particular politics upon an absolute universal, upon a theory in the ultimate sense, upon a judgment of what man is everywhere and at all times. How the Civil War resolved the dilemmas may be suggested by a comparison of Lincoln's first and second inaugural addresses. In 1861 he asked,

> Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people?...If the Almighty ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North or on yours of the South, that truth, and that justice, will surely prevail, by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people.

In 1865 Lincoln said that "the Almighty has his own purposes." Did this not mean that Lincoln had been wrong in supposing, as he did in the earlier utterance, that the voice of the people was the voice of God? The earlier speech still expressed optimism that a government established in accordance with the "laws of Nature and of Nature's God" could, by that fact have created the consensus which would resolve fundamental political differences. The God of the second inaugural is not one who writes, as with a sunbeam, in the volume

of nature. He is rather the God who moves by day in a dark cloud, and whose purposes are not those of man, and not to be comprehended by man. The Declaration of Independence, Lincoln said in Independence Hall on his way to Washington in February, 1861, gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country...but, I hope, to the world, for all future time." But this people, as the trustee of that liberty was, as Lincoln had said a few days earlier, "an almost chosen people." Because of the sinfulness of that people it had yet to enact the sacrificial drama by which its Messianic role could be confirmed. It had yet to resolve in action those dilemmas, in virtue of which the teaching of the Declaration of Independence was to become something more than a self-evident truth--a living faith.

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THE GOVERNOR'S STAFF: IT'S ROLE IN IMAGE PROJECTION*

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Image projection and construction have received a great deal of verbal attention by political scientists, sociologists and psychologists. News commentators and columnists frequently inject the word "image" into discussions of political personalities and events. President Kennedy during the campaign and since his election has repeatedly expressed concern over the image of America in the eyes of the world. Another public figure, Governor Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon, is fond of the word image. His concern lies with the image of his state in the minds of those who are making decisions relating to economic expansion.

The constant repetition of the word image as it relates to political personalities would in itself seem to be sufficient justification for this paper. Yet, there is a more significant need for studies in the area of image construction and projection. It is that investigation and observation oriented in this direction offers a more meaningful way to study administration as well as the manipulative aspects of politics. Descriptive studies very often do not penetrate beyond the superficial. But to condemn them on the grounds of superficiality and to claim greater perception through studies organized around the various roles of political figures does not negate the value of descriptive study nor does it automatically mean success for role-oriented research.

In role-oriented study it is necessary to recognize certain limitations and to carefully formulate questions for investigation. The present paper is centered around one governor and his staff, so generically it is a case study and subject to at least one major pitfall -- over-generalization on the basis of insufficient data. Another limiting factor is that the study falls into two areas which have received scant attention by the social scientist. Research on the office of governor has been rarely undertaken if journal and monographic publications are used as an index of interest. Using the same standard, research on the image -- unless one is interested in the sense of sight -- has enjoyed an even lower priority than the office of governor.

Those writing for the mass audiences and the "think" journals have ventured into the virgin land of the image. Two examples of this writing indicate its present position. Vance Packard in the last

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*This paper could not have been undertaken without the assistance of Governor Mark Hatfield and his "sub-cabinet" -- Travis Cross, Loren Hicks, Freeman Holmer, and Warne Nunn. They opened the doors which made it possible to observe and to participate fully in the affairs of the Governor's office. I also am indebted to the Citizenship Clearing House for the financial support which made possible the year in Oregon. Rhoten Smith rendered assistance beyond his role as Director of CCH. John Morgan, a colleague in the Department of Political Science at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, read the manuscript and made suggestions regarding style and substance.

chapters of the Hidden Persuaders demonstrates that many of the same techniques used by Madison Avenue in selling toothpaste are used in politics.[1] This observation is hardly startling to even the most unsophisticated sophomore in an American National Government course. Stanley Kelley, Jr., in writing on Madison Avenue politics and public discussion, attacks image construction because of the harmful effect it has on public discussion.[2]

Implicit in the writing of Kelly and Packard, and the commentaries of people like the Alsops and Howard K. Smith is that their audience understands the term image. The lack of precision used in verbalizing and writing does not indicate carelessness, more correctly it reflects the fact that the word has shades of meaning which are best understood in context. Image is used to connote illusion on one end of the scale and counterpart on the other. It can mean constructing or projecting attributes which the product or personality does not possess or it can mean the realistic portrayal of selected attributes of the commodity or personality. Those most friendly to advertising agencies would be hard pressed to make a case for their realism in selling commodities. It is similar with public figures. Via the mass media and other public contacts, the politician and his paid associates do not promote a conception of the principal which is an exact counterpart. Yet, the determination of what is illusion and what is counterpart need not be of concern if the study is limited primarily to technique. In this same vein, the image which is projected or constructed is not up for investigation. This is a task more appropriately left to those who study the political personality or who are interested in recruitment and voter motivation.

Illustrations of staff activity serve to illuminate the process of image projection. The questions to be asked are mundane. What is the background of the staff member? What are his main tasks? What are his relations with the governor? What does the governor expect of him? Of course, these questions are asked and answers oriented around the staff's role in image projection.

In an effort to keep the study managable, only the activities of the three male members of the Governor's immediate staff -- Travis Cross, Warne Nunn and Loren Hicks -- and those of Director of the Department of Finance and Administration (D.F.A.) Freeman Holmer, will be discussed. There are other members of Hatfield's immediate staff engaged in secretarial tasks and correspondence and other department heads who have an effect on the Governor's image, but they are not a part of the inner circle. The four men listed form what the Governor likes to call his "sub-cabinet." As such they meet with him at least once a week to discuss matters of strategy and policy.

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1. Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New York: D. McKay Co., 1957).

2. Stanley Kelley, Jr., "Afterthoughts on Madison Avenue Politics," Antioch Review, 17 (Summer, 1957), pp. 173-86.

The exclusion of department heads in sensitive positions may be open to question, but to examine their activities would require a monograph of considerable size. For the present, it seems appropriate to acknowledge the fact that they may influence the governor's image, but probably to a lesser extent than the immediate staff members and Holmer. (Indeed, it takes no particular insight to observe that any state employee might in the broadest and most ephemeral manner have a hand in the projection of the Governor's image.) To those enamored with the informal aspects of administration, there may come a cry that the neglect of secretaries is a serious fault. Proof that this is not so is hard to advance, and for lthe present I will elevate them to the status of those who head sensitive departments by acknowledging their effect.

In discussing the four who form the sub-cabinet, it is well to fix the length of their association with the Governor and their approximate duties. To maintain that a brief resume of their activities provides anything other than an approximation would be to ignore the realities of working on a small and informal staff. The staff members have known each other for at least ten years, and their association with the Governor with but one exception is as long.

Loren Hicks and Hatfield were students together at Willamette University and had previously been members of the same high school band. In 1956, Hicks actually came into a working relationship with Hatfield when the latter was elected Secretary of State. At Hatfield's request the Attorney General hired Hicks and assigned him as an assistant attorney general in the secretary of state's office. Before joining Hatfield's staff Hicks had been a practicing attorney, co-owner and co-manager of a small bag manufacturing company and "farmer." He still retains co-ownership of the bag company and lives on his farm. When Hatfield was elected Governor in 1958, Hicks moved with him and officially became his research assistant but in fact carried on as legal adviser. In this capacity, he prepares information on prospective judicial appointments, checks points of law, prepares resumes of laws as they are introduced in the legislature, and corresponds and talks with people who seek legal advice from the Governor.

Travis Cross, who is press secretary, political strategist and general trouble shooter, has been a close associate of Hatfield beginning with their student days at Stanford. Cross studied for an undergraduate degree in journalism at Stanford while Hatfield was a graduate student in political science. It was during this time that they seriously discussed a political career for Hatfield. After their student days at Stanford, they were both employed by Willamette University in Salem, Oregon which is directly across the street from the State Capitol. Hatfield became instructor in political science, and Cross was director of Willamette's news bureau. Cross left Willamette to become assistant to the chancellor of the Oregon System of Higher Education and moved some 30 miles to Eugene, Oregon. He resigned this position in 1956 to become Secretary of State Hatfield's press secretary and supervisor of the State Capitol and grounds. He continued in the former capacity when Hatfield became Governor.

Freeman Holmer and Hatfield were colleagues in the political science department at Willamette from 1949 to 1956. When Hatfield became Secretary of State, Holmer accepted the position of Director of Elections. In 1958, Holmer was appointed to head the D.F.A. In this capacity he serves as Oregon and Hatfield's chief fiscal officer and is the Governor's advisor on administrative affairs. Holmer's Department in consultation with and at the Governor's direction prepares the budget which is submitted to the legislature over the Governor's signature.

Warne Nunn, like the other members of the sub-cabinet, joined Hatfield's staff in 1956. Unlike the other three, his association with the governor had not been on a personal basis prior to 1956. Hatfield first as a member of the Oregon House of Representatives and later as a State Senator had come in contact with Nunn who was a high ranking member of the state civil service.

After World War II Nunn had a rather rapid rise within the bureauacracy. He served as classification chief with the civil service commission, assistant Public Utility Commissioner, and Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles. In appointing Nunn Assistant Secretary of State, Hatfield was motivated by the desire to secure a person who was familiar with the operation and personnel of state government. When Hatfield was elected governor, Nunn became his executive assistant which places him in a general supervisory position over the staff. He also serves as liason with the boards and commissions and their executive officers and with the department heads who serve at the pleasure of the governor. In making appointments to boards and commissions the Governor relies heavily on Nunn for information about prospective appointees.

A final word should be added here about the Governor and his staff; this is that their average age is forty. This has caused one wag to refer to the State Capitol as "Boy's Town."

Briefly and superficially the preceding sketches of the careers and responsibilities of the Governor's closest staff members establish a framework within which it is possible to discuss their activities in projecting Hatfield's image. Before delving deeper into their roles, it probably will be helpful to give an impression of Hatfield. M. MacKaye writing in The Saturday Evening Post labelled him Oregon s "golden boy."[3] Two political opponents have called him respectively a "bad boy" and "that man with hair and teeth." During the campaign of 1958 Wayne Morse charged that Hatfield could not be trusted. Republican National Chairman Miller recently suggested that after Rockefeller and Goldwater, Hatfield was the most likely prospect for a spot on the Republican national ticket in 1964. Many west coast Republicans would second the motion; and, in fact, think so highly of him that they are seriously suggesting him as a favorite son from the three Pacific coast states. On balance, the public reaction to Hatfield continues to be favorable, and his record of never having lost an election would appear to back up this evaluation.

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3. M. MacKaye, "Oregon's Golden Boy," The Saturday Evening Post, 213 (May 9, 1959), p. 32.

The sketches of the four staff members have outlined briefly the public career of Hatfield. However, they reveal little about Hatfield as an executive. Even his severest critics would agree that he is handsome, articulate and skilled in polemics. In the presence of adversary or friend, he clearly states a position and can summon the statistical and other data needed to support it. His mind is agile, and he possesses the not uncommon talent of successful politicians -- penetrating to the heart of the matter quickly. He is not given to snap decisions, but wants all facets of an issue presented. This he expects his staff to do, and generally he prefers that it be verbally. The long written report or even the short memorandum does not hold his attention as does an oral briefing by a member of his immediate staff. Yet, it would not be correct to say that Hatfield is inattentive to details. For instance, when the biennial budget of 1961-63 was in the preliminary stages of preparation he caught an error in transposing a figure from page one of a report to page sixteen. This happens frequently enough to cause the staff to be thorough in the written material they prepare for him, although at times they grumble about his not reading what they do.

It should not be surprising in view of his preference for oral briefings and his six years as a teacher of political science that he seldom delivers a speech from manuscript. Nor does he like to know the questions in advance of a news conference or to rehearse a television or radio program.

In preparing for a speech, television or radio appearance, or a press conference, a member of the staff,(usually Cross or Holmer) provides material that Hatfield requests or material that they think he could use. In the case of speeches, even if the staff member discusses the subject at length with the Governor and prepares material upon request, there is no certainty about his using it. Shortly after joining Hatfield's staff, I was discussing this with Holmer and remarked that the Governor had used most of the speech material he had asked me to prepare. Holmer cautioned me by saying that the next time he probably would not use the material, but that it might appear three or four speeches later. He was correct.

Obviously, then, those staff members who assist in preparing material for speeches and other public appearances are engaging in work directly related to image projection. They have no "control" over what the Governor says. But it is fundamental, if not elementary, to observe that the kind of material and its accuracy will have an effect on Hatfield's image. The function of the staff as it relates to this activity is that in most instances they are <u>protecting</u> rather than <u>projecting</u>.

If in connection with public appearances the staff protects rather than projects, there are other areas where they do likewise. Much of the routine work would have to fall into this category. The collection of background information on prospective appointees to boards and commissions and judicial posts is routine for the most part, but the appointments which result from such efforts can have an impact on Hatfield's

image. Both Nunn and Hicks operate in this area and have developed systematic approaches to the task.

Nunn prepares a file on each board and commission which contains pertinent sections of the statutes, including composition, terms of office, and qualifications. Together with this material he maintains a list of people who have been recommended by the party, by professional interest groups involved and by interested persons. As the date approaches to make an appointment or appointments, he solicits the advice of the agency clientelle group (which in some instances is required by law) if one exists, the executive officer of the agency and others of repute in the field. Since there are a number of appointments to be made each week, Nunn has several hours with the Governor on a regular basis for the purposes of discussing appointments. Cross is generally present for these sessions and the question of appointments is frequently raised at sub-cabinet meetings.

Nunn briefs the Governor on each position and indicates the names and background of those who have been recommended. It is at this point that Nunn's role becomes critical; the completeness and accuracy of his material is necessary to make appointments that will reflect favorably upon the Governor's image among the clientelle group and that portion of the public affected by or aware of the appointment. It almost seems that the less significant the board, the more difficult it becomes to select the "right" person. It might be thought the party affiliation or support of Hatfield hold easy outs in making important and not so important appointments. Such is not the case. Nunn's investigations are keyed to uncovering those persons who have ability and prestige, even though they might not have had prior public service. Of course, the whole burden does not fall on Nunn. The Governor or one of his staff members might know the persons in question, but except for the major posts this knowledge tends to be superficial. In general, it is on the basis of Nunn's information that the Governor makes an appointment.

In preparing for judicial appointments, Hicks follows a similar routine to that of Nunn. He consults leading members of the local bar association and asks the association to take a poll among their membership and to rank their preferences for the vacancy. The results of the bar association poll are influential, but not the sole determining factor. Because judges and district attorneys are in positions that tend to be more sensitive than boards and commissions, there is generally a finer screening process. Although it is not within the expressed purpose of this study to determine the effectiveness of staff work, it is significant to record the opinion of a Democratic member of the State Supreme Court regarding Hatfield's judicial appointments. It is his private but firm conviction that Hatfield has had no peers among recent Oregon Governors regarding the quality and general professional acceptability of judicial appointments.

This sentiment was echoed by other members of the bench and bar with whom I discussed the subject. It may be that Hatfield is "lucky," but the meticulous care which is taken by the staff in preparing information for the Governor and debating with each other the merits of the

various appointments reveals that they are conscious of their affect on the image which is projected through appointments.

Cross' contribution to Hatfield's image is more direct than that of advising on appointments. In dealing with the press, television and radio commentators he, next to the Governor, is in the most sensitive position viz a viz the public. He is available to the permanent members of the capitol press corps twice a day on an informal and individual or group basis. Unless it is otherwise agreed upon, the reporters do not attribute any stories that might develop out of these sessions to Cross. Not only is Cross rarely quoted, but he infrequently issues a formal statement. When he does speak for the governor's office, it is usually because Hatfield is not available because of absence from his office or illness.

For the most part, Cross gives candid responses to reporters' questions and speculations regarding what is or might be happening. He does not leak news a la Jim Haggerty. When a story breaks, he maintains a rigid impartiality. In fact, unless there is urgency in a public announcement, he tries to balance news releases so that the morning and evening papers get an equal share.

Press conferences are at the request of the press or when the Governor has a major announcement, e.g., the budget and reorganization proposals. An exception to this occurred during the 1961 legislative session when the Governor held a press conference each Monday. Other than the formal press conference, the Governor meets individual media representatives at their request. These meetings are generally arranged through the appointments secretary rather than Cross. The prevailing atmosphere in these meetings is that of familiarity and informality. The Governor may query Cross regarding the purpose of the interview, but he seldom asks him to be present. If a national media representative requests an interview, it is Cross' practice to meet with the person prior to an appointment with the Governor. In this way Cross provides a rather full outline of the Governor's career. But as with the local or state reporters he is generally not present during the interview.

The fact that the press and others deal directly with the Governor plus the rarity of Cross or any other staff member issuing statements on behalf of the Governor are indicative of one of the cardinal principles of the Hatfield staff -- anonymity. This principle is a conscious one, and whenever a staff member gets into the limelight there is a great deal of friendly ribbing from the others.

Anonymity is reflected even in the dress of the state police officer who drives the Governor. It is only on formal occasions that the driver wears a uniform; ordinarily he wears a conservative suit. In this same connection, it is interesting to note that Cross discourages all police or other escorts for the Governor unless the public appearance is one of great magnitude. In line with this policy, rarely more than one staff member travels with the Governor. And when they arrive at their destination the staff member and driver do not stay at the Governor's side. Thus, the retinue which so frequently is in evidence around other public figures is not present around Hatfield.

Anonymity is not always easy to maintain nor is it always desirable. There have been several occasions when either by design or by miscalculation a staff member has taken the limelight. A controversy between Nunn and State Senator and Democratic State Chairman Straub illustrates the former circumstance. An exchange between the two occurred when Straub charged that the Governor had advocated the sterilization of unwed mothers. His charge was based on a letter which Hatfield had written to members of the Public Welfare Commission. The letter outlined a number of major problems in welfare administration and policy. Under each problem a series of possible solutions was listed, sterilization of unwed mothers was oneof atleast six listed in that general problem area. According to participants in the meeting between the Governor and the Commission, sterilization was discussed and dismissed as a possible solution in about two minutes time.

Straub's accusation rested solely on a copy of the letter which someone had provided him (most probably a member of the Commission or its staff unfriendly to Hatfield). His charge was given great play by the press and television and public concern was evidenced by letters to lthe editors. The Governor felt that the charge could not go unanswered. Yet for him to have answered the accusation would have lent validity to it and would have fanned public interest. Nunn, as one of the participants in the meeting, was chosen to answer it with the admonition from the Governor that his language should be unmistakable. The Governor wanted all public apprehension eradicated. Nunn briefly recounted the facts of the situation and called Straub a liar. Straub retaliated by saying that it was unfortunate that the Governor had an emotionally unstable member on his staff. The matter hung fire for several weeks. Straub repeated his earlier charges, and the Governor's office ignored them. The whole affair died rather quickly and has not been revived.

Nunn's involvement in the controversy served to shift the spotlight from Hatfield. Further, those who might have been offended if the Governor had used the language thought necessary to combat the charge were disarmed by his silence. He stayed above the battle and preserved the dignity of the office.

In addition to the planned injection of a staff member into 'the public arena, there are times when staff members find themselves there either by accident or through action of someone outside the office. In supporting a grant of funds for the inaguration of a medical investigator program Freeman Holmer reluctantly and unintentionally became involved in a conflict with members of the legislative Emergency Board.

The 1959 Legislature had authorized the medical investigator program as a replacement for the county coroner system, but had made no appropriation to carry out the transfer. There had been an understanding between the State Health Officer and members of the Ways and Means Committee during the 1959 legislative session to the effect that the Emergency Board, which administers a contingency fund between legislative sessions, would supply the necessary funds to start the program.

In order to plan for the transfer which would take place as the terms of certain incumbent coroners expired in January, 1961, the State Health Officer, who had been appointed as a replacement for the one who had served during the 1959 legislative session, prepared a request for funds to be presented to the Emergency Board. As a matter of practice, but not as a requirement of law, the D.F.A. reviews the requests presented to the Emergency Board and prepares an evaluation which is circulated to the members in advance of their meetings. As the items are presented at the meeting the agency representative states the case for the request and the director of D.F.A. generally presents an oral resume of the Department's findings.

As was the usual procedure the State Health Officer stated the case for granting an emergency appropriation for the medical investigator program. Holmer followed and indicated support for the proposal. Almost immediately a wrangle developed over the amount of money the Ways and Means Committee and the former State Health Officer had agreed would be needed to undertake the program. During the course of the controversy Holmer commented on the practive of the legislature's authorizing a program and then failing to grant an appropriation. He labelled the practice "legislative irresponsibility." Members of the Board took rather violent exception to Holmer's charge and demanded an apology. Before Holmer had a chance to respond, a motion for adjournment was made and passed.

At the next session of the Board, Holmer requested permission to read a statement. In the statement, without referring specifically to the accusation, he expressed regret over having made it. A discussion of Holmer's statement followed, and the Board's acting Chairman asked Holmer if it constituted an apology. Holmer said it did. This terminated the public aspect of the altercation. It also has not been revived.

The Governor shied away from any public pronouncements on the controversy, but he privately indicated support of Holmer. On several subsequent occasions the Governor indicated strong disapproval of the legislative practice of authorizing programs without providing adequate appropriations. However, had the Governor become directly involved in the controversy, the repercussions could have been far reaching. A vigorous public defense of Holmer might have seriously damaged his relations with the legislature. Although the members were upset with Holmer, they did not publicly transfer this to Hatfield.

It is probably Holmer's adherence to the principle of anonymity which keeps him out of the public light. He, although not as closely associated as Cross with the mass media, is in a sensitive public position. As chief budget officer and as head of the principal management organ of State government, he must deal with department heads, other elected executive officials, the legislature,and representatives of pressure groups. Yet, his primary responsibility is to the Governor, and his work and that of his department has a major impact on the Governor's image. This can be demonstrated by relating the activities of Holmer

and his department in preparing the budget and the proposals for reorganization of the executive branch.

The detailed procedures involved in preparing the budget and the reorganization recommendations are too complex to relate fully and are not really germane to the central question of Holmer's role in image projection. What is of more significance is the manner in which the Governor's directions were carried out, how the results were relayed to him and the value of the process in building his image.

Before work was begun on the budget and reorganization proposals the Governor established certain broad guide lines which had been arrived at in the sub-cabinet meetings. In keeping with the broad policy the D.F.A. developed a set of alternatives. At this point the general procedure followed takes separate courses.

In the case of the budget, before meeting with department heads or making figures public, the Governor held a series of half-day meetings with the management analysts of the D.F.A.. Each analyst is responsible for reviewing the budget of a specific agency or agencies. In meeting with the analysts the Governor became more familiar with programs and their costs and made decisions with regard to the exclusion or inclusion of an item on the basis of what he had determined to be the priority of state needs. In these sessions Holmer's role was that of relating specific expenditures to the "present level of services" formula and the priority of state needs within the framework of the total estimated state revenues.

At the conclusion of these meetings the Governor had reviewed the entire budget. He was then able to use this data with department heads who objected to their appropriation recommendation. But more important, these budget sessions prepared him to meet the press, speak to civic groups and discuss with representatives of pressure groups with a great deal of assurance and much detail at his command. Thus, the give-and-take with the budget analysts in the context of Holmer's overview provided the knowledge which the Governor needed to match wits with those who opposed him. And he possessed one advantage over them. He had a grasp of the alternatives and knew what additions would mean in relation to total state expenditures.

The role of Holmer also was rather considerable in the preparation of the reorganization proposals. The members of the D.F.A. undertook much of the detailed background and legal work connected with drafting the proposals, but unlike the budget the opinion of the department heads was solicited shortly after the alternatives were drafted. On the basis of their reaction and in keeping with the Governor's desire to move as close to a cabinet system as possible without submitting constitutional amendments, Holmer submitted a more complete set of proposals to the Governor. At this stage, the Governor appointed a bi-partisan "blue ribbon" advisory committee to review the proposals and submit their reactions to him. Holmer met with the group, and they asked him to serve as their executive secretary. In essence, he was

operating in a dual capacity. As the Governor's representative it was his function to familiarize the group with the reasoning behind a particular proposal. In so doing, he was not an advocate but an explicator. His second responsibility was to prepare summaries of each advisory committee session. When they finished their work he drafted a report which with but very few exceptions they submitted to the Governor. With this report in hand and in consultation with Holmer and the other sub-cabinet members, the Governor made his final determination regarding the shape reorganization would take.

In preparing the reorganization proposals, it was Holmer's role to make sure that information and reactions flowed from the Governor to department heads and the advisory committee and back again. The results of Holmer's efforts were much as they were with the budget -- the Governor could speak with detailed knowledge of the proposals and was aware of their likely ramifications.

The sketches of the staff members together with the general and more specific examples of their activities lead to observations other than the ones contained in the body of the paper. Much of the staff's role in image projection is discovered in the routine activities which they perform. This is worthy of much greater attention. The fact that the staff rarely is in the limelight and that they spend much of their time protecting rather than projecting Hatfield's image reflects certain basic attributes of Hatfield the public figure. It also leads to speculation regarding other public figures and their staffs.

Multitudes of defects can go unnoticed if the politician is handsome, articulate and gregarious. Indeed, there are probably hundreds of public careers built on little more than these qualities. In these cases the image if it is drawn by those skilled in political merchandizing might be challenged but superior technique can be made to prevail over substance. The potency of the mass media coupled with the attendant conditioning of the mass audience probably makes it easier in some cases to be successful with the superficial man rather than with the man of training, ideas, and ability in public affairs.

In relating the above observations to the work of the Hatfield staff it is my conclusion that their job is increased because of his attributes. Their problem is that of structuring their activities so that he may use the full range of his talents. The staff cannot build a straw man; they cannot become his spokesman. Yet, within their areas of specialization they must be sufficiently proficient to provide him with a constant flow of ideas and materials necessary to make decisions. They may have reservations about some of his statements and decisions, but they do not second guess. Once the decision is made they move on to the next problem. They acknowledge and accept his role as decision-maker. But more important, they relate their activities to this concept of the Governor's role.

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URBAN RENEWAL IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY. THE POWER STRUCTURE OF A "SUCCESSFUL" PROGRAM

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This essay is concerned with the question of why some cities in this country have been able to execute highly successful urban renewal programs while many more have lagged far behind. How have the "successful" cities overcome the political conflict and stalemate that so often block renewal activity in other urban communities? What type of local politics provides the seedbed for successful renewal? Or, to phrase the question more broadly, what are the political concomitants of rapid planned change at the local level?

A few tentative answers to these questions are sought by examining the urban renewal politics of one highly successful city--Newark, New Jersey.[1] The focus, more specifically, is on the Newark Housing Authority (NHA) from 1949 to 1959 and how this agency secured local approval for its nine redevelopment projects.

By any of the quantitative indices frequently used to measure renewal achievement, Newark has one of the most active programs in the nation. A basic supposition of this paper is that Newark's clearance policies can be accurately viewed as the output or product of a certain type of power structure. Those local actors who, in some way, attempt to intervene in Newark's renewal decisions may be thought of as the "urban renewal public." The persistent forms of interaction that appear among these actors may be considered an "urban renewal power structure." Newark, it is argued, has a type of power structure in this policy area that is particularly conducive to high levels of clearance activity. The city's "success" can be explained by describing the structure of relationships that prevail among the members of this public.[2]

Focusing on the Housing Authority and its nine slum clearance projects, then, is a convenient methodological device for exposing the basic outlines of this power structure. It seems safe to assume that NHA, as official redevelopment agency, would be close to the center of such a structure. It is also likely that a summary of NHA's attempts to gain local approval for each of the nine projects would lay bare whatever stabilities in behavior may exist.

In the course of research, it soon became apparent that a rigid focus on the events immediately involved in the approval of these projects would be insufficient and perhaps even misleading. NHA's proposals are approved in a routine,

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[1] This essay is drawn from the author's The Politics of Slum Clearance. A Study of Urban Renewal in Newark, New Jersey (doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1961).

[2] The term "success" is used synonymously with high levels of clearance activity and is not meant to convey any personal preference of the author. For this reason, the word is placed within quotation marks whenever used.

expeditious manner, without any notable opposition from local actors. The inertness of local actors and their reluctance to intervene in these events seem to be defined in advance by a set of arrangements or a set of long-range mutual expectations. The form of intervention, in other words, is structured and stable.

The major task of this inquiry, then, is not so much describing local decision-making processes and policy controversies as it is seeking determinants for the behavior evidenced in specific clearance incidents. In order to explain why overt conflict did not appear in Newark renewal, it is necessary to shift the focus of inquiry to earlier phases of the causal sequence, to events somewhat removed in time from the nine projects themselves. It is necessary to identify how these well-defined political roles were established and to characterize relations between NHA and each major segment in its local public over the ten-year period.[3]

The Pattern of Policy Formation

Newark's urban renewal politics begins and ends with the Newark Housing Authority, a legally independent and actually autonomous city agency that has almost entirely dominated the clearance program. It has monopolized the initiation of clearance decisions, insulated its policy-making processes from local actors, and secured summary local approval for projects without having to make concessions on the substance of its policy. Within the Housing Authority itself, it is the professional staff (led by Executive Director Louis Danzig) which has pre-empted the policy making function and has secured willing compliance from those officially in charge, the six-man Board of NHA Commissioners. Slum clearance policy in Newark can best be characterized as the product of adjustments in the goals of NHA's professional staff to meet the demands of private redevelopers and of the federal housing agencies. The detailed plans for most of the nine projects were agreed upon in private negotiations between Danzig, private redevelopers, and federal officials, and then quickly ratified by local officials as an integrated, unamendable "project package."

With the exception of NHA's brief and futile attempt to have local business corporations enter the program as redevelopers, and outside of the Authority's successful attempt to win over the local Catholic hierarchy with parochial school expansion under Title I, NHA officials have made no continuing attempt to modulate their policy decisions in accordance with anticipated or actual local demands or interests. These same officials, on the other hand, have been singularly responsive to the demands of the Urban Renewal Administration (URA), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the private redevelopers. While there is still some commitment on the staff's part to its original intention of clearing substandard dwelling units for the construction of new, moderately priced housing, this staff has been prepared to abandon both "slum clearance" and "middle income housing" in the process of pleasing these out-of-town claimants.

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[3]The author is indebted to recent "case studies" of administrative policy-making, e.g.: Harold Stein (editor), Public Administration and Policy Development (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1952); The Inter-University Case Program Studies; and Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield, Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955). This essay, however, pursues a

Of greater importance to NHA officials than their original redevelopment goals and the goals of the housing profession has been their loyalty to the Newark Housing Authority as a flourishing, public enterprise. Danzig and his staff have not hesitated to sacrifice the substantive policy values they began with in 1949 in order to maintain a high level of activity and to have a few projects "in the mill" at all times. If FHA would not back construction in the midst of a Negro ghetto and if redevelopers claimed they could not build in Newark at moderate rents, the solution for NHA was to permit substantial increases in the rents planned for new buildings, to shift clearance out of the hard-core slums, and to redirect emphasis in the program towards non-residential redevelopment by quasi-public institutions. It was necessary, above all, to keep NHA "on top of the situation" by maintaining the public image of a highly successful, expanding agency, even if this occasionally meant action merely for action's sake. NHA has found that pragmatic, day-by-day responses to the demands of federal officials and private redevelopers are more conducive to overall success than a rigid adherence to long-range planning or initial goals.

Similar concessions to local actors on substantive policy have been viewed by the Authority's staff as unnecessary and, in fact, dangerous to NHA's high rate of activity. Even the most trivial concession to a local interest, even the slightest deviation from the "no amendment-project package" strategy, would encourage other Newark claimants to multiply their demands on NHA. Once the door to local intervention was left ajar, the need for political accommodations would cumulate and the finely balanced negotiations between Danzig and the outside parties would be disrupted beyond repair. Ultimately the project would collapse from the sheer weight of its own amendments.

When asked to give their own interpretation of Newark's renewal success NHA officials argue that private redevelopers and federal officials are attracted to the city by a "clean deal." By this NHA officials mean that the Authority's mastery of local renewal politics permits Danzig to negotiate freely with outside interests and to go more than half way in meeting their demands. Danzig can guarantee redevelopers and federal officials that their negotiations on a project will be approved swiftly by the Mayor, the City Council, and the local Planning Board, without any amendments being demanded and without any "politics" being interjected. Embarrassed by the number of vacant sites throughout the nation and anxious to justify their requests for larger urban renewal appropriations, URA officials have maintained a steady stream of federal aid to Newark. As long as Danzig could produce redevelopers, URA was prepared to wink at his violations of the Workable Program.

The Techniques of Political Accommodation

This pattern of policy formation, and perhaps Newark's success in slum clearance as well, may be seen as the product of a politically alert agency's successful accommodation to its local environment. A state of equilibrium may be said to exist in Newark renewal politics in which NHA and each major segment

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somewhat different approach to the study of policy formation. The intensive analysis of a single issue or decision is probably a superior method for dealing with unstructured political situations, but it has some apparent shortcomings when trying to describe a stable, integrated system like renewal politics in Newark.

of the local renewal public have settled upon forms of interaction that are satisfactory or functional to both. These ways of behaving have become recurrent or predictable for this reason.[4]

For NHA this almost eliminates the ubiquitous political problem of anticipating public responses to major decisions. Authority officials generally can predict with accuracy how local actors will respond to the announcement of a clearance project. Since they know that local support will be forthcoming, NHA officials can ignore or discount local interests in reaching their clearance decisions.

The net effect of this agency-environment accommodation, in the words of NHA's staff, is that clearance policy can be made in a "non-political atmosphere" and major decisions can be settled on the basis of "technical" rather than "political" criteria. It might be more accurately said that bargaining with outside interests has replaced bargaining with local groups as a result of this accommodation and that the technician's or professional staff's notion of the public good has supplanted the notions of local claimants. In one sense, however, NHA officials are correct in referring to a non-political atmosphere. The policy making process in Newark renewal does not consist of overt inter-group conflict, and the resultant policies are not reflections of the balance of power extant among the contending forces at various points in time.[5]

In the context of this benign environment an increasingly large area of NHA's decision making processes can be reduced to "routine." Danzig and his division directors have secured a consensus, both within and without NHA, for certain solutions to recurrent technical problems of slum clearance. Where certain solutions have become standard, policy decisions and even external relations with local interests can be handled in a secure, unchallenged fashion by the middle-rank staff members. Here NHA's staff is actually "administrating." It actually is involved in the non-discretionary execution of unambiguous directives and not in the making of political decisions under the guise of "administration."

In many respects, the NHA case resembles other accounts of administrative "success" in recent studies of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Army Corps of Engineers, and many of the Independent Regulatory Commissions.[6] The major ques-

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[4]This discussion of agency-environment accommodation owes a great deal to: Herbert Simon, Donald Smithburg, and Victor Thompson, Public Administration (New York: Alfred Knopf & Co., 1950), Chapters 2, 18, 19; Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City - Politics in the Metropolis (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960), Chapters VIII, IX, X, XIII, XIX; David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), Chapter 14.

[5]This definition of policy formation is a product of the "politics of administration" group, e.g.: Avery Leiserson, Administrative Regulation. A Study in Representation of Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), Introduction; Harold Stein (editor), Public Administration and Policy Administration, Introduction. Many of these studies do not fully explore the conditions under which policy making can become "non-political" and "routine."

[6]See: Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955);

tion is how NHA achieved this state of equilibrium with its environment and how this case differs from the agency-environment accommodations described in other studies. Here there are three aspects of the Authority's strategy that stand out: NHA's choice of whom to deal with and whom to ignore, its emphasis on the long-run political settlement rather than the ad hoc coalition for particular projects, and the terms or bases on which these settlements were made.

The Housing Authority's strategy for attaining an acquiescent environment is determined in large part by certain pre-existing features of that environment. To begin with, most Newark residents who are affected directly by clearance projects--site residents, small businessmen, and neighborhood associations--seem to be affected by them adversely. For this reason, organized grass roots' activity in urban renewal has tended to be hostile towards NHA. Secondly, in the last five or six years, sentiment in the amorphous public at large seems to have turned decisively against one of NHA's major functions, public housing. Finally, the only discernible bloc in the city which directly benefits from slum clearance, the Negro community, has been divided internally on its attitude towards such clearance and has been among the most underrepresented, impuissant groups at City Hall.

Given these facts, it is probably easier to understand why NHA has made no serious attempt to build a broadly based constitutency and why it has discouraged any widespread dissemination of information about its program. NHA's strategy is based on establishing "good relations" with a small circle of city officials and community leaders and on minimizing the public for most clearance issues. Their major concern has been to prevent site resident resistance or neighborhood concern over Negro invasion from straining NHA's "good relations" with the leadership segment and from turning a "routine" clearance proposal into a "political issue." NHA's success in delimiting the boundaries of renewal politics and restricting the intervention of this larger public is partly the product of careful strategy, as the following pages indicate. It is also the product of environmental factors beyond NHA's control, as later passages will point out.

The Housing Authority has had to decide who in its local environment is worth dealing with, who cannot be ignored with impunity, and whose support is indispensable in obtaining local endorsement of a project. For one reason or another, the Mayor, the professional planners at City Hall, the regular line agencies concerned with public works, the local business corporations' quasi-public committee on economic development, and the real estate-dominated committee on neighborhood rehabilitation are included in this list. Towards the others--the City Council, the Democratic county organization, the site residents, the neighborhood and small businessman's association, and the public at large--NHA has pursued a strategy of indifference, obfuscation, and adamance.

A second element in the Housing Authority's strategy is its emphasis on building long-run, stable arrangements with those whom it tries to accommodate, rather than attempting to construct ad hoc, supportive coalitions and to renegotiate fresh support on each new project.

Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters. The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951). Other administrative "empires" are described in: Charles Hardin, The Politics of Agriculture (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953); and Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1953). For information on Robert Moses, see: Sayre and Kaufman, Governing New York City . . .,Chapters IX,X,and passim.

Throughout the first six or seven years of Newark's redevelopment, the politicos, the realtors, the corporate businessmen, the planners, and the City Hall bureaucrats steadily drifted from a position of outright hostility towards NHA to one of grudging acceptance. Each of the above groups eventually came to terms and made its settlement with the Authority. In the case of the city planners and the rehabilitation committee, settlement came after a running feud between NHA and each of these blocs had reached a climax and had threatened to halt clearance progress. Here the settlements were consciously negotiated by the parties and were embodied in some new ordinance, administrative procedure, or delineation of jurisdiction. In NHA's dealings with the local corporation executives on the Newark Economic Development Committee (NEDC) and with the regular line agencies at City Hall, no open conflict, dramatic resolution, or written statement of terms was involved. Here the settlement consisted of mutually satisfactory reciprocal behaviors which emerged not from any overt agreement but from the process of gradual acclimatization.

But the settlement did more than merely resolve some immediate quarrel between NHA and a certain bloc. By establishing some expectations about future behavior, the settlement served to inaugurate a new phase in the political dealings of its parties. It served to structure or stabilize NHA's relations with a particular bloc, where only fluidity and overt conflict had before existed.

The common behavior pattern established for local claimants by these settlements was one of non-interference in NHA's policy-making procedures and of acquiescence in the resulting policy product. In return for these guarantees, the Authority was forced to make a variety of concessions, yet none of these concessions involved any breach in the insulation of NHA's policy making process or any adjustments in the substance of clearance policy. Here, perhaps, is the aspect of these settlements most relevant to the problem of explaining NHA's "success" in slum clearance. While concessions to local claimants were necessary to secure promises of non-intervention, most of these concessions were only remotely related to NHA's substantive decisions on the nine clearance projects.

A number of other accommodative techniques involving the substance of policy have been rejected by Danzig as unnecessary to effective accommodation and dangerous to ultimate success. Thus, NHA has achieved local support for its projects without having to create citizens' advisory committees on slum clearance, to clear or "coordinate" its projects with the city planning office, to cut back on its program, or to slacken its pace. It has not had to alter the boundary lines of any project in order to placate some neighborhood interest, to abandon its attempt at relocating Negro families in white neighborhoods, or to select private redevelopers by the strength of their friendships at City Hall.

The Political Settlement

It is probably most accurate to view NHA as a thriving governmental organization with a large number of values or rewards to dispense that are unrelated to the substance and procedure of its key policy decisions. Thus the Housing Authority can secure autonomy in the policy realm through the shrewd manipulation of these other resources.

To Mayor Leo Carlin and his personal electoral organization, for instance, Danzig has promised cooperation on matters of NHA patronage. At the same time Danzig has sought to establish certain "non-political" areas of NHA activity.

Carlin's control of NHA's jobs and favors, Danzig has argued, must not be permitted to go beyond the point where it would jeopardize the projects or provoke a public "exposé." The solution arrived at between Carlin and Danzig gives the Mayor a free rein with the "small stuff," that is, the securing of favored treatment for certain individuals: in the hiring and firing of clerical and unskilled NHA personnel, in the relocation of families, in the appraisal of property, in the selection of tenants for public housing, and in the Authority's relations with those individuals once they have become public housing occupants. In return, Carlin has agreed not to interfere: in the recruitment of division heads and other top personnel by Danzig on a merit basis, in the awarding of contracts, and in the selection of private redevelopers.

To compensate for these non-political areas and this loss of patronage to the Mayor, Danzig has guaranteed Carlin's electoral organization exclusive access to the jobs and favors in the "political" areas. Completely excluded from this flow of patronage are the members of the City Council and the regular Democratic and Republican organizations in Newark. In return, Carlin has given Danzig complete control over NHA's internal procedures, has agreed not to undercut the Executive Director by trying to work through someone else in the Authority, and thus has tacitly approved the pattern of staff dominance over the six-man Board of NHA Commissioners appointed by the Mayor himself. More recently Danzig has agreed to let the Mayor make all announcements on renewal and to appear to be the central figure in this program, so that Carlin may use slum clearance as an electoral issue.

Finally, it should be noted that Danzig first negotiated this pact in 1949 with a majority bloc on the old Board of City Commissioners and then carried it through a change in Administration and the subsequent adoption of a new city charter.

There seems to be cumulative factor at work in this settling of differences between NHA and segments of its local environment, for after NHA came to terms with one bloc, other blocs were encouraged to reach similar settlements. Thus Danzig could use this initial arrangement with the Mayor's organization as the basis for further settlements with the business corporations, with the realtors and the neighborhood rehabilitation bloc, with the City Hall line agencies, and with the central planning office.

In the early 1950's, when the city's leading businessmen, realtors, and professional men tried to divert the new urban renewal program towards neighborhood rehabilitation and economic development goals, they found little response to their demands among the politicos at City Hall. The Board of City Commissioners, and later Mayor Carlin, refused to remove Title I from the jurisdiction of NHA, urge rehabilitation and economic development goals on NHA, impede any Title I or public housing project proposed by NHA, or even urge Danzig to create citizens' committees to advise NHA on renewal matters. Mayor Carlin did agree to create a citizens' committee on neighborhood rehabilitation in his own office in 1954 and to let the leading corporation executives form a quasi-public committee on economic development in that same year. He indicated in advance, however, and later clearly demonstrated that he would not back these committees in a showdown with NHA and would not permit them to become rival redevelopment agencies. The Mayor's indifference forced these committees to fend for themselves in a hostile environment. Awed by NHA's obvious superiority in staff, experience, and "contacts," the leaders of these two citizens committees began direct negotiations with Danzig and soon agreed to some stabilization of the situation.

The terms of Danzig's settlements with these "civic leaders"--like those of his prior arrangements with the politicos--did not touch upon the substance of redevelopment policy and did not in any way alter NHA's course of behavior on the nine clearance projects. To the realtors and "good government" reformers who organized the committee on rehabilitation, now called the Newark Commission on Neighborhood Conservation and Rehabilitation (NCNCR), Danzig promised to avoid demanding a local monopoly of federal aid for non-clearance activities, a program that Congress had added in 1954 to the original Housing Act. The Authority, then, would concede NCNCR's right to exist as a separate renewal agency; neither would be designated the city's official rehabilitation agency, as NHA had been named the city's official redevelopment agency in 1949. Furthermore, NHA would even help NCNCR secure federal funds to build a staff, by officially hiring the committee as consultants on the Central Ward project.

NHA and NCNCR also tried to temper whatever future conflicts might arise from their divergent values and similar functions by a rough demarcation of jurisdictions and a mutual non-aggression pact. NHA, it was agreed, would administer both the rehabilitation and clearance aspects of all projects it had begun and would begin, while NCNCR would retain exclusive authority over its own rehabilitation projects. In the future NHA would confine its projects to "the slums" and NCNCR to the area surrounding them, although the Authority's subsequent incursion into what are commonly conceded to be "non-clearance" areas suggests the absence of any rigid commitment on this point. The basic achievement of this settlement was to permit each agency to proceed promptly with its own projects. Neither agency would have to "clear" its future actions with the other, and neither would have to worry about attacks from that direction once its decisions were announced.

The terms of Danzig's settlement with the Newark Economic Development Committee (NEDC)--a group of representatives from the city's major corporations, designated by the Mayor but financed by corporation contributions--are more elusive and less simply defined. In the absence of a "peak" or inner core in NEDC, Danzig had to carry on separate negotiations with the chairmen of important subcommittees and with the full committee's professional staff. NHA's Executive Director never met and never had to deal with some of the most important executives from the largest corporations in the city, simply because they took no active role in NEDC or local renewal politics.

Settlement with NEDC was possible only after the businessmen discovered that neither local corporations nor the city government would finance the clearance of land to attract new industry and commerce to Newark. Eager not only to quiet business opposition but also to involve local corporations in the program as investors or redevelopers, Danzig here proved more willing to use substantive policy concessions as an accommodative mechanism than in any of his other dealings. In 1956, after NEDC had vainly sought for several years to clear sites for incoming firms, Danzig proposed reviving NHA's earlier plans for light industrial redevelopment as part of Central Ward renewal. Since federal funds, however, were not available for non-residential redevelopment on non-residential sites, the achievement of economic development goals through Title I would have to go hand in hand with NHA's plans for additional housing. Thus Danzig would place NHA's powers of eminent domain and its access to federal aid at NEDC's disposal, if the businessmen would agree to support additional housing in the Central Ward.

Several years later, when it became apparent to Danzig that local corporations would not risk their capital in Newark redevelopment and that NHA could more easily find redevelopers outside the city, he began to cut back on his commitments

to NEDC. Danzig will still lend the committee NHA's Title I powers, the expertise of his staff, and his "good contacts" in Washington. However, he will no longer seize the initiative and draft a suitable Title I project for NEDC, as he did in the case of light industrial redevelopment. Industrial redevelopment as part of the Central Ward renewal project represents the high point in Danzig's concessions to business or any local claimant on clearance policy itself. NEDC's role in urban renewal in recent years has been to publicize the program, to interest out-of-town business friends in Newark redevelopment, and, until recently, to facilitate Danzig's negotiations with FHA through their friends in the Eisenhower administration.

The city planners arrived late as a claimant on the local renewal scene, having neither the inclination nor the staff to assert the values of central planning before 1956 or 1957. By this time, however, the basic configuration of NHA's settlements had been established. The planners had the choice of either "playing the game" in the hope of some marginal gains or attacking "the system" from an external position of outrage and impotence. Finding little support at City Hall or among the "civic leaders" for their attempt to bring NHA within the ambit of a master plan, the planners soon lowered their sights and made their peace with Danzig. In exchange for their guarantee of routine approval for all future NHA sites, the planners accepted Danzig's promise that "central planning considerations" would be kept before NHA's staff in planning future projects. Danzig further promised that the City Planning Officer would be fully informed and consulted on all NHA activities in the Central Ward.

Post-Settlement Negotiations

The settlement, of course, does not resolve all of the differences between two claimants and does not inaugurate a period of undisturbed harmony. Differences between the parties remain and new ones naturally appear. Yet the settlement does serve to remove the major issue from contention. The differences that remain are of a lesser order and can be negotiated informally in most cases without disrupting the basic accord. Demands are still made of NHA by various claimants, but these requests are not pushed to the point where they might re-open "closed questions" and precipitate a break with the Authority. Objections to NHA's policies are still raised, but they rarely are exposed to public scrutiny and are never pressed to the point where they might inhibit clearance progress. Ten or eleven years ago, objections to NHA policies were usually expressed through formal press releases. Now, to quote one long-time critic of NHA, "we just call Lou [Danzig] up and have it out with him over lunch."

It is clear, then, that the political settlement is an ongoing process. Negotiations do not merely precede and establish the settlement, they follow it and maintain its viability. Those differences not touched upon in the settlement, those differences which arise after the settlement, and even certain ambiguities in the terms of the settlement itself can be settled only through continual, day-to-day negotiations. The settlement, far from conclusively reconciling differences between two parties, simply sets the framework for a peaceful resolution of further difficulties, simply increases the likelihood that this day-to-day negotiation will go on.

Continued and skillful bargaining, in fact, is incumbent upon any participant if he is to actuate the terms of the settlement. The settlement itself

grants nothing to those concerned. It involves only a set of promises about future cooperation which may or may not be "cashed in" by the recipient of these promises when the time arises.

This is a fact which has eluded many local participants in their dealings with Danzig. They have too often viewed their settlement with NHA as a final resolution of the matter and have too often been content with Danzig's verbal assurances and deferential gestures. After the conclusion of some tacit or explicit arrangement with the Authority, these claimants have tended to relax their aggressive posture. In failing to press Danzig on his commitments, they have failed to extract full value from their settlements. The politicos, perhaps more conversant with the art of higgling and less awed by solely symbolic victories, have been more effective in holding Danzig to the terms of his "deal;" the realtors, corporation executives, civic reformers, and city planners have been considerably less effective.

A case in point is the failure of the city planners to reap any benefits from Danzig's promise to consult them and keep them informed during the planning stages of the Central Ward project. Where the planners seized the initiative and invoked their prior settlement with NHA, Danzig eventually, though reluctantly, yielded the desired information. When the planning office, however, has been harried by other matters (and this more often has been the case) Danzig has pushed on alone and left the planners to read about his projects in the newspapers like everyone else. Several members of the planning staff complained to the author about Danzig's readiness to ignore earlier commitments, about the need to "keep after him" constantly, and about the inability of their undermanned staff to do this. Other claimants also have come to recognize that a settlement with NHA does not vitiate the necessity for constant pressure on Danzig; it only directs that pressure into predictable channels.

The net effect of these political settlements, then, has been more advantageous to NHA than the very terms of the settlements imply. Those same resources, like access to federal funds and a well-trained staff, which permitted NHA to conclude settlements with parts of its local environment on terms highly favorable to the Authority, continued to provide Danzig with an "edge" in the post-settlement bargaining.

The Urban Renewal Power Structure

What are the characteristics of the overall system resulting from these settlements? Or to rephrase the question posed at the outset: What type of power structure is correlated with urban renewal "success" for this particular city?

Newark's renewal system may be accurately described as a radial or "spoke-like" structure. NHA stands at the nucleus, initiating clearance projects and negotiating for their local acceptance; and several local claimants occupy the position of "satellites," lending their support, benefiting from their cooperation with NHA, but not substantially affecting clearance decisions. Further out on the periphery are sporadic participants like the site residents and small businessmen's associations, who have no stable relations with NHA and no part in making clearance decisions.

This is, moreover, a relatively closed system with restricted membership. The number of claimants who play some persistent part in renewal politics and whose interests are respected by NHA and other claimants is small. Wholesale intervention by an array of organized interests is probably more characteristic of unstructured political situations. In Newark, however, NHA or any other regular participant in renewal politics need only touch base at a few points before proceeding with one of their proposals.

This may be viewed accurately as a closed club of urban renewal professionals, as an inner circle of those who devote most of their working hours to housing and renewal matters and who interact frequently on a day-to-day basis. Communication between these professionals is facilitated by the fact that they speak each other's language, face similar administrative problems, and share each other's concern with the disruptive potential of sporadic participants or "outsiders." The "members" of this network, with the exception of Mayor Carlin, are either appointed administrative officials or "civic leaders" playing a quasi-official role on some citizens' committee. Neither the administrative officials nor the "civic leaders" are directly responsible to any broadly-based constituency, a fact which provides these "professionals" with the discretion and flexibility necessary to make behind-the-scenes negotiation successful. Mayor Carlin, the only elected official in this circle, generally has played the role of catalyst and neutral mediator. He has reluctantly agreed to intervene when the structure is threatened with overt conflict, and even then has acted only to urge further negotiations on the contenders.

Interaction among the urban renewal professionals has been institutionalized to the point where their network of negotiations exhibits many characteristics of well-integrated and stable social structures. This can be seen in the detailed definitions of role contained in the political settlements, in the extent to which forms of interaction are pre-defined, and in the restricted range of variable behavior. The preceding discussion of political settlements, moreover, has indicated how the members of this system tried to minimize internal conflict through a differentiation of roles and a crude division of labor. There also appears to be a basic consensus within this circle on certain norms or values, like the emphasis on high levels of clearance or "activism" *per se* and the ban on exposing internal quarrels or negotiations to public scrutiny.

Two other characteristics of most stable structures, effective social control from within and staunch resistance to changes proposed or imposed from without, also typify this circle of renewal professionals. There have been few instances of internal rebellion against the system in Newark. Even in those few cases, moreover, the deviant was quickly pulled back to his expected role without any disruption in the system's high rate of policy output. Most participants in the system interviewed by the author in 1960 expressed satisfaction with the present set-up and seemed to value predictability and accord in their political relations almost as ends-in-themselves. Behavior which might reopen closed questions and might revive the open conflict and fluid relations of earlier days was to be carefully avoided. Proposals for reform (like one City Councilman's recent suggestion that NHA be stripped of redevelopment powers or the suggestion by some outsiders that a central coordinator standing above all the present renewal agencies be appointed by the Mayor) have found no response within the system.

Another characteristic of Newark's slum clearance politics is the low overall visibility of important political events and an unfamiliarity with the system's structure on the part of those outside its boundaries. Private negotiations among the urban renewal professionals rarely appear in the pages of the local press, even though the journalists covering the renewal scene are often fully aware of what occurred. This is the case in part because the local press defines public attacks and overt clashes as "news" but considers informal bargaining sessions unworthy of mention. In addition, many of the City Hall reporters are "members" of the system and have chosen to keep most of their information off the record. Press coverage of urban renewal in recent years has been restricted to formal press releases and official statements, public allegations by participants that conflict does not exist in Newark renewal, booster articles praising Newark's resurrection and attacking the "feet draggers," and routine accounts of how clearance projects are smoothly gliding through their required stages.

The absence of overt conflict and the local press's definition of what constitutes "news" have set the stage for another feature of this system. Since 1955, the Newark Economic Development Committee has propagated an officially endorsed image of how renewal policy is made and why Newark has been so successful in this field. This public relations image of the program, by identifying the Mayor and NEDC as prime movers and by reducing NHA to a non-discretionary administrative position, incorrectly describes the distribution of roles within the renewal system.

In interviewing local participants this author discovered that the further removed any respondent was from the daily negotiations of Danzig and the other professionals, the more likely he was to accept and re-state this official version of renewal politics. There was, in fact, a strong proclivity among those on the periphery of this negotiating circle for "power elite" interpretations of local renewal success.

To the extent that this public relations account is widely accepted, there exists a disparity between power and reputation in Newark renewal politics. Local businessmen, on the one hand, seem to derive major satisfaction from this reputation for power even if free of any substantial influence over clearance decisions. NHA, on the other hand, has been prepared to help publicize this image, since it more closely ties business into the system and further shields NHA's activities from public scrutiny.

The sparsity of large voluntary associations or broadly based interest groups that express concern with renewal decisions and attempt to influence their outcome is another distinctive aspect of the system in Newark. The pluralist model of politics (the image of varied political interests openly contending over public decision with no one bloc capable of calling the tune entirely to its own preference) has little in common with the restricted public and low temperature of Newark's renewal politics.[7] In a nation which allegedly thrives on "joining" and associational life, Newark appears "underorganized" and lacking in effective, concerted action at the grass roots level. The most common form of mass partici-

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[7]Pluralist politics seems to be more prevalent in the giant metropolises, like New York and Chicago. See: Sayre and Kaufman, Governing New York City . . .; and Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961).

pation in the Newark program is the short-lived political movement of those inconvenienced by and opposed to some action of the Housing Authority. These committees form only after the fact, only after NHA has already announced some clearance project. They begin with a burst of enthusiasm, prove to be internally unstable, find they cannot break through the closed system at City Hall, and soon fall apart without having made any imprint on clearance policy.

A final characteristic of the system to be cited here is what its critics label the "uncoordinated" and "haphazard" nature of the resultant renewal policy. NHA officials believe that extensive pre-planning in renewal is not possible and that projects must be run almost on a step-by-step, "plan as you go" basis. They also believe that any attempt to bring clearance activities within the dictates of a comprehensive, city-wide plan would pull NHA down to the expenditure level of other city agencies. There is, according to the members of NHA's staff, a positive correlation between the extent of Newark's clearance operations and the low priority given to city planning values.[8]

Another reason for this poor coordination, in addition to NHA's pre-eminent position in renewal and its aversion to central planning, is the absence of any center or peak in the program where the activities of all relevant agencies could be scrutinized and coordinated. The political settlements, in fact, have established specialization in one's own function and non-interference in the functions of others as a basic norm, thus guaranteeing the insulation of the various renewal agencies. Non-aggression, permissiveness, and logrolling have replaced coordination as ways of expediting renewal business and settling quarrels. The dispersiveness of the present system is defended, and proposals for a renewal coordinator are vigorously resisted.

Pre-conditions of the Structure

Having outlined some features of the system, it is yet to be determined what the pre-conditions of this system are, why it appeared in Newark in the 1950's, and under what circumstances it might reappear in other places. To ask this is also to ask which factors sustain the system and which might prove disruptive for it in the immediate future. In the preceding pages, Newark's clearance policies were viewed as the output of a certain type of power structure; in the following pages some speculations are offered on what environmental factors lie at the base of this structure.

To begin with, fairly unique historical and personal factors were important in the emergence of this structure. One cannot ignore the fact that, in 1948, NHA faced a grand jury investigation into its relations with various politicians and contractors, that Danzig agreed to clean up the Authority if he was made czar of public housing, and that this pact with City Hall lay at the basis of his later success in slum clearance. Danzig's aggressiveness and skill, Carlin's disinterest in policy and preoccupation with patronage, and the personality traits of other major participants are basic parts of the story.

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[8] During Summer, 1959, several NHA officials read Charles Lindblom's article, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" [19 Public Administration Review (Spring, 1959), 79]. They found it highly relevant to their experiences in Newark renewal.

There are other, less unique determinants of this structure, which can and often do appear in other cities. It is possible, for instance, that empires like Danzig's are easier to establish in areas of policy involving public construction and a guaranteed source of funds. Danzig's access to free flowing federal funds and his "good contacts" at Washington and at the regional offices in Philadelphia have been important resources in bargaining with local claimants. The fact that NHA's major output is projects permits Danzig to surprise his public with secretly planned proposals and to force others into the role of obstructionists. He may later justify his procedures by pointing to the tangible, dramatic product. As the New York City cases of Robert Moses and Austin Tobin suggest, an aggressive entrepreneur involved in some form of public construction and free of any reliance on city budgets for his funds may find it relatively easy to maintain a strategy of activism and constant expansion.[9]

There are facets of Newark's governmental institutions that are also pertinent:

1. The "strong Mayor" charter adopted in 1954 permits NHA to exclude the City Council from its calculations and to deal with one man rather than a fickle and volatile Board of City Commissioners. Thus Danzig may curtail sharply the number of actors taking part in his circle of negotiations.
2. NHA's status as an independent authority has reinforced Danzig's other resources. Mayor Carlin cannot add or subtract one penny from NHA's budget and cannot hire or fire one member of NHA's staff. The Mayor has recently discovered, moreover, that his own appointees to the Board of NHA Commissioners soon fall under Danzig's sway.
3. The vesting of redevelopment powers in the city's public housing authority permitted that authority to utilize the staff, patronage, and contacts it had amassed from 1939 to 1949,in negotiating support for redevelopment.
4. Newark's nonpartisan elections have forced each politician to build his own political organization, have increased the rate of turnover among local politicos, and have trebled the sense of insecurity among elected office-holders at City Hall. In so doing,nonpartisan politics has enhanced the bargaining value of NHA's patronage and has made it increasingly important for any politico to have NHA as a political ally.
5. Carlin's economy drive (a matter of policy rather than of formal institutions) has made a "patronage desert" of City Hall and has added to NHA's power as a free-wheeling, patronage-dispensing organization.
6. The Citizens Advisory Committee did not give the "civic leaders" a major role in slum clearance, as its initiators had hoped, but its use did have some important byproducts. By thrusting quasi-official responsibilities on the business and real estate groups, the citizens' committee served to weaken their traditional opposition towards government action in urban renewal and to foreclose a continuation of their usual "pressure group" activities in this policy area. The Mayor's economy drive, moreover, made it difficult for this committee to acquire a staff and thus made them reliant on NHA's assistance for the attainment of committee goals.

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[9]The strategy of "activism" is described in Sayre and Kaufman, Governing New York City . . ., pp. 337-343. This is a variation of what Dahl labels the "pyramiding of resources." See: Robert Dahl, "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities," in Charles R. Adrian (editor), Social Science and Community Action (Lansing, Michigan: The Institute for Community Development and Services, 1960). Other variables must be sought to explain why both Moses and Tobin have been checked within the last two years, while Danzig has not.

Other factors functionally correlated with the renewal system in Newark involve the socio-economic environment. One key facet of that environment deserves special emphasis: the flight of Newark's business and professional upper-middle class to the suburbs and the concomitant influx of non-white, unskilled laborers from the South. This sudden shift in the city's demography has had two consequences of importance to urban renewal politics. It has created a schism between city politics and the stratum from which Newark's "civic leaders" were traditionally drawn, and has probably (but less certainly) helped destroy the city's associational life.

"Joining" and participation in civic affairs are alleged to be the unique province of the upper-middle class. Low levels of political involvement, on the other hand, tend to be correlated with low income and low education. Transient areas or those undergoing rapid population shifts also tend to be underorganized. The sparsity of broadly based voluntary associations or political interest groups among the Negro population of our major northern cities also has been noted.[10]

Between 1950 and 1960, Newark's Negro population almost tripled, while the city's total population slowly declined. This fact and the fact that almost 40 per cent of Newark's 1960 population was non-white probably helps to explain the insignificance of mass participation in programs like urban renewal.

With close to 60 per cent of its daytime population residing outside the city limits, Newark often boasts of being "the most commuted to city in the nation." Though still commuting to offices in the city after their exodus to the suburbs, the leaders of Newark's business and professional worlds generally shunned local politics as a sordid, venal enterprise run by "the worst kind." The civic improvement associations led by this middle class continued to operate during the 1940's and 1950's, but the commuters' commitment to them grew more and more tenuous. At the same time, these civic groups found their influence at City Hall waning. The politicos, ignoring the "civic leaders'" attacks on public housing and NHA, denounced them as "outsiders," "big shots," and naive "do-gooders." Even after the "civic leaders" were drawn back into city politics by the staffs of their own civic associations, the commitment of these leaders to active participation remained tentative and their re-integration into city affairs incomplete. As members of the citizens' committees on urban renewal, the "civic leaders" still harbored a strong aversion towards any kind of political conflict or bargaining. Having abandoned city politics to the newcomers, the business and professional group now disliked dealing personally with their political representatives.

This continued, though somewhat narrowed, gap between City Hall and the "civic leaders" has permitted Danzig to insulate different segments of his political environment, to bargain separately with each, and to prevent the formation of any hostile coalition. By the time this suburban middle class was prepared to assert its leadership in urban renewal, Danzig already had things well arranged at City Hall. Spokesmen for these civic groups were told by Mayor Carlin

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[10]The literature on participation in politics generally and voluntary associations specifically is reviewed in: Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), Chapters 4, 5, 18. See also James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), Chapters 1, 2, and passim.

to take their demands directly to Danzig. NHA's Executive Director, then, has had a major part, perhaps the major part, in defining the role of the citizens' committees in urban renewal. Danzig, as much as Carlin, has provided the mediation necessary to bridge the gap between city politics and the "civic leaders." Danzig has played this role, however, on his own terms and with favorable consequences for the continuation of NHA's autonomy.

Instabilities and Threats

When the author concluded the research for this study in January, 1960, there did not appear to be any immediate prospect for a disruption of the system's equilibrium. Few of the personal, historical, institutional, and environmental factors cited in preceding pages seemed likely to change in the near future. If these factors did have anything to do with the emergence of this system, they could be expected to continue in force and help sustain the system.

Yet certain potential sources of disruption were apparent. Of all these, Danzig's relations with the Mayor represent the crucial, most volatile, and hence most vulnerable part of the system. To begin with, there is always the disruption caused by a change in administration. Yet Danzig has survived one such transition (the election of NHA's leading critic, Leo Carlin, as Mayor in 1953) without any damage being done to the program. He fully expects to survive another transition if Carlin should be defeated in 1962. A greater threat to NHA is the likelihood that both Mayor Carlin and his successor will become increasingly responsive to the concerns over Negro immigration and internal dispersion that are being voiced by neighborhood associations and many white politicians. The widespread notion that public housing encourages this immigration and that NHA's clearance activities foster Negro invasion of fringe neighborhoods has already caused some strain in the Mayor's relations with Danzig. Finally, a recent patronage rebellion by the City Councilmen (encouraged by Carlin's leading political enemy, the Essex County Democratic Chairman) and the increasingly independent behavior of the Business Administrator suggest a possible fractionation of power at City Hall in the coming years. If Carlin's firm control of matters down at "The Hall" should be shaken, NHA might have to expand the circle of negotiants to save its projects.

Slum Clearance and Democratic Values

Some of those familiar with the basic structure of urban renewal politics in Newark have been troubled by its implications for the general problem of achieving planned social change at the local level. Perhaps most distressing to these observers is the fact that NHA has achieved widespread, purposive innovation only at the cost of major democratic values.

There is nothing startling in the fact that appointed officials in Newark frequently make public policy decisions of far-reaching consequences. The growing power of public bureaucracies and the increasing importance of administrative policy-making have been described at length by more than a generation of political scientists. Most of these authors, however, refused to view the expansion of bureaucratic power with alarm, emphasizing the checks on administrative behavior that elected officials wield from above and that organized clientele groups exert from below.[11]

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[11]This description is a major achievement of the "politics of administration" school. The value questions were well discussed in Pendleton Herring's Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York:McGraw-Hill Book Co.,1936).

In Newark, however, neither type of check seems to be operative on the Housing Authority. If there are any controls on NHA's renewal decisions, they emanate from the offices of the leading private redevelopers across the nation and from the federal housing office in Washington, New York, and Philadelphia. It is NHA's departure from the image of policy formation in a democratic context, then, which has proven unsettling to those interested in reconciling planned change and democratic values. This departure, moreover, far from constituting a peripheral or coincidental occurrence, has contributed directly to Newark's "success" in slum clearance. Any attempt at present to make the system more "democratic," either through greater coordination from above or increased participation at the grass roots, would disturb the balanced network of settlements and reduce the high levels of clearance activity.

The Newark experience also challenges some current notions about the pre-conditions for successful innovation in local communities. Whatever URA and others may allege, the execution of slum clearance within the dictates of a comprehensive city-wide plan is far from being indispensable to urban renewal achievement in all cities. In fact it may be inversely correlated with a high rate of renewal activity. The same challenge can be applied to the statement that widespread citizen support is a basic pre-condition to successful renewal and that local agencies must begin by educating the public or by cultivating a broadly based constituency.[12]

Civic improvement projects in some communities apparently have little chance of success unless initiated or executed by the local "elite" of high-status, well-educated business and professional men.[13] In Newark, however, clearance progress was well under way and NHA had received local approval of two clearance projects, before the "civic leaders" decided to intervene. The members of NHA's staff provide the initiative and momentum for clearance projects; they ask of the "civic leaders" only to refrain from obstruction.

Central planning, widespread citizen participation, and leadership by the community's business and professional class may be preferable to the

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[12]These notions about the indispensability of central planning and citizen participation can be found in the publications of URA, e.g.: The Workable Program--What It Is (1957); How Localities Can Develop a Workable Program for Urban Renewal (1956); Key to the Problem of Slums and Blight (1957). They are also restated in most issues of the Journal of Housing and in a variety of other sources, e.g.: Reuel Hemdahl, Urban Renewal (New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1959) and Webb S. Fiser, "Urban Renewal in Syracuse" in Richard T. Frost (editor), Cases in State and Local Government (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961).

[13]Many of the sources cited in the preceding footnote also claim support by the community's leading citizens to be vital to renewal success. While the role of the local "elite" was stressed in earlier studies of community power, this emphasis more recently has been re-examined. The literature is summarized in Wallace S. Sayre and Nelson W. Polsby, "American Political Science and the Study of Urbanization" (unpublished manuscript).

pattern of agency autonomy described in these pages; but they are not indispensable or even conducive to renewal "success" in Newark.

Before any firm conclusions on the problem of slum clearance and democratic values can be drawn from this study, a number of empirical questions relating to the generality of these data must be asked. Is the above-described brand of urban renewal politics a unique occurrence, produced by historical events and environmental factors peculiar to the city of Newark? Have similar systems appeared in other local renewal programs? If this type of structure has some generality, to what extent is it always correlated with high achievement and to what extent is it always based on the same pre-conditions as in Newark? Can renewal "success" be achieved without this system or its determinants, and if so what do other structures of "success" look like? On the other hand, does this type of structure or any significant part of it often appear without the same degree of renewal achievement? Which aspects of the Newark system and its underlying prerequisites are crucial, and which peripheral, to the resulting high level of clearance activity?

Clearly this type of empirical question, while crucial to the problem of planned change in a democratic community, cannot be answered on the basis of data from Newark alone. Only comparative analyses of many local renewal systems will yield some reliable conclusions on the conditions for far-reaching political innovation at the local level. Perhaps the Newark experience in slum clearance will provide some useful hypotheses and guidelines for such an undertaking.

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THE ARMS RACE AND WORLD ORDER[1]

by Herman Kahn

Many sober people believe that the current international order with its emphasis on anarchy, national egoism, and deterrence is not going to last to the year 2000 and perhaps not more than a decade or two. One can hold this estimate even after allowing for the many adjustments that have already been made to modern technology and the important, but often neglected, fact that the current arms race is not as uncontrolled as it would be if narrow military, technological, and economic factors were allowed to totally dominate military research, development, procurement and operations. Actually, the current arms race is rather severely limited by political, social, moral, economic and doctrinal restraints on the participants. These restraints and adjustments doubtless "buy time," but many believe that they do not buy enough time for the system to adjust satisfactorily by gradual evolution; it still seems likely that either the system must be changed drastically in the near future or it will "blow up," that is, change itself in a violent explosive manner.

If a blow-up does occur, it is somewhat unlikely, perhaps most unlikely, that it will result in an "end of history." It may simply be a very serious crisis whose "solution" involves major structural changes in the international scene; it may be a "small" thermonuclear war followed by a viable peace; it may even be a large thermonuclear war but one which is not an

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[1] I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to Morton Halperin, Morton Kaplan, and Max Singer for many suggestions that have influenced or modified this paper.

Armageddon. Wars come in many sizes and shapes and, at least in the sixties, it is difficult to visualize a likely sequence of events that would set back either the population or the wealth of the world by more than a generation or so. Catastrophic as this would be, it would not be "an end to history" or even an end to civilization. (It should not be necessary for me to say so, but on the basis of some reactions to other things I have written, I should note that I understand that it would be a great misfortune if either the population or the wealth were set back as much as a generation or even a fraction of that time. However great a misfortune it would be, we are not barred from noting that greater misfortunes could occur.)

It is also possible that the either-or people will be wrong; that the international order will not change dramatically at all -- even though we experience both war and crisis -- or conversely, that it will change gradually and develop in such a way that the system will never be subjected to the strains which so many are predicting. I believe that the "no change" position can almost be ruled out. Even those who believe that relatively small change and slow evolution will do the trick, also tend to believe that the advent of nuclear weapons and modern technology will cause changes greater in their effect on the current social and international order than the introduction of cavalry, printing, the long bow, artillery, steam engine, rifles, telegraphy, etc., did in their respective eras. And it is most likely that these changes will come on an accelerated time scale. While

the last fifteen years have set the stage for such changes, few believe the necessary adjustments have been made.

This kind of "either-or" thinking or the even more extreme kind which equates every kind of a blowup with an end of history could and maybe even should lead to hysteria. However, it has been accepted with amazing calmness in the recent past, except by fringe groups. On the other hand, there is now a growing awareness and concern about the implications of the current and future arms race. This concern is not only being expressed through the activities of the informal and formal "peace", "arms control", and "international order" groups. It is having a major impact on both policy and practical politics here and abroad. In addition to the spontaneous (and often perfectly proper) pressures that are building up, there is a good deal of evidence that the Soviet Union has in the past, and hopes even more in the future, to use that widespread fear of arms and the arms race to manipulate the West for purposes of their own. It is therefore of the utmost value to examine the different varieties of either-or thinking in some detail and with some care.

Let me start with a rather extreme example of either-or thinking. The following excerpt is from a well-known speech by C. P. Snow,[2] which attracted much favorable comment, and little or no unfavorable comment.

> "We are faced with an either-or, and we haven't much time. The <u>either</u> is acceptance of a restriction of nuclear armaments. This is going to begin, just as a token, with an agreement on the stopping of nuclear

> The United States is not going to get the 99.9 percent 'security' that it has been asking for. This is unobtainable, though there are other bargains that the United States could probably secure. I am not going to conceal from you that this course involves certain risks. They are quite obvious, and no honest man is going to blink them. That is the either. The or is not a risk but a certainty. It is this. There is no agreement on tests. The nuclear arms race between the United States and the U.S.S.R. not only continues but accelerates. Other countries join in. Within, at the most, six years, China and several other states have a stock of nuclear bombs. Within, at the most, ten years, some of those bombs are going off. I am saying this as responsibly as I can. That is the certainty. On the one side, therefore, we have a finite risk. On the other side we have a certainty of disaster. Between a risk and a certainty, a sane man does not hesitate."

In spite of the rather widespread acclaim with which the above statement was received, and in spite of the fact that the author has achieved distinction in both science and letters, the statement is neither accurate nor responsible. The United States is not asking for 99.9 percent security via the arms control routes. In fact, we seem to be willing to accept agreements of a much lower reliability than almost anybody, even passionate arms controllers, would have been willing to accept a few years ago when they still did not know how difficult it is to get reliably enforceable and controllable agreements. Much more important, the "or" described above is not a certainty. Unless C. P. Snow has information denied to the rest of us, he cannot know that within ten years some of these bombs are going off. And more important, he cannot know that some of these bombs

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2 "The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science," C. P. Snow, Science, 1-27-61.

going off results in the certainty of universal disaster. I have a belief that the reason for the rather widespread acceptance of the attitude expressed by C. P. Snow is given in his last sentence. It would be nice indeed if all we had to do was to choose between a certainty and a risk of disaster. In that case a sane man need not hesitate. Unfortunately for the peace of mind of responsible decision-makers, it is by no means clear on which side the certainties and the risks lie. In fact it might be true that there is a certainty of disaster. It is even conceivable that a detached observer, say from Mars, with infinite wisdom would conclude that it was impossible for we poor creatures on earth to get out of the difficulties we are in. We have discovered weapons of mass destruction and sooner or later we are going to use them -- and maybe more than once -- until the peace of utter destruction prevents us. On the other hand, it might be true that there are a number of different paths to safety, involving, of course, varying degrees of risk and different historical outcomes. I hold with the latter belief; as a member of the human race, I can scarcely afford not to. But if there is anything that I am clear on, it is that the balancing of the risks is a difficult job. It cannot be done rigorously, though analysis should help. In the final analysis it will involve at best judicious guesses, informed acts of faith, careful steps in the dark -- but it is well to recognize these for what

they are, and that some new and appealing path might be even more risky than the perilous one we are now trodding.

In summary, one reason why people like to believe that the current system must inevitably end in total annihilation is that they want to stop thinking. They want to make the choice one between a risk and the certainty of disaster, and therefore as moral men they need no longer hesitate. Unfortunately, intelligent men cannot pose the problem in that fashion. I, myself, belong to a more moderate form of the either-or school. More moderate in that I do not feel certain that there really is an either-or situation, and more moderate in that I do not assign quite the same cataclysmic quality to a failure on the "or" side. But the failure could clearly be catastrophic enough.

Let us now examine one aspect of this current order for a moment to see why so many find it so unsatisfactory. There are about twenty-five nations today which spend between a hundred million and a billion dollars a year on national defense. One can certainly believe, if current growth rates and attitudes toward national defense continue, that before the twentieth century ends[3] there will be something like fifty nations spending between a hundred million and a billion a year on national

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3 I personally believe that technological progress, almost by itself, would make the situation critical much before the year 2000 unless there are compensating controls or other changes. However, by picking the year 2000 as a sort of outermost limit for the viability of the current system, I eliminate almost all of the objections of my more conservative colleagues.

defense. Since progress in both weaponry and the technical ability of these nations would accompany this increase in the number of nations, there would be at least half a hundred "small" nations able, within only a fraction of their customary defense budget, to acquire rather impressive strategic forces.[4] It is most unlikely that these forces would be comparable to the capabilities of the larger powers, and they may or may not have some problems as a "second strike" force; but they are still likely to be potentially very destructive.

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4 While current ICBM's are expensive to procure and maintain, it is quite likely that future models will be much less expensive. This is obvious from looking at the technology of the very next generation of solid-fueled or storable-propellant missiles. There is another reason why some models of ICBM's may reverse the normal trend of weapons systems to greater complexity and cost. Looking at the history of bombers, for example, one notes that the early bombers had inadequate performance, even for the minimum mission -- improvements in speed, range, and altitude were of the greatest importance. This meant that technological improvements were applied to solving these problems with a consequent increase in cost. In the absence of active and passive defense (and possibly in the presence) even the model T ICBM has a very impressive performance. This means that technological improvements may be used to reduce the procurement and operating costs, rather than improve the performance. If one accepts this last remark, then one can almost confidently predict that in the next few decades it will be possible for advanced nations to maintain large forces of some models of ICBM's for systems costs of less than $1,000,000 a year per missile and for less advanced nations to fabricate and maintain a force for systems costs less than five times this figure. In addition to being able to get simple strategic systems, many nations will be able to procure systems capable of disguised warfare, either because the weapons are fired from hidden sites (from sea borne or space borne platforms for example) or because the weapon is so subtle either in its effect or its causation, that the attacked nation is not aware -- perhaps until too late that it is being attacked. For example, the possibility of using some concealed form of bacteriological or chemical warfare to debilitate a nation's population over some years to reduce its competitive capabilities should not be out of the question by the year 2000 or perhaps earlier.

In addition, there are about ten nations which today spend over a billion dollars a year. By the year 2000 there could be about twenty nations spending more than a billion dollars a year on defense. It is, therefore, quite possible that there will be about twenty, or more, nations capable of achieving more than a modest strategic capability. For example, by amortizing the cost over ten years, any of these nations will be able to build a nuclear doomsday machine or its near equivalent within its regular defense budget. (A near doomsday machine can be defined as a device or a set of devices which when exploded will destroy all unprotected life in an area of at least continental proportions and also have major world-wide effects.) I have discussed elsewhere the "strategic theory" of such machines,[5] and though I concluded that it is most unlikely that any nation would build such devices in the next ten to twenty years, I also pointed out that there are circumstances in which a nation might wish it had built such a device. If such circumstances occur often enough, then at least one or two nations may actually construct such machines. I would judge that it is as likely as not that such devices will be built in the next thirty or forty years -- if one assumes a continuation of the current anarchy. Of course, even if doomsday machines are built, it is unlikely that they will be used. However, almost all agree that the mere existence of a doomsday machine is a vast and totally unacceptable danger. If the present anarchy were to continue for a century or so, then, even though the probability that a doomsday machine will be con-

I happen to believe also that it is most likely that the international order will change before a doomsday machine is built. It will change partly because of the general and specific political impact of the advancing military and non-military technology, partly as a continuation of current political, legal, and moral trends, and partly as a direct result of the first problem that I have already mentioned--the actual or potential diffusion of "normal" weapons. It is difficult for me to believe that the world will go unchanged if there are fifty independent, sovereign, small and medium nations with the capability to acquire small amounts of reasonably destructive modern weapon systems and ten or twenty nations with the capability to acquire large amounts. This is true even if many of these nations are not strongly motivated to acquire such systems. Even a weak motivation is likely to be motivation enough--particularly in an unstable competitive situation.

Just because many nations obtain nuclear weapons does not necessarily mean a cataclysmic instability. For example, the situation might turn out to be similar to the old duelling societies of the American West. In these societies many people went armed; every now and then a quarrel broke out and somebody was either wounded or killed but life went on.

The situation might turn out to be even more peaceful than the duelling analogy would suggest. Even before duelling became outlawed, there was a strong tendency in some of the duelling societies to minimize the role of duels. Individuals learned that force was not a proper way of settling personal disputes.

And it might indeed literally turn out that the war system will wither away by itself.

I believe that both of the above possibilities, a viable duelling system or an evolutionary withering away of the war system without any "special controls," are somewhat remote. In my book, On Thermonuclear War, I listed (pp. 492-493) ten problems which would either occur or be greatly aggravated if there is a widespread diffusion of nuclear weapons. Let me both repeat that list here and discuss each of these problems very briefly.

1. Greater opportunities for blackmail and mischiefmaking. In a world which is armed to its teeth in nuclear weapons, every time there is a quarrel or a difference of opinion, there will always be in the background a possibility of violence of a kind and degree and speed that is quite different from what is possible today. This could even occur in relative innocuous quarrels, for example, over fishing rights in addition to the obvious trouble making Irredentist movements or quarrels over prestige. There will be pressures not only to threaten all-out war but pressures to use single nuclear weapons to show resolve, commital, or how far one is willing to go. In other words, there is likely to be both encouragement and opportunities for playing the game of chicken.

2. Greater proneness to inadvertent war. An inadvertent (unpremeditated) war is one which occurs without the considered intention of any of the governments that wage it. The possibility of inadvertent war could go up not only because there are many more weapons, but also, and probably more important, because there are many more organizations with different standards of training, organization, and responsibleness. An inadvertent war could be caused by an accident in the sense of a switch failing, a false radar return, or some other statistical event. It could also occur because of unauthorized behavior, irresponsible behavior, misunderstandings of orders, generally lax discipline, or in any of the thousand and one ways in which something can go wrong. While it is not inevitable that any particular such occurrence will set off a large-scale chain reaction or war, it is quite clear that even if they do not, that nations will refuse to live with a situation in which accidents actually do occur frequently. If at all possible, they will do something to correct a system which allows such things to occur.

3. Increased capabilities for "local" Munichs, Pearl Harbors, and blitzkriegs. I have already mentioned the tendency to play the game of chicken. A slightly more reckless, irresponsible, desperate or decisive decision maker might simply go ahead and attack another nation, saying in effect to the other nations, "What will you do about it?" Even if the attacked nation has a nuclear capability, in many cases it may not have much effective second-strike capability. The other nations, on the other hand, are going to be loathe to start a nuclear war to avenge a fait accompli. The attacker might even use the attacked nation as a hostage to prevent effective reprisals.

The aggressor may not actually need to launch his attack. He might merely threaten to do so with explicit ultimatums, thus forcing the other side to either back down or to attack itself with all the political and military dangers such an attack might bring. In other words, in a situation where there are opportunities for large payoffs through extremely aggressive behavior, we should not be surprised if some nations indulge in such behavior.

4. Pressures to preempt because of points one, two and three. To the extent that the behavior described above actually occurs, as opposed to being an academic possibility, one could expect decision makers to note that it happens and therefore to also note the importance of doing it first. This is not just a question of attacking first. In any situation in which there is an important gain to be made by saying something like, "One of us has to be responsible, and since it isn't going to be me, it has to be you," there is a tendency to preempt by making that remark first. One could therefore expect an overwhelming and perhaps disastrous tendency to overuse committal strategies.

5. Tendency to neglect conventional military capabilities. Because of an over-reliance on one's own nuclear capabilities or fear of the other side's nuclear capabilities, it is likely to be extremely difficult for most nations to take the concept of limited conventional war seriously enough to actually allocate money, manpower, thought and other scarce commodities into conventional or other limited capabilities. It will be difficult for them to do this, even though they realize abstractly that in a crisis they are likely to find that they cannot rely on their nuclear capa-

bilities and must then either wage an inadequate conventional war or weakly threaten to do so. This is likely to create, all by itself, all kinds of instabilities and opportunities for bluff, counterbluff, or actual attacks that result in either defeat or escalation.

6. Internal (civil war, coup d'etat, irresponsibility, etc.) and external (arms race, fear of fear, etc.) political problems. It is difficult for me to believe that in a world as armed to the teeth and as dangerous looking as one I have pictured that there will not be both responsible and irresponsible peace and accommodation movements. These movements, particularly if accompanied by violence or even illegal non-violence, could paralyze normal political life. In addition, the necessity for reliable internal control of these weapons could force or encourage many governments to practice a rigid authoritarianism or despotism to prevent even small military or political groups from obtaining and using weapons for protest or revolutionary purposes.

In addition, if every time a hard decision is being made, a major portion of the country is being risked; if every time a country's diplomats walk into a hostile conference room every woman and child feels threatened, if every time a nation stands firm against aggressive probes panic seizes the hearts of many of its citizens, then many citizens will simply adopt an attitude of denial or apathetic fatalism while others will call for "peace" with about the intensity that Eisenhower indicated when he predicted that the people of the world will want peace so badly that the governments have to get out of their way. The trouble with

this method of negotiating a solution to a problem is that it is not likely, to put it mildly, to produce thoughtful and considered suggestions or programs. In any case, as a result of a combination of apathy, denial, and hysteria, responsible political life is likely to suffer disastrously.

7. Facilitate diffusion of nuclear weapons to really irresponsible organizations. To the extent that these advance weapons or components are treated as articles of commerce, their cost will be well within the resources available to many large organizations. In fact, if we get them down to $100,000 or so, and this is not at all implausible, they are in some sense available to any dedicated middle-income individual who is willing to save a major fraction of his income for ten or twenty years. Exactly what this could mean is hard to picture without detailed consideration of the various scenarios that are possible, but somehow few will feel comfortable in a world in which the Malayan guerrillas, Cuban rebels, Algerian terrorists (or the Right Wing counter-terrorists), or even the Puerto Rican independence party, could have access to nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction.

8. Complicate future problems of control. If we once allow weapons to diffuse widely, then even though an incident or a crisis occurs which makes most nations relatively willing to control the situation, such control is likely to be harder to achieve because the small powers are now being asked to accept a reduction in their current capability rather than simply to abstain from acquiring weapons. Of course, if the control measures that are envisaged are sufficiently thorough-going and complete, it may be that all

nations will be treated equally. Even then it is going to be difficult if not impossible to get all of them to junk their nuclear weapon systems peacefully rather than to just acquiesce in controls that prevent them from acquiring such systems, though, as France has shown, even the last may be difficult.

9. Creates and intensifies agent-provocateur problems. It should be clear that one thing which restrains the behavior of large nations in this super-armed world or perhaps any world is that they do not wish to get a reputation for being blatantly aggressive. Therefore, when a nation does want to be aggressive it often needs an excuse to make its aggression seem defensive or at least very special and limited. In the absence of a special situation (such as Berlin), it may be difficult to do this because it is usually almost impossible for a small power to be so provocative against a large power as to justify, for example, nuclear retaliation. But if a small power happens to have nuclear weapons, then many kinds of "accidental" incidents could be arranged; in particular, if the large power can arrange for an unauthorized or irresponsible firing of a weapon by the small power against the large power, then this incident could be used to justify all kinds of ultimatums or even actual reprisals up to and including the forceable disarming of the small power which had shown itself to be so irresponsible as to nearly cause a holocaust.

10. Catalytic war or escalation. The widespread diffusion of nuclear weapons would give many nations the capability, and in some cases also create the pressure, to aggravate an on-going crisis or even touch off a war between two other powers for pur-

poses of its own. Here again the situation is so complicated that one must think through many scenarios to get a feeling for the possibilities. However, even in advance of such systematic exploration and without discussing what thought has already been made, it should be clear that there are many possibilities for mischief making. (See note 4, page 6.)

The above comments should make it plausible that the diffusion of nuclear and other modern weapons could and probably will result in the creation of many more ways in which things can go wrong, and that under current programs this increase in possibilities is unlikely to be compensated for. Therefore, there should be an automatic increase in the probability that things will go wrong. In short, the diffusion of nuclear weapons will probably both increase the number of crises and also tend to increase the seriousness and the grim potentialities of any crisis or even misunderstandings which do occur. This will increase enormously the importance of having responsible and competent governments everywhere. I would myself conjecture that it puts an intolerable strain on the system if there really are a hundred or so independent sovereignties. Some governments will either fail inadvertently or deliberately try to exploit the common dangers for unilateral advantages. These failures will probably occur too frequently for the system to exist unchanged.

This last statement is likely to be true even if many of the possibilities just discussed do not occur. The widespread possession of nuclear weapons and delivery systems is likely to be similar to a situation that the physicist would describe as "quasi-stable equilibrium." Imagine, for example, a ball balanced on top of a

small cup so that small movements of the ball can be tolerated but not large ones. If this ball and the cup are isolated, it might sit there on top of its cup forever, but if it is submitted to the vagaries and chances of a sufficiently uncontrolled environment, one can guarantee that sooner or later it will fall. This can be true even though every "reasonable" analysis of the situation that looks at probable or plausible disturbances showed that the forces were in close enough balance so the ball should stay where it is. It takes an improbable and implausible force to topple the ball. But some improbable and implausible events will occur and, barring a secular change in the situation, almost with certainty the ball will eventually fall. However depending on the relationship of the degree of stability and the frequency and violence of the perturbing force the metastable state might be expected to last for only seconds or for centuries.

While the analogy simultaneously may be both apt and misleading, many who have thought about this problem have come to the conclusion that reliable stability can only come through an international agency with an effective monopoly of force, total disarmament, or a permanent stabilization of something like the current system with two or three main blocs with most non-bloc powers not having modern weapons systems. This last is likely to be stable only if the blocs are both monolithic in their external relations, cooperate on most issues, and act with a great deal of restraint when competitive. In the long run only some variant of "world government" seems plausible to this writer, both the bloc solution and total disarmament being too unstable to disturbances.

If one accepts this view of the future availability of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems from the technological and economic points of view and the instability that would ensue if these technological and economic factors were exploited to the point where there was a widespread diffusion of those weapons, then the only questions that remain are of the following sort: Under current and future conditions, how much motivation will there be to acquire these systems? If there is enough to create a problem then how much change is required to handle the situation? How will these changes come about? Can we do much to influence these changes or will most of them occur in a natural and unguided (but not necessarily peaceful) fashion?

It might be worthwhile at this point to comment on why it might take as long as thirty or forty years before the current system would reach the breaking point. One reason is obvious -- nations like the United States, the Soviet Union, members of the Western European Union, and so on, are extremely cautious about resorting to the use of modern arms or even formal threats to do so. In addition to being cauticus themselves, they restrain those who are not. In other words, deterrence is likely to work on at least 99.99 percent of the days (which would imply that with average luck it would work for about thirty years). The only trouble is that even one failure is likely to be very destructive and might be catastrophic. However, the unsatisfactoriness of a world system based on current deterrence concepts, with their ever present possibility of failure, is no reason for us unwisely to weaken our deterrence. We can easily worsen the situation, not only as judged from a narrow national point of view, but also as judged from the

viewpoint of developing a satisfactory world order.

I have already mentioned the other important reasons for believing that the current deterrent system will probably be more stable than a superficial examination would indicate -- there are all kinds of restraints on both the arms race and the military postures and operations. For example, imagine that I had written this paper about five years ago and that I had been informed that the Communist Chinese would openly prepare to test nuclear weapons at some point in the early sixties. (Many people now seem to believe that this is true.) I would have felt at that time that it was quite reasonable to assume that the Japanese and Indians would be working hard on their own bombs by now. Since these nations had (and probably still have) an intrinsically greater independent capability for achieving a nuclear explosion than the Chinese, it would have seemed likely that the early sixties would see three Asiatic nuclear powers. In fact, one might have imagined four or five.

Well, it doesn't seem to be like that. As far as is generally known, neither the Indians nor the Japanese have programs. While both Nehru and Bhabba (head of the Indian AEC) have stated that India could have nuclear weapons within two years after a decision to produce them, they have also stated that India will not make that decision. Citizens and leaders of India and other Asiatic nations seem now (though they change their minds) to believe that the Chinese will use self-restraint, or that the Americans or Soviets or other nations will protect them or they have some sophisticated (and probably incorrect) reason for not worrying. Some of them, of course, just refuse to face the problem.

Similarly in Europe. Five years ago I would have thought that once the French had achieved a nuclear explosion, that the Germans and Italians and even the Swiss and the Swedes would also try to procure nuclear weapons. Well, once more, it isn't like that. The last two countries, it is true, have authorized their departments of defense to look into the problem of obtaining nuclear weapons, but in both cases the legislatures have refused to appropriate substantial sums for this activity. These two nations have merely tried to establish the principle that they are entitled to get nuclear weapons if they want to, but they are not taking any serious actions in that direction that might rock the boat.

Similarly, in the late forties, it would have seemed to me (and to many technologists) that by 1969, or even 1959, some nation such as South Africa would have a gaseous diffusion plant of its own, designed and financed by Europeans, whose major output would be fuel for reactors but which would, as a by-product, sell uranium to countries which might divert this material to bombs. I could even have imagined such a munitions maker engaging in the manufacture and sale of bombs to "carefully" selected customers. It is true that there would be much pressure exerted on the South Africans not to do this, but they are already receiving much criticism and might feel thay they could afford to ignore the expected increase. It is also true that South Africa, intensely hated for its Apartheid policies, should, above all other nations, be interested in controlling the diffusion of nuclear weapons to small countries or clandestine groups. However, they might not realize that the sale of weapons to medium and advanced countries could speed the day when revolutionists or blackmailers or neighboring

countries would get nuclear weapons. They could also feel (and possibly correctly) that if they did not engage in this business other nations would, and that this way they could exert some control over the distribution in addition to making some profits.

None of these things has occurred. Because of technological and economic reasons the development of power reactors (another source of fissionable material) has been much slower than expected. And another potential cause of the diffusion of weapons, the AEC's project Plowshare (peaceful uses of nuclear explosives) is being fiercely opposed mainly because it may facilitate such diffusion. Furthermore, there seems to have been very little interest in some of the latest developments (such as the ultra high-speed centrifuge) which could be used by even small nations to acquire nuclear fuel for weapons.

There are also grave restraints on other research and development programs in the United States and, one rather suspects, in the Soviet Union as well. One need only notice how little work has been done on bacteriological and chemical warfare in the United States, both during World War II and in the subsequent fifteen years. Although there is now great interest in these subjects, much or almost all of this interest is directed toward incapacitating agents rather than killing agents. By and large, scientists have been unwilling to work in this area, and the government has been loathe to appropriate funds. Similar statements can be made about other areas of research or production that might cause an undue or undesirable acceleration in the arms race. Fear of the arms race, rather than budgetary considerations or inadequate effectiveness, is probably the main reason for the current neglect of

civil defense and de-emphasis on active defense. In addition, if the public discussion is any guide, the emphasis in our nuclear-weapons laboratories has recently been on smaller and cleaner, rather than larger and dirtier weapons. And, finally, one of the reasons for the interest in mobile systems is that they seem to be able to achieve certain kinds of deterrence with many times smaller total yield deployed than is true of the systems available today.

Not only in the United States but throughout the world there are important unilateral restraints on the arms race. In addition, there are outlets for both energies and competition in economic development, in the propaganda and political war, and even in technological progress (i.e., the space race). These restraints and "peaceful" alternatives may succeed in deferring for some

years or possibly even decades the day of reckoning. But it is hard for us members of even the moderate either-or school to believe that it will be deferred for more than a very few decades. And even if the arms race is controlled, both modern technology and modern morality create pressures and capabilities for a new world order. And if the arms race is not controlled, then any day may see a spectacular and revolutionary weapons development which really makes all nations equal in potential for violence in much the same way that the six gun became the great equalizer in the American West. Differences in skill, morality, nerve and recklessness could still be decisive, but mere physical size or wealth could become either irrelevant or a handicap.[6]

Although the breakdown of the current world order by a war or crisis need not lead to an end of history, it could be the most momentous catastrophe to occur in historical time. We would all, of course, prefer to escape from this situation peacefully. How can we go about this?

First of all we can try to buy time by increasing the safety of the current system while encouraging natural developments -- perhaps aiding these by negotiation on relatively simple and apolitical technical matters such as a nuclear test ban or control of surprise attack[7]-- in the hope that the "war system" will gradually wither away to be replaced by another system--perhaps by a more or less satisfactory

6. See Chapters IX and X of OTW for a reasonably detailed description of the current arms race. The Arms Race paper has a summary of these chapters.
7. Simple and apolitical as compared to agreements on important changes in the structure of the current system.

world government--perhaps by some other more sophisticated arrangement whose character is not now clear.

We might try to facilitate the peaceful evolution of the new system by trying to negotiate major structural changes in the international order. There seem to be few significant feasible suggestions, though I will mention one later--(a condominium between the United States and the Soviet Union on the use of nuclear weapons). I personally believe that it is almost impossible to negotiate a comprehensive arms control agreement without a general political settlement except as a reaction to a very dramatic event (such as a war or a crisis which is intense enough to have resulted in the evacuation of cities). I also believe that in the absence of war or crisis, a general political settlement is itself most unlikely. I hope that the above will turn out to be a self-defeating prophecy, but it may not. One can, of course, accept the above view and still be willing to negotiate--partly because there are many political and social reasons for going through the motions of negotiating, and partly because one's judgment may be wrong. The negotiations may succeed.

There is another possibly overwhelming reason for the study and possibly even the preliminary negotiation of comprehensive agreements. It is precisely the point of the above argument that if one does not believe in a relatively peaceful evolution, then one believes that a war or crisis will occur and that presumably we should be prepared to exploit whatever constructive things could be obtained from the event. Such a war or crisis is much more likely to result in a satisfactory comprehensive agreement if there are political and military plans and preparations to exploit the war or crisis; in particular, if an agreement exists ready to be initialled or there is enough common under-

standing of what is needed to make it easy to arrive at agreement under pressure.

Let me consider some of the above possibilities. The simplest and possibly most important available short-term actions are unilateral measures. To take a most important example, we can make our Command and Control system so reliable that the possibility of an accident, unauthorized behavior, or miscalculation is very small. We can make our strategic forces so invulnerable that we don't have to be trigger happy but can take an enemy's attack and still strike back.[8] If we carry through both of these measures we are unlikely to be the victim of an accident or even a deliberate attempt by a third party to set off a war. We will be able and prepared to wait and to analyze what has happened rather than react hastily and wrongly. Thus having invulnerable forces with adequate Command and Control not only deters the enemy from attacking, but eliminates such specially dangerous situations as "reciprocal fear of surprise attack"[9], "self fulfilling prophecy"[10], and "catalytic war"[11]. We need such measures even if they are costly

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8. For a detailed discussion of the problems see Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of OTW. I mention there that I expect both the Soviets and Americans to procure such stable systems that under normal circumstances even a number of ICBM's landing and exploding would not touch off an all-out war--though the system is not likely to be so reliable that either side would deliberately test it.
9. A crisis in which the enemy fears that we will feel so insecure as to be trigger happy, and that he must therefore pre-empt our possible attack.
10. Signals being generated by defensive actions by one side, which touch off actions by the other side which in turn generates signals that cause the first side to take additional precautions, and so on.
11. An attempt by a third nation to try to touch off a mutually undesired war between the two largest powers for purposes of its own.

or handicap the operations of our forces. In addition we must, on our own, design our strategic systems to be able to accept whatever implicit or explicit arrangements can be made--and in particular not develop or procure systems that needlessly accelerate or exacerbate the arms race. This last is not just a formal remark without content. In many influential quarters the most pertinent question that can be asked about a new weapon system is, "How will its procurement affect the arms race?"

As I have already mentioned, the above question is sometimes allowed to dominate the issue to the point where analysts and others have refused to consider otherwise reasonable active and passive defense measures for fear of touching off an offense-defense race. While I am unfriendly to an undue degree of unilateral disarmament, I am not unfriendly to the concept or limited practice, both in the hope of influencing others to do likewise and even more because there are limits to what we are willing to do in order to protect ourselves and further our policies. I used to use the following chart in a briefing to make clear this point.

Where Do You Draw the Line?

1. Insecticides
2. Eating meat
3. Any violence
4. Police force
5. Conventional warfare
6. Kiloton weapons
7. Megaton weapons
8. Begaton weapons
9. Doomsday machines
10. Galaxy destroying machines

It was the purpose of the above chart to make it clear to both the

the pacifist who generally draws the line somewhere between (3) and (5) and the more resolute militarist who draws the line somewhere between (7) and (9) that they both believe in some degree of unilateral disarmament; that there are things neither would procure or plan on doing, no matter what military risk results because they will not procure or do these things.

Of course we have to worry about the Soviets. Will they exercise similar restraints? It has been suggested that we might give them the knowledge and even the tools for decreasing their own vulnerability and improving their safety practices. Bizarre as it seems today, the idea is not inconceivable; something like this may happen. There is however a possible assymmetry between us and the Soviets. Many Marxists seem to be dedicated to a deterministic theory of history in which the so-called permanent operating and other basic factors play the major role. It may be difficult for them to believe that a switch failing or a fuse melting could change the course of history. Most Americans have no such difficulty since we tend to have a fairly shallow view of history. On the other hand, the Soviets worry a great deal about unauthorized behavior. As a result, in many cases they will take the same precautions we do, though with different motivation.

It is also possible that the Soviets will systematically exploit the fear of the Arms Race to corrode the will of the West. They may see only opportunities where we see dangers. However, it is likely that the Soviets themselves will recognize at least the need for highly

protected, slow reacting, reliable forces and will procure such forces almost irrespective of their other policies.

The next thing we can do to stabilize the situation is to negotiate those technical agreements that have little or no political effect but may do much to decrease the immediate risk of war. For example, one might install communication systems between the Soviet and U.S. headquarters. Then if any unexpected events occur, the two countries can communicate directly with each other. There is a possibility[12] (though nobody seems to have any practical proposals) that we can arrange not only to pass information on to the enemy but to establish reliable procedures that would allow him to verify its validity. If a complicated accident occurred or there was a crisis, each nation could then explain its view of what was happening and try to reassure the other that it was not in danger from a surprise attack or other aggressive moves. Even if the verification procedures cannot be worked out, just being able to transmit information and proposals quickly and reliably may be valuable.

Another possibility is the systematic (probably for free rather than on a quid pro quo basis) exchange of information in peacetime so that we can reassure each other as to the safety of our operating practice

12. The problem is that if the crisis is so serious that one is really concerned that the enemy might attack, then one is likely to be unwilling to initiate any kind of unilateral disarmament of other than the strictly offensive forces. By and large the practical measures that can be taken seem to be almost negligible in their effect on the offense forces, unless they also seriously weaken the defensive forces. The point needs further research, but a superficial initial look has not turned up promising ideas. However, see a "Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force" by Thomas Schelling, in World Politics _____, for some possibilities.

and so that each side will understand the nature of certain types of operations and not erroneously think of them as threatening. This exchange of information could be done formally or informally, explicitly or implicitly, officially or unofficially, openly or surreptitiously. There are many possibilities and we ought to systematically study how to exploit them. We might even exchange observers to facilitate, on a controlled basis, this exchange of information.

One could also imagine operating warning networks jointly, particularly in outer space, or making agreements to prevent the tracking of mobile Polaris weapons, the spoofing and jamming of warning networks, the shooting down of satellites, and so forth.

The next class of measures could be implicit rather than explicit or, even if explicit, negotiated on an informal basis, without having the binding character of the usual treaty. For example, we could simply tell the Soviets that if they don't shoot down our reconnaissance satellites we will not shoot down theirs. Or that if they do not build an AICBM system, we will not build one. Similarly for civil defense.[13] In all of these and many other cases, detection is very simple. The projects are either so large that it is impossible to conceal them, or the nature of the acts themselves makes concealment most unlikely.

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13. It is often said that we have today an implicit agreement not to initiate large scale civil defense programs. There may be some operational content to this belief. It the United States Government ever seriously considered spending, say, five billion dollars annually on civil defense, one of the most persuasive arguments that would be brought against the proposal would be the high probability of touching off an offense-defense arms race. That is, not only would the Soviets be stimulated into considering such civil defense programs for themselves, they would also consider buying more and larger missiles, etc. While we might be able to "win"

If the agreements are implicit there may be some ambiguity. For example, is a warning radar part of an AICBM system? What about an advanced Nike-Hercules designed against antiaircraft, but which has some small capability against missiles? Is the construction of basements that might be used as shelters or decentralization of industry the initial phase of a civil defense program? The ambiguity is not likely to be very important, and in many cases some ambiguity may be a valuable assist in facilitating agreement and in keeping the agreement flexible. Such implicit agreements between nations are actually traditional; they were almost common in the nineteenth century. They have gone out of fashion in recent years. Reinstituting them could be one of those simple measures that have vast importance for controlling future possibilities. While particularly important as short term interim measures, they may also have much direct influence on the medium and long term situations--particularly if age and custom increase their reliability.

13.cont'd. this arms race in the sense of increasing our objective military position vis a vis the Soviets, the resulting increase over the next 5-10 years in the number and quality of weapons on both sides might represent an increase in the mutual danger that could swamp the competitive aspects.
Insofar as the above considerations are both correct and symmetrical, one can say that we have an implicit agreement not to go into civil defense. I believe that they can be exaggerated. In particular, I do not believe that small civil defense programs--say of the billion dollar a year level--have such an impact on the arms race. In any case, the Soviets seem to have such a small program and we do not. Even the effect of large programs can be exaggerated. After all, the ability to kill millions of people, to destroy hundreds of billions of dollars of property, and to leave the environment more hostile to human life might be almost as deterring as the ability to kill tens or hundreds of millions of people.

It is relatively easy to reach implicit agreements precisely because there is less difficulty in breaking them--at least in the short term. Neither nation is committed if it changes its mind. If time or experience modifies a country's views about the seriousness, consequences, or assymmetries of the agreement, it can simply inform its opponent that it has changed its mind. In most cases there should be only the mildest exacerbation of tensions on the resumption of the forbidden practice or project.

Of course, such agreements have dangers. Not only must they be examined carefully, but the mere making of such agreements tends in varying degrees to weaken our resolve. They also discourage our friends and encourage our enemies in the satellite nations. They may have a similar effect on our allies. This last is especially likely to occur if the agreements can be given the appearance by critics or anxious observers that we are thinking of repudiating or modifying our more onerous obligations or that we are planning a private deal in which our allies' interests will not be fully recognized. By decreasing the risk of U.S. nuclear reaction some implicit agreements could actually create or increase the opportunity for Soviet or Chinese nuclear blackmail. There can also be deleterious effects on the neutrals. Finally there is the possibility that wishful thinking may cause us to slight control and inspection in such agreements--e.g., the current moratorium on nuclear tests is, to put it mildly, inadequately inspected. And the longer the agreement is kept in force, the harder it is to break the precedents and customs that have been established.

Even if all of the above general shortcomings are admitted, each proposal should be examined on its merits. Unless their costs are immoderately high, possible implicit agreements ought not to be dismissed out of hand. Almost any constructive action involves costs. Even doing nothing can bring fearful risks. It may even be worthwhile to accept small competitive losses now, not only to increase stability but to head of the catastrophic loss in the morale of the West that is likely to occur should an increasingly dangerous arms race ever make our weapons seem more dangerous than an undue accommodation or even a surrender.

As part and parcel of such a program we could institute informal but regular confidential and open dialogues between the Soviets and the Americans to the end that we will understand each other and our problems better. I am thinking especially of our ambassador or military attachés who might ask their opposite numbers such questions as "What do you think your country would do if my country did so and so?" Such dialogues would have to be held in complete confidence and would not commit either government. There are also possibilities for more open dialogues--for example the recent proposals by .D. G. Brennan or R. Leghorn, for bilateral or multilateral "World Security Institutes". One could even make more ambitious proposals for international or multinational research and study that could play an important role in generating and in improving the efficiency of the dialogue.

The next type of agreement the explicitly negotiated, binding treaty on other than a minor technical issue, will almost inevitably

have major political impacts of far-reaching consequences. For this reason they are much less likely to be negotiated--unless there is at least a partial political settlement. However, they provide some of the major possibilities for big changes and so must be considered even in the absence of such a settlement. The proposed agreement for a nuclear test suspension is a case in point. I believe it is also typical of the way in which we are likely to run into all kinds of unexpected difficulties and find out, in a very costly fashion, that we had not considered the consequences of the agreement until late in the game. My own attitude on the test agreement has changed so greatly that I have begun to question its desirability.

However, I am still in favor of signing such an agreement on roughly the terms that are currently being considered if no better alternatives can be worked out. Conceding all of the uncertainties and risks, I believe that not signing the agreement, if the Soviets are willing to sign, would be an enormous step backward. I believe this because I find it hard to see how we can turn our attention and energies to the control of the development and diffusion of nuclear weapons in other nations, if the three major powers cannot agree on self restraint among themselves. There are other benefits. For one thing, we can test Soviet "sincerity" and the ability of the two countries to work together in the construction and operation of a control system. We will educate both ourselves and the Soviets in the setting

up and operation of one class of arms-control agreements. If nothing else, this should create in both the Soviet Union and the United States a bureaucracy with a vested interest in understanding and maybe even promulgating arms control agreements. We may even build up pressures--hopefully in both countries--for additional measures. And while the effects of Soviet or Chinese cheating could be much more serious than many proponents for the treaty are willing to concede, I simply feel--perhaps wrongly--that this is one of those uncalculated "calculated risks" that is worth accepting.

Of course, if the agreement in Geneva fails but some acceptable substitute is devised, that might be even better. One possible alternative (or complement) suggested in my book and which I believe would be of great importance would be the negotiation of a "Hague" convention with teeth against the use of nuclear weapons in warfare. This convention could simply be a one clause condominium on world affairs between the United States and the Soviet Union that they will refrain from the first military use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and in addition will jointly strike any third power which uses nuclear weapons in a military operation.[14] Other nations should be encouraged to adhere to the convention, thus making it a truly international accord. If effective, such a convention might be more useful than a test suspension in discouraging the diffusion and controlling the use of nuclear weapons. It is also a major precedent to the creation

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14. See OTW, pp. 240-243, for some discussion of this suggestion.

of a very limited but possibly adequate "world government".

In any case the search for a less makeshift solution than the current one must go on. I have conjectured that the time available is to be measured in one or two decades, rather than one or two centuries. This means to me that our old concepts of national sovereignty are either obsolete or soon will be. To many this last remark implies that we should be unwilling to risk or fight a war solely to preserve the nation state as an independent sovereign entity. I would tend to agree. But this does not mean that we should not be willing to risk or fight a war to influence or vote on the system which replaces sovereignty and independence. However it is difficult to decide what one should be willing to risk unless the alternatives are spelled out.

I would therefore like to touch on the most important possibility of all, the comprehensive agreement. I include in this class many of the suggestions for international police forces, and suggestions for all-inclusive force limitation proposals, world governments, and near world governments.

Probably the most detailed and comprehensive proposal has been worked out by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn.[15] It is difficult for practical politicians, hard headed statesmen, or professional planners to take such proposals seriously--except as manifestations or symptoms of the impracticality of the "do gooders". As a result,

15. World Peace Through World Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1958

such studies are rarely read by critics except from the viewpoint of content analysis; their substantive audience tends to be restricted to "friends and relatives". As a result the Clark-Sohn studies have not had the benefit of as much hostile informed criticism as they deserve. This is singularly unfortunate because the study is not only an extraordinarily worthwhile basis for continued work; it may succeed in influencing history, even in its current relatively unfinished state.

Consider for example the following hypothetical scenario of what could happen. The United States and the Soviet Union are, today, each supposed to have a handful of missiles. Imagine some of these missiles being shot off accidentally. Imagine also that this accident touches off a reprisal by the other side and possibly further exchanges on both sides until most or all of the ready and reliable missiles are launched. Imagine further that the accidental nature of the strike is soon discovered (since there is no immediate follow-up bomber attack and the pattern and timing of the missile launchings do not conform to a reasonable surprise attack, this should become clear to both sides quite rapidly.) Imagine finally that communications between the two countries are established soon enough so that both sides (today miraculously) succeed in calling off or preventing massive bomber strikes.

With current missile forces, it is most likely that at this point possibly five or ten or even more cities on one side or the other or both might have been destroyed. But both countries would

survive this blow. One could confidently predict that the morning after this event there would be a deeply felt conviction among all the nations, but particularly the two antagonists, that deterrence and anarchy were not a good way to run affairs, that we simply could not go back to the old precarious balance of terror and assume the same risks over again. Under these circumstances, I would not be at all surprised to find the United States and the Soviet Union ready to sign something resembling the Clark-Sohn proposals within a few days. It would be realized that unless an agreement were made within days, i.e., before the dead were buried, one side or the other would quite likely try to exploit the common danger for unilateral advantage and thus create the possibility that the negotiations degenerate into the usual unproductive cold war jockeying.

I have an enormous admiration for Professors Clark and Sohn. My admiration is so great that I would prefer taking my chances with their proposals than with the current arms race. However, I believe their proposals do have serious defects. Therefore, I believe that (in the absence of an immediate war or crisis) they have given us only a foundation on which to work. Much better can be achieved. But this improvement will come about only if hard-headed and realistic people take such proposals seriously and either work on them or criticize the labor of others. While much is being done now, more can be done. This is one place where the lone scholar, working without either an interdisciplinary team or access to classified information,

can hope to make a major contribution. However the big 'inter-disciplinary studies will also play an important role. Let us therefore make a conscious attempt to increase and encourage the design and analysis of "utopias" or other alternatives that might be brought about through the agency of a war or crisis. Bleak as this prospect is, in my judgment, a war or crisis is the most likely route by which we will achieve a more stable international order.

THE CHALLENGE OF PSYCHOLOGY TO POLITICAL THOUGHT

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A good number of political scientists operate today as if unaware of the peculiar limitations inherent in nonpolitical approaches to an understanding of political action. This essay seeks to clarify the limitations of one nonpolitical approach, that of contemporary psychology, and to discuss its bearings on value-oriented political thought.

Traditionally, normative political thought has been discourse concerned with the analysis and understanding of the ends of political action: it has been an attempt to postulate, elucidate, and illuminate them. It has thereby been utopian, speculatively enlarging the realm of public possibilities and common choices. More recently, it has focused on accumulating empirically validated propositions about political behavior. To both of these concerns various forms of nonpolitical thought make their distinctive contributions, but not in ways which are clearly understood. One result is that traditional political philosophy is being quietly subverted by nonpolitical thinkers.[1] To be sure, there are a great many sources of subversion, and as many explanations for the readiness of contemporary political scientists to act as accessories. When their own discipline fails to sustain them, why should political scientists decline to turn elsewhere, whether to art, theology, sociology, or psychology? After all, they would appear to be justified in absorbing whatever approach might (1) specify the conditions for social cohesion and survival, (2) draft the blueprints for just action, and (3) articulate, in the words of Jacob Bronowski, "those deeper illuminations in whose light justice and injustice, good and evil, means and ends are seen in fearful sharpness of outline."[2]

If it is psychology in particular which has been encouraged to absorb political thought, this may be because of a willingness to accept Herbert Marcuse's proposition that today psychological issues and categories have turned into political ones, that individual disease has become a function of the sickness of the body politic.[3] Moreover, psychological studies, especially those dealing with motivation, perception, and small-group behavior, have been attractive to students of politics because of their scientific pretensions.

What, then, might be of relevance to political thought in the recent work of psychology? How significantly does current psychology depict modern man for us? Does it enrich our appreciation of the complexities of human nature? Does it introduce us to newly emerging tensions, calling our attention to a reality of which a relevant political theory must take account? Does it bring generalizations to bear on actual or possible configurations of power in society?

I

When we choose to define theory as a logically ordered scheme of empirically validated and functionally related propositions, there would seem to be good reason for asking an empirically oriented psychology what kind of contributions it may be making. Contemporary psychological studies should certainly engage us, for they are concerned, after all, with advancing knowledge, as Murray Horwitz has writte, "by experimental manipulation of environmental conditions in order to determine the types of psychological needs to be expected in particular situations."[4] We should expect returns from investigations in which man, necessarily, is postulated to be a determined creature, explicable in terms of his instincts, drives, needs, and motives. Psychological research, when it is undeviatingly empirical, is bound to reveal the extent to which an autonomous environment, partially built into man himself, acts on him. Tracing the force of the prevailing forms of conditioning, it should make us realize that some of our moral ends are less indeterminate than we like to believe. As part of a descriptive theory of political behavior, it should enable us to act economically when there is general agreement on what is ultimately desirable. It should tell us how to reconcile ourselves to given causal sequences and how to adapt to given environmental systems. It should inform us what factors to vary so as to produce specified results.

To provide us with such knowledge, its end (in the double sense of purpose and terminus) must be a theory of human society as a unit whose particles function harmoniously. All particular events, it must assume, are exemplifications of a stable order of social relations. This, indeed, must be its formal methodological postulate. The hypotheses validated when empirical psychologists doggedly adhere to this postulate have had inestimable value to the field itself, providing it with continuous nourishment, enabling researchers to note drily that their designs have the merit of leading to further studies. But they have scarcely impressed anyone by their relevance to the predicaments that exist outside the arena of methodology. Their marvelous self-sufficiency is suggested by Angus Campbell's serious proposal that admittedly "commonplace generalities" ("people in the older age categories have a stronger interest in social security than people of the younger age levels") be translated into formal propositions which

it would then be somehow "promising" to validate empirically.[5] The triviality of the consequent findings is widely acknowledged, and perhaps perverse to document.[6]

So far, let it be said clearly, nothing politically or publicly relevant has been revealed. The studies soundest in terms of the accepted methods turn out to be the least relevant in relation to our human, purposive preoccupations. The political theorist, however sympathetically disposed toward behavioral studies, is hardly led to imagine new worlds or to abandon old ones, as Eugene Burdick has solemnly urged, upon learning that individuals do not always vote in reference to principles or that they see what they want to see.[7] He is unlikely to be either galvanized or restrained upon being told that lecturing is far less effective than encouraging discussion for changing the attitudes of American college students--in contrast to Indian ones.[8] Nor is his speculation likely to be disciplined by the experimentally confirmed knowledge that American pedestrians will violate a "wait" sign at an intersection more readily when led by a well dressed than a shabbily dressed person.[9]

Aside from the self-fructifying character of current studies--not to dwell on their fundamental conservatism[10]--what sustains and dignifies them? Surely one of the convictions fortifying especially small-group research is that, without posing questions about the merits of alternative ends, specific findings will accumulate in such a way as to fit an overall theory, and this theory will be publicly and humanistically meaningful.[11] At the same time, there is the amorphous feeling that something, however marginal, has already been learned. We may not yet have a general theory of human behavior complete enough to be publicly interesting, but we do seem to know how politically engaged individuals perceive their environment and, in most general terms, what sort of psychological patterns underlie their political participation.[12] Also, we do have confirmation of various kinds of practical knowledge about the function of leaders and followers when consensus is being reached in a group. We know something reasonably certain about implementing a scale of values within stable societies. Those who wield power may now usefully discriminate between various consensus-creating techniques, such as getting individuals to play specified roles so that they will ratify predetermined policies.[13] Present social technology may still be primitive, but in its advanced stage it is expected to enable human relations specialists to dissolve prevailing social problems. Thus James G. Miller has concretely suggested how a positive science of psychology might support policy recommendations:

> If we can make an analysis of the profile of psychological and physical requirements for certain types of jobs and ways of life and a similar analysis of the profile of personality and physique of each of our citi-

zens, we will have a scientific basis on which to match our population with the jobs which need to be done. Application of such procedures might re-create the organization of the United States in a way to approach a "brave new world," but by enabling our people to locate themselves in jobs and ways of living which would be suited to them rather than continuing the present methods of chance determination, it would make Americans many times as strong through efficient utilization of manpower and training, as well as more healthy mentally.

Furthermore, Miller has written, psychological "techniques might well be applied to the selection of the persons who will receive special training for governmental functions, as well as to the selection of military men and civil servants." However, it must be admitted that "it will be some time before we shall be able to apply such selection to congressmen and presidents."[14] The prospects, in any case, have been elaborated:

DR. MILLER: I have been wondering during this discussion whether it would not be possible to apply both to American statesmen and to the leaders of foreign countries some of the techniques of clinical psychology and psychiatry.... Efforts were made during the war to analyze all the data available about Hitler, for example....

We might very well get all the material together that we have on Stalin and Molotov.... Of course, such clinical studies are difficult even under the most satisfactory conditions when the subject of your study is in the same room with you. It is vastly more difficult when he is surrounded by the towers of the Kremlin, or even by the pillars of the State Department, and consequently protected from direct clinical observation.

MR. /DONALD V./ MCGRANAHAN: I'm worried especially about the question of what practical action can be taken. Suppose we got all this knowledge..., what can we do about it?...

MR. /RONALD/ LIPPIT: It does seem to me that this is a most important question.... Now there is another aspect of the matter--changing the attitudes of the persons involved.... /W/e might break down the problem into three areas, if you will. One would be the changing of "grass-roots" public opinion.... Another, aimed at a more strategic type of thinking, would be to change the attitudes of key people who exert the strongest influence on the international negotiators. The third would be to determine what kind of consulting relationship social scientists can work out which might be of help in influencing directly the State Department officials, the American delegation to the United Nations, and so on. Does that supply a useful framework?[15]

What these casual reflections assume (and this assumption gives integrity to the most modest of projects) is that beneath all existing social conflicts, there really is a harmonious order of things. The inarticulate premise is that careful experimental probing, no matter how contrived the situation in which it may be carried on, will ultimately disclose the significance which rests immanent in human, conflict-beset societies. There is a natural social order, and a positive science of psychology can both tell us what it is and, if called on, bring it about. Without expressing a moral commitment to this order, the practitioners of empirical psychology permit it to control their work, to act as their and perhaps our model.

This model provides us, unwittingly to be sure, with one possible conception of society. It constitutes a contribution to political thought, furnishing a connected view of things, a denatured theory which should enable us to see the consequences of but half-articulated feelings and still incomplete policies.

One of the most complete and least embarrassed articulations is to be found in B.F. Skinner's Science and Human Behavior. But it is his earlier utopian fiction, Walden Two, which reveals more directly how determinacy as a mere hypothetical postulate becomes the very foundation of an actually operating social order. The psychologist-governor of Skinner's ideal community concedes that it might never be possible to prove that man is not free. "But," he finds himself saying, "the increasing success of a science of behavior makes it more and more plausible."[16] The hypothesis of determinacy, consistently acted upon, is of course vindicated: the notion that man is not free, though he may well retain a subjective feeling of freedom, can be progressively established as fact. Empowered to act on the basis of his belief in determinacy, the psychologist can actually institute it. In so legislating, he sees himself as law-abiding governor obedient to nature's own code.

It should be apparent that experimental psychology is providing us here with a theory for the distribution of power in society. We are led to recognize that we need no institutions to mediate between the findings of the science of psychology and the imperatives of the natural order of man, for both ultimately come to the same thing. We require no authority above social technicians; the success of their action will itself testify as to its soundness. They are checked by the power of nature, by the irresistible living force of biological and social organisms. Hence the traditional devices for distributing, sharing, and legitimating power in society, though they may remain atmospherically useful for creating agreement, are exposed as irrelevant. We can dispense with the rhetoric and institutions of citizenship, representation, parliament, and consensus. The good society will function without politics, without assuming either the autonomy of the rational individual or the consequent need for political power to restrain him. Nor are

individual interests sacrificed in the process. On the contrary, men are guided toward the fulfillment of their natural needs. They presumably agree on the ends of life. As Skinner disarmingly intones, "Health is better than illness, wisdom better than ignorance, love better than hate, and productive energy better than neurotic sloth."[17] It therefore becomes superfluous to raise questions about purposes or to consider institutions allowing for mediating among them. Men may at last be made "happy, informed, skillful, well behaved and productive" by acknowledging "that action is initiated by forces impinging upon the individual" and then by controlling these forces through a behavioral technology.[18] Thus Skinner's theory is a frankly anti-political program. If its adherents do not manage to establish a unified society emancipated from philosophical speculation and ideological conflict, their theory will at least be appropriate to such a society.

Skinner makes clear that as experimental psychology becomes the basis for policy decisions, it must threaten the political order. He fully faces the fact that a positive science of man is simply not a value-neutral means for serving <u>all</u> alternative ends, for one end it cannot serve is the preservation of politics. Now, it may seem that if we should persist in our perverse affection for politics it could arrange matters to suit us. It could lay out a social order so pluralistic as to require politicians to deal with the ensuing conflict. But this would negate the very assumption it operates on: the underlying existence of an objective apolitical system, one which can be unearthed by an experimental science. Such a science, after all, will create the healthy, productive, well-behaved individuals as soon as we permit it to extend its enterprises, as soon as we permit it to treat those whose cravings for community, status, prestige, and power are such a problem in non-utopian regimes. It does not, therefore, seek to illuminate the character of the human condition but to attack it directly as a "problem." Eminently practical, it literally converts obviously dysfunctional factors into functional ones. It exposes the presumed wastefulness of political institutions which, since they continuously respect the interests of even outvoted groups, shrink from demanding the conversion of their members. And its solutions, unlike political ones, are durable. If it is not widely argued that they be imposed on the body politic, this is only because most of the practitioners of experimental psychology are less rigorous than Skinner. There is actually no reason, Skinner has pointed out, for restricting experimental science: "It is not a matter of bringing the world into the laboratory, but of extending the practices of an experimental science to the world at large. We can do this as soon as we wish to do it. At the moment psychologists are curiously diffident...."[19]

As it systematically displaces the traditional political order, experimental psychology displaces traditional political thought as well. One of the tasks of political thought--to chal-

lenge what is "given" and to reorder it creatively in the light of reason--becomes pointless. Since experimental psychology itself becomes the rational ground for political action, alternative grounds must come to seem subjective and willful, or historically conditioned. If the truth to which a positive science of man guides us is objective and inexorably gains the assent of all rational men, if we clearly know what constitutes lawful behavior and have a full inventory of human needs, we must be benighted to question such knowledge.

Combining a romantic reaction against the complexity of life, a liberal distrust of coercive governmental power, and an elitist view of the masses as naturally desiring to escape responsibility for choice, Skinner bluntly spells out the abbreviations of the small-scale work of others. This itself may be redeeming in times when much is mumbled, repressed, or said in irony.

II

We are impelled toward a tranquil, self-contained political order insofar as we act on the postulate that human action, in Skinner's words, "is a lawful datum, that it is undisturbed by the capricious acts of any free agent--in other words, that it is completely determined."[20] And we are impelled toward an altogether different political order insofar as we take an approach to human nature which seeks, at some price, to save the pitch and texture of distinctively human experiences. What essentially is the character of this alternative approach? What kind of community does it imply, and can it actually be any more acceptable?

In contrast to experimental psychology, what may be called a humanistic psychology assumes that human conduct is ineradicably colored by freedom. No explanations of human action, it holds, can be telling unless we understand it as the result of free choices. By nature, man is in rebellion against social constraints. He is therefore to be comprehended as an irreducible phenomenon, as ultimately existing independent of all circumscribing systems, classifications, or blueprints. He is a being in process, always unfinished, a being of partially frustrated and partially developed potentialities. His mental health consequently is to be defined in the infinitely variable terms of the individual himself--that is, in reference to his own possibilities--while his ego is to be understood as creatively integrating internal needs and external demands.[21] Man is to be recognized as an autonomous actor whose role it is to conquer his environment and limit his renunciations. Since the promptings of his unconscious enable him to establish his being, they are not deemed to be manifestations of anxiety. On the contrary, they allow him to conduct himself in meaningful ways.

To act on the basis of the assumption of human freedom as the only given postulate, to practice therapy in relation to it, is to aim at providing the conditions for the self-directed actualization and fulfillment of the individual's potentialities. It is to urge men to do what their own nature dictates, not what some external code demands. Individuals are to be enabled to discover their identity, to experience it, and then to define their conduct to accord with their discovery and their experience.[22] This calls not for the psychologist's objectivity and detachment but for his thoroughgoing, compassionate involvement. It requires his selfless participation and an honest suspension of judgment. Pointing to all relationships, including therapeutic ones, as encounters between unique persons, a humanistic psychology seeks to destroy the norm as well as the fiction of the aloof, disengaged analyst. No alternative method, it asserts, yields understanding of distinctively human situations, situations in which men experience rage, horror, shame, joy, grief, love, and hate because they aspire to transcend themselves. As Leonard Feldstein has said,

> To be genuinely empirical, we must, when we inquire into the constitutive properties of an object, attend to every aspect and subtlety of that object. So a glance at a person, the "object" of psychoanalytic inquiry, discloses not a mind and a body, mysteriously conjoined as independent structures, but a gesture, an expression, a gait, a sign of his intellectual acuity, his physique, his physiognomy. We experience that person as an integrated agency--a living, breathing, moving, joyous and sorrowing whole. Whether in dignity, defiance or wretchedness, he declares himself before us to be himself. When he acts and when he thinks, he expresses a single dynamic of existence.[23]

In this formulation, of course, are the contours of the familiar existentialist prescription, both for a proper science of man and a just human community: (1) to understand man he must be viewed sympathetically from within[24] and (2) to establish the just state all men must be brought to realize that moral choice, to be authentic, is theirs alone. In a world which puts us on trial whenever we seek to assert ourselves, we are asked not to despair--and this despite the utter absence of reasons for bearing up. In the face of an oppressively organized environment which threatens our very existence as self-directed actors, an existentialist psychology asks us to be ourselves. There is no further directive, no circumscription of possibilities, no definition of virtuous conduct.

The source of the existentialist imperative may plausibly be located in clinical practice. Treating patients confined by abstract schemes, the physician is driven to remove the blocks to self-development, to battle all formulas and theories, all the

infernal ways of freezing human life from the outside. Reacting against theory,[25] he is not likely to become interested in offering any new moral codes, any positive ways of structuring human life. He will quite simply oppose myths, stereotypes, and ideologies, all in the name of freedom.

The word "freedom," however, cannot possibly be thought to describe any specific situation in which we find ourselves. Every existing situation necessarily has illiberal, coercive features. Thus the attempt to define human reality in terms of freedom is actually a form of exhortation, a call to enlarge the sphere of freedom. To give resonance to this call, the existentialist psychologist is impelled to make us aware of prevailing coercions and of the intricate ways we disguise them from ourselves. He will take the liberal stand, rebelling against whatever abstractions threaten to make objects of us.

This is not to imply that we should expect him to be wholly consistent in practice. Just as the experimental psychologist may follow his liberal impulses outside the human relations laboratory (voting, for example, against measures which increase restraints) so may the "practical" existentialist follow his illiberal impulses, counseling adjustment to "given" social conditions. Thus we are told that because we live in a status society--however subtle the outward signs of status, rank, and class may be--the healthy, realistic individual must reconcile himself to it. His anxieties and hostilities will be diminished, in Allison Davis's words, "by his continued positive identification with his 'superiors,' and also by his acceptance of the controls, ego-ideals, and identity of his own status-group." Here the existentialist position is patently compromised, for it is expected that man will somehow be at once self-directed and compliant, that he will somehow act on his own and yet accept the limits imposed by "the objective social sanctions of age-status, sex-status, and the other basic types of social status."[26]

Adherence to such a deceptive synthesis, one which provides no formula for fusing opposites, is avoidable, but only by paying the price of remaining eternally inconclusive, as David Riesman's lectures and essays invariably demonstrate. Sensitively in touch with what he believes to be the consensus of any particular audience, Riesman will take his bearings by it and will then proceed to reverse it. He will be careful, when engaged in what he calls contextual analysis, never to come down conclusively on anyone's side. Speaking to a group of liberal college students, he will thus warn of the dangers of ritualistic nonconformity and counsel against "the ruthless sacrifice of protective prejudices." His rhetoric--he is forever amending by seeing the other side--is a strikingly precise analogue to the marvelously flexible procedures of constitutional politics. If his mode entails moral relativism, it is derived from his dedication to freedom as highest public value.[27]

This dedication--the determination to save man from humiliation--sparks all existentialist psychology. Without it, we would surely be deprived of the analyses which alert us to the subtle degradations imposed by our language and ritual. Because of it, we get the arresting elucidations of inauthentic behavior provided by Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus.[28] We get Fromm's account of loneliness, insecurity, and alienation under contemporary industrial conditions of "freedom." We get Erik Erikson's picture of how we cope with the anxieties generated by modern life.[29] We get Ernest Schachtel's study of the way our potential experiences are devitalized by the barren cliches we have for anticipating them. We get Harry Stack Sullivan's delineation of the rigidities which characterize our social relations. We get Marcuse's stress on "the liberating function of negation in philosophical thought," on the need "to break the power of facts over the world and to speak a language which is not the language of those who establish, enforce, and benefit from the facts."[30] We get Norman O. Brown's stunningly perceptive diagnosis of the institution of money.[31] And we get Riesman's reports of the joyless work, the obsessive leisure, and the apolitical politics of the lonely crowd.

These accounts--and the harvest is rich--derive from an acute sensitivity to all types of coercion. But while they lead to telling and relevant descriptions of coercive institutions and practices, is it possible for them to stand for a positive science or a positive ethics?

The approach of a humanistic existentialism does break out of the boundaries of deterministic explanations of human behavior. It rightly affirms that there is always more to man than a naturalistic psychology can comprehend. But what of the claim that it alone will lead to genuine psychological knowledge, that its empiricism will give us unmediated understanding of the individual? It is Ludwig Binswanger who has most persistently argued along these lines. As early as 1926 he urged reliance on empathy as part of psychoanalysis. There are aspects of human existence, he claimed, which a positive science of psychoanalysis fails to uncover. What is required is the conception of man provided by the existentialist perspective, preeminently that of Heidegger. From Heidegger's point of view, Binswanger wrote, "man is no longer understood in terms of some theory--be it a mechanistic, a biologic, or a psychological one--but in terms of a purely phenomenologic elucidation of the total structure or total articulation of existence as 'being-in-the-world.'"[32]

To this day, however, it remains unclear just how such direct understanding may be conveyed to others, and what others, when they have grasped it, should make of it. What begins as a scientific claim ends with mystification. Where the idiom of experimental psychology was objective, vacant, and abstract, that of existentialist psychology becomes subjective, precious, and

esoteric. No doubt, we are presented with an uplifting reaffirmation of the inviolability of the individual, a respect for him as a potentially creative force. Though this may breathe life into the subject matter of the psychological sciences, making their practitioners aware that they deal with human actors, it cannot do anything else. An existentialist psychology ultimately seems unable to use a public vocabulary to express what its devotees have experienced. Nor can its rejection of coercion provide standards for social policy. Its only political ethic, as has often been noted in other contexts, is negative, a prohibition to treat men as objects. A promiscuous reverence for human life, the commandment not to interfere with it, simply cannot guide us when we must act against some manifestations of life and in favor of others, when we must discriminate not between freedom and restraint but between alternative forms of restraint.[33] The sympathetic immersion in pure human material provides us, in sum, with nothing positive, be it science or ethics.

The essential hollowness of a humanistic psychology is instructively illustrated by Erich Fromm's work.[34] According to Fromm, man needs both fraternal relations and freedom from restraint. In the "sane" society, freedom and restraint are duly proportioned; there is a moderate amount of both. And we can tell what is proper because when social institutions allow for an excess of freedom, men sacrifice their autonomy to escape it. Since Fromm optimistically believes that we really know what constitutes individual autonomy, he can assume that he has objective knowledge of social health. He can thus confidently emerge as social diagnostician and pathologist.

Alert, then, to the true character of our present society, Fromm offers a prospectus for reconstructing the shattered balance. His program--its features, all directed against the institutions of politics, do not matter here--does not pretend to define the good life, the substantive nature of individual morality, or the character of public virtue. His view of man as creative, productive, and loving is not meant to disclose the nature of the realm of morality itself but, more modestly, to establish the social and political preconditions for morality, to provide the social security and material comfort which allow men to live the good life variously.

In other words, we are advised to adhere again to the institution of democratic constitutionalism, to the always flexible procedures for making the existence of individuals various.[35] Fromm demands neither education nor conversion. Prescribing no specific definition of public excellence, he insists only that the public realm remain open-ended, checking and balancing every claim for the imposition of substantive justice. However congenial his sentiments, he thus gives us no new moral insight, no restatement of ideals which would in itself constitute an enlargement of moral

possibilities. His approach cannot tell us what makes our common life worth living. Like all humanistic psychology, it cannot legitimately assume the burden of political philosophy, for it entails nothing more than a political order which, because it respects the rights of individual persons, promotes the procedures that hold public coercion to a minimum. Treating individuals as ultimately incommensurable, it refuses to impose a public morality on their freedom. It assuredly does uphold a negative moral standard. Although it cannot define our ends for us, its prescription to act in harmony with one's own true nature may well brace us for our encounters with society. Insisting that substantive freedom is impossible in society without endangering the autonomy of others, it does make a case for formal freedom. It is thus committed to politics as an institution for the mediation of conflict and not the attainment of a public purpose. It gives us a politics of sensible moderation and civility--but no reason for being sensibly moderate and civil. It meaningfully guides us to the place political philosophy may take over.

III

For those still concerned with postulating, elucidating, and illuminating alternative ends of political action, the integral inadequacies of both an experimental and a humanistic psychology should be wholly evident at this point.

Granted, a generalizing experimental psychology contributes constructively to a naturalistic behavioral science. Yet the more basic issue--and this is the subject of a still subterranean debate in the social sciences today--is precisely the value of such a science for understanding purposive human beings and purposive human societies. While this issue remains, there should be no question that when an undiluted behavioral science is permitted to become the sufficient ground for public policy it exhausts political philosophy and degrades human enterprises. It supports efforts to adjust men to an allegedly objective definition of "health" or nature's "rationality." As a political theory, it would seem appropriate to an animal farm, to the society Plato called the community of pigs.

On the other hand a humanistic psychology does not finally communicate what it claims to know about the awesome uniqueness of the individual person. Nor does it affirmatively define moral conduct. Still, it may break the spell of convention, arouse our sense of injustice, and thereby inspire utopian speculation. It may chasten the political imagination, exposing the partisan nature of our intellectual preoccupations as well as the sweep of our delusions. It may thus summon the political philosopher to face up to the kind of miserable, tortured world which psychologists testify is ours.

And if he is dedicated to his calling, he will surely be impelled to respond to their testimony--indeed, to the testimony of all those who express our dilemmas without resolving them, who reflectively react against disorder, be they poets, novelists, or sociologists. He will be prepared to expand the dimensions of the conceivable, speaking not about the human condition but about the human promise, defining not what we are but what, with luck or grace, we have it within ourselves to become.

NOTES

[1]That traditional political philosophy is in retreat has been noted by a wide assortment of scholars: Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory," Political Science Quarterly, 68 (September 1953), 321-37; Harry Eckstein, "Political Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a Conference," American Political Science Review, 50 (June 1956), 475-87; Judith Shklar, After Utopia, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957, ch. 6; Arnold A. Rogow, "Comment on Smith and Apter: Or, Whatever Happened to the Great Issues?" American Political Science Review, 51 (September 1957), 763-75; Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, ch. 1; Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959, pp. 17-27; Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, Boston: Little, Brown, 1960, chs. 9, 10.

[2]Science and Human Values, New York: Harper, 1956, p. 94.

[3]Eros and Civilization, Boston: Beacon Press, 1955, p. xi. T.W. Adorno and his associates simply affirm that "ideology regarding each social area must be regarded as a facet of the total person and an expression of more central ('subideological') psychological dispositions" (The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper, 1950, p. 207).

[4]"Psychological Needs as a Function of Social Environments," in Leonard D. White, ed., The State of the Social Sciences, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, pp. 161-83, 181.

[5]"The Political Implications of Community Identification," in Roland Young, ed., Approaches to the Study of Politics, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1958, pp. 318-29, 321, 322, 329.

[6]"If opportunity and intellectual capacity to absorb such knowledge /of political phenomena/ are equal among different groups of children, it is reasonable to regard differential levels of knowledge as indicative of degrees of involvement." (Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959, p. 33.) Theodore H. Newcomb has found it "safe to conclude that successful communication is generally rewarding to communicators and that, whether or not they are able to describe the consensual consequences of successful communications, the fact of being rewarded by it results in their acquiring motivation to achieve it. This conclusion can be stated more effectively, for present purposes, in its negative form. That is, under certain specifiable conditions, a relationship among communicators that is judged by any one of them to be nonconsensual is punishing, stressful, or--as I prefer to say--characterized by strain." ("The Study of Consensus,"

in Robert K. Merton et al., eds., Sociology Today, New York: Basic Books, 1959, pp. 277-92, 281.) John R.P. French, Jr., and Richard Snyder have jointly concluded, among other things: "As predicted, those leaders who are more accepted by their subordinates tend to attempt more influence ($r=.28$, $p=.08$). Likewise, members attempt more influence when they are more accepted by their leader ($r=.54$, $p<.01$)." (Leadership and Interpersonal Power," in Dorwin Cartwright, ed., Studies in Social Power, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1959, pp. 118-49, 134.)

[7]"Political Theory and the Voting Studies," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., American Voting Behavior, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959, pp. 136-49, citing B.R. Berelson, P.F. Lazarsfeld, and W.N. McPhee, Voting, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, pp. 220, 309.

[8]See Gardner Murphy, In the Minds of Men, New York· Basic Books, 1953, pp. 114-15.

[9]See Robert R. Blake and Jane Srygley Mouton, "The Study of Social Conduct within a Framework," in Muzafer Sherif and M.O. Wilson, eds., Emerging Problems in Social Psychology, Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma, 1957, pp. 143-80. For other enterprises, see A. Paul Hare et al., Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction, New York: Knopf, 1955; Dorwin Cartwright, ed., Studies in Social Power, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1959; A. Paul Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961.

[10]This is something Veblen recognized some time ago; see The Higher Learning in America, New York: Huebsch, 1918, pp. 186-90.

[11]This hope was modestly expressed at the 1922 meeting of the American Political Science Association by Harold F. Gosnell; see his "Some Practical Applications of Psychology in Government," American Journal of Sociology, 28 (May 1923), 735-43.

[12]See Seymore M. Lipset et al., "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, 2 vols., Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954, Vol. II, pp. 1124-75; and Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959; Burdick and Brodbeck, eds., op. cit. That this knowledge may mislead us when we rely on it exclusively to orient ourselves about the politics of a relatively unregimented society has been suggested by V.O. Key, Jr., "The Practically Relevant in Surveys," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (Spring 1960), 54-61 (reviewing The American Voter by Angus Campbell et al.); and Leslie A. Fiedler, "Voting and Voting Studies," in Burdick and Brodbeck, eds., op. cit. pp. 184-96.

[13]See J.L. Moreno, Psychodrama, New York: Beacon House, 1946, and the work in the field of group dynamics. For a specific case in point, see Robert R. Golembiewski, "O & M and the Small Group," Public Administration Review, 20 (Autumn 1960), 205-12.

[14]James G. Miller, "Psychological Approaches to the Prevention of War," in Wayne Dennis et al., Current Trends in Social Psychology, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1948, pp. 274-99, 291-93.

[15]James G. Miller et al., "Social Psychology and the Atomic Bomb: A Round-Table Discussion," in Experiments in Social Process, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950, pp. 171-94, 184-86. McGranahan, it should be pointed out, did note the possibility of goal conflicts not resolvable scientifically (p. 188).

[16]Walden Two, New York: Macmillan, 1948, p. 214. I learned of Skinner's novel from Andrew Hacker's provocative "Dostoevsky's Disciples: Man and Sheep in Political Theory," Journal of Politics, 17 (November 1955), 590-613. Hacker fails to note that Skinner's novel was anticipated by Nicolai G. Chernyshevsky's What Is to Be Done? (1863). This is noteworthy since Chernyshevsky's rationalist utopia was fully parodied by Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground, so that Dostoevsky remains Skinner's most rigorous, thoroughgoing critic.

[17]B.F. Skinner, "Freedom and the Control of Men," American Scholar, 25 (Winter 1955-56), 47-65, 51. Skinner's ultimate value is group survival; see Science and Human Behavior, New York: Macmillan, 1953, pp. 430-36, 443-46.

[18]"Freedom and the Control of Men," loc. cit., pp. 47, 53.

[19]Cumulative Record, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959, p. 227. See Angus Campbell's similar plea in Young, ed., op. cit., p. 329. For a critical discussion of the new boundaries of the human relations laboratory, see Henry S. Kariel, "Society as Crucible," in Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins, eds., Psychiatry in Our Society, scheduled for publication in 1962.

[20]Cumulative Record, p. 227, "A proper theory," Skinner points out, "must .... abolish the conception of the individual as a doer, as an originator of action" (p. 236).

[21]Thus two psychologists, Heinz Hartmann and Erik H. Erikson, refuse to reduce ego functions to the id. See Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, New York: International Universities Press, 1958; "Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego," Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 5 (1950), 74-96; Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 4 (October 1956), 56-121; "Ego Development and Historical Change," Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 2 (1946), 359-96.

[22]For a therapeutic "system" based on this attitude, see Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1951. See also Rollo May, Ernest Angel, Henri F. Ellenberger, eds., Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, New York: Basic Books, 1958; and Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships," in Sigmund Koch, ed., Psychology; A Study of a Science, 3 vols., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959, Vol. III, pp. 184-256.

[23]Lecture at Bennington College, September 28, 1960, mimeographed, p. 6.

[24]It may be pertinent to note the origins of existentialist psychology in the formulations, though not the influence, of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). For Dilthey, a genuinely empirical approach required not external perception but empathy; see H.A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, New York: Humanities Press, 1952, ch. 5. See also Eric Heller's account of Goethe's idea of scientific truth in The Disinherited Mind, New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957, ch. 1.

[25]For a cautious account of a recent shift away from "the psychological Age of Theory," see Sigmund Koch's epilogue to vol. 3 of Koch, ed., Psychology; for a discussion of the sweep of existentialist psychology, including an extensive bibliography, see Adrian van Kaam, The Third Force in European Psychology, Greenville, Del.: Psychosynthesis Research Foundation, 1960.

[26]Allison Davis, "The Ego and Status-Anxiety," in White, ed., The State of the Social Sciences, pp. 212-28, 228.

[27]See Individualism Reconsidered, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954, ch. 1.

[28]See especially Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, New York: Philosophical Library, 1948, ch. 2. Note also Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, New York: Harper, 1951.

[29]Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, New York: W.W. Norton, 1950; see also Allan Wheelis, The Quest for Identity, New York: W.W. Norton, 1958. Erikson has been particularly concerned with showing that, as we mature in modern society, we are unprepared to meet successive crises. Our education fails to tell us to what to adjust and against what to rebel. We are made anxious by our inability to find out where we belong and who we are: child or parent, boy or girl, man or woman, entrepreneur or coordinator. And since we can gain self-knowledge only in specific encounters, our identity becomes diffuse and we do not get to know ourselves. We suffer from a "loss" of identity.

[30]Herbert Marcuse, "Actuality of Dialectic," Diogenes, No. 31 (Fall 1960), 80-88, 83, 84.

[31]See Norman O. Brown, "Filthy Lucre," in Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History, Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1959, ch. 15.

[32]Binswanger, "Erfahren, Verstehen, Deuten in der Psychoanalyse," Imago, 12 (May 6, 1926), 223-37; "Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy," in Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and J.L. Moreno, eds. Progress in Psychotherapy, New York: Grune and Stratton, 1956, p. 144; Ulrich Sonnemann, Existence and Therapy, New York: Grune and Stratton, 1954. See also May et al., eds., Existence.

[33]Thus Heinz Hartmann has properly noted that the psychological analysis of morality cannot validly direct our conduct and that, moreover, the psychologically healthy person is not necessarily moral. (Psychoanalysis and Moral Values, New York: International Universities Press, 1960.)

[34]Escape from Freedom, New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941; Man for Himself, New York: Rinehart, 1947; The Sane Society, New York: Rinehart, 1955.

[35]Harry W. Pearson has pointed out to me that placing Fromm in the camp of the constitutionalists does scant justice to his hankering for a closed "communitarian" society, and that, were his dream fulfilled, we would live in that very apolitical state of nature which Skinner's behaviorism seeks to establish. Nor is it surprising, given the agonies of the contemporary world, that much existentialist social analysis (such as Jaspers' or Arendt's) is normatively oriented by a vision of a warm, densely textured social organism.

THE CHANGING USES OF TELEVISION IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

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This paper has three main objectives: To show trends in the use to which campaigners have put television, to explain those trends, and to suggest their implications for some aspects of democratic theory. My concern is primarily with the use of television in U. S. presidential and British general election campaigns and entirely with air time controlled by the parties, singly or together, not with campaign news reporting or other industry controlled political programs.

The data show relatively clear patterns of change. The reasons for such change are also relatively clear, and they suggest that political television has reached a turning point in its development.

The Trends

Television was only emerging from the status of a novelty at the time of the 1948 presidential election, but by 1952 it had become a major medium of political communication. While the parties spent more for radio than for television time in 1952,_/

_/ Charles A. H. Thomson and Frances Shattuck, The 1956 Presidential Campaign (The Brookings Institution: Washington, 1956) p. 328.

their expenditures for the latter were substantial, and they reached their largest audiences by that route. In retrospect the approach they took to television seems unimaginative, despite a Democratic promise to use it "in a more exciting, more dramatic way than any political party ever dreamed of..."_/ By far the

_/ Editorial, The Democrat (June 2, 1952).

greater number of programs sponsored by both parties were simply half-hour telecasts of speeches delivered at political rallies. Among the exceptions were the filmed documentaries that each side presented. In addition, Adlai Stevenson delivered a few "fireside chats"; Republican Governors appeared on an hour-long program; and the Republicans ended with a final night show that was a fast paced, hour-long, three network "report on the campaign" involving eighty-one switches from city to city and from live telecasting

to film. The Republicans also saturated the air waves with spot announcements in the campaign's closing days.

The more important trends in the use of television in U.S. presidential campaigns since 1952 can be presented very briefly:

First, television programs replaced radio programs as the largest single item in party spending for publicity. In 1956 some 39 per cent of the direct expenditures made by committees at the national level went for television, 4 per cent for radio._/

_/ Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy (University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 1960), p. 390.

National level spending for television in 1960 remained about what it had been in 1956; that for radio declined still further._/

_/ Herbert Alexander, in a chapter in Paul T. David (ed) Political Change 1960-61 (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.), in press.

Second, the mean length of party telecasts declined radically. In 1952, it was 29.3 minutes; in 1956, 13.3 minutes; and in 1960, 13.3 minutes._/ This decline was due almost entirely

_/ These figures are averages for all paid programs five or more minutes in length presented on the national networks.

to the advent of the 5-minute "trailer" in the campaign of 1956 and its continued heavy use in 1960: The modal length of party programs was 30 minutes in 1952; in 1956 and 1960, it was five.

Third, the parties increasingly reserved their longer telecasts _/ for appearances by their presidential and vice-

_/ Those over five minutes in length.

presidential candidates and by the incumbent President. In 1952, 26.7 per cent of the principal speakers in such telecasts fell into none of these categories. In 1956 and 1960 the comparable figures were 10.3 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively.

Fourth, the producers of party television programs have been engaged in an effort to make them visually engaging and to bring entertainment, dramatic, and audience participation features into them. In television's early days most American politicians (with a few notable exceptions) used television as they had radio --they "gazed at their tables, script bound"_/ as French politicians

_/ D. E. Butler, Elections Abroad (Macmillan: London, 1959), p.27.

still did in 1958. By 1956 cue cards and the teleprompter had largely freed American politicians from scripts. They began to use visual aids and film clips. They tried panel discussions and interviews. They appeared with motion picture stars, most notably perhaps during the 1956 campaign when President Eisenhower was given a "surprise" party on his birthday, and entertainers rendered his favorite songs. They organized "telethons": Governor Thomas E. Dewey pioneered this format in his 1950 gubernatorial campaign when he spent 18 hours in a studio answering questions telephoned into him and relayed by street corner interviewers; the telethon came to presidential campaigning in 1960. They experimented with press conferences and programs modeled on press conferences: Vice-President Richard Nixon answered questions from reporters in one political show during the 1956 campaign; in another President Eisenhower held a "Citizens' Press Conference," where carefully selected citizens asked him friendly questions. There were scattered instances of debates between candidates. Mayor Robert Wagner and Senator Jacob Javits debated in the 1956 New York senatorial campaign, as did Senator Harrison Williams and former Representative Robert Kean in the New Jersey senatorial race of 1958. In 1960, in the most dramatic use of television for political purposes to date, presidential candidates met in a series of face to face debates.

The use of television in British general election campaigns shows a few contrasts and many parallels to that in American campaign politics. British politicians were more reluctant to enter the age of television than their American counterparts. Although British television was already reaching sizeable audiences in 1950, it was not used in that year's campaign. In 1951 the British parties did take the plunge, but only to the extent of one 15-minute program each. British parties have not, of course, been able to purchase time nor to use spot announcements.

Nonetheless, British politicians showed the same preference for short--and still shorter--political programs as did their American counterparts: In 1955 the average program length of major party telecasts was 20 minutes, in 1959, 19 minutes. British politicians concluded that the televised speech was lacking in appeal. In 1955 they tried interviews, documentaries, panel discussions, and press conferences. In 1959 three young Laborites with television experience played host in telecasts from a "Labor Television and Radio Operations Room" (actually a B.B.C. studio) to a series of Labor speakers and presided over programs featuring film clips, interviews, animated cartoons, and final questions challenging Conservatives to state their positions on a series of policy issues. The Conservatives began their series with some rather dated films. They ended with one program in which an interviewer fired sharp questions at two of

their ministers and another that was a carefully prepared, taped (but not announced as such) speech by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. The Liberals assayed a criticism of the performances of their two big rivals: "Many Conservative leaders are openly contemptuous of television...and because they've never learned to use it, we have seen, lumbering across the screen these last ten days, a succession of old party cart-horses, earnest, amiable, smug...And what of the other side? All those bright, young, Public School, Labour boys, directing nonexistent operations from a nonexistent operations room. As entertainment value, of course, its splendid. Smooth, glossy, slick."_/

_/ Quoted in D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, The British General Election of 1959 (Macmillan: London, 1960), pp. 89-90.

Explanation

A valid reaction to the foregoing discussion would be that politicians have been cautious and conservative in their use of television. Winston Churchill refused to appear on the medium, and Dwight Eisenhower was extremely uncomfortable when he did so in his early campaign efforts in 1952. In 1960 the principal television advisers to the Republicans urged almost complete abandonment of set speeches and the production of five "big shows" --one of which was to be called "Khrushchev as I Know Him" and to use film clips showing Nixon in conflict with the Russian leader._/

_/ See Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (Atheneum: New York, 1961), p. 265.

Nixon seems to have been receptive to this advice, but in the end too uneasy with so sharp a departure from more familiar formats to give final approval to the plans. The personal predilections of politicians have not only been important in slowing change in the use of television, however, but also in encouraging it. Governor Dewey is probably the outstanding early sponsor of innovations--he even influenced considerably the thinking of the leadership of the British Conservative Party on the proper uses of television in politics. _/

_/ Interview with Mr. Mark Chapman Walker, London, September 20, 1954.

Differences in party organization probably account for the American--as opposed to the British--politician's earlier readiness to use television. Ascent into the leadership of the tightly disciplined British parties has proceeded--until very recently, at least--with little or no regard to whether leaders were telegenic. Presidential nomination procedures, encouraging

as they do a greater impact of public opinion on the selection of party leaders, in effect forced presidential contenders to learn to live with television or to lose out to those who did. The direct primary has undoubtedly had the same effect at lower levels of leadership.

The most general explanation of the trends presented in the foregoing section, however, would seem to be this: They reflect the rational response of campaign strategists to their experience with television, particularly to the evidence they have accumulated about the factors that affect the size and response of its audiences. Most of this information comes from audience ratings, surveys, letters, and telephone calls. Some of the inferences politicians and their advisers have drawn from these sources of data may not appear fully convincing to students of public opinion, but they have seemed sound enough to politicians to have influenced their behavior. To use the language of statistics, the social scientists can afford to be more dedicated to avoiding Type II errors than can the practical politician.

The evolving thought of politicians about the use of television may be summarized as a set of "lessons":

First, go where the audiences are. As has already been noted, the two parties spent more on radio than television in 1952, but got larger audiences on television. This was in spite of the fact that only 37 per cent of American homes had television sets in that year, while 97 per cent of them had radios._/ There

_/ Leo Bogart, The Age of Television (Frederick Ungar: New York, 1956), p. 10. Bogart's sources were the A. C. Nielsen Company, The National Broadcasting Corporation, and the Columbia Broadcasting System.

is no doubt that viewing very largely displaced listening in American homes as television sets became available and less expensive. In 1948, the average family listened to radio about 4½ hours per day. In 1955 listening remained at 3.6 hours per day in radio-only homes but had dropped to 1.9 hours in television homes._/ These facts--and in addition the fact that radio

_/ Ibid., p. 106. Listening averaged about 1.9 hours in all homes by 1959.

listening had dropped most precipitously in the evening hours--dictated the striking re-allocation of party expenditures between the two media in the years after 1952.

Second, political television cannot compete effectively for audiences with commercial entertainment shows. Bits and pieces of evidence pointing to this conclusion accumulated rapidly. Nielsen ratings of the 1952 conventions showed them far less popular than the show, "I Love Lucy"._/ The attempt of the Democrats

_/ Paul Seabury, "Television--A New Campaign Weapon," The New Republic (December 1, 1952), p. 13.

to build an audience for Adlai Stevenson in 1952 by presenting him in programs regularly scheduled for 10:30 to 11:00 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays was notably unsuccessful. Both Stevenson and Eisenhower drew larger audiences when they appeared in the time periods normally occupied by the most popular commercial shows._/ A Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborn account executive

_/ Stanley Kelley, Jr., Professional Public Relations and Political Power (John Hopkins: Baltimore, 1956), p. 197.

spoke for many others when he drew the conclusion, "Buy the best time periods you can get, even if it means paying through the nose to pre-empt a high cost show."_/ But avoiding competition by

_/ Jock Elliot, in a speech to the BBDO annual meeting, February 27, 1953, quoted in Ibid, p. 197.

pre-emption was soon discovered to be no final solution to the politician's television problems. BBDO Vice President Carroll Newton has reported that half-hour political programs in 1956 drew audiences from 25 to 40 per cent smaller than those normal for the programs they replaced._/ Furthermore, party strategists

_/ In an address to Republican State Chairmen, June, 1958.

soon learned that viewers were more than passively unhappy when they tuned to one of their favorite programs to find, instead, a political speech. Said Mr. Newton, "I think the most phone calls we had during our campaign we got after displacing a very popular program and, while we were highly flattered at the number of calls, we found out that 98 per cent of them were disgruntled at us..."_/

_/ Ibid.

Third, "Don't spend your money on any one but the candidate... or the President of the United States..." The phrasing of this "lesson" is that of Jock Elliott, BBDO's account executive for the Republicans in 1952. _/ Both the

_/ Quoted in Stanley Kelley, Jr., Professional Public Relations and Political Power, p. 170. Elliott was referring to expenditures for "listeners" at the time, but clearly saw the advice as applying to viewers as well.

Republicans and Democrats had numerous speakers in 1952 who were neither candidates nor the President: Robert A. Taft, Phillip Murray, Clare Boothe Luce, Walter Reuther, Herbert Hoover, and Wayne Morse, to name only some of them. The average audience for a Stevenson speech that year was approximately 3,620,000 television homes and for an Eisenhower speech, over 4,120,000 television homes. _/ Of the speakers who were neither

_/ Ibid., p. 197.

President nor candidates for the Presidency or Vice-Presidency only Senator Joseph R. McCarthy attracted an audience that exceeded either of these averages. Most drew audiences that fell far below them.

Fourth, the already decided voters are the ones most likely to be attracted to political programs on television. There is less direct evidence than might be desired for this proposition, but it squares with findings about the 1952 audiences reported by Janowitz and Marvick. _/ It also conforms

_/ Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent. (Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1956), p. 64.

to more general findings about attention to campaign propaganda. Lazarsfeld and his associates reported in their Erie County study that "the people who already knew how they were going to vote read and listened to more campaign material than the people who still did not know how they would vote." _/ A similar

_/ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (Columbia University Press: New York, 1944), p. 124.

conclusion was reached by R. S. Milne and H. C. Mackenzie in their study of voting in Bristol, England. _/

_/ R. S. Milne and H. C. Mackenzie, Marginal Seat, 1955 (Hansard Society: London, 1958).

The campaigner wants to arouse the enthusiasm of his partisans and to gain the support of the undecided voter. To do either of these things he must reach voters and he must please them. If one takes to heart the lessons just outlined, two general strategies suggest themselves. The first is to attempt to locate and reach captive audiences. The second is to make politics entertaining.

Carroll Newton has forcefully advocated the first of these strategies and cogently stated its rationale and consequences:

> People are not as interested in politics and in candidates as they are in entertainment. Therefore, the audiences you enjoy will be largely determined by three factors: First, the size of the audience looking at the program immediately ahead of you; Second, the audience which normally, every week, tunes in for entertainment to the time period and the station you're buying for your political purpose; and Third, of course, the attraction value of the programs on other stations at the same time... it is further significant that the ability of a political program to hold its audience varies in inverse proportion to its length ... I think you can conclude... that the people who are really interested will follow campaigns from every source there is. You don't have to worry about reaching them, but the people who aren't interested--you have got to slip up on them through the broadcasting media. You have to catch them when they are looking or listening to something else, if you want to reach them at all.

Several specific prescriptions for action follow logically from these premises: (1) "Buy television at times when the largest number of people habitually use their receivers"; (2) "... smaller units of time will reach many more voters for your dollar," and therefore, a large proportion of the television budget should be put into spot announcements and five-minute trailers, which are effective because voters "have to listen before they can get up and switch them off"; and (3) "Devote all the time you buy to issues of real significance (as determined by surveys) and present your point of view so simply that even the viewers who don't give a damn will understand what you're talking about." _/

_/ All statements directly quoted in the foregoing paragraph are from Carroll Newton, loc. cit.

Two observations of importance are in order here. First, the Democrats have been making substantially the same recommendations to their candidates as those just quoted. They, too,

have noted that the candidate's principal competition on television is with entertainment programs. They have advised against half-hour shows. They value the spot announcement that presents a simple and memorable slogan. _/ They have advised against

_/ See particularly, Democratic National Committee, A Campaign Guide to Political Publicity (Washington, 1956).

advertising five-minute programs on the grounds that advance knowledge of them is more likely to lose than to attract viewers. Second, Newton's prescriptions (and those of the Democrats) are being followed, as the trend data presented above should make clear.

The attempt to attract audiences by making politics entertaining has been pursued with considerably less logic than has been brought to the search for captive audiences. This is undoubtedly true in part because many politicians have been unable to see clearly how they might exploit the entertainment values inherent in politics. Many have been aware that a speech growing out of a dramatic situation--Nixon's 1952 speech defending his use of a specially subscribed fund is the best and almost the only example--could compete effectively for audiences with commercial shows. It is not at all apparent, however, how such situations might be contrived as part of a conscious strategy.

But there is another important reason for the politician's hesitation to adopt this second strategy. Conflict is the most obvious entertainment appeal of political life. The panel discussions, the interviews, and the "press conferences" have been very tentative steps toward tapping this appeal. Conflict cannot be injected into political programs, however, without incurring one very heavy cost--that of exposing one's audience to an opposing point of view that is forcefully presented. When this is not done, the program is very likely to elicit a feeling similar to that expressed about a program in which Conservative ministers were questioned by British editors--"it resembled a board meeting with the directors being questioned by a group of keen but generally sympathetic shareholders." _/

_/ William Salter, "The TV Election--Round Two," New Statesman and Nation (May 21, 1955), p. 708.

Genuine conflict came to political television in the Nixon-Kennedy debates of 1960. They attracted far larger audiences for the time periods they occupied than the programs they replaced. The first debate reached almost 30,000,000 television homes. The third debate--that which attracted the fewest viewers--reached slightly over 24,000,000 homes. The largest audience attracted for a commercially sponsored program during

the period of the debates--the Sunday World Series game--was about 22,000,000 homes. Politics in this form was an effective competitor for mass television audiences. _/

_/ Data reported by the A. C. Nielsen Company. See Stanley Kelley, Jr., "The 1960 Presidential Election," American Government Annual, 1961-1962 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1961), p. 66.

Implications

This is not the place to present any comprehensive theory on the functioning of the democratic State. I do, however, want to advance two propositions that might find a place in such a theory and to show how what has been said so far is relevant to them.

The first proposition is that--given widespread consensus on certain constitutional procedures and certain substantive issues--the higher the level of political information possessed by individual citizens in a democratic State, the more stable will democratic government be. Extremely low levels of information among the citizens of a democracy endanger its continued existence for several reasons. They make it difficult for leaders to gain acceptance for objectively required sacrifices. They encourage capricious fluctuations in policy, because citizens lack a basis for assessing the long range consequences of momentarily appealing proposals for action. They tend to make of political conflict a struggle in which "ignorant armies clash by night": The temper of group conflict may be cooled by overlapping group memberships among citizens; it may also be cooled by overlapping sources of information.

Now, distribution of political propaganda by means calculated to reach captive audiences does little to raise the voters' level of political information and may actually lower it; propaganda disseminated in the context of a debate tends to raise it. Propaganda directed at captive audiences is normally characterized by gross distortions and a failure to define party differences. It is so characterized because the propagandist works on the assumption that the voter's attention is so sporadically attracted to political discussion that he is unlikely to hear the answers of one side to the assertions of the other. It is therefore good strategy for propagandists on both sides to present their opponent's position in as poor a light as possible and to ignore attacks on their own weaknesses._/

_/ Murray Chotiner, former campaign adviser to Vice President Richard Nixon, puts the case for this kind of strategy: "In the Nixon-Douglas campaign in 1950, for the Senate, Dick Nixon was talking about Communism at home and having a strong America. Helen Gahagan Douglas was talking about the handouts and all

these Federal payments for everything. We could not outbid the administration on those things because the Republican party did not stand for the same thing that Mrs. Douglas was espousing. Nobody could ever hope to out-promise a New Dealer. Mrs. Douglas said, 'my opponent will not debate me on these issues. He keeps talking about other things.' We still kept talking about a strong America and about seeing to it that communism did not gain a foothold in the United States, and what happened? Mrs. Douglas, in desperation, in order to have a head-on clash on issues started to debate with Dick Nixon's issues. Well, she was defeated the minute she tried to do it, because she could not sell the people of California that she would be a better fighter against communism than Dick Nixon. She made the fatal mistake of attacking our strength instead of sticking to attacking our weakness." (In an address to Republican State Chairmen, Washington, D. C., September, 1955.)

In television debates good strategy becomes quite a different thing. Both sides have equal and simultaneous access to the same audience. To distort the position of one's opponent is to invite a quick and authoritative reply. To fail to answer challenges is to invite the viewer's conclusion that an answer is not possible. To fail to define differences with one's opponent is to invite him to define them in the way most advantageous to himself. The debate situation thus tends to increase the accuracy, specificity, and relevance to voting decisions of statements in political discussion. _/

_/ I have developed this argument much more fully in Political Campaigning: Problems of Creating an Informal Electorate (The Brookings Institution: Washington, 1960), see particularly pp. 18-20, 67-69, 154.

A second proposition that may be advanced about the operation of democratic states is this: It is rarely rational for individual citizens to expend any great effort in acquiring political information. In a democracy it is rational for a citizen to acquire information relevant to voting if he thinks that he will discover that the outcome of an election will make a difference to him and if he thinks that his vote is likely to affect the outcome. Since in any sizeable constituency the chances that any given vote will change an election's outcome are very small, the rational citizen's motivation to acquire information is also very small. _/ It would seem to follow that

_/ This is substantially the argument advanced by Anthony Downs in his An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper and Brothers: New York, 1957).

democracies cannot rely on rationality in terms of immediate self-interest as a sufficient inducement for their citizens to

acquire high levels of political information, and voting behavior studies suggest, in fact, that other motives (such as a sense of civic obligation or the desire to please intimates) are of much greater importance in accounting for existing levels of political interest and participation.

Success in reaching captive audiences does little to alter or increase the incentives of such audiences to expose themselves to political information. The television debates--politics exploiting an entertainment appeal--seem to have done just that. The notion that tapping such non-rational motives as the desire to be entertained can, and may be necessary to, increase the rationality of voting may at first appear to be either a bizarre or perverse notion. It should not. Certainly those politicians who sponsored the torchlight parades of an era that is almost gone were not unaware of the relation between political participation and the entertainment elements of politics. _/

_/ Tocqueville reports that in his time "even women frequently attend public meetings and listen to political harangues as recreation from their household labors..." / Democracy in America (Knopf: New York, 1945), Vol. I, p. 50_7 and political participation was at a far higher level in his day than our own. This is not to suggest that it was higher only because its entertainment value was greater; it is to suggest that politics was a form of entertainment throughout much of our history and that the long decline of political participation beginning in the 1880's may have been in part due both to a decrease in its attraction as entertainment and to rising competition from other forms of entertainment. My colleague, Professor Marion J. Levy, Jr., has long been interested in this relation between politics and entertainment. He nicely characterizes the change involved in the politician's abandonment of the harangue for a chance to appear on the Jack Paar show or with Ginger Rogers as a change from "politics as entertainment" to "entertainment as politics."

Nor is it a new notion that education may be a by-product of entertainment.

Failure to tap the entertainment value of politics more successfully than has yet been done (except in the television debates) will almost certainly force political parties to rely primarily on the search for captive audiences as a way to publicize their views. Institutionalization of television debates may allow them to reach larger audiences in a way that can raise the viewer's level of political information--if debates can continue to hold the viewer's interest when the normally moderate character of the differences between candidates in two-party competition becomes obvious to him.

TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICS IN INDIA

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The strong ties of kinship that exist between labor movements and political movements are apparent wherever industrial workers have been organized, with the partial exception of the United States. But the direction, force and qualitative meaning of these ties vary greatly and the state of political and economic development of each society seems to be the most important factor determining these variations. For in the long institutional evolution which marks the development of what we call a modern society functioning autonomous labor unions and systematic union-management relations are much more difficult to achieve than political parties and political action. The reasons become increasingly clear as we learn more about the conditions of underdevelopment and about the process of development. Politics can proceed on the strength of nothing more than diverse interests and competition for power. Unionism and labor relations of any substance require a minimum dispersion of power in society and demand a high order of individual awareness, education, basic social agreement, social skills and discipline among the participants. The more these conditions are lacking the more dependent will be the tie of a labor movement to political parties and government. The interdependence between unionism and politics and the subordinate status of unions are extreme, therefore, in totalitarian regimes and in underdeveloped nations.

Conditions in India are consistent with this model. But there are special factors present in the Indian case which give particular interest to the interplay between unions, parties and government. These are, first, that India is doing its best to operate as a genuine parliamentary democracy. This means that there is a rich political life and that political parties of all descriptions exist throughout the country and compete with each other in free elections at all levels. The second point is that for a considerable period before independence the British regime in India either tolerated or encouraged unionism and that since 1947 the Indian government has encouraged the growth of unions and union-management relations as desirable features of a free society. As a result, trade unionism has a comparatively long history in India and has achieved a membership and organizational reality markedly different from what is to be found in most underdeveloped nations.

Before Independence

The Indian labor movement was well launched before Indian became free and has had a continuouse existence since about 1920. Splits in the movement along political lines likewise occurred early and have persisted to this day. The dominant political force in the country then as now was the Indian National Congressby dint of its long and devoted prosecution of the independence struggle. The organizing and promoting of unions was actively pushed by Congress leaders as a way of carrying this struggle to the urban masses. However, from the

early 1920's the Communist Party of India was also energetically and successfully at work in the trade union field. It is fair to say, therefore, that Indian unionism has had a strongly ideological and political coloration since the very beginning.

The disparate political elements were able to compose their differences for a few years within a single national federation, the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC). But in 1929 the anti-Communist group split off and formed a new federation leaving the Communists in control of the AITUC. In 1938 a long series of unity moves brought the second group back into the AITUC on the strength of constitutional safeguards against Communist domination. In August, 1942, Congress launched its "Quit India" movement and most leading Congressmen were imprisoned; this included labor leaders. The Communist Party, which was now vigorously supporting the allied war effort, seized this opportunity to take over the AITUC once again.

When Congress labor leaders emerged from prison in 1944 and 1945 they found the Communists well entrenched not only in the AITUC provincial and national organizations but in many of its most important constituent unions. As events moved toward the British withdrawal from India, Congress leaders were convinced that it was imperative to reestablish the Congress position in the labor movement. In November, 1946, Congress workers in the labor field were advised to enter the AITUC and bring about a shift in control and a change in its policies by working within the organization. Within five months this was recognized as a futile endeavor and the call was issued for the founding conference of a rival federation, the Indian National Trade Union Congress

Political fragmentation

The inauguration of the Indian National Trade Union Congress in 1947 was very plainly an action undertaken for political reasons by political leaders. The call to the conference contained the following revealing words:

> It is felt that it will militate against the best and most vital interests of the country and jeopardize its peaceful progress on democratic lines if at this stage a central organization of labor is not formed in harmony with the ideas and resolutions of the Indian National Congress.[1]

The call for the conference was issued by Gulzarilal Nanda, a prominent labor leader who had already been named Labor Minister of Bombay State. His call was supplemented by a letter from the Secretary of the All India Congress Committee to the provincial committees inviting them to send representatives. The conference chairman was Sardar Vallabhai Patel, strong man of the Congress organization who was reputed to have been very insistent on the need for a separate Congress labor organization. Many top Congress leaders, including Nehru, attended the conference. The two men elected first President and General Secretary of the new federation were both Congress members of Parliament.

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1. INTUC: A Review, Indian National Trade Union Congress, May 1949, p. 23.

The creation of a Congress labor front in opposition to its Communist rival together with the divisive political pressures which began to emerge with the arrival of self government made further politicalization of the labor movement inevitable. As soon as the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) took form the Congree Working Committee notified all Congressmen active in labor work to affiliate their unions with the new federation. The ensuing activity of local Congress Committees and of some of the officials of the provincial governments in support of the INTUC created alarm and resentment among Socialist labor leaders. Plans for a Socialist party and a Socialist labor organization independent of their Congress counterparts developed hand in hand. A conference of those interested in forming a third national trade union center was convened in Calcutta in December, 1948. At this meeting differences arose between the Socialists and non-Communist Marxist elements over issues of political ideology and the constitutional policies of the new organization. These could not be reconciled and so two national trade union centers were formed. The Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS) was allied with the Socialist - later the Praja Socialist - Party. The United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) was not so clearly identified with a single political group; however, in the areas of its principal following it has had strong ties with the Revolutionary Socialist Party.

This four way split of the Indian trade union movement into four politically differentiated federations has remained in effect since 1948.[2] While there have always been some independent unaffiliated unions, the great majority of the larger established unions maintain affiliation to one of these federations. The respective total membership to be credited to each central organization has always been a subject of controversy and statistical uncertainty. Two sets of figures are available. One consists of the membership claims of the federations; the other figures are reported by the central Labor Ministry on the basis of its own verification of the membership of affiliated unions which are registered and submit annual reports. Claimed membership has always exceeded verified figures by 50 to 100 per cent. The following table presents membership claims for an early year, 1950, verified figures for the first year in which they were reported by the Labor Ministry, 1953, and both sets of figures for the most recent date available, 1959.

As of March 31:	INTUC	AITUC	HMS	UTUC
1950 (claimed)				
Affiliated unions	1,043	722	460	306
Total membership	1,431,878	730,636	698,720	366,401
1953 (verified)				
Affiliated unions	587	334	220	154
Total membership	919,288	210,914	373,459	129,242
1959 (claimed)				
Affiliated unions	1,246	1,636	323	285
Total membership	1,503,811	1,086,646	480,290	197,587
1959 (verified)				
Affiliated unions	882	813	183	171
Total membership	1,018,445	506,304	240,622	89,877

Sources: The Indian Labour Year Book, 1951-52, 1952-53
Hind Mazdoor, October 1959, July-August, 1960

2. A fifth labor federation was established in July, 1955, by the Jan Sangh, a rightist political organization with national aspirations. But it failed to achieve any significance in the labor movement.

Interpreting the above figures and similar ones for the intervening years with care, it is apparent that there has been some fluctuation in the individual fortunes of the four federations but that over time the two smaller organizations, the HMS and the UTUC, have lost ground to the Congress INTUC and the Communist AITUC. This is doubtless a reflection in part of the failure of the fortunes of the two parties with which these lesser federations are identified to grow or prosper during the last ten years. The Praja Socialist Party suffered a blow when Mr. Lohia broke away and formed his own Socialist Party. While this did not result in a formal split in the HMS it certainly contributed to its organizational stagnation.

It is probable that the deteriorating position of the two smaller federations within the movement together with the declining value and meaning of the association with a political party in each case helped bring them in June, 1959 to the first promising unity move since the original four way split. A reason given by one of the spokesmen was that they found they were taking similar positions on issues. There had been sporadic unity gestures and joint actions involving various combinations among the four federations in the past but none with serious or lasting effect. The 1959 agreement signed between HMS and UTUC included the following provisions:

(1) The UTUC and HMS decide to work together with the ultimate objective of reaching unity.
(2) For this purpose there shall be joint committees formed at all India level and at state level. [3]

The political fragmentation which was set in motion in 1947 and 1948 was more far reaching than the mere creation of four different political trade union centers. This was followed by an unprecedented trade union scramble between the federations to garner existing unions unto themselves by fair means or foul, to set up rival organizations where existing unions could not be won and to establish footholds in previously unorganized plants and industries. This inter-union raiding and skirmishing has gone on unceasingly and has been facilitated by two other circumstances of the Indian labor scene. One is that most unions are strictly local in character being confined either to a local plant or a local industry. There has been very little consolidation into regional or national unions. The second point is that with minor exceptions Indian law and practice permit two or more unions to exist concurrently within, and purporting to represent , the same body of workers in a single plant or local industry. These circumstances have permitted and encouraged the needless multiplication of rival unions right down to the level of the individual establishment. The total number of separate unions has more than trebled in ten years and the average size of union has steadily declined. As of 1958 there were over 9,000 registered unions and the average membership of reporting unions was 547. [4]

The relations between parties and unions

The relationship between political parties and the labor movement in India is, of course, basically different from that which predominates in Western Europe.

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3 Hind Mazdoor, June, 1959
4 The Indian Labour Year Book, 1958

In many of those countries the political interests of labor are largely bound up with a single labor or social democratic party which a strong independent labor movement helped create and strongly influences. In India there is no labor party and the major divisions of the movement come close to being creatures of the respective parties.

The UTUC does not figure significantly in this discussion. Its total affiliated membership has steadily dwindled and it has never been a significant factor in the Indian movement as a national organization nor an effective labor front for a national political party. What significance it has had has been achieved more through individual leaders and the role of certain affiliated unions in particular industries in Kerala, Madras and West Bengal.

Of the other three organizations the position of the AITUC is most easily defined. Neither the Communist Party of India nor the AITUC makes any attempt to deny that the latter is the Party's trade union front. The principal officers of the national organization, of the state branches and of the major affiliated unions are in most cases Party functionaries or activists. The General Secretary of the AITUC since its early years has been Mr. S. A. Dange, an influential member of the Party's Central Committee and a Communist member of Parliament. The record of AITUC unions and of AITUC representatives on all kinds of tripartite bodies and committees gives every indication that basic union policies are set by the Party and that the key union leadership accepts Party discipline.

What cannot be gauged with any certainty is the role of the AITUC in the internal policy differences which have torn the Communist Party from time to time. Dange is a leader of the moderate faction in the Party high command and one can guess that his position in the labor movement lends force to his views in two ways. First, his AITUC office and his long identification with Indian unionism nationally and in the Bombay area give him a strong following among many rank and file groups. An impressive demonstration of this occurred in November, 1955, and January, 1956, when massive strikes of industrial workers were called in Bombay in support of making that city a part of the new linguistic state of Maharashtra.[5] Dange was one of the key leaders of this agitation. Dange's AITUC connection could support his moderate Party views in a second way in that moderation in the sense of getting along with government is a wise longer run policy for the future of AITUC unions. As a Communist labor front the AITUC continues to exist, to obtain access to industrial relations adjudication and to be granted representation on tripartite bodies at the sufferance of government. In the same way, AITUC unions stand to gain on the whole by maintaining responsible relations with employers.

The reverse aspect of the AITUC role in Party divisions is that one of the centers of AITUC strength is Calcutta which is also the headquarters of leaders of the left wing and more intransigent faction in the

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5 See Marshall Windmiller, "The Politics of States Reorganization in India: the Case of Bombay," Far Eastern Survey, September, 1956.

Party. In Calcutta it is plain that AITUC unions have been used to spearhead demonstrations and street disturbances one of whose main purposes has been to defy and discredit government.

The political connections of the INTUC and HMS are much more complex. Although their close association from the beginning with the Congress and Praja Socialist Parties, respectively, is obvious the allegiance is not 100 per cent throughout the ranks and does not by any means result in complete party determination of union policy. Some essentially non-political individuals have held leadership in INTUC unions. In the HMS there is an even larger sprinkling of non-Praja Socialists and non-political leaders. Included among these are a number of erstwhile followers of M. N. Roy, founder of the former Radical Democratic Party, who have played a significant role in the national affairs of HMS from the first. The split in the Praja Socialist Party following the withdrawal of Lohia in 1956 tended to weaken further the identification of HMS with a single party. Within some unions of both affiliations there are stirrings of opposition to party dictation or undue influence in union affairs.

National leaders of both the INTUC and HMS are quick to deny that their own organizations are subject to party influences although equally quick to convict the other labor groups on the same charge. An early report of the INTUC contained the following statement by the General Secretary:

> "Our organization has no affiliation with any political party or organization. We have at no stage during the last four years allowed our policies to be influenced by any political considerations nor have we ever subordinated them to the policies of any political party."
>
> This declaration was immediately followed by this admission:
>
> "It is, however, admittedly true that most of our workers have had close and active association with the Indian National Congress for many years and they still look to the Congress as the only suitable instrument for the fulfillment of the political objectives of this great country. As a matter of fact, during the past there has generally been a political homogeneity in the organization as a whole." [6]

In pursuance of its claim to political independence the national INTUC leadership even tolerated the embarrassment it suffered when the top officers of the West Bengal branch of the INTUC joined the Praja Socialist Party in the early 1950's. This development led to a split in the state INTUC organization for two years and severe internal pressure for the removal of the political deserters. However, the national leaders stood firm until the individuals in question found their positions in the INTUC unworkable and in 1956 shifted into the HMS taking a large part of their union following with them.

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6 Annual Report, 1951, Indian National Trade Union Congress, p. 127.

Their purported political independence has not prevented the INTUC and HMS from vigorously supporting their respective parties in general and local elections. A typical resolution was adopted by the INTUC General Council in July, 1951, calling upon all members and affiliated unions to "offer wholehearted support to the Congress" and directing the Working Committee and national officers to "ensure that adequate number of suitable trade union workers be nominated as Congress candidates and returned to various legislatures." This cooperation obviously goes beyond mere form and publicity. In the state of Uttar Pradesh in 1959 in certain towns, including the city of Kanpur, some INTUC leaders were contesting corporation elections as independents in opposition to Congress nominees. The president of the state INTUC organization issued a statement saying that "it is against INTUC policy to oppose Congress candidates" and warning that disciplinary action might be taken against INTUC workers involved. [7]

The Congress and Praja Socialist Parties have been more forthright in avowing their connections with their labor arms and the cooperation and allegiance they expect from them. During 1953 some conflicts arose in the then state of Madhya Bharat between the Congress Party organization and the state INTUC. Ultimately, Prime Minister Nehru, as Congress President, had to take note of the matter. He is reported to have made the following remarks to a local Congress official:

> "Technically, the INTUC and the Indian National Congress are two separate organizations...Still it goes without saying that the INTUC has been sponsored and nursed mostly by Congressmen and derives most of its strength from the moral and other support of the Congress. As such it is imperative that in political matters all Congressmen working in the INTUC should treat the Congress as the supreme body and abide by its code of conduct." [8]

A writer in the Praja Socialist Party organ in 1953 in deploring the weakening of "our trade union front" attributed it to the professional attitude which was replacing the missionary spirit in union workers and to the "popular tendency to overemphasize the independence of the union from the Party." [9] In 1954 the General Council of the Praja Socialist Party took notice of the "slackening of Party work in labor," called upon national and state executives to resume "initiative of organization and guidance in this field," urged Party members to "persuade unions to affiliate to the Hind Mazdoor Sabha" and directed active members working in labor "to take greater interest in Party work." [10]

Over and above the fact that these central labor bodies were created and have been nurtured by parties the important factor which keeps the political alliance strong in each case is the fact that a large proportion of the most influential union leaders are also political leaders. A great

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7 The Indian Worker, October 26, 1959
8 Times of India, December 31, 1953
9 Janata, November 22, 1953
10 Janata, June 13, 1954

many of the officers of both the state and national organizations of all four labor federations, but with the INTUC having much the largest representation, hold seats in the state or national legislatures. It is common also for these men to be elected concurrently to the presidencies of anywhere from one to more than a score of individual unions. In the case of the INTUC there is the additional factor that a significant number of former union leaders have been appointed to office in state and national labor ministries. At the annual sessions of the INTUC and at meetings of its General Council the central Labor Minister, Mr. Nanda, and his Deputy, Mr. Abid Ali, both prominent former union leaders, are invariably present and as intimately involved in speech making and leadership discussions as the regular officers. Comparable relationships prevail at meetings of many state INTUC branches. In a number of states the state offices of parties and their associated labor federation are housed in the same buildings, often in the same rooms. One finds active workers serving both organizations without distinction.

This dual role of the leadership seems to foster the often expressed contention in INTUC and HMS circles that their organizations are not subservient to party. Leaders believe they act independently in each role; they interpret the community of interest which prevails among them as they engage in labor work as the product of consultation about working class objectives; and they interpret the coincidence between union and party policies to be correct agreement on fundamentals between independent organizations. In the INTUC this way of thinking is facilitated, particularly for the old-time Congress workers, by the carry over from the long independence struggle of the assumption that Congress stands in some sense above partisan politics with a program for the good of all. This would account for the remark made to this writer in 1953 by a prominent national leader of the INTUC. He said that he favored as complete divorce as possible between politics and the labor movement and that there were not many politically active people in the INTUC. When it was pointed out that he had recently been a candidate for Parliament and that many of his INTUC colleagues either held or were seeking elective office, he replied, "We do not think of standing for Parliament on Congress ticket as engaging in politics".

The point on which this investigator has been unable to obtain meaningful evidence is the extent to which finance has been a means of party influence over unions. Undoubtedly the several wings of the movement have enjoyed material benefit of one kind or another from their party connections. This was important in the early years when the INTUC, HMS and UTUC were all trying to establish themselves and gain membership in competition with the AITUC and with each other. There have almost certainly been especially critical rivalry situations since then in which some party financial aid has been injected. But the main form of assistance throughout has probably been in the form of support of leadership. Presidents of Indian unions ordinarily do not draw any regular compensation from their unions and a striking number of leaders in executive positions with unions serve

either on an uncompensated, honorary basis or draw less than a living stipend. This does not mean that all these people are maintained by the party organizations. Some have other employment, others are maintained by their families and so on. But party support of political workers who double in the union field and of office facilities shared by unions has certainly been helpful.

The results of politics in the labor movement

A theme which receives nearly universal support among government, employer and union representatives in India is that the political orientation of the labor movement has had harmful effects on unions and on labor relations. Fragmentation of the movement and rivalry between unions are most prominently mentioned in this connection. As described above, fragmentation has proceeded to an extreme degree and although other factors contribute duplication and multiplication for political reasons have been the main causes.

There are several kinds of undesirable consequences. One is that all too many Indian unions are small in total size and fatally weak in finances, in organization and in that they embrace only a minority of the work force they seek to represent. The impact on labor relations is likely to be bad in at least two ways. More often than not an employer is confronted by two or more unions within his work force, no one of which is empowered to speak for all his employees and all contending for preferred position. Orderly labor relations, with predictability, continuity and repose following upon periodic negotiations, are very difficult or impossible to achieve, especially since the government has so far failed to work out any effective means of settling inter-union rivalry in a bargaining unit. Moreover, political motivations become inter-mixed with standard union objectives. Political strikes and agitation are commonplace among the non-INTUC unions. This is so not only because unions are political but because India is a developing nation and government necessarily has decision making power over a very wide range of subjects including employment conditions and because India is also committed to raise the welfare of the common man so that unions become a natural instrument of protest and pressure.

Another consequence of the political division among Indian unions is that it sets the stage for favoritism and discrimination by Congress governments and for constant debate over real and imagined grievances on this score between the non-Congress unions, the INTUC and government officials. While freely acknowledging that the INTUC was created by the Congress Party as an anti-Communist move and that the Party maintains close liaison with the INTUC and gives it active assistance where possible, government spokesmen stoutly maintain that it is firm policy in all official actions to observe strict impartiality as between rival union organizations. However, human and political realities being what they are some discrimination is inevitable. Congress and the opposition parties do have a lot at stake in retaining their labor followings. Labor ministers, labor commissioners, registrars, inspectors, conciliators, tribunal officials, magistrates, police officers and all other

officials with authority over unions and employers have been appointed by Congress governments for fourteen years and no alternative political power is in sight. It is a considerable tribute to Indian standards of administrative integrity and to the central government's basic commitment to democratic freedoms that more frequent and flagrant discrimination has not occurred.

Awareness of the political stakes has been apparent from the beginning in the government's handling of labor relations legislation, particularly in the omissions from it. For example, the fact that Indian national labor law makes no provision for conferring exclusive bargaining rights on individual unions or for compelling employers to gecognize and bargain with them or for settling representation disputes between rival unions by secret ballot votes undoubtedly can be attributed in no small part to the expectation of the authorities that Communist and Socialist unions would gain more from such provisions than the INTUC.

Although the secret ballot vote is not used as a method of determining union strength or following, in certain states government has been required to ascertain the most representative unions in given industries and the national government likewise finds it necessary to make investigations to verify membership claims and to allocate representatives from the trade union centers to International Labor Office meetigs and to the large number of tripartite bodies which exist within the country. These determinations have resulted in many charges of favoritism to the INTUC. On occasion, when these charges have been carried to an industrial court or tribunal, the certificate in favor of an INTUC union has been cancelled on grounds of inadequate investigation or a preponderance of evidence in favor of a rival union.

In one famous case a flagrant act of favoritism by a state administration was shown up by a secret ballot vote. This occurred in Uttar Pradesh in 1949 when the labor movement was in a very formative stage of its post-war development and badly divided by political and leadership rivalries. In this situation and on the basis of an alleged inquiry the state government declared the INTUC unions to be representative of workers in the state for all purposes. Employers in the state thereupon dutifully extended recognition to the INTUC unions. There was an immediate outcry from the other unions. Heeding this challenge in the large sugar industry the government decided to hold an election under the apparent impression that the INTUC would defeat a divided opposition. However, the opposition united and of 83,000 eligible sugar workers 68,000 cast ballots defeating the INTUC by more than two to one. [11]

In naming workers' representatives to international meetings and to tripartite bodies of a general character in India it has been the policy of government to grant larger representation to the INTUC than to the other federations on the ground that it has the largest national membership. However, this policy has also been applied to tripartite bodies for industries in which the INTUC does not predominate. In 1954 the HMS condemned

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[11] Annual Review of Activities, 1950, Department of Labour, Uttar Pradesh, 1951

this practice and threatened to withdraw from all tripartite organizations. Early in 1958 the HMS did initiate such a boycott of all tripartite bodies as a protest against the government's procedure for verifying union memberships. The boycott was terminated in October, 1960, because the "protest launched by the HMS against the obstinate attitude of the government was sufficiently recognized." [12]

One area in which government influence on behalf of the INTUC has been direct and important is public employment. In individual industrial enterprises in the public sector the preference of management for the INTUC has often been quite manifest, but the most extensive efforts by government administration to adjust union conditions to its liking have occurred in the defence establishments, in the railways and in the posts and telegraph services. In each of the first two cases administrative pressure was primarily responsible for bringing about a merger of two or more rival federations. In the third industry the administration took the lead in effecting a major realignment and merger of unions. It is significant that in all three industries the previously dominant union leaders and organizations had not been affiliated with or friendly to the INTUC. But the INTUC factions have been able to take advantage of the mergers and realignments.

On the railways the rival federations merged in 1953 but by 1955 the old rivalries had broken out in serious factionalism and soon the two rival federations were reestablished. But in the process the INTUC organization had clearly gained the upper hand in the use of the labor relations machinery and in recognition by the administration. In November, 1960, shortly after a general strike of central government employees, the Deputy Minister of Railways addressed the General Council of the INTUC railway federation. He thanked the organization for opposing the strike, acknowledged that government had had a false notion of neutrality in continuing to recognize the rival federation (unaffiliated but having strong HMS connections), charged that organization with being led "by the Reds" and promised that so far as government was concerned the INTUC body was the only federation of railwaymen. [13]

Other forms of discrimination charged against officialdom are virtually impossible to check or verify. For example, national and state labor laws give the respective governments discretionary power to refer labor disputes to compulsory adjudication. Since many cases are not referred, it is a common complaint of non-INTUC unions that INTUC unions get favored treatment. It is also alleged that there have been conciliators and industrial tribunals whose conduct of proceedings and awards have been influenced in favor of the INTUC. One finds frank INTUC leaders and government and management officials who will admit, off the record, that instances of this sort do occur. They also agree that the situation is quite uneven throughout the nation because the standards of integrity of partisanship in administering labor policy vary between the states. It is also not uncommon for employers to take sides between rival unions. Most often in these cases their support is given to the INTUC union, either because of personal political conviction or because they regard it as expedient to curry favor with the Congress Party and with

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12 Hind Mazdoor, October, 1960
13 The Indian Worker, December 5, 1960

government which can influence the fortunes of industrial enterprise in so many ways in India. It is also known that on occasion government officials have requested or pressured employers to assist the establishment or growth of INTUC unions or the defeat of rival organizations.

Another accusation by AITUC, HMS and UTUC unions is that local police and magistrates discriminate against them in exercise of police powers and in invoking the Criminal Procedure Code and the Preventive Detention Act to prohibit meetings, processions and demonstrations and to arrest leaders in conjunction with industrial disputes. Without question a much higher proportion of nonINTUC than of INTUC leaders have been restricted or arrested in these ways. For a period after independence large numbers of Communists and some Socialists, including trade union leaders, were imprisoned in connection with a political crisis involving the left wing at that time. But the situation also worked very much to the advantage of the INTUC in the labor movement. In evaluating these charges of discriminatory law enforcement it is necessary to recognize that the other unions are not committed, like the INTUC, to avoidance of methods of strike and agitation and that they <u>are</u> in a position of political opposition so that they are more frequently involved not only in ordinary economic strikes but in political strikes and demonstrations against the government.

It might be noted in this connection that when the Communist Party won control of an Indian state, Kerala, for more than two years, 1957-59, it resulted in very serious charges of favoritism, discrimination and police repression as practiced by that government against the non-Communist unions. The INTUC, HMS and UTUC formed a Joint Trade Union Council to work for the removal of the Communist regime. [14]

Perhaps the longer run danger in the problem of favoritism is forecast by the relative decline of the HMS and UTUC in the labor movement. This could be a more explicit polarization between the Congress and Communist labor fronts. Many Congressmen, in and out of labor work, increasingly see the Communist Party as their chief internal opposition and it is not hard for them to equate a blow struck for the INTUC as a blow struck against Communism. If this view of Indian labor affairs should continue to spread it could lead to a relationship between government and labor movement in which the INTUC is regarded not only by government but by unionists and employers as a different order of organization from its rivals and is accorded different treatment without conscious reflection as to the reasons.

So far the discussion has dwelt on the harmful effects of the close tie up between Indian unionism and politics. Has any good come of it? The very reasons for the tie up point to one benefit for unions themselves. For many individual unions political support and leadership are the means of survival and what little influence they possess. A complete divorce between unions and politics would probably cause a good share of the movement to disappear. It is probably also true that the fact that the movement is a political battle ground of importance has helped make industrial workers the beneficiaries of a large program of welfare legislation and a comparatively favorable set of

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14 <u>Communist Ministry and Trade Unions in Kerala</u>, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions - Asian Regional Organiztion, 1959.

wages and working conditions as fixed by tribunals and legislatures. Political rivalries in the movement certainly gave major impetus to the tremendous spread of unions and the large growth in total membership after independence. This in itself was not a healthy growth but could be said to provide a basis for sounder development to come. The competition and unceasing verbal warfare between rival unions, although much of the criticism is automatic, indiscriminate and inaccurate, provide a measure of disclosure and publicity on such issues as performance, malpractices and dishonesty and serve to remind workers that they can exercise a choice.

It has been implicit in most of this discussion that since the labor movement has had a dependent relation to political parties in India it has been on the receiving end of influences and consequences flowing from that relationship. It might well be asked: Does the Indian labor movement have any discernible impact of its own on the political process and on government policy? The answer can only be a general one. It is obviously important to political parties and to government to win and keep all the support thay can get from industrial labor and this must affect their actions and programs. However, this would be true even if an organized union movement did not exist, as long as India chose her governments by free elections. In addition, India's leadership, of all political faiths, has been committed from the beginning to welfare state objectives and, with important exceptions, to democratic methods. So the relatively favored treatment which Indian industrial workers have enjoyed, the unusually large number of protective and welfare labor laws which crowd the statute books and the pro-union declarations and tactics of the several parties cannot by any means be attributed solely to the existence of an active labor movement. At the least, it can be said that the unions serve as a very vocal conscience, with spokesmen in all legislatures, to remind Indian leadership of its commitments. And beyond this, the importance of the labor movement, as an organized and manipulable apparatus among the urban masses, in the critical struggle of India's democratic forces to contain and surmount Communism gives to unionism a leverage it could not wield by virtue of its own independent strength.

Prospects for lessening of ties between unions and politics

The desirability of taking Indian unions out of politics is a very popular theme in business, academic, government and even labor circles. But there is little analysis of how this might be accomplished or of the difficulties involved. The most common proposal is that outsiders, i.e., men who had not been employed in the establishment or industry involved and thus involving most political leaders in unions, should be barred from holding union office or should be limited to a fixed minority percentage of the offices in any union. A little reflection will show that under Indian conditions barring political leaders from holding formal union offices would not in fact eliminate political influence or control over unions.

Any genuine merger between rival national union federations would materially reduce the tendencies toward political fragmentation and dependence. As noted above, the HMS and UTUC are presumably working toward organizational merger at the present time. On occasion in the past tentative unity gestures have occurred between the INTUC and HMS. Although not a present prospect, unification or some form of closer cooperation between these two labor centers cannot be ruled out as a future possibility. One can predict with confidence, however, that no merger or other kind of joint action will occur between the AITUC and either the INTUC or the HMS as long as the three groups have anything like their present political coloration.

Theoretically, growth of trade union consciousness and purposes among industrial workers could reduce the influence of parties over unions. This too is far in the future. The point is that Indian unions do not acquire their political leanings from their rank and file members. In the words of K. C. Sen, who as President of the Industrial Court in Bombay came to know a wide variety of union groups, "in the vast majority of the workers political complexions are truly skin deep and they really join such unions as are believed by them to be most helpful, little heed being paid to the question of ideology." [15] Domestic party politics and processes are still new and not well developed in India and the wage earner's awareness and understanding of them are limited. Likewise, the worker's consciousness of political differentiation within the electorate based on economic or group interests rather than on language, community, caste or religion is still very tentative.

Indian unionism is made political by its leaders not by its members. Therefore, the movement's current political orientation could soon change if the present key leadership were replaced by leaders who were less interested in politics than in trade union careers. This goes to the heart of the matter and to the critical question for the future. For what it means is that the future of politics in the Indian labor movement depends on the future of the movement itself. The more Indian unions acquire their own sources of strength and purpose in durable bargaining relationships with employers in which decisions are made over a significant range of employment subjects and problems the more they will throw up and attract leaders whose vocation is unionism rather than politics and the more independent thay will become of parties. Such a weaning of the movement away from political dependence, if it ever comes in India, is a long way off.

One reason is that many difficulties stand in the way of developing effectual bargaining relations - fragmentation and rivalries among unions; their lack of disciplined bargaining power; employer opposition to collective bargaining or complete ignorance about it; strong class barriers against effective interchange between employers and employees; the existence of compulsory governmental adjudication of labor disputes as an alternative to bargaining; the unwillingness of government to reduce or

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15 The Industrial Court Reporter, Bombay, November, 1953, p. 1188. This is not to deny that the INTUC has had the advantage of an enormous fund of good will among workers for Congress as the Party of independence, Gandhi and Nehru.

help overcome some of these difficulties through appropriate legislative or administrative action. Another reason is the obstacles which stand in the way of replacing the present key leadership of the movement with non-political career unionists. Such leaders must come primarily from employment in the industries involved and yet must have a sufficiently high level of education and social status to handle the English language and the complexities of Indian labor law and governmental adjudication and to be able to deal with employers and government officials with some freedom and independence. In a few industries like banking, the press, railways, posts and telegraph and other government services which employ substantial numbers of educated middle class personnel some leadership of this character is making its appearance in Indian unions. In most other industries, however, such leadership is not available and, in addition, most of the unions do not have the financial resources to make this type of career employment attractive and secure. [16]

The future, therefore, does not promise any rapid change in the dominant hold which politics and parties have over Indian unions. At most there will be slow growth of those conditions which help unions to stand on their own feet and which weaken the bonds of their political allegiance. There is already within the non-Communist part of the movement a small body of active workers who would like to see their unions more independent of party influence. And in the case of the INTUC the ties between the unions and the Congress Party are likely to come in for more rather than less strain. As INTUC unions become better established and able to bear the expense of more leadership and organization and as their trade union activities proliferate and become institutionalized, Party workers and union leaders will increasingly have to make personal choices between the two types of organization. In so doing they will take on separate identities and for both personal and institutional reasons will tend to perceive their respective interests as competing rather than mutual. This process is facilitated by factional cleavages within the Congress organization at state and local levels. Where these splits occur the state or local INTUC organization tends to side with one of the factions or to split into factions itself. Schisms in either the Congress organization or in the INTUC or both have occurred with some prominence in several Indian states. The experience tends to weaken rather than strengthen the ties between unions and Party.

Another factor at work will be the recurring points of friction between the INTUC and Congress governments which are inevitable as the broad responsibilities of government and the narrow interests of unions come into conflict. The national INTUC has so far not had any publicly irreconcilable important difference with the central government or Congress leadership. But many issues have had to be negotiated. A recent example

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16 I have discussed the problems referred to in this paragraph at greater length in "Problems of Indian Trade Unionism and Labour Relations", Reprint No. 77, Institute of Industrial Relations, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, 1955, "The Conceptual and Legislative Framework of Labor Relations in India", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July, 1958, and "Reality and Labour Relations Policy in India", The Economic Weekly, Bombay, February, 1961.

grew out of the general strike of central government employees in 1960. The INTUC did not support the strike. But when, after the strike, government proposed to put a legislative ban on strikes in the public sector and to prohibit outsiders from holding office in government unions, the INTUC joined the other central labor organizations at the 18th Indian Labour Conference in vigorously opposing these moves and government abandoned them. [17] Another issue of long standing is whether to revive the labor appellate tribunals which were formerly part of the system of disputes adjudication. The government and employers favor their revival; the INTUC joins the other union groups in opposition. Decision continues to be postponed. [18]

There are several national labor problem areas in which it is not difficult to foresee the institutional pressures at work within the INTUC as an organization trying to serve the needs of workers clashing with the development and stabilization policy requirements of government. Rationalization or technological change, unemployment, labor legislation and wage policy are a few. The INTUC has already been quite free in its criticism of government for permitting rationalization in the textile industry, for its failure to enforce the Code of Discipline (to promote fair conduct in labor relations) against recalcitrant employers and for its slowness in appointing wage boards and implementing their recommendations in major industries. At state levels also there have been conflicts between government and INTUC unions on these and other issues. Although not as aggressive as the AITUC and HMS, INTUC unions account for a respectable proportion of Indian strike activity. And this on occasion brings INTUC unionists into direct conflict with police or other government authority. A strike by an INTUC union in 1959 at a paper mill in the state of Andhra Pradesh in direct defiance of government orders referring the dispute to a tribunal resulted in violence, the use of lathi charges and tear gas by the police and the arrest of the local union secretary and the president of the state INTUC organization. [19]

In the final analysis, the state of development of unionism and labor relations will be the critical determinant of the relations between trade unions and politics in India. As long as most unions are unable to reach decisions with employers through private bargaining and as long as they must draw their key leaders from the ranks of men who are career politicians, political parties will continue to exert strong influence over unions and the labor movement will be torn by rivalry. Substantial movement out of this stage of relationships will occur only as India builds the more complex social institutions and relations made possible by the deeply penetrating social changes that we call economic and democratic political development.

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17 The Indian Worker, October 3, 1960
18 Hindustan Times, January 7, 1960
19 Hindustan Times, January 6, 1960

EISENHOWER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE

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Political scientists who are interested in the functional roles and interactions of politics and administration in public affairs will find a rich field of study in the Presidential administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. To this writer, at least, Eisenhower's approach to the Presidential office represents a maximization of administration and a minimization of politics. Indeed, so contrasting is the emphasis he placed on the dual elements of politics and administration that in future history his Presidential term might well be styled "The Administrative Presidency."

With remarkable rapidity, Eisenhower, upon taking office, effected a series of far-reaching administrative transformations. He instituted new staff arrangements, heightened the emphasis upon channels and procedure, strengthened the numbers and roles of specialists, and infused both the Presidential staff and the executive branch with a pervading sense of organization in which two common administrative virtues -- coordination and cooperation -- were given a new urgency and respectibility.

While addressing himself with such enterprise to the administrative side of the Presidency, Eisenhower was oppositely disposed toward the political side of the Presidency. There his course was one of withdrawal or of minimum personal involvement. Throughout his tenure, Eisenhower displayed undisguised distaste for the partisan politics of the Presidency. He avoided political controversy; he consciously separated himself from partisan tactics and maneuver. He had as little to do as possible with the senatorial and congressional campaigns of his party and even with the campaign of his would-be successor, Mr. Nixon. Compared with other recent Presidents, Eisenhower did little to revitalize the philosophy of his party and to mobilize public support for a policy program. Eisenhower, in the characteristic appraisal of the professional politicians, was "not politically conditioned." When his Administration did become involved politically, the President relied heavily upon administrative tools and techniques, upon staff and systematic procedures. A reliable clue of Eisenhower's approach is his recruitment practices for the major positions of his Administration. In filling his posts, Eisenhower turned principally to the business community, long beheld in American society as the fountain of sound administrative practice. Professional politicians were only sparsely represented in the upper executive echelons of the Eisenhower Presidency, as was the academic community. Neither the politician nor the academician was considered to be endowed with the requisite skills and administrative experience. Eisenhower's point of view, of course, defies refutation.

The approach which any President takes in conducting his great office depends in no little way upon his view of himself and his environment, upon his values, habits, and tastes. In Eisenhower's case, these general elements all pointed toward the fullest use of an administrative staff.

One of the most striking characteristics of Eisenhower as President is his deep and abiding humility. Arrogance was no part of the man. "I hope," he once remarked at a press conference in a burst of obvious candor, "that I am old enough that I don't think there is anything particularly sacrosanct about my decisions and conclusions."[1] Humble himself, Eisenhower admired humility in others. Once in discussing the challenges of the times and the responses of the President and the people to them, he pointed admiringly to the example set by Abraham Lincoln. "Let us not be afraid to be humble," said Eisenhower of Lincoln, "as he was humble."[2] Eisenhower's type of humility seems to have led to his heavy dependence upon staff, a relationship which entrusted a large initiative and influence to the staff, and substantially limited the President's own participation in policy development. When asked in 1954 about prospects for the furtherance of the controversial Hell's Canyon project, Eisenhower replied, "I doubt that my own opinion on that should be even governing, except as, I suppose, eventually I have to decide between presentations."[3] When driven to mediate between his executive colleagues and the conflicting policy approaches and private group interests which lay behind their clash, Eisenhower preferred an approach that was moderate and unobstrusive. "My job here, as I see it," he once expounded his approach, "is not to create friction, not to accentuate differences, but to bring people together so we can actually achieve progress, not to be particularly dramatic or just to do something to get another headline, but to get progress for the United States of America."[4]

While humble personally, Eisenhower was acutely conscious of the dignity of his office. The latter sentiment also sizeably affected his use of staff. reportedly convinced that the Presidency's dignity had been impaired by his predecessor Harry S. Truman's occasional free-swinging engagement in public controversy, Eisenhower resolutely sought to avoid such entrapments. He brilliantly succeeded even in the face of McCarthy's merciless badgering and the final horrendous encounter with Kruschev in Paris. Consistently Eisenhower refused to denounce publicly his Democratic or Republican critics, or "engage in personalities," as he was wont to put it. "I never comment on the statements of any particular individual, either in a critical and only rarely in any other fashion,"[5] he laid down the formula he invariably held to.

Just as he was forbearing to individuals, Eisenhower was equally forbearing to groups. He never set upon any party or class as Roosevelt excoriated the "economic royalists," Jackson the Bank of the United States, and Truman the Republican Eightieth Congress. Eisenhower, in contrast, publicly counseled his administrative lieutenants and party chieftains like Leonard Hall not to engage in extreme partisanship. As for himself, the President in a national address on the achievements of the Eighty-third Congress declared that the times called "for a new era of fairplay, in which to treat everybody alike, to have no favored classes; and this Administration was pledged to do everything it could for the benefit of 160 million American people, and not for any single group, any single area, or any single geographic section."[6] The President's good will was buttressed by a resolute optimism and spirituality.

Even in Presidential administrations motivated by the best of intentions, the harsh word and the stern admonishment on occasion become necessary. The dispenser of these several varieties of unpleasantness was rarely the President. Ordinarily it was a member of his staff, usually his chief assistant, Sherman Adams. In the Congressional elections of 1954, for example, events reached a point where clearly the electorate had to be warned of the dreadful consequences in store should control of the houses of Congress pass to the Democrats. Eisenhower did not paint the grim picture for the voting public. It fell to Adams to do so. Unless a Republican Congress were elected, admonished Adams, the nation "could be turned back once more to the spending sprees and political orgies to which the American people called a halt in 1952." Adams was also called upon from time to time to administer the stern rebuke to his own party. Adams, and doubtless the White House as well, fed up with some heavy feuding that had been transpiring in Republican ranks, turned to the subject in the course of a little speech to a regional conferance of the party's leaders at Trenton, New Jersey, on May 24, 1957. "It's time," declared Adams, "we looked hard at our growing propensity to find motes in our colleague's eyes, to harp about our primly adjusted party halves, to pass judgments, and to bandy about epithets, as though we ourselves were our own worst enemies -- political or otherwise. It is time that we, as a Party, mind an old adage -- 'What Peter says about Paul tells more about Peter than it tells about Paul.'"

Another Eisenhower trait that profoundly influenced his approach to the institution of the Presidency was his love of system. He distrusted improvisation, believed in thorough staff work, and the orderly play of many minds upon every significant issue before it was resolved. His own role was one of seeing to it that every staff specialist had an effective opportunity to make his contribution and that in every decision every relevant staff specialist was consulted. In his own deportment, Eisenhower scrupulously maintained the integrity of his staff system. He stressed procedure and protocol, and elicited from his associates their trust and confidence. By every indication a straight-shooter, he engaged in none of the expedients for which F. D. Roosevelt became noted -- over-lapping and secret assignments, unclear authority, and other such artifices which periodically disrupted the procedures and channels of orderly administration.

Finally, it is clear that Eisenhower assumed the Presidency with the conviction that the great office was in a bad way administratively and he was behoved to do something about it at once. He was appalled that the cabinet should meet without a pre-arranged agenda and any record of its conclusions. He was vexed by the seemingly endless administrative trivia of the Presidency which forestalled his concentration on more serious things. "When he wanted to think about the Middle East," writes Sherman Adams of his chief, "he found that he had to listen to the merits of a bill concerning compensation for a woman who had been hit by an automobile on an Army post while crossing the street on her way to a laundromat."[7] Eisenhower was interested not only in the administrative refurbishment of his own Presidency, but of future Presidencies as well. His proposal for the new post of First Secretary, for example, was advanced several times by the President and with the greatest force near the close of his second term of office.

In setting up his Presidency as truly an Administrative Presidency, Eisenhower appears to have followed certain definite operating principles. He considered his several staffs -- the White House organization, the Executive Office, the Department Heads and junior department heads as a "team," or indeed a series of interacting teams over which he presided. As befits a team, the President expected cooperation from the member players and above all the avoidance of intra-mural conflicts which boiled over into the press, such as occurred in the Administrations of his two immediate predecessors. That Eisenhower was extremely successful in maintaining this aspect of team discipline seems clear by all objective evidence. "Minority views," Sherman Adams has written, "were well and carefully buried."[8]

Yet it should not be supposed that Eisenhower was surrounded by yes-men. Far from it; he had an acute abhorrence of the breed. "If I thought for one moment," Eisenhower said of one of his cabinet secretaries," that he was just a 'yes man' taking my suggestions and carrying them out, he wouldn't be there. I have never had that kind of a subordinate and I never expect to have one. His own judgment and his own dedication to his job is what I depend on, his own brain and intellectual capacity."[9]

Eisenhower demanded from his staff a goodly measure of initiative and self-reliance. The President's expectations were conveyed not only in the internal workings of his administration but in his public pronouncements as well. In his first state of the Union Message he declared that "the Secretary of Defense must take the initiative and assume the responsibility for developing plans to give our Nation maximum safety at minimum cost."[10] If questions arose as to the Administration's position on some important aspect of public policy, the President characteristically would turn to his executive associates for a definition of the current status of the matter. When asked during the legislative session of 1954 whether he supported the emergency school construction bill introduced by Senator John Sherman Cooper and Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen, the President replied, "I'd suggest you go to Secretary Hobby to find out where we stand."[11]

Eisenhower's expectations of initiative and self-reliance imposed upon his executive associates a continuing responsibility for the discovery of problems and the formulation of solutions. If somehow a problem was overlooked, the fault, according to official attitude, lay not with the President, but with the department head or the member of the White House staff most concerned. When, for example, a reporter observed one day at a White House press conference that the President had been appointing a number of ambassadors to the major capitals of the world who were ignorant of the local language, Eisenhower made a ready response to this disturbing and undeniable fact. "Why didn't somebody tell me about this?" he asked with a self-exculpating air.

The department head or White House staff member who most pleased Eisenhower was one who took pains to bring the thinking and planning that had gone into a problem to the point where a definite decision could be made. Anything short of that point of finality was apt to exasperate the President. "Nothing gets him out of sorts faster," Robert Donavan has written of Eisenhower as President, "than for a subordinate to come in and

start to hem and haw about a decision. He wants the decision and not the thinking out loud."[12] One department secretary who seems to have steadily transgressed the President's standards was Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson. Wilson seems to have leaned upon Eisenhower with his intimate knowledge of the defense establishment a little more than the President wanted anyone in his cabinet to lean upon him. Wilson, according to Sherman Adams, wanted "an hour a week alone with Eisenhower to discuss routine problems, many of which the President thought Wilson should solve by himself. Wilson's reliance upon Eisenhower was entirely natural but resulted in the President getting somewhat impatient with having to listen to departmental difficulties that he thought had not been sufficiently shaken down. Eisenhower wanted policies sharpened up with enough study and discussion so that he did not have to go through the preliminaries himself. Wilson complained later that he did not see the President often enough to obtain necessary guidance but the President did not have any such concern."[13]

Eisenhower's reposal of vast measures of policy discretion in his subordinates' hands was accompanied by the President's steadfast application of a corollary principle of administration. In giving his subordinates freedom to act, Eisenhower was painstaking in backing them up in what they did. His steadfastness was tested in many an ordeal. Probably his severest and most prolonged grial of all is represented by the instance of Secretary of Agriculture Benson. Throughout the Eisenhower years there were insistent cries from farm groups and legislators for the Secretary's scalp. Eisenhower unfalteringly rushed to the rescue. When confronted with an imposing demand that Benson resign, the President responded in a press conference, "I have seen no one more dedicated to America than is Mr. Benson. I have seen no man who is more anxious to get the welfare of every American -- the consumer in the city, the user of grain, the producer of grain, the user of beef, the producer of beef -- to get all of them in a fair position with respect to each other, than is Secretary Benson. Now, because he can't produce a miraculous, one-line cure for all the evils, I, for one, am not going to be critical because I have studied it myself."[14] Again, in 1958, when cries for Benson's resignation were resounding through the farmlands, Eisenhower rallied around the Secretary. "Now I think this," declared the President, "when we find a man of this dedication, this kind of courage, this kind of intellectual and personal honesty, we should say to ourselves, 'We just don'g believe that America has come to the point where it wants to dispense with the services of that kind of person.'"[15]

More than any other President in history, Eisenhower invested his personal initiative and enterprise in building up the staff resources of the Presidency and systematizing its administrative operations. He converted the cabinet from a casual organization into a systematic operating body. He subjected the rather random flow of the Presidency's paperwork to the orderly processes of a staff secretary. He created the Operations Coordinating Branch to oversee the crucial area of implementation in the national security field. He created new positions of policy specialists in the White House staff. The Council of Economic Advisers was revitalized and the cabinet and the National Security Council were consulted more by Eisenhower than by any of his predecessors in office.

Probably the most far-reaching of Eisenhower's staff creations was his sweeping redefinition of the authority and functions of the post of "The Assistant to the President" created in the previous Truman Administration. Sherman Adams as the first and longest-serving incumbent of the post in the Eisenhower Administration ranged so far and wide that he might well have been styled "The General Manager of the Presidency." Adams in actuality did what Eisenhower did not want to do. He was a converse image of the President's tastes and preferences, and since these were many and fixed, they gave Adams's job its latitude. Eisenhower abhorred the harsher phases of executive life -- saying "no" to insistent pressure, the back-breaking detail, and the strain and strife of policy initiative. These he gladly and freely delegated to an assistant such as Adams.

In distributing his energies over the far reaches of Presidential business Eisenhower concentrated his personal efforts on national security and foreign affairs, in which his previous career had made him thoroughly grounded. He was much less involved in domestic affairs where he was much less at home. His distaste for partisan politica also moved him to pretty much vacate that domain. Adams, accordingly, in his typical employment centered upon domestic affairs and politics and was infrequently involved in the technical phases of diplomacy and national security.

As general manager of those major parts of the Presidency that were in his charge, Adams played a number of subroles. He seems to have been tantamount to a chief of staff, a label which Adams in his memoirs rejects, and one that was not overly welcome in the Administration because of its militaristic connotation. Be that as it may, Adams took orders only from the President, and except in the singular case of John Foster Dulles, cabinet secretaries ordinarily conveyed their policy proposals to the President through Adams. Eisenhower preferred that policy proposals be submitted for Presidential decision in writing after study and formulation by the expert staffs of the departments. Adams's task was to see to it that every expert in the Executive Branch who could contribute to a proposal had his opportunity to do so. The recommendations of the experts were expected shaped up into definite conclusions which higher authority could accept or reject. When a proposal was ready for the President's action, the papers on which it was based were topped with a one-page synopsis prepared by Adams. "If a proposition can't be stated in one page," Eisenhower was known to declare, "it isn't worth saying." In times when governmental phenomena have multiplied in complexity, it is not surprising that Adams sometimes found his one-page summaries "next to impossible to do."[16]

Many final decisions seem to have been made not by the President, but by Adams. Eisenhower was brought in only if the matter was important or if the executive experts disagreed. Eisenhower admired Adams's courage in making decisions and his capacity for judicious balance. "Ike likes his ability to follow a middle course," a White House staff member once said. "The President knows Sherm will never swing too far to the right or too far to the left."

With zest and skill, Adams performed several other duties deriving from his capacity as General Manager of the Presidency. He was a mighty force in settling issues and disputes which arose between departments. "I always tried to resolve specific differences on a variety of problems before the issue had

to be submitted to the President," Adams himself has written. "Sometimes several meetings were necessary before an agreement was reached. But with a few excceptions I was successful." 17

Adams controlled the main lines of communication to the President. By dint of a close working accommodation with the appointments secretary, he was able to keep tabs on who saw the President, the proposed subject matter of the pending conference, and in many cases was able to steer the appointment into his own office and thus spare the President. Likewise, much of the reading matter destined for Eisenhower's attention was examined and screened by Adams. Frederick B. Lee, who in 1955 was dismissed as Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, is one of those who complained that in reality Adams was a censor whose restrictions at times went too far. Some time before his dismissal Mr. Lee wrote to the President asking for a hearing to clear up any misunderstanding which might unfortunately exist. After a few days a letter arrived from the President. To Lee's utter consternation, the Presidential letter simply accepted his resignation. Mr. Lee's anguish was compounded when he detected from the wording of the letter that the President had known nothing of any request for a hearing. The President by every indication had never even seen his letter.

Mr. Lee was not alone in his concern over Adams's roadblocks on the byways to the President. On occasion in the years of the Eisenhower Administration, reports appeared in the press of some high official or legislator being denied access to the President due to the intercession of Sherman Adams. One of the more widely circulated of these reports related how Senator John Sherman Cooper called at the White House to lay before the President his several objections to the Dixon-Yates contract then under consideration. Adams reportedly refused to grant the Senator an appointment with the President. In light of future events, a meeting of Cooper and the President might have spared the Administration much political grief. As for Adams, his recently published memoirs contain a strong, if somewhat qualified, denial of occurrences like the one which allegedly befell Senator Cooper. "Any allegations," writs Adams, "that I or any other member of the White House staff used presumptuous or arbitrary tactics to keep high-ranking executives or legislators from seeing Eisenhower are completely false. As often as I took the initiative in getting problems settled in the lower echelons, I was occupied in arranging meetings and conferences between the President and Cabinet people, and often with legislators, on plans and programs that needed topside judgment. Whenever members of Congress requested appointments, Persons and I arranged them unless we knew of good reasons not to do so."18

Eisenhower's innovation of vesting vast power and responsibility in a subordinate did not end with Sherman Adams. While Adams toiled in domestic affairs, his eminent counterpart, John Foster Dulles, was operating with such imposing authority in foreign affairs as to come closer than any executive subordinate in history to reserving the title of Assistant President for that field.

Characteristically, Eisenhower made foreign policy in only broadest outline and within the resulting roomy dimensions, Dulles developed specific policy, including, as Adams has put it, "the decision where the administration

would stand and what course of action would be followed in each international crisis."[19] Toward Dulles, Eisenhower was well nigh reverential. "I know of no man," said Eisenhower in assessing his Secretary's contribution to world affairs, "in my knowledge - in the world that has equalled his wisdom and his knowledge in this whole complicated business."

Although the Presidential staff included various expediters and coordinators in special aspects of foreign affairs -- for disarmament, atomic energy, cold war psychological strategy, and the like -- Dulles jealously and successfully guarded the straight-line of command between himself and the President.

By all accounts Dulles had the freest access to the President. During interludes when he was in Washington, the Secretary would see the President almost every other day and in addition talk with him on the telephone once or twice a day.[20] Dulles's habit was always to consult the President before taking a significant decision or step. Eisenhower himself acknowledged the breadth and care of these consultations when he remarked in a press conference, "So far as I know, Secretary Dulles has never made an important pronouncement without not only conferring and clearing with me, but sitting down and studying practically word by word what he is to say."[21]

There is no doubt that Dulles as well as anyone in the Administration filled the President's presumptions for ideal staff behavior. Typically, Dulles did not confront Eisenhower with problems without accompanying them with well formulated solutions. But Dulles did not allow his opinions to crystallize until apprising himself of the President's views. Thus he looked to Eisenhower for counsel and guidance and not for mere ratification of what he had done or planned to do.[22] "Although Eisenhower depended on Dulles to make the invariably decisive recommendation on what should be done in a critical situation," writes Sherman Adams, "I noticed that Dulles, in turn, placed great reliance upon Eisenhower to sense what the effect of doing it would be."[23] Often the President would come up with detailed suggestions or plans and, when necessary, backed up Dulles by writing personal letters, making public statements, and seeing visitors. Eisenhower's unrivaled contacts with leaders around the world were constantly available for Dulles's advantage.

In several senses, Eisenhower and Dulles complemented each other. Eisenhower, characteristically, took an optimistic approach to foreign affairs. The hopeful and conciliatory statement or policy usually issued from him; the crusade for peace was his constant concern. But just as Sherman Adams dealt out the harsh negative in domestic affairs, Dulles administered the rough hand, when necessary, in the foreign sector. By nature more pessimistic than Eisenhower, the Secretary came to it naturally. The several shattering pronouncements on massive retaliation and brinkmanship are thus identified with Dulles. The hard and uncompromising line taken by the United States toward the Soviet Union and Red China between 1953 and early 1959 has been authoritatively described as "more a Dulles line than an Eisenhower one."[24] Eisenhower, on the other hand, is more vividly identified with such peace-directed ventures as disarmament, the atoms-for-peace program, and the termination of the Anglo-French armed intervention in Egypt. Indeed the contrasting moods and approaches of Eisenhower and Dulles to foreign affairs seem to have been especially noticeable in the interludes of the President's several

illnesses. An impression widely developed that the United States talked in tougher terms when Eisenhower was in the hospital, and more softly when he was back on the job

Eisenhower's concept of the Administrative Presidency was by no means limited in its application to the internal workings of the executive branch. It was fully directed to such vital external sectors as party and legislative affairs. The essential formula was that the President held to a minimum his own and his Administration's movement in partisan politics. Instead the Eisenhower Presidency stressed a non-partisan or at times bipartisan approach to the questions of the day. In addition, the staff apparatus of the executive branch took on a growing role in party and legislative affairs and the processes of administrative systematization that had applied so comprehensively within the executive branch were markedly extended to the external sectors as well.

By taste and habit, Eisenhower was not a party man. As Harry Truman, Sherman Adams, Henry Cabot Lodge and others will attest there was acute confusion in the several years prior to the Republican Presidential nomination of 1952 as to whether Eisenhower was a Republican or a Democrat.

After assuming the Presidential office, Eisenhower repeatedly took a non-political stance. On October 17, 1953, while reminiscing about his nomination for the Presidency in the course of some remarks before a gathering of Republican workers, the President said, "Everybody knew I wasn't a politician -- and I'm not yet." But Eisenhower's choice of a non-political emphasis was more than a matter of personal preferance. He viewed the Presidency in the setting of his time as requiring such an approach. His address to the Annual Convention of the National Young Republican Organization on June 11, 1953 contains an extended statement of his beliefs. "Most Americans would agree with me," declared Eisenhower, "that it is not appropriate for the President of the United States to indulge incessantly in partisan political activities -- every day on every possible occasion. Many of the most critical problems before our country are in no sense partisan issues. They involve all Americans; and in meeting them the President must strive to serve all our citizens. For these problems threaten freedom itself. They summon and demand unadulterated patriotism.... We Republicans, in short, though identified as a partisan political party, can know and serve our own interests only as we know and serve those of all our people -- of all parties and races and creeds. Hence, as we join in a partisan meeting with great satisfaction, we gather in a spirit not so much partisan as American."[25]

Eisenhower removed himself not merely from certain phases of partisan politics, but as much as possible from all phases. He permitted no professional politician entree to his inner circle of policy advisers. Nor was that type represented among his personal friends. If anything Eisenhower's attitude toward politicians was one of distrust. His penchant for direct and straightforward dealings was constantly offended by their seemingly devious tactics.

Eisenhower had as little to do as possible with electoral campaigning particularly in senatorial and congressional instances. He had no taste for

the routine and the cliches of political oratory. "By golly, sometimes you sure get tired of all this clackety-clack," he remarked to press secretary Hagerty on one election eve.[26] As for the opposition's oratory, Eisenhower had little tolerance for it. "Because Eisenhower was never trained as a politician," observes Sherman Adams, "and had no personal experience with the give-and-take that the professional politicians regard as part of their occupation, he did not so easily shrug off campaign oratory after the election was over."[27] Eisenhower's attitude, needless to say, was well fortified by Harry Truman's extravagances in the 1952 campaign.

When he did take to campaigning, Eisenhower's favorite and most used approach was non-partisan in character. In a television address to the nation on his Administration's purposes and accomplishments, surely an occasion for pulling out all the partisan stops, Eisenhower commenced his peroration with this sentence: "And I hope that this program, because of its purpose of promoting the welfare of all our people, will enlist the support of all of you, regardless of party."[28] Again, when the chairman of the National Citizens-for-Eisenhower Congressional Committee attended a meeting of the cabinet to tell of the plans of his organization for the impending legislative elections, Eisenhower's contribution to the discussion is remembered as one cautioning against an overly partisan approach.[29] Eisenhower once explained to the press the reasons behind his penchant for dealing gently with the opposition party. "I don't believe in bitter partisanship," he said. "I never believe that all wisdom is confined to one of the great parties; and I certainly have neber, in general terms, criticized the other party, that is, to include its great membership. I believe there are good Americans in both parties, and I believe that the great mass of both parties is fundamentally and naturally sound."[30]

Notwithstanding Eisenhower's generous attitude of faith, hope, and charity for the Democrats, occasions arose when in the eyes of professional Republican strategists the harsh word and the savage blow had to be meted out to the opposition. The conveyor of the rough stuff, needless to say, was not Eisenhower. This particular function was gladly and freely delegated to the executive staff or to Vice President Nixon. Sherman Adams, for one, was sometimes pressed into service. Two speeches, one by Eisenhower and the other by Adams on the evening of January 20, 1957, illustrate the system at its peak. The first Russian Sputnik had been launched and in the wake of this crashing event an earnest reappraisal of United States defense policies was ensuing, spiced with occasional dashes of partisan maneuver. The discussion soon became so important that both Eisenhower and Adams emerged from the White House to make speeches dealing with the situation. In Chicago, the President took his accustomed highroad, appealing to everybody, in language of lofty principle, to keep politics out of the defense discussion. Several hundred miles away in Minneapolis, even as the President was speaking, Adams was launching a bold partisan counteroffensive by clawing the Democrats in a speech of sardonic aggression. The burden of his message was that if the country had its troubles the blame lay with the Democrats. Adams proceeded to pin upon that party such disasters as Pearl Harbor, "the tragic loss of China," and "the scientific catastrophe of losing our atomic secrets."

Eisenhower's disinterestedness in party affairs was by no means limited to external or public phases. In his encounters with the internal workings of his party, his approach, it is clear, was not particularly political. His

views on the relationships of the President as party leader and the national committee chairman were decidedly unorthodox as Presidents go. Eisenhower astonished his supporters at the Chicago convention in 1952 when, after securing the nomination, he refused to have anything to say about the selection of a national chairman.[31] Later, during his Presidency, the same general subject was raised in a press conference by a reporter who asked, "How far do the President's responsibilities as head of the party cover activities of the Republican National Committee?" "Well, by organization they don't control it all," Eisenhower replied. "What the President's responsibility as head of the party requires is that he devise a program that is in general conformity with the platform of his party, and that he do his best to get it enacted into law."[32]

Patronage was a matter which time and again sorely beset Eisenhower's temper. He felt, as he said on more than one occasion, that the President of the United States has more important obligations to attend to. At a cabinet meeting in his first year of office he made clear his aversion to having patronage problems brought to him time after time by individuals in the Republican party. At another cabinet meeting on October 9, 1953, Eisenhower reported the upshot of lengthy discussions he had been having with the national chairman, Leonard Hall, namely that not enough Republicans had been given jobs in the Administration to silence demands at the grass roots. Hereupon, according to Robert Donovan's account, Eisenhower heatedly gave the cabinet to understand that he was sick and tired of being bothered about patronage. He had always tried to do what he could about it, he said, but the situation never seemed to improve.[33]

The several duties of party management from which Eisenhower disengaged himself fell upon his administrative staff, particularly upon Sherman Adams. Adams brought a respectable background to the awaiting political tasks. He was one of the Administration's few members endowed with political experience, and its only figure who had left high public office, a governorship, to come to Washington. Eisenhower seems to have regarded Adams as something of a political genius and upon the latter's shoulders there quickly fell large responsibilities for devising political strategy and overseeing the grinding details of party affairs and political management.

Adams became the center of political maneuver in the Administration and was in the thick of its roughest legislative and party fights. As the attacks of Senator McCarthy upon the Administration mounted in 1953, for example, Adams, according to sworn testimony, first suggested that in retaliation the Army draw up a record of its dispute with the Senator, and the resulting compilation provided the basis of the later explosive Army-McCarthy hearings. Adams, in reality, was master of patronage. He supervised the elaborate checking involved and the preparation of recommendations to the President. Altogether, patronage was the assistant's most voluminous duty. Both Leonard Hall and Meade Alcorn, the successive national party chairman during Adams's tenure in the Eisenhower Administration, dealt more with Adams than with Eisenhower. Adams was almost equally occupied with the Chairmen of the Republican congressional and senatorial campaign committees in the elections of 1954 and 1956. Sometimes Adams sought to tinker constructively with touchy local situations, including trouble even of the dimensions of the California gubernatorial impasse in 1957. Senator William F. Knowland, whose term was expiring, coveted the impending gubernatorial nomination, as

did the incumbent Republican Governor, Goodwin J. Knight, who proposed to succeed himself. Adams headed west to manage the situation and by all accounts contributed most effectively to the resolution of the impasse and the avoidance of a public explosion.

Eisenhower's approach to legislative relations is largely presaged by his approach to party affairs. Partisan politics is generally deemphasized; the instrumentalities and techniques of the Administrative Presidency are systematically addressed to the realm of Congressional business.

Apart from his personal preferences, various other factors propelled Eisenhower into his oft-assumed politically moderate position. He was endowed with a genuine respect for Congress and a traditionalist's conception of the separation of powers. In private conversation he was given to referring to himself as a "Constitutional President."[34] "Our very form of Government is in peril," he declared to a convention of Young Republicans, "unless each branch willingly accepts and discharges its own clear responsibilities -- and respects the rights and responsibilities of the others."[35]

Given Eisenhower's predilictions and philosophy, it is not surprising that the long and acrid strife which characterized F. D. Roosevelt's and Truman's associations with Congress is wholly absent from the General's Administration. Not that Eisenhower did not have ample provocation. For, although he was deferential toward Congress, he elicited no equivalent reciprocity toward his own office. Indeed, sources in Congress, from his own party in fact, launched formidable assaults upon the integrity of presidential power as witness the McCarthy rampage and the Bricker amendment. Eisenhower's characteristic response in the face of the greatest adversity was deference and moderation. As for McCarthy, it was wrong, the President told his cabinet, for him to challenge a single individual. McCarthy's activities, he felt, were the responsibility of the constituted leadership of Congress. "I do not indulge in personal vituperation or quarrels of any kind," the President told his news conference on December 8, 1954.

In periods of general legislative rejection of major portions of his program, as in the winter and summer of 1954, Eisenhower's course was not one of countervailing political assertion, but of privately expressed annoyance. When some Congressmen of his party went on to attack his executive associates, he suffered great shock. "It was almost incomprehensible to him," writes Robert Donovan, "that any Republican could doubt the sincerity of his own motives and the motives of his assistants."[36]

The general approach of the Eisenhower Administration throughout its two terms was bipartisan in both domestic and foreign policy. Steadily, Eisenhower depended upon Democratic support, even when the Republicans controlled Congress. This general condition buttressed Eisenhower's tendency toward a non-partisan approach. The results spurred him on, for Democratic support was generally and steadily forthcoming. Sam Rayburn at the end of the first session of the 84th Congress gratefully described it as "one of the most fruitful sessions of Congress that I have ever served in.... The Democrats in this Congress," he went on to say, "have voted as if a Democrat had been in the White House."[37]

In his approach to Congress, Eisenhower depended heavily upon the administrative techniques of personalization and public relations, and extended the undertakings of his elaborate staff system deep into the legislative arena. His own contribution and his staff's were systematically integrated.

The Eisenhower personality, at its best in meeting and conference, was busily employed. The President met weekly with the Republican leaders from both houses of Congress. When the Democrats assumed control of Congress, Eisenhower was likewise assiduous in consulting their leadership. Eisenhower's scrupulous attention to the Democrats is suggested by Sherman Adams's remark that "the President avoided even discussing the really momentous decisions with the Republicans in Congress until he and Dulles had laid out their course of action at a meeting of the leaders of both parties."[38]

Eisenhower's other major personal tactic was one of holding a lengthy series of luncheons at the White House, to which all members of the House and Senate were invited. "These meetings," the President remarked at a press conference, "reflected a major purpose of this Administration. It is this: to do all that it reasonably can do to encourage cooperation and harmony between the legislative and executive branches."[39] The President's Sunday luncheon companions differed markedly in their evaluation of the occasions. The President's hospitality, in the opinion of Democratic Congressman Michael J. Kirwan of Ohio, fostered "a feeling of friendliness which will do more to bring about cooperation of members of Congress than all the testimonies presented to Congressional committees." Senator Wayne Morse was more restrained. While acknowledging that he had "a delightful time" at the White House, he said that he still intended to oppose the President when he thought the President was "wrong."

Eisenhower's personal application was intended to advance in Congress the programs and policies hammered out by the staff organizations of the executive branch. The entire process was closely overseen by Sherman Adams during his incumbency as the Assistant to the President. The several "January" messages of the President -- State of the Union, Budget, and Economic Report -- were carefully coordinated for consistency. Adams was in the thick of preparations of the State of the Union Message, which incorporated the departments' proposals and plans in general terms, and was followed by special messages of fuller detail and drafts of legislation. Each fall, Adams staged intensive meetings with department officials who outlined in broad strokes their major projects for the coming legislative session. By all reports, Adams exercised sharp scrutiny over the business before him, ruthlessly ripping out the impractical and clarifying the fuzzily conceived. After the pruifying ordeal with Adams, the departments refurbished their programs and trotted them out for discussion in special sessions of the cabinet, followed by similar sessions with the legislative leaders. Adams was also a court of appeal to which the departments might resort against the Bureau of the Budget. The task of overseeing the progress of Administration-supported legislation in Congress fell to the talented General Wilton B. Persons and his seven assistants and, to a lesser degree, Adams. What distinguishes the Eisenhower Administration in all of this from previous Presidencies is the systematic integration of the vast effort of the executive branch, extending from the President's own exertions to the preparations of the individual departments.

Any established administrative system undergoes its severest tests in periods of innovation and change. The modern administrative history of the Federal Government, particularly in the two World Wars and the economic and social transformations of the New Deal, provides ample illustration both of breakdown and of drastic structural revision occasioned by the inadequacies of the existing administrative organization in seasons of stress.

To be sure, the Eisenhower era was one of revolutionary change, at least in the world environment. This encompassed an awesome scientific revolution of missiles, Sputniks and thrusts to the moon; the exposure of the American mainland for the first time to the dread possibility of devostating attack; the shrinkage of the military and productive superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union; and the consequent urgency of a creative reexamination of policies in military, education, health, civil rights, anti-recession, and other fields. Paradoxically, although the world was changing, Eisenhower's administrative system changed little, once it was established, during his two terms of office.

A powerful reason why the administrative system did not change materially derives from Eisenhower's personal political philosophy, and his allied operating concepts of public policy. Eisenhower, in a word, possessed a political philosophy which is best described as traditionalist in character and he steadily maintained that philosophy no matter how drastically the world around him changed. Because Eisenhower so raacted to change, he cushioned and spared his administrative system from severe adjustments and accommodations which otherwise would befall it.

It is possible to note here only most sketchily several representative parts of Eisenhower's political traditionalism which protected so well the stability of his administrative system.

He was indefatigably devoted to balancing the budget, one of the most effective devices yet invented for limiting demands upon the administrative system. "He once told the Cabinet," Sherman Adams has written of Eisenhower, "that if he was able to do nothing as President except balance the budget he would feel that his time in the White House had been well spent.... He was always fearful that excessive military spending might weaken the nation internally and continually warned the Defense Department against pushing the country into a financial crisis."[40]

The President was devoted to a revitalization of the traditional federal system, with a shift of governmental functions that would reduce the national government's activities and increase those of the state and local governments. "I suppose if you were going to class me as anything else," the President once said to a news conference, "you would class me as a States' Righter."[41] The President's basic views are contained in his budget message of January 21, 1954. "This budget," he said, "marks the beginning of a movement to shift to state and local governments and to provate enterprise Federal activities which can be more appropriately and more efficiently carried on in that way.... In those cases where Federal participation is necessary, the effort of this administration is to develop partnership rather than an exclusive and often paternalistic position for the Federal Government." Housing, education, civil defense, natural resources, and agriculture were among the policy fields affected by these principles.

In many economic and social fields, the President deemed private enterprise and private action to be superior to governmental action, especially that of the national government. This view clearly qualified his approach to the subject of civil rights. In a speech before the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association on March 14, 1953, he declared, "I have found, in the past few years, that I have certain philosophical bonds with doctors. I don't like the word 'compulsory.' I am against the word 'socialized.' Everything about such words seems to me to be a step toward the thing that we are spending so many billions to prevent...."[42]

The Eisenhower Administration sought to reduce its involvement with several major private interest groups which in recent decades have been a powerful force in the expansion of the national government's activities. In his first State of the Union Message, after advocating economic stability and full parity of income for farmers, for example, the President admonished that these goals must be sought "in ways that minimize governmental interference in the farmers' affairs ... and that encourage the farmers themselves to use initiative in meeting changing economic conditions."

To make evaluations and to pass judgments on Eisenhower's Administrative Presidency is most difficult at this time so soon after the event. Nothing less is required than the most sweeping and painstaking determinations of history itself as to the adequacy of American policies in his eight years of office. The full consequences of the Eisenhower years are yet to be learned.

In its legislative program, the accomplishments of the Administration are impressive, at least to this writer, in light of the continuous decline of his own party's membership in the House and Senate, and his long confrontation with a Democratic-controlled Congress. On the side of party affairs, a favorable judgment seems more difficult. The President, it is clear, failed to convert his enormous popularity into an effective political movement. He remained essentially a personal political force, and Modern Republicanism, a label he applied to signify his purpose to bring his party into a more progressive appearance, remained at best vague in content. Eisenhower himself appears to have been dissatisfied with his own party situation in light of the thinking he is reported to have done toward the formation of a new party which would more nearly incorporate his philosophy.[43]

As administrative technique, the Eisenhower Presidency has evoked criticism on several grounds. It is seen as magnifying the role of the Organization Man in the conduct of the Presidency. The President becomes relatively less involved in the conduct of his great office, since his comfort and ease are better served the more he utilizes the Organization Men who surround him. As for the Organization Men themselves, the structures they occupy, and the processes they engage in, criticism applies here too. They are seen as bringing about a condition of things in which initiative is discouraged, conformity rewarded, and individual responsibility lost in the faceless group. The Organization Man is regarded as the enemy of creativity, variation, and flexibility, prime virtues in critical times. In their peroration, critics of the Eisenhower system point approvingly to the informal and flexible staff system of Franklin D. Roosevelt and now to that of John F. Kennedy.

It may well be that the Eisenhower system ought to be studied in a more positive sense than it has been up to now. It may prove to have had certain virtues as administrative technique, especially in the fields of foreign affairs and national security. Certainly in those areas the qualities of caution, judgment, and safety are important. Are we more apt to obtain these qualities in the system of administrative checks and balances entailed by the Eisenhower system than in the more informal systems" No less an authority than Lenin contended that a precious extra effectiveness is achieved in foreign policy if its political, economic, military, psychological, and other ingredients are effectively balanced and integrated. Are these qualities better achieved by the Eisenhower system or by the more informal systems of Roosevelt and Kennedy? In thinking of the American Presidency in the longer future, it may be further asked, would it be possible and desirable to arrange combinations of the best elements of these contrasting systems?

FOOTNOTES

1. News Conference, November 10, 1954. Transcripts of the President's news conferences and the texts of his speeches appear in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower. These have been published for the years 1953-1960 by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

2. Public Papers, op. cit., 1954, p. 242. Remarks at Lincoln Day Box Supper.

3. News Conference, May 7, 1953.

4. News Conference, July 22, 1953.

5. Public Papers, op. cit., 1959, p. 25. Remarks and Discussion at the National Press Club.

6. Ibid., 1954, p. 746.

7. Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York, 1961), p. 4.

8. Ibid., p. 5.

9. News Conference, March 11, 1959.

10. Public Papers, op. cit., p. 18.

11. News Conference, August 4, 1954.

12. Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York, 1956), p. 198.

13. Adams, op. cit., pp. 402-403.

14. News Conference, October 21, 1953.

15. Adams, op. cit., p. 211.

16. Ibid., p. 72.

17. Ibid., p. 51.

18. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

19. Ibid., p. 87.

20. Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the President (New York, 1956), p. 50.

21. News Conference, April 7, 1954.

22. Pusey, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

23. Adams, op. cit., p. 102.

24. Ibid., p. 87.

25. Public Papers, op. cit., 1953, p. 399.

26. Adams, op. cit., p. 166.

27. Ibid., p. 47.

28. Public Papers, op. cit., 1954, p. 3.

29. Donovan, op. cit., p. 272.

30. News Conference, February 10, 1954.

31. Adams, op. cit., p. 34.

32. News Conference, February 10, 1954.

33. Donovan, op. cit., pp. 96-100.

34. Ibid., p. 83.

35. Public Papers, op. cit., 1953, p. 407.

36. Donovan, op. cit., p. 143.

37. Congressional Record, vol. 101, (August 2, 1955), p. 13147.

38. Adams, op. cit., p. 9.

39. News Conference, May 7, 1953.

40. Adams, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

41. News Conference, January 13, 1954.

42. Public Papers, op. cit., 1953, p. 98.

43. Adams, op. cit., p. 28. Donovan, op. cit., p. 142.